Subject: Bilateral Relations

Context

The latest in the series of aggressive Chinese actions is the use of lawfare through the passing of the “Land Boundary Law” on October 21 which became effective this week.

Background of the Chinese approach

• The last residue of the Qing dynasty was wiped out in the 1911 revolution when China was established as a republic.
• The republic was again overthrown in 1949 by the Chinese Communist Party.
• Three successive Chinese governments in China refused to delineate or demarcate the boundary with either Tibet or India.
• British archival records, many declassified points to attempts made by Imperial Britain to formally formulate a boundary with China.
• Yet, all three regimes were united in their refusal to accept a formal limiting of China’s territorial expanse and kept their response ambiguous.
• Even during the Simla Convention of 1913-14, when the Republic was ascendant in China, there was a vehement refusal to recognise any demarcation of boundaries between Tibet and China.

Strong-arm tactics against India

• Having operated from a maximalist position to settle its borders with 12 of its 14 neighbours so far, China has attempted to use the same strong-arm tactics with both India and Bhutan.
• It has offered to forgo its claims in the larger parts of North Bhutan in lieu of gaining a relatively smaller area in West Bhutan.
• Threat to Siliguri corridor: This seeming magnanimity is calculated to expand into the Chumbi Valley in the South, threatening the narrow and strategic Siliguri corridor in India.
• In its latest move, China has made a new claim on Sakteng sanctuary in Bhutan which may form a launchpad for future operations against Tawang in Arunachal Pradesh.
• China has also strengthened its collusion with Pakistan.
• There is a deliberate attempt by China to physically link with Pakistan in the Northern Areas by removing the Indian wedge of DBO, the doorway to the Karakoram Pass.
• A Training Mobilisation Order (TMO) issued by Xi Jinping in January 2020 called for “confrontational training” for its troops and officers to assess their preparedness, especially in light of the new reforms undertaken by the PLA.
• These factors seem to be the tactical beginnings of China’s grand strategy which also saw China flexing in the South China Sea and Taiwan, almost simultaneously.

China making use of lawfare and implications for India

• The latest in the series of aggressive Chinese actions is the use of lawfare through the passing of the “Land Boundary Law”.
• Formalises and legalises land Chinese grab: The law formalises and legalises China’s geographic creep towards Tawang, Arunachal Pradesh and parts of eastern Ladakh and creates conditions for using newly-constructed border villages close to the LAC for claiming sovereignty over disputed areas.
• The import of the law is most critical for India but will affect China’s disputes with other countries too.
• What China has done, therefore, is convert a territory dispute over borders into a sovereignty dispute which precludes any give or take of territory.
• China will attempt to settle its Han population in the Tibetan regions, reversing established demographic patterns and at the same time.
•  Future negotiations over territory, if they occur, will then refer to the Border Defence Cooperation Agreements of 2005 and 2012 which call for border settlements to be done keeping in mind the local population in the border regions.

Way forward

• A deliberate thought process needs to be evolved to offset our disadvantages as purely military actions may not solve the situation in the long term.

Conclusion

What emerges clearly is that by adopting the Land Boundary Law, in conjunction with its physical actions on the LAC, China has consolidated its position in eastern Ladakh and kept possibilities open in Arunachal Pradesh.

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Context

The visit by United States Secretary of State  Antony J. Blinken to Southeast Asia in December 2021 underscores the importance that is being accorded to this region by the Joe Biden administration.

Take aways from the visit

[1] Projecting the US as reliable partner

• The idea was to present the U.S. as a reliable partner in meeting the challenges that the Indo-Pacific region is facing.
• For instance, completely aware that the Southeast Asian nations are averse to choosing sides in this U.S.-China competition, Mr. Blinken made it a point to mention that “individual countries will be able to choose their own path and their own partners.

[2] Tackling China challenge

• Both China and the U.S. are trying to lure the Association of Southeast Asian Nation (ASEAN) countries to their side — China with its grand economic infrastructure investment deals and the U.S. through recent high profile official visits as well as through the Build Back Better World initiative and Blue Dot Network.
• In Southeast Asia, the U.S.-China competition is most visible in two areas; one is the South China Sea and the second is the investment in fulfilling the infrastructure development needs of Southeast Asian countries.
• The U.S. has continued its Freedom of Navigation operations in the disputed waters of the South China Sea.
• In his remarks in Indonesia, Mr. Blinken stressed America’s determination “to ensure freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, where Beijing’s aggressive actions there threaten the movement of more than $3 trillion worth of commerce every year”.

[3] Closing the gap on infrastructure

• Southeast Asia has been one of the top recipients of Chinese investments under its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
• How these investments have driven countries such as Cambodia and Laos to do China’s bidding in the ASEAN even at the cost of compromising ASEAN’s unity is a known fact.
• Mr. Blinken reiterated that the U.S. remains committed to help close the gap on infrastructure.
• The infrastructure coordination group launched by the Quad members is seeking to catalyse even more investment and is looking to partner with Southeast Asia on infrastructure and many other shared priorities.
• Washington is promising to do more under the Build Back Better World initiative and the Blue Dot Network.

Way forward

• The ASEAN countries, even after the release of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, do not have a uniform approach when it comes to dealing with the U.S. and China.
• These differing approaches are also challenging the much vaunted ASEAN centrality in the Indo-Pacific.
• Though external players will have a limited role in ensuring that the unity within ASEAN is restored, providing proper alternative models of investments for development in sectors such as infrastructure, digital economy, supply chain, and health for the Southeast Asian nations will be critical.

Conclusion

The economic framework, investment plans and promises outlined need to be made operational quickly if Washington is to show that it is indeed serious about sustained commitment toward the Indo-Pacific.

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Context

In 2021, Indian diplomacy was characterised by a readiness to deal with friends and foes alike.

Challenges faced by India diplomacy in 2021

• The US leadership change: Coping with the change from President Donald Trump to President Joe Biden and the consequent changes in U.S. policy were big enough to keep the world leaders on tenterhooks.
• Pandemic:  With the increased onslaught of the pandemic, India suddenly became the epicentre of the tragedy.
• The exposure of the inefficiency of India’s health system and put the country in the defensive and weakened its credibility as it tried to contribute to the resolution of global issues.
• Aggression by China: For India, the biggest preoccupation of 2021 was the effort to get China to disengage in areas in Ladakh.
• Dialogue, military preparedness and economic pressure met with limited success.
• Afghanistan crisis: Afghanistan turned out to be a bigger crisis than expected, with the Taliban’s walkover in Kabul.
• Bringing some civility to the Taliban in Kabul became a high priority in the face of a Pakistan-China-Taliban axis with some support from Russia and Iran.
• Issue of permanent membership of the UN Security Council: Unprecedented in the history of the UN, an event at the Security Council was chaired by the Prime Minister.
• Significant inputs were provided during discussions on issues like maritime security, peacekeeping and anti-terrorism for active consideration in the future.
• Although it is illusory to believe that the way has been cleared for India’s permanent membership of the Security Council, India’s diplomatic capabilities and its commitment to the UN have demonstrated yet again.

What marks the change in the style of Indian diplomacy?

• From selective alignment, India moved to universal engagement, even to the extent of convening meetings with antagonists.
• Engagements with the U.S. went beyond familiarisation with the new government to increased commitment to Quad and acceptance of AUKUS and formation of the ‘western Quad’, with the U.S., Israel and the UAE.
• Engagement with Russia: Major agreements were signed with Russia, despite the American threat of CAATSA against S-400 missiles and the Russian inclination to align with China in the days to come.
• The engagement with China at the level of commanders and diplomats was intense, and ministerial interaction continued even when China tore up many fundamental agreements that sustained the dialogue for many years.
• Patience, diligence and firmness: India attended a Shanghai Cooperation Organisation meeting, where a sub-group led by China took its own decisions on Afghanistan.
• We also attended a meeting of Russia, China and India.
• Perhaps because of the unique geopolitical situation, India gave particular importance to its presidency of the UN Security Council in August 2021.
• Engagement with Myanmar: The Foreign Secretary’s visit to Myanmar to engage the military junta at a time when opposition leaders are in prison may raise eyebrows in many countries, but this is another instance of India’s readiness to engage those in power to explore possibilities of friendship and co-operation.
•  The intention is to prevent China from having a field day in Myanmar.

Conclusion

Sadly, the extraordinary efforts made by India have not been fruitful in the cases of China and Afghanistan.  But India’s new style of diplomacy will have an impact in shaping the world of the future.

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