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Subject: Bilateral Relations

1. Major World Events
2. India’s Interests in neighbourhood
3. Effects of our Policies

  • Why does the deepening Indo-US friendship puzzle so many?

    The India-US ties have advanced by leaps and bounds. Yet, there is a persistent underestimation of India’s capacity to rework its great power relations. The article deals with this issue.

    Expanding partnership

    • India-US relations have been on a steady upward trajectory over the last three decades.
    • This partnership withstood significant political transitions in both countries and managed to overcome many difficult barriers.
    • The US is now India’s most comprehensive partner.
    • The Russia relationship is long on defence but short on commerce.
    • India’s commercial ties with China are large, but tilted heavily in Beijing’s favour.
    • Collective Europe is big on commerce but small on security cooperation.
    • The US has a sizeable presence in both economic and security dimensions and the political common ground with India has steadily expanded.

    So, why persistent doubt in India about the US partnership

    • One part of it is the ingrained ideological bias in the dominant foreign policy elite.
    • Delhi’s stilted debate on the US is, unfortunately, reinforced by the sad absence of investment in institutional capabilities to study American politics, economics and international relations.

    Issues with our assessment of relations with India

    • There is an enduring reluctance of India’s foreign policy community to either acknowledge or accept the unfolding transformation of India’s ties with the US.
    • There is also continuing underestimation of India’s capacity to rework its great power relations to meet India’s changing interests and circumstances.
    • It was widely held that the Indo-Pacific and the Quad will become footnotes in Biden’s foreign policy.
    • This in turn was based on the bet that Biden is likely to embrace China rather than confront it in the manner that Trump did.
    • All these assumptions turned out to be inaccurate.
    • Concern for democracy and human rights has always been part of US foreign policy ideology.
    • But no state, not even a revolutionary one, can run its foreign policy on a single-point agenda. 

    Underestimating India’s agency to shape the partnership

    • Even as it continuously misjudged the US, the Indian foreign policy elite has not appreciated India’s agency to shape the relationship with America.
    • The conviction that Delhi is perennially under US pressure to accept policies harmful for itself further distorts the discourse in the media and among the chattering classes.
    • The evidence from the 1990s — one of India’s most vulnerable moments after Independence — should have corrected this misperception.
    • The traditional discourse finds it hard to come to terms with the twin factors shaping India’s new approach.
    • One is the significant increase in India’s material capabilities.
    • India’s aggregate GDP increased ten-fold between 1990 ($270 billion) and 2020 (about $2,700 billion).
    • Equally important is the new political will in Delhi.

    Consider the question “There is a continuing underestimation of Delhi’s capacity to rework its great power relations with the US to meet India’s changing interests and circumstances. Critically examine.” 

    Conclusion

    The new India no longer wrings its hands in dealing with the US; it relishes the large room for strategic bargaining with America. Even more important, Delhi is no longer a reluctant partner to Washington.

  • [pib] Maitri Setu between India and Bangladesh

    PM will inaugurate ‘Maitri Setu’ between India and Bangladesh tomorrow.

    Maitri Setu

    • The bridge ‘Maitri Setu’ has been built over the Feni River which flows between the Indian boundary in Tripura State and Bangladesh.
    • The 1.9 Km long bridge joins Sabroom in India with Ramgarh in Bangladesh.
    • The construction was taken up by the National Highways and Infrastructure Development Corporation Ltd.

    Try this PYQ:

    Q. Recently, which of the following States has explored the possibility of constructing an artificial inland port to be connected to the sea by a long navigational channel?

    (a) Andhra Pradesh

    (b) Chhattisgarh

    (c) Karnataka

    (d) Rajasthan

    Significance of the bridge

    • With this inauguration, Tripura is set to become the ‘Gateway of North East’ with access to Chittagong Port of Bangladesh, which is just 80 kms from Sabroom.
    • The name ‘Maitri Setu’ symbolizes growing bilateral relations and friendly ties between India and Bangladesh.

    About Feni River

    • Feni is a river in southeastern Bangladesh and Tripura.
    • It is a trans-boundary river with an ongoing dispute about water rights.
    • It originates in the South Tripura district and flows through Sabroom town and then enters Bangladesh.
    • The question of sharing the waters of the river between India and Pakistan was first discussed in 1958.

    Other associated projects

    Sabroom Check Post

    • PM will lay the foundation stone for setting up an Integrated Check Post at Sabroom.
    • It will help ease the movement of goods and passengers between the two countries provide new market opportunities for products of North-East states and assist the seamless movement of passengers to and from India and Bangladesh.
    • The project is being taken up by the Land Ports Authority of India.

  • Ceasefire between India and Pakistan.

     

    Why it is different from the past

    • The February ceasefire has triggered widespread speculation about its durability, significance and implication for bilateral relations in general.
    • This agreement is different from the routine ceasefire assurances that the two sides made till January 2021.
    • What makes the February 2021 ceasefire different is its two distinct features:
    • First, this was a joint statement by the two DGsMO.
    • Second, unlike the previous declarations, the recent agreement mentions a specific date, i.e., the night of February 24-25, to begin the ceasefire.
    • The agreement is also path-breaking from a conflict management point of view.
    • The ceasefire is also significant because this helps India to defuse an ugly two-front situation and a feeling of being boxed in by an inimical Pakistan and an aggressive China.

    Historical background of ceasefires with Pakistan

    • The Karachi agreement of 1949, which ended the first war between newly formed India and Pakistan, was the first ceasefire agreement between the two countries that created the India Pakistan boundary in Kashmir called the Ceasefire Line or CFL.
    • The United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) was mandated to monitor the ceasefire along the CFL.
    • Following the India-Pakistan war of 1971, the Suchetgarh Agreement of 1972 delineated the ‘line of control’ in Jammu and Kashmir thereby renaming the CFL as the LoC.
    • The 2003 agreement between the DGsMO, communicated through a telephone call between them, was a reiteration of the December 1971 war termination ceasefire.

    Rules and norms required

    • A ceasefire requires a clearly articulated and mutually-agreed-upon set of rules and norms for effective observance along with an intent to observe them. 
    • The February ceasefire is an expression of such an intent, but without the rules and norms to enforce it.
    • The Simla Agreement or the Suchetgarh Agreement do not have those rules either.
    • The Karachi Agreement, on the other hand, has clearly laid down provisions on how to manage the CFL which, of course, was overtaken by the LoC.
    • Therefore, armed forces deployed on either side of the LoC in Kashmir often have to resort to Karachi Agreement to observe the ceasefire.
    • Now that the two DGsMO have declared a joint ceasefire, the next logical step is to arrive at a set of rules to govern that ceasefire.
    • An unwritten ceasefire, experiences from conflict zones around the world show, tend to break down easily and trigger tensions in other domains.

    Role of back channels

    • What is also significant to note about the ceasefire agreement between the two DGsMO is that this was preceded by weeks.
    • Interestingly, the 2003 ceasefire was also preceded by discreet parleys between the heads of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan and the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) of India.
    • The 2003 CFA led to a sustained period of back channel talks on Kashmir which, by mid 2007, had almost finalised a deal to resolve the Kashmir conflict.
    • Ane key reason why the CFA held at least till 2008 was because there were parallel talks, along with holding fire on the LoC, on other outstanding bilateral issues, principally Kashmir.

    Conclusion

    While whether the 2021 CFA would prompt talks in other areas is unclear as of now, the possibility of piecemeal agreements to create durable stability bilaterally unless followed by progress in other domains remains to be seen.

  • Recalibrating relations with EU

    With India about to lose preferential access to the EU, there is a need to deepen the trade and investment ties with the region. The article deals with this issue.

    Export potential to the EU

    • India has an untapped export potential of $39.9 billion in the EU and Western Europe.
    • India benefits from tariff preferences under the EU’s Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) for several of these products.
    • In fact, India is among the major beneficiaries of the EU’s GSP, accounting for nearly 37% of India’s merchandise exports.

    India losing EU-GSP benefits: Product graduadion

    • Product graduation applies when average imports of a product from a beneficiary country exceed 17.5% of EU-GSP imports of the same product from all beneficiary countries over three years.
    • There are several products where India has export potential in the EU, but these have “graduated” or are at the brink of “graduation” under EU GSP.
    • India’s exports of products such as textiles, inorganic and organic chemicals, gems and jewellery, iron, steel and their articles, base metals and automotives are already out of the ambit of EU-GSP benefits.
    •  In apparel, India’s exports to the EU were valued at $7 billion in 2019, of which nearly 94% was under EU-GSP, indicative of the impact that the graduation may have on apparel exports.
    • Bangladesh’s apparel exports would continue to receive tariff benefits in the EU under Everything but Arms Initiative.
    • Another competitor, Vietnam, concluded a free trade agreement (FTA) with the EU in 2019.

    Need to deepen trade and investment ties

    • In light of the declining preferential access and the plausible erosion of competitiveness in the EU market, there is clearly a need to deepen trade and investment ties with the region.
    • Broad-based Trade and Investment Agreement, which commenced in 2007, is yet to materialise due to lack of concurrence in areas like automotives and dairy and marine products.
    • Therefore, a thorough assessment of the benefits from FTA for domestic producers is warranted, with due consideration to the impact on sensitive sectors, and possibility of inclusion of safeguards such as sunset clause on concessions for some items.
    • Further, there should also be provisions for aspects such as investment and non-tariff measures (NTMs).
    • India also needs to negotiate on investment-related aspects with the EU to foster stronger value chains, especially in technology-intensive sectors in which the EU has a comparative advantage.
    • As far as NTMs are concerned, India faces as many as 414 NTMs in the EU, in a wide array of sectors. FTAs have some institutional arrangements for NTMs.

    Consider the question “Forging stronger ties with the EU could pave way for the greater cooperation and stronger trade ties. Elucidate.” 

    Conclusion

    Post-Brexit EU finds itself in the midst of a growing need for recalibrating ties with its partner countries. Forging stronger ties with the region through a mutually beneficial agreement could help strengthen Indian manufacturing and revitalise the flailing exports.

  • India, Japan back in another Sri Lanka port project

    Sri Lanka has confirmed that it will develop the West Container Terminal (WCT) at the Colombo Port along with India and Japan.

    Q.The threat of Chinese presence in South Asia can be tackled more effectively if India changes course in its dealings with its neighbours and becomes more sensitive to their concerns. Critically analyse.

     Why in news?

    • The decision comes a month after the Rajapaksa government ejected the two partners from a 2019 tripartite agreement to jointly develop the East Container Terminal (ECT), citing resistance to “foreign involvement”.
    • Neither India nor Japan has officially commented on the offer, or on the said private investment from the countries.

    An alternative to ECT

    • SL has offered India and Japan the WCT as an alternative, allowing higher stakes.
    • In the ECT project agreed upon earlier, the Sri Lanka Ports Authority (SLPA) was to hold a majority 51%, but in the WCT proposal, India and Japan will be accorded an 85% stake.
    • The nearby Colombo International Container Terminal (CICT), where China Merchants Port Holdings Company Limited holds 85%.
    • This makes it a strategically desirable spot for India, whose concerns over China’s presence in Sri Lanka are well known.

    Issues with a new project

    • The WCT is adjacent to the China-run CICT and just a couple of kilometres away from the China-backed Port City being built on reclaimed land.
    • The West Container Terminal, however, has to be built from scratch, requiring a much higher investment.
    • The return on investment has not been envisaged yet.

    Why is Colombo so generous this time?

    • Colombo’s alternative offer also comes at a time when Sri Lanka is seeking support at the ongoing UN Human Right Council session, where a resolution on the country’s rights record will soon be put to vote.

  • India, Pak, China must build on de-escalation

    Three power, India, Pakistan and China need to take a new look at the factors underlying their relationship with each other. The article deals with this issue.

    Hope for regional politics to turn a new leaf

    • The announcement by India and Pakistan of strict observance of all agreements, understandings and cease firing along the Line of Control is a welcome step.
    • It is premature to conclude what all this will amount to in the long term.
    • But if all three powers, China, Pakistan and India, can draw the appropriate lessons in humility, there is hope for regional politics to turn over a new leaf.

    Lessons for India

    • First, the belligerent use of foreign policy in domestic politics has unintended effects on your international standing.
    • In 2019, the official rhetoric was promising India retaking PoK and putting more military pressure on Pakistan.
    • In contrast, the discourse on foreign policy since the Chinese pressure on the LAC has been one of marked sobriety scaling back all expectations of a flippant militarism.
    • Second, the standoff with China has brought home some stark realities. We can speculate on Chinese motives.
    •  The LAC standoff considerably released the pressure on Pakistan.
    • We were reminded that the LAC and LoC can be linked; that the zone around Kashmir was a trilateral and not a bilateral contest, and that India will need significant resources to deal with China.
    • In the matter of the CAA the talk of evicting Bangladeshis has been starkly checkmated by the need to placate Bangladesh, which is vital to our strategic interests.

    Lessons for Pakistan

    • First, India now has enough weight in the international system that any attempts to internationalise Kashmir are a non-starter.
    • Second, the revocation of Article 370 did not unleash the kinds of fissures and cycle of violence within the Valley that Pakistan might have been hoping to exploit.
    • Third, the pandemic is a great opportunity for Pakistan to recognise that opening up to the South Asian region is in its interest in the long term than acting on the coattails of China.

    Lessons for China

    • India may not have, in a literal sense, restored the status quo ante on the LAC, the fact of the matter is that it has stood up with enough firmness to send the signal that it will not be a pushover.
    • India signalled a resolve that Chinese military and economic hegemony can be resisted.
    • China cannot wish away considerable Indian power.
    • In fact, by concentrating India’s mind on the China challenge, it may have unwittingly done India a favour.

    Way forward

    • So this moment can be a constructive one if everyone understands the one lesson in world politics: There are diminishing returns to belligerence.
    • With Pakistan, India should seize the moment and build on the de-escalation.
    • The pandemic offers an opportunity for greater economic cooperation.
    • Political establishments of both countries will have to think of what is a win-win political narrative they can legitimately offer their citizens.

    Consider the question “If all three powers, China, Pakistan and India, can draw the appropriate lessons in humility, there is hope for regional politics to turn over a new leaf. Comment.“

    Conclusion

    The region will be better off with a humility that tries to align them, rather than a hubris that exults in unilateral triumphalism.

  • Sri Lanka at the UN Rights Council

    Sri Lanka is facing another UNHRC resolution for its war crimes that took place during the military campaign against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).

    UNHRC report on Sri Lanka

    • The report warned that Sri Lanka’s failure to address human rights violations and war crimes committed in the past had put the country on a “dangerous path”.
    • It rose that this could lead to a “recurrence” of policies and practices that gave rise to the earlier situation.
    • It flagged the accelerating militarization of civilian governmental functions, a reversal of important constitutional safeguards, political obstruction of accountability, intimidation of civil society, and the use of anti-terrorism laws.
    • The shrinking space for independent media and civil society and human rights organisations are also themes in the report.

    Try this question:

    Q.The triangulation in the ties between Sri Lanka, China and Pakistan is an emerging threat in the Indian Ocean Region. Discuss.

    The Resolution 30/1

    • The resolution 30/1 launched in 2015 deals with promoting reconciliation, accountability and human rights in Sri Lanka.
    • It extended an opportunity to make good on its promises for justice and offered extensive support to accomplish that objective.

    Sri Lanka’s intention

    • It is more than Sri Lanka has failed to – and doesn’t intend to — take the necessary, decisive, and sustainable steps necessary to achieve domestic justice and reconciliation.
    • Sri Lanka has officially sought India’s help to muster support against the resolution, which it has described as “unwanted interference by powerful countries”.

    Where India comes in

    • The UNHRC is scheduled to hold an “interactive” session on Sri Lanka where the report was to be discussed, and member countries were to make statements. India is expected to make a statement too.
    • Country-specific resolutions against Sri Lanka have regularly come up at the UNHRC in the last decade.
    • New Delhi voted against Sri Lanka in 2012 and abstained in 2014. It was spared the dilemma in 2015 when Sri Lanka joined resolution 30/1.
    • With elections coming up in Tamil Nadu, and PM declaring on a recent visit that he was the first Indian leader to visit Jaffna, Sri Lanka has begun reading the tea leaves.
    • Whichever way it goes, the resolution is likely to resonate in India-Sri Lanka Relations and for India internally, in the run-up to the Assembly elections in Tamil Nadu.

  • Pakistan- Sri Lanka Relations

    Pakistani PM is in Colombo on a two-day visit for ways and means to enhance trade and connectivity with Sri Lanka.

    What is the news?

    • Pakistan PM’s visit has attracted a fair amount of controversy because of a cancelled invitation to address the Sri Lankan parliament.
    • India too granted permission for using its airspace for the Pakistani PM’s aircraft.

    Try this question:

    Q.The triangulation in the ties between Sri Lanka, China and Pakistan is an emerging threat in the Indian Ocean Region. Discuss.

    Sri Lanka- Pakistan Relations

    • For Colombo, the visit holds much value. It comes at a fraught time for the government on the international stage.
    • Imminently, it is bracing to be hauled over the coals at the UN Human Rights Commission for withdrawing from resolution 30/1 of September 2015, under which it committed to carrying out war crime investigations.
    • To make matters worse, the Islamic world is appalled by Sri Lanka’s tight rules for the cremation and not burials of Muslims who have died of COVID-19.
    • The rule created a storm in Sri Lanka, with community leaders convinced that this is nothing but an extension of the state’s persecution of Muslims.

    Why Pakistan?

    (1) Trade ties

    • Pakistan is Sri Lanka’s second-largest trading partner in South Asia after India.
    • Sri Lanka and Pakistan have a free trade agreement dating back to 2005.
    • Pakistan’s top exports to Sri Lanka are textiles and cement.
    • Sri Lanka’s top exports to Pakistan are tea, rubber and readymade garments.

    (2) Cultural ties

    • In addition to trade cooperation, Pakistan invokes cricket and Buddhism, topics that most Sri Lankans share a deep connection with.
    • Over the last decade, Pakistan has also been projecting its ancient Buddhist sites to promote cultural ties with Sri Lanka.

    (3) Defence ties

    Defence ties are a strong pillar of Sri Lanka- Pakistan bilateral relationship.

    • During the 1971 war, Pakistan Air Force jets refuelled in Sri Lanka.
    • India pulled back the peacekeeping forces in 1990, it provided no active defence support to the Sri Lankan military.
    • Sri Lanka turned to Pakistan for arms, ammunition as well as training for its fighter pilots.
    • Gotabaya, who was defence secretary at the time, visited Pakistan in 2008 to make a request for emergency assistance with military supplies.
    • Earlier this month, Sri Lanka participated in Pakistan’s multi-nation naval exercise Aman.

    India’s observations and concerns

    • As Sri Lanka’s closest neighbour with strong, all-encompassing ties, even if these are sometimes problematic, India has not perceived Pakistan as a serious rival in Sri Lanka so far.
    • Sporadically, the Indian security establishment has voiced concerns about Pakistan’s role in the radicalization of people, especially in Eastern Sri Lanka.
    • Funds have poured in for new mosques from some West Asian countries, and the effect that this could have in India.

    Emerging threats from the ‘Triad’

    • There is now a new wariness about triangulation in the ties between Sri Lanka, China and Pakistan in defence co-operation, though it has not been publicly expressed.
    • In 2016, India put pressure on Sri Lanka to drop a plan to buy the Chinese JF-17 Thunder aircraft made in Pakistan and co-produced by the Chinese Chengdu Aircraft Corporation.
    • The most recent threat was from excluding India from the Colombo Terminal Project.

  • New disengagement agreement in eastern Ladakh

    In the first major breakthrough in talks China’s Defence Ministry that PLA and Indian troops on the southern and northern shores of Pangong Tso began synchronized and organized disengagement.

    This newscard presents a holistic report on the ground situation of Sino-India border disputes in Ladakh.

    Also, try this PYQ from CSP 2020:

    Q.Siachen Glacier is situated to the

    (a) East of Aksai Chin

    (b) East of Leh

    (c)North of Gilgit

    (d) North of Nubra Valley

    New plan in eastern Ladakh

    • As of now, the disengagement process seems restricted to the north and south banks of Pangong Tso.
    • The process has started with the pulling back of certain columns of tanks from the south bank region by both sides.
    • At the moment, there is no pullback of troops from the friction points and the heights they are positioned on.
    • That will happen in a phased and verified manner.

    Disengagement from Pangong Tso

    • China will pull its troops on the north bank towards the east of Finger 8.
    • Similarly, India will also position its forces at its permanent base near Finger 3.
    • Similar action will be taken by both the parties in the south bank area as well.
    • Both sides have also agreed that the area between Finger 3 and Finger 8 will become a no-patrolling zone temporarily, till both sides reach an agreement through military and diplomatic discussions to restore patrolling.
    • Further, all the construction done by both sides on the north and south banks of the lake since April 2020 will be removed.

    Why is this area important?

    • The north and south banks of Pangong Tso are two of the most significant and sensitive regions when it comes to the current standoff that began in May 2020.
    • What makes the areas around the shores of the lake so sensitive and important is that clashes here marked the beginning of the standoff.
    • It is one of the areas where the Chinese troops had come around 8 km deep west of India’s perception of the Line of Actual Control.
    • China had positioned its troops on the ridgeline connecting Fingers 3 and 4, while according to India the LAC passes through Finger 8.

    Take a glimpse of all friction points along Indian borders:

    India is at an advantage

    • Further, it is in the south bank of the lake that Indian forces in an action in late August had gained a strategic advantage by occupying certain peaks, outwitting the Chinese.
    • Indian troops had positioned themselves on heights of Magar Hill, Mukhpari, Gurung Hill, Rezang La and Rechin La, which were unoccupied by either side earlier.
    • Since then, the Chinese side had been particularly sensitive as these positions allowed India to not only dominate Spanggur Gap.
    • It is a two-km wide valley that can be used to launch an offensive, as China had done in 1962, they also allow India a direct view of China’s Moldo Garrison.

    Why has this taken so long?

    • Since September, China has insisted that India first pull its troops back from the south bank of Pangong Tso, and the Chushul sub-sector.
    • However, India has been demanding that any disengagement process should include the entire region, and troops should go back to their April 2020 positions.
    • However, it seems that for now, both sides have agreed to first disengage from the Pangong Tso area only.

    Principles of disengagement

    In military and diplomatic discussions with China India expects a solution to the issue on the basis of three principles:

    1. LAC should be accepted and respected by both parties.
    2. Neither party should attempt to change the status quo unilaterally.
    3. All agreements should be fully adhered to by both parties.

    Does this mean that the standoff is resolved?

    • There are still some outstanding issues that remain regarding deployment and patrolling on LAC.
    • The Pangong Tso region is just one of the friction areas. There are other friction points, all north of the Pangong Tso, where the troops have been face-to-face since last year.
    • The situation in Depsang Plains continues to be a concern.
    • Both sides agree that complete disengagement under bilateral agreements and protocols should be done as soon as possible.
    • After the talks so far, China is also aware of our resolve to protect the sovereignty of the country.

    Need for confidence building

    • Two of the main stumbling blocks in finding a permanent resolution are lack of trust and no clarity on intent.
    • Any permanent resolution will include first, disengagement of troops from the frontlines from all friction points.
    • Then de-escalation will entail sending the troops from the depth areas to their original bases.
    • Both sides have around 50,000 troops in the region, along with additional tanks, artillery and air defence assets.

    Conclusion

    • A resolution has to include sending these troops and military equipment where they came from on both sides.
    • But neither side had been willing to take the first step to reduce their troop or military strength, as it does not trust the other side.

  • Taking the long view with China

    The article explains the various choices India faces in the geopolitical landscape shaped by emergence of two Asian giants.

    New challenges and hard choices on geopolitical front

    • As it moves to becoming the third largest economy in the world, India needs to have a clear-eyed world view and strategy as it makes hard choices.
    • It needs to reject the developing country regional mindset that has shaped India’s  national aims and foreign policy.
    • We have a “special and privileged strategic partnership” with Russia which provides more than three-quarter of India’s military equipment and a “comprehensive global strategic partnership” with the U.S.
    • India’s relationship with the U.S.-led Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), where the others are military allies, has rightly been cautious, as U.S. President Joe Biden sees China as a ‘strategic competitor’ rather than a ‘strategic rival’.
    • Realism dictates that India does not need to compromise on its strategic autonomy.
    • India faces two sides of the China conundrum: Defining engagement with its neighbour which is consolidating an expanding BRI while remaining involved with the strategic, security and technological concerns of the U.S.

    China’s dominance in financial sphere

    • In the financial sphere, there is the real possibility of the Chinese renminbi becoming a global reserve currency or e-yuan becoming the digital payments currency.
    • China is the world’s largest trading economy.
    • It could soon become the world’s largest economy.
    • China has stitched together an investment agreement with the EU and with most of Asia.
    • Relative attractiveness will determine when the dollar goes the way of the sterling and the guilder.
    • China, facing technological sanctions from the U.S., may well put in the hard work to make this happen soon.

    China: Partner, competitor, and economic rival

    • Some form of the EU’s China policy of seeing the emerging superpower as a partner, competitor, and economic rival depending on the policy area in question is going to be the global norm. 
    • This broad perspective is also reflected in India’s participation in both the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, designed to resist the spread of Western interests, and in the U.S.-led Quad, with its anti-China stance.
    • Within the United Nations, India’s interests have greater congruence with China’s interests rather than the U.S.’s and the EU’s.
    • Sharing the COVID-19 vaccine with other countries distinguishes India, and China, from the rest.

    India’s engagement with the U.S.

    • The congruence between India and the U.S. lies in the U.S.’s declared strategic objective of promoting an integrated economic development model in the Indo-Pacific as a credible alternative to the BRI, but with a caveat.
    • Instead of an alternate development model, India should move the Quad towards supplementing the infrastructure push of the BRI in line with other strategic concerns in the region.
    • For example, developing their scientific, technological capacity and digital economy, based on India’s digital stack and financial resources of other Quad members, will resonate with Asia and Africa.

    India’s role in global governance

    • Another area where India can play a ‘bridging role’ is global governance.
    • President Xi Jinping’s “community with shared future for mankind”, and Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s “climate justice” and asking how long India will be excluded from the UN Security Council, challenge the frame of the liberal order without providing specific alternatives.
    • With respect to digital data, India has recently expressed that there must be reciprocity in data sharing, and this is the kind of ‘big idea’ for sharing prosperity that will gain traction with other countries.

    India’s growing influence

    • India’s recent policies are gaining influence at the expense of China and the West, and both know this trend will accelerate.
    • The steps to a $5 trillion economy, shift to indigenous capital military equipment, and a new Science, Technology and Innovation Policy underline impact, capacity and interests.
    • ASEAN remains keen India re-join its trade pact to balance China.
    • It is being recognised that India’s software development prowess could shape a sustainable post-industrial state different to the U.S. and China model.

    Consider the question “Examine how India’s foreing policy priorities and its role in global governance is shaped by China’s rise.”

    Conclusion

    As in the historical past, Asia is big enough for both Asian giants to have complementary roles, share prosperity and be independent of each other and of the West.