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  • The house of multilaterals

    Why in the News

    The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) has held its 26th summit at Bishkek in the Kyrgyz Republic, marking the completion of 25 years since its launch. The Bishkek Declaration expressed deep concern at and condemned the military strikes on Iran, and reaffirmed support for its sovereignty and territorial integrity. It named the United States and Israel as having violated the principles of international law and the UN Charter. The summit was the first since the U.S. and Israel began their war on Iran on 28 February 2026, which killed Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and a number of senior officials. The tension is that a grouping able to speak in one voice against outside powers closed the summit by handing its chair to Pakistan.

    What is the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation?

    1. Founding: The SCO was launched on 15 June 2001 by China, Russia, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan, together known as the Shanghai Five, as its founding members. India and Pakistan joined the group in 2017.
    2. Institutional machinery: The grouping has 29 charter bodies, including the Council of Heads of State, the Council of Heads of Government, the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, meetings of heads of ministries and agencies, and the Council of National Coordinators, alongside over 40 working mechanisms.
    3. What the machinery is for: These bodies meet through the year and serve as formal channels of communication between member states. They give members a standing consultation route in a sudden conflict or a cross-border natural calamity.
    4. No collective defence: The SCO carries no collective defence component, and several of its members have disputes with one another.

    What did the declaration say on West Asia?

    1. Condolence and a peace process: Member states condoled the assassination of Ali Khamenei and welcomed the peace process supported and mediated by several countries, including SCO member Pakistan.
    2. Indirect backing on the nuclear question: The summit advocated the “inalienable right” of member countries to develop atomic energy for peaceful purposes, which reads as support for Iran in its nuclear negotiations with the U.S.
    3. Palestine named as the root question: The declaration asserted that lasting stability in West Asia can be secured only through a just settlement of the Palestine question.
    4. Silence on Ukraine: Member states maintained silence on Russia’s role in the Ukraine war.

    Where did the declaration push back against the prevailing order?

    1. Missile defence: The declaration held that the “unilateral and unlimited build-up of global missile defence systems by groups of states” has a negative impact on international security and stability.
    2. Satellite Internet: It stated that “unauthorised satellite Internet services on the territory of Member States” violate international law, an evident reference to Starlink supplying Internet services in parts of eastern Ukraine and in Iran.
    3. Trade in local currencies: SCO leaders have periodically called for greater use of local currencies in trade, a practice viewed with scepticism in the West and particularly by the current U.S. leadership.
    4. A bank of its own: The announcement of the establishment of an SCO Development Bank is a further step in that direction.

    What did India press at Bishkek, and where did it diverge?

    1. No double standards on terrorism: The Prime Minister, who led the Indian delegation, spoke on ensuring that there is “no double standards” in fighting terrorism and called for peace and stability in Afghanistan.
    2. India’s Afghanistan record: He highlighted India’s role in supplying relief materials to Taliban-controlled Afghanistan over the years, and the declaration separately called on Afghanistan to form an “inclusive government”.
    3. Connectivity with a condition: He spoke for greater connectivity between the markets of SCO members, and for respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states. That formulation is an apparent reference to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which India has criticised for years.
    4. The Belt and Road split: India stayed away from endorsing the China-led Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Other member states expressed support for it and advocated alignment between the BRI and the Eurasian Economic Union, a customs union of Russia and four post-Soviet states.
    5. The troika language: The declaration carried strong language on the troika of challenges, “terrorism, separatism and extremism”, and “strongly condemned” terrorism, reflecting India’s concerns and those of other members.

    Why does the next chair create a problem for New Delhi?

    1. Pakistan takes the chair: With the conclusion of the summit, Pakistan has assumed the chair of the SCO, and the group’s next summit will be held in that country.
    2. The level of attendance is undecided: The Ministry of External Affairs has not clarified whether the Prime Minister will travel to Pakistan for it. The External Affairs Minister had visited Islamabad in 2024 for the 23rd meeting of the SCO Council of Heads of Government.
    3. What has intervened since: The Pahalgam terror attack of 22 April 2025, the subsequent Operation Sindoor, and India’s decision to place the Indus Waters Treaty, the 1960 arrangement sharing the Indus system between India and Pakistan, “in abeyance” have further complicated relations.
    4. A decision, not a formality: These developments will be a factor in the level at which the government sends representatives to next year’s summit.

    What has India got out of the grouping since 2017?

    1. A route back to China after Galwan: India and China began to re-engage at the 2024 Kazan Summit in Russia, where the Prime Minister met the Chinese President.
    2. A concrete boundary outcome: A further meeting between the two leaders at Tianjin in 2025 produced an “Early Harvest” proposal on boundary delimitation and the resumption of border trade through three points.
    3. Political will survived a military crisis: The Tianjin meeting showed that both sides retained the will to meet despite the strain following Operation Sindoor in May 2025, when China supported Pakistan as India targeted terror camps in Pakistani territory.
    4. A multilateral setting for hard subjects: The SCO gives the world an opportunity to engage China multilaterally on issues such as freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, and gives India and Pakistan a platform for sustained engagement inside a broader framework.
    5. Leverage in an uncertain phase with Washington: With the U.S. President imposing punitive tariffs on Indian goods, the grouping let New Delhi engage all major stakeholders and maintain diplomatic dialogue.

    Challenges to the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation

    1. Consensus decision-making lets one member stall an agenda: Every substantive document needs unanimity, so an economic or connectivity text is reduced to language all ten members can sign. Eg. India declined to endorse the Belt and Road paragraph at successive summits, and the connectivity language in SCO declarations has stayed generic as a result.
      The Fix: Adopt a consensus-minus-one procedure for economic annexures, so a project document can proceed without binding a dissenting member.
    2. Enlargement has widened the internal contradictions: Membership has grown from the original five to include India and Pakistan in 2017, Iran in 2023 and Belarus in 2024, and each addition brings its own quarrels into the room. Eg. Two pairs of members, India and Pakistan and India and China, carry live disputes with each other.
      The Fix: Tier the agenda, so security cooperation runs among members with no active bilateral dispute and the full membership meets on economic and connectivity subjects.
    3. Members do not share a definition of terrorism: The counter-terrorism arm works from a list members interpret differently, so a summit can condemn terrorism in general and fail on any specific incident. Eg. The SCO defence ministers’ meeting at Qingdao in June 2025 ended without a joint communique after India refused to sign a text that omitted the Pahalgam attack.
      The Fix: Attach a standing annexure of entities already designated by the UN Security Council, so the counter-terrorism text is not renegotiated at every summit.
    4. Connectivity runs through bilateral corridors rather than a common framework: The grouping has no transit and customs instrument of its own, so trade routes are governed by separate bilateral or plurilateral agreements. Eg. The International North-South Transport Corridor, used by India, Iran and Russia, rests on a 2000 agreement signed outside the SCO entirely.
      The Fix: Bring the corridor’s customs, transit and insurance protocols under an SCO transport facilitation agreement, so members trade on one rulebook.

    Conclusion

    The grouping’s value to India has always been access rather than agreement. It is the one table where New Delhi can sit with Beijing and Islamabad without the meeting itself being the story. That access now comes attached to a host India has no ordinary diplomatic traffic with. The decision to watch is the level at which India is represented at the next summit, because it will show whether access is still worth the price of attending.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “Critically examine the aims and objectives of SCO. What importance does it hold for India?”

  • Bihar makes consent mandatory for CBI to probe public servants

    Why in the News

    The Bihar Home Department has issued a notification regulating the jurisdiction of the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) in the State under Section 6 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946. It widens the agency’s standing general consent over offences involving employees of the Government of India, central Public Sector Undertakings (PSUs) and private persons implicated alongside them. A proviso then removes that automatic authority over public servants appointed in connection with the affairs of the Bihar government and over State-owned, State-controlled and State-aided bodies. The notification supersedes every previous notification on the subject. The result is a two-tier regime. The same agency needs no permission to investigate a central employee in Bihar. It needs case-by-case permission to investigate a State employee.

    What is consent under Section 6 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946?

    1. The statute is the CBI’s source of police powers: The CBI cannot ordinarily exercise its powers and jurisdiction inside a State without that State government’s consent.
    2. Two forms of consent: General consent allows the agency to investigate specified offences or categories of cases without seeking permission each time. Specific consent is granted for an individual case.
    3. Consent is tied to a notified offence list: The offences the agency may investigate are notified under Section 3 of the Act, so a State’s general consent operates only over that notified list.

    What does the Bihar notification alter on each side of the line?

    1. The offence list under general consent is widened: Consent now covers offences under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, the Information Technology Act, 2000, cybercrime, and the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 as amended.
    2. Whom the wider consent covers: It applies to employees of the Government of India, employees of PSUs under the Government of India, and private persons implicated alongside them.
    3. The proviso carves out the State’s own establishment: Prior consent of the Bihar government is mandatory for any probe of public servants appointed in connection with the affairs of the State, and of persons in any corporation, company or bank owned by, controlled by, or receiving financial assistance from the State.
    4. The State decides each request individually: On receiving a proposal from the Delhi Special Police Establishment, the State government considers it and takes a decision on granting powers of investigation case by case.

    Why is the order read as widening the agency’s reach rather than curbing it?

    1. The two-pronged reading inside the police establishment: The stated reading is that the first part of the order lets the CBI investigate cases that were the State’s prerogative, and the second part balances that by requiring the State’s permission.
    2. It is read as a template for other States: The assessment within the agency is that Bihar may have set a precedent for other States, and that the order gives the CBI more scope rather than less.
    3. The consent bar binds the executive alone: The requirement of State consent applies only to executive action by the CBI. It does not restrict a High Court or the Supreme Court from ordering a CBI investigation within a State without the State government’s consent.

    Challenges to the general consent mechanism

    1. Consent is revocable at will and leaves probes suspended: A State can withdraw general consent at any time, and the agency must then seek permission for every fresh case in that State. Eg. West Bengal withdrew its general consent in November 2018 and has required case-by-case permission since.
      The Fix: Prescribe a statutory period within which a State must decide a case-by-case request, with reasons recorded for a refusal.
    2. The agency has no charter of its own: The CBI rests on a 1946 police establishment law and a 1963 executive resolution, so its very constitution has been litigated. Eg. The Gauhati High Court in Navendra Kumar v. Union of India (2013) held the 1963 resolution constituting the CBI to be invalid, and the Supreme Court stayed that order within days.
      The Fix: Enact a dedicated CBI statute fixing its composition, its jurisdiction over notified central offences and the limits of State consent.
    3. Corruption probes against State officials face two separate gates: Consent under Section 6 is only the first permission, and a further approval is needed before an inquiry into a public servant’s official decisions can begin. Eg. Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, inserted in 2018, requires prior approval of the competent authority before any enquiry into a recommendation made or decision taken by a public servant in discharge of official functions.
      The Fix: Run both approvals through a single time-bound window, so a refusal at either gate is recorded once and is appealable.
    4. Selective consent invites a political reading of every case: The State controls access to its own officials, so each grant or refusal is readable as a political act rather than a legal one. Eg. The Supreme Court described the agency as a “caged parrot speaking in its master’s voice” in the coal blocks allocation matter in 2013.
      The Fix: Publish an annual statement of consent requests received, granted, refused and pending, State by State, so the pattern is visible rather than inferred.
    5. Joint cases now straddle two consent regimes: One case involving a central employee and a State public servant is fully open on one accused and permission-dependent on the other, which splits a single investigation. Eg. A corruption case in a centrally funded scheme executed by a State department typically names officials of both.
      The Fix: Provide that where a case includes even one accused covered by general consent, the State decides on the whole case within a fixed period rather than on each accused separately.

    Conclusion

    The notification is in force and it supersedes every earlier consent order in the State. It settles nothing about the underlying arrangement, which lets the same agency be widened and fenced by a single executive order that no legislature debated. What is worth watching is whether other States adopt the split model, and whether Bihar attaches any timeline to the permissions it has now reserved to itself. A permission with no deadline is a refusal that never has to be written down.

    Back2Basics: Central Bureau of Investigation

    1. Constitution: The CBI was set up by a resolution of the Ministry of Home Affairs in 1963, and it is not a statutory body created by its own Act.
    2. Administrative control: It functions under the Department of Personnel and Training in the Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions.
    3. Superintendence is split: For offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, superintendence vests in the Central Vigilance Commission. For all other matters it vests in the Central Government.
    4. Appointment of the Director: The Director is appointed on the recommendation of a committee of the Prime Minister, the Leader of the Opposition in the Lok Sabha and the Chief Justice of India or a Supreme Court judge nominated by the Chief Justice.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “The jurisdiction of the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) regarding lodging an FIR and conducting probe within a particular State is being questioned by various States. However, the power of the States to withhold consent to the CBI is not absolute. Explain with special reference to the federal character of India.”

  • Census advanced in four poll-bound States, formally deferred in Manipur

    Why in the News

    The Union government has advanced the population enumeration phase of Census 2027 in the poll-bound States of Uttar Pradesh, Punjab, Uttarakhand and Goa, scheduling it from November 16, 2026 to January 4, 2027, ahead of the nationwide enumeration planned for February 2027. The same notification formally deferred the Census exercise in Manipur till further declaration. The reference date for the four States is fixed at 00.00 hours on January 5, 2027, against March 1 for the rest of the country and October 1, 2026 for Ladakh and the snow-bound areas of Uttarakhand, Jammu and Kashmir and Himachal Pradesh. The second phase carries 40 questions and includes an open-ended field for recording caste details. The tension is that a single count needs a single moment of reference, and the schedule now bends to the electoral calendar in four States and to a citizenship register demand in one.

    What does the revised schedule change?

    1. The legal basis: The notification was issued by the Registrar General and Census Commissioner of India under the Census Act, 1948.
    2. The order of operations in the four States: Residents have the option of self-enumeration through a dedicated portal between November 16 and November 30, ahead of the door-to-door survey, which begins on December 1.
    3. The revisional round: Population enumeration in the four States is followed by a revisional round from January 5 to January 9, 2027, immediately after the reference moment.
    4. The stated reason for the advance: The exercise is being completed in these four States before assembly elections due early next year.

    What does the second phase ask?

    1. The scale of the schedule: The second phase carries 40 questions, of which at least 13 are new compared with the 2011 Census.
    2. Caste is recorded without a fixed list: The schedule includes an open-ended field for caste details. Respondents may also decline to disclose their caste or state that they do not belong to any caste.
    3. The new identity and household questions: Spouse’s name, nationality, father’s particulars and mother’s particulars are being asked for the first time.
    4. The new asset, document and service questions: Digital literacy, permanent residential address, place of Covid-19 vaccination, number of bank accounts, passport number, availability of a driving licence and a mobile phone, and Aadhaar and voter ID numbers where available.

    Why has Manipur been left out?

    1. The deferral is open ended: The notification defers the Census exercise in the State indefinitely, with no revised date attached.
    2. The demand behind it: A large section of civil society groups from the Meitei and Naga communities has demanded that a National Register of Citizens (NRC) be compiled first, before the Census is undertaken in the ethnic violence-hit State.
    3. The communities involved: Manipur has three major communities, the Meitei, the tribal Naga and the Kuki-Zo, and the demand as reported comes from groups within two of them.
    4. What deferral costs: A State counted at a different time cannot be compared with the rest of the country on the same reference date, which is the property that makes Census data usable for allocation.

    What is the Opposition’s objection?

    1. The planning objection: The Congress has said the fresh notification shows shoddy planning, since the population enumeration due in February 2027 has been advanced in four States where elections were already known to be due.
    2. The timing objection: It has framed the sudden revision as driven by political calculation rather than statistical need, given how long the schedule had been settled.
    3. The caste question objection: It has argued that the caste question is deliberately very poorly designed and will render the whole caste census exercise meaningless.
    4. The procedural complaint: The Leaders of the Opposition in the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha wrote to the Prime Minister on August 20, 2026 on the caste question, and no mid-course correction followed.

    Challenges to Census 2027

    1. An open-ended caste field cannot be aggregated: Self-reported caste names arrive in many spellings, synonyms and sub-group labels, and no total can be produced from them without a coding frame prepared in advance. Eg. The Socio Economic and Caste Census of 2011 threw up roughly 46 lakh distinct caste entries, and its caste data was never released.
      The Fix: Publish a draft State-wise caste list for public objection before enumeration, and code every response against that list at the point of collection.
    2. A delayed count ages every entitlement built on it: Welfare coverage fixed as a share of population continues to use the last enumerated population until a new one exists. Eg. Coverage under the National Food Security Act, 2013 remains anchored to the 2011 Census, so population added since then sits outside the ration entitlement.
      The Fix: Provide in the enumeration notification for automatic revision of population-linked entitlement ceilings once provisional totals are published.
    3. Self-enumeration presumes the capability being measured: A portal-first round shifts the first pass onto respondents who need a device, connectivity and the confidence to file. Eg. Digital literacy is itself one of the questions being asked in this schedule, which indicates it cannot be assumed across households.
      The Fix: Treat the portal response as one input into the door-to-door visit rather than as a substitute for it, and verify every self-filed record in the field round.
    4. The count competes with the election machinery for the same staff: Enumerators in India are largely school teachers and local officials, who are also the staff deployed on electoral roll work and poll duty. Eg. The advanced enumeration in the four States runs in the months immediately preceding their assembly elections.
      The Fix: Ring-fence the enumeration workforce from election duty for the enumeration and revisional rounds, and record the deployment so overlaps are visible.

    Conclusion

    The count is now running on two clocks, one set by the electoral calendar and one by the need for a common moment of reference. Comparability survives only if enumeration in each region closes cleanly before the next begins, and an advanced schedule in four States narrows that margin. The revisional round that follows the advanced enumeration is the last point at which its errors can be corrected. Manipur’s deferral carries no end date, so the country’s first count in over a decade will be incomplete until the demand that produced the deferral is settled.

    Back2Basics: Census Act, 1948

    1. It provides the legal basis for taking the Census in India and empowers the Centre to notify the schedule, the questions and the reference date.
    2. The exercise is conducted by the Registrar General and Census Commissioner of India, which functions under the Ministry of Home Affairs.
    3. Individual returns are confidential, are not open to inspection and are not admissible as evidence in any court; only aggregated data is published.
    4. Answering the Census questions is a legal obligation on the respondent, and giving false information or refusing to answer is a punishable offence.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “Consider the following statements : 1. Between Census 1951 and Census 2001, the density of the population of India has increased more than three times. 2. Between Census 1951 and Census 2001, the annual growth rate (exponential) of the population of India has doubled. Which of the statements given abova is/are correct ? (a) 1 only (b) 2 only (c) Both 1 and 2 (d) Neither 1 nor 2”

  • Why is the Centre opposed to totalisers?

    Why in the News

    A three judge Bench of the Supreme Court headed by the Chief Justice of India has asked the Central government to examine introducing totaliser machines for counting votes recorded in Electronic Voting Machines (EVM), in order to protect the secrecy of booth-wise voting patterns and prevent electors at individual booths from being identified and victimised. The direction was given on September 1, 2026, on a public interest petition filed in 2014 by Yogesh Gupta and Imran Khan seeking that votes cast at the various polling stations in a constituency be mixed before counting. The Election Commission of India has supported the measure since 2008 and has recommended it to the Union government. The Centre has opposed it throughout, arguing at different points that booth-wise disclosure causes no intimidation and that a totaliser could leak data before counting begins. The tension is between the secrecy of the ballot at the level of a locality and the granular booth data that campaigns and the administration both now rely on.

    What is a totaliser?

    1. What it does: A totaliser allows the votes cast in about 14 polling booths to be counted together, against the present practice of tallying votes booth by booth.
    2. How it connects: It is an interface connected to the main control unit of a cluster of 14 EVMs.
    3. What it outputs: Pressing the result button gives the consolidated votes polled by each candidate across the 14 machines, without revealing the voting pattern of any individual polling area.
    4. Who built it: It was developed by Bharat Electronics Limited, Bengaluru and Electronics Corporation of India Limited, Hyderabad.

    Why was the petition filed?

    1. The stated purpose: The petitioners sought a direction to the poll panel to mix the votes cast at various polling stations in a constituency, on the ground that this was necessary to stop candidates intimidating voters in areas that had rebuffed them.
    2. The illustration offered: The petitioners cited alleged intimidation by a late former Deputy Chief Minister of Maharashtra in the Baramati constituency during the last general election, where voters were allegedly threatened that his party would detect voting patterns from the EVM readings and cut off their water supply.
    3. Booths map onto communities: Polling booths in India are marked geographically, so where social groups live in segregated clusters, which is the case across much of rural India and increasingly in urban slums, a booth result roughly identifies how a numerically large community voted.
    4. The risk has grown since 2014: Advanced geospatial tools now allow booth trends to be correlated with social settings and causal inferences to be drawn from that correlation, which goes beyond what the petitioners feared when they filed.

    What has been the Centre’s position?

    1. The 2017 argument, that there is no harm: The Centre told the apex court that identifying booth-wise voting patterns did not lead to voter intimidation and that there was no need to stop the disclosure of booth-wise results.
    2. The 2017 argument, that there is a benefit: It contended that knowledge of booth-wise vote shares allowed candidates to work harder in areas where support for them was low, producing better results for everyone involved.
    3. The 2018 argument, that the machine is the risk: The Additional Solicitor General told the Bench, then led by the Chief Justice of India, that installing a totaliser could lead to a data breach even before vote counting began.
    4. The ministerial decision on record: A Law Ministry affidavit told the Court that a group of ministers headed by the then Union Home Minister had decided that intimidation or victimisation of voters as apprehended may not occur on a larger scale in this era of media activism.

    What is the Election Commission’s stand?

    1. Consistent support since 2008: The poll body first suggested the measure to the United Progressive Alliance government in 2008 and has recommended the totaliser system to the Union government since.
    2. The 2018 submission: It told the Supreme Court that a time has come for introduction of the totaliser for counting of the votes.
    3. The position in the current hearings: Counsel for the Commission backed the goal of protecting voter anonymity, and that support has carried into the present round.
    4. The caveats it has entered: It flagged practical and legal difficulties in implementing the proposal, including how booth-wise verification would work and how the exercise interacts with the Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT), the printer attached to a voting unit that shows the elector a paper slip of the vote cast before it drops into a sealed box.

    What has the Court now directed?

    1. The direction to the Centre: The Court asked the Central government to state its position on introducing a totaliser system for counting votes recorded through EVMs.
    2. The specific questions: It sought to know whether there are any impediments to introducing such a mechanism and whether there would be any negative impact from it.
    3. The deadline on the data breach point: The Centre’s repetition of the data breach apprehension prompted the Court to give the Election Commission two weeks to respond to that fear.
    4. The parallel instruction: The Commission has also been asked to submit its proposal to the government, which moves the question from litigation into an executive decision.

    Challenges to introducing the totaliser

    1. Booth level data has administrative uses beyond campaigning: Turnout and result data at the polling station is what flags a station for scrutiny or a re-poll. Eg. An implausibly high turnout at a single station is the standard trigger for ordering a re-poll there.
      The Fix: Retain booth-wise data with the Election Commission for audit and re-poll decisions, and publish only the aggregated cluster result.
    2. A re-poll cannot be isolated once votes are mixed: If the machines of 14 booths have been aggregated, a re-poll ordered at one of them cannot be separated from the counted total. Eg. Re-polls after booth capturing or machine failure are ordered station by station, not cluster by cluster.
      The Fix: Run the totaliser only after every re-poll in the constituency is complete and the machines are back in the strongroom.
    3. Slip verification is anchored to the polling station: The mandatory VVPAT count is done for randomly selected polling stations and compared against that station’s electronic count, which presumes station-wise totals exist. Eg. The Supreme Court’s direction requires slip counting in five randomly selected polling stations in each assembly segment.
      The Fix: Complete the station-wise slip verification first and aggregate through the totaliser only after the match is recorded.
    4. Clustering does not conceal a pattern in a homogeneous area: Where one community occupies most of a 14 booth cluster, the aggregate reveals its voting pattern as clearly as a single booth would. Eg. Reserved constituencies with geographically concentrated settlements would gain little anonymity from aggregation.
      The Fix: Form clusters across socially mixed areas rather than across contiguous ones, so no single cluster maps onto a single community.
    5. The Commission cannot act alone: Counting procedure is governed by the Conduct of Elections Rules, 1961, and the mixing provision presently covers ballot papers rather than voting machines. Eg. Rule 59A permits mixing of ballot papers before counting in specified elections and does not extend to EVMs.
      The Fix: Amend Rule 59A to extend the existing mixing provision to electronic voting machines, which is the single step that converts the recommendation into a usable power.

    Conclusion

    The Election Commission has backed this measure across successive governments and it has still not been introduced, because the decision sits with the Centre and not with the poll body. The objection now on record has shifted from denying that booth-level victimisation happens to warning that the counting device itself is insecure, which is a question about design and custody rather than about whether ballot secrecy is worth extending to a locality. The Centre’s reply to the Court and the Commission’s fresh proposal to the government are the two documents that decide whether the proposal moves this time.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “In the light of recent controversy regarding the use of Electronic Voting Machines (EVM), what are the challenges before the Election Commission of India to ensure the trustworthiness of elections in India?”

  • Voter lists shrink by 15.7% in 17 States and U.T.s after SIR

    Why in the News

    Draft electoral rolls published after the third phase of the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) show the electorate in 17 States and Union Territories falling 15.7 per cent, from 35,50,50,008 at the 2024 Lok Sabha elections to 29,93,00,115. Maharashtra recorded the largest drop in absolute numbers at 15,896,198 electors, or 17.08 per cent, and Delhi and Chandigarh the sharpest percentage falls at 35.89 per cent and 31.84 per cent. The revision rebuilds the roll rather than updating it, so an elector’s presence on the previous roll does not by itself carry them onto the new one. Of the 6.15 crore electors deleted in this phase, 1.11 crore are marked dead, and the remainder are recorded as absent, multiply enrolled or in an others category. The contest is over that remainder, since absence at the moment of verification is not the same thing as ineligibility.

    What happened to the rolls between the 2024 polls and the revision?

    1. The rolls first grew: Between the 2024 Lok Sabha elections and the cut-off date for the enumeration phase, these States and Union Territories added around 57.75 lakh electors, taking the cumulative total to 36,08,07,394.
    2. One State drove most of the addition: Maharashtra added 47.92 lakh electors, and ten other States including Haryana added about 9.83 lakh between them.
    3. Six States and Union Territories moved the other way: Delhi’s roll fell from 1,52,14,638 at the polls to 1,45,10,299 before the revision, a drop of more than 7 lakh.
    4. The other five declines: Uttarakhand fell by 4.7 lakh, Odisha by 3.17 lakh, Chandigarh by 1.44 lakh, Punjab by 1.1 lakh and Arunachal Pradesh by 10,937.

    What are the deletions made of?

    1. Death is the smaller share: Of the 6.15 crore electors deleted, 1.11 crore are marked dead, which is the only category that is verifiable against an independent record.
    2. Absence is the largest category: 4.52 crore electors are marked absent, meaning the enumerator did not find them at the registered address during the field round.
    3. Duplicate registration: 49.58 lakh are recorded as having multiple enrolments, which removes a name from one roll rather than removing the person from the electorate.
    4. The residual: Around 3 lakh fall into an others category that the draft does not break down further.

    Where does the exercise now stand?

    1. The current phase: The third phase covers 16 States and three Union Territories. Draft rolls have been published for 17 of them, with Nagaland due on September 20 and Tripura on October 21.
    2. Final rolls begin: The rollout of final lists starts with Mizoram, Sikkim and Manipur on September 6, and the numbers in the final lists can rise, since the Election Commission provides a window for claims and objections and for registration of new voters.
    3. Already completed: The revision is over in Bihar, West Bengal, Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Puducherry, Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat, Chhattisgarh, Goa, the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and Lakshadweep.
    4. Assam is on a different track: A special revision was conducted there instead, because of legal questions connected to the National Register of Citizens (NRC), the Assam-specific register of citizens prepared under Supreme Court supervision.
    5. What remains: With the third phase, the exercise covers the entire country except Himachal Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh, whose schedule is to be announced later.

    Challenges to the Special Intensive Revision

    1. The largest deletion category is the least verifiable: An elector recorded as absent may be a migrant worker away for the season rather than a person who has moved permanently. Eg. Out-migration from eastern Uttar Pradesh and Bihar peaks between sowing and harvest, which is when field verification is conducted.
      The Fix: Accept a claim filed remotely from a declared work address, with the home address retained, before a deletion on grounds of absence is confirmed.
    2. The remedy reaches the wrong address: The claims and objections window opens after publication and depends on the elector learning of the deletion, and notices are served at the registered address the elector was not found at. Eg. A household away for work misses both the enumeration visit and the notice that follows it.
      The Fix: Require the booth level officer to record a served notice and one repeat attempt before any absence-based deletion becomes final.
    3. The burden of proof inverts: In an intensive revision the existing roll stops being evidence of eligibility, so an elector already enrolled must establish the claim again. Eg. Electors absent from the previous intensive revision roll have had to produce documentary proof of eligibility rather than relying on their existing entry.
      The Fix: Treat the previous roll as presumptive evidence, and require the Electoral Registration Officer to record a specific ground before displacing that presumption.
    4. Field capacity is thin at the point where accuracy is decided: A single booth level officer covers a polling station of up to 1,500 electors within a fixed enumeration window. Eg. The verification and the draft publication in this phase ran across 19 States and Union Territories simultaneously.
      The Fix: Publish the per-officer elector load and the number of verification visits made, so the quality of the field round can be audited rather than assumed.

    Conclusion

    The draft numbers are not the final numbers. The claims and objections window decides whether an elector deleted in absence returns to the roll, and its use depends on people who are away learning that they were removed. A revision that removes duplicate entries and a revision that removes voters produce the same headline figure and are not the same event. The final lists are where the two become distinguishable.

    Back2Basics: Special Intensive Revision

    1. An intensive revision rebuilds the electoral roll from scratch, enumerating every elector afresh, rather than adding and deleting names at the margin as a summary revision does.
    2. It is conducted by the Election Commission of India under the Representation of the People Act, 1950 and the Registration of Electors Rules, 1960.
    3. The sequence is fixed: house-to-house enumeration, publication of a draft roll, a window for claims and objections, then publication of the final roll.
    4. The last countrywide intensive revision was carried out in 2002-03, and revisions since then have been summary revisions.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “Is the right to vote a fundamental right? Discuss the position of the Election Commission of India while undertaking the revision of electoral rolls. Can it also examine the question of citizenship of voters?”

  • Why is BRICS exploring cross-border payments?

    Why in the News

    The 18th BRICS summit in New Delhi, with India as Chair, is expected to push for mechanisms to settle payments between members, including links between national digital payment systems and central bank digital currencies (CBDCs), which are digital versions of a national currency issued by its central bank. Finance ministry and central bank representatives from member countries met at Jaipur on August 12-13 to discuss financial cooperation, payments and the wider use of national currencies in settling trade between members. The push follows a 2024 BRICS report under Russia’s chairmanship, which argued that this part of the financial system is monopolised by a single institution and that the monopoly raises transaction costs. India has framed its own proposal as a way of cutting costs and speeding settlement rather than as a move away from the dollar. The tension is that every workable alternative needs a critical mass of banks and regulators to join before it saves anyone money, and the members most eager to build one are the members others are most wary of joining.

    How does a cross-border payment move today?

    1. The chain of correspondents: Money does not travel directly between the buyer’s bank and the seller’s bank. It moves through a series of correspondent banks that hold accounts with each other. Eg. An importer in Cape Town paying an exporter in Chennai is routed through a larger international bank typically headquartered in London or New York.
    2. The dollar as a vehicle: Very few banks hold both rupees and rand, so the payment is converted from rand to dollars and then from dollars to rupees, with no American party to the trade.
    3. Messaging is separate from settlement: The instructions travel over SWIFT, the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication, a Belgium-based cooperative overseen by the National Bank of Belgium along with the G-10 central banks including the U.S. Federal Reserve. It carries payment instructions; the money is settled separately.
    4. Why the network is hard to displace: SWIFT is used directly by more than 11,000 institutions in over 200 countries, and smaller banks reach it indirectly through larger member banks.

    What does the chain cost?

    1. Foreign exchange margins are paid twice: Every intermediary charges a fee, and the two currency conversions mean the exchange margin is taken on both legs.
    2. The measured margins: A 2019 BRICS survey of cross-border payment systems conducted by Brazil found Brazilian respondents reporting foreign exchange margins of 2.5 per cent, rising to 8.5 per cent for payments into Africa and in some cases as high as 20 per cent.
    3. The network has thinned: The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) found active correspondent banking relationships fell by 20 per cent between 2011 and 2018, with regional declines ranging from 12 per cent to 30 per cent and Latin America worst affected. The reasons were largely commercial, since payment volumes kept growing through the same period.
    4. Speed is no longer the binding problem: SWIFT states that its Global Payments Innovation service has cut transaction times substantially, and the remaining delays are structural rather than a function of chain length.

    Why does BRICS want to change this system?

    1. Exposure to other countries’ monetary policy: Settling in a handful of dominant currencies, the U.S. dollar, the euro and the Japanese yen, exposes developing economies to policy decisions taken by the issuing countries.
    2. The stated cost argument: The 2024 BRICS report held that concentration of the messaging layer in one institution raises what every participant pays to transact.
    3. Sanctions are the sharpest driver and the sharpest deterrent: Several Russian banks were cut off from SWIFT in 2022 following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Sanctions-hit Russia has pushed hardest for an alternative, and that is also the reason other members are wary of joining one.
    4. The adoption problem: An alternative rail is useful only once a large number of banks and regulators have joined it, and a bank that uses one to deal with sanctioned entities risks sanctions itself.

    What alternatives are on the table?

    1. Bilateral linkage of national systems: Two countries can connect their domestic payment systems directly, avoiding correspondent banks and dollar conversion. Eg. India and Singapore have linked the Unified Payments Interface with PayNow for remittances. Building such links pair by pair does not scale.
    2. A shared hub: Project Nexus, designed by the BIS and handed to a company set up by six central banks including the Reserve Bank of India, lets each country join one connection rather than many. It goes live only in 2027 and is not a BRICS initiative.
    3. CBDC settlement on a common platform: Central banks issue digital versions of their currencies for use between banks, a settlement asset distinct from the retail digital rupee held by individuals, and exchange them on one platform. Both legs of a currency swap occur at the same instant or not at all, which removes the risk of paying out before the other side pays and cuts the capital banks must set aside.
    4. The one platform running today: mBridge, built by the BIS with the central banks of China, Thailand, Hong Kong and the UAE, was handed to its participants when the BIS left in October 2024. Over 95 per cent of its settlement volume is in China’s digital yuan, according to People’s Bank of China figures.
    5. The BRICS-specific proposal: The Kazan declaration of 2024 agreed to discuss and study the feasibility of an independent settlement system called BRICS Clear. The Rio declaration the following year did not mention it.

    What is India’s position?

    1. The proposal: India has proposed that members link their CBDCs for trade and tourism payments, extending the linkage idea from retail systems to central bank money.
    2. The framing is deliberate: Indian officials have consistently presented the payment systems as a means of cutting transaction costs and speeding settlement, not as an initiative to displace the dollar.
    3. Other members have gone further: Russian proposals, and those of some Brazilian economists, have moved towards alternative financial systems explicitly aimed at reducing dependence on the dollar.
    4. The reason for the caution: In November 2024 the U.S. President threatened 100 per cent tariffs on BRICS countries that moved away from the dollar, and a further 10 per cent on countries aligning with vaguely defined anti-American BRICS policies. The threats were not carried out.

    Challenges to a linked BRICS payment system

    1. Domestic rails are not built alike: Member systems differ in message formats, operating hours and rules on when a payment becomes final, so linking them forces each participant to change domestic infrastructure. Eg. The Unified Payments Interface settles instantly and around the clock. Several member country systems settle in batches on business days only.
      The Fix: Require every participant to migrate to the ISO 20022 messaging standard and extend operating windows so linked systems overlap for a common settlement period.
    2. Most member currency pairs have no liquid market: Settling directly in national currencies needs someone willing to hold and convert the receiving currency, which does not exist for most BRICS pairs. Eg. Indian exporters accumulated rupee balances in special vostro accounts under the rupee trade settlement mechanism that counterparties could not readily deploy.
      The Fix: Establish central bank swap lines and designated market makers for the main pairs, so balances can be converted rather than parked.
    3. One platform needs one rulebook: Customer verification, anti money laundering standards and dispute resolution differ across members, and a shared platform cannot function on several standards at once. Eg. Financial Action Task Force grey listing constrains banks anywhere from dealing with counterparties in a flagged jurisdiction.
      The Fix: Agree a common rulebook and a named dispute resolution seat before the platform carries live value rather than after.
    4. CBDC readiness is uneven across members: A linkage of central bank digital currencies cannot include a member whose currency has not reached production. Eg. India’s wholesale and retail digital rupee pilots began in 2022 and remain pilots.
      The Fix: Sequence the linkage in waves, beginning with members whose wholesale CBDC is already in live operation.

    Conclusion

    The grouping has no shortage of proposals and a shortage of commitment. Every model on the table asks members to surrender something domestically, either control over settlement or their own infrastructure standards, before any of them saves a rupee. The declarations so far have moved in the opposite direction, agreeing to study a settlement system in one year and passing over it the next. The New Delhi summit is where the members either name one model and a date for it or repeat the study language a third time.

    Back2Basics: Bank for International Settlements

    1. Established in 1930 and headquartered at Basel, Switzerland, it is the oldest international financial institution.
    2. It is owned by 63 member central banks, including the Reserve Bank of India, and functions as a bank for central banks rather than for governments or individuals.
    3. It hosts the committees that set global financial standards, including the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision.
    4. Its Innovation Hub builds payment and settlement prototypes and hands them over to participating central banks, which is how both mBridge and Project Nexus were created.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “With reference to the Central Bank digital currencies, consider the following statements: 1. It is possible to make payments in a digital currency without using US dollar or SWIFT system. 2. A digital currency can be distributed with a condition programmed into it such as time-frame for spending it. Which of the statements given above is/are correct? (a) 1 only (b) 2 only (c) Both 1 and 2 (d) Neither 1 nor 2”

  • The economy, its math and politics

    Why in the News

    A former Economic Affairs Secretary in the Ministry of Finance has claimed that nominal Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth in the first quarter of 2026-27 was 2.6 per cent, against the 10.3 per cent estimated by the Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation (MoSPI). Adjusted for inflation of 2 to 2.5 per cent, that arithmetic puts real growth at zero rather than at the official 7.8 per cent. The claim was built by comparing the April-June 2025 GDP level computed on the old 2011-12 base year with the April-June 2026 level computed on the 2022-23 base year that MoSPI adopted in February 2026. Splicing two series produces a growth rate that measures neither of them. The contest is between an official estimate the government spent a week publicly defending and a public mood in which a very low growth number was readily believed.

    What is a base year in GDP computation?

    1. The purpose: A base year fixes the set of prices at which output in every later year is valued, so a change in the measured total reflects a change in volume and not a change in prices.
    2. Nominal against real: Nominal GDP values output at the prices ruling in the year it was produced. Real GDP values that same output at base year prices, which is what makes growth comparable across years.
    3. The worked illustration: A country producing only crude oil sells 10 million barrels at $10 in year 1, giving a GDP of $100 million, then 5 million barrels at $30 in year 2, giving $150 million. Measured at year 1 prices, year 2 output is $50 million, so the economy has contracted by half even though its nominal GDP rose 50 per cent.
    4. What the base year carries: It fixes the relative prices and the weights of the period chosen, and those weights then run through every year of the series.

    Why is the base year revised every five to six years?

    1. Consumption patterns move: What households spend on shifts substantially over a decade, so an old price structure misvalues what the economy now produces. Eg. Telecom tariffs collapsed after 2016 and digital services barely existed as a separate category in 2011-12.
    2. Measurement itself improves: Technology and method allow faster and more precise capture of output and prices than were available when the previous base was set.
    3. Administrative data replaces proxies: The 2022-23 series draws on Goods and Services Tax returns, the Public Financial Management System for central government accounts, e-Vahan for transport spending, and the Annual Survey of Unincorporated Sector Enterprises and the Periodic Labour Force Survey for the informal economy.
    4. Every earlier year is restated: When the base moved from 2011-12 to 2022-23, the GDP values changed for all years from 2011-12 onwards, so growth must be computed between two comparable periods within the new series.

    Where did the disputed calculation go wrong?

    1. The splice: The claim took the April-June 2025 level from the 2011-12 series and the April-June 2026 level from the 2022-23 series, then divided one by the other.
    2. What that number actually measures: A ratio across two series captures the gap between two different valuations of the economy, not the change in output between two quarters.
    3. The office lent the claim weight: The claimant had headed the Department of Economic Affairs and was designated Finance Secretary, which is why the government machinery responded for most of a week rather than ignoring the claim.
    4. The rebuttal crossed party lines: A Congress Rajya Sabha member who is himself critical of the government’s economic management wrote publicly that the arithmetic behind the real growth estimate was not among the things wrong with India’s economy.

    Why did a wrong number travel so far?

    1. Perception ran ahead of the arithmetic: A low growth number was plausible to a section of readers before any of them checked how it was derived.
    2. The protest backdrop: The claim landed during the Jantar Mantar protests, which had already made the government’s economic record a live public argument.
    3. The employability gap: An education system that does not leave its graduates job ready weakens the link between a headline growth number and what people observe.
    4. The demographic pressure: More than a crore young people enter the job market every year, so growth is judged against absorption rather than against output.
    5. Political amplification and its limit: The Congress and several of its leaders amplified the claim. The Leader of the Opposition in the Lok Sabha, a standing critic of the government’s economic policy, did not comment on it.

    Challenges to the 2022-23 GDP series

    1. The deflator is built for goods: Converting nominal output into real output leans heavily on the Wholesale Price Index, which carries no services component at all. Eg. Services are close to 55 per cent of gross value added and are deflated using price indices constructed for wholesale goods transactions.
      The Fix: Complete the Wholesale Price Index base revision and introduce a Producer Price Index, which is the standard deflator in most large economies.
    2. The corporate database carries inactive firms: Private corporate value added is estimated from company filings, which can include shell and dormant entities. Eg. A National Sample Survey Office technical report on the corporate affairs database found a large share of sampled companies untraceable or wrongly classified.
      The Fix: Publish an annual reconciliation of the active company frame against Goods and Services Tax filings before the frame is used for estimation.
    3. Independent verification lags the release: The detailed sources and methods document that lets researchers reproduce the estimates is published well after the series itself. Eg. After the 2011-12 revision, the back series for years before that base remained contested for years, with a committee estimate and the official estimate disagreeing about growth in the 2000s.
      The Fix: Release the sources and methods volume on the same day as the new series rather than as a follow-up publication.
    4. Growth is not tracked by tax collections: High measured nominal growth that is not matched by proportionate corporate tax receipts leaves the estimate open to challenge. Eg. Direct tax buoyancy has repeatedly diverged from nominal GDP growth in years of strong headline expansion.
      The Fix: Publish the nominal GDP to tax base reconciliation alongside quarterly estimates, so the divergence is explained rather than argued over.

    Conclusion

    The arithmetic is settled and the credibility question is not. Two incompatible growth claims about the same quarter circulated side by side because most readers have no way to adjudicate between them. A statistical office that must be publicly defended each time a headline number is disputed is carrying a trust problem that no revision of the base year resolves. The transition to the 2025 System of National Accounts, due by 2029-30, is the next occasion on which that gap is either closed or carried forward.

    What is National Income Accounting?

    1. About: National income accounting is the set of methods used to measure economic activity across a national economy as a whole, producing indicators such as GDP, Gross National Product and Net National Income.
    2. Rationale: National accounts give fiscal policy, monetary policy, welfare targeting and cross-country comparison a single common measurement base.
    3. Named typology, the three methods: The production method sums value added at each stage across agriculture, industry and services. The income method sums rent, wages, interest, profit, mixed income and net income from abroad. The expenditure method totals consumption, investment, government spending and net exports.
    4. Who compiles it in India: The National Statistical Office under MoSPI prepares the estimates using the benchmark indicator method.

    Laws and Rules Governing National Income Accounting

    1. Collection of Statistics Act, 2008: Empowers the Centre, State governments and local bodies to collect statistics on economic, demographic, social, scientific and environmental matters, and makes furnishing the information a legal obligation.
    2. Collection of Statistics Rules, 2011: Prescribe how a statistical collection is notified and how statistics officers are appointed and their powers exercised.
    3. Collection of Statistics (Amendment) Act, 2017: Extended the parent Act to Jammu and Kashmir, closing a jurisdictional gap in national statistical collection.

    Key Facts about National Income Accounting

    1. National Statistics Day is observed on 29 June, the birth anniversary of P.C. Mahalanobis.
    2. MoSPI was created in 1999 by merging the Department of Statistics with the Department of Programme Implementation.
    3. The National Statistical Commission was set up in 2005 on the recommendation of the Rangarajan Commission and remains a non-statutory advisory body.
    4. The first estimate of India’s national income was made by Dadabhai Naoroji in 1868, and the first official post-Independence estimates came from the National Income Committee of 1949.

    Challenges in National Income Accounting

    1. The unorganised economy resists direct measurement: A large share of output comes from unregistered enterprises that file no accounts, so their contribution is surveyed and then projected forward. Eg. The informal sector contributed roughly 45 per cent of gross value added in 2022-23.
      The Fix: Shorten the interval between unincorporated enterprise surveys so projection periods are measured in months rather than years.
    2. Final and intermediate goods are hard to separate: Counting the same output twice inflates the total, and the distinction depends on who buys the good rather than on the good itself. Eg. Flour bought by a bakery is an intermediate input, and the identical flour bought by a household is final consumption.
      The Fix: Extend the Supply and Use Tables framework, which balances production against consumption and forces the discrepancy to surface.
    3. Non-market work is excluded by construction: Subsistence farming, barter and unpaid care work produce real output that no price attaches to, so they never enter the total. Eg. Time use survey data shows women performing several hours of unpaid domestic and care work daily, none of which is counted.
      The Fix: Publish satellite accounts for household and care production alongside the main accounts, as several statistical systems already do.
    4. Natural capital depletion is treated as income: Resource extraction adds to measured output and the loss of the resource is not netted out anywhere. Eg. Groundwater drawn beyond recharge in Punjab and Haryana raises agricultural value added. The stock that produced it shrinks, and nothing in the accounts records the loss.
      The Fix: Build a Green GDP series that deducts resource depletion and pollution costs, reported as a companion to the headline estimate.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “Explain the difference between computing methodology of India’s Gross Domestic Product(GDP) before the year 2015 and after the year 2015.”

  • Geothermal Energy

    Geothermal Energy

    Why in News

    The Press Information Bureau (PIB) published a thematic Backgrounder on Geothermal Energy on 4 September 2026. The piece is a subject explainer written for exam and public awareness value.

    Core facts

    1. Definition: Geothermal energy is heat stored inside the Earth. This heat is tapped through wells at sites with high underground temperature gradients.
    2. Nature of the source: Geothermal power is a renewable and baseload source. It generates around the clock, unlike solar or wind.
    3. Nodal ministry: The Ministry of New and Renewable Energy (MNRE) is the nodal ministry for geothermal energy in India.
    4. Verification note: The release body did not resolve on the source page this run, so release-specific figures are not quoted. The static estimates below come from standard reference data.

    Static Context

    1. India’s first project: India commissioned its first geothermal wells at Puga Valley in the Changthang region of Ladakh. A 1 Megawatt (MW) pilot geothermal plant is planned as the first demonstration scale project.
    2. Implementing agency: The ONGC Energy Centre, a body of the Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC), leads the Puga project with the Ladakh Administration.
    3. Estimated potential: India’s geothermal potential is estimated at about 10,600 MW (standard reference figure).
    4. Survey base: The Geological Survey of India (GSI) has documented about 381 hot springs. India has ten geothermal provinces, including the Himalayan, Son Narmada Tapi (SONATA), West Coast, Cambay and Godavari belts.
    5. Key sites: Notable geothermal sites include Puga and Chumathang in Ladakh, Manikaran in Himachal Pradesh, Tattapani in Chhattisgarh, and Bakreshwar in West Bengal.
    6. Policy frame: A National Policy on Geothermal Energy was notified in 2025, with the MNRE as the promoting authority.

    Prelims angle

    1. Nodal ministry: MNRE. Lead agency for Puga: ONGC Energy Centre.
    2. First site: Puga Valley, Ladakh. Survey body: GSI, with about 381 hot springs mapped.
    3. Source character: Renewable and baseload, driven by internal Earth heat.
    4. Geothermal provinces: Himalayan, SONATA, West Coast, Cambay, Godavari and others.

    Mains angle

    GS Paper 3, energy and infrastructure. A question can ask how geothermal energy can add firm renewable baseload capacity to India’s energy mix, and can weigh the high exploration cost and site concentration in the Himalayas against the round the clock output advantage.

    “[2013] Consider the following :

    (1). Electromagnetic radiation

    (2). Geothermal energy

    (3). Gravitational force

    (4). Plate movements

    (5). Rotation of the earth

    (6). Revolution of the earth

    Which of the above are responsible for bringing dynamic changes on the surface of the earth?

    (a) 1, 2, 3 and 4 only

    (b) 1, 3, 5 and 6 only

    (c) 2, 4, 5 and 6 only

    (d) 1, 2, 3, 4. 5 and 6.

  • NAMASTE Cards distributed to waste pickers in Najafgarh zone

    NAMASTE Cards distributed to waste pickers in Najafgarh zone

    Why in News

    The Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment (MoSJE) inaugurated distribution of NAMASTE Cards to waste pickers in the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD) Najafgarh Zone on 4 September 2026.

    Core facts

    1. Scheme name: NAMASTE stands for National Action for Mechanised Sanitation Ecosystem. It is a central scheme for the safety and dignity of sanitation workers.
    2. Implementing bodies: The scheme is run jointly by the MoSJE and the Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs (MoHUA).
    3. Event substance: Profiled waste pickers received NAMASTE identity cards. The cards formally recognise the worker and link the worker to scheme benefits.
    4. Officeholder: The distribution was inaugurated by the Union Minister of State for Social Justice and Empowerment. The individual identity is not material to the policy content.

    Static Context

    1. Objective: NAMASTE targets zero fatalities in sanitation work in India. It seeks to end direct human contact with faecal matter in sewer and septic tank cleaning.
    2. Coverage expansion: NAMASTE originally covered sewer and septic tank workers (SSWs). The scheme was later extended to enumerate and cover waste pickers. A national digital application for profiling waste pickers was launched on World Environment Day 2025.
    3. Benefits design: The scheme provides occupational profiling, Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) kits, Ayushman Bharat health cover, and a capital subsidy for sanitation related livelihoods.
    4. Predecessor: NAMASTE subsumed the earlier Self Employment Scheme for Rehabilitation of Manual Scavengers (SRMS).
    5. Governing law: Manual scavenging is prohibited under the Prohibition of Employment as Manual Scavengers and their Rehabilitation Act, 2013.

    Prelims angle

    1. Scheme full form and nodal ministries: NAMASTE is run by the MoSJE with the MoHUA. Expect a purpose or ministry match question.
    2. Beneficiary categories: Sewer and septic tank workers, and waste pickers. The waste picker inclusion is the newest hook.
    3. Benefit bundle: PPE, Ayushman Bharat health cover, capital subsidy, occupational profiling.
    4. Predecessor scheme: SRMS. Governing Act: Manual Scavengers Act, 2013.

    Mains angle

    GS Paper 2, welfare schemes for vulnerable sections. A question can frame the shift from a rehabilitation model (SRMS) to a mechanisation and formalisation model (NAMASTE), and ask whether profiling and card based inclusion secures the rights of informal sanitation workers.

    “[2016] Rashtriya Garima Abhiyaan’ is a national campaign to

    (a) rehabilitate the homeless and destitute persons and provide them with suitable sources of livelihood

    (b) release the sex workers from their practice and provide them with alternative sources of livelihood

    (c) eradicate the practice of manual scavenging and rehabilitate the manual scavengers

    (d) release the bonded labourers from their bondage and rehabilitate them.

  • ISRO launches advanced imaging satellite EOS-05

    ISRO launches advanced imaging satellite EOS-05

    Why in the News

    The Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) has launched the advanced earth observation satellite EOS-05 aboard the Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV-F17).

    What is EOS-05?

    1. What makes it a first: It is India’s first dedicated imaging satellite operating from geosynchronous orbit, where a satellite’s orbital period matches the earth’s rotation so it holds position over the same region.
    2. What it carries: The satellite has multi band operating capabilities and an operational life of nine years.
    3. What it replaces: It takes the place of EOS-03, lost in the unsuccessful GSLV-F10 mission of August 2021.
    4. Where it is now: ISRO has confirmed that the valves are operating, the solar panel is deployed and the satellite’s health is intact, and the orbit will be raised over the coming days to place it on the geo platform.

    Why does imaging from geosynchronous orbit matter?

    1. It removes the revisit gap: A low earth orbit imaging satellite passes over a given area only periodically, while a geosynchronous platform holds the same region in view continuously.
    2. The applications are time sensitive: Near real time imagery serves agriculture, environment monitoring and disaster management, where the value of an image collapses if it arrives days after the event.
    3. The data is described as strategic: ISRO has stated that the platform will supply important strategic data supporting “national activities”, which is the standard formulation for defence and security use.
    4. The trade off is resolution: Ground resolution falls as orbital distance rises, so a geosynchronous imager buys persistence at the cost of the fine detail a low orbit satellite returns.

    What does the mission say about the launch vehicle?

    1. It was the heaviest payload the vehicle has carried: The 2,367 kg satellite is the heaviest ISRO has injected using this launch vehicle.
    2. The growth is measurable against the first flight: The first GSLV flight, GSLV-D1, carried a payload of 1,536 kg.
    3. The gain came from two specific changes: ISRO has attributed the improvement to optimising the vehicle’s structural mass and improving its propulsion systems.
    4. The vehicle configuration: The GSLV is a three stage, 51.7 metre vehicle with a lift off mass of 420.5 tonnes, and its third stage is cryogenic (using propellants stored as liquids at extremely low temperatures, which yields higher efficiency than conventional stages).
    5. The mission count: This was the 19th GSLV mission and the 107th launch from Sriharikota.

    Why had ISRO stopped launching?

    1. Two consecutive vehicle failures: The PSLV-C61 mission failed on 18 May 2025, and the PSLV-C62 mission carrying the EOS-N1 earth observation satellite failed on 12 January 2026.
    2. The response was a deliberate halt: ISRO adopted a cautious approach after the back to back failures and refrained from carrying out further launches.
    3. The cost was an entire quarter: Seven missions, including this one, had been scheduled for the first quarter of 2026, and no satellite was launched during the period.

    Challenges to India’s earth observation programme

    1. Launch cadence lags the manifest: A single quarter of stood down launches pushes an entire year’s schedule, and satellites waiting for a slot age against their design windows. Eg. Seven missions planned for the first quarter of 2026 were carried forward without a single flight.
      The Fix: Move routine earth observation payloads onto the Small Satellite Launch Vehicle and commercial providers, so a review of one vehicle does not freeze the whole manifest.
    2. The cryogenic stage remains the vehicle’s hardest element: The GSLV’s performance depends on a stage that took India close to two decades to prove. Eg. The first fully successful flight of the indigenous cryogenic upper stage came only with GSLV-D5 in January 2014.
      The Fix: Sustain a parallel production line and ground test cadence for cryogenic stages, so a flight failure does not idle the vehicle for want of a qualified replacement stage.
    3. Optical imaging fails when it is needed most: An optical imager cannot see through cloud, and India’s worst flood and landslide events occur during the monsoon under continuous cloud cover. Eg. Disaster response during the monsoon depends on radar imaging satellites such as EOS-04 rather than on optical payloads.
      The Fix: Pair the geosynchronous optical platform with a scheduled radar imaging constellation, so persistent coverage survives the cloud season.
    4. Imagery is only as useful as its downstream users: Data value depends on agencies and states being able to ingest and act on it rather than on the satellite alone. Eg. Access to national imagery is routed through the Bhuvan platform and the National Remote Sensing Centre, and uptake varies sharply across state departments.
      The Fix: Fund state level remote sensing application centres with standing analyst posts, so imagery reaches district administrations as advisories rather than as raw files.

    Conclusion

    The satellite is in a transfer orbit and not yet at its station, so the mission’s outcome is settled only once orbit raising is complete and the platform is commissioned. The capability it brings is persistence over one region rather than sharper pictures, which suits warning and monitoring more than reconnaissance. The launch pause has ended on the vehicle that had the weaker record, which is the more demanding of the two returns to flight. What to watch is whether the remaining missions deferred from the first quarter of 2026 now fly on schedule, since a single successful launch does not by itself restore a cadence.

    “[2018] With reference to India’s satellite launch vehicles, consider the following statements :

    1.PSLVs launch the satellites useful for Earth resources monitoring whereas GSLVs are designed mainly to launch communication satellites.

    2.Satellites launched by PSLV appear to remain permanently fixed in the same position in the sky, as viewed from a particular location on Earth.

    3.GSLV Mk III is a four-stage launch vehicle with the first and third stages using solid rocket motors, and the second and fourth stages using liquid rocket engines.

    Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

    (a) 1 only

    (b) 2 and 3

    (c) 1 and 2

    (d) 3 only