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Subject: International Relations

  • UN Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)

    China will join a global pact to regulate arms sales that has been rejected by the United States.

    The New START, INF, Open Skies and now the ATT …. Be clear about the differences of these treaties. For example- to check if their inception was during cold war era etc.

    What is the Arms Trade Treaty?

    • The Arms Trade Treaty is a multilateral treaty that regulates the international trade in conventional weapons. It entered into force on 4th December 2014.
    • The ATT is an attempt to regulate the international trade of conventional weapons for the purpose of contributing to international and regional peace; reducing human suffering; and promoting co-operation, transparency, and responsible action by and among states.
    • 105 states have ratified the treaty, and a further 32 states have signed but not ratified it.
    • India has abstained from voting for this Treaty

    Highlights of the treaty

    ATT requires member countries to keep records of international transfers of weapons and to prohibit cross-border shipments that could be used in human rights violations or attacks on civilians. The treaty would ensure that no transfer is permitted if there is a substantial risk that it is likely to:

    • be used in serious violations of international human rights or humanitarian law, or acts of genocide or crimes against humanity;
    • facilitate terrorist attacks, a pattern of gender-based violence, violent crime, or organized crime;
    • violate UN Charter obligations, including UN arms embargoes;
    • be diverted from its stated recipient;
    • adversely affect regional security; or
    • seriously impair poverty reduction or socioeconomic development.

    China’s agenda at ATT

    • Beijing saying it is committed to efforts to “enhance peace and stability” in the world.
    • It comes after the US announced plans last year to pull the United States out of the agreement which entered into force in 2014.
    • The US Senate never ratified the 2013 Arms Trade Treaty after former president Barack Obama endorsed it, and Trump has said he would revoke his predecessor’s signature.

    Why has India abstained?

    • From the beginning of the ATT process, India has maintained that such a treaty should make a real impact on illicit trafficking in conventional arms and their illicit use especially by terrorists and other unauthorized and unlawful non-state actors.
    • India has also stressed consistently that the ATT should ensure a balance of obligations between exporting and importing states.
    • However, the ATT is weak on terrorism and non-state actors (undoubtedly Pakistan) and these concerns find no mention in the specific prohibitions of the Treaty.
    • Further, India cannot accept that the Treaty is used as an instrument in the hands of exporting states to take unilateral force majeure measures against importing states parties without consequences.

    Also read:

    U.S. set to exit the ‘Open Skies Treaty’ Copy

  • What is lacking in our China policy

    While formulating our response to China’s aggressive policies in Ladakh, we should first understand their objectives. This article explains these objective and suggests the steps to deal with China’s policies.

    Statements on Aksai Chin and Pakistan

    • Statements over Aksai Chin and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) by India have painted the image of India as a revanchist power in utter disregard of the country’s capabilities.
    • These statements also gave the impression that India precludes any attempt at changing the status quo on either front.
    • Though these statements were justifiable in terms of India’s legal rights to these territories, were ill-timed.

    How these statements were perceived by China

    • They were made when Beijing was feeling alarmed at the Indian government’s decision to separate Ladakh from Jammu and Kashmir.
    • The move augmented its perception that it was a prelude to India’s attempt to change the status quo in Aksai Chin.
    • India’s assertion of its claims on PoK that in China’s perception threatened the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor project.

    China’s 4 strategic objectives

    1. India and China are not equals

    • China wants India to understand that it is not in the same league as China.
    • China resorts to periodic assaults across the Line of Actual Control (LAC) if India tries to assume a position of equality.

    2. Keep India away from interfering in Indo-Pacific

    • China wants India not to actively oppose Chinese designs to dominate the Indo-Pacific region.
    • Also, China wants Indias to refrain from aligning with the U.S. and its allies — Japan and Australia, in particular — in an attempt to contain China.

    3. Keeping India preoccupied with problems

    • China’s strategy also includes keeping India preoccupied with problems in its immediate neighbourhood.
    • So with these problems, India cannot act as an alternative pole of power to China in the broader Asian region.

    4. Supporting Pakistan to neutralise India

    • As part of the last objective, China supports  Pakistan economically and militarily, including the sharing of nuclear weapons designs.
    • China uses Pakistan to neutralise India’s conventional power superiority vis-à-vis that country.

    An understanding of these objectives is essential to fashioning a realistic Indian response to China’s aggressive policies in Ladakh and elsewhere along the LAC.

    But, what about Pakistan?

    • Pakistan is at best an irritant for India. (so, focus on China)
    • Pakistan can be managed with the use of diplomatic tools, international opprobrium, and superior military force.
    • In fact, the Pakistani challenge to India has become magnified because of its nexus with China.

    What India should do?

    • India’s main strategic goal should be the adoption of carefully calculated policies that neutralise China’s diplomatic and military clout in the Asia-Pacific region.
    • While doing so, India should not appear as a surrogate for other powers.
    • And India should also ensure that in making alliances it in not sacrificing the autonomy of decision-making in foreign policy. 

    Consider the question “Understanding of China’s objective is essential to formulate a realistic response to its aggressive policies in Ladakh.” Comment.

    Conclusion

    Understanding the greater threat posed by China vis-a-vis Pakistan should be the basis of India’s policy towards China.

  • Why China trade ban is bad idea

    After the Galwan Valley skirmish, the popular idea resonating in Indian streets is that Indians should boycott Chinese goods and thus “teach China a lesson”.

    Practice question for mains:

    Q. India’s quest for self-reliance is still a distant dream. Critically comment in light of the popular sentiment against the Chinese imports in India.

    There are several reasons why the #Boycott_China is an ill-advised move:

    A. Trade deficits are not necessarily bad

    • Trade deficits/surpluses are just accounting exercises and having a trade deficit against a country doesn’t make the domestic economy weaker or worse off.
    • Example: If one looks at the top 25 countries with whom India trades, it has a trade surplus with the US, the UK and the Netherlands. But this does not make Indian economy better than them.

    What does this deficit indicate?

    • Both Indian consumers and Chinese producers are gainer through trading.
    • One gets the market other cheap price. Thus, both are better off than what they would have been without trade.

    So, having a trade deficit is good?

    • Of course, running persistent trade deficits across all countries raises two main issues.
    • One, availability of foreign exchange reserves to “buy” the imports.
    • Today, India has more than $500 billion of forex — good enough to cover imports for 12 months.
    • Two, lack of domestic capacity to produce in the most efficient manner.

    B. Will hurt the Indian poor the most

    • This is because poor are more price-sensitive.
    • For instance, if Chinese TVs were replaced by either costlier Indian TVs or less efficient ones, unlike poor, richer Indians may buy the costlier option.
    • Similarly, the Chinese products that are in India are already paid for. By banning their sale or avoiding them, Indians will be hurting fellow Indian retailers.
    • Again, this would hit poorest retailers more due to inability to cope with the unexpected losses.

    C. Will punish Indian producers and exporters

    • Several businesses in India import intermediate goods and raw materials, which, in turn, are used to create final goods — both for the domestic Indian market as well as the global market (as Indian exports).
    • An overwhelming proportion of Chinese imports are in the form of intermediate goods such as electrical machinery, nuclear reactors, fertilizers, optical and photographic measuring equipment organic chemicals etc.
    • Such imports are used to produce final goods which are then either sold in India or exported.
    • A blanket ban on Chinese imports will hurt all these businesses at a time when they are already struggling to survive, apart from hitting India’s ability to produce finished goods.

    D. Will barely hurt China

    • While China accounts for 5% of India’s exports and 14% of India’s imports — in US$ value terms — India’s imports from China are just 3% of China’s total exports.
    • More importantly, China’s imports from India are less than 1% of its total imports.
    • The point is that if India and China stop trading then — on the face of it — China would lose only 3% of its exports and less than 1% of its imports.
    • However, India will lose 5% of its exports and 14% of its imports.

    Issues

    • On the whole, it is much easier for China to replace India than for India to replace China.
    • Ban can also seize Chinese funding to many Indian businesses (the start-ups with billion-dollar valuations).
    • In short term, replacing Chinese products with Japan or Germany, will only increase our total trade deficit.
    • If on the other hand, we decide to use Indian products, that too would cost us more — albeit just internally.

    E. India will lose policy credibility

    • It has also been suggested that India should renege on existing contracts with China.
    • This can be detrimental for India’s effort to attract foreign investment.
    • As one of the first things an investor — especially foreign — tracks is the policy credibility and certainty.
    • If policies can be changed overnight or if the government itself reneges on contracts, investor will either not invest or demand higher returns for the increased risk.

    F. Raising tariffs is mutually assured destruction

    • Many argue that India should just slap higher import duties on Chinese goods or apply prohibitive tariffs on final goods.
    • By doing this, firstly India would be violating rules of the World Trade Organization.
    • Secondly, it would make China and many others to reciprocate in the same way.

    Equating border dispute with trade is no panacea

    • The first thing to understand is that turning a border dispute into a trade war is unlikely to solve the border dispute.
    • Worse, given India and China’s position in both global trade as well as relative to each other, this trade war will hurt India far more than China.
    • Thirdly, these measures will be most poorly timed since the Indian economy is already at its weakest point ever — facing a sharp GDP contraction.

    Way forward

    • In long term, under the banner of self reliance, India must develop its domestic capabilities and acquire a higher share of global trade by raising its competitiveness.
    • But no country is completely self-sufficient and that is why trade is such a fantastic idea.
    • It allows countries to specialize in what they can do most efficiently and export that good while importing whatever some other country does more efficiently.
    • Need of hour is well thought and balanced approach.

  • Postscript to a tragedy at Galwan

    The article suggests the approach that India should adopt in its policy toward China. Long term view of the situation is crucial. But some short term steps is also necessary.

    Prelude to 1962 War

    • Revolt in Tibet and granting asylum to the Dalai Lama in March 1959 can be seen as start of tensions in relations.
    •  In October 1959, there was a face-off between Indian and Chinese troops at Kongka La.
    • With the conflict in 1962,  there was very little room for a reasoned, negotiated settlement on the boundary question between the two countries.

    2020 is not same as 1959 for both India and China

    • Both nations have grown immensely in strength and stature on the world stage – even military wise.
    • Their relations have substance and a diversity of content in a manner absent in the 1950s – like the economic relations.
    • Hence, there is a need to not blame each other and find solutions instead of descent towards a full-blown conflict with China.

    Weighing the options carefully

    • India at present is struggling at multiple fronts:
    • 1) COVID-19 crisis demands the full attention of the government.
    • 2) Economy is stagnant and needs recovery.
    • 3) Tensions on other fronts – Pakistan persist and Nepal dispute in the Lipulekh/Kalapani area.
    • Thus, the call by warmongers should be evaluated, that too critically.

    Evolving comprehensive China policy

    • Strong political direction, mature deliberation and coherence are keys to handling the situation.
    • Army’s role can involve tactical adjustments and manoeuvres to deter the Chinese.
    • But comprehensive China strategy should be left to those tasked with national security policy.
    • Chinese transgressions in Sikkim and Ladakh can provide learning lessons for our future strategy.
    • A complete strategy would involve military, diplomatic and political levels.

    Future plan of action – Defence

    • India should take the initiative on a timely and early clarification of the LAC.
    • Identify areas of conflict and mark such areas as demilitarized by both sides through joint agreement.
    • At the same time, India must stand resolute and firm in the defence of territory in all four sectors of the border.
    • Contacts between the two militaries — joint exercises and exchanges of visits of senior Commanders — should be scaled down for short term future.
    • Diplomatic channels must continue to be open and should not be restricted in any way as they are essential in the current situation.
    • A border settlement is part of long term strategy.

    Future of business, trade and investment between two countries

    • Indian businesses in China and Chinese business operations in India can expect tougher future.
    • The scenario on trade and investments could encounter similar obstacles.
    • Areas of on national security, as in the cyber field and in telecommunications (5G) should take necessary reduction in import of Chinese items.

     India should strengthen alliances

    • The events in Galwan Valley should be a wake-up call to re invent it’s South and east Asia policy.
    • This is an opportunity for India to align its interests much more strongly with the U.S. as a principal strategic partner.
    • India should also infuse more energy into its relations with Japan, Australia, and the ASEAN.
    • The time has also come for India to reconsider its stand on joining the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership.
    • To disengage from economic involvement with China, and build the capacities and capabilities it needs in manufacturing, and in supply chains networks closer home, India has to think in the long terms.

    Consider the question “The context of changing relations with China has forced India to reconsider the depth of its engagement with other countries. In light of this examine the changes India’s foreign policy adopt in dealing with other countries.”

    Conclusion

    Galwan incident is a wake up call for us. In every aspect, engagement with China needs a re look. And that also includes an increased level of engagement in South Asian neighborhood.

  • Why Ladakh matters to India and China?

    This article from IE discusses this cold, dry, high altitude territory with its extremely scarce vegetation that makes it a point of disagreement between India and China.

    Practice question for mains:

    Q. India’s boundary disputes with its neighbourhood are the legacy of its colonial past. Analyse.

    Ladakh: The Cold Desert of India

    • Ladakh is the highest plateau in India with much of it being over 3,000 m.
    • It extends from the Himalayan to the Kunlun Ranges and includes the upper Indus River valley.
    • The importance of Ladakh is rooted in complicated historical processes that led to the territory becoming part of the state of J&K, and China’s interest in it post the occupation of Tibet in 1950.

    Beginning of the Chinese claim

    • In July 1958, an official monthly magazine in China published a map of the country that would in the next few months become a bone of contention between India and its East Asian neighbour.
    • The map in question showed large parts of the North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA) and the Himalayan territory of Ladakh as part of China.
    • Soon after ‘China pictorial’ came out with the new Chinese map, the leaders of both countries began writing to each other frequently regarding Ladakh.
    • The exchange of letters between Jawaharlal Nehru and his Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai was followed by the Sino-Indian war of 1962.
    • The war also led to the formation of the loosely demarcated Line of Actual Control (LAC) running through Ladakh.

    The Integration of Ladakh into India

    • Historically and culturally the state was intrinsically linked to neighbouring Tibet.
    • Language and religion linked Ladakh and Tibet; politically too, they shared a common history.
    • Ladakh was part of the Tibetan empire which broke up after the assassination of King Langdarma in 742 CE.
    • Up until the Dogra invasion of 1834, Ladakh was an independent Himalayan state, much the same way as Bhutan and Sikkim.
    • As the Sikhs acquired Kashmir in 1819, Emperor Ranjit Singh turned his ambition towards Ladakh.
    • But it was Gulab Singh, the Dogra feudatory of the Sikhs in Jammu, who went ahead with the task of integrating Ladakh into Jammu and Kashmir.

    British interests in Ladakh

    • The British East India Company, which was by now steadily establishing itself in India, had lacked interest in Ladakh initially.
    • However, it did show enthusiasm for the Dogra invasion of the area, with the hope that as a consequence, a large portion of Tibetan trade would be diverted to its holdings.
    • The state of J&K was essentially a British creation, formed as a buffer zone where they could meet the Russians.

    The Sino-Sikh War

    • In May 1841, Tibet under the Qing dynasty of China invaded Ladakh with the hope of adding it to the imperial Chinese dominions, leading to the Sino-Sikh war.
    • However, the Sino-Tibetan army was defeated, and the Treaty of Chushul was signed that agreed on no further transgressions or interference in the other country’s frontiers.
    • After the first Anglo-Sikh war of 1845-46, the state of J&K, including Ladakh, was taken out of the Sikh empire and brought under British suzerainty.

    Chinese interest in Ladakh after the occupation of Tibet in 1950

    • The annexation of Tibet by China in 1950 sparked a newfound interest in Ladakh, and particularly so after the 1959 Tibetan uprising that erupted in Lhasa with Dalai Lama’s political asylum in India.
    • In attempting to crush the Tibetan revolt while at the same time denying its existence, the Chinese have used methods which have brought China and India into sharp conflict.
    • To begin with, the road that the Chinese built across Ladakh in 1956-57 was important for the maintenance of their control over Tibet.
    • The building of the road through Ladakh upset Nehru’s government. The diplomatic negotiations failed, and the war of 1962 followed.

    Why conflict has flared up again?

    • There are two layers to this. First, up to 2013, India’s infrastructural development in that area was minimal.
    • From 2013, India started pushing for infrastructure projects there and by 2015; it became a major defence priority.
    • The second layer is the August 5, 2019 decision (to remove the special status of J&K and downgrade the state into two Union Territories).
    • From the Chinese point of view, they would have assumed that if India makes Ladakh a Union Territory, they would be reasserting its control over the entire state.
    • Moreover, it is also important to note that over time, Xinjiang which is part of Aksai Chin, has become very important to China for their internal reasons.

    The dispute

    • The British legacy of the map of the territory continued to remain the ground upon which India laid its claim on the area.
    • India insisted that the border was, for the most part, recognised and assured by treaty and tradition; the Chinese argued it had never really been delimited.
    • The claims of both governments rested in part on the legacy of imperialism; British imperialism (for India), and Chinese imperialism (over Tibet) for China.

  • India gets re-elected as Non-permanent Member of UNSC

    India gets re-elected as Non-permanent Members of UNSC with 184 out of the 192 valid votes polled in its favour.

    Practice question for mains:

    Q. United Nations is in need of structural reforms suiting to the needs of present times. Discuss.

    What are ‘non-permanent seats’ at the UNSC?

    • The UNSC is composed of 15 members: five permanent members — China, France, Russian Federation, the US, and the UK — and 10 non-permanent members who are elected by the General Assembly.
    • The non-permanent members are elected for two-year terms — so every year, the General Assembly elects five non-permanent members out of the total 10.
    • Even if a country is a “clean slate” candidate and has been endorsed by its group, it still needs to secure the votes of two-thirds of the members present and voting at the General Assembly session — which is a minimum of 129 votes, if all 193 member states participate.

    Sharing of seats

    • These 10 seats are distributed among the regions of the world: five seats for African and Asian countries; one for Eastern European countries; two for Latin American and Caribbean countries; and two for Western European and Other Countries.
    • Of the five seats for Africa and Asia, three are for Africa and two for Asia.
    • Also, there is an informal understanding between the two groups to reserve one seat for an Arab country.
    • The Africa and Asia Pacific group takes turns every two years to put up an Arab candidate.
    • Elections for terms beginning in even-numbered years select two African members, and one each within Eastern Europe, the Asia Pacific, and Latin America and the Caribbean.
    • Terms beginning in odd-numbered years consist of two West European and Other members, and one each from the Asia Pacific, Africa, and Latin America and the Caribbean.

    Current members as on today

    • The current non-permanent members of the Security Council are Belgium, Dominican Republic, Germany, Indonesia, and South Africa, all of whose terms end this year; and Estonia, Niger, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Tunisia, and Vietnam, whose terms end in 2021.
    • India begins its term at the beginning of 2021 and will hold the position until the end of 2022.

    Has India been in the UNSC earlier?

    • India’s term on the 15-member Council will be it’s eighth.
    • India has earlier been a non-permanent member of the Security Council in 1950-51, 1967-68, 1972-73, 1977-78, 1984-85, 1991-92 and 2011-12.
    • For the 2011-12 terms, India won 187 of 190 votes after Kazakhstan stood down from its candidacy.
    • Unlike Africa, which has formalized a system of rotation of its three seats, the Asia Pacific grouping has often seen contests for seats. In 2018, there was a contest between the Maldives and Indonesia.
    • On the occasions when there is a contest, the elections for non-permanent seats can go on for several rounds.
    • Back in 1975, there was a contest between India and Pakistan, which went into eight rounds, with Pakistan finally winning the seat. And in 1996, India lost a contest to Japan.

    Significance

    • Terming India’s winning of a non-permanent seat of the UN Security Council one of its best performances” ever, the Union government said.
    • The strong support by almost the entire U.N. membership demonstrates the goodwill that India enjoys in the U.N. and the confidence that the international community has reposed in India.
    • India’s EAM gave India’s overall objective during its forthcoming UNSC tenure as an acronym ‘NORMS’ — New Orientation for a Reformed Multilateral System.
    • NORMS includes the push for expanding the UNSC permanent membership.

    Back2Basics: United Nations Security Council

    • The UNSC is one of the six principal organs of the United Nations and is charged with the maintenance of international peace and security.
    • Its powers include the establishment of peacekeeping operations, the establishment of international sanctions, and the authorization of military action through Security Council resolutions.
    • It is the only UN body with the authority to issue binding resolutions to member states.
    • The Security Council consists of fifteen members. Russia, the United Kingdom, France, China, and the United States—serve as the body’s five permanent members.
    • These permanent members can veto any substantive Security Council resolution, including those on the admission of new member states or candidates for Secretary-General.
    • The Security Council also has 10 non-permanent members, elected on a regional basis to serve two-year terms. The body’s presidency rotates monthly among its members.

  • History, the standoff, and policy worth rereading

    In the changing circumstances, there is a need for recalibration of foreign policy when dealing with China. This article draws on a policy approach adopted by Nehru and suggests 4 areas to focus on while devising the foreign policy.

    India must pay attention to “five fingers”

    • The deadly clashes at Galwan and the ongoing standoff between India and China on the ridges or “fingers” around the Pangong Tso are a metaphor for the wider conflict between the two countries.
    • The metaphor refers to all the areas that Chinese strategy refers to as the “five fingers of the Tibetan palm”.
    • According to the construct, attributed to Mao and cited in the 1950s by Chinese officials, Xizang (Tibet) was China’s right palm, and it was its responsibility to “liberate” the fingers.
    • Fiver fingers are defined as Ladakh, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan, and the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA, or Arunachal Pradesh).
    • Sixty years ago, India began to set about ensuring that quite the reverse ensued, and all five fingers were more closely attached to India, not China.
    • As the government of India grapples with its next steps at the Line of Actual Control (LAC), it must cast a similarly grand strategy, to renew its compact with each of those areas today.

    Chines propaganda before 1962 War

    • In the 1950s, even after India and China signed the Panchsheel agreement in 1954.
    • And before the 1962 China-India war, the Nehru government had begun to worry about some of China’s proclamations.
    • Especially after the flight of the Dalai Lama to India in 1959, China began to demand “self-determination in Kashmir”, wrote former Foreign Secretary T.N. Kaul in his memoirs.
    •  More importantly, school textbooks there began to depict the “five fingers” as a part of China.

    India’s three-pronged foreign policy form past

    •  India’s defeat in the 1962 war has been studied in great detail, what is perhaps not so well understood is the three-pronged foreign policy New Delhi set into motion at the time, that provided an effective counter to Mao’s five finger policy over the course of the century.

    Following are the 3 elements that also formed the part of past policy, with the addition of Jammu and Kashmir status change.

    1. Focus on border infrastructure and governance

    • The first was a push for building border infrastructure and governance.
    • In the mid-1950s the government piloted a project to build the Indian Frontier Administrative Services (IFAS) for overseeing NEFA (Arunachal Pradesh) and other areas along the India-China frontier.
    • The Foreign secretary was the Chair of the IFAS selection board.
    • And many who enlisted in the cadre overlapped between the Indian Foreign Service, the Indian Administrative Service and the Indian Police Service, and rotated between postings in the most remote tribal areas and embassies in the region.
    • A special desk was created in the Ministry of External Affairs for officers who would tour all the regions from NEFA to Ladakh in order to make suggestions for the rapid development of these areas.
    • While India’s border infrastructure is only now catching up with the infrastructure China built in the course of the next few decades, its base was made during the brief period the IFAS existed, before it was wound up in 1968.
    • An idea before its time, the IFAS’s role has since been transferred to the Indian Army and the Border Roads Organisation (BRO).

    Idea worth revisiting: IFAS

    • IFAS is an idea worth revisiting, especially as areas along the frontier continue to complain of neglect and a lack of focus from the Centre.
    • In 2019, the Chief Ministers of Arunachal Pradesh and Mizoram called for the resurrection of the IFAS.

    2. Outreach and treaties

    • The second prong were a series of treaties that were signed around that time with neighbours such as Nepal and Bhutan.
    •  And the consolidation of control, militarily and administratively, of other territories that acceded to India, including Ladakh as a part of Jammu and Kashmir (1947), and NEFA (1951).
    • In 1950, India signed a treaty with Sikkim that made it a “protectorate”.
    • By 1975 the Indira Gandhi Government had annexed Sikkim and made it the 22nd State of India.
    • Each of these treaties built unique relationships with New Delhi, tying countries such as Nepal and Bhutan in ways that were seen as a “win-win” for both sides at the time.

    Treaties outliving their utility

    • Over time, the treaties have outlived their utility.
    • And the benefits of unique ties with Nepal and Bhutan, including open borders and ease of movement, jobs and education for their youth as well as India’s influential support on the world stage, have waned in public memory.

    What explains difference in Nepal and Bhutan for India

    • One of the reasons that China has been able to make inroads into Nepal and not with Bhutan, is that the government renegotiated its 1949 Treaty of Perpetual Peace and Friendship with Bhutan.
    • The India-Bhutan 1949 Treaty was replaced with the India-Bhutan Friendship Treaty in 2007.
    • 2007 treaty dropped an article that had committed Bhutan “to beguided” by India on its external affairs policy.
    • This has held India and Bhutan ties in good stead thus far, even during the Doklam stand-off between India and China in 2017 in the face of severe pressure from China.
    • However, despite years of requests from Kathmandu, New Delhi has dragged its feet on reviewing its 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship between the Government of India and the Government of Nepal.
    • and on accepting a report the Eminent Persons’ Group (EPG) on Nepal-India relations has produced that recommends a new treaty.
    • New treaties may not, in themselves reduce India’s security threat from China in its neighbourhood.
    • But they create space for a more mutually responsive diplomacy that is necessary to nurture special relationships.

    3. Tibet strategy: India must chart a more prominent role

    • For the third prong, India’s policy towards the “palm” or Tibet, itself should be looked at more closely as well.
    • While New Delhi’s decision to shelter the Dalai Lama and lakhs of his followers since 1959 is a policy that is lauded.
    • But it does not change the need for New Delhi to look into the future of its relationship, both with the Tibetan refugee community in India, which has lived here in limbo for decades, as well as with its future leadership.
    • At present, the Dalai Lama has the loyalty of Tibetans worldwide, but in the future, the question over who will take up the political leadership of the community looms large.
    • The Karmapa Lama, who lived in India after his flight from China in 2000, and was groomed as a possible political successor, has now taken the citizenship of another country and lives mostly in the United States.
    • Meanwhile, China will, without doubt, try to force its own choice on the community as well.
    • Given that it is home to so many Tibetans, India must chart a more prominent role in this discourse.

    4. Introspection of reorganisation in Jammu and Kashmir

    • Finally, it is necessary to introspect on how India’s own reorganisation of Jammu and Kashmir in August 2019 has changed the security matrix and threat parameters for India, and its neighbours.
    • While Pakistan’s extreme reaction to the move was expected, China’s reaction was perhaps not studied enough.
    • Beijing issued a statement decrying the impact on Jammu and Kashmir, and another one specifically on Ladakh.
    • In the statement, China called it an attempt to “undermine China’s territorial sovereignty by unilaterally changing its domestic law”.
    • And warned that the move was “unacceptable and will not come into force”.

    Consider the question “India’s relations with China has always had to factor in the border dispute. But the incidents in recent necessitated a relook at the foreign policy towards China.” In light of this, examine the factors that must form the basis of foreign policy.

    Conclusion

    The impact of the new map of Jammu and Kashmir on ties with Nepal as well, is no coincidence. There is proof enough that now more than ever, as the government readies its hand on dealing with China, it must not lose sight of every finger in play.

  • Multilateralism post COVID-19

    What is the future of multilateralism? This is the question we have come across many times recently. Given the chaos that we are witnessing in the global order, multilateral seems to be headed for either collapse or capture by China. But, the author of this article suggests that it would be a mistake to consider the choice as binary. Between the collapse and the capture, there are many stakeholders working for its sustenance. So, multilateralism will endure.

    International institutions performing below par

    • The COVID-19 outbreak has placed all international institutions under a magnifying glass.
    • By any measure, most have performed below par.
    • Such is the caution espoused that multilateralism today seems to have reverted to its version 0.1.
    • The General Assembly now passes resolutions through no-objection procedure.
    • The Security Council has been found wanting in no small measure.
    • The 75th session’s ‘leaders week’ runs the risk of being reduced to a video playback session.

    Pursuit of change by threatening to leave

    • It is true that functioning of multilateral institutions requires reform.
    • They need to adapt to new realities.
    • However, the pursuit of change by threatening to leave multilateral institutions is a phenomenon we witnessed only during the period of the League of Nations.
    • One state followed another in bidding goodbye, until the League’s final demise.

    Why post Second World War institutions survived departures

    • The post Second World War multilateral institutions have survived such departures.
    • The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in Paris and the Human Rights Council in Geneva have survived the departure of the U.S.
    • The United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) in Vienna continues despite the withdrawal of the U.S. and many others.
    • The World Health Organization (WHO), notwithstanding its visible shortcomings, will survive U.S. threats.
    • The reasons are simple.
    • Multilateral organisations serve desperately felt global needs of the vast membership.
    • The pandemic has reinforced the desire for greater global cooperation amongst most states.

    So, will the current multi-lateral order survive China’s onslaught?

    •  It is true that Chinese nationals head four multilateral organisations.
    • It is also true that Chinese nationals have failed in campaigns to head UNESCO and the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).
    • Despite contributing nearly 10% of the UN’s budget, Chinese nationals are not exactly over-represented in terms of staff positions.
    • China has certainly risen up the multilateral pantheon and is able to better promote its interests.
    • It has warded off attacks against it in multilateral fora, at times with the aid of the heads of these organisations.
    • However, it is yet to display an ability to set the multilateral agenda and dominate the discourse on an array of issues, in the manner that the U.S. once indispensably did.
    • China’s flagship venture, the Belt and Road Initiative, remains only on the fringes of multilateral fora.
    • Neither in monetary terms nor in substantive inputs are there portents of a ‘Chinese takeover’.
    • Amidst this, multilateral bodies are populated by a plethora of small and middle states quietly working to restore equilibrium, when the balance tends to shift.
    • The capture of the existing multilateral order by a new hegemon is antithetical to the ethos of multilateralism.
    • Multilateralism thrives on the notion of the Lilliputians tying up Gulliver — old or new.

    Evolving multilateralism is not a choice between collapse and capture

    • Between collapse and capture, there are other pathways.
    • Multilateral architecture places a premium on structures over functions, processes over substance.
    • It slows down the change of any sort.
    • The same processes that have stalled change in the past will militate against a takeover in the future.
    • Does that mean that multilateralism will meander meaninglessly?
    • It will meander, but perhaps not meaninglessly.
    • The ‘pluri-laterals’ and the emerging ‘mini-laterals’ each have their place in terms of international agenda-setting, but global norm-setting requires inclusivity that they lack.

    Opportunity for India

    • Being able to shape the discourse at an incipient stage is a good perch to be on.
    • Issue-specific ‘coalitions of the willing’ are catalysts.
    • As a growing power, India needs to avail of such avenues.
    • However, by themselves, these will not do justice to the depth and variety of India’s interests and our stakes in global cooperation.
    • Also, they are not holistic solutions in ensuring global acceptance of norms.

    Understanding the essence of multilateralism

    • Responses of states during the COVID-19 crisis point to more emphasis on sovereign decision making than before.
    • The imprimatur for acting on behalf of the global community is not going to be available easily.
    • On myriad issues, from sustainable development to the environment, from climate change to pandemics and cyberspace to outer space, the demands for ‘nothing about us without us’ are likely to increase.
    • Since stakeholders perceive that their stakes have risen, they will call for enhanced engagement.
    • Convening such stakeholders in pursuit of global goals is the essence of multilateralism.

    Consider the question “In the world afflicted by Covid, multilateralism seems to be headed for collapse or capture by a hegemon. Critically examine.”

    Conclusion

    We need to patiently promote reforms while building partnerships to avail opportunities which may arise for more fundamental change. We need to bide our time without hiding our intent.

  • Why did North Korea blow up a joint liaison office with Seoul?

    North Korea blew up the joint liaison office with South Korea in Kaesong, an industrial township on its side of the border, becoming one of the most serious incidents to have occurred between the two countries, without them actually going to war.

    Must read:

    What is the Korean Armistice Agreement?

    Practice question for mains:

    Q. What is the Korean Armstice Agreement? Discuss the concept of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ)?

    What is this liaison office?

    • In 2003, North Korea and South Korea jointly set up a liaison office at Kaesong in North Korea.
    • It was set up in 2018 to facilitate communication between North Korea and South Korea.
    • The Kaesong Industrial Complex is a joint industrial zone where factories are operated and run by both North Koreans and South Koreans.
    • At its height, approximately 120 factories were operating in this industrial zone with more than 50,000 North Korean employees and several hundred managers.

    Why did Pyongyang demolish it?

    • Since the past week, tensions between the two countries had increased after Pyongyang objected to activists and defectors in South Korea sending anti-North Korean propaganda leaflets, rice and Bibles using balloons.
    • Experts believe that these moves come after North Korea’s frustrations at South Korea’s inability to revive inter-Korean economic projects under pressure from the US, along with UN sanctions.

    What’s next?

    • The demolition occurred just days after North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s sister Kim Yo Jong had threatened to destroy the liaison office.
    • Following the demolition, North Korean said that it would be deploying troops in demilitarized areas, including in the Kaesong industrial zone.

    Are they heading towards war?

    • Observers say that these actions by North Korea have been the most provocative in recent years.
    • Experts believe these provocations may have occurred because Pyongyang is hoping to pressure Seoul into giving it more concessions that would be economically beneficial for North Korea that has been hit hard by sanctions.
    • Experts believe these actions, however provocative, are not severe enough for Seoul to contemplate military aggression in retaliation.

  • India-China Border Dispute: A Conflict that has been in the making for years

    This article chronicles the border dispute between the two countries. It began in 1914 and ever after more than a hundred years it still continues. But the latest clash was the deadliest after 1967. Let’s go through past incidents over the border issue.

    1914: A border China never agreed to

    • The conflict stretches back to at least 1914.
    • In 2014 representatives from Britain, the Republic of China and Tibet gathered in Simla to negotiate a treaty that would determine the status of Tibet and effectively settle the borders between China and British India.
    • The Chinese, unhappy at proposed terms that would have allowed Tibet to be autonomous and remain under Chinese control, refused to sign the deal.
    • But Britain and Tibet signed a treaty establishing what would be called the McMahon Line, named after a British colonial official, Henry McMahon, who proposed the border.
    • India maintains that the McMahon Line, a 550-mile frontier that extends through the Himalayas, is the official legal border between China and India.
    • But China has never accepted it.

    1962: India-China War and origin of LAC

    •  Tensions rose throughout the 1950s.
    • The Chinese insisted that Tibet was never independent and could not have signed a treaty creating an international border.
    • There were several failed attempts at peaceful negotiation.
    • China sought to control critical roadways near its western frontier in Xinjiang.
    • India and its Western allies saw any attempts at Chinese incursion as part of a wider plot to export Maoist-style Communism across the region.
    • By 1962, war had broken out.
    • Chinese troops crossed the McMahon Line and took up positions deep in Indian territory, capturing mountain passes and towns.
    • By November China declared a cease-fire, unofficially redrawing the border near where Chinese troops had conquered territory.
    • It was the so-called Line of Actual Control.

    1967: In Sikkim, India pushes China back

    • Tensions came to a head again in 1967 along two mountain passes, Nathu La and Cho La, that connected Sikkim — then a kingdom and a protectorate of India — and China’s Tibet Autonomous Region.
    • A scuffle broke out when Indian troops began laying barbed wire along what they recognized as the border.
    • The scuffles soon escalated when a Chinese military unit began firing artillery shells at the Indians.
    • In the ensuing conflict, more than 150 Indians and 340 Chinese were killed.
    • The clashes in September and October 1967 in those passes would later be considered the second all-out war between China and India.
    • But India prevailed, destroying Chinese fortifications in Nathu La and pushing them farther back into their territory near Cho La.
    • The change in positions, however, meant that China and India each had different and conflicting ideas about the location of the Line of Actual Control.
    • The fighting was the last time that troops on either side would be killed. — until the skirmishes in the Galwan Valley on Tuesday.

    1987: A crisis averted

    • In 1987, the Indian military was conducting a training operation to see how fast it could move troops to the border.
    • The large number of troops and material arriving next to Chinese outposts surprised Chinese commanders — who responded by advancing toward what they considered the Line of Actual Control.
    • Realizing the potential to inadvertently start a war, both India and China de-escalated, and a crisis was averted.

    2013: Stand-off at Daulat Beg Oldi

    • After decades of patrolling the border, a Chinese platoon pitched a camp near Daulat Beg Oldi in April 2013.
    • The Indians soon followed, setting up their own base fewer than 1,000 feet away.
    • The camps were later fortified by troops and heavy equipment.
    • By May, the sides had agreed to dismantle both encampments, but disputes about the location of the Line of Actual Control persisted.

    2017: Doklam Stand-off

    • In June 2017, the Chinese set to work building a road in the Doklam Plateau, an area of the Himalayas controlled not by India, but by its ally Bhutan.
    • Indian troops carrying weapons and operating bulldozers confronted the Chinese with the intention of destroying the road.
    • A standoff ensued, soldiers threw rocks at each other, and troops from both sides suffered injuries.
    • In August, the countries agreed to withdraw from the area, and China stopped construction on the road.

    2020: Ladakh stand-off

    • In May, melees broke out several times.
    • In one clash at the glacial lake Pangong Tso, Indian troops were badly injured and had to be evacuated by helicopter.
    • China bolstered its forces with dump trucks, excavators, troop carriers, artillery and armored vehicles, Indian experts said.
    • What was clear was that it was the most serious series of clashes between the two sides since 2017 — and a harbinger of the deadly confrontation to come.

    Consider the question “Examine the elements that make the border dispute between India and China difficult to resolve.”

    Conclusion

    Border dispute in two giants could easily escalate into a full-blown war. India has to recalibrate the policy approach after the recent clash and take steps that would prepare it for such an eventuality.