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Subject: Bilateral Relations

1. Major World Events
2. India’s Interests in neighbourhood
3. Effects of our Policies

  • Pakistan- Sri Lanka Relations

    Pakistani PM is in Colombo on a two-day visit for ways and means to enhance trade and connectivity with Sri Lanka.

    What is the news?

    • Pakistan PM’s visit has attracted a fair amount of controversy because of a cancelled invitation to address the Sri Lankan parliament.
    • India too granted permission for using its airspace for the Pakistani PM’s aircraft.

    Try this question:

    Q.The triangulation in the ties between Sri Lanka, China and Pakistan is an emerging threat in the Indian Ocean Region. Discuss.

    Sri Lanka- Pakistan Relations

    • For Colombo, the visit holds much value. It comes at a fraught time for the government on the international stage.
    • Imminently, it is bracing to be hauled over the coals at the UN Human Rights Commission for withdrawing from resolution 30/1 of September 2015, under which it committed to carrying out war crime investigations.
    • To make matters worse, the Islamic world is appalled by Sri Lanka’s tight rules for the cremation and not burials of Muslims who have died of COVID-19.
    • The rule created a storm in Sri Lanka, with community leaders convinced that this is nothing but an extension of the state’s persecution of Muslims.

    Why Pakistan?

    (1) Trade ties

    • Pakistan is Sri Lanka’s second-largest trading partner in South Asia after India.
    • Sri Lanka and Pakistan have a free trade agreement dating back to 2005.
    • Pakistan’s top exports to Sri Lanka are textiles and cement.
    • Sri Lanka’s top exports to Pakistan are tea, rubber and readymade garments.

    (2) Cultural ties

    • In addition to trade cooperation, Pakistan invokes cricket and Buddhism, topics that most Sri Lankans share a deep connection with.
    • Over the last decade, Pakistan has also been projecting its ancient Buddhist sites to promote cultural ties with Sri Lanka.

    (3) Defence ties

    Defence ties are a strong pillar of Sri Lanka- Pakistan bilateral relationship.

    • During the 1971 war, Pakistan Air Force jets refuelled in Sri Lanka.
    • India pulled back the peacekeeping forces in 1990, it provided no active defence support to the Sri Lankan military.
    • Sri Lanka turned to Pakistan for arms, ammunition as well as training for its fighter pilots.
    • Gotabaya, who was defence secretary at the time, visited Pakistan in 2008 to make a request for emergency assistance with military supplies.
    • Earlier this month, Sri Lanka participated in Pakistan’s multi-nation naval exercise Aman.

    India’s observations and concerns

    • As Sri Lanka’s closest neighbour with strong, all-encompassing ties, even if these are sometimes problematic, India has not perceived Pakistan as a serious rival in Sri Lanka so far.
    • Sporadically, the Indian security establishment has voiced concerns about Pakistan’s role in the radicalization of people, especially in Eastern Sri Lanka.
    • Funds have poured in for new mosques from some West Asian countries, and the effect that this could have in India.

    Emerging threats from the ‘Triad’

    • There is now a new wariness about triangulation in the ties between Sri Lanka, China and Pakistan in defence co-operation, though it has not been publicly expressed.
    • In 2016, India put pressure on Sri Lanka to drop a plan to buy the Chinese JF-17 Thunder aircraft made in Pakistan and co-produced by the Chinese Chengdu Aircraft Corporation.
    • The most recent threat was from excluding India from the Colombo Terminal Project.

  • New disengagement agreement in eastern Ladakh

    In the first major breakthrough in talks China’s Defence Ministry that PLA and Indian troops on the southern and northern shores of Pangong Tso began synchronized and organized disengagement.

    This newscard presents a holistic report on the ground situation of Sino-India border disputes in Ladakh.

    Also, try this PYQ from CSP 2020:

    Q.Siachen Glacier is situated to the

    (a) East of Aksai Chin

    (b) East of Leh

    (c)North of Gilgit

    (d) North of Nubra Valley

    New plan in eastern Ladakh

    • As of now, the disengagement process seems restricted to the north and south banks of Pangong Tso.
    • The process has started with the pulling back of certain columns of tanks from the south bank region by both sides.
    • At the moment, there is no pullback of troops from the friction points and the heights they are positioned on.
    • That will happen in a phased and verified manner.

    Disengagement from Pangong Tso

    • China will pull its troops on the north bank towards the east of Finger 8.
    • Similarly, India will also position its forces at its permanent base near Finger 3.
    • Similar action will be taken by both the parties in the south bank area as well.
    • Both sides have also agreed that the area between Finger 3 and Finger 8 will become a no-patrolling zone temporarily, till both sides reach an agreement through military and diplomatic discussions to restore patrolling.
    • Further, all the construction done by both sides on the north and south banks of the lake since April 2020 will be removed.

    Why is this area important?

    • The north and south banks of Pangong Tso are two of the most significant and sensitive regions when it comes to the current standoff that began in May 2020.
    • What makes the areas around the shores of the lake so sensitive and important is that clashes here marked the beginning of the standoff.
    • It is one of the areas where the Chinese troops had come around 8 km deep west of India’s perception of the Line of Actual Control.
    • China had positioned its troops on the ridgeline connecting Fingers 3 and 4, while according to India the LAC passes through Finger 8.

    Take a glimpse of all friction points along Indian borders:

    India is at an advantage

    • Further, it is in the south bank of the lake that Indian forces in an action in late August had gained a strategic advantage by occupying certain peaks, outwitting the Chinese.
    • Indian troops had positioned themselves on heights of Magar Hill, Mukhpari, Gurung Hill, Rezang La and Rechin La, which were unoccupied by either side earlier.
    • Since then, the Chinese side had been particularly sensitive as these positions allowed India to not only dominate Spanggur Gap.
    • It is a two-km wide valley that can be used to launch an offensive, as China had done in 1962, they also allow India a direct view of China’s Moldo Garrison.

    Why has this taken so long?

    • Since September, China has insisted that India first pull its troops back from the south bank of Pangong Tso, and the Chushul sub-sector.
    • However, India has been demanding that any disengagement process should include the entire region, and troops should go back to their April 2020 positions.
    • However, it seems that for now, both sides have agreed to first disengage from the Pangong Tso area only.

    Principles of disengagement

    In military and diplomatic discussions with China India expects a solution to the issue on the basis of three principles:

    1. LAC should be accepted and respected by both parties.
    2. Neither party should attempt to change the status quo unilaterally.
    3. All agreements should be fully adhered to by both parties.

    Does this mean that the standoff is resolved?

    • There are still some outstanding issues that remain regarding deployment and patrolling on LAC.
    • The Pangong Tso region is just one of the friction areas. There are other friction points, all north of the Pangong Tso, where the troops have been face-to-face since last year.
    • The situation in Depsang Plains continues to be a concern.
    • Both sides agree that complete disengagement under bilateral agreements and protocols should be done as soon as possible.
    • After the talks so far, China is also aware of our resolve to protect the sovereignty of the country.

    Need for confidence building

    • Two of the main stumbling blocks in finding a permanent resolution are lack of trust and no clarity on intent.
    • Any permanent resolution will include first, disengagement of troops from the frontlines from all friction points.
    • Then de-escalation will entail sending the troops from the depth areas to their original bases.
    • Both sides have around 50,000 troops in the region, along with additional tanks, artillery and air defence assets.

    Conclusion

    • A resolution has to include sending these troops and military equipment where they came from on both sides.
    • But neither side had been willing to take the first step to reduce their troop or military strength, as it does not trust the other side.

  • Taking the long view with China

    The article explains the various choices India faces in the geopolitical landscape shaped by emergence of two Asian giants.

    New challenges and hard choices on geopolitical front

    • As it moves to becoming the third largest economy in the world, India needs to have a clear-eyed world view and strategy as it makes hard choices.
    • It needs to reject the developing country regional mindset that has shaped India’s  national aims and foreign policy.
    • We have a “special and privileged strategic partnership” with Russia which provides more than three-quarter of India’s military equipment and a “comprehensive global strategic partnership” with the U.S.
    • India’s relationship with the U.S.-led Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), where the others are military allies, has rightly been cautious, as U.S. President Joe Biden sees China as a ‘strategic competitor’ rather than a ‘strategic rival’.
    • Realism dictates that India does not need to compromise on its strategic autonomy.
    • India faces two sides of the China conundrum: Defining engagement with its neighbour which is consolidating an expanding BRI while remaining involved with the strategic, security and technological concerns of the U.S.

    China’s dominance in financial sphere

    • In the financial sphere, there is the real possibility of the Chinese renminbi becoming a global reserve currency or e-yuan becoming the digital payments currency.
    • China is the world’s largest trading economy.
    • It could soon become the world’s largest economy.
    • China has stitched together an investment agreement with the EU and with most of Asia.
    • Relative attractiveness will determine when the dollar goes the way of the sterling and the guilder.
    • China, facing technological sanctions from the U.S., may well put in the hard work to make this happen soon.

    China: Partner, competitor, and economic rival

    • Some form of the EU’s China policy of seeing the emerging superpower as a partner, competitor, and economic rival depending on the policy area in question is going to be the global norm. 
    • This broad perspective is also reflected in India’s participation in both the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, designed to resist the spread of Western interests, and in the U.S.-led Quad, with its anti-China stance.
    • Within the United Nations, India’s interests have greater congruence with China’s interests rather than the U.S.’s and the EU’s.
    • Sharing the COVID-19 vaccine with other countries distinguishes India, and China, from the rest.

    India’s engagement with the U.S.

    • The congruence between India and the U.S. lies in the U.S.’s declared strategic objective of promoting an integrated economic development model in the Indo-Pacific as a credible alternative to the BRI, but with a caveat.
    • Instead of an alternate development model, India should move the Quad towards supplementing the infrastructure push of the BRI in line with other strategic concerns in the region.
    • For example, developing their scientific, technological capacity and digital economy, based on India’s digital stack and financial resources of other Quad members, will resonate with Asia and Africa.

    India’s role in global governance

    • Another area where India can play a ‘bridging role’ is global governance.
    • President Xi Jinping’s “community with shared future for mankind”, and Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s “climate justice” and asking how long India will be excluded from the UN Security Council, challenge the frame of the liberal order without providing specific alternatives.
    • With respect to digital data, India has recently expressed that there must be reciprocity in data sharing, and this is the kind of ‘big idea’ for sharing prosperity that will gain traction with other countries.

    India’s growing influence

    • India’s recent policies are gaining influence at the expense of China and the West, and both know this trend will accelerate.
    • The steps to a $5 trillion economy, shift to indigenous capital military equipment, and a new Science, Technology and Innovation Policy underline impact, capacity and interests.
    • ASEAN remains keen India re-join its trade pact to balance China.
    • It is being recognised that India’s software development prowess could shape a sustainable post-industrial state different to the U.S. and China model.

    Consider the question “Examine how India’s foreing policy priorities and its role in global governance is shaped by China’s rise.”

    Conclusion

    As in the historical past, Asia is big enough for both Asian giants to have complementary roles, share prosperity and be independent of each other and of the West.

     

  • Places in news: Shahtoot Dam

    India and Afghanistan have signed an agreement to build the Shahtoot Dam in Kabul to provide drinking water facility in the Afghan capital.

    Try this question from prelims 2020:

    Consider the following pairs

    Sr. River Flows into
    1. Mekong — Andaman Sea
    2. Thames — Irish Sea
    3. Volga — Caspian Sea
    4. Zambezi — Indian Ocean


    Which of the pairs given above is/are correctly matched?

    (a) 1 and 2 only

    (b) 3 only

    (c) 3 and 4 only

    (d) 1, 2 and 4 only

    Shahtoot Dam

    • It is a proposed dam in the Kabul river basin, one of the five river basins in Afghanistan.
    • This project will provide drinking, irrigation and Environmental water for Kabul province.
    • The dam will provide potable water to more than 2 million residents of Kabul, in addition to the irrigation of 4000 hectares of land in the district of Charasiab and Khairabad.
    • The dam will also provide water for irrigation to nearby areas, rehabilitate the existing irrigation and drainage network and help in flood protection and management efforts.
    • The project is expected to produce electricity for the region.

  • India’s challenge in dealing with international criticism

    Tweets by international celebrities in support of farmers’ protests and the government’s response to it have brought focus the issue of international scrutiny of India’s policies. The article analyses this issue.

    Issue of external criticism of India

    • Recently, India has been at the receiving end of international criticism over its dealing with the farmers’ protests against recently passed farm laws.
    • But neither the negative international scrutiny nor the Indian nationalist rejection of it are new.
    • Mobilising nationalist sentiment and evoking territorial sovereignty in fending off external criticism have been consistent themes in the conduct of independent India’s foreign policy.
    • The intensity of international scrutiny has varied over time and space, but they are unlikely to ever disappear.
    • As India becomes more connected to the world, there will be more global interest in its internal dynamics.
    • At the same time, like all rising powers, India will push back against demands that it must always measure up to external expectations.

    Why the Western criticism matters

    • Western power to turn sensible sentiments on democracy and human rights into consistent policies is rather limited.
    • Also, the issue of human rights has never been the sole factor shaping US foreign policy towards other nations.
    • But there is no denying that the Western power to create problems is real.
    • There are also implications of needless political arguments with the US over your domestic politics.
    • Asian realists also know that it is not difficult to neutralise Western liberal critics by emphasising engagement with others that might have commercial and security interests.

    Dealing with the criticism in the U.S. Congress

    • In the early 1990s, passing resolutions against India on Punjab and Kashmir in the US Congress was routine.
    • But once Delhi began to engage with US Congress and explained the complexity of the issues involved, the tide began to turn.
    • The Indian diaspora helped by reaching out to their representatives and pressing them to reconsider their positions.
    • Within a decade, supporters of separatism in Punjab and Kashmir could not even move the resolutions in the US Congress.

    Domestic polarisation and role of diaspora in international criticism

    • India’s problem is not with external criticism, India’s real challenge is the deepening domestic political divide.
    • India’s internal conflicts have inevitably enveloped the diaspora.
    • Sections of the diaspora that are opposed to Indian policies are actively mobilising the political class in their adopted countries to raise the voice against India.
    • They are also building wider coalitions to put the Indian government on the mat.
    • If the diaspora in the past helped India overcome some difficult problems with the US, it is the counter mobilisation of the diaspora that is shaping the western criticism of India.

    Way forward

    • The government’s ability to overcome external criticism depends on rebuilding the national consensus on key policies and healing the multiple social rifts.
    • Without a visible and sincere political effort to promote unity at home, internal divisions will get worse and make India more vulnerable to external meddling.

    Consider the question “Recently, India has been at the receiving end of the international criticism for its internal issues. What are the reasons for such criticism? Suggest the strategy to deal with such criticisms.” 

    Conclusion

    India’s own experience with Sri Lanka and Nepal underlines how hard it is to persuade other societies to accept Delhi’s preferences on the rights of minorities and federalism. In the end, democracy and pluralism can never be foreigner’s gifts. The struggle to construct and preserve democracies remains an internal one.

  • India’s Myanmar dilemma

    The coup in Myanmar poses several challenges for India. For one, it poses a dilemma in India’s dealing with Myanmar’s military. Also, it has implications for the Rohingya issue and containing the insurgency in north-east India.

    Implications of the coup in Myanmar

    1) Political realignment and role of Aung San Suu Kyi

    • Threat of sanctions from the United States and the West in the wake of the recent coup could lead to unique political realignments in Myanmar.
    • As a result, the international community may not have any alternatives than Aung San Suu Kyi when it comes to pursuing the restoration of democracy in the country.
    • The democratic credentials of Aung San Suu Kyi, remain deeply diminished today due to her justification of the ill-treatment meted out to the Rohingya,
    • Yet the recent events have brought her right back into the centre of the international community’s political calculations in Myanmar.

    2) Implications for Rohingya issus

    • International community will have to condone the government’s past actions against the Rohingya in order to highlight Suu Kyi as an anchor of democracy in Myanmar.
    • The case against Myanmar’s conduct during her government’s tenure at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) will most likely be put on the backburner.
    • Increasing global support for Ms. Suu Kyi could potentially negative consequences for the persecuted Rohingya.

    3) China factor

    • In the short run, the coup stands to hurt the interests of China, India and even the rest of the international community, all of whom were able to do business with Myanmar in their own unique ways.
    • For China, the coup has complicated its larger regional economic plans in Myanmar.
    • However, the international community’s sharp reactions will likely force the Tatmadaw (Myanmar’s military) to turn to China.
    • International sanctions are unlikely to have a major impact on the country’s largely inward-looking junta and its Generals.
    • However, it Generals would still expect Beijing to give them
    • For China, the coup has complicated its larger regional economic plans in Myanmar.
    • On the positive side for Beijing, decisive western sanctions will force the military to get closer to China.
    • To that extent, China will be its biggest beneficiary of the February coup by default.

    India’s dilemma

    • India faces the most challenging dilemma on how to respond to the military coup in Myanmar.
    • The dual power centres of the military and the civilian government that existed in Naypyitaw until recently, suited India.
    • While India’s national interests clearly lie in dealing with whoever is in power in Myanmar, India would find it difficult to openly support the junta given the strong western and American stance.
    • On the other hand, it can ill-afford to offend the junta by actively seeking a restoration of democracy there.
    • While Ms. Suu Kyi was getting cozy with Beijing, it was the Myanmar military that had been more circumspect.

    India’s concerns

    • While a friendless Myanmar junta getting closer to China is a real worry for New Delhi, there are other concerns too.
    • For one, Myanmar’s military played a helpful role in helping India contain the north-eastern insurgencies.
    • Equally important is the issue of providing succour to the Rohingya in the wake of the military coup in Myanmar.

    Consider the question “Developments in Myanmar have several implications for the regional geopolitics. In light of this, examine the challenges India faces from the development in Myanmar.”

    Conclusion

    India is left with very few clear policy options. And yet, it must continue to maintain relations with the government in power in Myanmar while discreetly pushing for political reconciliation in the country. In the meantime, the focus must be on improving trade, connectivity, and security links between the two sides.

  • Sri Lanka pushes India out of Colombo Terminal Project

    After the strong opposition from within, the Sri Lankan government was forced to revoke a 2019 agreement with India and Japan to develop the strategic East Container Terminal (ECT) at the Colombo Port.

    Map Reading: Note all these major ports and try recalling their sequences in the clockwise and counter-clockwise direction.

    What is the news?

    • PM Mahinda Rajapaksa made a statement that the operation of the east terminal would be done by Sri Lanka Ports Authority on its own.
    • Its cabinet has approved a proposal to develop the West Terminal at the Colombo Port as a PPP with India and Japan, which is seen as a bid to compensate India.
    • It is unclear whether India would accept the latest proposal.

    What is the Project?

    • The tripartite agreement, signed by India, Sri Lanka and Japan, proposes to develop the ECT, which is located at the newly expanded southern part of the Colombo Port.
    • The ECT is located 3 km away from the China-backed international financial city, known as Port City, currently being built in Colombo.
    • A Chinese company was behind the controversial 2018 Hambantota port project, signed its first contract in the Port City last month.
    • It is also on the map of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

    India’s reaction

    • A few weeks ago EAM S. Jaishankar visited Sri Lanka where he discussed the development of the stalled project.
    • India’s first response was that the island nation should not be taking a decision in a unilateral manner on an existing tripartite agreement.

    Compensatory offer to India

    • After the decision on revoking the 2019 agreement, SL has approved another proposal to develop the west terminal of the Colombo port with Japan and India.
    • Commercially, the west terminal offer is better for India as it gives 85% stake for developers of the West Terminal against the 49% in ECT.

    Sri Lanka expects India to rethink. Why?

    • Indian response to this compensatory offer is unclear since there was no formal communication by SL authorities.
    • Geo-politically, west terminal is almost the same India considers the security aspect and the necessity to have a port terminal in Sri Lanka.
    • There is no difference between East and West Terminals except for the fact that development of the ECT is partially completed while the development of the West Terminal has to start from scratch.

    SL version of the revocation

    • Incumbent PM Mahinda Rajapaksa said the pressure was immense on the President Gotabaya Rajapaksa to cancel the 2019 agreement.
    • The pressure was brewing so much that he was becoming so unpopular among the people.
    • As per the agreement signed by the former Maithripala Sirisena-Ranil Wickremesinghe administration, India and Japan together were to hold 49% stake in ECT.
    • What had finally made the government surrender before trade unions were the increasing support of many more sections in the society for the protests against privatization.

    The inevitable factor: China

    • This move can be easily interpreted as a reaction to Chinese communication to Sri Lanka.
    • China has reportedly instigated trade unions and civil societies against this project.

    Q.The threat of Chinese presence in South Asia can be tackled more effectively if India changes course in its dealings with its neighbours and becomes more sensitive to their concerns. Critically analyse.

    Outcome: Souring of the ties

    • For India, the strategic ECT project was important. Even the EAM has visited Colombo in January in this regard.
    • Critics of the Sri Lankan government anticipate many national and international impacts surrounding the latest decision on ECT.
    • Meantime, internationally an offended India can make life tough for Sri Lanka, isolating the tiny island nation, geo-politically and on the economic front.
    • The economic isolation will not help Sri Lanka at a time when the country is taking steps to revive the economy amid a pandemic.

  • Foreign Minister suggests way forward for India-China ties

    External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar has given useful insight on the future of India-China ties amid heating border tensions and has suggested the best way forward.

    Statements made by EAM are major breakthrough in itself. They are the most logical and amply reflect his perfect statesmanship.

    We can imbibe such statements in our answers as they hold extraordinary significance like any gospel.

    Key takeaways from EAM’s speech

    • 2020 was a year of exceptional stress in a relationship profoundly disturbed by the border crisis.
    • China’s actions last year had not only signaled a disregard of commitments to reduce troop levels” but also “a willingness” to breach the peace and tranquillity on the border.
    • For all the disagreements we had, the fact is the border areas still remained fundamentally peaceful with the last incident of a loss of life in 1975, prior to 2020.
    • Until now, India is yet to receive a credible explanation for the change in China’s stance or reasons for its amassing of troops.
    • Any expectation that can be brushed aside and life can carry on undisturbed despite the situation in the border is simply not realistic.

    China’s contentious moves

    • China did a unilateral attempt to redraw the LAC in several areas in eastern Ladakh
    • China’s issuing of stapled visas to Indian citizens from Jammu and Kashmir in 2010
    • Reluctance from China to deal with some of India’s military commands, Beijing had that same year refused to host the Northern Army Commander
    • China’s opposition to India’s membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the U.N. Security Council as a permanent member
    • Blocking of U.N. listings of Pakistani terrorists, and
    • China Pakistan Economic Corridor, a flagship project under China’s Belt and Road Initiative, violating India’s sovereignty

    Gone is the past

    • Both sides had “painstakingly” worked to normalize relations after the post-1962 war freeze and the first prime ministerial visit in 1988.
    • For the border areas, he said, both had agreed a complete and practical set of understandings and agreements focused on border management, while negotiations were being conducted on the boundary dispute.
    • The advancement of ties, he said, was predicated on ensuring that peace and tranquillity were not disturbed, and the LAC was both observed and respected by both sides.
    • For this reason, it was explicitly agreed the two countries would refrain from massing troops on their common border, along with a detailed understanding of handling frictions that would arise.

    No progress over the years

    • Over the years, he said, there was no sign of progress of arriving at a common understanding of the LAC, while there was increasing construction of border infrastructure, especially in the Chinese side.
    • India had made efforts to reduce the considerable infrastructure gap since 2014, including through greater budgetary commitments and border road building.

    Way forward

    The External Affairs Minister suggested “three mutuals” and “eight broad propositions” as a way forward for the relationship.

    #Three mutuals

    Mutual respect, mutual sensitivities and mutual interests are the “determining factors”.

    #Major propositions

    (1) Adhering to commitment

    • The first proposition was that agreements already reached must be adhered to in their entirety, both in letter and in spirit.

    (2) Respect for LAC

    • Both sides also needed to strictly observe and respect the LAC, and any attempt to unilaterally change the status quo was completely unacceptable.

    (3) Maintaining peace and tranquillity

    • Peace and tranquillity in border areas was the basis for the development of the relationship in other domains. If that was disturbed, he said, the rest of the relationship would be too.

    (4) Broader partnership

    • The fourth proposition was that while both remain committed to a multipolar world, they should recognise that a multipolar Asia was one of its essential constituents.

    (5) Reciprocity

    • While each state had its interests, concerns and priorities, sensitivities to them could not be one-sided and relations were reciprocal in nature. As rising powers, neither should ignore the other’s set of aspirations.

    (6) Divergences management

    • While both sides had made a common cause on development and economic issues and common membership of plurilateral groups was a meeting point, there were divergences when it came to interests and aspirations.

    (7) Civilizational ties

    • The last proposition was that as civilizational states, India and China must always take the long view.

    (8) Cooperation and competition

    • Even before the events of 2020, the relationship had reflected a duality of cooperation and competition.

  • China builds a new village in Arunachal Pradesh

    Satellite images show that China has constructed a new village in Arunachal Pradesh, around 4.5 kilometres inside of the de facto border on the Indian side.

    Indian and Chinese soldiers have confronted each other in their deadliest clash in decades in Ladakh last year and the earlier one in Doklam. Now another front has been opened up by China in Arunachal.

    This year could face another ugliest standoffs and skirmishes.

    Location of the village

    • The village, located on the banks of the River Tsari Chu, lies in the Upper Subansiri district.
    • It is an area that has been long disputed by India and China and has been marked by armed conflict.
    • Sources in the defense ministry have said that Beijing has, for years, maintained an army post on this territory, and the various constructions by the Chinese have not happened suddenly.

    Background of the story

    • China’s June 1959 operation known as the Longju incident reportedly accused Indian troops of occupying some places in Tibet and colluding with Tibetan rebels.
    • In August same year, the PLA clashed with the Indian personnel of the 9 Assam Rifles.
    • Two Indian soldiers were killed in action and the issue was finally resolved through diplomatic channels. Both sides withdrew from the area on August 20, 1960.
    • And the Assam Rifles then did not re-occupy the post.
    • In the late 1990s however, China established a company level post 3 kilometers inside the Indian Territory. Since then, the area remains contested to this day.

    India and Arunachal

    • Arunachal Pradesh (called South Tibet in China) is a full-fledged state of India.
    • India’s sovereignty over the area is internationally recognized and its residents have not shown any inclination to leave India.
    • The majority of the international maps acknowledge the area to be an Indian Territory.
    • China has some (pre-) historical claims through its ownership of Tibet, but the people and geography primarily favor India.

    Back2Basics: Chinese claim over Arunachal Pradesh

    • When the new Peoples Republic of China was formed in February 1912 after the abdication of the Qing emperor, the Tibetans asserted their independence.
    • They forced the Chinese troops based in Lhasa to return to the mainland-via India. A year later, Tibet declared independence from China.
    • In order to ensure that the unrest did not spread to India and assert their boundaries, the ruling British convened a tripartite meeting at Shimla with Tibetan and Chinese delegates to define the border.
    • The meeting gave China suzerainty over most of Tibet, and the boundary defined in this treaty was later known as the McMohan line.

    Chinese reluctance

    • The essential dispute is over China’s refusal to acknowledge the McMohan Line as the border between the two nations, and staking claim to large tracts of land as a contiguous part of Tibet.
    • However, it laid claim to the entire state of Arunachal Pradesh.
    • In the 16th century, the most important heritage of the state – Tawang Monastery was built. This is one of the most important sites for Tibetan Buddhists.
    • China never recognized Tibet’s independence nor the 1914 Simla convention.
    • In 1950 China completely took over Tibet. Thus, according to their version, the Tawang region belongs to them.
    • It especially wants to hold on to the monastery as that is a leading center of Tibetan Buddhism in India.

  • Ratle Hydroelectric Project

    The Centre has decided to go ahead with the long-pending 850-megawatt Ratle hydroelectric power project on the river Chenab in J&K Kishtwar district, despite objections raised by the Pakistan government over the same.

    Tap to read more about Indus River System

    Ratle Hydel Plant

    • It is a run-of-the-river hydroelectric power station currently under construction on the Chenab River, downstream of the village near Drabshalla in Kishtwar district of the Indian UT of Jammu and Kashmir.
    • The project includes a 133 m (436 ft) tall gravity dam and two power stations adjacent to one another.
    • The installed capacity of both power stations will be 850 MW.
    • In June 2013, then PM Manmohan Singh laid the foundation stone for the dam.
    • Pakistan has frequently alleged that it violates the Indus Water Treaty.

    What is the Indus Water Treaty?

    • The Indus Waters Treaty is a water-distribution treaty between India and Pakistan, brokered by the World Bank signed in Karachi in 1960.
    • According to this agreement, control over the water flowing in three “eastern” rivers of India — the Beas, the Ravi, and the Sutlej was given to India.
    • The control over the water flowing in three “western” rivers of India — the Indus, the Chenab, and the Jhelum was given to Pakistan
    • The treaty allowed India to use western rivers water for limited irrigation use and unrestricted use for power generation, domestic, industrial, and non-consumptive uses such as navigation, floating of property, fish culture, etc. while laying down precise regulations for India to build projects
    • India has also been given the right to generate hydroelectricity through the run of the river (RoR) projects on the Western Rivers which, subject to specific criteria for design and operation is unrestricted.