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Subject: Bilateral Relations

1. Major World Events
2. India’s Interests in neighbourhood
3. Effects of our Policies

  • India’s Central Asian outreach

    Context

    The evolving situation in Afghanistan has thrown up renewed challenges for India’s regional and bilateral ties with Central Asia and the Caucasus, prompting India to recalibrate its rules of engagement with the region.

    Background of India’s relations with Central Asian countries

    • After the breakup of the Soviet Union and the formation of the independent republics in Central Asia, India reset its ties with the strategically critical region.
    • India provided financial aid to the region and established diplomatic relations.
    • New Delhi signed the Strategic Partnership Agreements (SPA) with Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to stimulate defence cooperation and deepen trade relations.
    • In 2012, New Delhi’s ‘Connect Central Asia’ policy aimed at furthering India’s political, economic, historical and cultural connections with the region.
    • However, India’s efforts were stonewalled by Pakistan’s lack of willingness to allow India passage through its territory.

    Renewed engagement with Central Asia

    • The growing geostrategic and security concerns regarding the BRI’s China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and its violation of India’s sovereignty forced New Delhi to fix its lethargic strategy.
    • Eventually, Central Asia became the link that placed Eurasia in New Delhi’s zone of interest.
    • India signed MoUs with Iran in 2015 to develop the Chabahar port in the Sistan-Baluchistan province that was in the doldrums from 2003.
    • External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar was in the region earlier this month.
    • In Kyrgyzstan, Mr. Jaishankar extended a credit line of $200 million for the support of development projects and signed an memorandum of understanding (MoU) on High-Impact Community Development Projects (HICDP).
    • Kazakhstan: His next stop was the Kazakhstan capital, Nur Sultan, where he attended the 6th Foreign Ministers’ Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA).
    • Armenia: Mr. Jaishankar has become the first Indian External Affairs Minister to visit Armenia.
    •  During the visit, Mr. Jaishankar also supported efforts for a peaceful solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia under the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s (OSCE) Minsk group.

    Limits of SCO

    • The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was created in response to the threats of terrorism that sprang from Afghanistan.
    • The Taliban re-establishing its supremacy over Afghanistan has also exposed the weaknesses of coalitions such as SCO.
    • The SCO has been used by most member countries for their own regional geostrategic and security interests, increasing the trust-deficit and divergence within the forum.

    Way forward

    • Most of the Central Asian leaders view India’s Chabahar port as an opportunity to diversify their export markets and control China’s ambitions.
    • They have admitted New Delhi into the Ashgabat Agreement, allowing India access to connectivity networks to facilitate trade and commercial interactions with both Central Asia and Eurasia, and also access the natural resources of the region.
    • Rising anti-Chinese sentiments within the region and security threats from the Taliban allow New Delhi and Central Asia to reimagine their engagement.
    • Central Asian countries have been keen to have India as a partner as they have sought to diversify their strategic ties.

    Conclusion

    India cannot afford to lose any time in recalibrating its regional engagements.

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  • Crises in Pakistan is an occasion to reflect on the long-term regional consequences

    Context

    Whether it can or should make a difference to Pakistan’s internal politics, India must pay greater attention to the internal dynamics of our most difficult neighbour and more purposefully engage a diverse set of actors in that polity.

    India’s interventions in internal affairs of neighbours

    • Except for Pakistan, in most other countries of the subcontinent, India is drawn quickly into their internal political arguments.
    • Delhi has always exercised some influence on the outcomes of those contestations.
    • It is enough to note that India’s interventions are a recurring pattern in the subcontinent’s international relations.
    • Even when Delhi is reluctant to get into the weeds of these conflicts, the competing parties in the neighbourhood demand India’s intervention on their behalf.
    • All of the contestants, of course, resolutely oppose India’s meddling when it goes against them.
    • But Delhi has rarely been a decisive player in Pakistan’s internal politics.
    • Delhi’s hands-off attitude is surprising, given India’s huge stakes in the nature of Pakistan’s policies and their massive impact on regional security.

    Current crises in Pakistan

    • Internal crises: Among the many challenges confronting Pakistan is the fresh breakdown in civil-military relations.
    • Pakistan’s economy is in a tailspin as it struggles to negotiate a stabilisation package with the International Monetary Fund.
    • The militant religious movement Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP) has mounted a fresh march against the capital demanding the release of its arrested leader.
    • External crises: The internal crises are sharpened by worsening external conditions.
    • In Afghanistan, Pakistan has succeeded in restoring the Taliban to power.
    • The celebrations have not lasted too long; the long-awaited victory is turning sour.
    • The Arab Gulf states that have been fast friends of Pakistan are now tilting towards India.
    • Once a favourite partner of the West, Pakistan today faces tensions in its ties with the US and Europe.
    • More broadly, nuclear weapons and a powerful army seem unable to stop Pakistan’s relative decline in relation to not just India but also Bangladesh.
    • Pakistan’s economy is now 10 times smaller than that of India and is well behind Bangladesh.

    Suggestions

    • Whether it can or should make a difference to Pakistan’s internal politics, India must pay greater attention to the internal dynamics of our most difficult neighbour and more purposefully engage a diverse set of actors in that polity.
    • For Delhi, it is always about narrow political arguments with Rawalpindi and Islamabad; it is as if the people of Pakistan do not exist.
    • For India, the crises in Pakistan should be an occasion to reflect on the long-term regional consequences of Pakistan’s internal turbulence.
    • It might be argued that that unlike elsewhere in the neighbourhood, Delhi’s leverage in Pakistan’s politics is limited. But it is by no means negligible.

    Consider the question “For Delhi, it is always about narrow political arguments with Rawalpindi and Islamabad; it is as if the people of Pakistan do not exist. The depth of the current crises in Pakistan, however, should nudge India into overcoming this entrenched indifference. Comment.”

    Conclusion

    India looms so large in Pakistan’s mind space. For Delhi, it may be worth trying to turn that into influence over Pakistan’s policies if only at the tactical level and at the margins.

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  • Why India needs an international development cooperation agency

    Context

    Enhancing the efficacy of India’s development cooperation endeavours has been a challenging issue for the past several decades. The country, therefore, needs to expedite work on a specialised agency for proficient delivery of outcomes.

    Development assistance and lack of institutional foundation

    • In the last couple of years, India’s assistance to other developing countries has multiplied several times.
    • India’s development cooperation has converged to an all-encompassing integrated framework, a development compact that has five modalities — capacity building, concessional finance, technology sharing, grant and trade wherein duty-free and quota-free access to the Indian market is provided.
    •  India’s benevolent image does yield tremendous goodwill globally, but quality project delivery is yet to become the country’s USP.
    • On average, India provides development assistance of $6.48 billion and receives assistance of $6.09 billion annually from key partners as Official Development Assistance (ODA).
    • Under Indian Cooperation Mission (ICM) — India partners for development cooperation and does not give aid like OECD members.
    • India has been supporting the developmental endeavours of several partner countries in Africa and Asia, even before Independence.
    • However, this process lacks a firm institutional foundation.

    Efforts to form an institutional framework

    • The first effort by India to shape a framework was in 2003 with the announcement of the India Development Initiative (IDI).
    • Subsequently, the Indian Development and Economic Assistance Scheme (IDEAS) was launched in 2005 for managing credit lines.
    • The IDI was suspended in 2007 and the announcement about the setting up of the India International Development Cooperation Agency (IIDCA), which never took off.
    • Meanwhile, in 2018, China founded its international development cooperation agency.

    Changes in concessional financing

    • At this point, concessional financing in India’s development cooperation portfolio is close to 70 per cent.
    • So any major change would require alterations in the way LOCs (Line of Credit) have been working.
    • In 2015, the government made efforts to bring in operational changes in the way credit lines work.
    •  As of now, the EXIM Bank raises global resources and the Government of India absorbs the interest differential.

    Way forward

    • Countries have sovereign and non-sovereign windows for promoting infrastructure financing abroad — both have their own place.
    • A non-sovereign window would provide greater flexibility and bandwidth.
    • To become a leading strategic investor in commercially viable and financially attractive public-private partnership infrastructure projects, the fund may build an investment ecosystem in Africa with support from leading Indian firms.
    • The proposed new entity may also provide handholding to select performing Indian social enterprises to operate in other countries as well.
    • Besides making an immediate economic impact, these enterprises can facilitate development partnerships between India and other countries.
    • Post-pandemic, countries worldwide are exploring ways to reinvigorate their development cooperation efforts.
    • India’s own development experience is also evolving with programmes like the JAM trinity, Ayushman Bharat and other initiatives like Gati Shakti — the learnings from which should be absorbed in the portfolio to be shared with fellow developing countries.

    Conclusion

    It is high time India restructures its development finance apparatus for deeper and effective engagement and to address the rapidly evolving newer competitive development financing landscape.

  • Is the Indian foreign-policy ship changing course?

    Context

    India plans to host an international conference on Afghanistan in the second week of November.

    Is the Indian foreign policy changing course?

    • All signs point towards a major calibration of the foreign-policy compass in recent weeks since the tumultuous events in Kabul two months ago culminated in the formation of an interim government by the Taliban.
    • As regards the way forward in Afghanistan, India has opted to align with the Anglo-American camp in the international line-up arrayed against the Eurasian axis of Russia, China and Iran.
    • While the US has an attitude of “You’re either with us, or against us”, vis-a-vis the Taliban, Russia, China, Iran and other neighbouring states give primacy to stability and security of Afghanistan.
    • Being a discontented party, unsurprisingly, India would have more in common with the revisionist powers — the US and the UK.
    • While the stated purpose of the participating countries is marking Afghanistan, it is the future that matters, being an epochal one that would transform the geopolitics of the region.
    • Thus, Delhi has moved up to the centrestage of the Quad.
    • In turn, the US accepts that the Quad ought to be “inclusive”. Global Britain is knocking at the door.
    • On its part, Delhi has displayed its comfort level with the AUKUS.
    • The historical Western experience of the EU and NATO moving in tandem to weaken a common enemy is being replicated with Asian characteristics.
    • A dual containment strategy is unfolding against China and Russia.
    • Thus, its short-lived dalliance with Iran is losing its gravitas and India has swung to the other extreme to identify with a new quadrilateral platform in West Asia, with Israel, UAE and the US.
    • India shrugs its shoulders as its “time-tested” friend, Moscow, bemoans the Quad and AUKUS.
    • This astonishing zigzagging in India’s regional policy takes the breath away.

    Challenges for India

    • India lives in its region and the Quad and AUKUS are of no help when it comes to Afghanistan.
    • Pakistan and China are riding high in the Hindu Kush; Moscow and Beijing have moved close in Central Asia which Washington is having a hard time in dealing with.
    • India’s much-touted “influence” in Kabul has turned out to be delusional.
    • Its own capacity to shape future events is virtually nil. These are the hard realities.

    Conclusion

    With the conference where India hopes to create an equivalent of the vajrayudha of the ancient Vedas which would allow India to reclaim its rightful place in the Afghan pantheon of gods and demi-gods.

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  • EU, India and the Indo-Pacific

    Context

    Last month, the EU released it “EU strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific”. This document is very rich and needs to be analysed in the context of the rapprochement between the EU and India, which culminated in the June EU-India summit, a “turning point” according to some analysts.

    Important takeaways from EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy

    • The EU strategy in the Indo-Pacific appears to be over-determined by China’s expansionism.
    • “The display of force and increasing tensions in regional hotspots such as in the South and East China Sea and in the Taiwan Strait may have a direct impact on European security and prosperity,” the document says.
    • If security interests are highlighted in the beginning, they are rather low in the list of the objectives of the EU Indo-Pacific strategy, which are listed as: “Sustainable and inclusive prosperity; green transition; ocean governance; digital governance and partnerships; connectivity; security and defence; human security”.
    • Many paragraphs of the document are dedicated to values, including human rights.

    India does not figure prominently in the policy document

    • In terms of partnerships, India does not figure very prominently.
    • By contrast, ASEAN is presented as “an increasingly important partner for the EU”.
    • However, India appears in the list of the countries which already have an Indo-Pacific strategy and with which the EU is interested in a deeper “engagement”, a list made of ASEAN, Australia, India, Japan, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, the UK and US.
    • However, the document does not mention the role India could play in value-chain diversification, a top priority of the EU since the Covid-19 pandemic in particular.
    • Yet, India is mentioned few pages later in a similar perspective when it is said that the EU will help “low and middle-income Indo-Pacific partners to secure access to the Covid-19 vaccine through the Covax facility and through other means”.
    • What the French see as India’s main asset, its strategic dimension, is not central in the EU document.
    •  India is listed as the EU’s first partner only in one area: “under the project Enhancing Security Cooperation in and with Asia (ESIWA), which covers counter-terrorism, cybersecurity, maritime security and crisis management.
    • The pilot partners are India, Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Vietnam, with EU military experts already operating in Indonesia and in Vietnam.”

    Understanding the German influence on the policy document

    • Thus, the EU strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific is more in tune with the German vision of the Indo-Pacific than with the French one.
    • The fact that the German approach prevails in the EU document is a reflection of the influence of Berlin’s weltanschauung (worldview) in Europe — something Brexit has accentuated, Great Britain’s Indo-Pacific strategy being similar to France’s.
    • But China’s attitude may force Germany — and the EU — to change their mind in the near future.

    Conclusion

    By and large, the Indo-Pacific strategy of the EU remains driven by economic considerations and India, whose main asset is geopolitical and even geostrategic, does not figure prominently in it.

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  • Suggestions on alternative foreign policy

    Context

    A document has emerged from the Centre for Policy Research (CPR) in the nature of an alternative to the present foreign and defence policies named ‘India’s Path to Power: Strategy in a world adrift’. It is authored by eight well-known strategists and thinkers.

    Background of the document

    • In 2012, many of the same authors had produced another document, ‘Non-alignment 2.0’, in the light of the global changes at that time, as a contribution to policymaking, without criticising the policies of the government.
    • The present document, however, is in the nature of an alternative to the foreign and defence policies of the government, as some of its tenets are not considered conducive to finding a path to power for India in the post-pandemic world.

    Change in foreign policy

    • The first term of the Modi government was remarkable for its innovative, bold and assertive foreign policy, which received general approbation.
    • After his unconventional peace initiatives with Pakistan failed, he took a firm stand and gained popularity at home.
    • His wish to have close relations with the other neighbours did not materialise, but his helpful attitude to them even in difficult situations averted any crisis.
    • He brought a new symphony into India-U.S. relations and engaged China continuously to find a new equation with it. India’s relations with Israel and the Arab countries became productive.
    • In its second term, the government dealt with some of the sensitive matters, which were essentially of a domestic nature such as Article 370, citizenship issues and farming regulation.
    • The external dimensions of these matters led to a challenge to the government’s foreign policy.

    Suggestions in the Centre for Policy Research report

    • Impact of domestic issues on foreign policy: The finding of the report is that domestic issues have impacted foreign policy and, therefore, India should set its house in order to stem the tide of international reaction.
    • This assertion at the beginning of the report is the heart of the report and it is repeated in different forms.
    • Importance of globalisation: The report rightly points out that “it would be incorrect and counterproductive for India to turn its back on globalisation…”
    • Revival of SAARC: The report also suggests that SAARC should be revived and that India should rejoin the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership and continue its long-standing quest for membership in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation.
    • Strategic autonomy: The report also stresses the importance of strategic autonomy in today’s world where change is the only certainty.
    • Relations with the US and China: As for the India-U.S.- China triangle, the report makes the unusual suggestion that India should have better relations individually with both the U.S. and China than they have with each other.
    • The report concludes that since China will influence India’s external environment politically, economically and infrastructurally, there is no feasible alternative to a combination of engagement and competition with China.
    • Pakistan policy: The report asserts, “as long as our objectives of policy towards Pakistan are modest, resumption of dialogue and a gradual revival of trade, transport and other links are worth pursuing.”

    Conclusion

    The significance of the report is that it reveals the end of the era of consensus foreign policy and presents a shadow foreign policy for the first time in India. It remains to be seen whether any of the opposition parties will adopt it and fight the next election on the platform provided by the report.

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  • What is International Maritime Boundary Line (IMBL)?

    The Tamil Nadu police have issued an alert on the possibility of an attack on fishermen crossing the International Maritime Boundary Line (IMBL) for fishing in Sri Lankan waters.

    About International Maritime Boundary Line (IMBL)

    • A maritime boundary is a conceptual division of the Earth’s water surface areas using physiographic or geopolitical criteria.
    • As such, it usually bounds areas of exclusive national rights over mineral and biological resources, encompassing maritime features, limits and zones.
    • Generally, a maritime boundary is delineated at a particular distance from a jurisdiction’s coastline.
    • Although in some countries the term maritime boundary represents borders of a maritime nation that are recognized by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
    • The terminology does not encompass lake or river boundaries, which are considered within the context of land boundaries.

    The delineation of maritime boundaries has strategic, economic, and environmental implications.

    Classification

    Maritime spaces can be divided into the following groups based on their legal status:

    1. Under the sovereignty and authority (exercising power) of a coastal State: internal waters, territorial sea, and archipelagic waters,
    2. With mixed legal regime, which fall under both the jurisdiction of the coastal State and under the international law: contiguous zone, the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone, and
    3. That can be used by all States (including land-locked ones) on an equal basis: high seas.

    Note: While many maritime spaces can be classified as belonging to the same group, this does not imply that they all have the same legal regime. International straits and canals have their own legal status as well.

    Zones

    The zones of maritime boundaries are expressed in concentric limits surrounding coastal and feature baselines.

    1. Inland waters—the zone inside the baseline.
    2. Territorial sea—the zone extending 12 nm. from the baseline
    3. Contiguous zone—the area extending 24 nm. from the baseline
    4. Exclusive Economic Zone—the area extending 200 nm from the baseline except when the space between two countries is less than 400 nm

    Back2Basics: India-Sri Lanka Fisherman Issue

    • There have been several alleged incidents of Sri Lankan Navy personnel firing on Indian fishermen fishing in the Palk Strait, where India and Sri Lanka are only separated by 12 nautical miles.
    • The issue started because of Indian fishermen having used mechanized trawlers, which deprived the Sri Lankan fishermen (including Tamils) of their catch and damaged their fishing boats.
    • The Sri Lankan government wants India to ban use of mechanized trawlers in the Palk Strait region, and negotiations on this subject are undergoing.
    • So far, no concrete agreement has been reached since India favours regulating these trawlers instead of banning them altogether.
    • It has been often a sensitive political issue in Tamil Nadu in the past decade.

    About Katchatheevu Island

    • Katchatheevu, an uninhibited off-shore island in the Palk Strait, is administered by Sri Lanka.
    • Though the island was jointly managed by India and Sri Lanka allowing the fishermen of both countries to dry their nets there, it was ceded to Sri Lanka in 1974.
    • Since then, Katchatheevu has remained an issue with some political parties in Tamil Nadu demanding that the island be returned to benefit the fishermen of India.

     

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  • Bhutan-China Border Agreement

    In a step towards resolving their boundary disputes, Bhutan and China signed an agreement on a three-Step roadmap to help speed up talks to “break the deadlock” in negotiations.

    Bhutan-China Border Issues

    Bhutan shares an over 400-km-long border with China.

    • Doklam: China wants to exchange the valleys to the north of Bhutan with the pasture land to the west (including Doklam), totalling 269 square kilometres.
    • Jakarlung and Pasamlung valleys: located near Tibet to Bhutan’s North, which measure 495 sq. kms.
    • Sakteng Wildlife Sanctuary Project: China claims this area (near to Arunachal Pradesh) in eastern Bhutan as its own.

    What is the recent agreement?

    • The roadmap “for Expediting the Bhutan-China Boundary Negotiations”, is expected to progress on the boundary talks process that has been delayed for five years.
    • It was stalled due to the Doklam standoff in 2017, and then by the Covid Pandemic.
    • Although China and Bhutan do not have official diplomatic relations they have engaged in 24 rounds of ministerial-level talks to resolve their border dispute.

    Implications for India

    The boundary issue between China and Bhutan is special because it not only relates to Bhutan but also has become a negative factor for China-India ties.

    • China control much of the Doklam: Since the 2017 stand-off with India, Beijing has already strengthened its de facto control over much of the Doklam plateau, located strategically along the India-China-Bhutan trijunction.
    • Bhutan supports it: This agreement has been equally endorsed and appreciated by Bhutan and China.
    • Deadlock at LAC talks: Its timing is particularly significant New, given India-China border talks on their 17-month-old standoff at the Line of Actual Control appear to have hit an deadlock.
    • India’s strategic risks: This has big implications for India, since the Doklam swap would have given China access to the strategically sensitive “chicken neck” of the Siliguri corridor.

    India’s interest

    (a) Doklam

    • The Doklam plateau remains hugely critical for India due to the Siliguri Corridor that lies to the south of Doklam.
    • The corridor, also known as the ‘Chicken’s Neck’, is a 22-km wide major arterial road connecting mainland India with its northeastern states and thus it is a highly sensitive area for China.

    (b) Sakteng: the hotspot

    • The Sakteng sanctuary adjoins West Kameng district and Tawang disticts in India’s Arunachal Pradesh state.
    • Its strategic value lies in its proximity to Arunachal Pradesh, where China claims around 90,000 sq km of Indian territory.
    • Tawang, the major bone of contention between India and China in the eastern sector of their border dispute, lies to the northeast of the Sakteng.

    Conclusion

    • Bhutan has to balance its ties with India as well as China.
    • We need to explore channels that India can activate with Bhutan when it comes to the highly sensitive matter of settling the boundary dispute between them and China.

     

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  • India-Central Asia relations

    In his speech at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) meet last month, PM Modi stressed on commitment for increasing its connectivity with land-locked Central Asia.

    What is the Central Asia Region?

    • Central Asia is a region in Asia which stretches from the Caspian Sea in the west to China and Mongolia in the east, and from Afghanistan and Iran in the south to Russia in the north.
    • It includes the former Soviet republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.

    India-Central Asia Ties

    • India has decades-old wish to connect with the resource and fuel-rich Central Asian nations.
    • Since the emergence of the Central Asian Republics as independent countries in the early 1990s, New Delhi has been trying to establish ties with them.

    Trade and collaboration

    • India’s trade with the five Central Asian Republics—Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan—was below $ 2 billion in 2018.
    • The potential areas for collaboration include construction, sericulture and pharmaceuticals to IT and tourism.
    • Much of this trade was routed through Iran, Russia or the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

    Efforts for connectivity

     

    1. Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India (TAPI) Gas Pipeline
    2. Development of Iran’s Chabahar Port
    3. Zaranj-Delaram Highway
    4. International North-South (Transit) Corridor (INSTC)

    About INSTC

    • In 2000, India, Iran and Russia agreed on a new route for trade that later came to be known as INSTC.
    • It was aimed at cutting the costs and time in moving cargo between Russia and India.
    • The pact was ratified in 2002 and the original multi-modal route linked Mumbai in India to Bandar Abbas and Bandar-e-Anzali in Iran, then across the Caspian Sea to Astrakhan, Moscow and St. Petersburg in Russia.
    • Over the years, more countries joined the INSTC.
    • In 2003, India and Iran announced the development of the Chabahar port in the Sistan-Balochistan province.

    China’s opportunism: Based on proximity

    • China’s trade with Central Asia was $50 billion-$60 billion in the same period.
    • The obvious advantage in China’s favour is geographical proximity.

    Hurdles for India

    • Lack of mutual trust: Unfortunately, many connectivity options are not open to them today due to the lack of mutual trust.
    • Pakistan factor: Tensions with Pakistan mean there is no viable land route towards Central Asia.
    • Iran and the US sanctions: Efforts to look for a circuitous route via Iran (and Afghanistan) have stalled due to US sanctions on Iran.

    Issues in Iran-Afghanistan bypass route

    Recent events acquire broader geopolitical relevance for India in this route:

    • Taliban takeover of Afghanistan: The takeover of Afghanistan by the Pakistan-backed Taliban has severely set back India’s plans in Central Asia.
    • Iran’s bypassing of India: Iran’s overtures has been clearly visible after itself allocating Farzad-B Gas exploration contract to another company bypassing India.

    Central Asia’s importance for India

    • Fossil fuels: While Central Asia is seen as fuel-rich and, hence, important for an energy-starved India.
    • Mineral richness: Central Asian states are also mineral-rich, and Kazakhstan, for one, has been a source of uranium for India’s nuclear power plants.
    • Market for India: A country like India which is seen as a major economy has to have a presence in these markets. INSTC also offers a safe and cost-effective route to the EU (European Union) market.
    • Convergence against Terrorism: India can forge a common position on terrorism and radicalization, which is a matter of concern to the region as much as it is to India.

    India’s recent engagement

    • Defence collaboration: In recent years, New Delhi has engaged with Central Asian Republics in the defence sphere through military exercises (say Ex Kazind).
    • Engagement at UN: Political and economic engagement is also important, given the imperatives of working together at a body such as the United Nations (UN).
    • Technological ties: India has set up universities there—Sharda and Amity are examples.

    Scope for expansion

    • Dairy Sector: There is scope for collaboration in the dairy sector.
    • Pharma: Indian firms have been setting up pharmaceutical units in Russia that can serve these countries as well.
    • Info Technology: IT and IT-enabled services are two other areas.
    • Cultural connect: Bollywood movies are quite famous in these countries.

    Way forward

    • India needs to develop into stronger bonds of trade and commercial bonds which will be possible once the INSTC crystallizes.

    Conclusion

    • The road ahead in the short term is difficult as India doesn’t seem to have any real leverage to get the connectivity projects with Central Asia going.
    • India has been negotiating with individual bilateral partners though.

     

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    Also read:

    [Burning Issue] Ashgabat Agreement

  • Europe as a valuable strategic partner

    Context

    Last week’s in-person summit in Delhi was with the Danish prime minister, Mette Frederiksen.

    Europe as a valuable partner

    • Few Asian countries view Europe with strategic suspicion. Many in Asia see Europe as a valuable partner.
    • As the deepening confrontation between the US and China begins to squeeze South East Asia, Europe is widely seen as widening the strategic options for the region.
    • The perspective is similar in Delhi, which now sees Brussels as a critical element in the construction of a multipolar world.
    • Cultivate Europe: As External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar puts it, India’s strategy is to “engage America, manage China, cultivate Europe, reassure Russia, bring Japan into play”.
    • EU’s Strategy for India: The EU outlined a strategy for India in 2018 to focus on four themes — sustainable economic modernisation, promotion of a rules-based order, foreign policy coordination, and security cooperation.
    • At the summit in Portugal in May this year, the EU and India agreed to resume free trade talks and develop a new connectivity partnership that would widen options for the world beyond the Belt and Road Initiative.
    • Rebalancing the international system: Above all, there is a recognition in both Delhi and Brussels that the India-EU strategic partnership is crucial for the rebalancing of the international system amidst the current global flux.

    Possibilities with smaller European countries

    • Europe looms so large in the Indian diplomatic agenda today and smaller European states draw unprecedented political attention from Delhi.
    • That Denmark, a country of barely six million people, can establish a significant green partnership with India, is a reminder that smaller countries of Europe have much to offer in India’s economic, technological, and social transformation.
    • Luxembourg brings great financial clout, Norway offers impressive maritime technologies, Estonia is a cyber power, Czechia has deep strengths in optoelectronics, Portugal is a window to the Lusophone world, and Slovenia offers commercial access to the heart of Europe through its Adriatic sea port at Koper.
    • As India begins to realise this untapped potential, there are new openings with the 27-nation EU headquartered in Brussels.

    EU’s important role in Indo-Pacific

    • The EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy is likely to have a much greater impact on the region more immediately and on a wider range of areas than military security.
    • Area’s of impact range from trade and investment to green partnerships, the construction of quality infrastructure to digital partnerships, and from strengthening ocean governance to promoting research and innovation.
    • Defence and security are important elements of the EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy that “seeks to promote an open and rules-based regional security architecture, including secure sea lines of communication, capacity-building and enhanced naval presence in the Indo-Pacific.
    • Whatever the specific circumstances of the AUKUS deal and its impact on France, the US wants all its partners, especially Europe, to contribute actively to the reconstitution of the Asian balance of power.
    • Working with Quad: The EU strategy, in turn, sees room for working with the Quad in the Indo-Pacific, while stepping up security cooperation with a number of Asian partners, including India, Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Vietnam.
    • India is conscious that Europe can’t match America’s military heft in the Indo-Pacific.
    • But it could help strengthen the military balance and contribute to regional security in multiple other ways.

    Consider the question “Delhi knows that Europe could significantly boost India’s capacity to influence future outcomes in the Indo-Pacific. It would also be a valuable complement to India’s Quad coalition”. Comment.

    Conclusion

    It was Russia that defined India’s discourse on the multipolar world after the Cold War. Today, it is Europe — with its much greater economic weight, technological strength, and normative power — that promises to boost India’s own quest for a multipolar world and a rebalanced Indo-Pacific.

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