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Subject: Environment

  • Kottayam residents mobilise against Centre’s ESA proposal

    Why in the News

    The Centre’s seventh draft notification on Ecologically Sensitive Areas (ESAs) in the Western Ghats, issued on 27 July, has entered the closing fortnight of its 60 day objection window, with two weeks left for filing objections and suggestions. Four villages in the high ranges of Kottayam district in Kerala, Koottikkal, Melukavu, Poonjar Thekkekkara and Teekoy, all in the Poonjar Assembly constituency, are on the proposed ESA map, and the proposal is estimated to affect around 70,000 people. Opposition has already moved past petitions, with the Koottikkal local body convening special grama sabhas in all 14 wards and passing a council resolution detailing its objections. The contest is between a conservation boundary drawn at the level of the Ghats as a whole and settler households whose plantations sit inside it.

    What is an Ecologically Sensitive Area?

    1. Ecologically Sensitive Area: An Ecologically Sensitive Area is a zone notified by the Union government in which specified activities are prohibited or regulated because of the area’s ecological value.
    2. Environment (Protection) Act, 1986: The notification is issued under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, which lets the Centre restrict industries, operations and processes in an area on environmental grounds.
    3. What notification changes on the ground: Land inside the zone continues in private ownership, and it is the permissible use of that land that is narrowed.
    4. Why a draft matters procedurally: A draft notification opens a statutory window for objections and suggestions before the final notification is issued, and the boundary can move in that window.

    Which areas are proposed and who does the boundary affect?

    1. The four villages named: Koottikkal, Melukavu, Poonjar Thekkekkara and Teekoy have been included in the draft notification.
    2. Poonjar Assembly constituency: All four are in the Poonjar Assembly constituency in Kottayam district.
    3. The population estimate: The proposal is estimated to affect around 70,000 people, mostly settler families in the high ranges.
    4. Seventh draft notification in the series: This is the seventh draft notification on Western Ghats ESAs, so the boundary has been redrawn repeatedly without a final settlement.

    Why does the boundary matter to these villages?

    1. Agriculture is the economic base: Agriculture is the backbone of these high range villages, with rubber, cardamom, coffee, pepper, coconut and banana among the major crops.
    2. The fear is about permissible use: Residents hold that bringing their land under the ESA could impose restrictions on plantations.
    3. Development works in the villages: Residents also fear that essential development activities in the villages would be hampered.

    How has the objection been organised?

    1. The local body went beyond petitions: The Koottikkal local body convened special grama sabhas in all 14 wards and held an urgent council meeting.
    2. A formal resolution was passed: The council passed a resolution detailing its objections, and the resolution will be forwarded to the State and Union governments.
    3. The campaign is broad based: Residents, local bodies and various organisations including the Catholic church have stepped up the campaign against the move.
    4. The political channel is in use: The Government Chief Whip has stated that all possible steps would be taken to secure the exclusion of the villages, that the settlers’ concerns have been presented to the Chief Minister, and that interactions continue to mobilise observations of farmer collectives.

    Challenges to the Western Ghats Ecologically Sensitive Area notification

    1. The boundary has never been settled: Seven draft notifications over more than a decade mean no final legal position exists, so neither conservation nor land use planning can proceed on a fixed map. Eg. The present draft was issued on 27 July and is the seventh in the series.
      The Fix: Fix a statutory outer date for finalisation after the objection window closes, so a draft cannot be reissued indefinitely in place of a decision.
    2. The unit of demarcation is the village, not the forest: Drawing the zone on revenue village boundaries pulls in cultivated and settled land along with the ecologically sensitive tract. Eg. The four Kottayam villages carry rubber, cardamom and coffee plantations inside the proposed zone.
      The Fix: Demarcate on satellite verified land use at the survey plot level, so plantations and habitations are separated from natural forest before the boundary is drawn.
    3. Objections are filed individually against a technical map: A settler household is asked to contest a boundary drawn from remote sensing data without access to the underlying basis. Eg. The Koottikkal local body had to convene grama sabhas in all 14 wards to assemble its objections.
      The Fix: Publish the plot level basis for each village’s inclusion alongside the draft, so an objection can be argued on the record rather than as a general protest.
    4. Restriction is announced without a compensation route: A notification narrows permissible use of privately held land and carries no attached payment for the value foregone. Eg. Plantation crops in the high ranges are the single income source for settler households in the proposed zone.
      The Fix: Attach an ecosystem services payment schedule to the final notification, so land kept under restricted use earns a recurring transfer rather than only a prohibition.
    5. The zone is notified by the Centre and administered by the State: Enforcement, land records and local body consent all sit with the State, while the boundary is a Union decision. Eg. The Koottikkal resolution is being forwarded to both the State and the Union governments because neither alone can settle it.
      The Fix: Require a recorded State government response on each local body resolution before the final notification issues, so the objection is disposed of rather than absorbed.

    Conclusion

    The window closes in two weeks and the boundary in the draft is still the operative proposal. What the Kottayam mobilisation establishes is that the objection is now institutional rather than individual, since a local body resolution carries a claim that the Union government has to dispose of on the record. The status is that four villages remain on the map, the resolution is on its way to both governments, and the next milestone is the close of the objection window followed by the Centre’s decision on whether an eighth draft or a final notification issues.

    Back2Basics: Western Ghats

    1. Mountain chain along the western coast: A mountain chain running roughly parallel to India’s western coast, older than the Himalaya, spanning Gujarat, Maharashtra, Goa, Karnataka, Kerala and Tamil Nadu.
    2. Biodiversity hotspot status: It is one of the world’s recognised biodiversity hotspots and a UNESCO World Heritage Site, with high levels of endemic species.
    3. Monsoon interception and peninsular rivers: It intercepts the southwest monsoon and feeds the peninsular river systems that the southern States depend on.
    4. Overlap with settlement and plantations: Large parts of the range carry dense human settlement, plantations and mining, so ecological demarcation and existing land use overlap directly.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2022] Which one of the following has been constituted under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 ? (a) Central Water Commission (b) Central Ground Water Board (c) Central Ground Water Authority (d) National Water Development Agency ANSWER: (c)”

  • As India probes origin of 5 baby orangutans, Indonesia prepares ground for repatriation

    Why in the News

    Indonesia’s Ministry of Forestry has written to India offering government to government and Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) coordination on five baby orangutans, and is preparing the technical requirements for their repatriation. The letter, sent by its Directorate of Species and Genetic Conservation, went to the Director General of Forests and Special Secretary in the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change, who is also India’s CITES Management Authority. It follows the rescue of the five animals from a forest in Balasore district of Odisha, after which a preliminary assessment placed them as Sumatran and raised the possibility of an organised transnational wildlife trafficking network. Indonesia has stated that it respects the judicial and statutory procedures applicable in India, and the Indian side has replied that state forest authorities must finish their official investigation first. Any decision on custody, transport or transfer also needs the authorisation of a competent judicial court. Repatriation is therefore not held up by either government’s willingness, and it waits on a genetic result and a court order.

    What does CITES do, and what does Appendix I mean?

    1. What the treaty regulates: CITES is a multilateral treaty more than 50 years old that regulates global trade in wild animals and plants, so that the trade is legal, sustainable, traceable and does not threaten a species’ survival in the wild.
    2. What Appendix I does: It prohibits trade in species that are endangered, which removes commercial international trade in a listed species from the set of lawful transactions.
    3. How it operates inside a country: Each party designates a Management Authority that issues permits, verifies specimens and handles correspondence with other parties, which is why Indonesia’s letter went to that office in India rather than through a general diplomatic channel.
    4. What it does not settle: The Convention regulates trade and leaves the disposal of confiscated live animals, including whether they return to the country of origin, to the seizing country’s own law and courts.

    What has Indonesia asked for, and what has it offered?

    1. The information sought: Its communication asked for details of the incident, the species, the animals’ health, the investigation being carried out, and the collection of genetic samples.
    2. The offer on verification: It conveyed its readiness to cooperate with India on species and origin verification.
    3. The commitment if origin is confirmed: If the animals are confirmed as originating from Indonesia, it would undertake the measures needed for repatriation under CITES and its own national laws.
    4. The logistics already being assembled: It is preparing health examinations, quarantine arrangements, genetic identification, transport, animal welfare safeguards and appropriate post arrival rehabilitation.

    Why does the origin question turn on DNA rather than appearance?

    1. What the current assessment rests on: The animals are suspected to be from Sumatra on the basis of preliminary observations of their physical and morphological characteristics.
    2. What morphology cannot establish: Conclusive identification requires a DNA examination, which would fix their species, their geographical origin, and whether they came from the wild or had been held in captivity earlier.
    3. The range is wider than the working assumption: The animals could be from either Indonesia or Malaysia, and only DNA sampling can establish which population they belong to.
    4. Why the wild or captive finding matters: It separates a fresh capture from the wild from an animal moved out of an existing captive collection, and the two point to different chains of supply.

    What does the case suggest about the trafficking chain?

    1. A network rather than a single consignment: The possibility of an organised transnational wildlife trafficking network is being taken seriously on the Indonesian side.
    2. An enforcement arm has been brought in: Indonesia’s Directorate General of Forestry Law Enforcement has been roped in alongside its conservation directorate.
    3. The chain details sought from India: It has asked for the suspected trafficking route, the point of entry, the transit countries, the documentation, and the preliminary investigation findings.
    4. The jurisdictional follow through: Where the evidence reveals persons, transactions or collection points inside Indonesian jurisdiction, Indonesian authorities would act under national law and through international law enforcement cooperation.
    5. No names at this stage: The stated position is that identifying particular individuals or networks before the evidence is formally established would be premature.

    Challenges to returning trafficked wildlife to its country of origin

    1. Statutory machinery for the Convention arrived late: A Management Authority with powers written into domestic law is what lets a seizure move through a treaty process rather than an ad hoc one. Eg. India joined CITES in 1976 and acquired statutory CITES provisions, including a designated Management Authority and a schedule for listed specimens, only through the Wild Life (Protection) Amendment Act, 2022.
      The Fix: Publish a standing disposal protocol for confiscated live exotic animals, so custody, testing and transfer follow one written sequence from the day of seizure.
    2. A genetic result needs something to compare against: A DNA sample names a population only where reference profiles for wild populations already exist in an accessible library. Eg. Orangutans are recognised as three separate species, Bornean, Sumatran and Tapanuli, so a match has to resolve to a population rather than to an island.
      The Fix: Route seizure samples through a designated wildlife forensic laboratory that holds or can obtain source country reference profiles under a standing arrangement.
    3. Custody cost and welfare risk grow with the proceedings: Infant animals have to be housed, fed and treated for as long as the investigation and the court process run, and the holding facility is rarely built for the species. Eg. The five animals are being held in a zoological park in Odisha while the state investigation continues.
      The Fix: Set a statutory outer limit for a disposal decision on confiscated live animals, with interim custody vested in a facility equipped for the species.
    4. A returned great ape cannot simply be released: Infant orangutans learn foraging, nest building and predator avoidance from their mothers, so an orphaned animal needs years of rehabilitation before any release is possible. Eg. Indonesia’s own orangutan centres in Sumatra and Kalimantan run multi year forest school programmes before a release attempt.
      The Fix: Name the receiving rehabilitation centre and its capacity in the repatriation arrangement before the transfer is authorised, not after.
    5. No single authority covers the whole route: Source, transit and seizure fall under different national agencies, so the chain is investigated in fragments by bodies with no shared case file. Eg. The South Asia Wildlife Enforcement Network and its Southeast Asian counterpart exist precisely because wildlife crime routes cross the jurisdiction of several enforcement agencies.
      The Fix: Constitute a joint investigation team with named nodal officers in the source, transit and seizure countries at the point of seizure rather than after the first findings.

    Conclusion

    Both governments have already agreed on the process, so neither the treaty nor diplomacy is what decides where these animals end up. The sequence runs through a state forest investigation, a genetic result, and a court’s authorisation for custody and transfer, in that order. The step to watch is whether the genetic examination is commissioned early enough to be available when the court takes up the custody question, since a case decided without it settles the animals’ future on appearance alone. The wider test is whether the seizure produces a traced route and named collection points, or ends as five rescued animals and no network.

    Back2Basics: Orangutans

    1. What they are: The only great apes found in Asia, tree dwelling and native to the rainforests of Borneo and Sumatra in Indonesia and Malaysia.
    2. How many species: Three are recognised, the Bornean, the Sumatran and the Tapanuli, the last described as a separate species in 2017 and the rarest of the great apes.
    3. Conservation status: All three are listed as critically endangered on the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) Red List.
    4. Reproductive pace: Females give birth once in six to eight years, the longest interval of any land mammal, which is why a poached infant is not replaced within a generation.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2015] With reference to the International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN) and the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), which of the following statements is/are correct? (1) IUCN is an organ of the United Nations and CITES is an international agreement between governments. (2) IUCN runs thousands of field projects around the world to better manage natural environments. (3) CITES is legally binding on the States that have joined it, but this Convention does not take the place of national laws. Select the correct answer using the code given below. (a) 1 only (b) 2 and 3 only (c) 1 and 3 only (d) 1, 2 and 3 ANSWER: (b)”

  • Fueling the Blue Economy [PIB Backgrounder]

    PIB class: PIB Backgrounder. Unit: PIB feature unit.

    Why in News

    PIB published a thematic Backgrounder titled Fueling the Blue Economy.

    Core facts (static, definitional)

    1. The Blue Economy is the sustainable use of ocean resources for economic growth, livelihoods and jobs, while preserving ocean ecosystem health. It covers fisheries, shipping, ports, coastal tourism, marine minerals and marine renewable energy.
    2. Governing frame: India’s draft Blue Economy policy treats the ocean as the sixth dimension of national growth alongside land based sectors.
    3. Release specific figures: Not verifiable this run and therefore omitted.

    Static Context

    1. The Deep Ocean Mission is India’s flagship ocean programme. It funds deep sea exploration, a manned submersible named Samudrayaan, and survey of sea bed minerals and biodiversity. The nodal body is the Ministry of Earth Sciences.
    2. The Sagarmala Programme drives port led growth. It links port modernisation, coastal shipping and inland waterways under the Ministry of Ports, Shipping and Waterways.
    3. The Pradhan Mantri Matsya Sampada Yojana supports fisheries. It targets higher fish production, aquaculture and fisher incomes.
    4. India holds a large maritime footprint. It has a coastline of about 11,000 kilometres and an Exclusive Economic Zone of about 2 million square kilometres, which anchors the Blue Economy potential.

    Prelims angle

    The definition of the Blue Economy. Deep Ocean Mission and Samudrayaan under the Ministry of Earth Sciences. Sagarmala under the shipping ministry. The Exclusive Economic Zone extending to 200 nautical miles under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Blue carbon ecosystems such as mangroves and seagrass.

    Mains angle

    GS3, conservation and economy, and GS1 geography, ocean resources. Balancing marine resource extraction with ocean ecosystem health, and the Blue Economy as a driver of coastal livelihoods.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026] Consider the following statements with reference to the Sagarmala Programme of the Government of India: I. The Sagarmala Programme seeks to achieve port-led economic growth through cost-effective and sustainable coastal infrastructure. II. The success of the Sagarmala Programme is reflected in significant growth in coastal and inland waterway shipping, along with improved global port rankings. III. Sagarmala 2.0 aims to position India as a global maritime innovation hub aligned with Atmanirbhar Bharat and Viksit Bharat 2047 visions. Which of the following relationships among the above statements is/are correct? 1. Statement II validates the effectiveness of the strategies envisioned in Statement I. 2. Statement III extends the objectives of Statement I by embedding them into a future-oriented innovation framework. 3. Statement I contradicts Statement III by focusing only on traditional infrastructure instead of modern innovation. Select the answer using the code given below: (a) 1 only (b) 1 and 2 (c) 2 and 3 (d) 3 only. Answer: (b)”

    “[2014, GS1, 10 marks] Critically evaluate the various resources of the oceans which can be harnessed to meet the resource crisis in the world.”

  • Govt. backing ‘ecocide’ by going ahead with Tara coal block auction: Congress

    Why in the News

    The Tara (Revised) coal block in the Hasdeo Aranya region of Chhattisgarh has been auctioned and allocated. The block covers about 5,000 acres, of which over 4,000 acres is dense forest. The auction reverses a settled position on the region: the State Assembly had resolved against further coal allocation there, the State told the Supreme Court that no new mines were needed, and the Union Coal Ministry had denotified the block from the auction process. Local Gram Sabhas have opposed mining in the region for nearly 15 years. The principal Opposition party has described the auction as “ecocide”. The contest is between a commercial coal allocation and both the ecological value of a contiguous forest and the recorded consent position of the communities inside it.

    What does the Tara block auction involve on the ground?

    1. Area and forest share: The block covers about 5,000 acres, of which over 4,000 acres is dense forest in a biodiversity rich ecosystem.
    2. Scale of felling: Working the block would require the clear felling of more than 10 lakh trees.
    3. A renaming, not a redesign: The block was renamed Tara (Revised), which does not materially alter what is being mined or where.
    4. Who won it: The successful bidder is CG Syn Gas and Chemicals Limited, a wholly owned subsidiary of Mundra Synenergy Limited, itself wholly owned by Adani Enterprises Limited.

    Which earlier decisions does the auction reverse?

    1. A unanimous legislative resolution: The Chhattisgarh Assembly resolved unanimously in July 2022 that no further coal blocks should be allocated or auctioned in Hasdeo Aranya.
    2. The State’s position before the Supreme Court: The State government filed an affidavit in July 2023 stating that there was no need to allocate or develop any new mines in the region.
    3. The State’s request to the Centre: The State wrote to the Union Coal Ministry in June 2023 seeking the exclusion of nine coal blocks, including this one, from the auction.
    4. The Centre’s own earlier step: The Union Coal Ministry denotified 40 coal blocks, including this one, from the auction process in October 2023.

    What are the ecological stakes beyond the loss of trees?

    1. An elephant corridor runs through it: Mining around the Lemru Elephant Reserve would disrupt the movement corridor that elephant herds use through the region.
    2. Species at the sharper end: Other species in the same landscape, including critically endangered ones, would be placed at further risk.
    3. Replacement planting is contested: Compensatory afforestation replaces a diverted natural forest with a plantation raised elsewhere, and the objection is that no such planting can substitute for the loss of a contiguous mature forest of this size.

    How have the affected communities recorded their opposition?

    1. A fifteen year record of refusal: Adivasi and other local communities have opposed mining in Hasdeo Aranya for close to 15 years.
    2. The formal route used: Opposition has been recorded through Gram Sabha resolutions, the village assembly decisions that the forest diversion process is required to consider.
    3. Beyond the paperwork: The same communities have run public campaigns, sit ins and protest marches, including in Raipur.

    Challenges to auctioning coal blocks under dense forest

    1. The bid parameter does not price the forest: A commercial coal block is won on the revenue share offered to the State, so a block under dense forest competes on the same financial terms as one under farmland. Eg. Commercial auctions are decided on the percentage of revenue a bidder offers, with no ecological weighting in the bid.
      The Fix: Make a graded forest quality threshold a qualifying condition, so blocks above it never enter the auction list.
    2. Allocation happens before clearance is decided: A block is sold before forest and environmental clearance is settled, which converts a later refusal into the cancellation of an existing commercial commitment. Eg. The Parsa East and Kete Basan blocks in the same forest received clearance only after allocation and years of litigation.
      The Fix: Complete the forest diversion decision for a block before it is offered, so the auction follows the environmental appraisal rather than preceding it.
    3. Recorded consent is weakly verified: Consent is captured as a Gram Sabha resolution at the diversion stage, and a refusal has repeatedly been overridden or replaced by a fresh resolution. Eg. Gram Sabhas in Hasdeo Aranya alleged in 2022 that consent recorded for a neighbouring block had been forged.
      The Fix: Require independent verification of every consent resolution and publication of the minutes before diversion is recommended.
    4. Impact is appraised one block at a time: Each clearance assesses a single block, so the combined effect of several mines inside one contiguous forest is never evaluated as a whole. Eg. Hasdeo Aranya holds multiple allocated coal blocks within a single forest stretch and a shared river catchment.
      The Fix: Require a cumulative impact assessment for the entire coalfield before any further block inside it is auctioned.

    Conclusion

    The block has been allocated, and the operative decisions now move to the forest diversion and clearance stage, where the State and the Centre must each take a position again. The unresolved tension is that a legislature and a State executive have recorded one view of the region. The auction machinery has proceeded on another, with no mechanism that reconciles the two. What to watch is whether the recorded refusals are treated as binding inputs at the diversion stage, and whether the dispute returns to court before mining begins.

    Back2Basics: Elephant Reserves

    1. What the designation is: An elephant reserve is an area declared by a State government to protect elephant populations and the corridors between their habitats.
    2. The programme behind it: Reserves are declared under Project Elephant, launched by the Union environment ministry in 1992 to support elephant range States.
    3. Its legal weight: The designation is administrative, and it carries none of the statutory bar on land use that applies inside a national park or wildlife sanctuary.
    4. The species status: The Asian elephant is listed as Endangered on the IUCN Red List and in Schedule I of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2025, GS3, 15 marks] Mineral resources are fundamental to the country economy and these are exploited by mining. Why is mining considered an environmental hazard? Explain the remedial measures required to reduce the environmental hazard due to mining.”

  • Withdraw stand on Gram Sabha consent, rights group urges Ministry

    Why in the News

    The Tribal Affairs Ministry has held in an office memorandum that there is “no provision” under the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006 to seek the consent of Gram Sabhas for diverting forest land to non-forest purposes. The Campaign for Survival and Dignity (CSD), a national platform of Adivasi and forest dweller organisations, has demanded immediate withdrawal of the memorandum. The position was arrived at during the Ministry’s discussion with the Power Ministry on the requirement of 100% Gram Sabha consent, which has been described as a “critical bottleneck” delaying large government projects. The contest is over what the consent requirement actually is. Treated as a statutory right it cannot be set aside by an executive communication, and treated as an administrative practice it can.

    What does the Forest Rights Act, 2006 give the Gram Sabha?

    1. It recognises rights: Section 3 recognises individual rights over forest land under occupation and community rights over minor forest produce, grazing, water bodies and traditional use.
    2. The Gram Sabha starts the process: Section 6 makes the Gram Sabha the authority that initiates determination of the nature and extent of individual and community forest rights.
    3. It carries powers over the forest itself: Section 5 empowers the Gram Sabha to protect wildlife, forest and biodiversity and to stop any activity that harms the community forest resource.
    4. Consent attaches to diversion: An Environment Ministry circular of 3 August 2009 requires written Gram Sabha consent, together with a certificate that rights recognition is complete, before forest land is diverted under the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980.

    What did the Ministry hold, and what produced it?

    1. The memorandum’s claim: The office memorandum of 31 August states there is no provision in the Act requiring Gram Sabha consent for diversion of forest land to non-forest use.
    2. It came out of an inter-ministerial discussion: The Tribal Affairs Ministry is in discussions with the Power Ministry on the 100% consent requirement, which the discussions treat as a critical bottleneck holding up large government projects.

    On what grounds is the memorandum contested?

    1. Called factually and legally untenable: The CSD said the position “smacks of dereliction of duty” and that the error could have been avoided by reading the text of the law.
    2. It cuts against the Ministry’s own record: A former Union Environment Minister said the stance runs contrary to the Ministry’s own directives, communications, guidelines and the set procedure under law as it stands.
    3. It sits against the Niyamgiri ruling: In Orissa Mining Corporation v. Ministry of Environment and Forests (2013), the Supreme Court referred the question of community and religious claims to the Gram Sabhas of Rayagada and Kalahandi districts. All twelve Gram Sabhas consulted rejected bauxite mining in the Niyamgiri hills.
    4. A motive is alleged: The CSD alleged the Ministry took the position to appease the interests of project developers, contractors and large corporations.

    Challenges to Gram Sabha consent under the Forest Rights Act

    1. Consent presumes recognition is finished: Where community forest resource rights have not been recognised, there is no recorded rights holder whose consent can be sought, and the diversion proceeds on that silence. Eg. Gadchiroli district in Maharashtra carries widespread community forest resource titles, and recognition remains thin across most other States.
      The Fix: Complete community forest resource mapping and titling for a block before any diversion proposal for that block is admitted for processing.
    2. Consent can be manufactured: Resolutions are recorded without quorum, or with an agenda drafted by the project proponent and read out at the meeting. Eg. Gram Sabha consent resolutions for the Parsa coal block in Chhattisgarh’s Hasdeo Arand were alleged to be forged and were placed under official inquiry.
      The Fix: Video record every consent Gram Sabha and publish the attendance roll and the resolution in the local language before the clearance file moves.
    3. Clearance stages have been decoupled from consent: The Forest (Conservation) Rules, 2022 allow the Centre to grant in principle approval before the State certifies that forest rights settlement is complete. Eg. The Rules were challenged before the Supreme Court by retired civil servants and forest rights groups on precisely this ground.
      The Fix: Restore the consent certificate as a condition precedent to the first stage approval rather than an obligation the State discharges afterwards.

    Conclusion

    The memorandum stands, and only the Ministry that issued it can withdraw it. What is in dispute is not a policy preference but a reading of a statute, which means the answer is available to any court asked the question. The immediate marker is whether the Tribal Affairs Ministry withdraws or reissues its communication to the Power Ministry. The larger one is whether consent survives as a condition of forest diversion or is converted into a clearance stage that the executive can waive when a project is large enough.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2013] Under the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006, who shall be the authority to initiate the process for determining the nature and extent of individual or community forest rights or both? (a) State Forest Department (b) Distrit Collector/Deputy Commissioner (c) Tahsildar/Block Develoment Officer/Mandal Revenue Officer (d) Gram Sabha ANSWER: (d)”

  • Pollution from open waste burning triples in cities during winter: study

    Why in the News

    Open waste burning across Indian cities rises sharply in winter, with the average incidence, the quantity of waste burned and the associated emissions as much as three times higher than in summer. The finding comes from a working paper by the World Resources Institute (WRI) India, built on field surveys carried out between 2019 and 2026 in 11 polluted Indian cities whose names have not been disclosed. The burning is not a major source of citywide particulate pollution, contributing under 1% of total PM2.5 and PM10 emissions in the cities assessed. The contest is over what the finding measures. Read as an air quality number the share is small, and read as a service delivery number it is evidence that municipal waste collection is failing in the poorest wards of the smallest cities.

    Why does the burning rise in winter?

    1. The seasonal multiple: Incidence, quantity burned and emissions run up to three times higher in winter than in summer across every category of city examined.
    2. The weather compounds it: The post monsoon period brings falling temperatures and stagnant atmospheric conditions, which make it harder for pollutants to disperse.

    How does the burden differ across city tiers?

    1. Tier 3 cities burn most often: They recorded the highest winter incidence, at an average of 49.6 incidents per square kilometre per day.
    2. Tier 2 cities burn the most waste: Cities with populations between 500,000 and five million recorded the highest quantities of waste burned, at 46 incidents per square kilometre per day.
    3. Tier 1 cities trail: The largest cities recorded 39.4 incidents per square kilometre per day.

    Why does a share under 1% still matter?

    1. The citywide share is small: Open burning contributed less than 1% of total citywide PM2.5 and PM10 emissions in the cities assessed.
    2. The exposure is close range: Burning happens near homes, streets and waste dumps, so it raises short term exposure to toxic smoke for the people living beside it.

    What does the income gradient reveal?

    1. Poorer areas burn more: Lower income neighbourhoods recorded substantially more burning than higher income areas within the same cities.
    2. The single highest reading: Nearly 84 incidents per square kilometre per day were recorded in the poorer areas of Tier 2 cities during winter, the highest figure in the study.
    3. What the researchers read into it: The pattern points to disparities in waste collection and other municipal services between neighbourhoods, rather than to differences in household behaviour alone.

    Challenges to municipal solid waste collection

    1. Segregation at source stays low: The Solid Waste Management Rules, 2016 require households to hand over segregated wet, dry and domestic hazardous waste, and mixed waste continues to reach collection points. Eg. Indore’s ward level segregated door to door collection is cited as an exception rather than the norm across Indian cities.
      The Fix: Tie Swachh Bharat Mission grant releases to third party audited segregation rates at ward level rather than to citywide self reported figures.
    2. Collection routes stop at the settlement edge: Informal settlements and peri urban wards often sit outside the contracted collection route, so waste there has no lawful disposal path. Eg. Peri urban wards added to municipal limits after boundary expansion frequently retain no collection contract for years.
      The Fix: Use burning incidence mapped per square kilometre to identify uncollected pockets and extend contracted routes to them.
    3. Processing capacity lags behind collection: Waste that is collected still lands on legacy dumpsites because sorting and processing plants are missing or underused. Eg. Delhi’s Ghazipur, Bhalswa and Okhla legacy dumps continue to receive fresh waste, with bio-mining running alongside.
      The Fix: Release bio-mining funds against verified reduction in dump height and volume rather than against tonnage cleared on paper.
    4. Enforcement against burning is nominal: Open burning of waste is prohibited and carries a spot fine under the 2016 Rules, and prosecution is rare because the offence is momentary and unwitnessed. Eg. The Graded Response Action Plan bars open burning across Delhi and the National Capital Region every winter, and incidents persist through the season.
      The Fix: Make the ward sanitation officer accountable for a measured incidence figure in the ward, so enforcement is judged on the count rather than on fines issued.

    Conclusion

    The paper converts open waste burning from an air quality footnote into a measurable test of municipal performance. The unit it uses is a count of incidents in a defined area, which a city can track ward by ward and compare across seasons. That makes the finding usable in a way a citywide emission share is not. The marker to watch is whether city clean air action plans adopt burning incidence as a service delivery indicator before the coming winter, or continue to treat it as a source with a negligible share.

    Back2Basics

    1. World Resources Institute: A global research organisation founded in 1982 and headquartered in Washington DC, working on climate, energy, food, forests, water and cities.
    2. WRI India: An independent research charity registered in India, which works with State governments and urban local bodies on air quality, mobility, energy and urban development.
    3. What a working paper is: A pre-publication research document circulated for comment, which has not been through peer review.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026, GS3, 15.0 marks] What are the challenges to solid waste management in India? Discuss the governmental policy framework on solid waste management. Discuss the success/failure cases of Delhi and Indore cities highlighting the salient feature of their solid waste management initiatives.”

  • Behind Nepal’s compensation demand for devastating flood

    Why in the News

    Nepal has written to the United Nations fund for responding to loss and damage after a catastrophic flash flood killed more than 1,000 people. The country had already decided to shift its diplomatic position, seeking ‘compensation’ for natural disasters in place of aid. Its Foreign Minister framed the claim as a matter of legal and moral liability rather than charity, and named China, the United States and India as major industrial emitters carrying a historical responsibility to compensate vulnerable nations. The contest is over what a country with negligible emissions is owed and by whom. Aid is discretionary and can be refused; compensation asserts a liability that the international climate regime has never accepted.

    What is the loss and damage fund?

    1. What it does: The fund was set up in 2022 to help countries respond to the economic hits from extreme events, in addition to financing mitigation and adaptation.
    2. What has been promised: Around USD 822 million has been pledged to it.
    3. What is actually available: Around USD 350 million is allotted for disbursement.
    4. How it is financed: Contributions are voluntary. The United Arab Emirates has provided USD 100 million, and much of the remaining contribution has come from Europe.

    What happened in Nepal?

    1. The scale: More than 1,000 people are dead and thousands remain missing nearly ten days later, with whole villages, bridges and roads swept away.
    2. Two amplifiers: The impact was heightened by heavy infrastructure development by China in Tibet, which has affected the Himalayas, and by climate change.
    3. The range as a water store: The Himalayas are referred to as the third pole, given their huge reservoirs of ice and water.
    4. A long flagged risk: Melting of Himalayan glaciers has been observed for years, with climatologists warning of severe consequences.

    Who has actually caused the accumulated emissions?

    1. The United States leads: It is the leading contributor at 25 per cent of the CO2 accumulated in the atmosphere, which is the key cause of climate change.
    2. Europe and China follow: Europe is next at around 20 per cent, with China now fast catching up at 15 per cent of the global stock.
    3. India’s share of the stock is small: India’s contribution is under 4 per cent.
    4. India’s per capita emissions are half the average: India emits around 2 tonnes of CO2 per person a year, against a global average of 4.5 tonnes.

    Why has Nepal replaced aid with compensation?

    1. The stated ground: Nepal’s greenhouse gas emissions are negligible, and its position is that it is bearing the consequences of a problem it did not create.
    2. The causal claim: The rapid melting of glaciers and the resulting mountain floods are presented as direct consequences of global climate change.
    3. The legal framing: The Foreign Minister described the claim as a matter of legal and moral liability rather than charity.
    4. The practical driver: The size of the rehabilitation requirement makes access to international funding necessary, and seeking solidarity in place of aid suits a young and globally aware government.

    Why did the demand name India?

    1. The three named emitters: The Foreign Minister named China as the world’s top emitter, the United States as second and India as third.
    2. Current output, not accumulated stock: That ranking rests on current annual emissions, which places India very differently from where its share of the accumulated stock places it.
    3. A balancing act: The inclusion of India alongside the two largest emitters is read as Nepal’s practice of balancing its two neighbours.
    4. The walk back: Nepal’s Prime Minister thanked India and China for their assistance after the floods. The Foreign Minister later said the issue was not about shifting blame to one country or another but about working together.

    Does the shift from aid to compensation gain anything?

    1. The two words carry different obligations: Aid is offered at the giver’s discretion. Compensation asserts a claim the payer is obliged to meet.
    2. The fund is built on the first: Contributions to the loss and damage fund are voluntary, so a liability framing has no forum inside the fund that could compel a payment.
    3. The diplomatic cost is immediate: The claim was softened within days, once the neighbours it named turned out to be the ones supplying relief.
    4. The gain is agenda setting: A liability framing raises the political price of underfunding the mechanism. It does not create a right to be paid.

    Challenges to the loss and damage fund

    1. The regime expressly excludes liability: Loss and damage is recognised under Article 8 of the Paris Agreement, and the decision adopting the agreement records that Article 8 does not involve or provide a basis for any liability or compensation. Eg. Small island states pressed for a liability provision in 2015 and accepted its exclusion in order to secure the agreement.
      The Fix: Negotiate an agreed needs based replenishment cycle, so predictable funding substitutes for a legal claim that will not be conceded.
    2. The hosting arrangement is contested: The fund was operationalised at the 2023 Conference of the Parties in Dubai with the World Bank as interim host for four years, over developing country objections about the Bank’s governance and its fees. Eg. Developing country negotiators sought an independent secretariat outside the Bank’s board structure.
      The Fix: Fix a firm date for the review of the hosting arrangement and publish the fee and governance terms against which it will be judged.
    3. Access is slowest where need is highest: Climate funds require accreditation of a national entity and detailed project proposals, which the least developed countries take years to complete. Eg. National implementing entities in several least developed countries have waited years for Green Climate Fund accreditation.
      The Fix: Create a rapid disbursement window that releases a fixed sum on a declared national disaster, without a project proposal.

    Conclusion

    The claim Nepal made and then softened will outlast the flood that produced it. The climate regime has built a fund for loss and damage without the liability that would make any claim on it enforceable, and a country facing a rehabilitation bill it cannot carry will keep pressing at that gap. What is worth watching is not whether the demand is repeated but whether the next replenishment round ties contributions to assessed need rather than to donor discretion. Until it does, a small mountain state’s only real leverage is the moral argument it was persuaded to withdraw.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2022, GS2, 15.0 marks] Clean energy is the order of the day. Describe briefly India’s changing policy towards climate change in various international fora in the context of geopolitics.”

  • [8th September 2026] The Hindu OpED: India can cut steel emissions before coal plants lock them in

    [8th September 2026] The Hindu OpED: India can cut steel emissions before coal plants lock them in

    Question (2025): “Write a review on India’s climate commitments under the Paris Agreement (2015) and mention how these have been further strengthened in COP26 (2021). In this direction, how has the first Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) intended by India been updated in 2022?
    Linkage: Since steelmaking alone accounts for roughly 12% of India’s national greenhouse gas emissions, the investment choices made during this relining cycle will decide whether India can successfully honor its updated NDCs and progress toward its long-term Net-Zero targets

    Mentor Comment

    Indian steelmakers are approaching a replacement cycle in which more than 43 million tonnes per annum of blast furnace capacity falls due for relining before 2030. Relining is a capital intensive overhaul carried out roughly every two decades that extends a plant’s working life by another 15 to 20 years. A study published in Nature Climate Change finds that avoiding new blast furnaces, declining to reline young ones, and redirecting that money to electric arc furnaces could almost halve globally committed steel emissions. India’s steelmaking emissions are about 32% above the global average and account for nearly 12% of national greenhouse gas emissions. The tension is that the decision is not a technology problem but a timing problem: the furnaces chosen in this cycle fix the sector’s emissions until the 2040s, well before any of the promised hydrogen supply exists.

    How is steel made, and where do the emissions come from?

    1. The blast furnace and basic oxygen furnace route: Coking coal is burned in a blast furnace to smelt iron ore and strip its oxygen, producing a carbon rich liquid iron. That liquid is then blown with pure oxygen in a basic oxygen furnace to burn off impurities and yield steel.
    2. Why that route is carbon intensive: Coal here is not only the heat source but the chemical agent that removes oxygen from the ore, so the carbon dioxide is produced by the chemistry itself and not merely by combustion.
    3. The scrap and electric arc furnace route: An electric arc furnace melts steel scrap using electricity, skipping the ore reduction step entirely. Its emissions intensity is less than half that of the coal route.
    4. The direct reduced iron route: Direct reduced iron (DRI) strips oxygen from ore using a gas rather than coal, and the resulting solid iron is then melted in an electric furnace. Run on natural gas it emits around 1.2 tonnes of carbon dioxide per tonne of steel, and run on green hydrogen it is close to zero.

    How large is India’s steel emissions problem?

    1. Intensity above the world: India’s steelmaking emissions are roughly 32% higher than the global average, meaning each tonne produced here carries more carbon than a tonne produced elsewhere.
    2. Share of national emissions: The sector accounts for nearly 12% of India’s total greenhouse gas emissions.
    3. Scale and growth: India produced around 160 million tonnes of crude steel in FY 2025-26, the second highest in the world after China. Demand is driven by infrastructure development, construction and automotive manufacturing.
    4. Scrap scarcity limits the easy route: A developing economy that has not yet accumulated a large stock of old steel cannot recycle its way to lower emissions, because there is little scrap to feed electric arc furnaces.

    What does the National Mission on Green Steel actually promise?

    1. The intensity target: The Mission aims to bring steelmaking emissions intensity down from the current 2.55 to 2.65 tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (tCO2e) per tonne of crude steel to 2.2 tCO2e by 2029-30.
    2. The money behind it: A Rs 5,000 crore scheme to accelerate steel sector decarbonisation was announced last year and is set to launch in the coming months.
    3. The certification threshold: A certification scheme launched under the Mission in 2024 treats any steel made below 2.2 tCO2e as green, with the greenest band extending up to 1.6 tCO2e.
    4. The threshold sits above the world average: Global steelmaking averages around 1.85 tCO2e, so steel certified as India’s greenest can still be more carbon intensive than the world’s ordinary output.

    What does India’s furnace mix look like, and where is it headed?

    1. The current split: 43% of India’s crude steel comes from blast furnace and basic oxygen furnace plants, 22% from electric arc furnaces and 35% from electric induction furnaces, which use electromagnetic fields to process small batches of scrap or direct reduced iron.
    2. The projected drift: Blast furnace capacity is projected to rise to 56% of the mix by 2030 on the strength of planned new plants.
    3. The global picture: 70.4% of world steelmaking still uses the coal based route, with the remainder on electric arc furnaces.
    4. India’s mix is unusually heterogeneous: More than half of Indian output already comes from electricity based furnaces, which is a starting position most large producers do not have.

    Why does the relining decision lock in emissions for decades?

    1. Relining resets the clock: A blast furnace overhauled today keeps operating on coal for another 15 to 20 years, and more than 43 million tonnes per annum of capacity falls due for that overhaul before 2030.
    2. The plants are still on paper: The majority of new basic oxygen furnace plants planned in India have not broken ground, so switching them to direct reduced iron and electric arc furnace designs is a redirection of committed money rather than a fresh demand for capital.
    3. Sunk cost makes reversal politically hard: Once large sums are invested in a coal based asset, closing it early becomes a fight over stranded value rather than an engineering decision.
    4. The abatement is cheap only now: Emissions avoided at the investment stage cost far less than emissions removed later through bioenergy with carbon capture and storage or carbon dioxide removal technologies.

    What do the modelled transition pathways show?

    1. What was modelled: Two global steel sector pathways consistent with 1.5 degrees Celsius of warming by the end of the century, allowing an overshoot of up to 1.7 degrees Celsius.
    2. Who drives the outcome: China and India dominate the dynamics of the fast transition scenario, because their near term coal based investments far exceed those of every other region.
    3. The cost of moving slowly: In the slow transition scenario young blast furnaces are relined and announced plants are built as planned, which forces heavier reliance on carbon dioxide removal technologies that remain immature, plus deeper cuts in other sectors.
    4. The fuel sequence India would follow: The model has India running direct reduced iron and electric arc furnace plants mainly on natural gas until 2040 to 2045, switching to hydrogen once it becomes cost competitive.
    5. The reframing: Steel is described less as a hard to abate sector than as a sector facing a hard to abate investment barrier, since the technology already exists and only the green premium stands in the way.

    Is India’s certified green steel actually green?

    1. The brackets are wide: The certification bands are broad enough that steel qualifying as green can still be more carbon intensive than ordinary steel made elsewhere, which weakens the label as a signal.
    2. India defined the term first: No other country has set out a formal definition of green steel, so the taxonomy itself is an initiative rather than a copy.
    3. The demand side was never built: Certification creates a supply of labelled steel without creating any buyer obliged to prefer it, so the premium has no market to be recovered in.
    4. Uptake so far: ArcelorMittal Nippon Steel India became the first integrated steel producer to receive green steel certification in February this year, and 89 steel units held the certification as of 31 March, covering 12.34 million tonnes of production.

    What is pushing steelmakers to move now?

    1. The export penalty: The European Union’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism came into effect in January, imposing steep penalties on carbon intensive imports including India’s high emission steel.
    2. The commercial response: India has been seeking alternative markets and boosting domestic consumption, while compliance obligations push producers to reconsider which furnace technology to invest in.
    3. Public money for hydrogen: The Union Ministry of New and Renewable Energy funded three pilot green hydrogen projects in March totalling more than Rs 400 crore, to validate the technical feasibility of using 100% green hydrogen in furnaces.
    4. The first commercial link: JSW Energy commissioned India’s largest commercial scale green hydrogen plant at Vijayanagar in Karnataka last year to supply 100% green hydrogen to the adjoining JSW Steel direct reduced iron unit.

    Challenges to steel decarbonisation in India

    1. The bridge fuel carries its own lock in: Natural gas based direct reduction substitutes an imported fuel for a domestic one, exposing the sector to supply shortages, price shocks and gas infrastructure that is stranded once hydrogen arrives. Eg. India imports roughly half its natural gas, and delivered prices swung sharply through the European supply crisis.
    2. The thermal power precedent: Once heavy capital sits in a coal asset, the owner resists closure in order to recover the investment, which is how India acquired thermal plants that are uneconomic yet politically impossible to retire. Eg. Several state generating stations continue running below viable plant load factors rather than shutting down.
    3. Electricity based steel is only as clean as the grid: An electric arc furnace shifts emissions from the furnace to the power station, so in a coal heavy grid the accounting gain outruns the physical one. Eg. Coal still supplies the majority of India’s generation, so an induction furnace running at night draws largely thermal power.
    4. Green hydrogen is not yet affordable at steel scale: Running a direct reduction plant on hydrogen today costs far more than running it on gas, and a steel plant needs hydrogen in volumes no pilot has demonstrated. Eg. Existing Indian projects supply a single adjoining unit rather than a cluster of plants.
    5. Iron ore quality constrains the switch: Direct reduction needs high grade iron ore or pellets, and much of India’s ore is not of that grade, so the route requires beneficiation capacity that does not yet exist. Eg. Indian producers rely on lower grade ore fines that suit blast furnaces but not shaft furnaces.

    Way Forward

    1. Make gas based DRI hydrogen ready: Design gas based direct reduction plants as hydrogen ready at the outset, so the shaft furnace does not need replacing at the point of switching.
    2. Plan for coal asset retirement: Attach a stated retirement date and a transition financing package to every new coal based approval, so the exit is priced when the asset is sanctioned.
    3. Link steel decarbonisation with clean electricity: Tie decarbonisation scheme support to a round the clock renewable supply contract for the plant rather than to the furnace type alone.
    4. Aggregate green hydrogen demand: Aggregate demand across neighbouring plants into a single hydrogen offtake contract, so an electrolyser project can be financed against assured volume.
    5. Build beneficiation and pelletisation capacity: Include ore beneficiation and pelletisation capacity within the decarbonisation scheme’s eligible expenditure, not only the furnace itself.

    Conclusion

    The steel sector’s emissions are being decided by a maintenance schedule rather than by a climate policy. Every furnace relined in this cycle removes a plant from the reachable set for two decades, and every plant still on paper can be redirected at no extra cost. The unresolved tension is that India has defined green steel and funded the technology without creating a single buyer obliged to pay for it, so the supply side moves while the demand side does not. The measurable thing to watch is how much of the 43 million tonnes per annum falling due before 2030 is relined rather than replaced.

    Back2Basics: Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism

    1. What it is: A levy charged by an importing jurisdiction on the greenhouse gases embedded in an imported good, set at the carbon price the importing jurisdiction’s own producers already pay.
    2. Why it exists: It is intended to prevent carbon leakage, meaning the shifting of production to countries with weaker climate rules rather than an actual reduction in emissions.
    3. What it covers: The European Union’s version applies to iron and steel, aluminium, cement, fertilisers, electricity and hydrogen, the goods with the highest embedded emissions per unit of trade value.
    4. How it is contested: Developing country exporters argue the levy shifts the cost of the importing country’s climate policy onto producers who bear no comparable historical responsibility.

  • 16th National Meet of State Biodiversity Boards and Union Territory Biodiversity Councils

    Why in News

    The Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change held the 16th National Meet of State Biodiversity Boards and Union Territory Biodiversity Councils on 6 September 2026.

    Static Context

    1. Governing law: The Biological Diversity Act, 2002 governs the use of India’s biological resources. It gives effect to the Convention on Biological Diversity.
    2. Three tier structure: The Act built a three tier system. The National Biodiversity Authority (NBA) at Chennai sits at the top. State Biodiversity Boards (SBB) operate at the state level. Biodiversity Management Committees (BMC) function at the local body level.
    3. Access and benefit sharing: The system regulates access to biological resources and the fair sharing of benefits from their use. The BMCs prepare People’s Biodiversity Registers and can levy collection fees within their jurisdiction.
    4. Nagoya link: The Biodiversity Management Committees are central to realising the objectives of the Nagoya Protocol on access and benefit sharing.

    [2023] Consider the following statements:
    1. In Biodiversity the India, Management Committees are key to the realization of the objectives of the Nagoya Protocol.
    2. The Biodiversity Management Committees have important functions in determining access and benefit sharing, including the power to levy collection fees on the access of biological resources within its jurisdiction.
    Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

    [A] 1 only

    [B] 2 only

    [C] Both 1 and 2

    [D] Neither 1 nor 2

  • International Vulture Awareness Day 2026

    Why in News

    The Union Environment Minister led the International Vulture Awareness Day 2026 celebrations on 6 September 2026. The day falls on the first Saturday of September each year.

    Key Points

    1. The collapse: India’s Gyps vulture populations collapsed from tens of millions to near extinction from the mid 1990s. The cause was diclofenac, a painkiller given to cattle. Vultures that fed on treated carcasses suffered fatal kidney failure.
    2. The ban: India banned the veterinary use of diclofenac in 2006. Later restrictions targeted other toxic veterinary drugs such as aceclofenac and ketoprofen.
    3. Conservation effort: The Vulture Action Plan guides recovery through captive breeding and safe zones. Conservation breeding runs at centres such as the one at Pinjore, Haryana. Several Indian vulture species remain Critically Endangered on the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) Red List.
    4. Ecological role: Vultures are scavengers that clear carcasses. Their loss raised feral dog numbers and disease risk.

    Prelims angle

    • The diclofenac link to the vulture decline; the 2006 veterinary ban; Gyps species and their Critically Endangered status; vultures as scavengers in the food chain.

    [2012] Vultures which used to be very common in Indian countryside some years ago are rarely seen nowadays. This is attributed to

    (a) the destruction of their nesting sites by new invasive species

    (b) a drug used by cattle owners for treating their diseased cattle

    (c) scarcity of food available to them

    (d) a widespread, persistent and fatal disease among them.