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Subject: International Relations

  • US Treasury keeps India on currency watch list

    India is one of the 11 countries on the US Treasury’s ‘Monitoring List’ with regard to their currency practices for the first time in the Biden administration.

    What is Currency Manipulation?

    • Currency manipulation refers to actions taken by governments to change the value of their currencies relative to other currencies in order to bring about some desirable objective.
    • The typical claim – often doubtful – is that countries manipulate their currencies in order to make their exports effectively cheaper on the world market and in turn make imports more expensive.

    Why do countries manipulate their currencies?

    • In general, countries prefer their currency to be weak because it makes them more competitive on the international trade front.
    • A lower currency makes a country’s exports more attractive because they are cheaper on the international market.
    • For example, a weak Rupee makes Indian exports less expensive for offshore buyers.
    • Secondly, by boosting exports, a country can use a lower currency to shrink its trade deficit.
    • Finally, a weaker currency alleviates pressure on a country’s sovereign debt obligations.
    • After issuing offshore debt, a country will make payments, and as these payments are denominated in the offshore currency, a weak local currency effectively decreases these debt payments.

    US treasury’s criteria

    To be labelled a manipulator by the U.S. Treasury:

    • Countries must at least have a $20 billion-plus bilateral trade surplus with the US
    • foreign currency intervention exceeding 2% of GDP and a global current account surplus exceeding 2% of GDP

    Implications for India

    • India has traditionally tried to balance between preventing excess currency appreciation on the one hand and protecting domestic financial stability on the other.
    • India being on the watch list could restrict the RBI in the foreign exchange operations it needs to pursue to protect financial stability.
    • This comes when global capital flows threaten to overwhelm domestic monetary policy.
    • The two most obvious consequences could be an appreciating rupee as well as excess liquidity that messes with the interest rate policy of the RBI.
    • Indian policymakers have to be sensitive to the unpredictable nature of policy-making in the US under Trump, especially concerning global trade.

  • A multipolarity, scripted by the middle powers

    Four middle powers: India, Japan, China and Turkey anchor the world to multipolarity. The article deals with this issue.

    New cold war

    • In respect of three crucial relationships, namely China, Russia and Iran, Mr. Biden is following in the footsteps of his predecessor.
    • Mr. Biden has also extended his firm backing for the “Indo-Pacific” and the associated alignment — the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or Quad for short.
    • The U.S. continues to view China as its principal adversary on the world stage and that it will use the Quad to challenge China in the Indo-Pacific.
    • The U.S.’s hostility for Russia goes back to the latter’s war with Ukraine and the occupation of Crimea in 2014, followed by allegations of Russian cyber-interference in the U.S. presidential elections of 2016.
    • U.S. animosity has encouraged China and Russia to solidify their relations.
    • The two countries have agreed to harmonise their visions under the Eurasian Economic Union sponsored by Russia and China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
    • This idea has now been subsumed under the ‘Greater Eurasian Partnership’ to which both are committed.
    • Thus, the new Cold War is now being reflected in a new geopolitical binary — the Indo-Pacific versus Eurasia.

    How middle powers can play an important role

    • Four nations, Japan, Iran, Turkey and India, which, as “middle powers”, have the capacity to project power regionally, build alliances, and support (or disrupt) the strategies
    • But all four seems to be already aligned.
    • Japan and India are part of the Quad and have substantial security ties with the U.S.
    • Iran has found strategic comfort with the Sino-Russian alliance.
    • Turkey, a NATO member, has found its interests better-served by Russia and China rather than the U.S. and its European allies.
    • So, why the uncertainty? The main reason is that, despite the allure, the four nations are not yet prepared to join immutable alliances.

    Why the middle powers are reluctant to join alliances

    1) India’s China concerns

    • India has been expanding defence ties with the U.S. since 2016, by massive defence purchases and agreements on inter-operability and intelligence-sharing and frequent military exercises, as also the elevation of the Quad to ministerial level.
    • This might have signalled to China that India was now irreversibly in the U.S. camp.
    • But China has a point: while the Quad has made India a valuable partner for the U.S. in the west Pacific, neither the U.S. nor the Quad can address the challenges it faces at its 3,500-kilometre land border with China. 
    • Moreover, the U.S.’s intrusive approach on human rights issues ensures that India will need to manage its ties with China largely through its own efforts while retaining Russia as its defence partner.

    2) Sino-Japan relations

    • Japan has an ongoing territorial dispute with China relating to the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea.
    • But there is more to Sino-Japanese relations: in 2019, 24% of Japanese imports came from China, while 19% of its exports went to China, affirming the adage.

    3) Why Iran is reluctant

    • The crippling sanctions on Iran and the frequent threats of regime change make it a natural ally of the Sino-Russian axis.
    • However, its strategic culture eschews long-term security alignments.

    4) Why Turkey is reluctant to join

    • Turkey is steady distancing from its western partners and increasing geopolitical, military and economic alignment with Russia and China.
    • But Turkey still wishes to keep its ties with the U.S. intact and retain the freedom to make choices.
    • Its “New Asia” initiative involves the strengthening of east-west logistical and economic connectivity backed by western powers and China.

    Consider the question “What are the factors India need to consider as it deepens its involvement in the Quad?” 

    Conclusion

    As the clouds of the new Cold War gathers over the world, these four nations could find salvation in “strategic autonomy” — defined by flexible partnerships, with freedom to shape alliances to suit specific interests at different times.

  • Navigation with permission

    The explains the issues involved in the recent incident in which US position on freedom of navigation under UNCLOS differed from India’s.

    Different positions

    • On April 7, the U.S.’s 7th Fleet Destroyer conducted a ‘Freedom of Navigation Operation’ inside India’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).
    • This exercise was conducted without requesting India’s consent.
    • Moreover, the U.S. 7th Fleet noted in its press release that India’s requirement of prior consent is “inconsistent with international law”.
    • However, India asserted that the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) “does not authorize other States to carry out in the Exclusive Economic Zone and on the continental shelf, military exercises or manoeuvres, in particular those involving the use of weapons or explosives, without the consent of the coastal state”. 
    • The question is, can countries carry out military exercises in another country’s EEZ and if yes, subject to what conditions?

    UNCLOS Provisions for EEZ

    • UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) binds all its signatories and customary international law binds all states, subject to exceptions like the doctrine of persistent objector.
    • As per the UNCLOS, EEZ is an area adjacent to the territorial waters of a coastal state.
    • Under UNCLOS, a sovereign coastal state has rights and duties relating to management of natural resources; establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures; marine scientific research; and protection of the marine environment.
    • India is a party to the UNCLOS while the U.S. is not.
    • Article 87 provides for freedom of the high seas under which all states have the freedom of navigation. 
    • Apart from that, states enjoy the freedom of overflight and of the laying of submarine cables and pipelines as well as other internationally lawful uses of the sea.
    •  However, the freedom of navigation is subject to the conditions laid down under the UNCLOS and other rules of international law.
    • In addition to it, Article 58 (3) stipulates another qualification: “In exercising their rights and performing their duties under this Convention in the exclusive economic zone, States shall have due regard to the rights and duties of the coastal State and shall comply with the laws and regulations adopted by the coastal State…”.

    So, what laws and regulation are adopted by India under Article 58 (3) of UNCLOS

    • The relevant Indian law in this regard is the Territorial Waters, Continental Shelf, Exclusive Economic Zone and Other Maritime Zones of India Act, 1976.
    • Section 7 sub-section 9 of this Act recognises the freedom of navigation of the ships of all States but makes them subject to the exercise of rights by India within the zone.
    • Article 310 of the UNCLOS does permit states to make declarations in order to explain the relationship between the Convention and their own laws.
    • The declaration by India in 1995 also states that India “understands that the provisions of the Convention do not authorize other States to carry out in the exclusive economic zone and on the continental shelf military exercises or manoeuvres.

    Way forward

    • Non-consensual military activities that hinder the lawful enjoyment of rights of coastal states need not be permissible.
    • Also, a coastal state is naturally concerned about military exercises and manoeuvres posing a risk to its coastal communities, its installations or artificial islands, as well as the marine environment.
    • Thus, any state which wishes to conduct such exercises must do so only in consultation with the coastal state since the coastal state is the best judge of its EEZ.
    • Both India and the U.S. should negotiate such concerns for the maintenance of international peace and security.

    Consider the question “What are the rights of coastal state on its Exclusive Economic Zone under UNCLOS? “

    Conclusion

    On a conjoint reading of Articles 58, 87 and 310, it can be argued that freedom of navigation cannot be read in an absolute and isolated manner.

  • BIMSTEC

    More than two decades after its formation, BIMSTEC still remains a work in progress. And it has many obstacles to overcome. The article highlights challenges and progress made so far.

    Background of BIMSTEC

    • The foreign ministers of BIMSTEC (the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation) met virtually on April 1.
    • It was established as a grouping of four nations — India, Thailand, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka — through the Bangkok Declaration of 1997 to promote rapid economic development.
    • BIMSTEC was expanded later to include three more countries — Myanmar, Nepal and Bhutan.
    • It moved at a leisurely pace during its first 20 years with only three summits held and a record of modest achievements.

    Growing significance

    • BIMSTEC suddenly received special attention when India chose to treat it as a more practical instrument for regional cooperation over a faltering SAARC.
    • The BIMSTEC Leaders’ Retreat, followed by their Outreach Summit with the BRICS leaders in Goa in October 2016, drew considerable international limelight to the low-profile regional grouping.
    • At the fourth leaders’ summit in Kathmandu in 2018, a plan for institutional reform and renewal that would encompass economic and security cooperation was devised.
    • It took the important decision to craft a charter to provide BIMSTEC with a more formal and stronger foundation.
    • The shared goal now is to head towards “a Peaceful, Prosperous and Sustainable Bay of Bengal Region”.

    Why the recent summit is important

    • In the recent virtual summit, the foreign ministers cleared the draft for the BIMSTEC charter.
    • They endorsed the rationalisation of sectors and sub-sectors of activity, with each member-state serving as a lead for the assigned areas of special interest.
    • The ministers also conveyed their support for the Master Plan for Transport Connectivity.
    • Preparations have been completed for the signing of three agreements:
    • 1) Mutual legal assistance in criminal matters.
    • 2) Cooperation between diplomatic academies.
    • 3) The establishment of a technology transfer facility in Colombo.

    Lack of progress on trade

    • In the recent deliberation, there was no reference to the lack of progress on the trade and economic dossier.
    • A January 2018 study by the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry had suggested that BIMSTEC urgently needed a comprehensive Free Trade Agreement to be a real game-changer.
    • Ideally, it should cover trade in goods, services and investment; promote regulatory harmonisation; adopt policies that develop regional value chains, and eliminate non-tariff barriers.
    • Also lacking was an effort to enthuse and engage the vibrant business communities of these seven countries.
    • Over 20 rounds of negotiations to operationalise the BIMSTEC Free Trade Area Framework Agreement, signed in 2004, are yet to bear fruit.

    Achievements

    • Much has been achieved in Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief and security, including counterterrorism, cybersecurity, and coastal security cooperation.
    • India has led through constant focus and follow-up.
    • While national business chambers are yet to be optimally engaged with the BIMSTEC project, the academic and strategic community has shown ample enthusiasm through the BIMSTEC Network of Policy Think Tanks and other fora.

    Challenges

    • A strong BIMSTEC presupposes cordial and tension-free bilateral relations among all its member-states.
    • However, there has been tensions in India-Nepal, India-Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh-Myanmar ties in recent years.
    • Second, uncertainties over SAARC hovers, complicating matters. Both Kathmandu and Colombo want the SAARC summit revived, even as they cooperate within BIMSTEC, with diluted zeal.
    • Third, China’s decisive intrusion in the South-Southeast Asian space has cast dark shadows.
    • Finally, the military coup in Myanmar and the continuation of popular resistance resulting in a protracted impasse have produced a new set of challenges.

    Consider the question “What are the challenges BIMSTEC faces in emerging as an alternative to the SAARC? What are its achievements?”

    Conclusion

    The grouping needs to reinvent itself, possibly even rename itself as ‘The Bay of Bengal Community’. It should consider holding regular annual summits. Only then will its leaders convince the region about their strong commitment to the new vision they have for this unique platform linking South Asia and Southeast Asia.

  • India’s South Asian opportunity

    India-Pakistan relations weigh down heavily on the SAARC. This affects the economic development of the region. The highlight opportunity for India and Pakistan to separate politics from economics.

    Economic integration

    • There is a growing, but unstated, realisation that neither India nor Pakistan can wrest parts of Kashmir that each controls from the other.
    • A fair peace between India and Pakistan is not just good for the two states but for all the nations constituting the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).
    • While SAARC has facilitated limited collaborations among its members, it has remained a victim of India-Pakistan posturing.
    • World Bank publication titled ‘A Glass Half Full’ conclude that there is explosive value to be derived from South Asian economic integration.
    • An economically transformed and integrated South Asian region could advantageously link up with China’s Belt and Road Initiative and even join the RCEP.

    Important role of India

    • Collectively with a population of slightly over 1.9 billion, South Asia has a GDP (PPP) of $12 trillion.
    • However, India’s enjoys an overwhelming ‘size imbalance’ in South Asia.
    • The shares of India in the total land area, population, and real GDP of South Asia in 2016 are 62%, 75%, and 83%, respectively.
    • The two other big countries in South Asia are Pakistan and Bangladesh with shares in regional GDP of only 7.6% and 5.6%, respectively.
    • Given its size and heft, only India can take the lead in transforming a grossly under-performing region like South Asia.

    Consider the question “How India-Pakistan relations affects the potential of SAARC? Examine the role both countries can play in the prosperity of the region through economic integration.”

    Conclusion

    This is the moment for India to think big and act big. But for that to happen, India needs to view peace with Pakistan not as a bilateral matter, but as essential and urgent, all the while viewing it as a chance of a lifetime, to dramatically transform South Asia for the better, no less.

  • India and the great power triangle of Russia, China and US

    Relations between Russia, China and the US have not always been the same. The changes in triangular dynamic offers lessons for India. The article deals with this issue.

    India’s changing relations with great powers

    • The recent visit of Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov to Delhi and Islamabad is among multiple signs of India’s changing relations with the great powers.
    •  At the same time, Delhi’s growing strategic partnerships with the US and Europe have begun to end India’s prolonged alienation from the West.
    • Also, New Delhi’s own relative weight in the international system continues to increase and give greater breadth and depth to India’s foreign policy.

    Shifts in triangular relations between Russia, China and America

    1) Russia-China relations

    • The leaders of Russia and China — Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong — signed a formal treaty of alliance in 1950.
    •  Russia invested massively in the economic modernisation of China, and also gave it the technology to become a nuclear weapon power.
    • However, by the 1960s, their relations soured and two were arguing about ideology and a lot else.
    • The Sino-Soviet split had consequences way beyond their bilateral relations.
    • None of them more important than the efforts by both Moscow and Beijing to woo Washington.
    • The break-up between Russia and China also opened space for Delhi against Beijing after the 1962 war in the Himalayas.
    • Under intense American pressure on Russia in the 1980s, Moscow sought to normalise ties with Beijing.
    • Stepping back to the 1960s and 1970s, China strongly objected to Delhi’s partnership with Moscow.

    2) Russia-US relations

    • Russia, which today resents India’s growing strategic warmth with the US, has its own long history of collaboration with Washington.
    • Moscow and Washington laid the foundations for nuclear arms control and sought to develop a new framework for shared global leadership.
    • But Delhi was especially concerned about the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty system, with all its constraints on India’s atomic options, that Moscow and Washington constructed in the late 1960s.

    3) US-China relations

    • Despite fighting Korean War with the US in the early 1950s, China normalised relations with the U.S. in 1971 to counter the perceived threat from Russia.
    • Deng Xiaoping, refused to extend the 1950 security treaty with Russia that expired in 1980.
    • China turned instead, towards building a solid economic partnership with the US and the West that helped accelerate China’s rise as a great power.

    Lessons for India

    • The twists and turns in the triangular dynamic between America, Russia and China noted above should remind us that Moscow and Beijing are not going to be “best friends forever”.
    • India has no reason to rule out important changes in the way the US, Russia and China relate to each other in the near and medium-term.
    • In the last few years, India has finally overcome its historic hesitations in partnering with the US.
    • India has also intensified its efforts to engage European powers, especially France.
    • Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s visit to India later this month promises a fresh start in India’s difficult postcolonial ties with Britain.
    • India is also expanding its ties with Asian middle powers like Japan, Korea and Australia.
    • Despite the current differences over Afghanistan and the Indo-Pacific, India and Russia have no reason to throw away their mutually beneficial bilateral partnership.
    • The current troubles with China seem to be an unfortunate exception to the upswing in India’s bilateral ties with global actors.

    Consider the question “What are the lessons India can draw from the  twists and turns in the triangular dynamic between America, Russia and China.”

    Conclusion

    India has successfully managed the past flux in the great power politics; it is even better positioned today to deal with potential changes among the great powers.

  • Explaining Pakistan’s flip-flop on trade with India

    The article highlights the key takeaways from Pakistan’s vacillations on resuming the trade ties even in the face of impending economic crisis.

    U-turn on resuming trade

    • On March 31, Pakistan announced the decision to import cotton, yarn, and sugar from India.
    • However, it took a U-turn on that announcement about resuming trade ties.
    • This highlights the internal differences and the emphasis on politics over economy and trade.
    • It also signifies Pakistan cabinet’s grandstanding, linking the normalisation of ties with India to Jammu and Kashmir.

    3 takeaways from the decision

    1) Immediate economic needs

    • Pakistan’s decision was to import only three items from India, namely cotton, yarn and sugar.
    • It was based on Pakistan’s immediate economic needs and not designed as a political confidence-building measure to normalise relations with India.
    • For the textile and sugar industries in Pakistan, importing from India is imperative, practical and is the most economic.
    • This is because cotton and sugarcane production declined there by 6.9% and 0.4%, respectively.
    •  By early 2019, the sugar prices started increasing, and in 2020, there was a crisis due to shortage and cost.
    • Importing sugar from India would be cheaper for the consumer market in Pakistan.

    2) Politics first

    • The second takeaway is the supremacy of politics over trade and economy, even if the latter is beneficial to the importing country.
    • The interests of its own business community and its export potential have become secondary.
    • However, Pakistan need not be singled out; this is a curse in South Asia, where politics play supreme over trade and economy.
    • The meagre percentage of intra-South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) trade and the failure of SAARC engaging in bilateral or regional trade would underline the above.

    3) Emphasis on Jammu and Kashmir issue

    • The third takeaway is the emphasis on Jammu and Kashmir by Pakistan to make any meaningful start in bilateral relations.
    • This goes against what it has been telling the rest of the world that India should begin a dialogue with Pakistan.
    • There were also reports that Pakistan agreeing to re-establish the ceasefire along the Line of Control (LoC) was a part of this new strategy.

    Consider the question: “Trade is unlikely to triumph over politics in South Asia; especially in India-Pakistan relations. This is a curse in South Asia, where politics play supreme over trade and economy.” Critically Examine.

    Conclusion

    Pakistan has been saying that the onus is on India to normalise the process. Perhaps, it is India’s turn to tell Islamabad that it is willing, but without any preconditions, and start with trade.

  • Why the Indo-Pacific has assumed significance for Europe after the pandemic

    The article highlights Asia’s growing significance in the wake of the pandemic. This is underscored by Europe’s meaningful engagement with Asia which is based on an understanding of the region’s geopolitical and economic significance.

    Asia’s rise

    • The pandemic has upended many certainties. But it has reinforced one major trend in global politics: The rise of Asia.
    • The region’s rise has created three Asias.
    • First, there is the familiar Asia of business — open, dynamic, interconnected.
    • Second, an Asia of geopolitics, with ever-starker nationalisms, territorial conflicts, arms races and Sino-American rivalry.
    • Lastly, we have an Asia of global challenges.
    • These three Asias are also marked by 3 dynamics:
    • 1) Geopolitical rivalries that threaten free trade.
    • 2) The fight against the pandemic is mutating into a systemic competition between democracy and authoritarianism.
    • 3) And frenzied economic growth is fuelling climate change.

    European strategy for Indo-Pacific

    • Germany together with France and the Netherlands, have commenced work on a European strategy for the Indo-Pacific.
    • The strategy seeks cooperation with all countries of the region: For open economies and free trade; for the fight against pandemics and climate change; and for an inclusive, rules-based order.
    • Such a European strategy for the Indo-Pacific must take all three Asias into account.
    • Europe is a key trading, technology and investment partner for many countries of the region.
    •  The EU recently concluded groundbreaking free trade agreements with Japan, Singapore and Vietnam that set environmental and social standards.
    • In late 2020, the countries of East and Southeast Asia signed Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, encompassing one-third of the global economy.
    • It is time for the EU to swiftly conclude the ongoing negotiations on trade agreements with Australia and New Zealand – and to move forward with negotiations with Indonesia and India.

    Reducing dependencies

    • Following the above policies, Europe will also reduce dependency and following the principle of diversification.
    • Together with its Indo-Pacific partners, Europe can set standards for new technologies, human-centred digitisation and sustainable connectivity. 
    • In this endeavour, Europe can draw on its innovative and economic strength as well as its regulatory power.
    • At the EU-India Summit in May, the launch of a connectivity partnership with India will further connect India’s and Europe’s digital economies.

    Rising tensions and rules-based Indo-Pacific

    • Meanwhile, tensions are rising in the Asia of geopolitics.
    • New cold wars or even hot conflicts in the Indo-Pacific would be an economic and political nightmare.
    • Europe must, therefore, take a firmer stand against polarisation and more strongly advocate an inclusive, rules-based Indo-Pacific.
    • The strategic partnership concluded between the EU and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) last December connects us with like-minded middle powers.

    Asia of geopolitical challenges

    • Containing geopolitical rivalries in Asia is also a precondition for shaping the future with the Asia of global challenges.
    •  As the biggest emitters of CO2, the US, China, India and the EU will only win the fight against climate change together.
    • The Leaders Summit on Climate that will be hosted by the US next week sets the stage for cooperation.
    • Europe and the countries of the Indo-Pacific need each other also in the fight against the virus.
    • The EU is by far the biggest supporter of the international vaccine platform COVAX, and India as a leading producer of vaccines is the most important COVAX supplier.
    • We will all benefit from this as, without the worldwide vaccination rollout, mutations will keep on setting us back in the fight against the pandemic.
    • Europe will continue to stand up for human rights and democracy in the Indo-Pacific.
    • This was demonstrated with sanctions against those responsible for human rights violations in Xinjiang — and also against Myanmar’s generals.

    Conclusion

    Europe is ready for a new partnership — a partnership founded on seeking dialogue with the open Asia of business, taming geopolitical rivalry in Asia together and coming up with responses to the world of tomorrow with the Asia of global challenges. This must be the objective of European policy — for and with the Indo-Pacific

  • 7th Fleet’s patrol in India’s EEZ was an act of impropriety

    The explains the implications of a recent incident in which the US 7th fleet asserted navigation freedom and rights inside India’s Exclusive Economic Zone.

    Freedom of navigation operation in India’s EEZ

    • The US 7th fleet recently declared that on 7th April, 2021 USS John Paul Jones asserted navigational rights and freedom inside India’s EEZ, without requesting India’s prior consent.
    • The statement also said that  “India requires prior consent for military exercises or manoeuvres in its EEZ, a claim inconsistent with international law.

    Which international law the statement referred to

    • The “international law” being cited by Commander 7th Fleet is a UN Convention which resulted from the third UN Conference on Law of the Seas (UNCLOS 1982).
    • India has ratified the Convention, which came into force in 1994.
    • However, amongst the 168 nations who have either acceded to or ratified UNCLOS 1982, the US is conspicuous by its absence.

    Background of the UNCLOS

    • In 1945, the US unilaterally declared its jurisdiction over all natural resources on that nation’s continental shelf. 
    • Taking cue from the US, some states extended their sovereign rights to 200 miles, while others declared territorial limits as they pleased.
    • To bring order to a confusing situation, conferences for codifying laws of the seas were convened by the UN.
    • After negotiations, an agreement was obtained on a set of laws that formalised the following maritime zones:
    • (a) A 12-mile limit on territorial sea;
    • (b) A 24-mile contiguous zone.
    • (c) Amnewly conceived “exclusive economic zone” (EEZ) extending up to 200 miles within which the state would have sole rights over natural resources.
    • The EEZ was said to be unique in that it was neither high seas nor territorial waters.

    Issues with the UNCLOS 1982

    • The signatories UNCLOS 1982 have chosen to remain silent on controversial issues with military or security implications and mandated no process for resolution of ambiguities.
    • Resort to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea or a Court of Arbitration are amongst the options available.
    • However, many states have expressed a preference for “negotiating in good faith”.
    • The time has, perhaps, come for signatories of UNCLOS 1982 to convene another conference to review laws and resolve issues of contention.

    Why US refused to ratify UNCLOS

    • It was accepted that the seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction was not subject to national sovereignty but would be “the common heritage of mankind” .
    • This seems to have been at the root of the US opposition to UNCLOS.
    • It was felt in the US that this concept favoured the under-developed countries thereby denying America the fruits of its technological superiority.
    • The US Senate, therefore, refused to ratify UNCLOS.
    • Amongst the areas of major contention or sharp divergence in the interpretation of rules are:
    • 1) Applicability of the EEZ concept to rocks and islets.
    • 2) The right of innocent passage for foreign warships through territorial seas.
    • 3) Conduct of naval activities in the EEZ and the pursuit of marine scientific research in territorial waters and EEZ.

    Containing China

    • China has insulated itself against US intervention, through the progressive development of its “anti-access, area-denial” or A2AD capability.
    • China has accelerated its campaign to achieve control of the South China Sea (SCS).
    • In 2013, China commenced on an intense campaign to build artificial islands in the SCS on top of reefs in the Spratly and Paracel groups.
    • In 2016, China disdainfully rejected the verdict of the UN Court of Arbitration in its dispute with the Philippines.
    • So far, none of the US initiatives including Obama’s abortive US Pivot/Re-balance to Asia, Trump’s Indo-Pacific Strategy and Asia Reassurance Initiative Act, seem to have had the slightest impact on China’s aggressive intent
    • Therefore, it seems pointless for the US Navy to frighten the Maldives or friendly India and it needs to focus on China instead.

    Consider the question “What are the different types of maritime zones under the United Nations Convention for the Law of the Sea 1982? What are the flaws in the convention?

    Conclusion

    In this fraught environment, the ever-expanding, worldwide FONOP campaign needs a careful reappraisal by US policy-makers for effectiveness — lest it alienates friends instead of deterring adversaries.

  • India’s refugee Policy & Issues with it

    The article highlights the issue of the lack of refugee protection framework in India and suggests enacting domestic law to deal with the issue. 

    India’s record on refugee protection

    • India, for the most part, has had a stellar record on the issue of refugee protection.
    • But this moral tradition has come under great stress of late.
    • New Delhi has been one of the largest recipients of refugees in the world in spite of not being a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol.

    Confusion in policies for immigrants and refugees

    • Much of the debate in India is about illegal immigrants, not refugees, the two categories tend to get bunched together.
    • Our policies towards illegal immigrants and refugees is confused is because as per Indian law, both categories of people are viewed as one and the same and are covered under the Foreigners Act, 1946.
    • The act offers a simple definition of a foreigner — “foreigner” means “a person who is not a citizen of India”.
    • There are fundamental differences between illegal immigrants and refugees, but India is legally ill-equipped to deal with them separately due to a lack of legal provisions.
    • Also, India is not a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, the key legal documents pertaining to refugee protection.

    How absence of policy framework creates problems

    • The absence of legal framework for refugees leads to policy ambiguity whereby India’s refugee policy is guided primarily by ad hocism and ‘political utility’.
    • At the same time, the absence of a legal framework increases the possibility of the domestic politicisation of refugee protection and complicates its geopolitical faultlines.
    • The absence of a clearly laid down refugee protection law also opens the door for geopolitical considerations while deciding to admit refugees or not.
    • For example, India’s decision in the recent case of admitting Myanmarese refugees fleeing to India was influence by the possibility of irking the Generals in Naypyitaw.
    • However, hypothetically speaking, if New Delhi had domestic legislation regarding refugees it could have tempered the expectations of the junta to return the fleeing Myanmarese.

    Why India has not signed convention and protocol on refugee protection

    • The definition of refugees in the 1951 convention only pertains to the violation of civil and political rights, but not economic rights, of individuals.
    • If the violation of economic rights were to be included in the definition of a refugee, it would clearly pose a major burden on the developed world.
    • This argument, if used in the South Asian context, could be a problematic proposition for India too.
    • India also need to argue that the North is violating the convention in both letter and spirit, and make its accession conditional on the Western States rolling back the non-entrée (no entry) regime.
    • The non-entrée regime is constituted by a range of legal and administrative measures that include visa restrictions, carrier sanctions, interdictions, third safe-country rule, restrictive interpretations of the definition of ‘refugee’, withdrawal of social welfare benefits to asylum seekers, and widespread practices of detention.”
    • In other words, India must use its exemplary, though less than perfect, history of refugee protection to begin a global conversation on the issue.

    Way forward

    • What other options do we have to respond to the refugee situation we are faced with?
    • The answer perhaps lies in a new domestic law aimed at refugees.
    • The CAA, however, is not the answer to this problem primarily because of its deeply discriminatory nature.
    • What is perhaps equally important is that such a domestic refugee law should allow for temporary shelter and work permit for refugees.
    • India must also make a distinction between temporary migrant workers, illegal immigrants and refugees and deal with each of them differently through proper legal and institutional mechanisms.

    Consider the question “What are the reasons for India’s not singing 1951 Refugee Convention? What are the options India can explore for refugee protection? 

    Conclusion

    Our traditional practice of managing these issues with ambiguity and political expediency has become deeply counterproductive: It neither protects the refugees nor helps stop illegal immigration into the country.