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Subject: International Relations

  • Indian Ocean Commission

    India was accepted as an observer in the Indian Ocean Commission getting a seat at the table of the organization that handles maritime governance in the western Indian Ocean.

    Indian Ocean Commission

    • The Indian Ocean Commission is an intergovernmental organization that was created in 1982 at Port Louis, Mauritius and institutionalized in 1984 by the Victoria Agreement in Seychelles.
    • The COI is composed of five African Indian Ocean nations: Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, Réunion (an overseas region of France), and Seychelles.
    • These five islands share geographic proximity, historical and demographic relationships, natural resources and common development issues.

    Aims and Objectives of IOC

    • COI’s principal mission is to strengthen the ties of friendship between the countries and to be a platform of solidarity for the entire population of the African Indian Ocean region.
    • COI’s mission also includes development, through projects related to sustainability for the region, aimed at protecting the region, improving the living conditions of the populations and preserving the various natural resources that the countries depend on.
    • Being an organisation regrouping only island states, the COI has usually championed the cause of small island states in regional and international fora.

    India and IOC

    • India’s entry is a consequence of its deepening strategic partnership with France as well as its expanding ties with the Vanilla Islands.
    • India had made the application to be an observer. The IOC has four observers — China, EU, Malta and International Organisation of La Francophonie (OIF).

    Significance

    • For India, the importance of joining this organization lies in several things.
    • First, India will get an official foothold in a premier regional institution in the western Indian Ocean, boosting engagement with islands in this part of the Indian Ocean.
    • These island nations are increasingly important for India’s strategic outreach as part of its Indo-Pacific policy.
    • This move would enhance ties with France which is the strong global power in the western Indian Ocean.
    • It lends depth to India’s SAGAR (security and growth for all in the region) policy unveiled by PM Modi in 2015.
    • The move, India hopes, would lead to greater security cooperation with countries in East Africa.

  • The diplomatic cost

    Context

    The CAA and violence in Delhi have started to take its toll on India’s secular foreign policy.

    The US and other’s reaction to the situation in India

    • Trump visit to India: President Trump referred to India as a democracy which was peaceful and tolerant. He lauded freedom, rule of law, liberty and protection of human dignity, adding graphically that where India had the holy Ganges, it also had the Golden Temple and Jama Masjid.
      • Assurance to the critics at home: He thereby cleverly reassured critics at home, especially in the US Congress, that he was not ignoring the values the two great democracies shared.
      • However, as the situation in Delhi spun into violence the next day, in an untutored media interaction at the US ambassador’s residence, he ducked questions about the CAA or Delhi riots, nonchalantly remarking it was “up to India” to deal with it.
      • This may have brought comfort to the Indian government but the world at large differed.
    • Response from the other countries: Delhi had already exchanged angry words with Malaysia, Turkey and even Indonesia over their varied critique of India’s handling of its Muslim minority when Iran joined the issue.

    Iran’s response to violence in India

    • Condemnation by foreign ministers: Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif condemned the “wave of organised violence against Indian Muslims”, adding that “Iran has been a friend of India”.
      • India’s foreign ministry summoned the Iranian ambassador to protest the inappropriateness of the minister’s remark.
    • The reaction by the Iranian Supreme Leader: Soon after, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei found the time, in the middle of the COVID-19 outbreak, to excoriate the Indian government.
      • Adding insult to injury, he appended #IndianMuslimsInDanger.
    • No reaction on China problems: A facile response, can be that Iran is being hypocritical as it has not expressed remorse over the Chinese repression of Uyghurs.
    • The difference in India’s importance to China: China is a veto-wielding member of the UN Security Council, which also sustains the Iranian economy despite US sanctions. On the other hand, India has a Shia population second only to that of Iran.

    Relations with Iran

    • Two consulates in India: There are two Iranian consulates in India in Hyderabad and Mumbai. Iran seeks the third one in Lucknow.
      • Qom also hosts many Shia students, particularly from the Kargil region.
    • Historic links between the two countries: After Humanyun’s exile in Iran (1530-40) before recovering the Indian throne, the Persian language and culture fired the cultural renaissance at the Mughal court.
      • Religio-cultural heritage importance: India is important for Iran for its religio-cultural heritage, unlike China, which is needed for transactional and strategic reasons.
    • Two interrelated questions flow from this reasoning:
      • 1. What is Iran’s importance for India and the trajectory of India-Iran relations over the last two decades?
      • 2. And why is Iran adopting this sharp tone over what the Indian government argues is an internal matter?
    • Convergence in the relations: The closest India-Iran strategic convergence began in the 1990s, particularly after Kabul fell to the Taliban in 1996. These ties blossomed under reformist Iranian President Mohammad Khatami and Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee.
    • Tehran Declaration: In 2001, the two signed the Teheran Declaration. Khatami in his opening remarks said that Iran always admired India’s secular credentials and Vajpayee had maintained that tradition.
      • In 2003, Khatami was the chief guest at India’s Republic Day and a New Delhi Declaration was issued.
    • Deterioration in relations and impact of India-US relation: The relationship began to slip as Iran’s clandestine nuclear programme and assistance from Pakistan’s rogue scientist A Q Khan was uncovered in mid-2003.
      • Impact of India-US closeness: Concomitantly, India was drawing closer to the US and negotiating a nuclear cooperation agreement.
      • The US used the nuclear issue to cause a cleavage as Indian and Iranian interests began seriously diverging.
      • Taliban factor: In any case, the Taliban had been ejected from Afghanistan and US troops literally surrounded Iran, having in 2003 overthrown Saddam Hussein. Geo-strategy trumped diplomacy.

    The US-Iran relation cycle

    • The nuclear deal with Iran: Iran-US relations also went through a cycle, with President Barack Obama recalibrating US policy towards the Gulf and West Asia.
      • Countering ISIS: Calculating that without Iran, ISIS could not be countered, the US in 2015 endorsed the nuclear deal that P-5 and Germany negotiated to end the nuclear stand-off.
    • Missing warmth of the 1990s: Although India-Iran relations after that returned to near normal as most US sanctions were lifted, the warmth of the 1990s was missing.
      • Iran was now beginning to extend its influence and role across Iraq and West Asia.
    • Maximum Pressure strategy of the US: President Donald Trump in 2016 reversed US policy and since then “maximum pressure” has been applied on Iran via tightened sanctions.
    • India’s engagement with Saudi Arabia and UAE: PM Modi also moved more forthrightly to engage Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
    • The fallout of the US strategy reversal: A fallout of the US policy reversal has been an exacerbation of not only the Shia-Sunni split but a Sunni-Sunni split as Qatar and Turkey are with Iran.

    Changing polity and increasing influence in the neighbourhood

    • Conservatives elected to power: In Iran’s parliamentary election on February 28, extremely conservative members have been elected, the moderates having been vetoed by the Guardians Council earlier.
      • Turnout was a low 43 per cent, due partly to fear of the coronavirus.
    • Increasing influence in the neighbourhood: Iran is even more isolated, though determined to resist US demands, due to communications being curtailed due to the virus.
      • Relations with the Taliban: It has good working relations with the Taliban and converging interests to see that US troops exit the region.
      • The friendly government in Baghdad: Iran is battling to ensure a friendly government in Baghdad, despite the killing of Major General Qasem Soleimani, by keeping militias aligned to it in play.

    Conclusion

    • Perception of India: Khamenei’s tweet reflects the perception that India is in the US-Saudi-Emirati corner and of little use as long as Trump is president.
      • Growing closeness Abu Dhabi, Riyadh and Ahmedabad would have led Iran to this conclusion.
    • Leveraging India’s dependence: In the Islamic world, Iran by publicly defending Indian Muslims embarrasses the silent Saudis.
      • It also calculates that India needs access to Afghanistan through Chabahar to assist the Ghani government or influence developments there.

     

  • After the Trump visit

    Context

    President Trump’s visit had the right optics. Attention must now turn to India-US priority areas.

    What were the mutual gains and highlights of the visit?

    • Security: Homeland Security is an American expression. For us to own it shows our concerns on cross-border sponsored terrorism.
    • Nuclear technology: Our nuclear VVER power plant technologies are state of the art and of Russian and French design.
      • Fast breeder: Good, but one more is better. We are well on the way to the fast breeder on the thorium route and these nuclear turbines are an essential step.
      • Unlimited thorium: We don’t have much uranium but unlimited thorium, so in the long run, apart from solar, this is the energy future.
      • Insurance obstacle resolved: Obviously, the insurance obstacle, as to who will bear the cost of insurance against disaster damage, which the Americans were raising earlier, has been resolved.
      • We have to build nuclear power to provide the initial feedstock for the thorium-based reactors.
    • No progress on trade pact: There are obviously differences between the two nations on the trade pact.
      • There is “progress”, but otherwise, we don’t know the way forward. Since the event was Ahmedabad-based, Amul is invading America and dairying is real politics.
    • US concerns over Kashmir issue: The US concern on Kashmir and minority rights is real.
      • If the largest foreign office establishment in the world is raising issues through their chief, let’s not bury our head in the sand.
      • Our defence minister expressing sadness at former chief ministers of Jammu and Kashmir being in detention was a gesture to the US President’s stand on pursuing solutions.
    • The bipartisan foreign policy of India shifting: The Americans generally rally behind the President on foreign policy.
      • We are more advanced now and have kicked a bipartisan approach to foreign affairs.
      • Seven decades of a bipartisan policy are thrown away without a word in explanation.

    Challenges to the rights in India

    • Every right is tampered with. Your religion, your identity in a country that never questioned it, you name it, it’s in question.
    • Multiple identity cards not accepted: The Aadhaar card, passport, ration card, election card are not enough. One office doesn’t accept another’s card, even if they carry the same information.
    • A study on a ration card and election cards: A study funded by the Canadian IDRC showed the poor only keep under lock and key the ration and election cards. One saves them from starvation, the other gives them dignity. At least once every five years, the mightiest knock at their door. We must not destroy, we must build.

    Conclusion

    There are obviously differences between the two nations on the trade pact. But apart from trade, there are many areas the cooperation on which can benefit both the countries.

     

     

  • Freedom in the World 2020

     

    India has become one of the world’s least free democracies, according to a global survey.

    Freedom in the World Report

    • It is a yearly survey and report by the U.S. based non-governmental organization Freedom House.
    • It measures the degree of civil liberties and political rights in every nation and significant related and disputed territories around the world.
    • The report derives its methodology from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1948.
    • It covers 195 countries, awarding scores based on political rights indicators such as the electoral process, political pluralism and participation and government functioning, as well as civil liberties indicators related to freedom of expression and belief associational and organisational rights, the rule of law and personal autonomy and individual rights.

    Highlights of the report

     

     

    Deteriorating freedom in India

    • The report ranks India at the 83rd position, along with Timor-Leste and Senegal.
    • This is near the bottom of the pile among the countries categorised as “Free”.
    • India’s score fell by four points to 71, the worst decline among the world’s 25 largest democracies this year.
    • India scored 34 out of 40 points in the political rights category, but only 37 out of 60 in the civil liberties category, for a total score of 71, a drop from last year’s score of 75.
    • The report treats “Indian Kashmir” as a separate territory, which saw its total score drop precipitously from 49 to 28 this year, moving it from a status of “Partly Free” to “Not Free”.

    Reason for the downfall

    • The annulment of autonomy and the subsequent shutdown of Kashmir, the NRC and the CAA, as well as the crackdown on mass protests, have been listed as the main signs of declining freedom in the report.
    • These three actions have shaken the rule of law in India and threatened the secular and inclusive nature of its political system said the report.
    • The report slammed the internet blackout in Kashmir terming it the longest shutdown ever imposed by democracy.
    • It said freedom of expression was under threat in India, with journalists, academics and others facing harassment and intimidation when addressing politically sensitive topics.
    • It warned that the Indian government’s alarming departures from democratic norms under present govt. could blur the values-based distinction between Beijing and New Delhi.

  • Explained: Why UN Human Rights Commission intends to intervene in a SC case against CAA?

    The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights “intends to file” an Intervention Application in the Supreme Court of India seeking to intervene in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1474 of 2019 and praying that it be allowed to make submissions.

    On what grounds is a UN body seeking to intervene in a case regarding a domestic Indian law?

    • The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UN Human Rights) is the leading UN entity on human rights.
    • The UN General Assembly entrusted both the High Commissioner and her Office with a unique mandate to promote and protect all human rights for all people.
    • As the principal United Nations office mandated to promote and protect human rights for all, OHCHR leads global human rights efforts speaks out objectively in the face of human rights violations worldwide.
    • This resolution, adopted by the UNGA in 1994, created the post of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.

    Its jurisdiction

    • The application says that successive High Commissioners have filed amicus curiae briefs on issues of particular public importance within proceedings before a diverse range of international and national jurisdictions.
    • It includes the European Court of Human Rights, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the International Criminal Court, and at the national level, the United States Supreme Court and final appeal courts of States in Asia and Latin America.

    What exactly does the intervention application say?

    • The OHCHR has welcomed as “commendable” the CAA’s stated purpose, “namely the protection of some persons from persecution on religious grounds.
    • It also “acknowledges the history of openness and welcome that India has exhibited to persons seeking to find a safer, more dignified life within its borders”.
    • However the examination of the CAA raises important issues with respect to international human rights law and its application to migrants, including refugees, says the OHCHR.
    • The CAA, it says, raises “important human rights issues, including its compatibility in relation to the right to equality before the law and nondiscrimination on nationality grounds under India’s human rights obligations”.
    • The application acknowledges that “the issue of nondiscrimination on nationality grounds falls outside the scope of this intervention”, but insists that “this in no way implies that there are not human rights concerns in this respect”.

    Why intervene?

    • The application questions the reasonableness and objectivity of the criterion of extending the benefits of the CAA to Buddhists, Sikhs, Hindus, Jains, Parsis and Christians from Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Pakistan alone.
    • It points out that while the Indian government has suggested that persons of Muslim faith, regardless of denomination or ethnicity, are protected there.
    • However recent reports by UN human rights show that Ahmadi, Hazara and Shia Muslims in these countries warrant protection on the same basis as that provided in the preferential treatment proposed by the CAA.

    Is there a specific basis on which the OHCHR has faulted the CAA?

    The application flags some central principles of international human rights law:

    1. the impact of the CAA on some migrants
    2. the enjoyment of human rights by all migrants and the rights of all migrants (non-citizens) to equality before the law and
    3. the principle of non-refoulment, which prohibits the forcible return of refugees and asylum seekers to a country where they are likely to be persecuted
    • The application mentions that all migrants “regardless of their race, ethnicity, religion, nationality and/or immigration status enjoy human rights and are entitled to protection”.
    • It cites international human rights instruments to urge the inclusion of non-discrimination, equality before the law, and equal protection before the law into the foundation of a rule of law.
    • International human rights law, the application says, does not distinguish between citizens and non-citizens or different groups of non-citizens for the purposes of providing them protection from discrimination, “including in respect of their migration status”.

    India’s stance

    • The Citizenship Amendment Act is an internal matter of India and concerns the sovereign right of the Indian Parliament to make laws.
    • MEA spokesperson insisted that no foreign party has any locus standi on issues pertaining to India’s sovereignty.
    • The CAA was “constitutionally valid and complies with all requirements of (India’s) constitutional values”, and “is reflective of our long-standing national commitment in respect of human rights issues arising from the tragedy of the Partition of India”.

  • Pieces of peace

    Context

    “Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan” between the US and Taliban signed on February 29 in Doha, is just another piece in the overall strategy of the US for Afghanistan.

    Pakistan’s support to the Taliban and unchanged Afghan policy of the US

    • Continuation of the same hard-nosed policy: While rolling out the Afghan policy in August 2017, it was emphasised by the current US dispensation that it was making amends to the Afghan strategy of the previous dispensation.
      • In reality, it has been a continuation of the same hard-nosed line.
    • How Pakistan supported the Taliban? The US and allies had got a rude shock when it dawned on them that between 2001 and 2008, the Taliban had used training and recuperation centres in Pakistan to regain domination over most parts of Afghanistan.
      • Benefiting from the Coalition Support Fund: Pakistan had actively aided the Taliban and al Qaeda (AQ), while continuing to benefit from handsome Coalition Support Funds and a seat at the “high table”.
      • Support of the Pakistan Army: All failures were blamed on inadequate numbers of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), which were ill-equipped to challenge the Taliban, backed by a professional Pakistan Army.
      • Misdiagnosed cause: The Obama administration diagnosed that lack of governance, corruption and fragmented polity were other key factors.

    What was the comprehensive Afghanistan Strategy?

    • COIN doctrine and “troop surge”: A comprehensive Afghanistan strategy review led to replicating its “troop surge” strategy, which was believed to have succeeded in Iraq, leading to total withdrawal of US troops (December 2011).
      • At the heart of the troop surge was the Counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine of the US Field Manual.
    • COIN plus CT: The military strategy in Afghanistan was split into COIN plus CT (Counter Terrorism) objectives.
      • The Taliban movement was treated as an insurgency.
      • What was involved in COIN: The COIN efforts entailed protecting population centres and highways, building numbers and capability of the ANSF to take on insurgents, with emphasis on good governance and support for reconstruction.
      • It also included reconciliation and reintegration of lower to mid-level willing Taliban.
      • The UN designations of Taliban and AQ were separated to pave the way for “peace talks” with Taliban commanders who were tired of fighting.
    • What this strategy achieved? The US-led ISAF troop surge helped create time and space to build and strengthen the ANSF over three times and succeeded in pushing the Taliban back to outlying areas.
      • Even today these territorial gains have not been reversed, except in some areas.
      • As the ANSF gained strength and depth, the US led-ISAF mission became a NATO led-Resolute Support mission.
    • How changing geopolitical circumstances increased challenges? The CT effort yielded rich dividends for the US and allies, in the Af-Pak region and even beyond.
      • The rise of ISIS: From the build-up of ISIS in 2014 to the loss of its Caliphate in 2019 and recently to the killing of General Solemani, the CT challenges of the US and allies in the Af-Pak region and periphery have become graver than ever.
      • These elements had a bearing on the Afghan strategy rolled out in August 2017.
      • Good progress was made in building up the ANSF, with a strong focus on three key elements — Special Forces, Air Force, and Afghan Intelligence (NDS).

    The US withdrawal

    • Objectives of the withdrawal: Emphasising that “consequences of a rapid exit were predictable and unacceptable”, it outlined two key objectives —
      • Preventing a resurgence of safe havens that threatened the security of Afghanistan and the US interests in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
      • Preventing terrorists from getting nukes or nuclear material which could be used against the US or elsewhere.
    • What is the recalibrated strategy: The “recalibrated” strategy envisaged following-
      • Time-bound but condition-based withdrawal.
      • Support for the Ghani government.
      • ANSF to take on the Taliban.
      • Talks with the Taliban and for Pakistan to demonstrate commitment on dismantling safe havens that threatened US objectives.
      • Overall, the strategy remained the same, except for the withdrawal of the US from a role in nation-building.
    • What are the results of the strategy? There has been a greater emphasis on the strengthening of ANSF.
      • The regular assessments by the US show an increasing role and success of the Afghan Special Forces.
      • The Air Force and the NDS in playing the lead in keeping the Taliban from running over capitals.
      • By and large, the ANSF have been successful in maintaining the balance and the Taliban-control has not slipped to 2009 levels.
      • In the meantime, US forces have dropped to 10 per cent of the peak (in 2011).
      • With the re-election of President Ghani, it is assured that the US line of thinking will prevail over the Afghan government.
      • Role of Pakistan in the process: On its part, Pakistan has demonstrated its intent by delivering top-rung Taliban, including Mullah Baradar in its custody since 2010, and Anas Haqqani released as part of the process, for the talks.
      • Even if there is no comprehensive ceasefire or full withdrawal ever, Pakistan is unlikely to be blamed.

    What Pakistan achieved from the peace process?

    • Return of Afghan refugee: Pakistan has been rewarded in more ways than one. It managed to return lakhs of Afghans.
    • Fencing on the eastern border of Afghanistan: It builds a fence along the eastern parts of Afghanistan to prevent cross-border attacks.
    • Targeting the key TTP leaders: Pakistan got the US and Afghan forces to target key TTP leaders, starting with TTP chief Mullah Fazlullah in June 2018.
      • Since January this year, three top TTP leaders have been killed in Kabul and Kunar.
      • This has also helped build the Pakistan narrative that Afghan soil is being used to target Pakistan.
    • Changing the international narrative in its favour: Even though it is facing “calibrated” heat on FATF sanctions, Pakistan has managed to change the international narrative in its favour.
      • The 24th report (July 2019) of the UNSC monitoring committee has stated, “Al Qaeda continues to cooperate closely with LeT and the Haqqani Network”, but there is no reference to LeT or Haqqani in the 25th report (January 2020).
      • This report has also asserted that ISIL-K has established informal contact with other terrorist groups, including Jamaat-ul-Ahrar, TTP and Lashkar e-Islam.
      • Meanwhile, these groups regularly attack Pakistani posts along the Afghan border.
      • All key anti-Pakistan groups are now being categorised as ISIL-K supporters, even though Pakistan has run the so-called Daesh networks in eastern Afghanistan for years.
      • The UNSC reports also highlight the positive role of Taliban in targeting ISIL-K.

    Conclusion

    • The election in the US has bearing on the process: In an election year, the US needs to show that it is not fighting someone else’s battles and is making “sincere efforts” at peace-making.
      • The “Agreement” demonstrates sincerity.
      • At the same time, the US has to continue steering the Afghan strategy to keep terror networks in check.
      • The peace process has already created a comfort-loving, globe-trotting leadership in the top echelons of the Taliban, who would continue to talk, even if the current Agreement falters.
    • Pakistan is again sitting on the high table: As the LeT and Haqqani networks go missing from UN reports and JeM chief Masood Azhar and pro-Pak TTP leader Ehasanullah Ehsan go conveniently “missing” from Pakistan soil, the pressure on Pakistan has eased.
      • The new non-state entities backed by Pakistan, such as the AQIS and ISKP/IS-Kashmir/IS-Hind will become more visible.
      • The rank and file of LeT, JeM, HUJI etc can easily be transferred to these new entities, while many more can be recruited under new banners.
      • Online propaganda of these entities, including in Indian languages, is already visible and likely to escalate.

     

  • Explained: US-Taliban Pact

     

     

    • The US and Taliban signed an agreement for “Bringing Peace to Afghanistan”, which will enable the US and NATO to withdraw troops in the next 14 months.
    • The pact is between the “Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan which is not recognized by the United States as a state and is known as the Taliban” and the US.
    • The four-page pact was signed between Zalmay Khalilzad, US Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation, and Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, political head of the Taliban.

    Key elements of the deal

    Troops Withdrawal

    • The US will draw down to 8,600 troops in 135 days and the NATO or coalition troop numbers will also be brought down, proportionately and simultaneously.
    • And all troops will be out within 14 months — “all” would include “non-diplomatic civilian personnel” (could be interpreted to mean “intelligence” personnel).

    Taliban Commitment

    • The main counter-terrorism commitment by the Taliban is that “It will not allow any of its members, other individuals or groups, including al-Qaeda, to use the soil of Afghanistan to threaten the security of the US and its allies”.
    • While Miller said the reference to al-Qaeda is important, the pact is silent on other terrorist groups — such as anti-India groups Lashkar-e-Toiba or Jaish-e-Mohammed.
    • Again, India, not being an US ally, is not covered under this pact.

    Sanctions Removal

    • UN sanctions on Taliban leaders to be removed by three months (by May 29) and US sanctions by August 27.
    • The sanctions will be out before much progress is expected in the intra-Afghan dialogue.

    Prisoner’s release

    • This is a possible trouble spot because the US-Taliban agreement and the joint declaration differ, and it is not clear whether the Ashraf Ghani-led government is on board with this big up-front concession to Taliban.
    • The joint declaration says the US will facilitate discussion with Taliban representatives on confidence building measures, to include determining the feasibility of releasing significant numbers of prisoners on both sides.
    • While there are no numbers or deadlines in the joint declaration, the US-Taliban pact says up to 5,000 imprisoned Taliban and up to 1,000 prisoners from “the other side” held by Taliban “will be released” by March.
    • The intra-Afghan negotiations are supposed to start in Oslo.

    Ceasefire

    • This is identified as another potential “trouble spot”.
    • The agreement states ceasefire will be simply “an item on the agenda” when intra-Afghan talks start, and indicate actual ceasefire will come with the “completion” of an Afghan political agreement.

    Implications of the Deal

    An adieu to democracy in Afghanistan

    • The Taliban have got what they wanted: troops withdrawal, removal of sanctions, release of prisoners.
    • This has also strengthened Pakistan, Taliban’s benefactor, and the Pakistan Army and the ISI’s influence appears to be on the rise.
    • It has made it unambiguous that it wants an Islamic regime.
    • The Afghan government has been completely sidelined during the talks between the US and Taliban.
    • The future for the people of Afghanistan is uncertain and will depend on how Taliban honours its commitments and whether it goes back to the mediaeval practices of its 1996-2001 regimes.

    Implications for India

    • India has been backing the Ghani-led government and was among very few countries to congratulate Ghani on his victory.
    • India’s proximity to Ghani also drew from their shared view of cross-border terrorism emanating from Pakistan.
    • There has not been formal contact with top Taliban leaders, the Indian mission has a fair amount of access to the Pashtun community throughout Afghanistan through community development projects of about $3 billion.
    • Due to So, although Pakistan military and its ally Taliban have become dominant players in Kabul’s power circles, South Block insiders insist that it is not all that grim for New Delhi.
    • these high-impact projects, diplomats feel India has gained goodwill among ordinary Afghans, the majority of whom are Pashtuns and some may be aligned with the Taliban as well.

    Way Forward

    • The joint declaration is a symbolic commitment to the Afghanistan government that the US is not abandoning it.
    • Much will depend on whether the US and the Taliban are able to keep their ends of the bargain, and every step forward will be negotiated, and how the Afghan government and the political spectrum are involved.
    • Like in 1989, 1992, 1996, and in 2001, Pakistan has the opportunity to play a constructive role. It frittered away the opportunities in the past.

    Back2Basics

    India and the Taliban

    • India and the Taliban have had a bitter past.
    • New Delhi nurses bitter memories from the IC-814 hijack in 1999, when it had to release terrorists — including Masood Azhar who founded Jaish-e-Mohammed that went on to carry out terror attacks as such on Parliament, Pathankot and in Pulwama.
    • Quite predictably, Mullah Baradar did not name India among the countries that supported the peace process, but specially thanked Pakistan for the “support, work and assistance” provided.
    • The Taliban perceived India as a hostile country, as India had supported the anti-Taliban force Northern Alliance in the 1990s.
    • India never gave diplomatic and official recognition to the Taliban when it was in power during 1996-2001.
    • But its foreign policy establishment has shied away from engaging with the Taliban directly.

  • Regional bonding: On Ranil Wickremesinghe’s prescription for peace

    Context

    Former Sri Lankan Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe’s push for regional economic integration and for India-Pakistan dialogue should be studied carefully by New Delhi.

    What are the issues with SAARC?

    • Recent moves by India: India has more or less shut down all conversations on the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).
      • India also walked away from the ASEAN-led Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).
    •  Mr Wickremesinghe set out a number of suggestions:
    • The original purpose of SAARC-Regional growth: India-Pakistan tensions have brought economic integration within the SAARC region to a “standstill”.
      • That the original purpose of the South Asian group was to build a platform where bilateral issues could be set aside in the interest of regional growth.
    • Start at the sub-grouping levels: To engender more intra-regional trade, an even smaller sub-grouping of four countries with complementary economies: India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Thailand, can start the process of reducing tariffs and demolishing non-tariff barrier regimes.
      • When it comes to the intra-regional share of total trade, SAARC and BIMSTEC languish behind groupings such as ASEAN, EU and MERCOSUR.
    • Economic Integration Road Map: The Sri Lankan leader also suggested that with India’s leadership, a more integrated South Asian region would be better equipped to negotiate for better terms with RCEP so as not to be cut out of the “productivity network” in Asia, and envisioned an Economic Integration Road Map to speed up the process.

    Governments stand

    • Talks with Pakistan off the table: The government has made it clear that talks with Pakistan are strictly off the table, and that a SAARC summit, which has not been held since 2014, is unlikely to be convened anytime soon.
    • More reliance on bilateral deals: The government, which has taken a protectionist turn on multilateral trade pacts, is relying more on direct bilateral deals with countries rather than overarching ones that might expose Indian markets to flooding by Chinese goods.
    • India’s trade deficit with the neighbours: For any regional sub-grouping in South Asia to flourish, it is India that will have to make the most concessions given the vast trade deficits India’s neighbours have at present, which it may not wish to do.

    Conclusion

    • The overall projection that India’s global reach will be severely constrained unless it is integrated with its neighbours, and tensions with Pakistan are resolved, cannot be refuted. India needs to be more accommodative for the realisation of its ambitions.

     

     

  • Blue Dot Network

     

    With US President Donald Trump on his maiden visit to India, the two countries are expected to have discussed the Blue Dot Network, a proposal that will certify infrastructure and development projects.

    Blue Dot Network

    • Led by the US’s International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), the Blue Dot network was jointly launched by the US, Japan (Japanese Bank for International Cooperation) and Australia (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade) in November 2019 on the sidelines of the 35th ASEAN Summit in Thailand.
    • It is meant to be a multi-stakeholder initiative that aims to bring governments, the private sector and civil society together to promote “high quality, trusted standards for global infrastructure development”.
    • The network is like a “Michelin Guide” for infrastructure projects.
    • This means that as part of this initiative, infrastructure projects will be vetted and approved by the network depending on standards, as per which, the projects should meet certain global infrastructure principles.
    • The projects that are approved will get a “Blue Dot”, thereby setting universal standards of excellence, which will attract private capital to projects in developing and emerging economies.

    Countering China’s BRI?

    • Observers have referred to the proposal as a means of countering China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which was launched over six years ago.
    • While Blue Dot may be seen as a counter to BRI, it will need a lot of work for two reasons.

    Fundamental difference between BRI and Blue Dot

    • While the former involves direct financing, giving countries in need immediate short-term relief, the latter is not a direct financing initiative and therefore may not be what some developing countries need.
    • The question is whether Blue Dot offering first-world solutions to third-world countries.
    • Secondly, Blue Dot will require coordination among multiple stakeholders when it comes to grading projects.
    • Given the past experience of Quad, the countries involved in it are still struggling to put a viable bloc. Therefore, it remains to be seen how Blue Dot fares in the long run.

  • A U.S. strategy only meant to isolate China

    Context

    Since 2017, the United States government has released a few reports and fact sheets on its new Indo-Pacific strategy. Buried in these documents is a much deeper agenda of the U.S. government: to use three large Asian states — Australia, India, and Japan — to isolate China. There is nothing else to it.

    The scale of BRI and the US objections

    • Objections to BRI: The U.S. government has made it clear that what it finds most objectionable is China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which has signed on more than 70 countries in the world.
    • What BRI aims to achieve? Adopted in 2013, the BRI is intended as a mechanism to-
      • Development of new markets: BRI aims to end China’s reliance upon the markets of the West and to develop new markets in other continents.
      • Building infra: It is also intended to use China’s massive surpluses to build infrastructure in key parts of Africa, Asia, and Latin America.
      • Investment of $ 1.3 trillion: By 2027, according to estimates by Morgan Stanley, China will spend about $1.3 trillion on this ambitious construction project.
      • Involvement of Saudi Arabia: Even Saudi Arabia, a close ally of the U.S., has made the BRI one of the cornerstones of its Saudi Vision 2030 plan.
    • Involvement of Pakistan: While China has invested $68 billion to build the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor from Xinjiang to Pakistan’s Gwadar Port.
      • Saudi Arabia has agreed to invest $10 billion in the port itself.

    Significance of the BRI and comparison with the US spending

    • Staggering scale and participation: The scale of Chinese investment, and the participation of a range of countries with different political identities in the BRI, is staggering.
    • Loss of appetite in the US to spend: At the Indo-Pacific Business Forum in July 2018 the U.S. said that it has spent $2.9 billion through the Department of State and the USAID (United States Agency for International Development).
      • It has lined up hundreds of millions of dollars more through its U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation.
      • Inadequate US spending: If one adds up all the money that the U.S. intends to spend for economic projects, it is still a fraction of the amount spent by China.
      • ‘America First’ attitude: There is no appetite in Washington, D.C., with its ‘America First’ attitude, to funnel more money towards investments in the region currently being built by the BRI.

    Military Claims of the US and investment

    • US investment with military presence: It appears as if U.S. investments will come only with military claims.
      • The case of Nepal: A few years ago, Nepal discovered a large amount of uranium in Mustang, near the Nepal-China border; this has certainly motivated U.S. interest in Nepal’s economy.
      • If the U.S. money comes with U.S. military presence, this will create a serious flashpoint in the Himalayas.

    Raising human right and transparency issue against China

    • The argument of human rights and transparency
      • Rhetorical argument: Unable to outspend the Chinese, the U.S. government is making a rhetorical argument that it has more respect for “transparency, human rights, and democratic values” than China, which “practices repression at home and abroad”.
    • The argument of transparency and the debt trap
      • Debt trap used by the US: It is hard to imagine the U.S. being “transparent” with its trade deals. It is equally hard to imagine the U.S. being able to argue that it would not put countries into debt.
      • Debt crisis created by the US in the 1980s: The U.S. government enabled a massive Third World debt crisis in the 1980s, which was then used by the U.S.-driven International Monetary Fund’s Structural Adjustment Programs to strangle countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.
      • This history is alive, and it makes a mockery of the U.S.’s attempt to say that its own approach is superior to that of China’s.

    US withdrawal from multilateralism

    • Apart from that, the U.S. government has already indicated that it is uninterested in multilateral deals.
    • Withdrawal from TPP: The US withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership in 2017, for instance.
      • Australia and Japan shrugged, and then put their energy into the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, which sidelines the U.S.

    The claim of free and open Indo-Pacific

    • Renaming the Pacific Command: In May 2018, the U.S. military’s Pacific Command was renamed the Indo-Pacific Command, a symbolic gesture that provides a military aspect to the Indo-Pacific Strategy.
    • What free and open mean to the US? The U.S. government has made it clear that for all its talk of a “free and open Indo-Pacific”, what it actually wants is an Indo-Pacific with fewer Chinese ships and more U.S. warships.
    • Just before this renaming, the U.S. National Security Strategy of 2017 noted that “China seeks to displace the United States in the Indo-Pacific region”, and so the Indo-Pacific Strategy intends for the S. to fight for its dominance in the Pacific Ocean, the Indian Ocean, and in the Asian rim.
    • This is a very dangerous war that the U.S. seeks to impose on Asia.

    India adopting the US project of Indo-Pacific

    • Australia and Japan moving away: As the military aspect of the Strategy increased, both Australia and Japan edged away from full-scale adoption of the U.S. project.
      • Japan has begun to use the term “Indo-Pacific” without the word “Strategy”.
      • Australia has signed onto a “comprehensive strategic partnership” with China.
    • Only India adopting the project: Only India remains loyal to the agenda set by U.S. President Donald Trump.
      • No US strategy to contain China: In all the documents released by the U.S. government and in all the speeches by officials, there is no discussion of the strategy to contain China.
      • There is only rhetoric that skates into the belligerent territory.

    Conclusion

    India would be advised to study the U.S. project rather than jump into it eagerly. Room for an independent foreign policy for India is already narrowed, and room for independent trade policy is equally suffocated. To remain the subordinate ally of the U.S. suggests that India will miss an opportunity to be part of a reshaped Asia.