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Subject: International Relations

  • Why South China Sea matters to India

    What happens in the South China Sea has bearing on India. So far, the U.S. played a major role in the prosperity and security of the Indo-Pacific, but after the Covid, it may be forced to reconsider its stand over the region. So, what is at stake for India? And what are the options available with ASEAN countries and Indian in such a situation? Read to know…

    Dilemma the Indo-Pacific countries faces

    •  As the two most consequential powers of the world, the United States and China which are engaged in a fundamental transformation of their relationship rest of the countries in the region face a dilemma.
    • Almost nobody any longer thinks that China will conform to the US worldview, or that China’s rise from hereon will be unchallenged.
    • The Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong’s essay in the latest issue of Foreign Affairs cogently spells out this dilemma.

    How the U.S. contributed to the region’s prosperity

    • The Indo-Pacific has prospered under American hegemony for the previous 40 years not just because of their huge investments.
    • U.S. invested $328.8 billion in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) alone and a further $107 billion in China.
    • However, it’s not the investment but also because of the security blanket that it provides.
    • China might have replaced the US as the primary engine of growth in the last decade, but it has come with a cost — the assertion of Chinese power.
    • The benign American military presence has afforded countries the opportunity to pursue economic prosperity without substantial increases in their own defence expenditures or having to look over their shoulders.
    • No group of nations has benefitted more from the presence of the US than the ASEAN.

    How Chinese military posture is different from the U.S.

    • Chinese military postures, on the other hand, give cause for concern ever since they unilaterally put forward the Nine-Dash Line in 2009 to declare the South China Sea as territorial waters.
    • Their territorial claim itself is tenuous, neither treaty-based nor legally sound.
    • They act in ways that are neither benign nor helpful for long-term peace and stability.
    • In the first half of 2020 alone, Chinese naval or militia forces have rammed a Vietnamese fishing boat, “buzzed” a Philippines naval vessel and harassed a Malaysian oil drilling operation, all within their respective EEZs.
    • Since 2015, they have built a runway and underground storage facilities on the Subi Reef and Thitu Island as well as radar sites and missile shelters on Fiery Cross Reef and Mischief Reef.
    • They conducted ballistic missile tests in the South China Sea in June 2019 and continue to enhance naval patrols to enforce area denial for others.

    Fundamental choices the region faces

    • Going forward, the US and China face fundamental choices.
    • But then, so do the rest of us living in the Indo-Pacific.
    • America’s role in the preservation of the region’s peace and security should not be taken for granted.
    • As COVID imposes crushing costs on all economies, the US may also be weighing its options.
    • Finding justification for Chinese actions in the South China Sea, even as countries in the region help themselves to Chinese economic opportunities while sheltering under the US security blanket, is also fraught with risk.
    • Accommodation may have worked thus far but regional prosperity has come at a mounting cost in geo-strategic terms.
    • The South China Sea is effectively militarised. In the post-COVID age, enjoying the best of both worlds may no longer be an option.

    But, ASEAN won’t change the course suddenly

    • Nobody should expect that ASEAN will suddenly reverse course when faced with possibly heightened Sino-US competition.
    • China is a major power that will continue to receive the respect of ASEAN and, for that matter, many others in the Indo-Pacific, especially in a post-COVID world where they are struggling to revive their economies.
    • ASEAN overtook the European Union to become China’s largest trading partner in the first quarter of 2020, and China is the third-largest investor ($150 billion) in ASEAN.
    • The South East Asians are skilled at finding the wiggle room to accommodate competing hegemons while advancing their interests.
    • This does not, however, mean that they are not concerned over Chinese behaviour in the South China Sea.
    • They need others to help them in managing the situation.

    Validation of the US military presence and collective efforts of stakeholders

    • A robust US military presence is one guarantee.
    • A stronger validation by the littoral states of the South China Sea helps the US Administration in justifying their presence to the American tax-payer.
    • Others who have stakes in the region also need to collectively encourage an increasingly powerful China to pursue strategic interests in a legitimate way, and on the basis of respect for international law, in the South China Sea.
    • The real choice is not between China and America — it is between keeping the global commons open for all or surrendering the right to choose one’s partners for the foreseeable future.

    What is at stake for India?

    • How the South China Sea situation plays out will be critical for our security and well-being.
    • India must consider the following factors while calibrating its approach.
    • 1) The South China Sea is not China’s sea but a global common.
    • 2) It has been an important sea-lane of communication since the very beginning, and passage has been unimpeded over the centuries.
    • 3) Indians have sailed these waters for well over 1,500 years — there is ample historical and archaeological proof of a continuous Indian trading presence from Kedah in Malaysia to Quanzhou in China.
    • 4) Nearly $200 billion of our trade passes through the South China Sea and thousands of our citizens study, work and invest in ASEAN, China, Japan and the Republic of Korea.
    • 5)  We have stakes in the peace and security of this region in common with others who reside there, and freedom of navigation, as well as other normal activities with friendly countries, are essential for our economic well-being. In short, the South China Sea is our business.
    • We have historical rights established by practice and tradition to traverse the South China Sea without impediment.
    • We have mutually contributed to each other’s prosperity for two thousand years.
    • We continue to do so.
    • The proposition that nations that have plied these waters in the centuries past for trade and other peaceful purposes are somehow outsiders who should not be permitted to engage in legitimate activity in the South China Sea, or have a voice without China’s say, should be firmly resisted.

    India needs to be responsive to ASEAN

    • India needs to be responsive to ASEAN’s expectations.
    • While strategic partnerships and high-level engagements are important, ASEAN expects longer-lasting buy-ins by India in their future.
    • They have taken the initiative time and again to involve India in Indo-Pacific affairs.
    • It is not as if our current level of trade or investment with ASEAN makes a compelling argument for them to automatically involve us.
    • They have deliberately taken a longer-term view.
    • A restructuring of global trade is unlikely to happen any time soon in the post-COVID context.
    • Regional arrangements will become even more important for our economic recovery and rejuvenation.
    • If we intend to heed the clarion call of “Think Global Act Local”, India has to be part of the global supply chains in the world’s leading growth region for the next half-century.
    • It is worth paying heed to the words from Singapore’s prime minister, who writes that something significant is lost in an RCEP without India.
    • And urges us to recognise that the value of such agreements goes beyond the economic gains they generate.
    • Singapore is playing the long game. Are we willing to do so, even if it imposes some costs in the short-term?

    Consider the question “The South China Sea has been witnessing growing militarisation day by day. And how the South China Sea situation plays out will be critical for our security and well-being. In light of this, examine the basis on which India should contest China’s unilateral claims in the area and scope of engagement with the ASEAN countries in this regard.”

    Conclusion

    Indian is a stakeholder in the South China Sea. What happens there have implications for us. In such a scenario, India must form a partnership with other players in the region and should attempt to make China follow international laws and global order.

  • SIPRI Report on Nuclear Stockpiles

    All nations that have nuclear weapons continue to modernize their nuclear arsenals, while India and China increased their nuclear warheads in the last one year, according to a latest report by Swedish think tank Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

    About SIPRI

    • Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) is an international institute based in Sweden, dedicated to research into conflict, armaments, arms control and disarmament.
    • Established in 1966, the Stockholm based SIPRI provides data, analysis and recommendations, based on open sources, to policymakers, researchers, media and the interested public.

    Practice question for Mains:

    Q.“Nuclear disarmament of the world seems a distant dream”. Comment.

    Nuclear arsenals are on rise in ‘thy neighbourhood’

    • China is in the middle of a significant modernization of its nuclear arsenal.
    • It is developing a so-called nuclear triad for the first time, made up of new land and sea-based missiles and nuclear-capable aircraft.
    • China’s nuclear arsenal had gone up from 290 warheads in 2019 to 320 in 2020, while India’s went up from 130-140 in 2019 to 150 in 2020.
    • Pakistan’s arsenal was estimated to be between 150-160 in 2019 and has reached 160 in 2020.
    • Both China and Pakistan continue to have larger nuclear arsenals than India.

    A general decline across the globe

    • Together with the nine nuclear-armed states — the U.S., Russia, the United Kingdom, France, China, India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea — possessed an estimated 13,400 nuclear weapons at the start of 2020.
    • This marked a decrease from an estimated 13,865 nuclear weapons at the beginning of 2019.
    • The decrease in the overall numbers was largely due to the dismantlement of old nuclear weapons by Russia and the U.S., which together possess over 90% of the global nuclear weapons.

    Major issue in reporting: Low levels of disclosure

    • The availability of reliable information on the status of the nuclear arsenals and capabilities of the nuclear-armed states varied considerably, the report noted.
    • The U.S. had disclosed important information about its stockpile and nuclear capabilities, but in 2019, the administration ended the practice of publicly disclosing the size of its stockpile.
    • The governments of India and Pakistan make statements about some of their missile tests but provide little information about the status or size of their arsenals, the report said.

    New START seems to ‘STOP’ very soon

    • The U.S. and Russia have reduced their nuclear arsenals under the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) but it will lapse in February 2021 unless both parties agree to prolong it.
    • However, discussions to extend the New START or negotiate a new treaty made no progress with the U.S.’s insistence that China must join any future nuclear arms reduction talks, which China has categorically ruled out.
    • The deadlock over the New START and the collapse of the 1987 Soviet–U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty) in 2019 suggest that the era of bilateral nuclear arms control agreements between Russia and the U.S. might be coming to an end.
    • Russia and the U.S. have already announced extensive plans to replace and modernize their nuclear warheads and delivery systems.
    • Both countries have also given new or expanded roles to nuclear weapons in their military plans and doctrines, which marks a significant reversal of the post-Cold War trend towards the gradual marginalisation of nuclear weapons.

    Back2Basics: INF Treaty

    • Under the INF treaty, the US and Soviet Union agreed not to develop, produce, possess or deploy any ground-based ballistic and cruise missiles that have a range between 500 and 5,500 km.
    • It exempted the air-launched and sea-based missile systems in the same range.
    • The INF treaty helped address the fears of an imminent nuclear war in Europe.
    • It also built some trust between Washington and Moscow and contributed to the end of the Cold War.

    New START Policy

    • The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) pact limits the number of deployed nuclear warheads, missiles and bombers and is due to expire in 2021 unless renewed.
    • The treaty limits the US and Russia to a maximum of 1,550 deployed nuclear warheads and 700 deployed missiles and bombers, well below Cold War caps.
    • It was signed in 2010 by former US President Barack Obama and then-Russian President Dmitry Medvedev.
    • It is one of the key controls on superpower deployment of nuclear weapons.
    • If it falls, it will be the second nuclear weapons treaty to collapse under the leadership of US President Donald Trump.

  • International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

    The UN nuclear watchdog IAEA’s governing body began meeting as a row brews over Iran’s refusal to allow access to two sites where nuclear activity may have occurred in the past.

    Practice question for mains:

    Q. Discuss the role of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in enhancing nuclear accountability of the world.

    Concerns over Iran

    • The latest row over access comes as a landmark deal between Iran and world powers in 2015 continues to unravel.
    • If IAEA passes a resolution critical of Iran, it would be the first of its kind since 2012.
    • Even though the two sites are not thought to be key to Iran’s current activities, the agency says it needs to know if past activities going back almost two decades have been properly declared and all materials accounted for.

    About IAEA

    • The IAEA is an international organization that seeks to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy and to inhibit its use for any military purpose, including nuclear weapons.
    • The IAEA has its headquarters in Vienna, Austria. It was established as an autonomous organisation on 29 July 1957.
    • Though established independently of the UN through its own international treaty, the IAEA reports to both the UN General Assembly and UN Security Council.

    Functions of IAEA

    • The IAEA serves as an intergovernmental forum for scientific and technical co-operation in the peaceful use of nuclear technology and nuclear power worldwide.
    • The programs of the IAEA encourage the development of the peaceful applications of nuclear energy, science and technology, provide international safeguards against misuse of nuclear technology and nuclear materials, and promote nuclear safety (including radiation protection) and nuclear security standards and their implementation.

  • Indian Ocean Commission (IOC)

    India is looking to post Navy Liaison Officers at the Regional Maritime Information Fusion Centre (RMIFC) of IOC in Madagascar and also at the European maritime surveillance initiative in the Strait of Hormuz.

    Note the members of the IOC form map. One may get confused considering India as a permanent member.

    About Indian Ocean Commission (IOC)

    • The IOC is an intergovernmental organization that was created in 1982 at Port Louis, Mauritius and institutionalized in 1984 by the Victoria Agreement in Seychelles.
    • The IOC is composed of five African Indian Ocean nations: Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, Réunion (an overseas region of France), and Seychelles.
    • These five islands share geographic proximity, historical and demographic relationships, natural resources and common development issues.

    Aims and Objectives of IOC

    • IOC’s principal mission is to strengthen the ties of friendship between the countries and to be a platform of solidarity for the entire population of the African Indian Ocean region.
    • IOC’s mission also includes development, through projects related to sustainability for the region, aimed at protecting the region, improving the living conditions of the populations and preserving the various natural resources that the countries depend on.
    • Being an organisation regrouping only island states, the IOC has usually championed the cause of small island states in regional and international fora.

    India and IOC

    • India was accepted as an observer getting a seat at the table of the organization that handles maritime governance in the western Indian Ocean.
    • India’s entry is a consequence of its deepening strategic partnership with France as well as its expanding ties with the Vanilla Islands.
    • The IOC has four observers — China, EU, Malta and International Organisation of La Francophonie (OIF).

    Significance of IOC

    • For India, the importance of joining this organization lies in several things.
    • First, India will get an official foothold in a premier regional institution in the western Indian Ocean, boosting engagement with islands in this part of the Indian Ocean.
    • These island nations are increasingly important for India’s strategic outreach as part of its Indo-Pacific policy.
    • This move would enhance ties with France which is the strong global power in the western Indian Ocean.
    • It lends depth to India’s SAGAR (security and growth for all in the region) policy unveiled by PM Modi in 2015.
    • The move, India hopes, would lead to greater security cooperation with countries in East Africa.

  • A case for quiet diplomacy to resolve standoff

    Apart from the recent one, there had been several stand-offs between India and China over the border issue. The use of quiet diplomacy to diffuse the situation underlies all these stand-offs. However, politicisation of stand-off could make the situation difficult to resolve. This article explains the use of quiet diplomacy and problems posed by the politicisation of the stand-offs.

    Process to diffuse tension began but not at all points

    •  Both sides have agreed on a broad plan to defuse four of the five points of discord.
    • The situation at the fifth, Pangong Lake remains uncertain as also in Galwan valley and north Sikkim.
    • At Pangong Tso, the Chinese have entrenched their positions with tents and remain on India’s side of the LAC.
    • There is a major point of difference which will not be easy to resolve.

    Let’s look into the strategy used by India in the past to resolve stand-offs

    • The pattern of resolution of past stand-offs underlines the key role played by quiet diplomacy in unlocking complicated stand-off situations.
    • Both the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) and National Democratic Alliance (NDA) governments have followed an approach that has coupled quiet diplomacy with a strong military posture, while at the same time allowing the adversary a way out.
    • This has been the broad strategy in dealing with challenges from China across the LAC.
    • And this strategy has generally worked.

    Let’s look into three specific incidents

    1) 2013-Depsang plains

    • In 2013, when Chinese troops pitched tents on India’s side of the LAC on the Depsang plains, similar to Pangong Tso.
    • The UPA government was under fire, both for being weak on China and for its reticence.
    • While the government was being publicly attacked for doing nothing, it had privately conveyed to China that if the stand-off didn’t end, an upcoming visit by Premier Li Keqiang would be off.
    • If that demand had been made public at the time, China would have only dug in its heels, even if the government may have won the headlines of the day.

    2) Chumar stand-off

    • The government adopted a similar strategy during the 2014 stand-off at Chumar, which coincided with President Xi Jinping’s visit to India.
    • Mr. Xi’s visit went ahead, while India quietly but forcefully stopped the Chinese road-building and deployed 2,500 soldiers, outnumbering the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).
    • The PLA withdrew.
    • Both sides disengaged and followed a moratorium into patrolling into contested areas, which was observed for many months thereafter.

    Ultimately, in both cases, the objective was achieved. China, faced with firm resistance, was prevented from changing the status quo.

    3) Doklam stand-off in 2017

    • In 2017, the government came under particularly intense fire because it stayed studiously silent through a 72-day stand-off at Doklam.
    • Indian troops crossed over into Bhutan to stop a Chinese road construction on territory India sees as Bhutanese but China claims.
    • By extending the road, India argued, China was unilaterally altering the India-Bhutan-China trijunction.
    • Beijing demanded an unconditional withdrawal.
    • When both finally disengaged, neither divulged the terms.
    • It would later emerge that the deal struck involved India withdrawing first.
    • China then stopped construction, and the status quo at the face-off site was restored.

    Stand-off politics in the country

    • Politics over border stand-offs is not new.
    •  The Opposition and the media are certainly right to hold the government to account.
    • Indeed, neither the Opposition nor the media would be doing its job if they weren’t.
    • The tensions on the LAC are neither the first nor likely to be the last.
    • With every incident, they are, however, getting increasingly politicised in an environment where there is a 24/7 demand on social media for information — and unprecedented capacity for disinformation.
    • Rather than wish away this reality — and adopt a stand that it is above questioning — the government needs to come to terms with it. 

    Dealing with the politicisation of stand-offs

    •  First, it needs to keep the Opposition informed, which it is clear it hasn’t.
    • Second, it needs to proactively engage with the media, even if that may be through low-key engagement as was the case on June 9, that does not escalate into a public war of words.
    • At the same time, expectations of having a public debate about the intricacies of every border stand-off — or for the Prime Minister to weigh in even while negotiations are ongoing — need to be tempered.
    • This will only risk inflaming tensions, and reduce the wiggle room for both sides to find an off-ramp.
    • The broader objective shouldn’t get lost in political debates.
    • That objective is to ensure India’s security interests remain protected — and that the status quo on India’s borders isn’t changed by force.

    Consider the question “Border issue between India and China has several times resulted in the stand-off between the two countries but the use of quiet diplomacy helped defuse the tension. But the politicisation of such issue could complicate the situation in the future. Comment.

    Conclusion

    • Past incidents have shown that quiet diplomacy, coupled with strong military resolve that deters any Chinese misadventures, has been more effective than public sabre-rattling, even if we may be inhabiting a media environment that misconstrues loudness as strength, and silence as weakness.

  • Sikkim-Tibet Convention of 1890 and its significance

    The skirmishes between Indian and Chinese troops at Naku La in Sikkim that is considered settled may be Beijing’s way of attempting a new claim. Defence experts highlighted the historical Sikkim-Tibet Convention of 1890 as proof of India’s ownership of the territory.

    Practice question for mains:

    Q. China’s actions on dormant areas mask a hidden agenda of broader assertiveness in the entire Asia-Pacific. Comment.

    China creates a new flashpoint

    • Referring to a major scuffle that took place at Naku La in May, it was unusual for Chinese troops to open up a part of the LAC that has not been in contention before.

    Sikkim-Tibet Convention of 1890

    • Of the entire 3,488km Sino-Indian border, the only section on which both countries agree that there is no dispute is the 220km Sikkim-Tibet section of the boundary.
    • This is because under the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890, the Sikkim-Tibet border was agreed upon and in 1895 it was jointly demarcated on the ground.
    • Not only that but the new government of People’s Republic of China, which took power in 1949, confirmed this position in a formal note to the government of India on 26 December 1959.

    Chinese claims

    • Prior to Sikkim’s merger with India in 1975, the Chinese side accepted the Watershed based alignment of the International Border (IB).
    • The Sikkim – Tibet boundary has long formally been delimited and there is neither any discrepancy between the maps nor any dispute in practice.
    • The Chinese reiterate that, as per para (1) of the Convention of 1890, the tri-junction is at Mount Gipmochi.

    India’s stance

    • The geographic alignment of the features was so prominent that it could easily be identified and recognized.
    • Even analysing the available Google images of the past, the location of Naku La could be discerned by anyone as the watershed parting line in the area was very prominent. “
    • There exist no ambiguity with respect to the location of the pass, since geographic realities cannot be altered.

    How Sikkim came into the picture?

    • Earlier, Sikkim came into the limelight in 1965 during the India-Pakistan conflict, when the Chinese suddenly and without any provocation sent a strongly-worded threat.
    • Then PM Lal Bahadur Shastri neatly sidestepped the issue by stating that if the bunkers were on the Chinese side they were well within their rights to demolish them.
    • The point that the Chinese were trying to make was not military, but political, for they wanted to bolster the Pakistani spirit, which by then was rapidly losing steam.
    • As India stood firm with the backing of USSR and the US, nothing emerged from Chinese threats on the Sikkim-Tibet border.

    Series of activity since then

    • In 1967, the Chinese again activated the Sikkim-Tibet border and on 11 September, suddenly opened fire on an Indian patrol party near Nathu La pass. The main point was that India did not lose any position, nor did it yield any ground.
    • The next important episode was in 2003. When PM Vajpayee conceded during his visit to China in 2003 that “the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) was a part of the PRC” with the expectation that China would recognize Sikkim as a part of India.
    • This did not materialize then but in the joint statement issued by premier Wen Jiabao and prime minister Manmohan Singh on 11 April 2005.
    • In part 13, the Chinese recognized “Sikkim State of the Republic of India”. Wen even handed over an official map of the People’s Republic of China to Singh, showing Sikkim as a part of India.

    Nothing new about the skirmishes over Sikkim

    • History would thus indicate that the present stand-off between India and China over the Sikkim-Tibet boundary is nothing new.
    • The latest episode after a road construction party entered Doklam area, despite Bhutanese attempts to dissuade them.

    Ignoring usual behaviour

    • The clearly orchestrated actions on an otherwise dormant area mask a hidden agenda.
    • The Chinese push at several points along the LAC and also the ongoing aggression in the South China Sea and Taiwan Straits are testimony to this.
    • The timeline of initiating this incident indicates a high level of pre-planning, possibly at senior levels of the PLA as well as the Chinese government.

    Way forward

    • There is no question of India bending to Chinese “demands”, for like in 1967, it must stand its ground firmly.
    • That would be a sufficient lesson for the Chinese that the Indian Army is no pushover and this is perhaps the only way to deal with China that likes to flaunt its economic and military prowess.

  • Expanding the G7

    There has been a call for expansion of G7 by the U.S. President. Against this backdrop, this article examines the historical background in which the group emerged. But a lot has changed since. So, it would be appropriate for G7 to adjust to the new reality. But what would be the focus of a new mechanism? What are the areas in which India would be interested? All such questions are answered in this article.

    Call for expansion of G7 and China’s objection

    • Recently, the U.S. President proposed the expansion of G7 to G10 or G11,  with the inclusion of India, South Korea, Australia and possibly Russia.
    • Elaborating this logic, the White House Director of Strategic Communications said the U.S. President wanted to include other countries, including the Five Eyes countries.
    • Five Eye is an intelligence alliance comprising Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States.
    • The U.S. also stressed said the expanded group should talk about the future of China.
    • A Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs official immediately reacted, labelling it as “seeking a clique targeting China”.

    Should India care about China’s objection if invited to join?

    • China’s objection to an expanded G7 is no reason for India to stay away from it, if invited to join.
    • India has attended several G7 summits earlier too, as a special invitee for its outreach sessions.
    • India’s Prime Minister was guest invited to Biarritz, France to the G7 summit last year, along with other heads of government.

    The historical background of G7

    • The G7 emerged as a restricted club of the rich democracies in the early 1970s.
    • The quadrupling of oil prices just after the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, when  OPEC imposed an embargo against Canada, Japan, the Netherlands, and the United States, shocked their economies.
    • Although the French were spared the embargo, the chill winds of the OPEC action reverberated around the world.
    • So, French President invited the Finance Ministers of five of the most developed members of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, the United States, Germany, Japan, Italy, and the United Kingdom, for an informal discussion on global issues.
    • This transformed into a G7 Summit of the heads of government from the following year with the inclusion of Canada in 1976.
    • And the European Commission/Community (later Union) joined as a non-enumerated member, a year later.
    • On the initiative of U.S. President Bill Clinton and British Prime Minister Tony Blair, the G7 became the G8, with the Russian Federation joining the club in 1998.
    • This ended with Russia’s expulsion following the annexation of Crimea in 2014.

    Declining share G7 and rising of E7 in world GDP

    • When constituted, the G7 countries accounted for close to two-thirds of global GDP.
    • According to the 2017 report of the accountancy firm, PwC, “The World in 2050”, they now account for less than a third of global GDP on a purchasing power parity (PPP) basis.
    • And less than half on market exchange rates (MER) basis.
    • The seven largest emerging economies (E7, or “Emerging 7”), comprising Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia and Turkey, account for over a third of global GDP on purchasing power parity (PPP) terms.
    • And over a quarter on MER basis.

    Predictions for India

    • India’s economy is already the third largest in the world in PPP terms, even if way behind that of the U.S. and China.
    • By 2050, the PwC Report predicts, six of the seven of the world’s best performing economies will be China, India, the United States, Indonesia, Brazil, and Russia.
    • Two other E7 countries, Mexico and Turkey, also improve their position.
    • It projects that India’s GDP will increase to $17 trillion in 2030 and $42 trillion in 2050 in PPP terms, in second place after China, just ahead of the United States.
    • This is predicated on India overcoming the challenge of COVID-19, sustaining its reform process and ensuring adequate investments in infrastructure, institutions, governance, education and health.

    Limitations of G7

    • The success or otherwise of multilateral institutions are judged by the standard of whether or not they have successfully addressed the core global or regional challenges of the time.
    • The G7 failed to head off the economic downturn of 2007-08.
    • This failure led to the rise of the G20.
    • In the short span of its existence, the G20 has provided a degree of confidence, by promoting open markets, and stimulus, preventing a collapse of the global financial system.
    • The G7 also failed to address the contemporary issues, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, climate change, the challenge of the Daesh, and the crisis of state collapse in West Asia.
    • It had announced its members would phase out all fossil fuels and subsidies, but has not so far announced any plan of action to do so.
    • And their coal fired plants emit “twice more CO2 than those of the entire African continent”.

    Turmoil in West Asia and failure of Europe to act

    • Three of the G7 countries, France, Germany, and the U.K., were among the top 10 countries contributing volunteers to the ISIS.
    • West Asia is in a greater state of turmoil than at any point of time since the fall of the Ottoman Empire.
    • This turmoil has led to a migrants crisis.
    • Migrant crisis persuaded many countries in Europe to renege on their western liberal values, making the Mediterranean Sea a death trap for people fleeing against fear of persecution and threat to their lives.

    So, to deal with the unprecedented challenge, we need new institution

    • The global economy has stalled and COVID-19 will inevitably create widespread distress.
    • Nations need dexterity and resilience to cope with the current flux, as also a revival of multilateralism, for they have been seeking national solutions for problems that are unresolvable internally.
    • Existing international institutions have proven themselves unequal to these tasks.
    • A new mechanism might help in attenuating them.
    • It would be ideal to include in it the seven future leading economies, plus Germany, Japan, the U.K., France, Mexico, Turkey, South Korea, and Australia.
    •  The 2005 ad hoc experiment by Prime Minister Tony Blair in bringing together the G7 and the BRICS countries was a one-off.

    What should be the focus of this new institution?

    • A new international mechanism will have value only if it focuses on key global issues.
    • A related aspect is how to push for observing international law and preventing the retreat from liberal values on which public goods are predicated.
    • Global public health and the revival of growth and trade in a sustainable way -that also reduces the inequalities among and within nations- would pose a huge challenge.

    What should be India’s priority in new institution?

    • India would be vitally interested in three: 1) international trade, 2) climate change, 3) the COVID-19 crisis.
    • Second order priorities for India would be cross-cutting issues such as counter-terrorism and counter-proliferation.
    • An immediate concern is to ensure effective implementation of the 1975 Biological Weapons Convention .
    • And the prevention of any possible cheating by its state parties by the possible creation of new microorganisms or viruses by using recombinant technologies.
    • On regional issues, establishing a modus vivendi with Iran would be important to ensure that it does not acquire nuclear weapons and is able to contribute to peace and stability in Afghanistan, the Gulf and West Asia.
    • The end state in Afghanistan would also be of interest to India.
    • And also the reduction of tensions in the Korean Peninsula and the South China Sea.

    Consider the question “There has been a clamour for expanding G7 and India is being considered as one of the prospective candidates in the expanded group. In light of this examine the challenges and opportunities for India if it gets entry into the expanded group.”

    Conclusion

    The decaying influence in geopolitics and declining share in the world GDP calls for the formation of the new institution. IF and when that institution comes into being India should try to address its immediate concern with the help of new mechanism based on values.

  • Strategic importance of Daulat Beg Oldie, Ladakh

    In the reporting on the LAC stand-off, the Darbuk-Shyok-Daulat Beg Oldie (DSDBO) road has often appeared in news.

    Practice questions for mains:

    Q. Discuss how India’s all-weather border infrastructure has created new festering points for the Sino-Indian border skirmished.

    Daulat Beg Oldie

    • DBO is the northernmost corner of Indian Territory in Ladakh, in the area better known in Army parlance as Sub-Sector North.
    • DBO has the world’s highest airstrip, originally built during the 1962 war but abandoned until 2008 when the Indian Air Force (IAF) revived it as one of its many Advanced Landing Grounds (ALGs) along the LAC.

    The DSDBO Road

    • DSDBO is an all-weather 255-km long road 255-km long built by India over nearly 20 years.
    • Running almost parallel to the LAC, the DSDBO road, meandering through elevations ranging between 13,000 ft and 16,000 ft, took India’s Border Roads Organisation (BRO) almost two decades to construct.
    • Its strategic importance is that it connects Leh to DBO, virtually at the base of the Karakoram Pass that separates China’s Xinjiang Autonomous Region from Ladakh.

    A trigger for PLA incursions

    • Of the possible triggers cited for the PLA targeting of Indian Territory along the LAC in eastern Ladakh, the construction of DSDBO all-weather road is possibly the most consequential.
    • The Chinese build-up along the Galwan River valley region overlooks and hence poses a direct threat to the DSDBO road.

    Significance of DSDBO Road

    • The DSDBO highway provides the Indian military access to the section of the Tibet-Xinjaing highway that passes through Aksai Chin.
    • The road runs almost parallel to the LAC at Aksai Chin, the eastern ear of erstwhile Jammu and Kashmir state that China occupied in the 1950s, leading to the 1962 war in which India came off worse.
    • The DSDBO’s emergence seemingly panicked China, evidenced by the 2013 intrusion by the PLA into the nearby Depsang Plains, lasting nearly three weeks.
    • DBO itself is less than 10 km west of the LAC at Aksai Chin. A military outpost was created in DBO in reaction to China’s occupation of Aksai Chin.
    • It is at present manned by a combination of the Army’s Ladakh Scouts and the paramilitary Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP).

    Other strategic considerations

    • To the west of DBO is the region where China abuts Pakistan in the Gilgit-Baltistan area, once a part of the erstwhile Kashmir principality.
    • This is also the critical region where China is currently constructing the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (PoK), to which India has objected.
    • As well, this is the region where Pakistan ceded over 5,180 sq km of PoK to China in 1963 under a Sino-Pakistan Boundary Agreement, contested by India.

    Also read:

    https://www.civilsdaily.com/burning-issue-india-china-skirmish-in-ladakh/

     

  • LAC row: China reaches accord with India

    China said that it had “reached an agreement” with India on the ongoing tensions along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), a day after India announced troops from both sides had begun a “partial disengagement” from some of the stand-off points.

    Practice question for mains:

    Q. “Early settlement of the boundary question serves the fundamental interests of both countries”. Discuss in light of the ongoing border skirmishes between India and China.

    Read the complete story here:

    [Burning Issue] India-China Skirmish in Ladakh

    Troops moving back

    • Partial deinduction has happened from some points in Galwan and Hot Springs areas.
    • Chinese side removed some of the tents and some troops and vehicles have been moved back, and the Indian side to has reciprocated.
    • At some points in the Galwan Valley, Chinese troops have moved back 2-3 km. However, there is no change in the ground situation at Pangong Tso.

    De-escalation begins

    • India and China held Major general-level talks to discuss further de-escalation at several standoff points in Eastern Ladakh including Patrolling Point (PP) 14, following a broad accord reached on Saturday in talks held at the Corps Commander-level.
    • As per the agreement, a series of ground-level talks would be held over the next 10 days, with four other points of conflict identified at PP15, PP17, Chushul and the north bank of Pangong Lake.
    • The Chinese Foreign Ministry said both sides had agreed to handle the situation “properly” and “in line with the agreement” to ease the situation.
    • However, it did not provide specific details on some of the stand-off points, such as Pangong Lake, where Chinese troops are still present on India’s side of the LAC.

    No final solution yet

    • At present, the two sides are taking actions in line with the agreement to ameliorate the border situation.
    • Government officials said a partial disengagement had happened at some points in the Galwan area and at Hot Springs, but there was no change at Pangong Lake.
    • Chinese state-run media has revealed that the ongoing dispute will not escalate into a conflict.
    • But it added due to the complexity of the situation, the military stand-off could continue for a little longer.

    Way forward

    • The military-level talks showed that both sides do not want to escalate tensions further.
    • It showed that China and India remain determined to peacefully resolve border issues.
    • However, the ongoing stand-off is not likely to end immediately, as concrete issues must still be resolved.

  • Complexity of India-Nepal relations

    This article helps us understand Nepal’s perspective of the India-Nepal border dispute. Though the issue dates back to India’s independence, it came to dominate the political landscape in Nepal since 1990s. But there is no solution in sight. So, what makes the issue complex? Read to know…

    What the border dispute between two countries is about?

    • The inauguration of the “new road to Mansarovar” on May 8 by India’s defence minister has strained the relations between Nepal and India.
    • Nepal claims that a section of the road passes through the territory of Nepal and links with the Tibetan Autonomous Region of China through the Lipu Lekh pass in Nepal.
    • The 1816 Sugauli Treaty between Nepal and British India placed all the territories east of the Kali (Mahakali) river, including Limpiyadhura, Kalapani and Lipu Lekh at the northwestern front of Nepal, on its side.
    • The borders of Nepal, India and China intersect in this area.
    • Given the situation in 1961, Nepal and China fixed pillar number one at Tinker pass with the understanding that pillar number zero (the tri-junction of Nepal, India, and China) would be fixed later.
    • Lipu Lekh pass is 4 km northwest and Limpiyadhura 53 km west of Tinker pass.

    No progress on the solution of the issue

    • The dispute over the Kalapani area has spanned the last seven decades.
    • Both Nepal and India have recognised it as an outstanding border issue requiring an optimal resolution.
    • When in August 2014, Prime Minister Narendra Modi became the first Indian Prime Minister to visit Nepal in 17 years, Nepal’s Prime Minister Sushil Koirala raised this issue again.
    • The two prime ministers agreed to resolve the issue on a priority basis and directed their foreign secretaries “to work on the outstanding boundary issues including Kalapani and Susta”.
    •  There was virtually no progress on the ground.

    Nepal’s objection to India-China agreement

    •  In May 2015, Prime Minister Modi visited China, and the two countries agreed to “enhance border areas cooperation”.
    • The May 2015 agreement is a broad one compared to the 1954 India-China agreement “on trade and intercourse between Tibet Region of China and India”, which mentions Lipu Lekh pass as one of the six passes “through which traders and pilgrims of both countries may travel”.
    • Nepal protested against the inclusion of its territory, Lipu Lekh, in the joint statement without its consent and demanded that the two countries make necessary corrections to reflect the ground realities.
    • The protest was ignored.

    Growing nationalism and distrust let to the deterioration of relations

    • The tone of Nepal-India relations appears to be dominated by frustrations of the past and traditional attitudes more than the opportunities of the future.
    • The widening gap in understanding each other’s concerns has helped feed Nepali nationalism and create a dense cloud of distrust and suspicion between the two countries.
    • The gap widened after India chose to impose an economic blockade in response to Nepal’s sovereign decision to promulgate a democratic constitution.
    • The current ruling Communist Party of Nepal made people’s anger over the blockade its campaign plank during the 2017 general election.

    What makes the border issues complex and difficult to solve?

    • Complexity of the issue stems from the fact that the political leadership handles only a small part of this very important bilateral relationship.
    • India as a big neighbour is rarely seen grasping the psychological dimensions of the relationship.
    • Officials handling these multifaceted relations may momentarily influence the atmospherics but they rarely touch the core of these relations, let alone reorient or transform them in the rapidly changing context.
    • This is manifest in the deferring of substantive conversations on the outstanding boundary issue for decades.
    • The foreign secretary level mechanism has not met even once to discuss the border issue since its formation.
    • There are over three dozen bilateral mechanisms between Nepal and India to engage at various levels.
    • The meetings of these mechanisms are rarely regular.

    Consider the question “The India-Nepal border dispute looks minor, but allowing it to fester is likely to sow the seeds of immense competition and intense rivalry in the sensitive Himalayan frontier with far-reaching geopolitical implications. Comment.”

    Conclusion

    Geography, history, and economy make Nepal and India natural partners, sharing vital interest in each other’s freedom, integrity, dignity, security and progress. People-to-people relations are unique strengths of bilateral relations. India, for it’s part and in the spirit of its ‘neighbourhood first’ policy, must start a solution-oriented dialogue and find the solution to the dispute.