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Subject: International Relations

  • New disengagement agreement in eastern Ladakh

    In the first major breakthrough in talks China’s Defence Ministry that PLA and Indian troops on the southern and northern shores of Pangong Tso began synchronized and organized disengagement.

    This newscard presents a holistic report on the ground situation of Sino-India border disputes in Ladakh.

    Also, try this PYQ from CSP 2020:

    Q.Siachen Glacier is situated to the

    (a) East of Aksai Chin

    (b) East of Leh

    (c)North of Gilgit

    (d) North of Nubra Valley

    New plan in eastern Ladakh

    • As of now, the disengagement process seems restricted to the north and south banks of Pangong Tso.
    • The process has started with the pulling back of certain columns of tanks from the south bank region by both sides.
    • At the moment, there is no pullback of troops from the friction points and the heights they are positioned on.
    • That will happen in a phased and verified manner.

    Disengagement from Pangong Tso

    • China will pull its troops on the north bank towards the east of Finger 8.
    • Similarly, India will also position its forces at its permanent base near Finger 3.
    • Similar action will be taken by both the parties in the south bank area as well.
    • Both sides have also agreed that the area between Finger 3 and Finger 8 will become a no-patrolling zone temporarily, till both sides reach an agreement through military and diplomatic discussions to restore patrolling.
    • Further, all the construction done by both sides on the north and south banks of the lake since April 2020 will be removed.

    Why is this area important?

    • The north and south banks of Pangong Tso are two of the most significant and sensitive regions when it comes to the current standoff that began in May 2020.
    • What makes the areas around the shores of the lake so sensitive and important is that clashes here marked the beginning of the standoff.
    • It is one of the areas where the Chinese troops had come around 8 km deep west of India’s perception of the Line of Actual Control.
    • China had positioned its troops on the ridgeline connecting Fingers 3 and 4, while according to India the LAC passes through Finger 8.

    Take a glimpse of all friction points along Indian borders:

    India is at an advantage

    • Further, it is in the south bank of the lake that Indian forces in an action in late August had gained a strategic advantage by occupying certain peaks, outwitting the Chinese.
    • Indian troops had positioned themselves on heights of Magar Hill, Mukhpari, Gurung Hill, Rezang La and Rechin La, which were unoccupied by either side earlier.
    • Since then, the Chinese side had been particularly sensitive as these positions allowed India to not only dominate Spanggur Gap.
    • It is a two-km wide valley that can be used to launch an offensive, as China had done in 1962, they also allow India a direct view of China’s Moldo Garrison.

    Why has this taken so long?

    • Since September, China has insisted that India first pull its troops back from the south bank of Pangong Tso, and the Chushul sub-sector.
    • However, India has been demanding that any disengagement process should include the entire region, and troops should go back to their April 2020 positions.
    • However, it seems that for now, both sides have agreed to first disengage from the Pangong Tso area only.

    Principles of disengagement

    In military and diplomatic discussions with China India expects a solution to the issue on the basis of three principles:

    1. LAC should be accepted and respected by both parties.
    2. Neither party should attempt to change the status quo unilaterally.
    3. All agreements should be fully adhered to by both parties.

    Does this mean that the standoff is resolved?

    • There are still some outstanding issues that remain regarding deployment and patrolling on LAC.
    • The Pangong Tso region is just one of the friction areas. There are other friction points, all north of the Pangong Tso, where the troops have been face-to-face since last year.
    • The situation in Depsang Plains continues to be a concern.
    • Both sides agree that complete disengagement under bilateral agreements and protocols should be done as soon as possible.
    • After the talks so far, China is also aware of our resolve to protect the sovereignty of the country.

    Need for confidence building

    • Two of the main stumbling blocks in finding a permanent resolution are lack of trust and no clarity on intent.
    • Any permanent resolution will include first, disengagement of troops from the frontlines from all friction points.
    • Then de-escalation will entail sending the troops from the depth areas to their original bases.
    • Both sides have around 50,000 troops in the region, along with additional tanks, artillery and air defence assets.

    Conclusion

    • A resolution has to include sending these troops and military equipment where they came from on both sides.
    • But neither side had been willing to take the first step to reduce their troop or military strength, as it does not trust the other side.

  • Taking the long view with China

    The article explains the various choices India faces in the geopolitical landscape shaped by emergence of two Asian giants.

    New challenges and hard choices on geopolitical front

    • As it moves to becoming the third largest economy in the world, India needs to have a clear-eyed world view and strategy as it makes hard choices.
    • It needs to reject the developing country regional mindset that has shaped India’s  national aims and foreign policy.
    • We have a “special and privileged strategic partnership” with Russia which provides more than three-quarter of India’s military equipment and a “comprehensive global strategic partnership” with the U.S.
    • India’s relationship with the U.S.-led Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), where the others are military allies, has rightly been cautious, as U.S. President Joe Biden sees China as a ‘strategic competitor’ rather than a ‘strategic rival’.
    • Realism dictates that India does not need to compromise on its strategic autonomy.
    • India faces two sides of the China conundrum: Defining engagement with its neighbour which is consolidating an expanding BRI while remaining involved with the strategic, security and technological concerns of the U.S.

    China’s dominance in financial sphere

    • In the financial sphere, there is the real possibility of the Chinese renminbi becoming a global reserve currency or e-yuan becoming the digital payments currency.
    • China is the world’s largest trading economy.
    • It could soon become the world’s largest economy.
    • China has stitched together an investment agreement with the EU and with most of Asia.
    • Relative attractiveness will determine when the dollar goes the way of the sterling and the guilder.
    • China, facing technological sanctions from the U.S., may well put in the hard work to make this happen soon.

    China: Partner, competitor, and economic rival

    • Some form of the EU’s China policy of seeing the emerging superpower as a partner, competitor, and economic rival depending on the policy area in question is going to be the global norm. 
    • This broad perspective is also reflected in India’s participation in both the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, designed to resist the spread of Western interests, and in the U.S.-led Quad, with its anti-China stance.
    • Within the United Nations, India’s interests have greater congruence with China’s interests rather than the U.S.’s and the EU’s.
    • Sharing the COVID-19 vaccine with other countries distinguishes India, and China, from the rest.

    India’s engagement with the U.S.

    • The congruence between India and the U.S. lies in the U.S.’s declared strategic objective of promoting an integrated economic development model in the Indo-Pacific as a credible alternative to the BRI, but with a caveat.
    • Instead of an alternate development model, India should move the Quad towards supplementing the infrastructure push of the BRI in line with other strategic concerns in the region.
    • For example, developing their scientific, technological capacity and digital economy, based on India’s digital stack and financial resources of other Quad members, will resonate with Asia and Africa.

    India’s role in global governance

    • Another area where India can play a ‘bridging role’ is global governance.
    • President Xi Jinping’s “community with shared future for mankind”, and Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s “climate justice” and asking how long India will be excluded from the UN Security Council, challenge the frame of the liberal order without providing specific alternatives.
    • With respect to digital data, India has recently expressed that there must be reciprocity in data sharing, and this is the kind of ‘big idea’ for sharing prosperity that will gain traction with other countries.

    India’s growing influence

    • India’s recent policies are gaining influence at the expense of China and the West, and both know this trend will accelerate.
    • The steps to a $5 trillion economy, shift to indigenous capital military equipment, and a new Science, Technology and Innovation Policy underline impact, capacity and interests.
    • ASEAN remains keen India re-join its trade pact to balance China.
    • It is being recognised that India’s software development prowess could shape a sustainable post-industrial state different to the U.S. and China model.

    Consider the question “Examine how India’s foreing policy priorities and its role in global governance is shaped by China’s rise.”

    Conclusion

    As in the historical past, Asia is big enough for both Asian giants to have complementary roles, share prosperity and be independent of each other and of the West.

     

  • Places in news: Shahtoot Dam

    India and Afghanistan have signed an agreement to build the Shahtoot Dam in Kabul to provide drinking water facility in the Afghan capital.

    Try this question from prelims 2020:

    Consider the following pairs

    Sr. River Flows into
    1. Mekong — Andaman Sea
    2. Thames — Irish Sea
    3. Volga — Caspian Sea
    4. Zambezi — Indian Ocean


    Which of the pairs given above is/are correctly matched?

    (a) 1 and 2 only

    (b) 3 only

    (c) 3 and 4 only

    (d) 1, 2 and 4 only

    Shahtoot Dam

    • It is a proposed dam in the Kabul river basin, one of the five river basins in Afghanistan.
    • This project will provide drinking, irrigation and Environmental water for Kabul province.
    • The dam will provide potable water to more than 2 million residents of Kabul, in addition to the irrigation of 4000 hectares of land in the district of Charasiab and Khairabad.
    • The dam will also provide water for irrigation to nearby areas, rehabilitate the existing irrigation and drainage network and help in flood protection and management efforts.
    • The project is expected to produce electricity for the region.

  • India’s challenge in dealing with international criticism

    Tweets by international celebrities in support of farmers’ protests and the government’s response to it have brought focus the issue of international scrutiny of India’s policies. The article analyses this issue.

    Issue of external criticism of India

    • Recently, India has been at the receiving end of international criticism over its dealing with the farmers’ protests against recently passed farm laws.
    • But neither the negative international scrutiny nor the Indian nationalist rejection of it are new.
    • Mobilising nationalist sentiment and evoking territorial sovereignty in fending off external criticism have been consistent themes in the conduct of independent India’s foreign policy.
    • The intensity of international scrutiny has varied over time and space, but they are unlikely to ever disappear.
    • As India becomes more connected to the world, there will be more global interest in its internal dynamics.
    • At the same time, like all rising powers, India will push back against demands that it must always measure up to external expectations.

    Why the Western criticism matters

    • Western power to turn sensible sentiments on democracy and human rights into consistent policies is rather limited.
    • Also, the issue of human rights has never been the sole factor shaping US foreign policy towards other nations.
    • But there is no denying that the Western power to create problems is real.
    • There are also implications of needless political arguments with the US over your domestic politics.
    • Asian realists also know that it is not difficult to neutralise Western liberal critics by emphasising engagement with others that might have commercial and security interests.

    Dealing with the criticism in the U.S. Congress

    • In the early 1990s, passing resolutions against India on Punjab and Kashmir in the US Congress was routine.
    • But once Delhi began to engage with US Congress and explained the complexity of the issues involved, the tide began to turn.
    • The Indian diaspora helped by reaching out to their representatives and pressing them to reconsider their positions.
    • Within a decade, supporters of separatism in Punjab and Kashmir could not even move the resolutions in the US Congress.

    Domestic polarisation and role of diaspora in international criticism

    • India’s problem is not with external criticism, India’s real challenge is the deepening domestic political divide.
    • India’s internal conflicts have inevitably enveloped the diaspora.
    • Sections of the diaspora that are opposed to Indian policies are actively mobilising the political class in their adopted countries to raise the voice against India.
    • They are also building wider coalitions to put the Indian government on the mat.
    • If the diaspora in the past helped India overcome some difficult problems with the US, it is the counter mobilisation of the diaspora that is shaping the western criticism of India.

    Way forward

    • The government’s ability to overcome external criticism depends on rebuilding the national consensus on key policies and healing the multiple social rifts.
    • Without a visible and sincere political effort to promote unity at home, internal divisions will get worse and make India more vulnerable to external meddling.

    Consider the question “Recently, India has been at the receiving end of the international criticism for its internal issues. What are the reasons for such criticism? Suggest the strategy to deal with such criticisms.” 

    Conclusion

    India’s own experience with Sri Lanka and Nepal underlines how hard it is to persuade other societies to accept Delhi’s preferences on the rights of minorities and federalism. In the end, democracy and pluralism can never be foreigner’s gifts. The struggle to construct and preserve democracies remains an internal one.

  • India’s Myanmar dilemma

    The coup in Myanmar poses several challenges for India. For one, it poses a dilemma in India’s dealing with Myanmar’s military. Also, it has implications for the Rohingya issue and containing the insurgency in north-east India.

    Implications of the coup in Myanmar

    1) Political realignment and role of Aung San Suu Kyi

    • Threat of sanctions from the United States and the West in the wake of the recent coup could lead to unique political realignments in Myanmar.
    • As a result, the international community may not have any alternatives than Aung San Suu Kyi when it comes to pursuing the restoration of democracy in the country.
    • The democratic credentials of Aung San Suu Kyi, remain deeply diminished today due to her justification of the ill-treatment meted out to the Rohingya,
    • Yet the recent events have brought her right back into the centre of the international community’s political calculations in Myanmar.

    2) Implications for Rohingya issus

    • International community will have to condone the government’s past actions against the Rohingya in order to highlight Suu Kyi as an anchor of democracy in Myanmar.
    • The case against Myanmar’s conduct during her government’s tenure at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) will most likely be put on the backburner.
    • Increasing global support for Ms. Suu Kyi could potentially negative consequences for the persecuted Rohingya.

    3) China factor

    • In the short run, the coup stands to hurt the interests of China, India and even the rest of the international community, all of whom were able to do business with Myanmar in their own unique ways.
    • For China, the coup has complicated its larger regional economic plans in Myanmar.
    • However, the international community’s sharp reactions will likely force the Tatmadaw (Myanmar’s military) to turn to China.
    • International sanctions are unlikely to have a major impact on the country’s largely inward-looking junta and its Generals.
    • However, it Generals would still expect Beijing to give them
    • For China, the coup has complicated its larger regional economic plans in Myanmar.
    • On the positive side for Beijing, decisive western sanctions will force the military to get closer to China.
    • To that extent, China will be its biggest beneficiary of the February coup by default.

    India’s dilemma

    • India faces the most challenging dilemma on how to respond to the military coup in Myanmar.
    • The dual power centres of the military and the civilian government that existed in Naypyitaw until recently, suited India.
    • While India’s national interests clearly lie in dealing with whoever is in power in Myanmar, India would find it difficult to openly support the junta given the strong western and American stance.
    • On the other hand, it can ill-afford to offend the junta by actively seeking a restoration of democracy there.
    • While Ms. Suu Kyi was getting cozy with Beijing, it was the Myanmar military that had been more circumspect.

    India’s concerns

    • While a friendless Myanmar junta getting closer to China is a real worry for New Delhi, there are other concerns too.
    • For one, Myanmar’s military played a helpful role in helping India contain the north-eastern insurgencies.
    • Equally important is the issue of providing succour to the Rohingya in the wake of the military coup in Myanmar.

    Consider the question “Developments in Myanmar have several implications for the regional geopolitics. In light of this, examine the challenges India faces from the development in Myanmar.”

    Conclusion

    India is left with very few clear policy options. And yet, it must continue to maintain relations with the government in power in Myanmar while discreetly pushing for political reconciliation in the country. In the meantime, the focus must be on improving trade, connectivity, and security links between the two sides.

  • US moves to rejoin UN Human Rights Council

    The Biden administration is set to reengage with the much-maligned UN Human Rights Council that former Donald Trump withdrew from almost three years ago.

    Try this PYQ:

    Q.Consider the following:

    1. Right to education.
    2. Right to equal access to public service.
    3. Right to food.

    Which of the above is/are Human Right/Human Rights under “Universal Declaration of Human Rights”?

    (a) 1 and 2 only

    (b) Only 1

    (c) 1, 2 and 3

    (d) Only 3

    Why did the US pulled-out earlier?

    • Trump pulled out of the world body’s main human rights agency in 2018 due to its disproportionate focus on Israel.
    • Israel had received by far the largest number of critical council resolutions against any country.
    • The Trump administration took issue with the body’s membership, which currently includes China, Cuba, Eritrea, Russia and Venezuela, all of which have been accused of human rights abuses.

    About UN Human Rights Council

    • The UNHRC describes itself as “an inter-governmental body within the UN system responsible for strengthening the promotion and protection of human rights around the globe.
    • It addresses situations of human rights violations and make recommendations on them.
    • The first session took place from June 19-30, 2006, three months after the Council was created by UN General Assembly Resolution 60/251 on March 15 that year.
    • The UNHRC has the ability to discuss all thematic human rights issues and situations that require its attention throughout the year.
    • The HRC replaced the former United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR).

    HRC Meetings

    • The Human Rights Council holds no fewer than three regular sessions a year, for a total of at least 10 weeks.
    • The meetings take place for four weeks in March, for three weeks in June, and for another three weeks in September.
    • The sessions are held at the UN Office in Geneva, Switzerland.
    • If one-third of the Member States so request, the HRC can decide at any time to hold a special session to address human rights violations and emergencies.

    Membership

    • The Council is made up of 47 UN Member States, which are elected by the UNGA through a direct and secret ballot.
    • The General Assembly takes into account the contribution of the candidate states to the promotion and protection of human rights, as well as their voluntary pledges and commitments in this regard.
    • Members of the Council serve for a period of three years and are not eligible for immediate re-election after serving two consecutive terms.
    • As of January 1, 2019, 114 UN Member States have served on the HRC. Both India and Pakistan are on this list.
    • The HRC has a Bureau of one President and four Vice-Presidents, representing the five regional groups. They serve for a year, in accordance with the Council’s annual cycle.

    Seat distribution

    • African States: 13 seats
    • Asia-Pacific States: 13 seats
    • Latin American and Caribbean States: 8 seats
    • Western European and other States: 7 seats
    • Eastern European States: 6 seats

  • The way forward in Myanmar

    The article discusses the five lessons from past experiences as the international community frames its response to the military coup in Myanmar.

    Coup in Myanmar

    • After Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) swept the polls by winning almost 80% of the vote, Myanmar’s military staged a coup and declared a state of Emergency for a year.
    • Myanmar, which started a fragile transition to democracy 10 years ago after decades of brutal military dictatorship, is back in the hands of the Generals.

    Lessons for the international community

    1) Benefits of sanctions

    • The developments in Myanmar will invariably bring back the old debate around the prudence of sanctions.
    • Notwithstanding the western sanctions before 2010 [during military rule], China, Thailand and Singapore were the key trading partners of Myanmar.
    • The present reality is no different.
    • Singapore was reportedly the largest foreign investor in Myanmar in 2020, accounting for 34% of the overall approved investment.
    • Given that the military has been able to economically withstand sanctions by striking deals with Asian countries in the past, sanctions are unlikely to bring any major political change.

    2) Accountability for crime against humanity

    • As political changes got underway in 2010, many generals were on the radar of the international community for perpetuating a regime of human rights abuses, quietly vanished from the scene.
    • This bred a culture of impunity.
    • During the 2017 Rohingya crisis, senior military officials brazenly exploited social media to mobilise public support for brutality against Rohingyas.

    3) China’s influence

    • Three, a critical international player in Myanmar is China.
    • The international community, particularly the West, has to factor in China’s multi-layered influence on Myanmar.

    4) Revival of past international mechanisms

    • Many international mechanisms comprising Western and Asian countries that were formed to coordinate strategies on Myanmar were disbanded after the 2015 election.
    • That the changes in Myanmar were irreversible was the standard thinking.
    • Relevant actors should be brought on a common platform by reviving past mechanisms.

    5) Increasing the engagement with domestic stakeholders

    • The expectation that Myanmar will see a nationwide protest against the military after the coup should be examined with the geographical extent of Bamar, Myanmar’s largest ethnic group, who support the National League for Democracy.
    • The minorities in the country form around 35% of the population.
    • In the current scenario, the military will continue to exploit ethnic and religious fault lines.
    • Engagement with domestic stakeholders, including ethnic minorities, especially from the north, should be pursued by the international community.

    Consider the question “As military hinders Myanmar’s transition to democracy, what are the factors that should be considered by the international community as it form the response to the situation in the country.”

    Conclusion

    There is one consistent lesson, that no change is irreversible, particularly in a context where military leadership scripted the meaning of democracy, and domestic forces and geopolitics continuously fail to deter its actions and impulses to rule.

  • No to vaccine nationalism, yes to global cooperation

    India has been supplying vaccines to other countries even as its first phase of vaccination covers the health care workers. At the same time, the selfishness of the advanced countries has been on full display by amassing the approved vaccines. The article deals with the issue of vaccine nationalism.

    What is vaccine nationalism

    • When a country manages to secure doses of vaccines for its own citizens or residents and prioritises its own domestic markets before they are made available in other countries it is known as ‘vaccine nationalism’.
    • This is done through pre-purchase agreements between a government and a vaccine manufacturer.
    • The advance purchase contracts made by some advanced countries for potential vaccines would vaccinate their population many times: the European Union, two times, the United States and the United Kingdom, four times, and Canada, six times.

    Impact on the SDGs

    • The reversal of progress on many Sustainable Development Goals, or SDGs, such as SDG 3 (“Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages) could affect the health of the world population, and global growth itself.
    • Even before COVID-19, projections have shown that 6% of the global population would be in extreme poverty, which has gone up by 71 million, thereby causing enormous challenges to SDG 1 (“End poverty in all its forms everywhere”).
    • According to estimates by the International Monetary Fund, over 50% of emerging markets and developing economies that were converging toward advanced economies per capita income over the last decade are expected to diverge over the 2020-22 period.

    India’s important role

    • While advanced countries have turned their back on the need of poor countries, India has taken a position that a significant percentage of the approved doses will be permitted for exports.
    • While its exports to neighbouring counties will be under grant mode, initial shipment of vaccines to least developed countries will be free of cost.
    • Brazil has received 2 million doses of vaccine from India (as of January 23).
    • While India is in its first phase of vaccination to cover health-care workers, exports from India are helping other countries also in initiating phase one of their vaccination programme — a gesture well-appreciated globally.
    • The ability to produce large volumes of vaccine at an affordable cost underlines India’s importance to developing countries when it comes to drug access.

    Need for coordinated global efforts

    • Due to the vaccine nationalism, the arguments of public good and global cooperation have been widely neglected.
    • Nevertheless, India’s approach only reinforces the need of having coordinated global efforts in bringing COVID-19 under control.
    • This response manifests India’s unstinted commitment to global development and has consolidated its name as the world’s pharmacy.

    COVAX Project: Unique case of global cooperation

    • The COVAX project is a global risk-sharing mechanism for pooled procurement and fair distribution of COVID-19 vaccines.
    • It is based on funding from high and middle-income countries.
    • Since high and middle-income countries are buying up large amounts of the vaccine directly from suppliers, the promise by COVAX to deliver 2 billion doses by the end of 2021 seems to face new challenges.
    • Since most of the vaccines are purchased from the global south [specifically, India and China] for developing nations, the COVAX project can draw new pathways for global development.
    • Most of these vaccines are cost-effective and affordable to the global south.

    Consider the question “What is vaccine nationalism? Examine the role played by India against the backdrop of vaccine nationalism.” 

    Conclusion

    The development of vaccines is a classic story of global cooperation between the North and the South. Unfortunately, the increasing nationalist tendencies of the democratic World during the pandemic have challenged the positive narrative on global cooperation.

  • Iran rules out changes to Nuclear Deal

    Iranian President Hassan Rouhani ruled out changes to Iran’s nuclear accord with world powers and dismissed calls to broaden the terms of the deal and include regional countries.

    Do you know how the enmity between Iran and the US came into reality?  We hope you have watched the Argo (2012) movie for sure!

    What is the news?

    • The election of Joe Biden, who supports a US return to the agreement, has spurred some expectations of renewed diplomacy.
    • But Rouhani’s refusal puts this possibility at the end.

    The United States since 1979 has applied various economic, trades, scientific and military sanctions against Iran. U.S. economic sanctions are administered by the Office of Foreign Assets Control.

    Iranian Nuclear Agreement

    • The Iran nuclear agreement, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), is a landmark accord reached between Iran and several world powers, including the US, in July 2015.
    • Under its terms, Iran agreed to dismantle much of its nuclear program and open its facilities to more extensive international inspections in exchange for billions of dollars’ worth of sanctions relief.

    What were the goals of JCPOA?

    • The P5+1 wanted to unwind Iran’s nuclear program to the point that if Tehran decided to pursue a nuclear weapon, it would take at least one year, giving world powers time to respond.
    • Heading into the JCPOA negotiations, U.S. intelligence officials estimated that, in the absence of an agreement, Iran could produce enough nuclear material for a weapon in a few months.

    Who are the participants?

    • The JCPOA, which went into effect in January 2016, imposes restrictions on Iran’s civilian nuclear enrichment program.
    • At the heart of negotiations with Iran were the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (China, France, Russia, the UK, and the US) and Germany—collectively known as the P5+1.
    • The European Union also took part.
    • Prior to the JCPOA, the P5+1 had been negotiating with Iran for years, offering its government various incentives to halt uranium enrichment.

    Disruptions after trump

    • The deal has been in jeopardy since President Donald J. Trump withdrew the US from it in 2018.
    • In response to the U.S. departure, as well as to deadly attacks on prominent Iranians in 2020, including one by the United States, Iran has resumed some of its nuclear activities.

    Why isn’t the deal yet enforced?

    • In April 2020, the United States announced its intention to keep back sanctions.
    • The other P5 members objected to the move, saying the US could not unilaterally implement the mechanism because it left the nuclear deal in 2018.
    • Meanwhile, the wide range of U.S. sanctions unrelated to the nuclear program has added to the damage.

     Iran’s current nuclear activity

    • Iran since Trump’s decisions started exceeding agreed-upon limits to its stockpile of low-enriched uranium.
    • It began enriching uranium to higher concentrations (though still far short of the purity required for weapons).
    • It also began developing new centrifuges to accelerate uranium enrichment; resuming heavy water production at its Arak facility.

    Did you know?

     

    Mined uranium has less than 1 percent of the uranium-235 isotope used in fission reactions, and centrifuges increase that isotope’s concentration. Uranium enriched to 5 percent is used in nuclear power plants, and at 20 percent it can be used in research reactors or for medical purposes. High-enriched uranium, at some 90 percent, is used in nuclear weapons.

  • Sri Lanka pushes India out of Colombo Terminal Project

    After the strong opposition from within, the Sri Lankan government was forced to revoke a 2019 agreement with India and Japan to develop the strategic East Container Terminal (ECT) at the Colombo Port.

    Map Reading: Note all these major ports and try recalling their sequences in the clockwise and counter-clockwise direction.

    What is the news?

    • PM Mahinda Rajapaksa made a statement that the operation of the east terminal would be done by Sri Lanka Ports Authority on its own.
    • Its cabinet has approved a proposal to develop the West Terminal at the Colombo Port as a PPP with India and Japan, which is seen as a bid to compensate India.
    • It is unclear whether India would accept the latest proposal.

    What is the Project?

    • The tripartite agreement, signed by India, Sri Lanka and Japan, proposes to develop the ECT, which is located at the newly expanded southern part of the Colombo Port.
    • The ECT is located 3 km away from the China-backed international financial city, known as Port City, currently being built in Colombo.
    • A Chinese company was behind the controversial 2018 Hambantota port project, signed its first contract in the Port City last month.
    • It is also on the map of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

    India’s reaction

    • A few weeks ago EAM S. Jaishankar visited Sri Lanka where he discussed the development of the stalled project.
    • India’s first response was that the island nation should not be taking a decision in a unilateral manner on an existing tripartite agreement.

    Compensatory offer to India

    • After the decision on revoking the 2019 agreement, SL has approved another proposal to develop the west terminal of the Colombo port with Japan and India.
    • Commercially, the west terminal offer is better for India as it gives 85% stake for developers of the West Terminal against the 49% in ECT.

    Sri Lanka expects India to rethink. Why?

    • Indian response to this compensatory offer is unclear since there was no formal communication by SL authorities.
    • Geo-politically, west terminal is almost the same India considers the security aspect and the necessity to have a port terminal in Sri Lanka.
    • There is no difference between East and West Terminals except for the fact that development of the ECT is partially completed while the development of the West Terminal has to start from scratch.

    SL version of the revocation

    • Incumbent PM Mahinda Rajapaksa said the pressure was immense on the President Gotabaya Rajapaksa to cancel the 2019 agreement.
    • The pressure was brewing so much that he was becoming so unpopular among the people.
    • As per the agreement signed by the former Maithripala Sirisena-Ranil Wickremesinghe administration, India and Japan together were to hold 49% stake in ECT.
    • What had finally made the government surrender before trade unions were the increasing support of many more sections in the society for the protests against privatization.

    The inevitable factor: China

    • This move can be easily interpreted as a reaction to Chinese communication to Sri Lanka.
    • China has reportedly instigated trade unions and civil societies against this project.

    Q.The threat of Chinese presence in South Asia can be tackled more effectively if India changes course in its dealings with its neighbours and becomes more sensitive to their concerns. Critically analyse.

    Outcome: Souring of the ties

    • For India, the strategic ECT project was important. Even the EAM has visited Colombo in January in this regard.
    • Critics of the Sri Lankan government anticipate many national and international impacts surrounding the latest decision on ECT.
    • Meantime, internationally an offended India can make life tough for Sri Lanka, isolating the tiny island nation, geo-politically and on the economic front.
    • The economic isolation will not help Sri Lanka at a time when the country is taking steps to revive the economy amid a pandemic.