Introduction
When the Taliban recaptured Kabul in August 2021, Pakistan perceived it as a strategic victory after two decades of covert support to the insurgents. However, the celebration was short-lived. Four years later, Pakistan faces an unprecedented internal security crisis, with over 2,400 people killed in militancy-related violence in 2025 alone. The rise of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and recent Pakistani airstrikes on Kabul (October 2025) signal a dangerous escalation — and a stark reversal of the country’s long-standing policy of using non-state actors as strategic assets.
Why in the News?
For the first time, Pakistan bombed Kabul, directly targeting militants across the Afghan border. This marks a major policy shift, as Islamabad traditionally treated the Taliban as an ally and buffer against India. The strikes came while Afghan Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi was visiting India, adding a symbolic twist to regional alignments. The scale of violence, with over 2,414 deaths this year, underscores the depth of Pakistan’s internal crisis and its failure to control militancy in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. This development has drawn comparisons to India’s own doctrine of cross-border strikes, raising questions about whether Pakistan is now borrowing from a playbook it once condemned.
The Illusion of Strategic Depth
- Taliban Patronage: Pakistan’s military establishment nurtured the Afghan Taliban for decades, offering refuge and logistical support during their insurgency against the U.S.-backed Afghan government.
- Strategic Depth Doctrine: Islamabad’s rationale was to create a friendly regime in Kabul that could serve as a buffer against India and offer “strategic depth” in case of war.
- Backfiring Reality: Instead, the Taliban’s rise empowered the TTP, an ideologically aligned but operationally separate entity, turning Pakistan’s proxy into its nemesis.
How the Taliban’s Return Changed the Equation
- End of Patron-Client Relationship: Once in power, the Taliban sought state-to-state relations, not subservience to Pakistan’s military agenda.
- Durand Line Dispute: Kabul never recognized the Durand Line, reigniting border tensions that colonial history had left unresolved.
- TTP Empowerment: Inspired by the Afghan Taliban’s triumph, the TTP now demands enforcement of strict Islamic law and reversal of the merger of tribal areas with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
- Refugee Crisis: Pakistan’s decision to deport thousands of Afghan refugees further worsened ties, adding a humanitarian dimension to political hostility.
Pakistan’s New Doctrine: Borrowing from India?
- Airstrikes as Deterrence: By bombing Kabul, Pakistan appears to be testing a new counter-terrorism strategy, directly holding Afghanistan responsible for cross-border militant attacks.
- India Parallel: The move is reminiscent of India’s 2016 and 2019 strikes on Pakistani territory after terror attacks in Uri and Pulwama.
- Diplomatic Irony: The timing, coinciding with the Afghan FM’s India visit, highlights shifting regional equations where India engages diplomatically, and Pakistan responds militarily.
The Security Crisis within Pakistan
- Rising Violence: The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province has become the epicenter of TTP-led insurgency.
- Contradictory Policy: Pakistan’s dual policy of fighting terrorism while nurturing militants targeting its neighbors has eroded domestic stability.
- Blowback Effect: Militancy now threatens Pakistan’s political order, economic recovery, and regional credibility.
- Qatar-Brokered Ceasefire: A fragile truce mediated by Qatar hints at the international community’s anxiety over a new South Asian flashpoint.
Why Pakistan’s Strategy is Self-Defeating
- Cycle of Violence: Airstrikes may offer short-term political gains but deepen long-term instability.
- Internal vs External Conflict: Pakistan’s greatest threat now emanates from within its borders, not across them.
- Loss of Moral Credibility: Its past of backing non-state actors undercuts its legitimacy when accusing others of the same.
- Strategic Isolation: Continued conflict risks alienating even traditional allies like China and Gulf states, who seek regional stability.
Conclusion
Pakistan’s experiment with militant patronage has collapsed under its own contradictions. The strategic depth doctrine that once defined its Afghan policy has morphed into a strategic liability. Peace in Pakistan cannot be achieved through bombs over Kabul, but through a coherent internal reform of its security, political, and ideological ecosystem. As the editorial aptly concludes, “Pakistan cannot ensure internal security by bombing Afghanistan.”
PYQ Relevance
[UPSC 2013] The proposed withdrawal of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) from Afghanistan in 2014 is fraught with major security implications for the countries of the region. Examine in light of the fact that India is faced with a plethora of challenges and needs to safeguard its own strategic interests.
Linkage: The 2013 PYQ and this 2025 editorial both explore the Afghan theatre as a pivot of regional security, then, in anticipation of instability; now, in its full manifestation. Both are invaluable for analysing India’s neighbourhood policy, counter-terror strategy, and regional diplomacy in the post-US Afghanistan order.
