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Type: DOMR

  • FSSAI proposes ban on sale of analogue ‘paneer’

    Why in the News

    The Food Safety and Standards Authority of India (FSSAI) has proposed amending its regulations to stop non dairy substitutes being sold as paneer. These are products in which milk fats and milk proteins are replaced with vegetable oils, fats and vegetable proteins. The proposal follows an episode last year in which social media posts alleged that “fake paneer” was served at a Mumbai restaurant. The existing dairy standard already bars vegetable fat from paneer. The contested point is therefore not composition but nomenclature, since a product lawfully licensed as a dairy analogue could still reach the buyer under the name of the dairy product it displaces.

    What does the draft amendment on analogue paneer propose?

    1. Prohibition on the name: The draft notification prohibits the sale of “paneer made of constituents not derived from milk” as paneer.
    2. Stated rationale: The amendment is proposed to restrict the manufacture and sale of analogue products as paneer, to prevent misleading consumers regarding the nature and composition of the product.
    3. Existing licence holders: Products already licensed or registered under the Analogue in Dairy Context category must discontinue use of the term paneer in their nomenclature, labelling or marketing.
    4. Consultation window: FSSAI has invited suggestions on the draft notification within 60 days.

    Why did the existing dairy standard not prevent the name being used?

    1. Compositional rule: Under FSSAI’s dairy products standards, paneer may be made only from milk and milk solids.
    2. Permitted additions: The standard allows acidulants such as lactic acid, citric acid, malic acid, vinegar, glucono delta-lactone and sour whey, along with salt, spices or condiments.
    3. Exclusion of vegetable inputs: Vegetable oils, fats and vegetable proteins are not permitted in paneer under that standard.
    4. The naming gap: The standard fixes what paneer may contain. It does not fix what a product outside that standard may be called, so the term travelled to the very products the standard had excluded.

    Challenges to the ban on the sale of analogue paneer

    1. Detection capacity: Separating vegetable fat from milk fat in a mixed or cooked product needs laboratory testing rather than inspection. Eg. FSSAI’s Food Safety on Wheels mobile vans were introduced to reach districts with no fixed testing laboratory.
      The Fix: Notify a standard test method for vegetable fat in paneer and route samples from unequipped districts to an accredited laboratory.
    2. Loose and unbranded sale: A labelling prohibition binds pre packaged food, so paneer sold loose over a counter carries no declaration to check. Eg. Petty food manufacturers and retailers below the turnover threshold in the Food Safety and Standards (Licensing and Registration of Food Businesses) Regulations, 2011 only register rather than take a licence.
      The Fix: Require a composition declaration on a display board at the point of loose sale, on the model of the display duties the Food Safety and Standards (Labelling and Display) Regulations, 2020 place on food service establishments.
    3. No lawful name for a legitimate product: Barring the term leaves dairy analogues without a name a buyer recognises, which pushes them toward vaguer descriptors. Eg. Vegetable oil based cheese substitutes are sold internationally as analogue cheese rather than as cheese.
      The Fix: Notify a positive naming convention for dairy analogues, so the category carries a lawful name of its own alongside the prohibition.
    4. Price advantage in bulk channels: Vegetable fat substitutes cost less than milk based paneer, so commercial kitchens buying in bulk keep the incentive to source them. Eg. Palm oil, the commonest vegetable fat in such substitutes, is India’s largest imported edible oil and trades far below milk fat.
      The Fix: Extend the nomenclature rule to institutional supply invoices and menus, so a bulk buyer sees the same declaration as a retail consumer.

    Conclusion

    The gap the regulator is closing is one of naming, not of composition. A standard that lists permitted ingredients does not by itself stop a substitute borrowing the name of the product it displaces, and the dairy analogue category gave such products a lawful footing from which to do so. The markers to watch are the final notification once the consultation closes and the compliance date set for existing licence holders.

    Back2Basics: Food Safety and Standards Authority of India

    1. Governing Act: FSSAI was established under the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006, which consolidated the earlier food laws including the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954.
    2. Administrative home: It functions under the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare.
    3. Mandate: It lays down science based standards for articles of food and regulates their manufacture, storage, distribution, sale and import.
    4. Enforcement route: It licenses or registers food businesses, and standards are enforced through State food safety commissioners and designated officers.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2016] With reference to pre-packaged items in India, it is mandatory to the manufacturer to put which of the following information on the main label, as per the Food Safety and Standards (Packaging and Labelling) Regulations, 2011? 1. List of ingredients including additives 2. Nutrition information 3. Recommendation, if any, made by the medical profession about the possibility of any allergic reactions 4. Vegetarian/non-vegetarian Select the correct answer using the code given below. (a) 1, 2 and 3 (b) 2, 3 and 4 (c) 1, 2 and 4 (d) 1 and 4 only Answer: (c)”

  • SEBI eases settlement, overhauls PMS

    Why in the News

    The Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) has approved a new settlement framework for entities facing enforcement proceedings. The new norms replace the Settlement Proceedings Regulations, 2018 and are aimed at reducing the regulator’s own discretion. The same decision approved a common advertisement code for market intermediaries and a comprehensive overhaul of the Portfolio Managers Regulations. The contested point is whether widening the settlement route prices a violation below the harm it caused.

    What is a settlement proceeding before SEBI?

    1. Closure without a finding: An entity facing enforcement proceedings pays a computed amount and the matter closes without an adjudicated finding against it. The show cause notice starts the period within which an application may be filed.
    2. The deciding body: A High Powered Committee examines the application and retains the power to reject it. Settlement is an option the regulator grants rather than a right the applicant holds.
    3. Exclusions under the 2018 regulations: The Settlement Proceedings Regulations, 2018 excluded whole categories of violation from the route, including those involving significant market impact, substantial investor losses and threats to market integrity.

    What changes in the settlement framework?

    1. A formula in place of an assessment: SEBI has introduced a new formula for calculating settlement amounts. The calculation now drives the figure rather than a case by case assessment.
    2. A fast track below a threshold: A case may be settled without reference to the High Powered Committee where the calculated amount is below Rs 10 lakh. Small matters therefore close without a committee sitting.
    3. A longer filing window: The deadline for filing a settlement application runs to 90 days from the date of the show cause notice, against 60 days earlier.
    4. Statutory anchoring: The new regulations are aligned with provisions introduced in the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956. Those provisions supply a statutory framework for settlement and related mechanisms.

    What changes for portfolio managers and for market advertising?

    1. The Portfolio Managers Regulations overhaul: SEBI approved a comprehensive overhaul of the regulations governing portfolio management services (PMS), the business of running a client’s securities portfolio under a discretionary or advisory mandate. The stated aims are expanding the industry, easing compliance requirements, consolidating the regulations and removing outdated provisions.
    2. The competitiveness objective: The reforms seek to make the business more competitive by improving operational flexibility and simplifying compliance. Consolidation replaces a set of separately amended provisions with one instrument.
    3. A common advertisement code: A single advertisement code will apply to market intermediaries and regulated entities across the securities market. Its stated purpose is to simplify and standardise advertising practices.

    Challenges to the new settlement framework

    1. A settlement produces no adjudicated finding: A matter closed by settlement leaves no ruling for the market to read, so conduct at the margin stays untested. Eg. The objection put to the regulator was that a violator could settle by paying less than the impact caused, and the answer given was that the high powered committee retains the discretion to reject an application.
      The Fix: Publish a reasoned order for every settled matter above a stated value, recording the conduct and the calculation applied.
    2. Unresolved proceedings carry their own cost: An enforcement matter left open for years freezes an entity’s corporate actions whatever the eventual finding. Eg. The National Stock Exchange (NSE) brought its over Rs 22,200 crore public issue to listing only after a decade long regulatory and legal overhang.
      The Fix: Publish a standing disposal timeline for enforcement matters, so speed does not depend on the entity choosing to settle.
    3. A rupee threshold is not indexed: A fast track limit set in rupees covers a changing share of matters as values and participation rise. Eg. The minimum investment in bonds on online bond platforms has been cut to Rs 10,000 to widen retail participation.
      The Fix: Tie the fast track threshold to a published index with automatic revision, so the committee’s caseload stays a policy choice.
    4. Framework changes reprice a business before they are notified: A proposal on how a regulated business earns its revenue moves prices on the day it is published. Eg. An Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority of India (IRDAI) consultation paper, ‘Recalibrating Economics of Insurance Distribution’, triggered heavy selling in insurance distribution stocks.
      The Fix: Publish a dated implementation calendar with every consultation paper, so a regulated entity prices the change rather than the announcement.

    Conclusion

    Board approval is not notification. The framework’s effect turns on the calculation formula and on how many matters bypass the committee once the regulations are in force. The regulator has traded a case by case judgement for a published rule. That is the trade it describes as reducing its own discretion. The thing to watch is the share of enforcement matters disposed through the fast track route in the first full year, and whether a reasoned order is published for the rest.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2013, GS2, 10 marks] The product diversification of financial institutions and insurance companies, resulting in overlapping of products and services strengthens the case for the merger of the two regulatory agencies, namely SEBI and IRDA. Justify.”

  • EC’s expanded logical discrepancy list for third phase of SIR keeps voters on their toes

    Why in the News

    The Election Commission of India (ECI) has expanded the list of “logical discrepancies” used to flag electors in the third phase of the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls to up to 11 distinct categories. The categories have been identified and applied across States and Union Territories including Karnataka, Haryana, Delhi and Telangana. The list has grown from the original four categories used when the concept was introduced during West Bengal’s SIR. A flagged elector must prove eligibility to stay on the roll, and the flag is generated by a centralised system rather than by field verification. The contested point is that the term has never been defined in any official communication, so an elector cannot know in advance what will trigger it.

    What is a “logical discrepancy” under the SIR?

    1. What the term describes: A logical discrepancy is an inconsistency the Commission’s software detects between an elector’s entry and the entries of that elector’s relatives on the base roll.
    2. How it is generated: The software attempts “progeny mapping”, linking a voter to their parents’ entries on the base roll, and flags the inconsistencies that result.
    3. What a flag does to the elector: A flagged elector receives a notice and must establish eligibility to remain on the roll. A place in the draft list does not prevent the flag.
    4. Origin of the category: The category first surfaced during the SIR in West Bengal and was carried into the current phase.

    Which categories does the expanded list carry?

    1. Sibling age gap: An age gap of less than nine months between siblings is treated as a discrepancy.
    2. Parent age gap: An age gap of less than 15 years between a voter and their parent is flagged.
    3. Grandparent age gap: An age gap of less than 40 years between a voter and their grandparent is flagged.
    4. Sibling count: More than six siblings linked with a single parent is flagged.
    5. Parent name variation: A discrepancy or spelling variation in a parent’s name between the current electoral roll and the previous revision is flagged.
    6. Relative mapping change: A change in relative mapping between revisions is flagged, such as a father recorded in the previous roll against a mother in the current roll.
    7. Marital mapping mismatch: A female voter linked to her father in the previous roll and mapped to her husband in the current roll without cross referencing is flagged.
    8. Age progression discrepancy: An implausible age leap, or a mathematical discrepancy between different revision cycles, is flagged.

    How does ERONet flag a discrepancy, and who controls it?

    1. The flagging system: Discrepancies are flagged under a centralised artificial intelligence system through ERONet, the Electoral Roll Officers’ Network.
    2. Centralisation flagged internally: Two Election Commissioners have flagged the ERONet software for having become increasingly centralised.
    3. Officers locked out: Electoral Registration Officers (EROs) have complained that they are unable to access the platform from their end in many cases, according to the two Commissioners.

    Why has the category never been defined?

    1. No definition in any official communication: “Logical discrepancies” has never been clearly defined in any official communication, neither in the Commission’s notice of May 2026 nor in the original SIR order of June 2025.
    2. Parameters not documented: The actual parameters and the methodology used to assign an elector to the category were not publicly documented.
    3. Effect on the elector: An elector cannot contest a classification whose criteria are unavailable, so the burden of proving eligibility falls on a person who cannot see the test being applied.

    What has the Right to Information route produced?

    1. A trade secret claim: The Commission was described as “hiding” details of the software on the ground that it was a “trade secret”, by a former Member of Parliament who is a Right to Information (RTI) Act activist.
    2. Refusal on commercial grounds: RTI applications seeking details of the software were refused, with the Commission claiming that disclosure would affect “commercial confidence”.
    3. The objection recorded: The software was described as an opaque algorithm used to delete voters through a centralised system in Delhi, bypassing the EROs. Software used by a public authority being kept secret for commercial interests was the specific objection raised.

    How many electors has the list touched?

    1. West Bengal: Approximately 1.36 crore voters received notices when the logical discrepancy category first surfaced during West Bengal’s SIR.
    2. Delhi: 19.33 lakh electors have received discrepancy notices in Delhi, where the SIR is being conducted currently.
    3. Karnataka: 20.35 lakh electors have received the notices in Karnataka.

    Conclusion

    The third phase of the SIR is running with an expanded discrepancy list whose criteria the Commission has not published and whose software it has declined to describe. Electors are being asked to rebut a classification they cannot examine, and the officers statutorily responsible for the roll report that they cannot reach the system generating it. The next milestone is whether the Commission publishes the parameters and the methodology behind the category before the phase closes, or whether the classification is settled case by case through the notice and appeal process.

    Back2Basics: Electoral roll machinery of the Election Commission

    1. Chief Electoral Officer: The Chief Electoral Officer supervises the preparation and maintenance of electoral rolls at the State level.
    2. District Election Officer: The District Election Officer carries the same responsibility at the district level.
    3. Electoral Registration Officer: The Electoral Registration Officer is the officer responsible for the roll of a constituency.
    4. Booth Level Officer: Booth Level Officers work at the polling booth level and carry out the door to door verification during a revision.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2018, GS2, 10 marks] In the light of recent controversy regarding the use of Electronic Voting Machines (EVM), what are the challenges before the Election Commission of India to ensure the trustworthiness of elections in India?”

  • Rethink or abandon SIR. Revelations about ECI take lid off electoral upheaval

    Why in the News

    Two Election Commissioners formally recorded written objections at least 14 times over 10 months against decisions taken by the Chief Election Commissioner. The objections red flagged unilateral and “unauthorised” changes to new voter registration forms. They also opposed mass voter deletions under the ongoing Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls. The SIR was presented as a routine technical cleanup of the rolls maintained by the Election Commission of India (ECI). It has instead grown into a verification exercise that places the burden of proving eligibility on long standing voters. The contested point is whether an exercise its own multi member commission did not settle unanimously can still be defended as neutral administration.

    What is the Special Intensive Revision of electoral rolls?

    1. Nature of the exercise: A Special Intensive Revision is a time bound house to house verification of every entry on an electoral roll. It replaces routine updating with fresh enumeration forms for all voters.
    2. What it verifies: Booth Level Officers (BLOs) verify documents at the door, delete entries found ineligible and add omitted voters. Citizenship credentials are checked as part of that verification.
    3. The mapping baseline: Entries in the current roll are mapped against an earlier roll treated as the baseline. The third phase uses the 2002 electoral rolls for that comparison.

    How large is the contraction the third phase has produced?

    1. Delhi’s affected share: More than half of Delhi’s existing voters, 54.6 per cent, have either been struck off the roll or served notices asking them to prove they are genuine. Over 80 lakh of the Capital’s 1.45 crore registered voters are under ECI scrutiny.
    2. Deletion categories: About 47.5 lakh voters have been marked for deletion under the categories of Absent, Shifted, Dead or Duplicate.
    3. Technical flags: A further 33.13 lakh have been flagged for operational and technical errors. That figure includes 19.33 lakh marked for “logical discrepancies” and 13.80 lakh left unmapped against the 2002 rolls.
    4. Notice volume: Over 31.6 lakh notices had been generated by mid September.
    5. Spread across States: Electoral rolls are shrinking by over 15 per cent across 17 of the 19 States and Union Territories in the third phase of the SIR.
    6. National projection: Overall deletions could remove 12 to 13 crore voters nationwide. Maharashtra alone is expected to lose up to 2 crore voters.
    7. Steepest contractions: Delhi’s roll is shrinking by 35.89 per cent and Chandigarh’s by 31.84 per cent.

    Why does the ECI’s own data cut against a technical cleanup?

    1. Deletions before the SIR: Between January 2025 and June 2026, before the SIR was launched, 1.1 million Delhi voters were dropped from the rolls with no explanation offered.
    2. Departure from the addition trend: Around 4,00,000 voters were added between the 2020 Assembly and 2024 Lok Sabha polls. A similar number joined between the 2024 general election and the 2025 State polls.
    3. Population moving the other way: India’s adult population has expanded from 99 crore in 2024 to an estimated 103 crore today. A roll that contracts while the adult population grows inverts the expected direction.
    4. Projected electorate: Analysts project that the national electorate could contract to 88 crore, disenfranchising up to 15 crore citizens.
    5. Rolls smaller than turnout: In Delhi, 24 of 70 Assembly constituencies now count fewer registered electors than the number of voters who actually cast ballots in the 2025 Assembly elections.
    6. A single booth: In polling booth 33 of the Chandni Chowk constituency, 908 of 909 voters were marked for deletion.

    Does the non discriminatory defence survive the notice list?

    1. Who the list caught: The notice list flagged the Delhi Chief Minister and her predecessor, the External Affairs Minister, a serving Election Commissioner and a serving Director of the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI). Former holders of the offices of Vice President, Chief Justice, Army Chief and Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) were flagged as well.
    2. The ECI’s reading: The ECI cites this spread as proof that the process is not discriminatory.
    3. Why the spread proves little: Ministers, judges and senior officials hold the institutional access and resources to get a technical flag corrected quickly. The same flag pushes an ordinary citizen into an administrative process with no comparable route out.

    Where do the flagged “logical discrepancies” actually originate?

    1. Errors inside the ECI’s own databases: Many flagged discrepancies originate in the ECI’s internal records rather than in anything a voter did. A coding error converted a father’s recorded age of 45 to zero, and a clerk’s misspelling of a name created an artificial “logical discrepancy”.
    2. The 2002 baseline carries its own errors: A former Chief Election Commissioner has criticised treating the 2002 roll as an unassailable baseline for voter mapping, noting that even his own father’s name was misspelt in the 2002 data.
    3. Software deletions with welfare consequences: In Goa the ECI’s software eliminated large numbers of legitimate voters and cut them off from benefits ranging from dialysis to transplants, for which only voters are eligible.
    4. The West Bengal error rate: In West Bengal 27 lakh voters were flagged for tribunal review over alleged “logical discrepancies”. Of 82,000 cases adjudicated, Right to Information (RTI) disclosures showed 91 per cent had been wrongly deleted and had to be restored.
    5. What the error rate implies: Nine wrong deletions in every ten adjudicated cases put the reliability of the flagging algorithm itself in question.

    Challenges to the Special Intensive Revision

    1. Quasi judicial power delegated to field enumerators: Booth Level Officers are effectively tasked with verifying the citizenship credentials of long standing voters, a determination they have no training to make. Eg. In Uttar Pradesh field verification by Booth Level Officers was reported to be cursory, with forms collected in bulk and without individual verification.
      The Fix: Route every citizenship doubt to the Electoral Registration Officer with a written order and a reasoned finding, so the determination sits with a designated officer rather than a field enumerator.
    2. Compressed timelines before major polls: The SIR was scheduled for compressed execution immediately before major elections in Bihar, West Bengal, Kerala and Tamil Nadu, leaving voters too little time to appeal and rectify. Eg. The ECI has offered no rationale for forcing millions of voters into documentation checks just weeks before they are due to vote.
      The Fix: Fix a minimum gap between the publication of a final roll and the notification of a poll, so an appeal can be heard before the election it affects.
    3. Deletion without individual notice: Unreliable software combined with field discretion converts routine documentation checks into arbitrary purges. Eg. In West Bengal the requirement of individual notice before deletion under the Registration of Electors Rules, 1960 was alleged to have been violated.
      The Fix: Publish the flagging parameters and require a signed individual notice stating the ground before any name is removed.
    4. Legality settled while fairness is not: The Supreme Court has upheld the legality of the SIR, so the exercise continues while its fairness is contested outside court. Eg. A former Election Commissioner and a former Chief Election Commissioner have both openly questioned the exercise’s fairness.
      The Fix: Require the Commission to publish a reasoned majority order for every contested SIR decision, so a fairness objection has a document to attach itself to.
    5. An exceptional exercise launched without a stated trigger: An intensive revision is exceptional and is triggered only where rolls have remained largely unchanged for years or large scale irregularities are suspected. Eg. The nationwide SIR was announced within six months of a clean January 2025 summary revision, with no new justification offered.
      The Fix: Record the specific irregularity that triggers an intensive revision in the order announcing it, so the exceptional character of the exercise is tested at the outset.

    Conclusion

    An electoral roll revision draws its authority from the presumption that the body running it is neutral. A written record of its own members objecting to the decisions removes that presumption, and a judicial finding on legality does not restore it. What remains unreconciled is the Commission’s duty to remove ineligible entries against its duty not to remove eligible ones, with the second carrying no comparable enforcement behind it. The marker to watch is whether the Commission publishes a reasoned majority order for the contested decisions and reopens the appeal window before the next set of polls.

    Electoral Roll Revision in India

    1. Statutory basis: Electoral rolls are prepared and maintained by the ECI under Article 324 of the Constitution and Section 21 of the Representation of the People Act, 1950.
    2. Summary revision: This is the routine exercise carried out before every general election to the Lok Sabha, every State Legislative Assembly election and every bye election, against a qualifying date.
    3. Special Summary Revision: An enhanced version run before major elections. It uses targeted campaigns to add voters who have turned 18, remove deceased voters and correct existing entries.
    4. Intensive revision: The exceptional category, used only 13 times since Independence, in 1952, 1957, 1961, 1965, 1966, 1983 to 1984, 1987 to 1989, 1992, 1993, 1995, 2002, 2003 and 2004.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026, GS2, 10 marks] Is the right to vote a fundamental right? Discuss the position of the Election Commission of India while undertaking the revision of electoral rolls. Can it also examine the question of citizenship of voters?”

  • Motion in both Houses, 2/3rds majority: Process to remove CEC

    Why in the News

    The Opposition will soon move a motion in both Houses of Parliament to remove the Chief Election Commissioner (CEC), and the Leader of the Opposition in the Lok Sabha has demanded the CEC’s resignation. The demand follows the disclosure of criticisms that the two Election Commissioners raised internally against the decisions and processes of the Election Commission of India (ECI) over recent months. Article 324(5) of the Constitution protects the CEC with the same removal safeguard that applies to a judge of the Supreme Court. A removal therefore runs through the route the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 lays down. The tension is that a safeguard built to shield the Commission from political pressure also places the remedy beyond the reach of any group without a two thirds majority.

    What does Article 324(5) provide on removing the CEC?

    1. The standard for the CEC: Article 324(5) states that the CEC can be removed from office only “in like manner and on the like grounds as a Judge of the Supreme Court”.
    2. The same wording in statute: The same framing appears in Section 11(2) of the CEC and Other Election Commissioners (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Act, 2023.
    3. A weaker rule for the others: The same Article states that any other Election Commissioner or a Regional Commissioner shall not be removed from office except on the recommendation of the CEC.
    4. Why the bar is high: The bar for removing the CEC is set high deliberately, with the view of shielding the ECI from political pressures.

    Who appoints the Election Commission, and on what terms?

    1. The mandate: The ECI is entrusted with conducting free and fair elections in the country. Article 324 of the Constitution and the 2023 Act lay down the provisions on appointment, tenure and removal.
    2. Composition and internal standing: The ECI has three Election Commissioners. The CEC is first among equals rather than the seniormost, and decisions are to be taken unanimously by all three as far as possible.
    3. The appointment route: The President appoints the CEC and the Election Commissioners on the recommendation of a three member selection committee comprising the Prime Minister, the Leader of the Opposition and one member of the Union Cabinet.
    4. Eligibility: Appointees should have previously held secretary level positions in the Government and be “persons of integrity, who have knowledge of and experience in management and conduct of elections”, under the 2023 Act.
    5. Tenure and status: Appointments run for six years or until the age of 65, whichever comes first. The CEC enjoys the same services and monetary benefits extended to justices of the Supreme Court.

    What are the grounds for removal?

    1. The constitutional ground: Article 124(4), which carries the process for removing a Supreme Court judge, allows removal only “on the ground of proved misbehavior or incapacity”.
    2. What misbehaviour covers: Misbehaviour can comprise corrupt practices or abuse of office. Courts have interpreted it to include actions incompatible with the office of the CEC and a failure to discharge official duties.
    3. What incapacity covers: Incapacity refers to a situation where the officer is unable to perform the duties of the office.

    What procedure does the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 set?

    1. The notice of motion: Members of both Houses must bring a notice of motion explicitly alleging misbehaviour or incapacity.
    2. The signature threshold: To be admitted, the motion needs the signatures of at least 100 MPs in the Lok Sabha and 50 in the Rajya Sabha.
    3. Admission is a decision: The presiding officers can consult people and materials before refusing or admitting the motion.
    4. The inquiry stage: If the motion is admitted, an inquiry examines the validity of the charges. This involves forming a committee to investigate evidence of misbehaviour or incapacity.
    5. The vote: The motion must then be passed by a two thirds majority of those present and voting in both Houses.
    6. The final step: Once it is passed, the President orders the removal. There is no discretion at that stage, since the President acts on the advice of Parliament in this context.
    7. Application to the CEC: This process, written for a judge, is what extends to the removal of the CEC.

    Why did the earlier attempt fail?

    1. No CEC has been removed: No CEC has been impeached.
    2. Rejection at admission: The Rajya Sabha Chairman and the Lok Sabha Speaker rejected the impeachment motions submitted in both Houses in April. Neither presiding officer assigned any reason, and Opposition leaders criticised the move.
    3. The numbers behind the motions: The Trinamool Congress led the Opposition in submitting the motions on 12 March, with 130 MPs signing the Lok Sabha motion and 63 the Rajya Sabha one.
    4. The grounds alleged: Both motions referred to the ECI’s ongoing Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls. They alleged “partisan and discriminatory conduct” by the CEC and “obstruction of investigation into electoral fraud and SIR”.
    5. The internal criticism on the same subject: The two Election Commissioners also raised concerns about processes linked to the SIR.

    Challenges to the process for removing the CEC

    1. The arithmetic makes the route unusable for an Opposition: A two thirds majority of those present and voting in both Houses can only be reached with the support of the party holding the majority, so the remedy is available only when the government agrees to it. Eg. No judge of the Supreme Court has been removed under the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 since it was enacted.
      The Fix: Provide graded consequences short of removal, such as a mandatory inquiry report laid before both Houses whatever the vote.
    2. Admission rests on an unreasoned discretion: A presiding officer decides whether the motion is admitted at all and need not record reasons, so the process can end before any inquiry tests the charge. Eg. A removal motion against a Chief Justice of India was rejected at the admission stage by the Rajya Sabha Chairman in 2018.
      The Fix: Require written reasons for refusing admission, so the decision becomes reviewable.
    3. Protection inside the Commission is asymmetric: Only the CEC holds the Supreme Court judge standard, so a dissenting Election Commissioner has less security of tenure than the officeholder whose decisions are being contested. Eg. The Law Commission’s 255th Report on electoral reforms recommended extending the CEC’s removal protection to all Election Commissioners.
      The Fix: Amend Article 324(5) to extend the same removal standard to every Election Commissioner.
    4. Appointment design decides the independence a removal bar cannot: A selection committee with a government majority chooses the officeholder, so independence is settled at appointment rather than at removal. Eg. The Supreme Court in Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India (2023) directed that the selection panel include the Chief Justice of India until Parliament legislated, and the 2023 Act omitted the Chief Justice.
      The Fix: Restore a member outside the executive to the selection committee, such as the Chief Justice of India or a nominee of the Chief Justice.

    Conclusion

    The safeguard and the obstacle are the same provision. A removal standard borrowed from the judiciary keeps the office out of reach of an ordinary majority, and it equally keeps the office out of reach of an Opposition that cannot assemble a supermajority. The unresolved question sits earlier in the chain, at admission, where a presiding officer can end the process without recording a reason and without any inquiry testing the charge. What follows next is whether the fresh notices are admitted in either House, and whether the reasons for that decision are placed on record this time.

    Back2Basics: Special Intensive Revision

    1. What it is: A comprehensive, time bound house to house verification of the electoral roll, using fresh enumeration forms for every voter, door to door verification by Booth Level Officers, document verification of citizenship, deletion of ineligible entries and inclusion of omitted voters.
    2. How it differs from the routine revision: Summary Revision is the routine exercise before an election, updating additions, deletions and corrections against a qualifying date. An intensive revision re enumerates the whole roll instead.
    3. When it is triggered: Only where rolls have stayed largely unchanged for years or large scale irregularities are suspected. Intensive revisions have been carried out 13 times in India’s history.
    4. The current exercise: A nationwide revision was launched from 4 November 2025, the first in 21 years, covering nine States and three Union Territories and about 51 crore voter records, mandated under Sections 22 and 23 of the Representation of the People Act, 1950.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2019] Consider the following statements: 1. The- motion to impeach a Judge of the Supreme Court of India cannot be rejected by the Speaker of the Lok Sabha as per the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968. 2. The Constitution of India defines and gives details of what Constitutes ‘incapacity and proved misbehaviour’ of the Judges of the Supreme Court of India. 3. The details of the process of impeachment of the Judges of the Supreme Court of India are given in the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968. 4. If the motion for the impeachment of a Judge is taken up for voting, the law requires the motion to be backed by each House of the Parliament and supported by a majority of total membership of that House and by not less than two-thirds of total members of that House present and voting. Answer: (c)”

  • Fear of shift to cash due to merchant fee on UPI ‘100% misplaced’: Govt sources

    Why in the News

    A merchant discount rate of 0.4 per cent will apply to Unified Payments Interface (UPI) payments made to merchants above Rs 2,000 from 15 October, under a decision of the National Payments Corporation of India (NPCI). The government has called fears of a public shift back to cash “100% misplaced”, noting that a merchant fee already applies to credit and debit cards other than RuPay debit cards and that those cards continue to be used. A Goods and Services Tax (GST) of 18 per cent applies on the fee itself. The contested point is whether a charge levied on the seller stays with the seller, or reaches the buyer as a higher price.

    What is the merchant discount rate now applying to UPI?

    1. What the charge is: A merchant discount rate (MDR) is a fee paid by the seller on a payment accepted electronically. On UPI it has been set at 0.4 per cent of the transaction value.
    2. Where it applies: It applies to person to merchant UPI transactions of more than Rs 2,000, and takes effect on 15 October.
    3. Who receives it: The fee is split between the payments industry players that run the rail, which includes banks, payment gateways, UPI apps and other service providers.

    How narrow is the fee’s incidence?

    1. Share of transactions: Only 4 per cent of person to merchant UPI transactions are for more than Rs 2,000 and will attract the fee.
    2. Share of value: That small group of payments accounts for two thirds of person to merchant UPI payments measured by value.
    3. Merchants untouched: Around three fourths of India’s merchants accepting digital payments have never recorded a UPI transaction above the threshold, so they stay outside the fee altogether.
    4. Transfers stay free: All person to person UPI payments remain without any MDR.
    5. RuPay debit exempt: Payments made by RuPay debit card attract no MDR even above the threshold.

    Why does the government reject the fear of a shift back to cash?

    1. Card fees already exist: An MDR already applies to credit and debit cards other than RuPay debit cards, and users have not given those cards up.
    2. Merchants already absorb it: Merchants have always absorbed the MDR on credit cards while continuing to accept Visa, Mastercard and American Express.
    3. The comparison on rates: The merchant fee on debit and credit cards runs broadly in the range of 1 per cent to 3 per cent, significantly higher than the rate set for UPI.

    What is the stated purpose of charging for UPI?

    1. Cost of a free service: The stated ground is that a payment service cannot be supplied free indefinitely without exhausting the business that funds it.
    2. Reinvestment rather than full recovery: NPCI’s managing director and chief executive officer said the objective is not to recover the full cost of running UPI, but to generate enough revenue for banks and payment companies to keep investing in the ecosystem.

    What else decides how much of the fee reaches the buyer?

    1. The pass through concern: Shopkeepers may stop accepting UPI, and consumers expect sellers to pass the fee on by raising prices.
    2. A monitoring mechanism: The government is willing to talk to the Indian Banks’ Association (IBA) to set up a mechanism for monitoring whether shopkeepers pass the MDR to buyers.
    3. Talks with traders: The government will also speak to traders, including the Confederation of All India Traders (CAIT), about the issue.
    4. Tax on the fee: GST of 18 per cent applies on the MDR on person to merchant UPI payments, which lifts the seller’s cost above the notified rate.
    5. The stated hope on the tax: The position taken is that the GST Council will take a favourable view and be reasonable on the rate.
    6. The Council’s agenda: The GST Council meets on 7 October and is not expected to discuss the indirect tax rate on the MDR.

    Challenges to the UPI merchant discount rate

    1. Pass through is hard to police: A monitoring arrangement cannot observe a shopkeeper who quotes one price for cash and a higher one for UPI. Eg. Surcharging on card payments continues at small outlets even though the card rules bar it.
      The Fix: Require the acquiring bank to certify surcharge free acceptance as a condition of the merchant’s UPI acceptance agreement.
    2. A value threshold invites splitting: A fee that triggers above a transaction value gives the seller a reason to break one payment into two below the line. Eg. The fee applies only above Rs 2,000, so a bill just over that figure can be collected as two smaller payments.
      The Fix: Levy the fee on a merchant’s aggregate monthly person to merchant value rather than on the size of each transaction.
    3. The revenue split leaves acquirers last: The fee is divided among banks, gateways and app providers, so the share reaching the party that actually onboards a small shop may not cover that cost. Eg. Person to merchant acceptance among small merchants was built on zero MDR and on government incentive payouts to banks.
      The Fix: Fix a minimum acquirer share of the fee in the settlement rules so merchant onboarding stays funded.
    4. A priced rail can be repriced: A charge introduced administratively can be raised the same way, and the rail loses its universality if some sellers refuse the instrument above the threshold. Eg. The European Union caps interchange at 0.2 per cent on debit cards and 0.3 per cent on credit cards precisely to keep acceptance universal.
      The Fix: Notify a statutory ceiling on the person to merchant fee so the rate cannot be revised upward by the operator alone.

    Conclusion

    The charge is small and narrowly aimed, and it still changes what UPI is: a rail built on being free to use now carries a price for sellers above a value threshold. Whether that price stays with the seller is not settled by the fee’s design but by enforcement the government has yet to build. Two things are worth watching. The first is whether a monitoring arrangement with the banks is in place before the fee takes effect, and the second is whether the tax levied on the fee is revisited once the Council turns to it.

    Back2Basics: National Payments Corporation of India

    1. What it is: An umbrella organisation for retail payments and settlement systems in India, incorporated in 2008 as a not for profit company.
    2. Promoters and statutory basis: It was promoted by the Reserve Bank of India and the Indian Banks’ Association under the Payment and Settlement Systems Act, 2007.
    3. Systems it operates: UPI, RuPay, the Immediate Payment Service, the National Automated Clearing House, the Aadhaar Enabled Payment System and FASTag.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026] Which one of the following statements about Unified Payments Interface (UPI) and Central Bank Digital Currency (Digital Rupee) is NOT correct? (a) UPI is a real-time payment system but Digital Rupee is akin to sovereign paper currency (b) In case of UPI, settlement for end users happens instantly; in case of Digital Rupee, wallet balance gets transferred to another wallet (no traditional settlement) (c) UPI transactions are recorded by banks and reflected in bank statements; in case of Digital Rupee, no data is captured in bank statements (d) In both the cases (UPI and Digital Rupee), the liability lies with the users and their respective banks Answer: (d)”

  • Irdai proposes specific caps on insurance commission

    Why in the News

    The Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority of India (IRDAI) has proposed specific caps on insurance commissions, in place of the single overall expense ceiling that governs distribution cost today. A consultation paper also proposes significantly lower overall expense limits for insurers, with a glide path for bringing down commissions and management expenses. The proposal reverses the approach of the Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority of India (Payment of Commission) Regulations, 2023, which withdrew product specific commission caps and left commission to be paid under a board approved policy within an insurer’s overall expense ceiling. The contested point is whether distribution cost is better disciplined by one aggregate ceiling the insurer manages, or by product level caps the regulator sets.

    What is the expense of management limit?

    1. What the limit covers: Expenses of management are the commission and operating expenses an insurer charges against its business. The limit is expressed as a share of premium.
    2. Why the ceiling exists: Every rupee of distribution and administration cost is a rupee not available for policyholder benefits, so a ceiling protects the return the buyer gets.
    3. The 2023 shift: Product specific commission caps were withdrawn and each insurer was left to fix commission through a board approved policy, inside the aggregate ceiling.
    4. What an aggregate ceiling cannot do: A single ceiling says nothing about how the expense is distributed across products and channels. An insurer can load cost onto one product and still stay within the limit.

    What do the proposed commission caps do?

    1. The basis of the cap: Caps are proposed by segment, line of business, distribution channel, product complexity, and the effort involved in selling and servicing the product.
    2. Agents on shorter tenure individual plans: For individual non linked plans, participating or non participating, and unit linked plans with a policy term of up to five years, first year commission for an agent is capped at 6.25 per cent.
    3. Other distribution entities: The same plans carry a 5 per cent cap on first year commission for other distribution entities, including corporate agents, brokers and composite brokers.
    4. The channel split: The same product therefore carries a different permitted acquisition cost depending on who sells it.

    What changes on the overall expense limits?

    1. Lower ceilings: The paper proposes a significant reduction in the overall expense of management limits that insurers work within.
    2. A phased reduction: The cut in commissions and management expenses is to come through a glide path rather than at once.
    3. Why phasing matters: An immediate cut would strand distribution agreements and agent payouts already written on current terms.

    Why is distribution cost a regulatory question at all?

    1. The cost is recovered from premium: Commission and management expense come out of what the policyholder pays, so a higher distribution cost lowers the return on the policy.
    2. Front loaded payouts reward the sale: A high first year commission pays for the act of selling rather than for servicing the policy over its term, which is the incentive structure behind mis selling and policy churning.
    3. Lapses destroy both sides of the contract: A policy sold to earn a first year commission lapses more often, and a lapsed policy leaves the buyer without protection and the insurer without a book.
    4. Trust decides market width: Insurance penetration in India remains low, so the terms on which a product is sold decide whether the market deepens or the buyer withdraws.

    Challenges to capping insurance commissions

    1. A cap moves the cost rather than removing it: Where the commission head is capped, the same payment can reappear as rewards, incentives, reimbursements or marketing support. Eg. Payments to a bank distributor can be routed under heads such as marketing or infrastructure support rather than as commission.
      The Fix: Bring every payment to a distributor, under whatever head, into a single reported remuneration figure disclosed product by product.
    2. Differentiated caps steer sales toward the better paying product: A cap that varies by segment and complexity gives a distributor a reason to recommend the product that pays more rather than the one that fits. Eg. Two products sold to the same customer can carry different payouts under the proposed structure.
      The Fix: Require a suitability record for every sale, stating why the recommended product matches the buyer’s stated need.
    3. Bank led distribution sells to a captive customer: A bank selling insurance to its own depositor faces little competitive check on what it recommends, whatever the commission rate is. Eg. Mis selling of unit linked and single premium policies at bank counters is a standing grievance before the insurance ombudsman.
      The Fix: Publish channel wise complaint and persistency data for every insurer, so the distribution channel carrying the problem is identifiable.
    4. A percentage cap bites hardest where the ticket size is small: The agent servicing low premium rural policies earns least from a cap expressed in percentage terms, so the least profitable business is served last. Eg. The individual agent remains the primary life insurance channel outside metropolitan markets.
      The Fix: Allow a higher cap for policies below a stated premium threshold, so low value business remains viable to sell and service.

    Conclusion

    The regulator is moving back from an aggregate ceiling the insurer manages to caps it sets itself, because an aggregate limit never governed where the money went inside it. Whether the buyer is better off depends on which heads a payout can be shifted into once the commission head is capped. The proposal is at the consultation stage, so the next step is the comment period. The final regulations are where it will become clear how long insurers get to reach the lower limits, and whether the disclosure obligation on distributor payments is tightened alongside the caps.

    Back2Basics: Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority of India

    1. Governing Act: IRDAI is a statutory body established under the Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority Act, 1999.
    2. Headquarters: It has been headquartered at Hyderabad since 2001.
    3. Composition: It is headed by a chairperson, with whole time members and part time members appointed by the central government.
    4. Mandate: It regulates the insurance and reinsurance business, licenses insurers and intermediaries, and protects the interests of policyholders.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2013, GS2, 10 marks] The product diversification of financial institutions and insurance companies, resulting in overlapping of products and services strengthens the case for the merger of the two regulatory agencies, namely SEBI and IRDA. Justify.”

  • Chief Election Commissioner is not the Election Commission of India

    Why in the News

    Decisions issued in the name of the Election Commission of India (ECI) without being placed before two of its three Commissioners are prima facie ultra vires, meaning taken beyond the authority the statute confers. The position answers an investigation reporting that two Election Commissioners recorded objections at least 14 times in 10 months to decisions and orders taken without their knowledge. Those objections covered the registration and deletion of voters, the restoration of names, Form 6, appeals in electoral roll cases, and control over the digital architecture of the rolls. Two of three members are a majority of the Commission, so they were not outvoted. The contested point is no longer whether the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls was wise or fair, but whether the decisions taken in the Commission’s name were decisions of the Commission at all.

    How does the Election Commission of India take a decision?

    1. Constitutional vesting: Article 324 vests the superintendence, direction and control of elections in the Election Commission of India. The power is conferred on the body, not on its chairman.
    2. Unanimity as the statutory norm: Section 18(2) of the Chief Election Commissioner and other Election Commissioners (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Act, 2023 requires all business of the Commission to be transacted unanimously as far as possible.
    3. The fallback rule: Where the Chief Election Commissioner and the Election Commissioners differ, the matter “shall be decided according to the opinion of the majority”.
    4. Allocation of business: Section 18(1) allows the procedure for the transaction and allocation of business to be regulated only by a unanimous decision. A unilaterally settled allocation cannot supply authority for a unilateral decision.

    Why would a bypassed decision be legally vulnerable?

    1. The nature of the defect: A substantive decision the law vests in “the Election Commission”, taken in its name without being placed before the Commission, is void for want of authority.
    2. No cover from an allocation: Such a decision also lacks cover where no lawfully adopted allocation of business authorised a single member to take it. A letterhead does not supply authority the statute withholds.
    3. The governing precedent: T N Seshan vs Union of India (1995) held that the Constitution entrusts elections to the Election Commission and not to an individual. The Court warned that “It would be wrong to project the individual and eclipse the Election Commission.”
    4. A majority is not a dissent: The objections did not come from one Commissioner differing with two colleagues. They came from two of three members, which is the number the statute makes decisive.

    Which specific decisions are in question?

    1. Form 6 alteration: An Election Commissioner recorded in May that Form 6, prescribed under the Registration of Electors Rules, could not be altered by an SIR direction without amending the Rules. The second Commissioner concurred, and the altered form appeared on ECINet regardless.
    2. A recorded majority against the change: In August one of them called the change “unauthorised/illegal” and sought its immediate removal. There was not merely an absence of consensus, but a recorded majority view against the change.
    3. Centralisation of the roll database: Both Commissioners warned that access to the electoral roll database was being centralised in Delhi. Both sought safeguards, including an independent technical audit.
    4. Restoration blocked in Goa: Electoral Registration Officers (EROs), the statutory authorities for additions, deletions and corrections, found 97 people eligible after they produced documents, and the software did not permit their restoration. A computer programme cannot overrule a statutory officer.
    5. The West Bengal appeals: Of 38.31 lakh appeals filed before tribunals, 22.21 lakh came from deleted voters seeking restoration. Another 16.10 lakh were reportedly filed by the Commission itself, seeking deletion of voters.
    6. Authority for that litigation: An Election Commissioner asked who had authorised appeals “on behalf of ECI”, recording that neither he nor his colleague had been informed.

    What would an institutional response require?

    1. Disclosure of the decision record: The Commission, meeting as a Commission, should disclose which major SIR decisions were approved unanimously, which were decided by majority, and under what valid allocation any others were issued.
    2. Review of the challenged decisions: Every decision the two Commissioners have challenged as lacking approval should be reviewed, and any found to have been taken without lawful authority should be withdrawn.
    3. Form 6 restored to the Rules: The form should be brought back into conformity with the statutory Rules that prescribe it.
    4. An independent audit of the platform: ECINet should be subjected to an independent technical and legal audit.
    5. Restoring the statutory officer’s powers: EROs should be able to exercise the powers Parliament gave them, without a software permission standing between the decision and the roll.
    6. Disclosure of litigation authority: The authority under which appeals were filed in the Commission’s name should be placed on record.
    7. The forum if the Commission does not act: Where the Commission will not act on its own, the Supreme Court is the only remaining route.

    Challenges to collective decision making in the Election Commission

    1. The allocation of business is not published: A reader cannot tell from an order whether it was collective, because the allocation under which a member may act alone is not in the public domain. Eg. The disclosure now sought is of which SIR decisions were unanimous, which were by majority, and under what allocation the rest were issued.
      The Fix: Publish the allocation of business and record every substantive decision against it, so authority is visible on the face of the order.
    2. No quorum or meeting rule: The statute fixes unanimity and a majority fallback, and prescribes no quorum, no meeting calendar and no record of how a file is circulated. Eg. The objections were written on file across ten months rather than resolved at a sitting of the full Commission.
      The Fix: Frame regulations under Section 18(1) fixing a minimum meeting frequency and requiring each substantive decision to carry the members’ recorded assent.
    3. No internal remedy against an invalid decision: A member who holds a decision to be unauthorised has no forum inside the Commission to set it aside, so the dispute leaves the institution. Eg. The two Commissioners approached the Cabinet Secretary when they believed institutional processes had been breached.
      The Fix: Provide that a contested instruction is placed before the full Commission before it takes effect.
    4. Asymmetric removal protection: The Chief Election Commissioner can be removed only in the manner of a judge of the Supreme Court, while an Election Commissioner can be removed on the Chief Election Commissioner’s recommendation. Eg. The Tarkunde Committee of 1975 and the Goswami Committee of 1990 both recommended the same protection for every member.
      The Fix: Extend the Chief Election Commissioner’s removal protection to all members through an amendment to Article 324(5).
    5. Executive weight in appointments: The 2023 Act placed a Union Cabinet Minister on the three member selection panel in place of the Chief Justice of India, giving the Union two of three votes. Eg. Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India (2023) had set an interim panel of the Prime Minister, the Leader of the Opposition and the Chief Justice of India.
      The Fix: Restore a selector drawn from outside the executive, so the panel cannot be carried by the government of the day alone.

    Conclusion

    For years the standing question about the Election Commission was whether it is independent of the executive. The question now is whether it is functioning as a Commission at all. A constitutional authority that demands strict compliance with electoral law from nearly a billion voters has to begin by complying with the law that governs itself. What is unresolved is that the only forum able to test a decision taken without the Commission sits outside it, so a defect in collective authority becomes litigation rather than correction.

    Schemes and Initiatives for Electoral Administration

    1. cVIGIL: A citizen reporting application for Model Code of Conduct violations, with a 100 minute turnaround mandated for the investigating officer.
    2. National Voters’ Services Portal: An online route through which an elector can register, modify and confirm their electoral details.
    3. Accessible voting measures: Braille enabled elector photo identity cards, free transport for persons with disabilities, and a vote from home facility for senior citizens.
    4. Delisting of unrecognised parties: Over 808 registered unrecognised political parties that failed to meet essential conditions were delisted by early 2026, curbing misuse of tax exemptions.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026, GS2, 10 marks] Is the right to vote a fundamental right? Discuss the position of the Election Commission of India while undertaking the revision of electoral rolls. Can it also examine the question of citizenship of voters?”

  • ‘Still awaited… urgently required’: Goa staff sent 8 emails in 7 days, but EC shut out valid voters

    Why in the News

    Ninety seven electors in Goa whom the State’s own Electoral Registration Officers (EROs) heard, examined and found eligible were left off the final electoral roll, and all 97 are still missing from it. The EROs could not give effect to their own decision, because ECINet, the Election Commission of India’s (ECI) roll platform, carried no rollback option and the permission to enable one is controlled from Delhi. Goa’s Chief Electoral Officer wrote to the ECI eight times in seven days seeking that facility. No reply is on record and none of the requests was acted on. The exclusions follow a Supreme Court order directing that electors flagged for a “logical discrepancy” be listed publicly, given ten days to submit documents or objections, and heard. The contested point is whether an electoral roll remains the statutory authority’s document when the software that records it answers to a central information technology division.

    What is a “logical discrepancy”?

    1. Not a finding of ineligibility: A logical discrepancy is not a finding that someone is not a voter. It is a mismatch the Commission’s software throws up when it tries to link an elector to a parent or grandparent on the roll from the last Special Intensive Revision (SIR).
    2. What triggers the flag: The triggers include a parent’s name that does not match, an age gap between parent and child of under 15 or over 50 years, and an age that does not progress correctly between the old roll and the new.
    3. Documentary triggers: A case where the elector submitted no document, or only Aadhaar, is also flagged.
    4. Where the flag is recorded: The flagging decision is entered on ECINet, the platform on which every electoral roll in the country has sat since January.

    What did the Supreme Court order, and what did Goa do?

    1. The display direction: A Supreme Court Bench headed by the Chief Justice of India ordered on 29 January, in the SIR batch of petitions, that the names of those flagged for logical discrepancies be displayed publicly. The display was to carry “the brief reason of discrepancy”, at gram panchayat bhavans, public places, taluka and sub division offices and urban ward offices.
    2. The hearing direction: Those affected were to be allowed ten days to submit documents or objections and to be heard.
    3. Scope of the order: The order was about Tamil Nadu. The Court said it expected the Commission to ensure compliance with these procedural directions in every State where the SIR process was ongoing.
    4. Implementation in Goa: The Commission issued a letter on 31 January to implement the order, and Goa put up the lists.
    5. The hearings: 649 electors came forward with documents or objections. EROs and Assistant EROs examined them and concluded in 97 cases that the elector had “become eligible to be included in the final Electoral Roll”.

    Why could the ERO not give effect to its own decision?

    1. Where the law puts the power: The electoral roll of each Assembly constituency is prepared by its ERO, usually the sub divisional magistrate, who hears every claim and objection and decides every name.
    2. Where the software puts it: What an ERO can do on ECINet and its roll management module ERONet is decided by permissions set in the Commission’s information technology division in Delhi.
    3. The missing function: The decision to flag the 97 had already been entered on the system, and the system carried no rollback option that would let the EROs reverse it.
    4. How long the field had been asking: Requests for a rollback facility had been coming from the field since 22 January.
    5. The vendor was told too: Goa Electronics Limited, the State agency that supports the Chief Electoral Officer’s office on the software, wrote on 11 February to the Chief Electoral Officer and to Tata Consultancy Services, the Commission’s vendor. It recorded that the rollback and reversion functionality, including the document re-upload option, had still not been provided despite “multiple emails” from District Election Officers, EROs and Assistant EROs.

    What does the email trail record?

    1. The escalation: Goa’s Chief Electoral Officer forwarded that record to Delhi the same day, to the Senior Deputy Election Commissioner in charge of Goa, with the Commission’s Director General of Information Technology copied.
    2. The repeated asks: Eight communications went from Goa to the Commission between 11 and 17 February. On 13 February the office recorded that a “response to any of the emails and letters sent from officer of the Chief Electoral Officer, Goa… is still awaited”, and on 15 February that “The Roll back option is urgently required”.
    3. The formal letter: On 14 February the Chief Electoral Officer wrote formally to the Senior Deputy Election Commissioner in charge of Goa, recording that “no response has been received” to the emails of the previous two days.
    4. The list: On 17 February, four days before the final roll was due, the Chief Electoral Officer sent the list of the 97 cases in which the earlier decisions “have to be reversed”.
    5. The Commission’s own instruction: On 18 February the Deputy Election Commissioner holding the electoral roll charge in Delhi wrote to the Director General of Information Technology that EROs and Assistant EROs have powers under Sections 21 and 21A of the Representation of the People Act, 1950 to take corrective action. He recorded that the “IT system cannot block necessary action as per the directions of SC”.
    6. The outcome: The final roll was published on 21 February without the 97. All 97 were still missing when the roll was checked on 20 September.

    What does being off the roll cost a voter in Goa?

    1. Where the 97 are: Sixty five of the 97 are from the Taleigao seat. The rest are from the St Cruz, Cumbarjua, Priol, Margao, Benaulim and Velim Assembly seats.
    2. The roll as an eligibility document: Several Goa State schemes use the electoral roll to establish eligibility, so being off it costs more than a vote.
    3. Health cover: The Goa Mediclaim Scheme funds super speciality treatment not available in government hospitals, covering dialysis, angioplasty, open heart surgery, transplants, chemotherapy and cochlear implants. It is open only to voters of the State.
    4. What the 97 were told: When the names did not go in, the electoral officers on the ground told these voters to apply afresh on Form 6, the form for new voters.

    How does the Goa case fit the two Election Commissioners’ recorded objections?

    1. The record: Two of the Election Commission of India’s three Election Commissioners objected on record at least 14 times in 10 months to decisions taken without their knowledge. Their notes run from November to August.
    2. Centralisation: One of them wrote in May of “the gradual centralisation” of the electoral roll database. Both recorded that centralised control of the software was taking the roll out of the EROs’ hands, where the law puts it.
    3. Access: An August note recorded that EROs, District Election Officers and Chief Electoral Officers “don’t have proper and complete access to the ERONet portal”.
    4. Authority: The same note recorded that the Director General of Information Technology “doesn’t have any legal authority to restrict proper and complete access and freedom to operate, as given by law, to the statutory authorities”.
    5. The unanswered question: A questionnaire sent to the head of the Commission’s information technology division, asking why the rollback facility was not enabled for Goa before the final roll, drew no response.

    Challenges to a centralised electoral roll platform

    1. Vendor dependence on a statutory system: Core roll functionality sits with an external software vendor, so a missing feature becomes a change request question rather than a legal one. Eg. The Commission’s roll platform is built and maintained under contract by an external information technology firm.
      The Fix: Publish a service level agreement for statutory functions on the platform, with a fixed turnaround for any change request that a court order requires.
    2. No independent audit trail of permissions: A roll database with centrally set permissions needs an external record of who changed what and when, or the system’s own logs become the only evidence of its own integrity. Eg. A proposal for an audit certifying that no one outside the statutory authorities can alter the database went unanswered.
      The Fix: Commission a third party security and access audit of the roll platform, with its findings placed before the full Commission.
    3. A revision calendar compresses the citizen’s remedy: A roll built on software generated flags puts the burden of establishing eligibility on the elector, inside a window set by the revision timetable rather than by the elector’s circumstances. Eg. An elector who misses a revision window must return to the roll through the new voter route, starting the process again.
      The Fix: Provide a standing, year round correction route that does not depend on a revision cycle being open.
    4. Roll membership is used far beyond voting: A welfare scheme that keys eligibility to the electoral roll converts a roll error into a loss of services, which electoral law never contemplated. Eg. Several State benefit schemes use voter identity or roll membership as a residence proxy.
      The Fix: Decouple welfare eligibility from the electoral roll by accepting alternative residence proof for scheme access.
    5. Deletion before verification inverts the burden: A design that removes a name first and then asks the elector to establish eligibility places the cost of the system’s own uncertainty on the citizen. Eg. Over nine in 10 appeals against deletion decided so far in West Bengal have restored the elector.
      The Fix: Hold a flagged name on the roll until the hearing concludes, so an elector’s status changes only after a decision is taken.

    Conclusion

    The Commission’s standing answer to any allegation about the roll is that no one person can touch it, because thousands of Electoral Registration Officers prepare it constituency by constituency. Goa is the case where that answer stops holding. The officer decided, and the decision never reached the roll. What is unresolved is who is accountable when a statutory decision fails at the system layer, since the law names the officer and the software answers elsewhere. The marker to watch is whether a rollback facility is enabled at the ERO level before the next revision, and whether the 97 are restored without being routed through the new voter form.

    Back2Basics: Special Intensive Revision

    1. What it is: A Special Intensive Revision is a house to house exercise in which the electoral roll is prepared afresh rather than amended, with electors asked to establish eligibility.
    2. Legal basis: The Election Commission may direct a special revision of the roll of any constituency at any time, under Section 21(3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1950.
    3. How it differs from a summary revision: A summary revision updates the existing roll through additions, deletions and corrections. An intensive revision enumerates the electorate afresh.
    4. Procedure: A draft roll is published, claims and objections are invited and heard by the Electoral Registration Officer, and a final roll is then published.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026, GS2, 10 marks] Is the right to vote a fundamental right? Discuss the position of the Election Commission of India while undertaking the revision of electoral rolls. Can it also examine the question of citizenship of voters?”

  • From a jan sunwai in Delhi, lessons for poll body

    Why in the News

    Residents of Mangolpuri in Delhi lined up at a jan sunwai, a public hearing, to file claims and objections against being wrongfully excluded from the draft Special Intensive Revision (SIR) voter list. The hearing produced a documented record of wrongful deletion in every category the draft roll used. The draft roll had been published four days earlier, with over 47 lakh names in Delhi marked absent, permanently shifted, dead or duplicate (ASDD). A further 11 lakh voters were dropped from the list altogether and 32 lakh were to receive notices, so one in two voters in Delhi was trying to get a name back on the roll. The Chief Election Commissioner has certified the process, on the claim that zero appeals have been filed against deletions in the 12 states where the revision is complete. A certification of no grievance and a public record of proven error cannot both describe the same exercise.

    How does the Special Intensive Revision work?

    1. About: The SIR is a house to house revision of the electoral roll in which every voter files a fresh enumeration form.
    2. Draft roll: The revision produces a draft list. Voters then file claims and objections against exclusion from it.
    3. Markings on exclusion: A name not carried forward is marked absent, permanently shifted, dead or duplicate (ASDD). Other names are dropped from the list outright or issued notices.
    4. Logical discrepancies: Mismatches that the software throws up against older entries are recorded as “logical discrepancies”.

    What did the Mangolpuri public audit find?

    1. Wrongful deletion in every category: The audit showed wrongful deletions across all the ASDD categories.
    2. Spouses split: In 95 houses one spouse was marked as shifted. The other spouse remained on the SIR list.
    3. An elector marked dead: An elector named Kanta Prasad, recorded as dead, came to the microphone at the hearing and asked what he could do to come back to life.
    4. The basis for that entry: The Chief Electoral Officer’s press note said he was placed in the dead category on information furnished by a family member. That family member is his son.
    5. The son’s account: The son has recorded a statement that he was tricked into signing a blank sheet of paper, on the pretext that it would restore his father’s name.
    6. A resettlement colony: Mangolpuri is a resettlement colony. The scale of deletion there caused extreme insecurity among residents.

    What six lessons does the public audit yield for the poll body?

    1. Three mandated house visits: The booth level officer (BLO) cannot complete the mandated three visits to every house, whatever orders are passed. Many houses were not visited even once.
    2. Burden of registration: De novo filling of enumeration forms by all voters shifts the burden of voter registration from the Election Commission to the voter, and is bound to produce mass exclusions. In 2002 booth level officers instead used the previously frozen voter list to verify additions and deletions house to house.
    3. Lineage based proof of citizenship: Proving citizenship by mapping oneself or one’s direct lineage onto the 2002 voter list has proved a nightmare. It falls hardest on migrant workers and on women who have shifted after marriage.
    4. Amplified data entry errors: The logical discrepancies amplify wrong data entries made over the years. The burden of correcting data that the administration entered wrongly falls on the citizen.
    5. Grievance redress machinery: The appeal and grievance redress process lies with the same machinery that is implementing the exercise. The system is arbitrary by design and must go.
    6. Public hearing before deletion: The election manual already provides for a public hearing at the panchayat, ward or booth level before any name is deleted or added. Those provisions must be implemented in letter and spirit.

    What does the poll body’s response to the audit show?

    1. A press note in defence of the deletions: Two days after the hearing the Chief Electoral Officer’s office responded through a press note. It stood by its deletions in all six cases it addressed.
    2. Restoration treated as first time registration: A wrongly deleted voter is required to return to the roll by filling Form 6. That form makes the voter declare that they are “applying for inclusion in the electoral roll for the first time”, which is false in their case.
    3. Accountability not offered: No redress or accountability was offered for the incorrect deletions the audit established.

    Can a citizen led public audit become part of revising the roll?

    1. A demonstrated method: The audit did not merely prove incorrect exclusions. It also demonstrated an efficacious method to update and revise the electoral roll.
    2. Ignored by the Commission: The Election Commission has almost entirely ignored that method.
    3. Orders that cannot be executed: The Chief Electoral Officers of Karnataka, Telangana and Jharkhand have issued perfunctory orders for such hearings. One day has been allocated for the purpose, so the orders can never be carried out.

    Conclusion

    A revision that begins from a blank form makes the voter prove an entitlement the law already grants. The poll body’s own certification and the record produced at a public hearing cannot both be accurate. Nothing in the process decides between them, because the authority that deletes a name also hears the appeal against it. That is the question this exercise leaves open. What to watch is whether additions and deletions are put through an independent public audit before a roll is finalised, and Delhi is where that safeguard would be tested first.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026, GS2, 10 marks] Is the right to vote a fundamental right? Discuss the position of the Election Commission of India while undertaking the revision of electoral rolls. Can it also examine the question of citizenship of voters?”