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  • Nepal wants climate compensation, putting major emitters on the hookNepal wants climate compensation, putting major emitters on the hook

    Nepal wants climate compensation, putting major emitters on the hookNepal wants climate compensation, putting major emitters on the hook

    Why in the News

    Nepal has demanded direct climate compensation from the United States, China and India, the world’s three largest emitters. The demand follows the glacial collapse of 26 August on the Nepal China border, which killed over 1,200 people and buried hydropower tunnels and valleys downstream. Nepal’s Foreign Minister has framed the country as paying the ultimate price for a crisis it did not create.

    What is the Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage?

    1. What it is for: It is the dedicated financing mechanism for climate damage that has already occurred and can no longer be adapted to, as distinct from funds for mitigation or for adaptation.
    2. How it came about: Vulnerable nations secured its establishment at COP27 in 2022, after decades of resistance from developed countries to any dedicated loss and damage facility.
    3. When it began operating: It was operationalised a year later at COP28.
    4. Where it sits: It is temporarily hosted by the World Bank, which places a development lender at the centre of a compensation mechanism.

    Why does Nepal sit at the centre of climate injustice?

    1. Its own contribution is negligible: Nepal accounts for 0.1 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions and generates almost all its electricity from renewable hydropower.
    2. Its geography is the exposure: The Hindu Kush Himalayas, described as the “Third Pole”, are warming at nearly twice the global average, and their glaciers are melting at 10 times their historical norms.
    3. The driver is remote, not local: Warming in the North Eurasian Arctic disrupts planetary waves and the stratospheric polar vortex, which in turn destabilises the South Asian monsoon.
    4. The scale was misread: The major powers treated the event as a localised weather emergency manageable with temporary relief, when the cryosphere failure cascaded down into densely populated valleys.

    What did the disaster do to Nepal’s economy?

    1. It struck the sector the country had bet on: Nepal’s strategy for economic sovereignty rested on harnessing 43,000 MW of commercially viable hydropower to become a regional energy exporter, and it had only recently achieved net exporter status.
    2. A tenth of installed capacity is gone: The floods crippled approximately 10 percent of installed capacity, wiping out older surface level plants such as Devighat and burying under construction projects in mud.
    3. The trade position reversed overnight: A country banking on power exports to narrow its trade deficit with India halted exports and began importing power to survive the winter.
    4. Rebuilding costs more than building did: Climate resilient underground engineering will raise future project costs by 10 to 12 percent.
    5. The bill is a tenth of the economy: Total damages are estimated between 4 billion dollars and 7 billion dollars, roughly a tenth of Nepal’s entire gross domestic product.

    Why has Nepal named the United States, China and India?

    1. The case against the United States is cumulative: America accounts for over 20 percent of cumulative global emissions since 1850, which anchors the claim in historical liability rather than current output.
    2. The case against China is proximity and data: China is the current top annual emitter, and Nepali officials had asked at a bilateral meeting in Kathmandu in May 2026 for real time data sharing on glacial lakes and avalanches in the Tibetan region.
    3. What China supplied instead: Beijing provided only heavy rain forecasts, and the absence of transboundary early warning proved fatal when the glacial lake burst.
    4. The case against India inverts India’s own argument: New Delhi has long cited low per capita emissions and demanded “common but differentiated responsibilities” from the West, and Nepal now applies that logic regionally to South Asia’s largest economy and emitter.
    5. India’s regional conduct is part of the charge: India’s refusal to buy power from Nepali projects built by Chinese contractors has complicated Nepal’s recovery and spread the friction horizontally across the region.

    Why can the existing fund not answer the demand?

    1. The fund is smaller than one country’s damage: It holds a mere 700 million dollars in pledges, against a single catastrophe costing several billion.
    2. The grant ceiling makes the arithmetic absurd: Pilot phase rules cap individual grants at between 5 million and 20 million dollars, so the maximum available payout answers a fraction of one percent of the loss.
    3. Speed is the second failure: The mechanism is handicapped by slow moving bureaucracy, and Nepal’s out of cycle demand on 1 September forces its board to decide whether it can respond to a live emergency at all.
    4. Compensation may arrive as debt: Debt saddled developing nations fear that money routed through a development lender converts into loans, turning a liability payment into a further obligation.
    5. The major powers answered with relief, not liability: China and India responded with helicopters, rescue teams and medicines, which supplies assistance while conceding no legal responsibility.

    Challenges to Nepal’s compensation claim

    1. The climate treaty framework expressly rules out liability: The decision adopting the Paris Agreement records that loss and damage provisions do not involve or provide a basis for any liability or compensation. Eg. Developed countries insisted on that language in 2015 as the price of accepting loss and damage in the text at all.
      The Fix: Pursue the claim through state responsibility and human rights forums in parallel, so the treaty carve out does not extinguish the legal route entirely.
    2. Attributing a single collapse to named emitters is contested: Compensation requires linking one event to specific contributors, and attribution science produces probabilities rather than the causal certainty a liability claim needs. Eg. The International Court of Justice advisory proceedings on climate obligations turned substantially on whether such a link can ground state responsibility.
      The Fix: Commission an independent forensic attribution study of the 26 August collapse before the claim reaches any forum, so the demand rests on published evidence.
    3. Pledged climate money has a record of not arriving: Announced sums and disbursed sums diverge by years in climate finance. Eg. The 100 billion dollar a year promise made for 2020 at Copenhagen in 2009 was reported as met only in 2022.
      The Fix: Attach disbursement deadlines and public tracking to each pledge, so a pledge that is not paid is visible rather than absorbed into a cumulative total.
    4. Upstream data sharing rests on no binding obligation: Early warning for glacial hazards depends on the upstream state volunteering information, and no treaty compels it. Eg. Hydrological data on the Brahmaputra reaches India through renewable memoranda of understanding, and sharing lapsed after the 2017 Doklam standoff.
      The Fix: Negotiate a Hindu Kush Himalaya data protocol with automatic sensor level transmission, so glacial lake readings do not depend on the state of bilateral relations.
    5. Regional politics undercuts regional claims: Nepal is asking India for differentiated responsibility while its recovery is being slowed by an Indian trade restriction. Eg. Power from Nepali projects built by Chinese contractors is refused entry to the Indian market.
      The Fix: Separate the power trade rules from the security screening by publishing objective eligibility criteria, so recovery generation is not blocked by contractor nationality.

    Conclusion

    Nepal’s claim will not be paid, and that was never the whole point of making it. A country responsible for a rounding error in global emissions has converted a disaster into a legal argument, and the argument lands on India rather than only on the West. The precedent it sets is that differentiated responsibility runs downward as well as upward, which is uncomfortable for every middle emitter that has used the doctrine as a shield. What to watch is the fund board’s response to an out of cycle demand, since a refusal establishes that the mechanism handles paperwork rather than emergencies.

    Back2Basics: Common But Differentiated Responsibilities

    1. What the principle holds: All states share responsibility for protecting the global environment, and their obligations differ according to their historical contribution to the problem and their present capacity to act.
    2. Where it is written: It appears as Principle 7 of the 1992 Rio Declaration and in Article 3.1 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 1992.
    3. How it was first operationalised: The Kyoto Protocol, 1997 split countries into Annex I parties carrying binding emission targets and non Annex I parties carrying none.
    4. How the Paris Agreement restated it: The 2015 text retains the principle “in the light of different national circumstances”, replacing the fixed two group split with nationally determined contributions.

    “[2017, GS3, 15 marks] ‘Climate Change’ is a global problem. How India will be affected by climate change? How Himalayan and coastal states of India will be affected by climate change?

  • [5th September 2026] The Hindu OpED: Warning on warming

    [5th September 2026] The Hindu OpED: Warning on warming

    Question (2025, GS3 – 15 Marks): “Write a review on India’s climate commitments under the Paris Agreement (2015) and mention how these have been further strengthened in COP26 (2021). In this direction, how has the first Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) intended by India been updated in 2022?
    Linkage: This is the most direct conceptual parallel. To analyze the gap between “climate pledges” and “actual policy trajectory” highlighted by the UNEP, candidates must evaluate India’s specific NDCs under the Paris Agreement, how they were upgraded at COP26, and their final 2022 formalization

    Mentor Comment

    The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) has found that breaching the 1.5 degrees Celsius global warming limit brings irreversible losses that adaptation cannot undo. Its report, Limiting Overshoot, accepts that the limit has already been breached. Full delivery of every existing national climate pledge still puts the world on course for 1.8 degrees Celsius, and current policies point to 2.6 degrees Celsius. The report’s new emphasis falls on greenhouse gases other than carbon dioxide, and on methane above all. The disagreement it reopens is between assessments that measure climate progress by mitigation and major developing economies that measure it by the finance and technology they receive. That disagreement now reaches India directly, because a smaller neighbour hit by a glacial disaster has named India among the emitters responsible.

    What is the “overshoot, peak and decline” pathway?

    1. What it describes: Average global temperatures rise above the 1.5 degrees Celsius limit, countries hold that peak as low as they collectively can, and temperatures are brought back below the limit by the end of the century.
    2. Why the peak is the variable that matters: Neutralising the heating effect of even a tenth of a degree is far harder than preventing that rise in the first place, so every fraction avoided at the peak is a fraction that never has to be reversed.
    3. What it refuses to concede: The pathway accepts the scientific reality of a 1.5 degrees Celsius world and rejects the conclusion that nothing further can be done once the threshold is crossed.

    Why has the report shifted attention to gases other than carbon dioxide?

    1. Methane carries a large share of present warming: It is responsible for about 0.5 degrees Celsius of current warming, so cutting it changes the temperature curve within years rather than decades.
    2. It is the fastest available brake: Action on methane is treated as the most effective way to slow warming in the near term, which is precisely the window in which the peak is decided.
    3. The collective instrument already exists: More than 155 countries have joined the Global Methane Pledge, committing to cut anthropogenic methane at least 30 percent below 2020 levels by 2030.
    4. India stands outside it: India has not joined the Pledge, so the single fastest near term lever is not one the country has committed to pull.

    Why do major developing economies resist a mitigation first framing?

    1. They claim the transition is already under way: These economies argue that they are moving away from fossil fuels and should not be assessed as though they were not.
    2. The damage they face comes from someone else’s stock: Their vulnerability arises from historical accumulations of carbon released by richer developed countries, which is the basis of their claim to greater financial support and affordable technology.
    3. The report is silent where they are loudest: Limiting Overshoot has little to say on adaptation finance, so the question these economies bring to every negotiation goes unanswered in the assessment they are asked to act on.

    How does the Bhotekoshi disaster complicate India’s position?

    1. A vulnerable neighbour has named India: Nepal’s Foreign Affairs Minister has said that major industrial emitters such as China, the United States and India must consider the impact of rising temperatures on small countries such as Nepal.
    2. The victim framing no longer holds unchallenged: India’s per capita emissions remain below the world average, and a section of the world nonetheless now places India within the group causing the problem rather than the group suffering it.
    3. The next negotiation is dated: Countries convene in Turkiye in November for COP31, where the familiar disagreements over mitigation and finance are expected to resurface with this new complication attached.

    Challenges to the overshoot, peak and decline pathway

    1. The return leg depends on removal capacity that does not exist at scale: Bringing temperatures back below the limit assumes large volumes of carbon dioxide will be removed from the atmosphere later in the century. Eg. The direct air capture plants operating in Iceland remove tens of thousands of tonnes a year at most, against annual global emissions measured in tens of billions of tonnes.
      The Fix: Treat removal as a supplement to be verified and funded now, and set peak temperature targets that assume no removal beyond capacity already demonstrated.
    2. Some losses do not reverse when the temperature does: Ice sheets, coral reefs and glaciers respond to the peak rather than to the eventual average, so returning below 1.5 degrees Celsius does not restore what the overshoot destroyed. Eg. The August 2026 glacial collapse on the Nepal China border destroyed valleys that no later cooling will reconstitute.
      The Fix: Attach separate thresholds for irreversible systems to the pathway, so peak height is judged against them rather than against the century end average alone.
    3. The methane lever sits with countries that have not pulled it: The largest sources of anthropogenic methane are concentrated in a handful of economies outside the Pledge. Eg. India’s methane arises chiefly from livestock and paddy cultivation, which are livelihood activities rather than industrial infrastructure that can be shut down.
      The Fix: Fund livestock feed and paddy water management programmes that cut methane without cutting output, so the reduction is not paid for by farm incomes.
    4. The pathway offers nothing to those already past adaptation: A framework organised around peak management assumes adaptation absorbs the interim, and for the most exposed countries it does not. Eg. Nepal contributes a negligible share of global emissions and has lost roughly a tenth of its economy to a single event.
      The Fix: Pair every overshoot pathway with a stated adaptation finance figure, so the interim period carries a costed obligation rather than an assumption.

    Conclusion

    The threshold argument is over and the argument about who pays for its consequences is not. India has spent three decades arguing that historical responsibility sits elsewhere, and that argument is now being made about India by a country downstream of the Himalayas. Refusing the mitigation frame no longer settles the question, because the objection is arriving from the Global South rather than from the West. What to watch is whether India carries a methane position and an adaptation finance demand into COP31 as a single package, or continues to press the second while declining the first.

    Back2Basics: United Nations Environment Programme

    1. What it is: The United Nations body responsible for setting the global environmental agenda and coordinating environmental work across the UN system.
    2. When it was created: It was established in 1972, following the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment held at Stockholm that year.
    3. Where it sits: Its headquarters are at Nairobi, making it the first UN agency headquartered in a developing country.
    4. What it publishes: Its recurring assessments include the Emissions Gap Report, the Adaptation Gap Report and the Global Environment Outlook.
  • The Gulf is calling and New Delhi must listen

    The Gulf is calling and New Delhi must listen

    Why in the News

    Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan have entered a collective defence arrangement, the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement, at India’s western maritime doorstep. The agreement follows an American retreat into an unpredictable “selective engagement” posture, which has opened a security vacuum that regional states are now filling with new partners. India’s West Asia policy was built for the opposite condition. The United States guaranteed regional security and kept sea lines of communication open, so India could hedge between Riyadh, Tehran, Tel Aviv and Abu Dhabi without accepting security obligations to any of them. That posture, called multi alignment, bought influence while the region wanted markets, labour and capital. The region now wants security guarantees, and India has none on offer.

    What is the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement?

    1. Three capabilities in one arrangement: It links Gulf capital to Turkish defence technology and to Pakistani military manpower and skill, inside a collective defence framework.
    2. It is framed as defensive: The pact is presented as a way of managing shared vulnerabilities among its members rather than as a bloc aimed at any particular state.
    3. Its significance is structural: It signals that West Asia’s security framework is being rewritten, and that the rewriting is being done by actors whose strategic interests run counter to India’s long term objectives.

    What did India’s multi alignment rest on?

    1. The region was read as an economic hinterland: West Asia was treated as a critical source of crude oil, a reliable destination for outbound labour and a vital conduit for remittances.
    2. Hedging was the default in a crisis: India balanced relations between competing power centres and declined security obligations to any single capital.
    3. The framing was macroeconomic: The region’s geography, oil and gas reserves, capital accumulation and appetite for imported labour and skills positioned it as the bridge between a debt burdened West and a rising Asia.
    4. Distance was itself the asset: Being friendly to all without being too friendly to any was the point of the policy, since an obligation to one power centre would have cost access to another.

    What has changed in the region’s security market?

    1. Distancing has lost its value: West Asian capitals no longer treat non alignment or multi alignment as a virtue, and are actively seeking dependable security partners.
    2. Diplomatic and commercial offers no longer buy influence: What is sought is naval patrols, intelligence sharing, defence industrial collaboration and credible counter terrorism capability, not platitudes and routine economic cooperation.
    3. The vacuum is filled by whoever arrives first: Türkiye has already converted the opening into a treaty commitment, and regional security arrangements will coalesce with or without Indian participation.
    4. The exposure is concrete: Hostile regional pacts and the growing influence of external powers bear directly on India’s trade routes, its energy security and the welfare of millions of Indian citizens in the Gulf.

    Why does economic infrastructure not buy security?

    1. Low cost weapons defeat capital intensive assets: The eruption of hostilities involving Iran showed that state of the art port facilities, energy networks and logistics corridors remain vulnerable to low cost drones in grey zone, asymmetric warfare, meaning attacks kept below the threshold of declared war and carried out by deniable or irregular means.
    2. A secure enclave is not secure: Hyper secure economic zones stay exposed to spillover from the instability around them, because the perimeter is not where the risk originates.
    3. The Gulf model is hostage to perception: The economy runs on foreign corporations and expatriate labour, so talent and capital exit as rapidly as they arrived once security risk crosses a psychological threshold.
    4. A corridor is only as strong as its worst link: Disruption at a narrow naval chokepoint or along an overland route stalls the whole supply chain, whatever the quality of the infrastructure at either end.

    What hard moves are available to India?

    1. Build presence at the chokepoints: The named priorities are the Strait of Hormuz, the Gulf of Oman, the Gulf of Aden, the waters off the Somali coast and the Bab el-Mandeb.
    2. Convert presence into standing arrangements: Joint maritime patrols, permanent logistics access arrangements and interoperable surveillance networks with friendly Gulf states are what turn deployments into a net security provider role.
    3. Sell capability rather than only buying it: India’s defence manufacturing base can offer West Asian states an alternative source of hardware and technology, with collaborative ventures, exercises carrying real operational content and deep intelligence sharing replacing procurement discussions.
    4. Use minilaterals rather than alliances: Security frameworks with the United Arab Emirates or Israel, and separately with Saudi Arabia, build a counterweight against hostile axes without the rigidity of a Cold War style alliance.

    Challenges to an Indian security role in West Asia

    1. India holds no base of its own in the region: Sustained naval presence at several chokepoints needs repair, replenishment and crew rotation ashore, which an access agreement does not guarantee during a crisis. Eg. India’s logistics in the western Indian Ocean rest on access to Port Duqm in Oman rather than on infrastructure it controls.
      The Fix: Convert existing access arrangements into pre stocked logistics hubs with agreed wartime access clauses, so replenishment does not turn on a host government’s decision mid conflict.
    2. A Gulf security partnership collides with the Iran relationship: Deeper security alignment with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi narrows the space for India’s connectivity investments in Iran. Eg. The Chabahar port project has already run into payment and equipment difficulties because of exposure to United States sanctions.
      The Fix: Keep the maritime role functional rather than political, built around freedom of navigation and anti piracy tasks from which Iran also benefits.
    3. Pakistan’s institutional depth in Gulf security cannot be matched quickly: Decades of troop deployments, training missions and personnel exchanges give it standing that a new partner cannot replicate through joint exercises. Eg. Pakistani personnel have served in Saudi Arabian training and internal security roles across successive decades.
      The Fix: Compete where the incumbent is weak, in maritime domain awareness, satellite surveillance and cyber defence, rather than in ground manpower.
    4. The defence export base is small relative to the offer: Supplying a serious regional partner requires sustained production, spares and lifecycle support, which the Indian ecosystem has demonstrated in a narrow band of systems. Eg. India’s defence exports remain concentrated in components, subsystems and a small number of complete platforms.
      The Fix: Anchor offers to systems with a proven service record and a committed spares chain, instead of promising a full spectrum supplier relationship the industrial base cannot yet sustain.
    5. A guarantor role imports the region’s own quarrels: Standing commitments make India a party to disputes among partners who are themselves in conflict with each other. Eg. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates backed rival factions in Yemen while both are named as prospective Indian partners.
      The Fix: Restrict commitments to maritime and counter terrorism tasks with defined geographic limits, excluding participation in intra regional ground conflicts.

    Conclusion

    The currency of influence in West Asia has changed from investment to protection, and India’s instruments were built for the older one. Trade volume and a large resident population do not translate into a seat in a security arrangement, which is what the region is now assembling. The marker to watch is whether the Mecca arrangement acquires operational content, meaning a joint command, basing rights or a published exercise calendar, since that is the point at which a signed pact becomes a standing capability. India’s answer will register in the same currency or it will not register at all.

    India and West Asia

    1. The policy has a named progression: A pro Arab, Non Aligned Movement era stance gave way to full diplomatic ties with Israel in 1992, a “Look West” policy in 2005 centred on the Gulf Cooperation Council, and a “Think West” approach from 2014 that added maritime security, counter terrorism and investment to oil and diaspora.
    2. Energy is the base of the relationship: The region supplies nearly 60 percent of India’s crude oil and about 70 percent of its liquefied petroleum gas and liquefied natural gas requirements.
    3. The Gulf is India’s largest trading bloc: India-GCC bilateral trade stood at $178 billion in FY 2024-25, making the Gulf Cooperation Council India’s largest trading partner bloc.
    4. The human link is the largest anywhere: About 10 million Indians live and work in West Asia, and the region contributes roughly 38 percent of India’s global remittances.

    Government Initiatives and Frameworks for India-West Asia Relations

    1. I2U2: A grouping of India, Israel, the United Arab Emirates and the United States, working on joint projects in food and energy security.
    2. India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC): A rail and shipping corridor intended to link India to Europe through the Gulf, bypassing the Suez route.
    3. India-UAE Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA): A bilateral trade agreement that removed tariffs across most trade lines and deepened investment flows between the two countries.
    4. Chabahar port agreement: A ten year contract signed in 2024 to operate the Shahid Beheshti terminal in Iran, giving India a land and sea route to Afghanistan and Central Asia that avoids Pakistan.

    Challenges in India’s West Asia Engagement

    1. Energy import concentration: A large share of India’s crude and gas comes from a single region whose export routes run through two narrow straits. Eg. Qatar supplies roughly 40 percent of India’s liquefied natural gas imports.
      The Fix: Expand long term contracts with West African, American and Australian suppliers, so no single region carries a majority of the import basket.
    2. Remittance dependence at the State level: Household incomes and State finances in parts of India rest on Gulf transfers that fall the moment the regional economy contracts. Eg. Kerala reported roughly a 20 percent decline in monthly Gulf inflows during the 2026 crisis.
      The Fix: Widen the destination mix for emigrant workers through skill mobility agreements with Japan, Germany and Australia, so remittance flows are not tied to one region’s business cycle.
    3. Fertiliser and food input exposure: Gulf sourced urea and phosphate underpin Indian crop cycles, so a shipping disruption reaches the farm within a season. Eg. Long term potash and phosphate supplies from Jordan and Oman are central to India’s fertiliser availability.
      The Fix: Hold buffer stocks timed to the Rabi and Kharif input calendars, and widen phosphate sourcing towards Morocco, so one corridor’s closure does not hit a sowing season.

    [2018, GS2, 15 marks] In what ways would the ongoing US-Iran Nuclear Pact Controversy affect the national interest of India? How should India respond to this situation?”

  • ‘UN Convention on the Law of the Sea is still the constitution of oceans’

    ‘UN Convention on the Law of the Sea is still the constitution of oceans’

    Why in the News

    The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) remains the governing framework for the world’s oceans, in the assessment of Tommy Koh. He presided over the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, and led more than 150 nations to adopt the Convention in 1982. He is among this year’s Ramon Magsaysay award winners. He puts the number of parties at 172 and treats that as near universal. The United States has never ratified the Convention and still regards it as the authoritative law of the sea. Iran is not a party either, and the regime of transit passage binds it as customary international law. The Convention’s authority is therefore being tested in the Strait of Hormuz against a state that never accepted the treaty.

    What is UNCLOS?

    1. What it is: A comprehensive treaty setting the legal order for the world’s oceans, adopted in 1982 after nine years of negotiation and in force since 1994.
    2. What it allocates: It fixes the maritime zones a coastal state may claim and the rights it holds in each, running outward from the territorial sea to the exclusive economic zone, the continental shelf and the high seas.
    3. What it does with the deep seabed: Part XI treats the deep seabed and its minerals as the “common heritage of mankind”, to be administered for all states rather than claimed by any one of them.
    4. Why it is described as a constitution: It settles jurisdiction, resource rights and dispute settlement in one instrument, so later ocean agreements are negotiated inside its framework rather than beside it.

    Why has the United States never ratified UNCLOS?

    1. The objection was to the seabed regime, not to the law of the sea: The Reagan Administration rejected Part XI as incompatible with free enterprise and private property norms.
    2. It reversed an earlier American position: The stance taken during the Carter Administration was changed under President Reagan, and the demands that followed were rejected by the developing countries.
    3. The 1994 repair did not change the outcome: A separate agreement in 1994 revised the Part XI arrangements to meet those objections, and ratification still did not follow.
    4. Non ratification is not confined to one objector: Iran and a number of other states have also stayed outside the Convention.

    What binds a state that is not a party?

    1. The count itself does the work: With 172 parties, the Convention’s rules describe general state practice rather than the internal arrangements of a treaty club.
    2. Custom reaches the non party: Transit passage through international straits has passed into customary international law, so it binds Iran although Iran never joined the Convention.
    3. The dispute is political rather than legal: There was no trouble in the Strait of Hormuz before the war, so the priority is ending the war rather than rewriting the law that governs the strait.
    4. A fourth conference answers the wrong question: Reopening the Convention to bring the remaining states in would put a settled architecture back on the negotiating table, and near universal participation already exists without it.

    Where does the Convention not reach?

    1. Dark fleet enforcement is happening outside it: States are designating vessels as a “dark fleet” and taking punitive material action against them, including on the high seas.
    2. The forum named for that problem is the IMO: The International Maritime Organization, rather than a law of the sea conference, is where the practice should be addressed.
    3. Boundary disputes are read as application, not failure: Exclusive economic zone and seabed contests in the South China Sea and over Indian Ocean boundaries are treated as arguments inside the Convention’s architecture rather than as evidence that the architecture has stopped working.

    Conclusion

    A treaty honoured by states that never signed it is strong in one sense and weak in another. Its rules describe how states actually behave, which is precisely what turns them into custom. It carries no way of compelling a state that decides to behave differently, because the states outside it are the ones its dispute settlement machinery cannot reach. That gap is where a closed strait sits, and no further round of accessions would close it.

    Back2Basics: International Maritime Organization

    1. What it is: The United Nations specialised agency responsible for the safety and security of shipping and for preventing marine pollution by ships.
    2. When it was established: It was created by a convention adopted in 1948, began functioning in 1959, and is headquartered in London.
    3. What it produces: Its principal instruments are the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) and the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL).
    4. How it enforces: It sets standards that flag states then apply to ships registered with them, so it regulates through member state implementation rather than by direct enforcement at sea.

    [2022] With reference to the United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea, consider the following statements :

    1. A coastal state has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles, measured from baseline determined in accordance with the convention.

    2. Ships of all states, whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea.

    3. The Exclusive Economic Zone shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.

    Which of the statements given above are correct ?

    (a) 1 and 2 only

    (b) 2 and 3 only

    (c) 1 and 3 only

    (d) 1, 2 and 3

  • Focus on the children, not the platform

    Focus on the children, not the platform

    Why in the News

    Meta has settled a $171 billion case with several United States States over allegations about the effect of its apps on children’s mental health. The settlement requires daily usage limits and “nighttime blocks” for teenagers. It requires “enhanced age assurance measures” (checks intended to establish a user’s age before access is granted) to keep children off the apps. It also requires the depersonalisation of feeds, so a child is served random content rather than content matched to that child’s interests. The outcome is being read as a step towards holding platforms accountable. That framing places the platform at the centre of the problem rather than the child, and the two framings do not produce the same policy.

    Why does a platform centric approach to child safety misfire?

    1. The measures are difficult to enforce: An age gate assumes a child will not defeat it, while children are sophisticated and motivated users of technology who find ways around such checks.
    2. It ignores what children need to be safe online: Poorly designed recommendation systems expose children to harmful content, and stripping personalisation replaces that risk with irrelevant or inappropriate material. It also makes it harder for educational and support services to reach the children who need them.
    3. Online spaces are the only support some children have: Children experiencing neglect or abuse, LGBTQIA+ children and socially isolated children use platforms to find information, companionship or help. A child’s participation is not confined to one service, so a platform that becomes too restrictive simply loses them to platforms with weaker protections.
    4. The offline environment is what pushes children online: In India screens fill a vacuum rather than displacing abundant offline opportunities, because many children have no access to safe public spaces or affordable recreational facilities.

    What would a child centred approach ask for instead?

    1. Equip the child, as is done in the physical world: Children are taught what not to share, how to respond to unsolicited contact, how to recognise manipulation, when to block or report someone, and when to seek help.
    2. Treat digital literacy as the instrument, not the afterthought: Digital literacy and sensitisation are what change a child’s behaviour at the moment a technical control fails, and they receive far less policy attention than platform obligations.
    3. Address the whole ecology of childhood: Responsibility sits across platforms, parents, schools, communities, public spaces and children themselves, so a measure aimed at one of the six leaves the other five untouched.

    Why does the harder answer receive less policy attention?

    1. A platform obligation is visible and countable: A regulator can order a control, verify that it shipped, and record compliance, none of which a curriculum or a public playground delivers on the same timescale.
    2. India’s move so far is a recommendation, not a mandate: The 2026 Economic Survey called for a digital wellness curriculum in schools, and whether it is implemented widely and appropriately is untested.
    3. The effective lever sits outside the regulator’s reach: Digital literacy runs through school systems and recreational space runs through municipalities, while enforcement powers sit with technology and data protection regulators.
    4. The argument does not absolve platforms: Platform responsibility survives intact, and the contest is over which lever produces a safer child rather than over whether platforms owe anything at all.

    Conclusion

    Child online safety is presently measured by the number of controls a service ships. The better measure is what a child is able to do when a control fails, and the settlement model produces no information about that at all. The capability side of the problem belongs to schools, parents and municipalities. The enforcement side belongs to a technology regulator, and nobody owns the gap between the two.

    Child Online Safety in India

    1. What the field covers: The rules governing children’s access to online services, the data those services may collect about a child, and the content they may direct at one.
    2. How India regulates it: Through due diligence obligations on intermediaries under technology law and consent rules under data protection law, rather than through a single children’s online safety statute.
    3. Who counts as a child: Indian data protection law treats every person below 18 as a child, a higher threshold than the 13 year line used in United States children’s privacy law.

    Laws and Rules Governing Child Online Safety

    1. Information Technology Act, 2000, amended in 2008: The parent statute for offences committed through a computer resource, carrying Section 66D on cheating by impersonation and Section 69 on interception.
    2. Section 67B separately punishes publishing or transmitting material depicting children in sexually explicit acts.
    3. Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021, amended in 2023: Impose due diligence, grievance redressal and content takedown obligations on intermediaries.
    4. Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023, with the Digital Personal Data Protection Rules, 2025: Govern consent, data fiduciary duties, breach notification and the Data Protection Board of India.
    5. Section 9 requires verifiable parental consent before a child’s personal data is processed, and bars tracking, behavioural monitoring and advertising targeted at children.
    6. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012: Defines and punishes sexual offences against persons below 18, covers offences committed using electronic material, and makes reporting mandatory.

    [2024, GS3, 10 marks] Describe the context and salient features of the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023.

  • Missing: boundary walls, bathrooms, blackboards

    Why in the News

    Government schools across Bihar, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh are running without boundary walls, functional wash rooms, sufficient classrooms or electricity. Children in several of them sit on verandas, under trees, or in a single room shared with storage almirahs and meal utensils. A citizen audit campaign called ‘School thik karo’, run by the Cockroach Janta Party (CJP) since 15 August, asks residents to download a checklist, audit their local school and post the findings, covering drinking water, boundary walls, wash rooms and midday meals. These schools have sanctioned buildings, sanctioned teaching posts and an annual maintenance head in the budget. What is absent is the capacity to convert those into a room a child can sit in. State attention has meanwhile moved to a small tier of flagship institutions.

    What did the four State ground reports find?

    1. Bihar, schools operating without a facility of any kind: Three schools in Muzaffarpur and Vaishali districts run without a boundary wall, a wash room or storage for midday meal supplies.
    2. A primary school of 119 students, established in 1982, has plaster falling from the corridor its two classrooms open onto. Its six teachers use neighbours’ bathrooms and the children go in the open.
    3. A middle school of 283 students has two rooms, so Class 8 sits on the veranda and Classes 1 and 2 sit under a tree behind the kitchen.
    4. A primary school in Vaishali has no building of its own. It runs 91 students across Classes 1 to 5 in a single room of a community centre, alongside department almirahs and meal utensils.
    5. Rajasthan, the approach to the school is itself the barrier: In Unchki village of Deeg district there is no public road to the school, so students walk through a graveyard and a muddy path to reach it.
    6. Corridors serve as classrooms in three schools of the district, and one teacher takes Classes 4 and 5 together for want of rooms or electricity.
    7. None of the three has functional wash rooms, so children walk home in the middle of the school day and return.
    8. The district falls within the National Capital Region and lies 165 km from Delhi.
    9. Uttar Pradesh, the cost of a dirty wash room: A cab driver in Lucknow is moving his 11 year old daughter out of a government primary school after a prolonged urinary tract infection that the family attributes to the school’s wash room.
    10. The transfer costs an additional Rs 4,000 a month, which the household is meeting by cutting other spending.
    11. Drinking water at the school arrives intermittently and the wash room’s water supply is often dysfunctional, so students fetch water from nearby houses.
    12. Madhya Pradesh, buildings condemned and services withdrawn: A middle school in Hirapur village of Sehore district runs eight classes in three rooms, after the primary block on the same premises was abandoned six months ago.
    13. Its 22 students sit on mats without benches, in rooms with dim lighting, broken almirahs, fans that do not work and rainwater seeping through the roof.
    14. One of the two student wash rooms is functional, so girls and boys use the same toilet.
    15. The self help group contracted to cook the midday meal stopped three months ago, and the school in charge is buying ration himself while awaiting reimbursement.
    16. A second school 20 km away, of 104 students, has had its electricity connection cut because water leaking through the ceiling was reaching the wiring.

    Where does the teaching itself break down?

    1. Attendance runs at roughly half the roll: Teachers at the three Rajasthan schools say 50 to 60 percent of enrolled students come on a given day, and they attribute part of that absence to the infrastructure.
    2. Posted teachers are absent or shared: At one Rajasthan school neither of the two teachers came on the day of the visit, and a teacher posted elsewhere visits only after finishing his own school day.
    3. Senior classes go unstaffed: At the Madhya Pradesh school of 104 students, all three teachers for Classes 6 to 8 were on leave and the principal was away at a training exercise, leaving two primary teachers in charge.
    4. The commute eats the school day: One headmaster travels 15 km each way and a teacher 40 km daily by motorcycle to reach schools in rural Bihar.
    5. Staff are under orders not to speak: Teachers in the Rajasthan schools said their supervisors had instructed them not to speak to the media, so their complaints surface only anonymously.

    Why do repairs not happen even when schools ask for them?

    1. The annual grant cannot fund a repair: One Madhya Pradesh school receives Rs 25,000 a year for miscellaneous works, which is spent on hiring a worker once a month to clean the wash rooms.
    2. Proposals go unanswered for years: That school has sent annual repair proposals for five years without a response, over the same period its building has been in poor condition.
    3. The panchayat fills the gap the department leaves: Its floor, boundary wall and gate were built by the village panchayat after a school alumnus became its head.
    4. Budget is the stated reason given to schools: Rajasthan teachers say district authorities answer requests for more classrooms by citing the absence of budget, while the District Magistrate’s position is that complaints are acted on quickly and vacancies filled regularly.
    5. Attention has moved to a flagship tier: A State School Education Department official says the focus in Madhya Pradesh has been on Sandipani Schools, earlier called CM Rise, and Excellence schools, so small rural schools have struggled for basic infrastructure.

    Who stays in these schools, and who leaves?

    1. The exit has a price: A private school near the Rajasthan cluster costs about Rs 18,000 a year, which a grandparent says rules out sending all his grandchildren to one.
    2. Enrolment collapses where an alternative exists: The Madhya Pradesh middle school runs eight classes for fewer children than a single functioning class would hold, and the school in charge says dominant communities in the village send their children to private schools.
    3. Those who remain are the poorest: Most of the students left at that school are from marginalised communities, and its neglect tracks who is left in it.
    4. Residents read the neglect as targeted: Locals around the Rajasthan schools allege that their requests are ignored because they live in predominantly Muslim areas.
    5. The reason parents give is not academic: The Lucknow parent cites a peaceful atmosphere in which a child can concentrate, not examination results, as what the private school offers.

    Conclusion

    A school counts as functioning in the record when it has a building, a sanctioned staff strength and a maintenance head in the budget. None of those three states whether a child can sit in a lit room, use a toilet, or eat a cooked meal that day. The forward move is to make the release of school funds conditional on periodic physical verification of those conditions, rather than on the return the school files about itself. Until that link exists, the audit is being done by residents with a downloaded checklist while departmental records show nothing wrong.

    Back2Basics: Sandipani Schools, earlier CM Rise Schools

    1. What they are: A Madhya Pradesh government programme creating a tier of well resourced composite schools, running from the pre primary stage to Class 12 on a single campus.
    2. What they provide: Selected schools receive upgraded buildings, laboratories, libraries, digital classrooms and transport for students drawn from surrounding villages.
    3. How they differ from an ordinary school: They are a small, high investment tier rather than a universal upgrade, so a district holds a handful of them alongside its regular government schools.
    4. Why the name changed: The schools were launched as CM Rise Schools and were later renamed Sandipani Vidyalaya.

    [2022, GS2, 15 marks] The Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 remains inadequate in promoting incentive-based system for children’s education without generating awareness about the importance of schooling. Analyse.”

  • Play leading role in skilling push: Govt tells industry

    Play leading role in skilling push: Govt tells industry

    Why in the News

    The Ministry of Skill Development and Entrepreneurship has asked industry to take the leading role in the Pradhan Mantri Skilling and Employability Transformation through Upgraded ITIs (PM-SETU) scheme. The scheme’s own design already places industry there. Industry partners take a controlling 51 percent stake in the Section 8 companies (not for profit companies registered under the Companies Act, 2013, which cannot pay dividends to their members) that will manage clusters of Industrial Training Institutes (ITIs). The Centre and the States put up the bulk of the money. Industry’s 17 percent share qualifies as Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) spending. Control over curriculum, technology and delivery therefore passes to a partner whose own contribution comes out of a statutory obligation rather than commercial risk capital.

    What is PM-SETU?

    1. What it is: A central scheme carrying an outlay of Rs 60,000 crore to upgrade government Industrial Training Institutes.
    2. What it funds: Upgraded laboratories, new machines and revised trade curricula at the institutes it covers.
    3. What it is measured on: Employability, since the stated purpose is the quality and relevance of vocational training rather than the number of training seats created.

    What does the ownership structure change?

    1. Industry holds control of the managing entity: Industry partners take a controlling 51 percent stake in the Section 8 companies that will manage ITI clusters.
    2. The state pays and industry decides: The Centre and the States provide the bulk of the funding, against an industry contribution of 17 percent.
    3. The industry share is a statutory obligation, not risk capital: That 17 percent is eligible under Corporate Social Responsibility, so the controlling partner can meet it from money the Companies Act, 2013 already requires it to spend.
    4. What moves into the partner’s hands: Curriculum design, technology adoption and the running of skill development pass to the industry partner.

    Why is industry being asked to lead?

    1. The demand side gets to write the syllabus: Placing curriculum and technology decisions with employers is meant to keep trade training aligned to the machines and processes actually in use.
    2. The immediate driver is the energy and manufacturing transition: The appeal was addressed to the power and utilities industry, whose workforce requirements are changing as generation and grid technology change.
    3. A working cluster is being held up as the model: ArcelorMittal’s leadership of the Vizag cluster has been cited as the benchmark for what the arrangement should produce.
    4. Institute workshops lag the shop floor: ITIs have long trained on equipment that industry has already replaced, which is the specific gap upgraded labs and employer set curricula are meant to close.

    Challenges to PM-SETU

    1. Most trades have no anchor employer: A cluster needs a large firm willing to hold a controlling stake and carry the management burden, which exists in steel or power and not across most trades an ITI teaches. Eg. Plumbing, welding and electrical work are served largely by contractors and micro enterprises, with no single firm able to lead a cluster.
      The Fix: Allow a sector skill council or an industry association to hold the controlling stake in trades where no single anchor firm exists.
    2. Corporate Social Responsibility money contracts in a downturn: A partner funding its share from CSR can redirect that spending in a year when its own hiring slows. Eg. The obligation is calculated at two percent of average net profits of the preceding three financial years, so it falls exactly when industrial demand falls.
      The Fix: Fix the industry contribution as a multi year commitment inside the cluster agreement, so a cluster’s operating budget does not track one partner’s profits.
    3. Control is granted without an outcome obligation: A controlling stake gives industry decision rights over publicly funded assets with no placement or wage commitment attached to those rights. Eg. The National Apprenticeship Promotion Scheme has repeatedly recorded engagement below its sanctioned targets, since participation carried no binding hiring commitment.
      The Fix: Tie renewal of a cluster’s management contract to verified placement and wage outcomes for its trainees.
    4. Clusters will form where industry already is: The model reproduces the existing gap between industrialised and lagging States, because the anchor employer is the precondition. Eg. Institutes in the north eastern States operate with far thinner employer presence than those in Tamil Nadu, Gujarat or Maharashtra.
      The Fix: Reserve a share of central funding for clusters in districts with no large anchor employer, with a public sector undertaking as the lead partner.
    5. The trained worker is a poachable asset: A Section 8 company cannot distribute surplus, so a firm’s only return is the workers it hires, and a competitor can hire them instead. Eg. A firm that trains a welder who then joins a rival bears the full cost and gets none of the benefit, which is the standard problem in employer funded training.
      The Fix: Publish cluster wise trainee supply data so participating firms recruit from a pool they collectively financed rather than each underwriting a rival’s hiring.

    Conclusion

    The scheme moves the state from provider of vocational training to financier of it. That works where a large employer wants the workers and is willing to run the institution, and the scheme has not said who takes charge in the trades where neither condition holds. The marker to watch is the first set of cluster agreements, and specifically whether any hiring or wage commitment is attached to the controlling stake.

    Back2Basics: Industrial Training Institutes

    1. What they are: Post school institutions offering trade level vocational training in engineering and non engineering trades, entered after Class 8, 10 or 12 depending on the trade.
    2. Who runs them: Government institutes are run by State governments alongside a large private sector, with standards set by the Directorate General of Training under the Ministry of Skill Development and Entrepreneurship.
    3. What a trainee gets: Trainees sit the All India Trade Test and are awarded the National Trade Certificate.
    4. Where they sit in the system: They form the country’s oldest and largest formal vocational training network, run under the Craftsmen Training Scheme since 1950.

    [2023, GS2, 15 marks] Skill development programs have succeed in increasing human resources supply to various sectors. In the context of the statement analyze the linkages between education, skill and employment.

  • Centre’s rationale for not using OBC lists for caste enumeration is flawed, say associations

    Centre’s rationale for not using OBC lists for caste enumeration is flawed, say associations

    Why in the News

    Associations representing Other Backward Classes (OBC) have rejected the Union government’s stated reason for not using the Central and State OBC lists in the caste enumeration component of the 2027 Census. The government’s position is that those lists record classes rather than castes, so caste names cannot be drawn and codified from them. Castes other than the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes will instead be recorded through an open column, in which the enumerator writes down what the respondent states. The associations argue that a government which recognises these communities as OBCs for reservation cannot disregard their caste identities when it collects population data. What is contested is whether an enumeration run without a pre-coded caste frame can produce a usable OBC population figure at all.

    How would the two methods of enumeration differ?

    1. The open column method: Castes other than the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes are recorded as stated by the respondent, without a pre-coded list of caste names for the enumerator to select from.
    2. The list based alternative: Caste names would have been drawn from the Central and State OBC lists and codified in advance, so responses map onto a fixed set of entries.
    3. Where the lists already exist: The Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes are enumerated against notified lists, which is the precedent the associations point to.

    What is the government’s reason, and how do the associations answer it?

    1. The stated rationale: The OBC lists identify backward classes rather than castes, so caste names cannot be lifted from them for enumeration.
    2. The associations’ core objection: The All India OBC Students’ Association (AIOBCSA) calls the class and caste distinction artificial, arguing that a government recognising these communities as OBCs for reservation and other affirmative action cannot then disregard their caste identities when collecting population data.
    3. Fix the lists rather than drop them: The associations say that if the existing lists are inadequate or carry inconsistencies for enumeration, the government should use experts to draw and rationalise the caste names from them, not “drop them altogether”.
    4. Administrative records already do both: The AIOBCSA points out that certificates and official records routinely identify communities by their specific social and caste identities, and that even Economically Weaker Section certificates identify the beneficiary through prescribed social or category criteria. Administrative classification and social identity therefore coexist in practice.
    5. A charge of bad faith: The OBC Public Representatives Forum said the justification adds to the perception that the government agreed to enumerate castes with no real intention of doing it properly.

    Why do the associations link this to the EWS estimate?

    1. The estimate behind EWS: When the Economically Weaker Section (EWS) quota was introduced, the government worked with an estimate that the population outside the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and OBCs was about 35 to 40 percent.
    2. What a rigorous count would do to it: The Backwards Classes Intellectual Forum argues that a scientific enumeration of OBC populations would show that estimate to be an overestimation.
    3. The alleged motive: The same body argues that the refusal to codify existing caste names and count caste group populations, as is done for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, is intended to cover up the basis on which EWS reservation was justified.

    Why has the OBC count been the core of the caste Census demand?

    1. The figure has never been counted: The OBC population across the country has only ever been estimated in India, based on the caste Census data of 1931.
    2. The demand was built on that gap: Enumerating the OBC population has historically been the principal argument driving the demand for a caste Census.
    3. The method is what is now questioned: Senior Opposition leaders have questioned the utility of the open column methodology for enumerating every caste other than the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes.

    Challenges to caste enumeration through an open column

    1. Free text responses multiply into unusable entries: A column with no pre-coded frame collects spellings, surnames, sub castes and clan names as separate answers, and classifying them afterwards becomes a second exercise larger than the count. Eg. The Socio Economic and Caste Census, 2011 returned roughly 46 lakh distinct caste and related entries, and its caste data was never released.
      The Fix: Publish a codified caste directory built from the Central and State lists and State commission reports before enumeration, and let the open column carry only the entries that directory does not hold.
    2. No single classification governs across States: Central and State OBC lists differ, so the same caste name can carry backward class status in one State and not in another or at the Centre. Eg. Jats were added to the Central OBC list in 2014 and the inclusion was set aside by the Supreme Court in Ram Singh versus Union of India (2015), while several States continue to list them.
      The Fix: Record the State of enumeration against each caste entry, so the count can be read against the list actually applicable to that respondent.
    3. Data collected without a publication commitment invites contest: A count whose tables and methodology are not released cannot settle any claim, and every group then disputes its own number. Eg. Bihar’s caste survey of 2023 was challenged in court, and several communities publicly disputed the figures recorded for them.
      The Fix: Fix a statutory deadline for publishing the caste tables together with the methodology note.
    4. Self declaration can be strategic: Where recognition carries reservation benefits, the answer given to an enumerator responds to the benefit rather than to the record. Eg. Sections of the Maratha community in Maharashtra have pressed for recognition as Kunbi in official records in order to access OBC reservation.
      The Fix: Cross check declared entries against existing caste certificate records at the tabulation stage rather than at the point of enumeration.

    Conclusion

    The same administration recognises these communities by caste for the purpose of reservation and declines to name them by caste for the purpose of counting. That is the contradiction the associations have put on the record, and no procedural reason offered so far reconciles the two positions. The decision also determines whether the coming enumeration produces a number that can be used in policy or one that has to be reclassified before anyone can read it. What to watch is whether a codified caste directory is issued to enumerators before fieldwork begins.

    Back2Basics: Economically Weaker Section reservation

    1. What it is: A 10 percent reservation in government jobs and educational institutions for economically weaker sections outside the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes.
    2. Its constitutional basis: It was introduced by the Constitution (One Hundred and Third Amendment) Act, 2019, inserting Articles 15(6) and 16(6).
    3. How eligibility is set: Eligibility rests on income and asset criteria notified by the government, not on social or educational backwardness.
    4. Its judicial status: The Supreme Court upheld the amendment in Janhit Abhiyan versus Union of India (2022) by a majority of three to two.

    [2022, GS2, 10 marks] Discuss the role of the National Commission for Backward Classes in the wake of its transformation from a statutory body to a constitutional body.

  • Govt has deferred Census in Manipur amid calls for NRC to be carried out

    Govt has deferred Census in Manipur amid calls for NRC to be carried out

    Why in the News

    The Union government has decided to defer the 2027 Census in Manipur. The decision followed a meeting of the Union Home Minister with the Governor and the Chief Minister of Manipur, and the State government said it came out of discussions on the demand that the Census be held only after a National Register of Citizens (NRC), a register of persons verified as Indian citizens, is implemented in the State. Meitei and Naga organisations want citizenship settled before any population figure is recorded. Kuki-Zo organisations want the reverse order, arguing that the Census is the credible data source against which citizenship allegations should be tested. The count is contested because the same figures will eventually decide how Assembly seats are shared between the valley and the hills.

    Why is the Census being opposed?

    1. Citizenship and demographic change: Meitei civil society groups in the valley and Naga communities in the hill districts allege that migration from Myanmar and elsewhere has altered Manipur’s demographic composition. They want an exercise distinguishing Indian citizens from illegal immigrants before population figures are recorded.
    2. Displacement from the ethnic conflict: Thousands remain displaced more than three years after the violence that began in May 2023. Meitei groups say a count taken while people live away from their homes would record the consequences of displacement rather than the underlying population pattern.
    3. Political representation: Census figures will eventually govern delimitation, and Manipur has had no fresh delimitation implemented since the 1970s.

    How old is the NRC demand?

    1. It predates the current conflict: The demand existed before the May 2023 violence, and the influx from Myanmar and the conflict later gave it a sharper political and security dimension.
    2. A joint memorandum in 2022: In June 2022 the Coordinating Committee on Manipur Integrity (COCOMI), representing Meitei civil society, and the United Naga Council (UNC) jointly demanded an NRC and a State Population Commission.
    3. The Assembly endorsed it twice: The Manipur Assembly adopted a resolution seeking both on 5 August 2022, and reaffirmed it on 1 March 2024.
    4. The growth figures the resolution cited: The resolution recorded population growth of 153.3 percent between 1971 and 2001 and 250.9 percent between 2001 and 2011 in the hill districts, against 94.8 percent and 125.4 percent respectively in the valley. Those figures do not by themselves establish illegal immigration.
    5. An institution was created: The State government constituted the Manipur State Population Commission in February 2023.

    What did the Myanmar crisis add?

    1. Displacement across the border: Fighting in Myanmar’s Chin State and adjoining areas after the 2021 military coup drove thousands across the border into India.
    2. Ethnic links on both sides of the border: Many of those arriving belonged to Chin and related communities with ethnic and familial ties to the Kuki-Zomi population in Manipur.
    3. The State government’s framing: The Manipur government linked the influx to new settlements, poppy cultivation, encroachment and demographic change.
    4. The counter position: Kuki organisations disputed that framing, arguing that legitimate Indian citizens were being conflated with recent arrivals from Myanmar.
    5. A border policy change: The Centre scrapped the Free Movement Regime with Myanmar in February 2024, citing security and demographic concerns.

    What are the Meitei and Naga groups demanding now?

    1. A fixed sequence: The UNC stated on 18 August, “NRC first: No Census, No Delimitation Before Implementation of NRC in Manipur.”
    2. An old base year: It demanded an NRC with 1951 as the base year, followed by the Census and then delimitation.
    3. The demand cuts across party lines: The State Congress president, himself a former Chief Minister, supported the demand for an NRC before the Census on 19 and 20 August, placing the two main parties broadly on the same side.

    Why do the Kuki-Zo groups oppose it?

    1. A national exercise, not a State one: The Kuki-Zo Council called an NRC before the Census “premature and unjustified”, stating on 23 August that there is no provision for a community or a State government to unilaterally initiate a separate NRC in one State.
    2. Allegations should be tested against data: It argued that the demand rests on unsubstantiated allegations about the Kuki-Zo community, and that such claims should be tested against credible demographic data. The Census is the appropriate source of that data.
    3. It supports delimitation on verified data: The Council has backed delimitation once verified demographic figures exist.
    4. The documentary cut off is the underlying fear: Kuki, Zomi and Chin communities straddle the India-Myanmar border, so a register built on an old documentary cut off could raise doubts about people who have lived in Manipur for generations.

    Why does delimitation matter so much here?

    1. The present seat split: Manipur has 60 Assembly seats, 40 in the valley and 20 in the hills.
    2. The demographic map behind it: The State’s 16 districts divide broadly into hills, where Nagas and Kuki-Zomis predominate, and the valley, where Meiteis are in the majority.
    3. The map is more than fifty years old: The present political map goes back to the 1973 delimitation, which was based on the 1971 Census.
    4. Manipur was left out of the last exercise: A national delimitation based on the 2001 Census ran between 2002 and 2008, and Manipur, Assam, Arunachal Pradesh and Nagaland were excluded after the Centre deferred it in 2008, citing security concerns and challenges to the credibility of the 2001 Census data in the region.
    5. The disputed 2001 figures: In nine hill subdivisions the increase between 1991 and 2001 was over 40 percent, and in four it exceeded 100 percent.
    6. What the valley’s political class fears: A new Census followed by delimitation could move the 40:20 distribution to something closer to 35:25 or 30:30.

    Can an NRC be held only in Manipur, and what else is the Centre weighing?

    1. The usual national sequence is stalled: A nationwide NRC is supposed to follow an update of the National Population Register (NPR), a register of usual residents, and the government has not notified the NPR to be taken up with the 2027 Census.
    2. No legal bar on a State specific exercise: Section 14A of the Citizenship Act, 1955 vests the power to compulsorily register citizens and maintain the National Register of Indian Citizens in the Centre. No statutory requirement makes simultaneous nationwide deployment necessary.
    3. The decision is political rather than legal: The Centre could in principle notify the exercise for a particular State or border region, and the recorded position is that this is a political call.
    4. An alternative route already exists: A High-Level Committee on Demographic Change, announced in May this year, is examining demographic change arising from illegal immigration and other abnormal causes, and will recommend policy, legislative and administrative measures. Its findings could form the basis of a policy specific to Manipur.

    Challenges to holding the Census in Manipur

    1. Displacement distorts where people are counted: An enumeration records a person where they are living on the reference date, so a district hosting relief camps absorbs the population of the district people fled. Eg. Displaced Kashmiri Pandit families have been counted in Jammu and Delhi rather than in their home districts across successive Censuses.
      The Fix: Record a home district field for persons enumerated in relief camps, so displacement is visible in the data instead of silently altering district totals.
    2. A register built on an old base year excludes documented residents: Citizenship registration turns on producing legacy documents, which the poorest and the most mobile are least able to hold. Eg. Assam’s updated register, worked against a 1971 cut off, left 19,06,657 persons out of the final list published in August 2019, and the appeals process has still not concluded.
      The Fix: Publish the documentary standard and a binding appeal timeline before enumeration begins, so exclusion is contestable within a fixed period.
    3. A deferred count leaves the State on stale data: Allocations for welfare programmes are pegged to Census population, so a State that is skipped keeps running on figures more than a decade old. Eg. Coverage under the National Food Security Act, 2013 is still fixed against the 2011 Census population.
      The Fix: Notify an alternative statutory data source, such as updated ration and electoral rolls, for allocations in the deferred State until enumeration is held.
    4. The credibility of the count is itself contested in the region: A count that any side believes is inflated cannot settle the question it is being deferred to answer. Eg. Nagaland recorded decadal growth of about 64 percent in the 2001 Census and a fall of about 0.6 percent in 2011, and the earlier count was widely described within the State as inflated.
      The Fix: Publish subdivision level growth anomalies alongside post enumeration survey results, so a disputed count is audited rather than defended.

    Conclusion

    Deferring the count postpones the dispute without resolving either question behind it. The two demands cannot be met on the same timetable, since one side wants citizenship settled before people are counted and the other wants the count to test the citizenship allegations. A deferral also leaves the State without the current population data that its own programmes and its own representation ultimately rest on. What to watch is whether the Centre fixes a date for enumeration in the State or lets the deferral run open ended.

    Back2Basics: National Register of Indian Citizens

    1. What it is: A register of persons verified as citizens of India, maintained by the Centre.
    2. Its statutory basis: Section 14A of the Citizenship Act, 1955 empowers the Centre to compulsorily register every citizen and to issue national identity cards.
    3. How it is meant to be built: The rules contemplate verification of the particulars collected in the National Population Register to sort residents into citizens and doubtful cases.
    4. Where it has been done: The only State level exercise so far was in Assam, carried out under Supreme Court supervision, with the final list published in 2019.

    “[2009] Consider the following statements :

    1. Between Census 1951 and Census 2001, the density of the population of India has increased more than three times.

    2. Between Census 1951 and Census 2001, the annual growth rate (exponential) of the population of India has doubled.

    Which of the statements given abova is/are correct ?

    (a) 1 only

    (b) 2 only

    (c) Both 1 and 2

    (d) Neither 1 nor 2

  • Ladakh clears new ‘nautor land’ regularisation rules, paves way for grant of proprietary rights

    Why in the News

    The Lieutenant Governor of Ladakh has approved the Ladakh Autonomous Hill Development Councils (Nautor Regularisation) Rules, 2026. The Rules create a one time mechanism to grant proprietary rights over nautor land to the people already occupying it, across all seven districts of the Union Territory. Eligibility is pegged to possession taken before 27 October 2020, the date on which the Jammu and Kashmir Tenancy Act, 1980 was repealed. The power to allot the land is vested in the elected Hill Councils rather than in the Union Territory administration. The stated aim is to balance the interests of genuine occupants against the protection of public and Council land from encroachment, which is the line the Rules must now hold in a territory where more than 60,000 acres sit in this single revenue category.

    What is nautor land?

    1. The category: Nautor land is barren land or wasteland owned by the government.
    2. How it came to be occupied: Such land was historically allotted to individuals for cultivation or other productive use.
    3. The scale in Ladakh: More than 60,000 acres in Ladakh is presently recorded in revenue records as nautor holdings.
    4. The gap the Rules address: Occupants held and worked the land without proprietary title over it.

    What do the 2026 Rules provide?

    1. A proprietary grant with a ceiling: Proprietary rights may be granted over up to 10 acres of eligible nautor land to the occupant.
    2. A leasehold route above the ceiling: Nautor land beyond the 10 acre limit may be allotted on a leasehold basis.
    3. A single cut off date: Regularisation is available only for land occupied before 27 October 2020, and any possession taken after that date is ineligible.
    4. Uniform application: The framework applies to occupants across all seven districts of Ladakh.
    5. A one time exercise: The mechanism is available once, and does not create a standing route to regularise later occupation.

    Where do the Hill Councils get the power to allot this land?

    1. Transfer of land to the Council: Under Section 42 of the Ladakh Autonomous Hill Development Councils Act, 1997, land within a district stands transferred to the Council.
    2. Executive power over allotment: Clause (i) of Section 23 of the same Act vests executive powers in the Council in relation to the allotment, use and occupation of land vested in it.
    3. What this changes in practice: Title over former government wasteland is granted by an elected district body rather than by the Union Territory revenue administration.

    What changes for an occupant once title is granted?

    1. Legal certainty over possession: A recorded proprietary right replaces occupation that rested on an old allotment or on long use.
    2. The land becomes a financial asset: Titled land can be pledged, so an occupant can use it to avail bank loans.
    3. Two grades of right, not one: An occupant above the ceiling receives a lease rather than ownership, so the holding remains Council land.
    4. A boundary against fresh claims: The cut off is what separates a genuine holder from a claim raised after the repeal of the tenancy law.

    Challenges to the nautor regularisation framework

    1. Proving possession before a cut off date: Regularisation turns on documentary proof of occupation before a date five years past, in a territory where much land is recorded simply as government wasteland. Eg. Under the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006, individual claims were rejected in large numbers across hill States for want of documentary proof of occupation before the statutory cut off.
      The Fix: Allow the Hill Council to accept community verified evidence of possession, including village records and dated satellite imagery of cultivation, in place of a title deed.
    2. Common grazing land can be enclosed as private holdings: High altitude pasture carries no individual title and is recorded in the same wasteland category the Rules open up. Eg. The Changpa herders of Changthang, who rear the goats that supply pashmina, depend on open rangeland held by no individual.
      The Fix: Exclude recorded grazing land and migratory routes from eligibility, and settle common pasture rights in the name of the village before individual titles issue.
    3. Cultivation expands where water does not: Bringing more barren land under the plough in a cold desert raises demand on streams that already run short at sowing time. Eg. Ice stupas were developed in Ladakh to store winter water precisely because glacier fed channels do not deliver water when spring sowing begins.
      The Fix: Condition regularisation of land held for cultivation on a water availability assessment by the district administration.
    4. A safeguard made by rule can be unmade by rule: The eligibility limits and the cut off sit in subordinate rules, so the same executive authority can revise them later. Eg. Ladakh’s demand for constitutional safeguards on land and employment has been under discussion with the Ministry of Home Affairs since 2023.
      The Fix: Carry the ceiling, the cut off and the exclusion of common land into primary legislation, so the terms of allotment are not alterable by executive rule making.

    Conclusion

    The Rules are approved and the allotment power now rests with the Hill Councils in every district of Ladakh. Notification settles the framework but not its outcome, since the exercise runs on claims that must be verified holding by holding. The markers to watch are the district level verification process the Councils adopt, and whether common pasture is fenced off from the exercise before individual titles begin to issue.

    Back2Basics: Ladakh Autonomous Hill Development Councils

    1. What they are: Elected district councils exercising devolved powers over local development and land use in Ladakh.
    2. Their statutory basis: They function under the Ladakh Autonomous Hill Development Councils Act, 1997.
    3. Where they exist: The Leh Council was constituted in 1995 and the Kargil Council in 2003.
    4. Their composition: Each Council has 30 members, of whom 26 are directly elected and four are nominated, with a term of five years.

    [2023, GS3, 10 marks] State the objectives and measures of land reforms in India. Discuss how land ceiling policy on landholding can be considered as an effective reform under economic criteria”