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Subject: International Relations

  • What India must do to protect its ties with the Islamic world

    Context

    A controversial remark by the ruling party spokesperson against the Prophet has snowballed into a diplomatic row. Against this backdrop, New Delhi should not stop engaging the Gulf countries and strive to move beyond damage control.

    International reaction against the remarks

    • The United Arab Emirates, Oman, Indonesia, Iraq, the Maldives, Jordan, Libya and Bahrain have joined the growing list of countries in the Islamic world that have condemned the remarks.
    • Earlier, Kuwait, Iran and Qatar had called Indian ambassadors to register their protest, and Saudi Arabia had issued a strongly-worded statement.
    • Campaigners (including a few GCC regimes) demand that Prime Minister of India should tender an apology for all that happened.
    • But New Delhi’s stance is categorial and legitimate insofar as the Union government has nothing to do with such unsolicited comments.

    Why WANA is important for India

    • Engagement with WANA: Countries in West Asia and North Africa (WANA) region do not have a fixed position vis-à-vis India.
    • Delhi has vibrant economic and strategic ties with almost all regimes in the region.
    • That’s precisely the reason these countries are unwilling to join the Islamabad-led chorus or go beyond passing resolutions.
    • India’s signing of a free trade agreement (FTA) with the UAE and the ongoing negotiations for a wider FTA with the GCC could be an eye-opener for the country’s detractors.
    • India’s energy needs: As much as 40 per cent of oil and an equal share of gas requirements are met through India’s strategic cooperation with the Gulf regimes.
    • Mutuality of interests: India and the WANA regimes know that there is a mutuality of interests in these transactions which cannot be substituted by any other segments of the world system.
    • Indian diaspora: Equally important is the role of the more than eight million-strong Indian diaspora in the WANA region.
    • The “Gulf remittance” is an important part of the Indian economy, as important as the Indian investment in the GCC and GCC investment in India.

    Way forward

    • India’s foreign policy strategy — which includes strategic bargaining with regional and international actors — would fetch reasonable dividends.
    • The response to its Ukraine war strategy has convinced South Block that it has adequate manoeuvrability in global affairs.

    Conclusion

    New Delhi should not stop engaging the countries, especially the ones in the WANA region, as both have shared interests. Therefore, South Block must go beyond a mere damage-control exercise.

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  • Indo-Pacific Economic Framework presents opportunities

    Context

    The official launch of the Biden Administration’s Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), the US’s de facto foreign economic policy for Asia, has been lauded and welcomed.

    About IPEF

    • Seen as a means to counter China in the region, it is a U.S.-led framework for participating countries to solidify their relationships and engage in crucial economic and trade matters in the region.
    • The member nations include Australia, Brunei, India, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.
    • It includes seven out of 10 members of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), all four Quad countries, and New Zealand.
    • Together, these countries account for 40 per cent of the global GDP. 
    • Not a free trade agreement: The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework is not a free trade agreement.
    • No market access or tariff reductions have been outlined, although experts say it can pave the way for future trade deals.
    • The IPEF is also seen as a means by which the US is trying to regain credibility in the region after former President Donald Trump pulled out of the Trans Pacific Partnership TPP.
    • IPEF countries value its purpose and potential, particularly given some doubts over whether the US administration could sustain its focus in Asia as war broke out in Europe.
    • The IPEF empowers the Biden administration to shape rules across several critical pillars that will condition America’s economic engagement in the Indo-Pacific amid competing economic paradigms, notably the Chinese through the BRI and Europe through digital policies and standards.
    • Countering China: Besides Ukraine, the IPEF’s importance also owes to China’s patent economic footprint across Asia that could be checked by an alternative economic paradigm that emphasises openness, flexibility, and integration.

     Significance of IPEF

    • Boost supply chain resilience: Globally, the IPEF signifies the first multilateral attempt to boost supply chain resilience to ease global inflationary pressures and mitigate effects of future disruptions, particularly key raw materials, critical minerals, and semiconductors.
    • Four key pillars: It’s a framework or a starting point to regulate trade and commerce across four key pillars: Digital economy, supply chains, clean energy, and governance. 
    • Negotiating high standard rules: The IPEF also represents an effort to negotiate “high-standard” rules between like-minded countries to govern the digital economy, particularly data flows, climate mitigation, global tax, anti-money laundering and anti-bribery provisions.

    Challenges

    • Impact on domestic companies: IPEF commitments and standards that other signatories like India have to accede to, will likely facilitate US MNCs’ access to Asian economies at the expense of domestic preferences.
    • Impact on policy preference of countries: The IPEF’s pillars — climate, digital, supply chains, and governance reforms — could clash with and supersede these countries’ policy preferences on such issues.
    • For instance, the US’ preference to allow free and open data flows under the digital economy pillar will constrict India’s ability to regulate data for domestic purposes.

    Way forward for India

    • The IPEF remains attractive for India given its flexibility and open nature, allowing Delhi to demonstrate its political commitment to the United States to jointly shape the rules governing the Indo-Pacific’s economic future even as competitors lurk.
    • Tough policy choices, like the one on data and taxation, must be made by Indian officials while negotiating the terms of the IPEF accession.

    Conclusion

    What’s clear is that the IPEF represents both a mirage and aspiration. Collectively, it represents a leap into an unknown that has to be negotiated amongst partners that share interests and some values.

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  • Indus Waters Treaty (IWT): An enduring agreement bridging India-Pakistan ties

    Context

    The 118th meeting of the Permanent Indus Commission (PIC) comprising the Indus Commissioners of India and Pakistan held on May 30-31, 2022 in New Delhi.

    Indus Waters Treaty, 1960: A background

    • After years of arduous negotiations, the Indus Waters Treaty was signed in Karachi on September 19, 1960, by then Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and then Pakistani President Ayub Khan, negotiated by the World Bank.
    • According to this agreement, control over the water flowing in three “eastern” rivers of India — the Beas, the Ravi and the Sutlej was given to India
    • The control over the water flowing in three “western” rivers of India — the Indus, the Chenab and the Jhelum was given to Pakistan
    • The treaty allowed India to use western rivers water for limited irrigation use and unrestricted use for power generation, domestic, industrial and non-consumptive uses such as navigation, floating of property, fish culture, etc. while laying down precise regulations for India to build projects
    • India has also been given the right to generate hydroelectricity through the run of the river (RoR) projects on the Western Rivers which, subject to specific criteria for design and operation is unrestricted.
    • The Permanent Indus Commission, which has a commissioner from each country, oversees the cooperative mechanism and ensures that the two countries meet annually (alternately in India and Pakistan).
    • This year, the commission met twice, in March in Islamabad, Pakistan, and then in New Delhi, in May.
    • It is a rare feat that despite the many lows in India-Pakistan relations, talks under the treaty have been held on a regular basis.

    Some disagreements

    • Throughout its existence, there have been many occasions during which differences between the two countries were discernible.
    • Both countries held different positions when Pakistan raised objections regarding the technical design features of the Kishanganga and Ratle hydroelectric power plants.
    • Differences were also discernible when Pakistan approached the World Bank to facilitate the setting up of a court of arbitration to address the concerns related to these two projects referred to in Article IX Clause 5 of the treaty, and when India requested the appointment of a Neutral Expert referent to Clause 2.1 of Article IX .
    • Eventually, on March 31, 2022, the World Bank, decided to resume two separate processes by appointing a neutral expert and a chairman for the court of arbitration.
    • The appointment of a neutral expert will find precedence to address the differences since under Article IX Clause 6 of the treaty provisions, Arbitration ‘shall not apply to any difference while it is being dealt with by a Neutral Expert’.
    • Pakistan, invoking Article VII Clause 2 on future cooperation, raised objections on the construction and technical designs of the Pakal Dul and Lower Kalnai hydropower plants.
    • Similarly, India has raised concerns on issues such as Pakistan’s blockade of the Fazilka drain.

    Lessons from the treaty

    • Engagement between conflicting nations: The treaty is an illustration of a long-standing engagement between the conflicting nations that has stood the vagaries of time.
    • Water management cooperation: The treaty is considered one of the oldest and the most effective examples of water management cooperation in the region and the world.
    • Avoiding conflict: With the exception of differences on a few pending issues, both countries have avoided any actions resulting in the aggravation of the conflict or acted in a manner causing conflict to resurface.

    Potential for cooperation

    • Joint research: Recognising common interests and mutual benefits, India and Pakistan can undertake joint research on the rivers to study the impact of climate change for ‘future cooperation’ (underlined in Article VII).
    • Potential for cooperation and development: The Indus Waters Treaty also offers great potential for cooperation and development in the subcontinent which can go a long way in ensuring peace and stability.

    Conclusion

    Given that both India and Pakistan have been committed to manage the rivers in a responsible manner, the Treaty can be a reference point to resolve other water-related issues in the region through regular dialogue and interaction.

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  • India and Vietnam sign Mutual Logistics Agreement

    India and Vietnam signed a MoU on mutual logistics support.

    India and other such Logistics Agreements

    • Logistics agreements are administrative arrangements facilitating access to military facilities for exchange of fuel.
    • It provides for logistical support and increasing operational turnaround of the military when operating away from India.
    • India has signed several logistics agreements including with all Quad countries, France, Singapore and South Korea beginning with the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) with the U.S. in 2016.

    What makes this newer agreement special?

    • The MoU is the first such major agreement which Vietnam has signed with any country.
    • Both nations signed key pacts including a rare 10-year vision document.
    • Both have similar territorial challenges from China.

    Why Vietnam is at the centre of India’s policy to counter China?

    • India entered the contested region of the South China Sea via Vietnam.
    • India signed an agreement with Vietnam in October 2011 to expand and promote oil exploration in the South China Sea.
    • It stood by its decision despite China’s challenge to the legality of Indian presence.
    • Hanoi has been publicly sparring with Beijing over its claims to the South China Sea for some years now.
    • India and Vietnam share a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership since 2016 and defence cooperation is a key pillar of this partnership.
    • Vietnam is an important partner in India’s Act East policy.

    Significance of such ties

    • If China wants to expand its presence in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region, the thinking in New Delhi goes, India can do the same thing in East Asia.
    • India can develop robust ties with states on China’s periphery such as Vietnam without giving China a veto on such relationships.

    Contributing factor: India’s Necklace of Diamonds Strategy

    • Over the past few years, China is expanding its footprint in the Indian Ocean through its ‘Debt Trap Diplomacy’ and ‘String of Pearls Strategy’.
    • Through its String of Pearls strategy, China is expanding its footprints to contain Indian hold in the Indian Ocean.
    • It is creating a ring around India through strategically placed nations such as at Chittagong (Bangladesh), at Karachi, Gwadar port (Pakistan) and at Colombo, Hambantota (both in Sri Lanka) and other facilities.

    What is Necklace of Diamonds Strategy?

    • It strategy aims at garlanding China or in simple words, the counter encirclement strategy.
    • India is expanding its naval bases and is also improving relations with strategically placed countries to counter China’s strategies.
    • Under this strategy, India’s strategic bases include-
    1. Changi Naval Base, Singapore
    2. Sabang Port, Indonesia
    3. Duqm Port, Oman
    4. Assumption Island, Seychelles
    5. Chabahar Port, Iran
    • Apart from getting direct access to the strategically placed naval bases, India is also developing new naval bases, developing the old bases to garland China.

    Conclusion

    • India has a perfect antidote for Chinese expansion.
    • It has been successful in establishing healthy relations with all the nations on China’s periphery.

     

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  • Challenges in dealing with Indo-Pacific

    Context

    The Indo-Pacific region has been under pressure and East Asia, in particular, has had to weather repeated storms.

    Background

    • Recently, U.S. President Joseph Biden was on his five-day visit to Asia.
    • During this visit, the new conservative South Korean government showed a willingness to expand the presence of a U.S. missile defence system in the country, which had earlier angered China.
    • In Japan, the administration promised him that it was ready to do away with its long-standing 1% GDP ceiling for annual defence spending.
    • Mr. Biden said at a press conference that the U.S. would intervene militarily to defend Taiwan if it came under attack from China.
    • The President and members of his delegation later clarified that there is no change in the substance of American foreign policy, which is still governed by the Taiwan Relations Act.
    • As per the 1979 Congressional law, the U.S. “shall provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character” so that the region can defend itself.
    • The law says nothing about the U.S. being required to step in militarily to defend Taiwan in the event of an invasion by China.

    China-challenge in Indo-Pacific

    • South Korea and Japan face regular nuclear and missile threats from North Korea.
    • Challenge to international maritime law: China not only challenges international maritime laws in the South China Sea, but also confronts Japan over the Senkaku Islands.
    • Spratly Islands dispute: Six nations, including China and Taiwan, are involved in the dispute over the Spratly Islands, which are supposedly sitting on vast reserves of oil and natural gas.
    • Militarisation of disputed isles: China has vigorously militarised some portions of the disputed isles, islets and coral reefs; and countries like Vietnam and the Philippines are anxious not to be left behind.

    Will IPEF framework help in tackling challenges from China?

    • The US has sought to deal with China by establishing an Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) with Australia, Brunei, India, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.
    • Four pillars of IPEF: The IPEF will work on fine-tuning four major pillars: standards and rules for digital trade; resilient supply chains; green energy commitments; and fair trade.
    • Issues of trade and tariffs: However, there is discontent that the framework does not address issues of trade and tariffs. 
    • Lack of trade component: Asian partners really want is trade, they want market access.
    • And the trade component of the IPEF is really lacking.

    Two facets of Indo-Pacific

    • 1] Balance relations with US and China: One is that China’s neighbours would rather balance relations between Washington and Beijing.
    • 2] Extent of resistance: Second is the extent to which countries in the region will want to get on the anti-China bandwagon, economic or strategic.
    • Whether it is in East, Southeast or South Asia, every country has its own unique relationship with Beijing.
    • India may be a part of the Quad, but is quite mindful that it is the only country in the group that shares a land border with China.
    • South Korea and Japan are part of a strong American security/strategic partnership but will be keen on maintaining their economic status with China.
    • This is also true for the Association of South East Asian Nations.

    Conclusion

    Given the complex nature of the threats and the challenges the Indo-Pacific faces, drawing up any strategy remains to be an uphill task.

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  • India needs a forward-looking strategy on Pakistan

    Context

    India’s approach in dealing with Pakistan today is very different from the framework that emerged at the dawn of the 1990s.

    Terms of engagement with Pakistan

    • From the 1990s, for nearly three decades, it was Pakistan that had the political initiative.
    • The turmoil in Kashmir, the international focus on nuclear proliferation, and the relentless external pressure for a sustained dialogue with Pakistan put Delhi in a difficult situation.
    • If Pakistan was on the political offensive, a series of weak coalition governments in Delhi were forced onto the back foot.
    • At the heart of Pakistan’s ambition was to change the status quo in Jammu and Kashmir.
    • Islamabad also played up to the concerns in Western chancelleries that the conflict in Kashmir might escalate to the nuclear level.
    • The new international consensus that Kashmir is the “world’s most dangerous nuclear flashpoint” aligned well with Pakistan’s strategy.
    • Delhi had no option but to respond, but any move to counter Pakistan would make the situation worse.
    • Under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, India has begun to reset the terms of the engagement agenda.
    • Change in regional and international context: Meanwhile, the regional and international context has also altered in many ways since the early 1990s essentially in India’s favour.

    Reset in engagement

    • India’s transformed relations with the US, the resolution of Delhi’s dispute with the global nuclear order, and getting the West to discard its temptation to mediate on Kashmir enormously improved India’s diplomatic position.
    • But the most consequential change has been in the economic domain.
    • The persistent neglect of economic challenges left Pakistan in an increasingly weaker position in relation to India.
    • If India has inched its way into the top six global economies, Pakistan today is broke.
    • Modi had the opportunity to build on these shifting fortunes of Delhi and Islamabad and develop a three-pronged strategy of his own.
    • 1] India bet that the heavens won’t fall if Delhi stops talking to Islamabad or negotiating with Pakistan-backed militant groups in Kashmir.
    • 2] Delhi has been unafraid of staring at nuclear escalation in responding to Pakistan’s cross-border terrorism.
    • 3] By changing the constitutional status of Kashmir in 2019, India has reduced the scope of India’s future negotiations with Pakistan on Kashmir.

    Way forward

    • Pakistan’s hand today is much weaker than in the 1990s and Delhi’s room for manoeuvring has grown, notwithstanding the challenges it confronts on the China border.
    • That opens some room for new Indian initiatives toward Pakistan.
    • Getting Pakistan’s army and its political class to be more practical in engaging India is certainly a tall order; but Delhi can afford to make a move.

    Conclusion

    While there can be much disagreement on Pakistan’s capacity to respond, Delhi’s new initiatives can reinforce the positive evolution of Indian foreign policy, and expand the space for Indian diplomacy in the region and beyond.

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  • BIMSTEC

    Context

    After 25 years, BIMSTEC can do much better as a grouping, addressing shortcomings in trade and connectivity.

    About BIMSTEC

    • BIST-EC in 1997: The 1997 Bangkok Declaration led to creation of the grouping of Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka and Thailand with the acronym, BIST-EC.
    • BIMSTEC: Three countries-Nepal, Bhutan and Myanmar joined BIST-EC later to make it the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC).
    • At the grouping’s birth, the world was different; it was stamped by America’s ‘unipolar moment’.
    • India and Thailand joined hands to start an experiment of infusing a part of South Asia with the economic and institutional dynamism that defined the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
    • But BIMSTEC found the burdens of South Asia too heavy to carry, and so it grew slowly.
    • The grouping has succeeded in rejuvenating itself.
    • Instrument of regional cooperation and integration: Since its Kathmandu summit in 2018, it is viewed as an instrument of regional cooperation and integration, not just of sub-regional cooperation.

    New opportunities in the changed geopolitical context

    • In the third decade of the 21st century, the strategic contestation between the United States and China defines the region’s geopolitics and geo-economics, creating new tensions and opportunities.
    • Deepening linkage between South Asia and Southeast Asia: In this Indo-Pacific century, the Bay of Bengal Community (BOBC) has the potential to play a pivotal role, deepening linkages between South Asia and Southeast Asia.
    • Collaboration with IPEF: It should accelerate the region’s economic development by collaborating with the newly minted Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF).
    • New synergy should be created between BIMSTEC and the IPEF.
    • While all member-states are equal, three have a special responsibility: Bangladesh as the host of the BIMSTEC Secretariat; Thailand as the representative of Southeast Asia; and India as the largest state in South Asia.

    Key achievements of BIMSTEC

    • Charter: It has crafted a new Charter for itself, spelling out the grouping’s vision, functions of its constituent parts, and has secured a legal personality.
    • Sectors of cooperation reduced to 7:  It has prioritised the sectors of cooperation, reducing them from the unwieldy 14 to the more manageable seven, with each member-state serving as the lead country for the assigned sector.
    • Strengthened Secretariat: It has, finally, taken measures to strengthen the Secretariat.
    • Combating terrorism: The grouping has also registered progress in combating terrorism, forging security cooperation, and creating mechanisms and practices for the better management of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.
    • Held regular summits: Unlike the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, post-2014, BIMSTEC has continued to hold its summits and meetings of Foreign Ministers.
    • Unlike the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) which held only one summit since its establishment in 1997, BIMSTEC has succeeded in holding five summits so far; it has now resolved to hold regular summits once in two years.
    • Sectoral cooperation: Institutions such as an Energy Centre and the Centre on Weather and Climate are in place to push sectoral cooperation forward.

    Challenges

    • No progress on FTA yet: A major failure relates to the continuing inability to produce a comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (FTA) 18 years after the signing of the Framework Agreement.
    • Lack of connectivity: The other disappointment is connectivity — in infrastructure (roads, railways, air, river, and coastal shipping links), energy, the digital and financial domain, and institutions that bring people closer together for trade, tourism and cultural exchanges.
    • Only limited progress has been achieved so far, despite the adoption of the Master Plan for Connectivity supported by the Asian Development Bank (ADB).
    • Much of the connectivity established recently is the outcome of bilateral initiatives taken by India, Bangladesh, Nepal and Bhutan to strengthen transport links.
    • No progress on Blue Economy: The grouping has talked about the Blue Economy but is yet to begin any work on it.
    • Business chambers and corporate leaders are yet to be engaged fully with the activities of BIMSTEC.

    Conclusion

    If BIMSTEC is truly committed to its stated goals, it must recreate the spirit of working in unison.

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  • Myanmar’s internal situation shouldn’t hobble India’s ‘Act East’ policy

    Context

    The military takeover in Myanmar on February 1, 2021 and its aftermath have seen an adverse impact on India’s Act East policy.

    What happened in Myanmar?

    • The 2021 coup occurred in the aftermath of the general election on 8 November 2020, in which the NLD won 396 out of 476 seats in parliament, an even larger margin of victory than in the 2015 election. The military’s proxy party, the Union Solidarity and Development Party, won only 33 seats. The Army claimed the results of the election were rigged and did not acknowledge the results.
    • On February 3 2021, Aung San Suu Kyi was placed under house arrest under charges for breaking COVID-19 laws. Additional charges included importing and using radio and communication devices from her security team which is prohibited in Myanmar and require clearances from intelligence agencies.
    • Aung San Suu Kyi received an additional criminal charge for violating the National Disaster Act on 16 February, and two additional charges for violating communications laws and an intent to incite public unrest on 1 March.

    Events of the Myanmar Coup

    • By March 31st 2021, at least 520 civilians have been killed by military or police forces and at least 3070 pope. At least three members from the NLD have died in police custody
    • About 400 elected parliament members were placed under house arrest. Following the coup, the NLD arranged for the MPs to remain housed in the complex until 6 February.
    • When the Myanmar ambassador to the United Nations, Kyaw Moe Tun, condemned the coup by the military, he was fired from his post the following day.
    • Civil resistance efforts have emerged within the country, in opposition to the. Numerous acts of civil disobedience labour strokes, military boycott campaign, and formal recognition of the election results by elected officials
    • Since the onset of the coup, residents in urban centres such as Yangon staged cacerolazos, striking pots and pans in unison every evening as a symbolic act to drive away evil, as a method of expressing their opposition to the coup.

    India’s stance regarding the Myanmar Coup

    • Ever since the protests started, there have been reports of defections from the Myanmar Police Force. On March 11, 2021, 11 officers crossed the India-Myanmar border into the state of Mizoram with their families. The Myanmar government reached out to India to extradite them, with the Indian government replying that they would make a decision regarding that matter.
    • The Assam Rifles were given orders to tighten security along the India–Myanmar border. From 10 March, the border has been closed after 48 nationals from Myanmar have crossed it.
    • Officially, the Indian government has expressed its deepest concern regarding the developing situation in Myanmar. While supporting a smooth and transitional process towards democracy, it is also concerned that the instability in Myanmar may affect the northeastern states.

    Look East Policy

    • In order to recover from the loss of the strategic partner -USSR (end of the Cold war 1991), India sought to build up a relationship with the USA and allies of the USA in Southeast Asia.
    • In this pursuit, former Prime minister of India P V Narasimha Rao launched Look East policy in 1992, to give a strategic push to India’s engagement with the South-East Asia region, to bolster its standing as a regional power and a counterweight to the strategic influence of the People’s Republic of China.

     

    Difference Between Look East and Act East:

    Look East:

    • Look East policy focused on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries + Economic Integration.
    • India became a dialogue partner of ASEAN in 1996 and summit level partner in 2002.
    • In 2012 the relationship got up-graded into a Strategic Partnership.
    • The time when India launched the Look East Policy in 1992, India’s trade with ASEAN was USD 2 billion. After signing the Free Trade Agreement in 2010 with ASEAN, the trade has grown to USD 72 billion (2017-18).
    • India is also an active participant in several regional forums like the East Asia Summit (EAS), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) etc.

     

    Act East:

    Act East Policy focused on ASEAN countries + Economic Integration + East Asian countries + Security cooperation.

    Prime minister of India highlighted 4C’s of Act East Policy.

    • Culture
    • Commerce
    • Connectivity
    • Capacity building

     

    • Security is an important dimension of India’s Act East Policy.
    • In the context of growing Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean, securing freedom of navigation and India’s own role in the Indian Ocean is a key feature of Act East Policy.
    • In pursuance of this, India has been engaged under the narrative of Indo-pacific and informal grouping called Quad.

    Impact on Act East policy

    • With the present dispensation in Myanmar, the Act East policy is going nowhere.
    • Impact on outreach: This has not only stymied New Delhi’s initiatives in terms of land outreach towards the vibrant economies of South East Asia, but has retarded development in the Northeast.
    • Pragmatism demands that an ambitious policy that had fired the aspirations of the Northeast does not become a casualty to the inertia of policymakers.
    • There seems to be a full-bodied recalibration exercise among insurgent groups operating from the Sagaing Division and Chin State in Myanmar.
    • In the north, the ULFA which was until recently in a submissive mood and had declared three back-to-back unilateral ceasefires has suddenly turned belligerent.
    • Need for a relook at Act East policy: In this background, a fresh look needs to be taken at both the furtherance of the Act East policy and the security matrix that governs the Northeast.

    Suggestions

    1] Opening a new axis of land-sea connectivity

    • Promoting trade and commerce: Favourable bilateral relations with Bangladesh offer an opportunity for opening a new axis of land-sea connectivity for promoting trade and commerce with Southeast Asia.
    • Upgrade land routes: There is a need to upgrade the multitude of land routes to the seaports of Mongla and Chittagong in Bangladesh, from Assam, Meghalaya, Mizoram and Tripura.
    • The key land linkages from the Northeast are — Agartala via Akhaura, Dawki (Meghalaya) via Tamabil, Sutarkandi (Assam), and Srimantapur (Tripura) via Bibir Bazar.
    • Exploit shared river connectivity: In addition, there is a need to use inland water transport (IWT) to exploit the shared river connectivity of the Brahmaputra and Barak rivers.

    2] Continued engagement with Myanmar

    • The land gateway to South East Asia does not seem likely in the near future.
    • But there should be no dilution in our initiatives to ensure that peace and stability return to Myanmar at the earliest.
    • For this, there is a need for continued engagement, both formal and informal, with the warring factions in Myanmar.

    3] Develop appropriate infrastructure

    • Appropriate infrastructure such as container depots, cold storage facilities and seamless highways will have to be developed on a war footing.
    • Indian manufactured goods will have to be transported to the rail/roadheads in the Northeast like Guwahati for ready access to the seaports of Bangladesh.

    4] Integrated defence zones

    • To make ineffective the strike capability of the insurgent groups there is a need to create “integrated defence zones”.
    •  These should be jointly manned by the Tatmadaw (Myanmar army) and the Indian Army/Assam Rifles
    • To enthuse dynamism and empower the Assam Rifles, there is a need to retain its current structure of being officered by the Indian Army, as it ensures systemic command and control.
    • This force needs to be mandated to undertake intelligence operations for greater transparency of the events within Myanmar and further the national strategy.

    Conclusion

    The Act East policy is intertwined with India’s Northeast policy. Let not the dismal scenario of Myanmar impede our vision for the actualisation of our ambitious Act East to go East, as alternates exist. To that end, there is a need to ensure the continued economic development of Northeastern states.

     

  • India-Pakistan ties and the mirror of 2019

    Context

    An official delegation from Pakistan was in New Delhi recently to hold talks with its Indian counterparts under the aegis of the Indus Water Treaty.

    Positive developments in the relations

    • Starting from February, India has been sending through Pakistan consignments of wheat, via the World Food Programme, to the Taliban-run Afghanistan.
    • Evidently, channels of communication between the two governments are working and open hostility has subsided, if not vanished completely.
    • China factor: The change has been driven by realist considerations that surfaced during the Ladakh border crisis on the Line of Actual Control with China in the summer of 2020.
    • The recent change of government in Pakistan, including Imran Khan’s removal, is seen as a positive in New Delhi.
    • The official Indian establishment has had close ties with both the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz and the Pakistan Peoples Party that are now part of the government.

    Countering the collusive military threat from China and Pakistan

    • The border crisis in Ladakh raised the spectre of a collusive military threat between China and Pakistan.
    • Such a challenge cannot be effectively dealt with by the military alone and would need all the instruments of the state — diplomatic, economic, informational, and military — to act in concert.
    •  To prevent such a situation, India’s National Security Adviser Ajit Doval opened backchannel talks with Pakistan.

    Way ahead

    • There are some low-hanging fruits which can be plucked the moment a political go-ahead is given.
    • These include a deal on the Sir Creek dispute, an agreement for revival of bilateral trade, return of High Commissioners to the missions in Delhi and Islamabad, and build-up of diplomatic missions to their full strength.
    • Demilitarisation of the Siachen glacier is still seen to be off the table as the Indian proposal is believed to be unacceptable to the Pakistan Army.
    • A window of opportunity would possibly open in Pakistan after the next elections, which are scheduled next year but could be held earlier.

    Conclusion

    India must shift course from the belligerence it has displayed and profited from earlier in favour of proper diplomatic and political engagement with Pakistan.

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  • Why India must engage Taliban

    Context

    It is good that India has extended humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan at this time through international agencies and not let its unhappiness with the Taliban’s policies come in the way.

    India’s  recent engagement with Afghanistan

    • Recently, the Ministry of External Affairs announced that a team led by J P Singh, Joint Secretary (PAI) “is currently on a visit to Kabul to oversee the delivery operations of our humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan”.
    • The MEA clearly implied that this engagement should be seen only in the limited context of assistance to the Afghan people
    • The continuance of humanitarian assistance can be only one, though an important, segment of interaction; other aspects, especially security issues and later, connectivity and investments, as Afghanistan stabilises, have to be part of the dialogue with the Taliban.

    Why Afghanistan matters to India’s security

    • Afghanistan impacts India’s security.
    •  It has, in the past, provided space to al Qaeda with which the Taliban had a special relationship.
    • Afghanistan has an ISIS presence too.
    • Of special concern to India are the Taliban’s ties with the Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed.
    • A recent United Nations report has emphasised that the Taliban’s connections with these groups have not been severed.

    So, what should be India’s approach toward the Taliban?

    • It is argued that both “principle and pragmatism” demand that India should not do business with the Taliban.
    • However, Pakistan has continued to sponsor terror and yet India has continued to engage it and has maintained a diplomatic presence in Islamabad. 
    • India cannot argue that the diplomatic door must be kept open for Pakistan because it’s a neighbour while it can be shut on the Taliban because Afghanistan directly impacts Indian security.
    • Engagement with Taliban: An engagement with the Taliban would at least give an opportunity to convey Indian concerns directly and encourage those elements within the group who wish to open up its diplomatic choices.
    • Exploit contradiction: Far from being a monolith, the Taliban has significant tribal and regional contradictions.
    • Therefore, India should not leave the Afghan arena entirely to Pakistan and China because of the social manifestation of Taliban theology.
    • The Taliban is here to stay and for India, there is no alternative but to deal with it even while repeating, if it wishes, the mantra of inclusive government.
    • India should also maintain contacts with the leaders of the ousted Republic, especially as the Taliban itself wants them to return to the country.

    Conclusion

    All in all, the sooner India establishes a permanent presence in Kabul the better for the pursuit of national interests in the external sphere. This is not an exercise in evangelism but the cold and undeterred pursuit of interests.

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