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Subject: Bilateral Relations

1. Major World Events
2. India’s Interests in neighbourhood
3. Effects of our Policies

  • EU, India and the Indo-Pacific

    Context

    Last month, the EU released it “EU strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific”. This document is very rich and needs to be analysed in the context of the rapprochement between the EU and India, which culminated in the June EU-India summit, a “turning point” according to some analysts.

    Important takeaways from EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy

    • The EU strategy in the Indo-Pacific appears to be over-determined by China’s expansionism.
    • “The display of force and increasing tensions in regional hotspots such as in the South and East China Sea and in the Taiwan Strait may have a direct impact on European security and prosperity,” the document says.
    • If security interests are highlighted in the beginning, they are rather low in the list of the objectives of the EU Indo-Pacific strategy, which are listed as: “Sustainable and inclusive prosperity; green transition; ocean governance; digital governance and partnerships; connectivity; security and defence; human security”.
    • Many paragraphs of the document are dedicated to values, including human rights.

    India does not figure prominently in the policy document

    • In terms of partnerships, India does not figure very prominently.
    • By contrast, ASEAN is presented as “an increasingly important partner for the EU”.
    • However, India appears in the list of the countries which already have an Indo-Pacific strategy and with which the EU is interested in a deeper “engagement”, a list made of ASEAN, Australia, India, Japan, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, the UK and US.
    • However, the document does not mention the role India could play in value-chain diversification, a top priority of the EU since the Covid-19 pandemic in particular.
    • Yet, India is mentioned few pages later in a similar perspective when it is said that the EU will help “low and middle-income Indo-Pacific partners to secure access to the Covid-19 vaccine through the Covax facility and through other means”.
    • What the French see as India’s main asset, its strategic dimension, is not central in the EU document.
    •  India is listed as the EU’s first partner only in one area: “under the project Enhancing Security Cooperation in and with Asia (ESIWA), which covers counter-terrorism, cybersecurity, maritime security and crisis management.
    • The pilot partners are India, Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Vietnam, with EU military experts already operating in Indonesia and in Vietnam.”

    Understanding the German influence on the policy document

    • Thus, the EU strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific is more in tune with the German vision of the Indo-Pacific than with the French one.
    • The fact that the German approach prevails in the EU document is a reflection of the influence of Berlin’s weltanschauung (worldview) in Europe — something Brexit has accentuated, Great Britain’s Indo-Pacific strategy being similar to France’s.
    • But China’s attitude may force Germany — and the EU — to change their mind in the near future.

    Conclusion

    By and large, the Indo-Pacific strategy of the EU remains driven by economic considerations and India, whose main asset is geopolitical and even geostrategic, does not figure prominently in it.

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  • Suggestions on alternative foreign policy

    Context

    A document has emerged from the Centre for Policy Research (CPR) in the nature of an alternative to the present foreign and defence policies named ‘India’s Path to Power: Strategy in a world adrift’. It is authored by eight well-known strategists and thinkers.

    Background of the document

    • In 2012, many of the same authors had produced another document, ‘Non-alignment 2.0’, in the light of the global changes at that time, as a contribution to policymaking, without criticising the policies of the government.
    • The present document, however, is in the nature of an alternative to the foreign and defence policies of the government, as some of its tenets are not considered conducive to finding a path to power for India in the post-pandemic world.

    Change in foreign policy

    • The first term of the Modi government was remarkable for its innovative, bold and assertive foreign policy, which received general approbation.
    • After his unconventional peace initiatives with Pakistan failed, he took a firm stand and gained popularity at home.
    • His wish to have close relations with the other neighbours did not materialise, but his helpful attitude to them even in difficult situations averted any crisis.
    • He brought a new symphony into India-U.S. relations and engaged China continuously to find a new equation with it. India’s relations with Israel and the Arab countries became productive.
    • In its second term, the government dealt with some of the sensitive matters, which were essentially of a domestic nature such as Article 370, citizenship issues and farming regulation.
    • The external dimensions of these matters led to a challenge to the government’s foreign policy.

    Suggestions in the Centre for Policy Research report

    • Impact of domestic issues on foreign policy: The finding of the report is that domestic issues have impacted foreign policy and, therefore, India should set its house in order to stem the tide of international reaction.
    • This assertion at the beginning of the report is the heart of the report and it is repeated in different forms.
    • Importance of globalisation: The report rightly points out that “it would be incorrect and counterproductive for India to turn its back on globalisation…”
    • Revival of SAARC: The report also suggests that SAARC should be revived and that India should rejoin the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership and continue its long-standing quest for membership in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation.
    • Strategic autonomy: The report also stresses the importance of strategic autonomy in today’s world where change is the only certainty.
    • Relations with the US and China: As for the India-U.S.- China triangle, the report makes the unusual suggestion that India should have better relations individually with both the U.S. and China than they have with each other.
    • The report concludes that since China will influence India’s external environment politically, economically and infrastructurally, there is no feasible alternative to a combination of engagement and competition with China.
    • Pakistan policy: The report asserts, “as long as our objectives of policy towards Pakistan are modest, resumption of dialogue and a gradual revival of trade, transport and other links are worth pursuing.”

    Conclusion

    The significance of the report is that it reveals the end of the era of consensus foreign policy and presents a shadow foreign policy for the first time in India. It remains to be seen whether any of the opposition parties will adopt it and fight the next election on the platform provided by the report.

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  • What is International Maritime Boundary Line (IMBL)?

    The Tamil Nadu police have issued an alert on the possibility of an attack on fishermen crossing the International Maritime Boundary Line (IMBL) for fishing in Sri Lankan waters.

    About International Maritime Boundary Line (IMBL)

    • A maritime boundary is a conceptual division of the Earth’s water surface areas using physiographic or geopolitical criteria.
    • As such, it usually bounds areas of exclusive national rights over mineral and biological resources, encompassing maritime features, limits and zones.
    • Generally, a maritime boundary is delineated at a particular distance from a jurisdiction’s coastline.
    • Although in some countries the term maritime boundary represents borders of a maritime nation that are recognized by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
    • The terminology does not encompass lake or river boundaries, which are considered within the context of land boundaries.

    The delineation of maritime boundaries has strategic, economic, and environmental implications.

    Classification

    Maritime spaces can be divided into the following groups based on their legal status:

    1. Under the sovereignty and authority (exercising power) of a coastal State: internal waters, territorial sea, and archipelagic waters,
    2. With mixed legal regime, which fall under both the jurisdiction of the coastal State and under the international law: contiguous zone, the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone, and
    3. That can be used by all States (including land-locked ones) on an equal basis: high seas.

    Note: While many maritime spaces can be classified as belonging to the same group, this does not imply that they all have the same legal regime. International straits and canals have their own legal status as well.

    Zones

    The zones of maritime boundaries are expressed in concentric limits surrounding coastal and feature baselines.

    1. Inland waters—the zone inside the baseline.
    2. Territorial sea—the zone extending 12 nm. from the baseline
    3. Contiguous zone—the area extending 24 nm. from the baseline
    4. Exclusive Economic Zone—the area extending 200 nm from the baseline except when the space between two countries is less than 400 nm

    Back2Basics: India-Sri Lanka Fisherman Issue

    • There have been several alleged incidents of Sri Lankan Navy personnel firing on Indian fishermen fishing in the Palk Strait, where India and Sri Lanka are only separated by 12 nautical miles.
    • The issue started because of Indian fishermen having used mechanized trawlers, which deprived the Sri Lankan fishermen (including Tamils) of their catch and damaged their fishing boats.
    • The Sri Lankan government wants India to ban use of mechanized trawlers in the Palk Strait region, and negotiations on this subject are undergoing.
    • So far, no concrete agreement has been reached since India favours regulating these trawlers instead of banning them altogether.
    • It has been often a sensitive political issue in Tamil Nadu in the past decade.

    About Katchatheevu Island

    • Katchatheevu, an uninhibited off-shore island in the Palk Strait, is administered by Sri Lanka.
    • Though the island was jointly managed by India and Sri Lanka allowing the fishermen of both countries to dry their nets there, it was ceded to Sri Lanka in 1974.
    • Since then, Katchatheevu has remained an issue with some political parties in Tamil Nadu demanding that the island be returned to benefit the fishermen of India.

     

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  • Bhutan-China Border Agreement

    In a step towards resolving their boundary disputes, Bhutan and China signed an agreement on a three-Step roadmap to help speed up talks to “break the deadlock” in negotiations.

    Bhutan-China Border Issues

    Bhutan shares an over 400-km-long border with China.

    • Doklam: China wants to exchange the valleys to the north of Bhutan with the pasture land to the west (including Doklam), totalling 269 square kilometres.
    • Jakarlung and Pasamlung valleys: located near Tibet to Bhutan’s North, which measure 495 sq. kms.
    • Sakteng Wildlife Sanctuary Project: China claims this area (near to Arunachal Pradesh) in eastern Bhutan as its own.

    What is the recent agreement?

    • The roadmap “for Expediting the Bhutan-China Boundary Negotiations”, is expected to progress on the boundary talks process that has been delayed for five years.
    • It was stalled due to the Doklam standoff in 2017, and then by the Covid Pandemic.
    • Although China and Bhutan do not have official diplomatic relations they have engaged in 24 rounds of ministerial-level talks to resolve their border dispute.

    Implications for India

    The boundary issue between China and Bhutan is special because it not only relates to Bhutan but also has become a negative factor for China-India ties.

    • China control much of the Doklam: Since the 2017 stand-off with India, Beijing has already strengthened its de facto control over much of the Doklam plateau, located strategically along the India-China-Bhutan trijunction.
    • Bhutan supports it: This agreement has been equally endorsed and appreciated by Bhutan and China.
    • Deadlock at LAC talks: Its timing is particularly significant New, given India-China border talks on their 17-month-old standoff at the Line of Actual Control appear to have hit an deadlock.
    • India’s strategic risks: This has big implications for India, since the Doklam swap would have given China access to the strategically sensitive “chicken neck” of the Siliguri corridor.

    India’s interest

    (a) Doklam

    • The Doklam plateau remains hugely critical for India due to the Siliguri Corridor that lies to the south of Doklam.
    • The corridor, also known as the ‘Chicken’s Neck’, is a 22-km wide major arterial road connecting mainland India with its northeastern states and thus it is a highly sensitive area for China.

    (b) Sakteng: the hotspot

    • The Sakteng sanctuary adjoins West Kameng district and Tawang disticts in India’s Arunachal Pradesh state.
    • Its strategic value lies in its proximity to Arunachal Pradesh, where China claims around 90,000 sq km of Indian territory.
    • Tawang, the major bone of contention between India and China in the eastern sector of their border dispute, lies to the northeast of the Sakteng.

    Conclusion

    • Bhutan has to balance its ties with India as well as China.
    • We need to explore channels that India can activate with Bhutan when it comes to the highly sensitive matter of settling the boundary dispute between them and China.

     

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  • India-Central Asia relations

    In his speech at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) meet last month, PM Modi stressed on commitment for increasing its connectivity with land-locked Central Asia.

    What is the Central Asia Region?

    • Central Asia is a region in Asia which stretches from the Caspian Sea in the west to China and Mongolia in the east, and from Afghanistan and Iran in the south to Russia in the north.
    • It includes the former Soviet republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.

    India-Central Asia Ties

    • India has decades-old wish to connect with the resource and fuel-rich Central Asian nations.
    • Since the emergence of the Central Asian Republics as independent countries in the early 1990s, New Delhi has been trying to establish ties with them.

    Trade and collaboration

    • India’s trade with the five Central Asian Republics—Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan—was below $ 2 billion in 2018.
    • The potential areas for collaboration include construction, sericulture and pharmaceuticals to IT and tourism.
    • Much of this trade was routed through Iran, Russia or the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

    Efforts for connectivity

     

    1. Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India (TAPI) Gas Pipeline
    2. Development of Iran’s Chabahar Port
    3. Zaranj-Delaram Highway
    4. International North-South (Transit) Corridor (INSTC)

    About INSTC

    • In 2000, India, Iran and Russia agreed on a new route for trade that later came to be known as INSTC.
    • It was aimed at cutting the costs and time in moving cargo between Russia and India.
    • The pact was ratified in 2002 and the original multi-modal route linked Mumbai in India to Bandar Abbas and Bandar-e-Anzali in Iran, then across the Caspian Sea to Astrakhan, Moscow and St. Petersburg in Russia.
    • Over the years, more countries joined the INSTC.
    • In 2003, India and Iran announced the development of the Chabahar port in the Sistan-Balochistan province.

    China’s opportunism: Based on proximity

    • China’s trade with Central Asia was $50 billion-$60 billion in the same period.
    • The obvious advantage in China’s favour is geographical proximity.

    Hurdles for India

    • Lack of mutual trust: Unfortunately, many connectivity options are not open to them today due to the lack of mutual trust.
    • Pakistan factor: Tensions with Pakistan mean there is no viable land route towards Central Asia.
    • Iran and the US sanctions: Efforts to look for a circuitous route via Iran (and Afghanistan) have stalled due to US sanctions on Iran.

    Issues in Iran-Afghanistan bypass route

    Recent events acquire broader geopolitical relevance for India in this route:

    • Taliban takeover of Afghanistan: The takeover of Afghanistan by the Pakistan-backed Taliban has severely set back India’s plans in Central Asia.
    • Iran’s bypassing of India: Iran’s overtures has been clearly visible after itself allocating Farzad-B Gas exploration contract to another company bypassing India.

    Central Asia’s importance for India

    • Fossil fuels: While Central Asia is seen as fuel-rich and, hence, important for an energy-starved India.
    • Mineral richness: Central Asian states are also mineral-rich, and Kazakhstan, for one, has been a source of uranium for India’s nuclear power plants.
    • Market for India: A country like India which is seen as a major economy has to have a presence in these markets. INSTC also offers a safe and cost-effective route to the EU (European Union) market.
    • Convergence against Terrorism: India can forge a common position on terrorism and radicalization, which is a matter of concern to the region as much as it is to India.

    India’s recent engagement

    • Defence collaboration: In recent years, New Delhi has engaged with Central Asian Republics in the defence sphere through military exercises (say Ex Kazind).
    • Engagement at UN: Political and economic engagement is also important, given the imperatives of working together at a body such as the United Nations (UN).
    • Technological ties: India has set up universities there—Sharda and Amity are examples.

    Scope for expansion

    • Dairy Sector: There is scope for collaboration in the dairy sector.
    • Pharma: Indian firms have been setting up pharmaceutical units in Russia that can serve these countries as well.
    • Info Technology: IT and IT-enabled services are two other areas.
    • Cultural connect: Bollywood movies are quite famous in these countries.

    Way forward

    • India needs to develop into stronger bonds of trade and commercial bonds which will be possible once the INSTC crystallizes.

    Conclusion

    • The road ahead in the short term is difficult as India doesn’t seem to have any real leverage to get the connectivity projects with Central Asia going.
    • India has been negotiating with individual bilateral partners though.

     

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    Also read:

    [Burning Issue] Ashgabat Agreement

  • Europe as a valuable strategic partner

    Context

    Last week’s in-person summit in Delhi was with the Danish prime minister, Mette Frederiksen.

    Europe as a valuable partner

    • Few Asian countries view Europe with strategic suspicion. Many in Asia see Europe as a valuable partner.
    • As the deepening confrontation between the US and China begins to squeeze South East Asia, Europe is widely seen as widening the strategic options for the region.
    • The perspective is similar in Delhi, which now sees Brussels as a critical element in the construction of a multipolar world.
    • Cultivate Europe: As External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar puts it, India’s strategy is to “engage America, manage China, cultivate Europe, reassure Russia, bring Japan into play”.
    • EU’s Strategy for India: The EU outlined a strategy for India in 2018 to focus on four themes — sustainable economic modernisation, promotion of a rules-based order, foreign policy coordination, and security cooperation.
    • At the summit in Portugal in May this year, the EU and India agreed to resume free trade talks and develop a new connectivity partnership that would widen options for the world beyond the Belt and Road Initiative.
    • Rebalancing the international system: Above all, there is a recognition in both Delhi and Brussels that the India-EU strategic partnership is crucial for the rebalancing of the international system amidst the current global flux.

    Possibilities with smaller European countries

    • Europe looms so large in the Indian diplomatic agenda today and smaller European states draw unprecedented political attention from Delhi.
    • That Denmark, a country of barely six million people, can establish a significant green partnership with India, is a reminder that smaller countries of Europe have much to offer in India’s economic, technological, and social transformation.
    • Luxembourg brings great financial clout, Norway offers impressive maritime technologies, Estonia is a cyber power, Czechia has deep strengths in optoelectronics, Portugal is a window to the Lusophone world, and Slovenia offers commercial access to the heart of Europe through its Adriatic sea port at Koper.
    • As India begins to realise this untapped potential, there are new openings with the 27-nation EU headquartered in Brussels.

    EU’s important role in Indo-Pacific

    • The EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy is likely to have a much greater impact on the region more immediately and on a wider range of areas than military security.
    • Area’s of impact range from trade and investment to green partnerships, the construction of quality infrastructure to digital partnerships, and from strengthening ocean governance to promoting research and innovation.
    • Defence and security are important elements of the EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy that “seeks to promote an open and rules-based regional security architecture, including secure sea lines of communication, capacity-building and enhanced naval presence in the Indo-Pacific.
    • Whatever the specific circumstances of the AUKUS deal and its impact on France, the US wants all its partners, especially Europe, to contribute actively to the reconstitution of the Asian balance of power.
    • Working with Quad: The EU strategy, in turn, sees room for working with the Quad in the Indo-Pacific, while stepping up security cooperation with a number of Asian partners, including India, Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Vietnam.
    • India is conscious that Europe can’t match America’s military heft in the Indo-Pacific.
    • But it could help strengthen the military balance and contribute to regional security in multiple other ways.

    Consider the question “Delhi knows that Europe could significantly boost India’s capacity to influence future outcomes in the Indo-Pacific. It would also be a valuable complement to India’s Quad coalition”. Comment.

    Conclusion

    It was Russia that defined India’s discourse on the multipolar world after the Cold War. Today, it is Europe — with its much greater economic weight, technological strength, and normative power — that promises to boost India’s own quest for a multipolar world and a rebalanced Indo-Pacific.

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  • Explained: Patrolling Points along LAC

    The standoffs between Indian and Chinese troops in Ladakh on the Line of Actual Control (LAC), where initial steps towards disengagement have taken place, are around a number of patrolling points or PPs in Galwan, Hot Springs and Gogra areas.

    What exactly are Patrolling Points?

    • PPs are patrolling points identified and marked on the LAC, which are patrolled with a stipulated frequency by the security forces.
    • They serve as a guide to the location of the LAC for the soldiers, acting as indicators of the extent of ‘actual control’ exercised on the territory by India.
    • By regularly patrolling up to these PPs, the Indian side is able to establish and assert its physical claim about the LAC.

    Are all the Patrolling Points numbered?

    • Some of the PPs are prominent and identifiable geographical features, such as a pass, or a nala junction where no numerals are given.
    • Only those PPs, where there are no prominent features, are numbered as in the case of PP14 in Galwan Valley.

    Are all on the Patrolling Points bang on the LAC?

    • Mostly, yes. Except for the Depsang plains in northern Ladakh, where PP10, PP11, PP11A, PP12 and PP13 – from Raki Nala to Jivan Nala – do not fall on the LAC.
    • These are short of the LAC, on the Indian side.

    Are these Patrolling Points not manned?

    • The PPs are not posts and thus not manned.
    • Unlike on the Line of Control (LoC) with Pakistan, the border with China is not physically held by the Army all along.
    • They are just physical markers on the ground, chosen for their location and have no defensive potential or tactical importance for the Army.

    If the Patrolling Points are not manned, how is the claim actually asserted?

    • The claim is asserted by the Army or joint Army-ITBP patrols as they show more visible presence in these areas.
    • This is done by physically visiting PPs with a higher frequency, as the deployment has moved closer to the LAC and due to improved infrastructure.
    • As the Chinese may not see when the Indian patrols visit these PPs, they will leave come cigarette packets or food tins with Indian markings behind.
    • That lets the Chinese know that Indian soldiers had visited the place, which indicates that India was in control of these areas.

    Who has given these Patrolling Points?

    • These PPs have been identified by the high-powered China Study Group, starting from 1975 when patrolling limits for Indian forces were specified.
    • It is based on the LAC, after the government accepted the concept in 1993, which is also marked on the maps with the Army in the border areas.
    • But the frequency of patrolling to PPs is not specified by the CSG – it is finalised by the Army Headquarters in New Delhi, based on the recommendations made by the Army and ITBP.

    What is this frequency?

    • The frequency of reaching various PPs are given in the annual patrolling programme.
    • Based on the terrain, the ground situation and the location of the LAC, the duration for visiting each PP is specified – it can vary from once a month to twice a year.

    Major friction area: Hot Springs

    • Hot Springs lies in the Chang Chenmo River valley, close to Kongka La, a pass that marks the Line of Actual Control.
    • India’s Patrolling Point 15, it is not a launchpad for any offensive action though the area did see action before and during the 1962 war.
    • China’s unwillingness to pull back its platoon-sized unit from Hot Springs is a sign of the difficulties that lie in normalising the situation.
    • The PLA has traditionally had a major base east of Kongka La.
    • The pass also marks the border between two of China’s most sensitive provinces — Xinjiang to the north and Tibet to the south.

     

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  • A strategy for India in a world that is adrift

    This article discusses new situations prompted by the tectonic shifts in India’s internal and external environment to take another look at India’s path to power in a world between orders.

    New global order: No Order

    • Multipolarity: The world is today adrift. We are neither in a bipolar Cold War nor in a multipolar world, though perhaps tending towards a world of several power centres.
    • Lack of cohesion: The lack of a coherent international response to the COVID-19 pandemic is proof of an absence of international order and of the ineffectiveness of multilateral institutions.
    • Climate ignorance: So is the ineffective international response to climate change and other transnational threats.

    What are the major shifts in global order?

    • Secular stagnation
    • Retreat from globalisation
    • Regionalisation of trade
    • Shifting balance of power
    • Rise of China and others
    • Structural China-United States strategic rivalry

    All above factors have shifted the geopolitical and economic centres of gravity from the Atlantic to Asia.

    Major Concerns

    • Chauvinism: Inequality between and within states has bred a narrow nationalism and parochialism.
    • Existential threats: We are entering a new polarised information age, and face ecological crises of the Anthropocene, making climate change an existential threat.

    Asia as the nucleus: With focus on China

    • Shift of focus by the US: Over the next decade we expect Asia to remain the cockpit of geopolitical rivalries, and that the US remains the most formidable power, though its relative power is declining.
    • China at the centre: China sees a window of opportunity but acts in a hurry, suggesting that she believes that window may close or is already closing due to push back from the West and others.

    China’s expansionism

    • China’s crowded geography constrains her both on land and at sea.
    • Hence it expects her profile and power to continue expanding, particularly in our periphery.
    • The result is likely continued friction, some cooperation, and quasi-adversarial relations between India and China, which others will take advantage of.
    • Overall, we do not expect conventional conflict between the great powers in Asia, though other forms and levels of violence and contention in the international system will rise, with Taiwan a special case.

    Opportunities in disguise for India

    • The uncertainty and changing geopolitical environment clearly pose considerable challenges to Indian policy.
    • However, it also throws up certain opportunities, enhancing our strategic options and diplomatic space, if we adjust policies internally and externally, particularly in the subcontinent.

    How can India reap the benefits?

    • Enhancing ties with the US: Increasing security congruence with the US could enable growing cooperation in fields significant for India’s transformation: energy, trade, investment, education and health.
    • Climate cooperation: Other areas in which India and the U.S. could increase cooperation are: climate change and energy, tech solutions for renewable energy, and on digital cooperation.
    • Neighbourhood first: Several middle powers like Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Indonesia in the neighbourhood are now India’s natural partners.
    • Digital space: This time of transition between orders is also when new standards and norms are being developed, particularly in the digital space. India can and must be present at the creation.
    • Maritime cooperation: At sea, the balance is today more favourable to us than before, possibly more so than on the continent. India must bat for the creation of a Maritime Commission in IOR.

    Bottlenecks in India’s neighbourhood policy

    • Over securitisation of policy: towards our neighbours has driven trade underground, criminalised our borders.
    • Conducive environment for entry of China: This has enabled the large-scale entry of Chinese goods destroying local industry in the northeast.
    • Lack of self-strengthening: While lessening dependence on China, and seeking external balancing, our primary effort has to concentrate on self-strengthening.
    • Lack of socio-political enterprise: If there is one country which in terms of its size, population, economic potential, scientific and technological capabilities can match or even surpass China, it is India.

    Way forward for India

    (A) Bringing multipolarity in Asia.

    • The way forward should be based on the core strategic principles in Non-Alignment 2.0 which are still relevant: independent judgement, developing our capacities, and creating an equitable and enabling international order for India’s transformation.
    • Today’s situation makes India’s strategic autonomy all the more essential.

    (B) Making an issue-based coalition

    • India must adjust to changing circumstances. We have no choice but to engage with this uncertain and more volatile world.
    • One productive way to do so would be through issue-based coalitions including different actors, depending on who has an interest and capability.

    (C) Reviving SAARC

    • India must craft and reinvigorate regional institutions and processes in the neighbourhood, reviving the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) for instance.
    • India could be the primary source of both prosperity and security in the neighbourhood — the subcontinent and the Indian Ocean Region.

    Conclusion

    • Economic policy must match political and strategic engagement.
    • Globalisation has been central to India’s growth.
    • A more active regional and international role for India is incompatible with a position on the margins of the global economy.
    • Self-reliance in today’s world and technologies can only be realised as part of the global economy.
    • We should not imitate China’s claims to being a civilisational state and its adoption of victimhood.
    • Instead, we should affirm our own strength and historic national identity.

     

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  • Outer space

    In opening new pathways for outer space cooperation in the recent US visit, PM Modi has positioned India to engage more productively with a rapidly evolving domain that is seeing more commerce and contestation.

    Outer Space Cooperation: A backgrounder

    • International cooperation is the new normal in space exploration, but it’s not a new concept.
    • One example of this cooperation is the International Space Station (ISS).
    • Another advance in international cooperation in the peaceful exploration of outer space came with the Artemis Accords.
    • Introduced in October 2020, the Artemis Accords establish a set of principles to guide space cooperation among countries participating in NASA’s Artemis program.

    There are five treaties that deal with issues related to outer space

    1. Moon Treaty: Non-appropriation of outer space by any one country, arms control, the freedom of exploration
    2. Liability Convention: Liability for damage caused by space objects
    3. Rescue Agreement: Safety and rescue of spacecraft and astronauts
    4. Outer Space Treaty: Prevention of harmful interference with space activities and the environment
    5. Registration Convention: Notification and registration of space activities, scientific investigation and exploitation of natural resources in outer space and the settlement of disputes

    Why does Outer Spaces matter?

    • Space situational awareness (SSA) involves monitoring the movement of all objects — natural (meteors) and man-made (satellites) — and tracking space weather.
    • Today, space is integral to our lives and disruption of space-based communications and earth observation will have serious consequences.

    India’s strategic interest in Outer Space

    Delhi’s new strategic interest in outer space is based on a recognition of two important trends.

    1. Centrality of emerging technologies in shaping the 21st-century global order
    2. Urgency of writing new rules for the road to peace and stability in outer space

    Why need US for this?

    • Technology cooperation has always been an important part of India-US relations.
    • But it has been a boutique discourse between the relevant agencies of the two governments.
    • The US has traditionally dominated outer space in the commercial domain.
    • As emerging technologies overhaul global economic and security structures, Delhi and Washington now have to widen the interface of technology.

    Why need a comprehensive outer space treaty?

    • Although human forays into space began in the middle of the 20th century, the intensity of that activity as well as its commercial and security implications have dramatically increased in recent decades.
    • Outer space has become a location for lucrative business as well as a site of military competition between states.
    • Until recently, outer space has been the sole preserve of states. But private entities are now major players in space commerce.
    • At the same time, as space becomes a critical factor in shaping the military balance of power on the earth, there is growing competition among states.

    Expanding QUAD in this term

    • Until now, the maritime domain has dominated the strategic cooperation bilaterally between Delhi and Washington as well as within the Quad.
    • The annual Malabar naval exercise, for example, began nearly three decades ago as a bilateral venture in 1992 and became a quadrilateral one in 2020 with the participation of Australia.

    Why does US need India in OST?

    • India, which has developed significant space capabilities over the decades, is a deeply invested party.
    • The US recognises that it can’t unilaterally define the space order anymore and is looking for partners.
    • International cooperation on space situational awareness is similar to the agreements on maritime domain awareness — that facilitate sharing of information on a range of ocean metrics.
    • India has been strengthening its maritime domain awareness through bilateral agreements as well as the Information Fusion Centre for the Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR) at Gurugram.
    • India has also taken tentative steps to cope with the unfolding military challenges in outer space.
    • It has also initiated space security dialogue with close partners like the US, Japan, and France.

    Making a first global move

    • When signed, the agreement with the US on SSA will be the first of its kind for India.
    • Washington has agreements with more than two dozen countries on SSA.
    • The US and Indian delegations have also discussed a US initiative called the Artemis Accords — that seek to develop norms for activity in the Moon and other planetary objects.

    Way forward

    • As commercial and military activity in outer space grows, the 20th-century agreements like Outer Space Treaty and the Moon Treaty (1979) need reinforcement and renewal.
    • The growing strategic salience of outer space demands substantive national policy action in India.
    • That can only be mandated by the highest political level. Back in 2015, PM Modi’s speech on the Indian Ocean focused national attention on maritime affairs.
    • India could do with a similar intervention on outer space today.

     

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  • India, Australia to conclude free trade pact by end 2022

    India and Australia have agreed to conclude a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) by the end of 2022.

    What is a Free Trade Agreement (FTA)?

    • A FTA is a pact between two or more nations to reduce barriers to imports and exports among them.
    • Under a free trade policy, goods and services can be bought and sold across international borders with little or no government tariffs, quotas, subsidies, or prohibitions to inhibit their exchange.
    • The concept of free trade is the opposite of trade protectionism or economic isolationism.

    Key benefits offered by FTA

    • Reduction or elimination of tariffs on qualified: For example, a country that normally charges a tariff of 12% of the value of the incoming product will rationalize or eliminate that tariff.
    • Intellectual Property Protection: Protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights in the FTA partner country is upheld.
    • Product Standards: FTA enhances the ability for domestic exporters to participate in the development of product standards in the FTA partner country.
    • Fair treatment for investors: FTA provides treatment as favourably as the FTA partner country gives equal treatment for investments from the partner country.
    • Elimination of monopolies: With FTAs, global monopolies are eliminated due to increased competition.

    How many FTAs does India have?

    • India has signed it’s first Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with Sri Lanka in 1998.
    • Likewise, India had FTAs with: Nepal, Bhutan, Thailand, Singapore, ASEAN, Japan and Malaysia.
    • India has signed Preferential Trade Agreements such as:
    1. Asia Pacific Trade Agreement (APTA) with Bangladesh, China, India, Lao PDR, Republic of Korea, and Sri Lanka
    2. Global System of Trade Preferences (GSTP)
    3. India – MERCOSUR PTA etc. with South American countries

    Back2Basics: Types of Trade Agreements

    (1) Free Trade Agreement – discussed above

    (2) Preferential Trade Agreement

    • In this type of agreement, two or more partners give preferential right of entry to certain products.
    • This is done by reducing duties on an agreed number of tariff lines.
    • Here a positive list is maintained i.e. the list of the products on which the two partners have agreed to provide preferential access.
    • Tariff may even be reduced to zero for some products even in a PTA.
    • India signed a PTA with Afghanistan.

    (3) Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement

    • Partnership agreement or cooperation agreement are more comprehensive than an FTA.
    • CECA/CEPA also looks into the regulatory aspect of trade and encompasses and agreement covering the regulatory issues.
    • CECA has the widest coverage. CEPA covers negotiation on the trade in services and investment, and other areas of economic partnership.
    • It may even consider negotiation on areas such as trade facilitation and customs cooperation, competition, and IPR.
    • India has signed CEPAs with South Korea and Japan.

    (4) Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement

    • CECA generally cover negotiation on trade tariff and Tariff rate quotas (TRQs) rates only.
    • It is not as comprehensive as CEPA.
    • India has signed CECA with Malaysia.

    (5) Framework Agreement

    • Framework agreement primarily defines the scope and provisions of orientation of the potential agreement between the trading partners.
    • It provides for some new area of discussions and set the period for future liberalisation.
    • India has previously signed framework agreements with the ASEAN, Japan etc.

    (6) Early Harvest Scheme

    • An Early Harvest Scheme (EHS) is a precursor to an FTA/CECA/CEPA between two trading partners. For example, early harvest scheme of RCEP has been rolled out.
    • At this stage, the negotiating countries identify certain products for tariff liberalization pending the conclusion of actual FTA negotiations.
    • An Early Harvest Scheme is thus a step towards enhanced engagement and confidence building.

     

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