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  • Kondapalli in Bastar shows what state presence looks like after the Maoist withdrawal

    Why in the News

    Kondapalli, a village of 600 people in Chhattisgarh’s Bijapur district that served as the base of the most dreaded Maoist battalion, now has a road, a bus, grid electricity, a cellphone tower and a new school. The change moves the test of the insurgency’s end from the absence of armed cadre to the delivery of ordinary services, since a surrendered commander now demands from the State the borewell, pond, land rights and visiting doctor he once took up arms against it over.

    How does the forward base model work in the Red Corridor?

    1. Step one, the camp: A central armed police force announces a forward operating base inside a village previously controlled by the Maoists.
    2. Step two, clearing operations: A series of encounters follows, which pushes the armed cadre out of the area.
    3. Step three, the road: An engineering agency opens a motorable road to the camp, which ends the physical isolation the insurgency depended on.
    4. Step four, civil administration: Grid electricity, telecom towers, schools, anganwadis, ration shops, Aadhaar enrolment and bank accounts follow the road.
    5. Step five, the political process: Elections resume and elected panchayat bodies begin to function.
    6. Application in Kondapalli: The Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) announced its forward base in the village in November 2024, and this sequence has run there since.

    What is the People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA)?

    1. About: The PLGA is the armed wing of the Communist Party of India (Maoist), organised into platoons, companies and battalions.
    2. Its role here: Kondapalli served as the base of Battalion No. 1, the most dreaded unit of the PLGA.

    What was Battalion No. 1?

    1. About: Battalion No. 1 was the main armed formation of the Maoists in south Bastar, camped in the jungle outside Kondapalli.
    2. Present position: The battalion is gone from the area and security forces now camp in the same space.

    What is a Revolutionary People’s Committee?

    1. About: It is a grassroots governing body of the Maoists that ran village level administration, land distribution and dispute settlement in areas under their control.
    2. Its role here: A former commander of one such committee surrendered in Kondapalli in March 2025.

    What is the Bal Sangam?

    1. About: The Bal Sangam is the children’s wing of the Maoists, used to recruit and indoctrinate minors in areas under their control.

    What is the Chetna Natya Manch?

    1. About: The Chetna Natya Manch is the Maoists’ cultural troupe, which used song and theatre on themes such as jal, jungle and zameen to mobilise villagers.

    What was the Salwa Judum?

    1. About: The Salwa Judum was a civilian counter insurgency force set up in Chhattisgarh in 2005, which armed villagers against the Maoists.
    2. Legal status: The Supreme Court declared it illegal in 2011 and ordered the disarming of the appointed special police officers.

    What is the Red Corridor?

    1. About: The Red Corridor is the belt of forested, mineral rich and largely tribal districts across central and eastern India where Maoist influence was concentrated.
    2. Scale in Chhattisgarh: Kondapalli was one of nearly 400 villages in the State’s Red Corridor where the state had little say or presence.

    What is the Border Roads Organisation (BRO)?

    1. About: The BRO is a road construction agency under the Ministry of Defence that builds and maintains roads in border and strategically sensitive areas.
    2. Its role here: It began work on the Tarrem to Kondapalli road soon after security forces pushed the Maoists back in November 2024.

    What is a Bailey bridge?

    1. About: A Bailey bridge is a portable, prefabricated steel truss bridge assembled on site without heavy equipment, used where permanent bridges cannot be built quickly.
    2. Its use here: The BRO installed nine Bailey bridges over river streams on the stretch past Kondapalli.

    What is the Mahtari Vandan Yojana?

    1. About: It is a Chhattisgarh government scheme that transfers Rs 1,000 a month to eligible married women through direct benefit transfer.
    2. Its role here: One villager’s mother opened a bank account last year and now receives this transfer.

    How did the Maoists govern Kondapalli?

    1. Territorial claim: Kondapalli lay in the Maoists’ South Bastar division, part of what they called the Liberated Zone.
    2. Strength of the formation: The division was one of the strongest Maoist formations and among the last to fall, and could gather the support of 400 to 500 people at short notice.
    3. Economic function of the village: Kondapalli mattered to the Maoists because their supplies came from its local market.
    4. Commemorative gatherings: Hundreds of villagers were assembled every year at a 64 foot tall memorial in Komatpalli, part of the Kondapalli gram panchayat, for Martyrs’ Week.
    5. Land and housing: The Maoists redistributed land and helped villagers build their houses, which is how they gained trust.
    6. Local public works: They built small roads and a pond, and asked villagers to donate money for the treatment of anyone who fell sick.
    7. Forest rule: Cutting trees was punishable under their order.
    8. What was withheld: Residents describe the arrangement as delivering a sense of security and of being seen, with little development alongside it.

    How was that order enforced?

    1. Conscription pressure: At least one person from every village had to join, which put pressure on families to give up their sons or daughters.
    2. Recruitment through front organisations: A boy recruited as a teenager passed through the Bal Sangam and then the Chetna Natya Manch, singing about saving jal, jungle and zameen.
    3. Fear of dispossession: Recruits were told the government would steal their land and that they would eventually have to leave the village.
    4. Control of movement: Villagers leaving the Kondapalli gram panchayat were questioned on their return.
    5. Public punishment: Wrongdoers were beaten publicly under a tree.
    6. Killing of suspected informers: Those suspected of informing to the police were killed, and others left the village.
    7. Destruction of state assets: The Maoists burnt down the only school and the adjoining hostel in the 2000s to stop security forces sheltering there, and destroyed the electric poles the administration brought.
    8. Withdrawal of officials: Forest officials and the patwari, the village records keeper, stopped coming to Kondapalli.
    9. Control of communication: Phones were seized and villagers were told not to use them.
    10. Cost on the other side: Villagers were caught in the middle, and one resident’s uncle was killed by security forces on the suspicion that he was a Maoist.

    What ended the Maoist hold on Kondapalli?

    1. The forward base: The CRPF announced in November 2024 that it was establishing a forward base in Kondapalli.
    2. Encounters: A series of encounters followed, after which the Maoists were pushed into Telangana.
    3. Surrender of the formation: The cadre pushed into Telangana laid down arms in March 2026.
    4. Village level surrender: A former commander of the Revolutionary People’s Committee surrendered in March 2025 along with 12 other villagers.
    5. Rehabilitation in practice: He opened a kirana store with the money received under the State’s rehabilitation policy.
    6. Losses in the campaign: A villager’s 18 year old daughter, who left home in December 2022 to join the Maoists, was among about 30 Maoists killed in a security operation in Telangana’s Karregutta hills last year.
    7. Scale of the insurgency: The decades long insurgency claimed at least 4,741 lives in the Bastar region alone since 2000.
    8. National declaration: The Union Home Minister has declared the country Maoist free, 80 years after Independence.

    Which markers of state presence have appeared in the village?

    1. Grid electricity: Kondapalli received electricity from the grid last July, after years of solar lamps and then of darkness once those failed.
    2. Telecom: A cellphone tower was erected on the edge of the village in December last year, rising above the mud houses and small shops.
    3. School building: A new government school building came up in the summer of 2025, painted bright blue and standing by the main road.
    4. School capacity: The school runs classes 1 to 8 with 158 students and seven teaching staff, all male, and has blackboards and benches.
    5. What preceded it: After the school was burnt down children studied in a shanty in the same compound, and an asbestos shade was put up there in 2020.
    6. Anganwadi and residential school: An anganwadi and a residential school are under construction in the village.
    7. Panchayat and ration infrastructure: Panchayat bhawans have been built and the new ration shop is painted in the colours of the Tricolour.
    8. Identity and banking: Villagers were called to the police camp where they were enrolled under Aadhaar and given birth certificates and bank accounts.
    9. Cash transfer: A household bank account opened last year now receives Rs 1,000 from the State under the Mahtari Vandan Yojana for women.
    10. Return of the vote: The village voted for the first time last year, in the local body polls, having been told under the Maoists to make no demands of the government.
    11. Political visit: The Chhattisgarh Chief Minister visited Kondapalli on 2 June, a first for the village.
    12. Announced pipeline: The Bijapur District Collector stated that over the next two years the village will get a cricket ground, a health centre, a cement road and government scheme benefits.
    13. Security presence: Security forces now camp in the jungle outside the village where Battalion No. 1 used to camp.
    14. Private consumption: A villager bought a Redmi phone for Rs 10,000 after the Maoists left, and uses it to watch films, news and skill tutorials.

    How has connectivity changed?

    1. Bus service: A blue bus from Cherla in Telangana has run since March 2025 under the State’s rural bus scheme, making two trips a day.
    2. What it connects: The bus carries villagers to Bijapur, 79 km to the north, and to Cherla in Telangana, where many young men work as daily wage labourers.
    3. The road agency: The Border Roads Organisation began work on the Tarrem to Kondapalli road soon after November 2024.
    4. Engineering on the road: On the stretch running past Kondapalli into Telangana, the BRO installed nine Bailey bridges over river streams and 43 precast culverts to keep the road usable during the rains.
    5. Present condition: The road is still a work in progress, carrying the occasional motorcycle or truck with construction material.
    6. Travel before the road: A circuitous journey of 209 km taking five hours through Cherla was the only way to travel from Bijapur to Kondapalli.
    7. Travel now: A 90 minute car ride from Bijapur reaches the village without crossing into Telangana, passing the junctions of Awapalli and Basaguda and reaching Tarrem on the Sukma and Bijapur border.
    8. Map lag: For the 18 km beyond Tarrem, Google Maps still recommends the older and longer route through Telangana.
    9. What the road replaced: Villagers earlier walked two days to Telangana carrying 30 kg of rice, stayed 45 days and worked plucking chillies on farms.
    10. A generation without a bus: The bus stopped after the Maoists came from Telangana in 1985, and an entire generation grew up without ever seeing one.
    11. Border geography: Kondapalli sits on the Telangana border and is closer to Cherla at 46 km than to its own district headquarters at Bijapur, 79 km away.

    What distances still separate the village from basic services?

    1. Health care: The nearest doctor requires a journey of over 30 km to Basaguda.
    2. Schooling beyond class 8: Students travel 33 km to Basaguda or 23 km to Pamed to continue past class 8.
    3. Higher education: The village’s first graduate could finish his education only by leaving during the Salwa Judum years for a hostel in Basaguda and then a college in Dantewada.
    4. A second case of leaving to study: A CRPF recruit from the village completed school while staying in a hostel in Usoor in Bijapur.
    5. Schooling in the earlier generation: The village head travelled 27 km by bus to school in Awapalli in the 1980s.
    6. Food supply: Villagers earlier travelled to Awapalli even to buy rice, which took a full day.
    7. Maternal health: Women died in labour or on the way to hospital because there was no medical facility nearby and no road, and were carried on cots.

    Why does the arrival of the state not settle the question of legitimacy?

    1. The camp changed hands rather than disappeared: Security forces occupy the same jungle space the Maoist battalion used, so the village still lives beside an armed presence.
    2. The demands are the same goods: A surrendered commander now asks the State for a borewell for irrigation, a pond, land rights, small roads and a visiting doctor, which are the goods the Maoists claimed to supply.
    3. Memory of redistribution: Residents attribute the Maoists’ trust to land redistribution and help in building houses, which the State’s works now have to match.
    4. Memory of being caught in between: Families were punished by both sides, with suspected informers killed by the Maoists and a relative killed by security forces on suspicion.
    5. The Salwa Judum legacy: A villager still recalls her father being beaten for hours in 2006 during the Salwa Judum years, and the Supreme Court declared that force illegal in 2011.
    6. Delivery remains promised: The health centre, cement road and cricket ground sit on a two year timetable, and the anganwadi and residential school are still under construction.
    7. What residents ask for next: Villagers name a health facility, a school for higher studies and a self help group for poultry, farming and other livelihoods as the unmet needs.

    Challenges to consolidating state presence in Bastar

    1. Reversibility of security gains: Cadre pushed across a State border can regroup and return if camps thin out. e.g. the cadre pushed out of Kondapalli in November 2024 moved into Telangana and laid down arms only in March 2026.
    2. Roads reach before services do: Physical connectivity arrives years ahead of health and higher education facilities, so the mortality and dropout risks persist. e.g. Kondapalli residents still travel more than 30 km to Basaguda to see a doctor.
    3. Education discontinuity beyond the primary stage: Village schools stop at class 8, so children must migrate to hostels to continue studying. e.g. Kondapalli students travel 33 km to Basaguda or 23 km to Pamed after class 8.
    4. Unsettled forest and land rights: Slow recognition of individual and community forest rights leaves the state contested on the very issue the Maoists mobilised on. e.g. community forest rights claims under the Forest Rights Act, 2006 have seen high rejection rates in Chhattisgarh’s Bastar districts.
    5. Distrust from past counter insurgency: Civilian militias and killings on suspicion leave a memory that slows cooperation with the administration. e.g. the Supreme Court struck down the Salwa Judum in Nandini Sundar versus State of Chhattisgarh (2011).
    6. Livelihood dependence on distant labour markets: Without local employment, better connectivity mainly makes it easier to migrate out. e.g. young men from Kondapalli take the daily bus to Cherla in Telangana for daily wage work.
    7. Administrative vacancy in interior blocks: Staffing in remote blocks remains thin even after the security situation improves. e.g. forest officials and the patwari stopped visiting Kondapalli entirely during the Maoist years, and the new school runs with seven teachers for classes 1 to 8.
    8. Displacement risk from mining and infrastructure: Newly accessible mineral belts raise the prospect of acquisition in Scheduled Areas without full consent. e.g. protests over iron ore mining in the Bailadila range in Dantewada in 2019.

    Conclusion

    Kondapalli shows that the end of an insurgency is measured by the return of ordinary state functions, not by the absence of armed cadre. Within two years of the CRPF forward base, the village has a road with nine Bailey bridges, a daily bus, grid electricity, a tower, a school with 158 students, Aadhaar numbers and bank accounts, and it has voted for the first time. The health centre, the cement road and the school for higher studies remain on a two year promise, and the villagers’ claims on the State now decide whether the change holds.

    Left Wing Extremism in India

    1. About: Left Wing Extremism is an armed movement that seeks to capture state power through a protracted people’s war, drawing on grievances over land, forest rights, displacement and the absence of the administration in tribal districts.
    2. Origin: It began with the peasant uprising at Naxalbari in West Bengal in 1967, which gave the movement its popular name.
    3. Principal organisation: The Communist Party of India (Maoist) was formed in 2004 by the merger of the People’s War Group and the Maoist Communist Centre of India, and is banned as a terrorist organisation.
    4. Armed wing: The People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army is its military formation, organised into platoons, companies and battalions.
    5. Geography: Influence was concentrated in the Dandakaranya belt across Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Odisha, Maharashtra, Telangana and Andhra Pradesh.
    6. Parallel governance: Janatana Sarkars, also called Revolutionary People’s Committees, ran village administration, land distribution and dispute settlement in areas under Maoist control.
    7. Scale of decline: The number of districts affected by Left Wing Extremism fell from 126 in 2018 to 38 in April 2024, with the worst affected districts concentrated in the Bastar division.
    8. Policy frame: The National Policy and Action Plan of 2015 combines security measures, development, entitlements for tribal groups and perception management.
    9. Constitutional position: Police and public order are State subjects, so the Centre acts through central armed police forces, funding and intelligence sharing.

    Constitutional Framework Governing Scheduled Areas and Internal Security

    1. Article 244 and the Fifth Schedule: Provide for the administration of Scheduled Areas and Scheduled Tribes, including the Governor’s power to modify the application of laws and the Tribes Advisory Council.
    2. Article 275(1): Provides grants in aid to States for tribal welfare and for raising the administration of Scheduled Areas to the level of the rest of the State.
    3. Article 338A: Establishes the National Commission for Scheduled Tribes to investigate and monitor safeguards for Scheduled Tribes.
    4. Article 355: Places on the Union the duty to protect every State against external aggression and internal disturbance.
    5. Article 356: Allows a proclamation where the government of a State cannot be carried on in accordance with the Constitution.
    6. Entry 1 of the State List: Places public order within the legislative competence of the States.
    7. Entry 2 of the State List: Places police within the legislative competence of the States.
    8. Entry 2A of the Union List: Covers the deployment of any armed force of the Union in a State in aid of the civil power.

    Laws and Rules Governing the Response to Left Wing Extremism

    1. Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967: Provides for banning unlawful associations and terrorist organisations and for offences of membership and support.
    2. Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Amendment Act, 2019: Allows the Centre to designate individuals, and not only organisations, as terrorists.
    3. Chhattisgarh Special Public Security Act, 2005: Criminalises membership of and support to organisations declared unlawful within the State.
    4. National Investigation Agency Act, 2008: Creates a central agency to investigate scheduled offences including terrorism, with jurisdiction across States.
    5. Panchayats (Extension to the Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996: Extends panchayat provisions to Fifth Schedule areas and vests the gram sabha with control over minor forest produce and consultation before land acquisition.
    6. Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006: Recognises individual and community forest rights of forest dwelling tribal groups.
    7. Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013: Requires consent, social impact assessment and rehabilitation, with additional safeguards in Scheduled Areas.
    8. Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023: Section 152 penalises acts endangering the sovereignty, unity and integrity of India.

    Back2Basics: Bastar Region

    1. Designation: Bastar is an administrative division of southern Chhattisgarh and the core of the Dandakaranya region.
    2. Districts: The division covers Bastar, Kondagaon, Narayanpur, Dantewada, Sukma, Bijapur and Kanker.
    3. Rivers: The Indravati and the Sabari are the principal rivers of the region.
    4. Protected areas: Kanger Valley National Park and the Indravati National Park and Tiger Reserve lie in the division.
    5. Landform features: The Chitrakote falls on the Indravati are the widest waterfall in India, and the Abujhmarh hills remain largely unsurveyed.
    6. Tribal groups: The Gond, Muria, Madia, Dorla, Halba and Bhatra communities live in the region.
    7. Cultural institutions: Bastar Dussehra runs for about 75 days and is among the longest festivals in the country, and the Ghotul is the traditional youth dormitory of the Muria.
    8. Mineral base: The Bailadila range in Dantewada holds some of India’s richest iron ore deposits.

    Government Initiatives for Left Wing Extremism Affected Areas

    1. SAMADHAN doctrine: The Centre’s operational framework combining smart leadership, aggressive strategy, motivation and training, actionable intelligence, dashboards, harnessing technology, action plans for each theatre and denial of financing.
    2. Security Related Expenditure Scheme: Reimburses States for the costs of security operations, training, community policing and rehabilitation of surrendered cadre.
    3. Special Infrastructure Scheme: Funds fortified police stations, secure camps and district police infrastructure in affected districts.
    4. Special Central Assistance: Provides funds for public infrastructure and services in the most affected districts.
    5. Road Connectivity Project for Left Wing Extremism Affected Areas: Builds all weather roads and bridges in affected districts, alongside the earlier Road Requirement Plan.
    6. LWE Mobile Tower Project: Installs mobile towers in affected districts to close the telecom gap.
    7. Civic Action Programme: Funds central armed police forces to run health camps, sports events and welfare activity to build local trust.
    8. ROSHNI and Eklavya Model Residential Schools: Provide skill training for youth and residential schooling for tribal children in affected districts.
    9. Aspirational Districts Programme: Targets health, nutrition, education and infrastructure indicators in the districts with the weakest outcomes, many of them in the Red Corridor.
    10. Niyad Nellanar scheme: A Chhattisgarh programme that saturates villages within a radius of new security camps with central and State scheme benefits.

    Key Facts about Left Wing Extremism

    1. Naxalbari: The movement takes its name from the 1967 uprising at Naxalbari in Darjeeling district of West Bengal.
    2. Formation of the CPI (Maoist): The party was formed on 21 September 2004 and is listed as a terrorist organisation under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967.
    3. Decline in affected districts: Affected districts fell from 126 in 2018 to 38 in April 2024.
    4. Salwa Judum: Formed in 2005 and declared illegal by the Supreme Court in 2011 in Nandini Sundar versus State of Chhattisgarh.
    5. Specialised forces: The Greyhounds in Andhra Pradesh and Telangana, and the District Reserve Guard and Bastar Fighters in Chhattisgarh, are the principal anti Maoist units.
    6. Stated deadline: The Union government set a target of ending Left Wing Extremism by 31 March 2026.
    7. Bastar toll: The insurgency claimed at least 4,741 lives in the Bastar region alone since 2000.
    8. Karregutta hills: The hills on the Chhattisgarh and Telangana border were the site of a major operation against Maoist formations.

    Challenges in Left Wing Extremism Affected Areas

    1. Development deficit that created the grievance: Absence of roads, schools, health centres and electricity is the condition the movement recruited on. e.g. Kondapalli got grid electricity only last July and a cellphone tower only in December.
    2. Weak implementation of tribal rights law: PESA and the Forest Rights Act remain unevenly implemented, so consent and forest produce rights stay contested. e.g. community forest rights claims across the Bastar districts have been rejected in large numbers.
    3. Displacement from mining and infrastructure: Acquisition in mineral rich Scheduled Areas turns development projects into recruitment arguments. e.g. protests over iron ore mining at Bailadila in Dantewada in 2019.
    4. Human rights costs of the security response: Killings on suspicion and civilian militias damage the state’s legitimacy for a generation. e.g. the Supreme Court’s 2011 order disbanding the Salwa Judum and disarming special police officers.
    5. Financing of the insurgency: Extortion from contractors, tendu leaf traders and transporters sustains cadre even after territorial losses. e.g. levy collection on road contractors has repeatedly been cited in National Investigation Agency chargesheets.
    6. Coordination across State borders: Cadre exploit inter State boundaries where police jurisdiction ends. e.g. the Kondapalli cadre moved into Telangana after the November 2024 encounters.
    7. Rehabilitation follow through: Surrender packages fail where no livelihood follows the cash grant. e.g. surrendered cadre in Bijapur depend on small kirana shops set up with one time rehabilitation money.
    8. Sustaining services after the camp: Teachers, doctors and revenue officials remain reluctant to serve in interior blocks. e.g. the new Kondapalli school has seven teachers for classes 1 to 8 and no facility beyond that.

    Way Forward

    1. Saturate cleared villages with entitlements: Extend the saturation model so every village within reach of a new camp receives Aadhaar, bank accounts, ration cards, pensions and scheme benefits within a fixed timeframe.
    2. Complete the road and telecom grid: Finish the Tarrem to Kondapalli type links and the mobile tower programme so connectivity does not stop at the camp.
    3. Settle forest and land rights first: Clear pending individual and community claims under the Forest Rights Act, 2006 and enforce gram sabha consent under PESA before any acquisition.
    4. Extend schooling beyond class 8 locally: Upgrade village schools and expand residential schools so children are not forced to migrate 20 to 35 km to continue.
    5. Place health infrastructure with the road: Staff sub centres and mobile medical units at the same time as road completion, rather than years later.
    6. Build local livelihoods: Fund self help groups, minor forest produce processing and poultry and farming enterprises so connectivity does not only enable outmigration.
    7. Make rehabilitation a multi year programme: Follow the surrender grant with skill training, credit and market linkage, and monitor outcomes for surrendered cadre.
    8. Institutionalise inter State coordination: Sustain joint operations, shared intelligence and unified surrender policies across Chhattisgarh, Telangana, Odisha, Maharashtra and Jharkhand.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2025, GS3, 10 marks] The Government of India recently stated that Left Wing Extremism (LWE) will be eliminated by 2026. What do you understand by LWE and how are the people affected by it? What measures have been taken by the government to eliminate LWE?”

  • Strait of Hormuz transit collapses to two vessels a day as the naval blockade hardens

    Why in the News

    Transit through the Strait of Hormuz fell to two vessels on Friday after two more ships were attacked in the waterway, against more than 130 crossings a day before the war began in February. The near standstill has turned Iran’s ability to close the strait into the decisive bargaining instrument of the war, and has pushed the United States to place cheaper fuel above nuclear denial as its first stated war aim.

    What is the Strait of Hormuz?

    1. Location: The strait connects the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea, with Iran on the northern shore and Oman’s Musandam peninsula and the United Arab Emirates on the southern shore.
    2. Dimensions: It narrows to about 21 nautical miles, with inbound and outbound traffic separated into lanes about two nautical miles wide each.
    3. Volume carried: About a fifth of global petroleum liquids consumption passes through it, along with a large share of the world’s seaborne liquefied natural gas.
    4. Why it cannot be bypassed: Gulf producers hold limited pipeline capacity that avoids the strait, so most Gulf crude has no alternative route to the open ocean.
    5. Legal position of the lanes: The shipping lanes lie inside the territorial seas of Iran and Oman, so passage rests on the transit passage regime rather than on high seas freedom of navigation.

    What is a maritime chokepoint?

    1. About: A chokepoint is a narrow channel on a high volume shipping route where traffic must converge and cannot be economically rerouted.
    2. Why it matters: Closure at a chokepoint raises freight and insurance costs across an entire trade, because the alternative is a far longer voyage or no voyage at all.

    What is a naval blockade?

    1. About: A naval blockade is the use of warships to prevent vessels from entering or leaving an adversary’s ports or coastline.
    2. Its object here: The United States blockade is aimed at stopping Iran from selling oil and at inflicting economic damage rather than at seizing territory.

    Who is the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC)?

    1. About: ADNOC is the state owned oil and gas company of the United Arab Emirates and one of the largest producers in the Gulf.
    2. Its role in the news: Two vessels affiliated to ADNOC were attacked while transiting the strait, and the UAE government blamed Iran for the attack.

    What is going dark on the Automatic Identification System?

    1. About: Merchant ships broadcast their identity and position through a transponder, and switching it off removes them from public tracking.
    2. Effect on the count: Vessel counts drawn from tracking data understate real traffic, because ships moving with transponders off are not recorded.

    How far has traffic through the strait actually fallen?

    1. Friday count: Two vessels passed through the waterway, a grain ship entering Iranian waters and an empty dry bulk ship moving in the opposite direction.
    2. A third movement: A separate empty liquefied petroleum products tanker was sailing into the Gulf through the strait on the same day.
    3. No crude at all: No crude oil shipments were visible on Friday.
    4. Preceding days: Nine vessels passed through on Thursday, up from five on Wednesday.
    5. Benchmark for the month: The August average stands at 12 vessels a day.
    6. Pre war benchmark: More than 130 ships traversed the strait daily before the war launched by the United States and Israel on Iran in February.
    7. Measurement caveat: Some ships may pass undetected with their transponders switched off, so the recorded figures are a floor rather than a full count.

    Why is control of the strait Iran’s main leverage?

    1. Analyst assessment: The principal Middle East analyst at a risk intelligence firm assessed that Iran’s ability to restrict shipping through the strait is its main source of leverage in negotiations, alongside the threat to regional energy infrastructure.
    2. A permission regime at sea: Iran has resumed attacks on ships it accuses of trying to transit the strait without its permission.
    3. Talks stalled: A senior Iranian source stated on Wednesday that there had been no progress in talks to build on the June agreement to end the war.
    4. Collapse of the ceasefire: The ceasefire renewed under the June deal has broken down, which preceded the resumption of attacks on shipping.
    5. Conditions for reopening: Iran has said it will not allow the waterway to reopen until economic sanctions are removed and frozen Iranian assets are released.
    6. Legislative backing: An Iranian parliamentary committee approved a plan for the strait on Thursday that bans the transit of United States, Israeli and other hostile countries’ assets and equipment.
    7. Attack on Emirati vessels: ADNOC said two of its vessels were attacked while transiting the strait on Thursday evening, and Iran made no immediate comment on the Emirati accusation.

    How has the closure reordered United States war aims?

    1. Stated reversal of priorities: The Vice President stated that goal number one is to keep oil and gas cheap for Americans and that goal number two is to ensure Iran never gets a nuclear weapon.
    2. The original justification: Preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon had been the consistently stated main reason for the war.
    3. Domestic pressure: The war is unpopular, the President’s approval rating is falling and midterm elections are due in November.
    4. Party calculation: Republicans fear that the war and the gasoline prices it has driven up will cost them control of Congress.
    5. Military constraint: The United States military burned through stockpiles of costly high technology missiles and is running low, which limits the option of resuming large scale attacks.
    6. Blockade endurance: The Defence Secretary stated that the navy can maintain the blockade indefinitely by rotating ships in and out of the region.
    7. Negotiating posture: The President described the approach as low keying it and only semi negotiating, days after saying an agreement to reopen the strait was imminent.
    8. Economic track: The Treasury Secretary announced measures of economic isolation without precedent, with further announcements expected next week.

    What do the positions of the other parties show about the cost of the closure?

    1. United Arab Emirates: Its state oil company had two vessels attacked in the strait and the government publicly blamed Iran, which shows that Gulf producers outside the war are absorbing its shipping costs.
    2. Iran: Its parliamentary committee converted the closure into a formal transit ban on the assets and equipment of hostile states, which shows the closure is now settled policy rather than episodic reprisal.
    3. United States: It has moved from strikes to a naval blockade of Iranian ports and a bar on Iranian oil sales, which shows the war has become an economic siege rather than a military campaign.
    4. Israel: It launched the war jointly with the United States in February and is named in Iran’s transit ban, which shows the strait is being used to impose costs directly on the belligerents.
    5. Limits of the evidence: These are the only national positions the reporting supplies, so the effect on Asian importers is documented through prices rather than through stated country positions.

    How exposed is India to a prolonged closure of the strait?

    1. Crude dependence: India imports over 85 percent of the crude oil it consumes and is the third largest crude importer in the world.
    2. Route concentration: Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait are among India’s largest suppliers, and cargoes from all four leave the Gulf through Hormuz.
    3. Gas contracts: Qatar supplies close to half of India’s liquefied natural gas under long term contracts, and every one of those cargoes transits the strait.
    4. Fertiliser inputs: Urea, ammonia and phosphatic raw material contracted from Oman, Saudi Arabia and Qatar move on the same route, which links the strait directly to the fertiliser subsidy bill.
    5. Seafarers: Indians form a large share of the global seafaring workforce and crew a substantial part of Gulf trade, so attacks on merchant shipping place Indian crews directly at risk.
    6. Price transmission: A sustained rise in crude prices widens the current account deficit, raises the oil import bill and feeds into domestic fuel and freight costs.
    7. Insurance and freight: War risk premiums on Gulf voyages rise sharply during a closure, which adds a cost to every cargo that does move.
    8. Remittances and diaspora: About nine million Indians live and work in the Gulf, so a prolonged war in the region carries an employment and remittance risk alongside the energy risk.

    Challenges to keeping the Strait of Hormuz open

    1. Narrow lanes inside territorial waters: The shipping lanes run through Iranian and Omani territorial seas, which lets a littoral state interfere with passage at short notice. e.g. Iranian forces seized the container ship MSC Aries near the strait in April 2024.
    2. Mines and fast attack craft: Sea mines and small armed boats can close a channel at very low cost against far more expensive warships. e.g. the mining of the frigate USS Samuel B. Roberts in 1988 triggered Operation Praying Mantis.
    3. Limited bypass pipeline capacity: Existing pipelines that avoid the strait can carry only a fraction of Gulf export volumes. e.g. Saudi Arabia’s East West pipeline to Yanbu and the Emirati line to Fujairah together fall well short of normal Hormuz throughput.
    4. Insurance and crew availability: War risk premiums and crew refusal can halt trade even where warships keep a route physically open. e.g. attacks on shipping in the Red Sea from late 2023 pushed premiums up several fold and diverted traffic around the Cape of Good Hope.
    5. Attribution difficulties in attacks at sea: Limpet mines and drones leave little evidence, which delays any collective response. e.g. the 2019 attacks on tankers near Fujairah were denied by Iran and never conclusively attributed.
    6. Escalation risk from convoy operations: Naval escorting draws external navies into direct contact with a littoral state’s forces. e.g. the reflagging of Kuwaiti tankers under Operation Earnest Will in 1987 led to repeated armed clashes.
    7. Thin strategic buffers for importers: Importing countries hold limited emergency stocks, so a closure of a few weeks becomes a fiscal event. e.g. India’s strategic petroleum reserves hold about 5.33 million tonnes, close to nine to ten days of imports.

    Conclusion

    Control of the Strait of Hormuz, and not the nuclear programme, now sets the terms of the war. Iran has converted a waterway into a bargaining instrument, and the United States has answered with a blockade it says it can sustain indefinitely and sanctions it says will be without precedent. Transit stands at two vessels a day against more than 130 before February, and reopening rests on sanctions relief and the release of frozen assets that neither side has conceded.

    Maritime Chokepoints and Global Energy Security

    1. About: A small number of narrow sea passages carry most of the world’s traded oil and gas, which makes energy security a function of a few points on the map.
    2. Strait of Hormuz: It carries roughly 20 million barrels of oil a day and the bulk of Qatari liquefied natural gas, and it has no adequate bypass.
    3. Strait of Malacca: It links the Indian Ocean to the South China Sea and carries a comparable volume of oil, mostly bound for China, Japan and South Korea.
    4. Bab el Mandeb: It connects the Gulf of Aden to the Red Sea and is the approach to the Suez Canal for Asia to Europe trade.
    5. Suez Canal and the SUMED pipeline: Together they move Gulf and Red Sea crude to the Mediterranean without the Cape route.
    6. Turkish Straits: The Bosphorus and the Dardanelles carry Russian and Caspian crude out of the Black Sea.
    7. Cape of Good Hope: It is the fallback route when Suez or Bab el Mandeb is unusable, adding roughly two weeks to an Asia to Europe voyage.
    8. India’s position: India is the third largest oil consumer and importer in the world, and its imports pass through Hormuz on the western side and Malacca on the eastern side.

    Legal Framework Governing Transit Through International Straits

    1. Article 3 of UNCLOS, 1982: Allows a coastal state a territorial sea of up to 12 nautical miles, which is why the Hormuz lanes fall within national waters.
    2. Article 37 of UNCLOS, 1982: Applies the transit passage regime to straits used for international navigation between one part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another.
    3. Article 38 of UNCLOS, 1982: Grants all ships and aircraft the right of transit passage, which shall not be impeded.
    4. Article 39 of UNCLOS, 1982: Requires ships in transit passage to proceed without delay and to refrain from any threat or use of force against the bordering state.
    5. Article 44 of UNCLOS, 1982: Bars states bordering straits from hampering transit passage and from suspending it.
    6. Article 45 of UNCLOS, 1982: Applies non suspendable innocent passage to straits excluded from the transit passage regime.
    7. SUA Convention, 1988: Criminalises seizure of and violence against ships and obliges parties to prosecute or extradite offenders.
    8. Article 51 of the United Nations Charter: Preserves the right of individual and collective self defence against an armed attack, which is the ground invoked for naval action.

    Back2Basics: Strait of Hormuz

    1. Type: It is a maritime chokepoint and the only sea route from the Persian Gulf to the open ocean.
    2. Connects: It joins the Persian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman and further with the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean.
    3. Littoral states: Iran lies to the north, and Oman and the United Arab Emirates lie to the south.
    4. Width: Its narrowest point is about 21 nautical miles, roughly 39 kilometres.
    5. Key islands: Qeshm, Hormuz and Larak are Iranian, and Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs are held by Iran and claimed by the United Arab Emirates.
    6. Peninsula on the southern shore: The Musandam peninsula belongs to Oman and is separated from the rest of the country by Emirati territory.
    7. Users: Saudi Arabia, Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain and Iran export their oil and gas through it.
    8. Volume: It handles roughly a fifth of the world’s petroleum liquids consumption and about a fifth of global liquefied natural gas trade.

    Government Initiatives for India’s Energy Security

    1. Indian Strategic Petroleum Reserves: Underground caverns at Visakhapatnam, Mangaluru and Padur hold about 5.33 million tonnes of crude for emergency use, with a second phase planned at Chandikhol and Padur.
    2. Diversification of crude sources: Refiners have expanded purchases from Russia, West Africa, the United States and Latin America to reduce dependence on Gulf cargoes.
    3. Chabahar port and the International North South Transport Corridor: These provide a route to Central Asia and Russia that avoids the Suez and Hormuz corridors.
    4. India Middle East Europe Economic Corridor: A rail and shipping corridor announced in 2023 to link India to the Gulf and Europe with reduced maritime dependence.
    5. National Green Hydrogen Mission: Targets 5 million tonnes of annual green hydrogen production by 2030 to displace imported fossil fuel in industry and transport.
    6. Ethanol Blended Petrol Programme: Raises the ethanol share in petrol to cut crude import volumes and the import bill.
    7. Open Acreage Licensing Policy and the Hydrocarbon Exploration and Licensing Policy: Expand domestic exploration acreage to raise indigenous production.
    8. Maritime India Vision 2030 and Sagarmala: Expand port capacity, coastal shipping and shipbuilding to strengthen India’s own maritime logistics.

    Key Facts about World Maritime Chokepoints

    1. Hormuz volume: Roughly 20 million barrels of oil a day pass through the Strait of Hormuz.
    2. Malacca volume: The Strait of Malacca carries a comparable oil volume and is the shortest route between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific.
    3. Suez Canal: Opened in 1869 and nationalised in 1956, it links the Red Sea to the Mediterranean.
    4. Panama Canal: Opened in 1914, it links the Atlantic and the Pacific and is constrained by fresh water availability at Gatun Lake.
    5. Bab el Mandeb: Its name means the Gate of Tears, and it separates Yemen from Djibouti and Eritrea.
    6. Turkish Straits regime: Transit is governed by the Montreux Convention of 1936, which regulates warship passage into the Black Sea.
    7. India’s maritime footprint: About 95 percent of India’s trade by volume and 70 percent by value moves by sea.
    8. Observance: World Maritime Day is observed by the International Maritime Organization in the last week of September.

    Challenges in India’s Energy Security

    1. Import dependence in crude: More than four fifths of consumption is met by imports, so any supply shock transmits straight to the fiscal position. e.g. the oil import bill crossed 130 billion dollars in a single year when Brent averaged above 100 dollars a barrel in 2022 and 2023.
    2. Concentration of gas supply: A single supplier accounts for close to half of contracted liquefied natural gas imports. e.g. the long term Qatari contracts renewed in 2024 run to 2048 and all of that volume transits Hormuz.
    3. Thin emergency stocks: Strategic reserves cover only a few days of consumption against the 90 day norm followed by International Energy Agency members. e.g. India’s reserves at Visakhapatnam, Mangaluru and Padur total about 5.33 million tonnes.
    4. Payment and sanctions exposure: Sanctions on suppliers disrupt settlement channels and shipping insurance for Indian refiners. e.g. tightened sanctions on Russian crude in 2025 forced refiners to switch cargoes and payment routes at short notice.
    5. Fertiliser and petrochemical linkage: Gas priced off oil raises the urea subsidy and petrochemical feedstock costs at the same time. e.g. imported urea contracted at 390 dollars a tonne this year illustrates how a Gulf disruption reaches farm input prices.
    6. Domestic production stagnation: Crude and gas output from ageing fields has not risen with demand. e.g. Mumbai High and the Krishna Godavari basin have seen declining production profiles despite repeated bid rounds.
    7. Renewable intermittency and storage gap: Solar and wind capacity growth is not matched by storage, which keeps thermal and imported fuel in the base load. e.g. peak evening demand in northern States is still met largely by coal and imported gas.

    Way Forward

    1. Expand strategic petroleum reserves: Complete the Chandikhol and Padur phase two caverns and move coverage towards the 90 day international norm.
    2. Diversify supply and routes: Extend term contracts to non Gulf suppliers and build storage and refuelling arrangements outside the Hormuz corridor.
    3. Invest in bypass connectivity: Operationalise Chabahar, the International North South Transport Corridor and the India Middle East Europe Economic Corridor so a single chokepoint does not carry all trade.
    4. Strengthen naval escort and maritime domain awareness: Sustain deployments and the Information Fusion Centre for the Indian Ocean Region to protect Indian flagged and Indian crewed shipping.
    5. Support seafarers and shipping insurance: Extend war risk cover arrangements and evacuation protocols for Indian crews on Gulf routes.
    6. Accelerate demand substitution: Raise ethanol blending, electric mobility and green hydrogen use to cut the volume of crude that must be imported at all.
    7. Build a price shock buffer in the Budget: Maintain an explicit fiscal cushion for the fuel and fertiliser subsidy so a chokepoint closure does not force mid year expenditure cuts.

    “[2026] Ships from which of the following countries have to cross the Strait of Hormuz to reach out to the Indian Ocean?

    1. Bahrain

    2. Syria

    3. Qatar

    4. Egypt

    (a) 1 and 2

    (b) 1 and 3

    (c) 2 and 3

    (d) 3 and 4

  • Registrar General notifies 40-question Census schedule with caste enumerated beyond SC and ST

    Why in the News

    The Registrar General and Census Commissioner of India has notified the 40 question schedule for the population enumeration phase of Census 2027, with caste recorded as an open declaration for the first time in independent India outside the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. The notification exposes two tensions. An open caste column stands against the State wise lists prepared in advance for recent State caste surveys, and eight identity fields drawn from the 2020 National Population Register schedule now sit inside an exercise conducted under the Census Act, 1948.

    What is the population enumeration schedule of Census 2027?

    1. About: The schedule is the questionnaire that census officers are legally authorised to put to every person residing in their assigned area.
    2. Issuing authority: It was notified by the Ministry of Home Affairs under the Census Act, 1948, on the authority of the Registrar General and Census Commissioner of India.
    3. Instrument of collection: Information is gathered through the household schedule, which records the particulars of every person residing in a household.
    4. Size: Census 2027 carries 40 questions against the 29 questions of the Census 2011 questionnaire.
    5. Placement in the exercise: The Census runs in two phases, Housing and House Listing Operations followed by Population Enumeration, and this schedule governs the second phase.
    6. The caste field: Question number 10 reads Scheduled Caste (SC), Scheduled Tribe (ST), Caste, and the enumerator records the caste as declared by the respondent.

    What is the National Population Register (NPR)?

    1. About: The NPR is the register of usual residents of the country, which is distinct from a register of citizens.
    2. Legal basis: It is prepared under the Citizenship (Registration of Citizens and Issue of National Identity Cards) Rules, 2003, framed under the Citizenship Act, 1955.

    What is the National Register of Indian Citizens?

    1. About: It is a register of citizens prepared by verifying the entries already recorded in the Population Register.
    2. Local tier: The Local Register of Indian Citizens holds the verified particulars of persons within the jurisdiction of a Local Registrar.

    What is the Socio Economic and Caste Census (SECC) 2011?

    1. About: The SECC was a household survey of socio economic status and caste conducted alongside Census 2011.
    2. Statutory position: It was run as a survey outside the purview of the Census Act, 1948, carried no statutory backing, and its caste data were never released by the government.

    What are Housing and House Listing Operations?

    1. About: This is the first phase of the Census, which lists every building and household and records housing conditions and household assets.
    2. Current status: The phase is due to end on 30 September and has been completed in most States except West Bengal, Assam and Manipur.

    What is a reference date in a Census?

    1. About: The reference date is the fixed instant to which every entry relates, so a person is counted by their situation at that moment rather than on the day the enumerator visits.
    2. Dates notified: It is 12 a.m. on 1 October for the areas enumerated early and 12 a.m. on 1 March 2027 for the rest of the country.

    What is self enumeration in the Census?

    1. About: Self enumeration allows a household to fill its own schedule through a digital application before any enumerator visit.
    2. Window notified: The option is available from 17 to 31 August, before house to house population enumeration begins.

    Who is the Registrar General and Census Commissioner of India (RG&CCI)?

    1. About: The RG&CCI is the authority under the Ministry of Home Affairs that conducts the Census and notifies the questions census officers are authorised to ask.
    2. Other charge: The same office runs the Civil Registration System and the Sample Registration System.

    What are the new or modified questions in the Census 2027 schedule?

    1. Spouse name: The name of the respondent’s spouse is recorded for the first time.
    2. Nationality as declared: Nationality is recorded as stated by the respondent.
    3. Father’s particulars: Details of the respondent’s father are recorded.
    4. Mother’s particulars: Details of the respondent’s mother are recorded.
    5. Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe, Caste: The existing SC and ST question is modified to add an open caste field.
    6. Literacy and digital literacy: Digital literacy is added to the existing literacy question.
    7. Highest educational level attained and stream or discipline: The stream or discipline of study is recorded along with the level attained.
    8. Place of COVID 19 vaccination: The place where the person received a COVID 19 vaccine is recorded.
    9. Total number of bank accounts: The count of bank accounts held is recorded.
    10. Mobile number: The mobile telephone number is recorded where available.
    11. Aadhaar number: The Aadhaar number is recorded where available.
    12. Voter ID number: The voter identity card number is recorded where available.
    13. Passport number: The passport number is recorded for Indian passport holders.
    14. Availability of driving licence: Whether the person holds a driving licence is recorded.
    15. Permanent residential address: The permanent residential address is also listed among the fields added for the first time.
    16. Scale of the change: Thirteen questions or data fields are entirely new against the 29 question Census 2011 schedule, and 14 questions are new or modified when the caste field is counted as a modification.

    Which of these questions were also part of the 2020 NPR schedule?

    1. Nationality as declared: Declared nationality was sought in the NPR schedule notified in 2020.
    2. Father’s particulars: Particulars of the father were part of the same NPR schedule.
    3. Mother’s particulars: Particulars of the mother were part of the same NPR schedule.
    4. Mobile number: The mobile number was collected under the NPR schedule.
    5. Aadhaar number: The Aadhaar number was collected under the NPR schedule.
    6. Voter ID number: The voter identity card number was collected under the NPR schedule.
    7. Passport number: The passport number was collected under the NPR schedule.
    8. Driving licence: Availability of a driving licence was collected under the NPR schedule.

    Why does an open caste column divide opinion against a list prepared in advance?

    1. The method notified: The enumerator records the caste as declared by the respondent, because the field is an open column with no fixed set of options.
    2. Evidence from the pre test: The pre test for population enumeration ran from 1 to 20 July in 16 States and Union Territories, where respondents outside the reserved categories recorded caste in an open column.
    3. The alternative sought: The Congress general secretary stated that the caste question was widely expected to carry a State wise list prepared in advance, as in the Bihar and Telangana caste surveys, with the response merely ticked.
    4. Charge on intent: The absence of such a list has been described as raising serious doubts on intent.
    5. Record of the open column: The same method in the 2011 SECC returned over 46 lakh different caste names, largely owing to differences in what people understand by caste.
    6. Historical benchmark: The 1931 Census, the last to enumerate caste, recorded 4,147 castes.
    7. Government position: The 2011 SECC caste data have been held over the last decade to be unreliable because of errors in data collection.

    How does the overlap with the NPR schedule reopen the citizenship question?

    1. Statutory link: The Citizenship Rules, 2003 provide for preparation of a Population Register and envisage its verification for preparation of the National Register of Indian Citizens.
    2. Doubtful entries: Rule 4 provides for marking the particulars of individuals whose citizenship is considered doubtful during verification, for further inquiry.
    3. Parental birth details: The 2020 NPR schedule sought the date and place of birth of a person’s father and mother, including district and State, and the country of birth where they were born outside India.
    4. The earlier controversy: Opposition parties and civil society groups argued in 2019 and 2020 that the NPR was a precursor to a nationwide NRC and that parental birth details could later be used to determine citizenship.
    5. State resistance: Several Opposition ruled States passed resolutions opposing the NPR exercise.
    6. Political amplification: The Union Home Minister had repeatedly spoken of a nationwide NRC and sought to link it with the Citizenship Amendment Act through a stated chronology.
    7. Assurance on record: The Prime Minister said in December 2019 that the government had not taken any decision to conduct the NRC, and the Home Ministry reiterated that position on several occasions.
    8. Present position: The Census questions return without any notification for an NPR and without any announced decision to undertake a nationwide NRC.

    What is the current status of the NPR exercise?

    1. First collection: NPR data were first collected in 2010, along with the houselisting phase of the 2011 Census.
    2. Update: The register was updated through a door to door exercise in 2015.
    3. Revival: The Registrar General revived the NPR through a notification in August 2019, to be carried out with the houselisting phase of the 2021 Census.
    4. Postponement: That exercise was postponed because of the COVID 19 pandemic.
    5. Budget provision: The Union Budget 2026 to 2027 allocated Rs 6,000 crore under the head Census, Survey and Statistics and Registrar General of India, for Census 2027 and the NPR.
    6. No fresh notification: The houselisting phase was notified for 1 April to 30 September and made no mention of the NPR, and no fresh NPR exercise has been notified.
    7. Official explanation: A Home Ministry official stated that the allocation followed provisions made in previous budgets since 2020, to keep funds available if and when the government decides to conduct the NPR.

    How is Census 2027 being sequenced across the country?

    1. Early start: Population enumeration begins on Monday in Ladakh and the snow bound areas of Jammu and Kashmir, Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh.
    2. Rest of the country: Enumeration in the remaining States and Union Territories will take place in February 2027.
    3. Self enumeration window: The self enumeration option runs from 17 to 31 August, before house to house enumeration starts.
    4. Reference dates: The count relates to 12 a.m. on 1 October for the early areas and to 12 a.m. on 1 March 2027 for the rest of the country.
    5. First phase status: Housing and House Listing Operations end on 30 September and are complete in most States except West Bengal, Assam and Manipur.
    6. Historical marker: This is the first Census since 1931 to enumerate caste and the first in independent India to record caste beyond the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.

    Challenges to caste enumeration in Census 2027

    1. Uncontrolled caste nomenclature: An open column accepts whatever name a respondent offers, so sub castes, gotras, sect names and surnames enter the record as separate castes. e.g. the 2011 SECC returned over 46 lakh caste names against the 4,147 castes recorded in the 1931 Census.
    2. No mapping to State lists: Names collected without a State list cannot be matched to State Other Backward Classes schedules that decide reservation benefits. e.g. Bihar’s 2023 caste survey worked from a fixed list of 214 castes, which allowed direct tabulation of shares.
    3. Enumerator discretion in the field: Recording is left to a field enumerator, usually a school teacher, with limited training in caste classification. e.g. the 2011 SECC required years of post survey classification by an Expert Group and still yielded data the government declined to release.
    4. Privacy exposure of identity numbers: Aadhaar, voter identity, passport and mobile numbers create a single linked identity record collected by a field officer. e.g. the Supreme Court in K.S. Puttaswamy versus Union of India (2017) required legality, legitimate aim and proportionality for any state collection of personal data.
    5. Association with citizenship verification: Eight fields repeat the NPR schedule that triggered protests in 2019 and 2020, which raises the risk of non response in minority and migrant households. e.g. several Opposition ruled State assemblies passed resolutions against the NPR in 2020.
    6. Operational strain of a longer schedule: Forty questions against 29 lengthens every household visit and raises enumerator fatigue and transcription error. e.g. the first phase is still incomplete in West Bengal, Assam and Manipur with six weeks left on the notified deadline.
    7. Contestation of the published count: Caste totals feed directly into claims on reservation, so each figure becomes a subject of political dispute. e.g. Bihar’s survey finding that Extremely Backward and Backward Classes form about 63 percent of the State’s population immediately produced demands to breach the 50 percent ceiling.

    Conclusion

    The notification settles the method of the caste count and leaves its reliability open. An open column repeats the design that produced 46 lakh caste names in 2011, and eight identity fields carry the NPR schedule into a statutory Census that no NPR notification accompanies. Population enumeration begins on Monday in the snow bound areas, with the rest of the country following in February 2027.

    Population Data Systems in India

    1. About: India measures its population through one complete decennial count, one continuous registration system, and a set of large sample surveys that fill the years between counts.
    2. Census: The Census is a complete headcount conducted since 1872 and synchronously since 1881, and it has run every ten years without interruption until the 2021 round was postponed.
    3. Civil Registration System: The system continuously records births and deaths under the Registration of Births and Deaths Act, 1969, through State registrars.
    4. Sample Registration System: This large scale sample survey supplies annual estimates of birth rate, death rate and infant mortality rate between two Censuses.
    5. National Population Register: The NPR is a register of usual residents maintained under the Citizenship Rules, 2003, and is not a statistical product.
    6. Sample surveys: The National Sample Survey and the National Family Health Survey supply consumption, employment and health estimates that draw their sampling frames from the Census.
    7. Digital shift: Census 2027 is the first Census to be conducted digitally, using a mobile application for enumerators and a self enumeration portal for households.

    Statutory and Constitutional Framework Governing the Census and Population Registers

    1. Article 246: Distributes legislative power between the Union and the States through the three lists of the Seventh Schedule.
    2. Entry 69 of the Union List: Places Census exclusively within the legislative competence of Parliament.
    3. Census Act, 1948: Provides the legal basis for conducting the Census and for the appointment, powers and duties of census officers.
    4. Section 3 of the Census Act, 1948: Empowers the Central Government to take a census whenever it considers necessary and to notify its intention.
    5. Section 8 of the Census Act, 1948: Obliges every occupier and every person to answer the questions put by a census officer.
    6. Section 15 of the Census Act, 1948: Makes census records confidential, keeps them out of public inspection and bars their use as evidence.
    7. Section 14A of the Citizenship Act, 1955: Empowers the Centre to compulsorily register every citizen, issue national identity cards and maintain a National Register of Indian Citizens.
    8. Rule 3(4) of the Citizenship Rules, 2003: Allows the Centre to fix a date by which the Population Register is to be prepared, by collecting information on all persons usually residing within a Local Registrar’s jurisdiction.
    9. Rule 3(5) of the Citizenship Rules, 2003: Provides that the Local Register of Indian Citizens will contain the details of persons after verification from the Population Register.
    10. Rule 4 of the Citizenship Rules, 2003: Provides for marking the particulars of individuals whose citizenship is considered doubtful during verification, for further inquiry.

    Laws and Rules Governing Census and Population Data

    1. Census Act, 1948: Governs the conduct of the Census, the powers of census officers and the confidentiality of individual returns.
    2. Census Rules, 1990: Provide the operational detail for appointment of census officers, forms, schedules and the handling of census records.
    3. Registration of Births and Deaths Act, 1969: Makes registration of births and deaths compulsory and establishes the Civil Registration System.
    4. Registration of Births and Deaths (Amendment) Act, 2023: Makes the birth certificate a single document for admission, employment and voter registration, and provides for national databases of registered births and deaths.
    5. Citizenship Act, 1955: Governs acquisition and determination of citizenship, and carries the registration mandate in Section 14A.
    6. Citizenship (Registration of Citizens and Issue of National Identity Cards) Rules, 2003: Provide for the Population Register, the Local, Sub District, District, State and National Registers of Indian Citizens, and the marking of doubtful citizenship.
    7. Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and Other Subsidies, Benefits and Services) Act, 2016: Governs the collection and use of Aadhaar numbers and restricts their use to notified purposes.
    8. Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023: Governs the processing of digital personal data and allows the Centre to exempt State instrumentalities from specified obligations.
    9. Collection of Statistics Act, 2008: Governs the collection of statistics on economic, demographic and social matters by the Centre, States and local bodies.

    Back2Basics: Census of India

    1. First census: The first census was taken in 1872 in a non synchronous manner during the tenure of Viceroy Lord Mayo.
    2. First synchronous census: The first synchronous census was held in 1881 under Viceroy Lord Ripon.
    3. Frequency: The Census has been conducted every ten years without a break since 1881, and Census 2011 was the fifteenth national census and the seventh since Independence.
    4. Administering office: The Office of the Registrar General and Census Commissioner of India was created in 1949 and functions under the Ministry of Home Affairs.
    5. Legal basis: The exercise is conducted under the Census Act, 1948, and Census is Entry 69 of the Union List.
    6. Last caste count: The 1931 Census was the last to enumerate caste in full, recording 4,147 castes.
    7. Census 2011 headline figures: Population stood at 121.09 crore, decadal growth at 17.7 percent, density at 382 persons per square kilometre, sex ratio at 943 and literacy at 74.04 percent.
    8. Census 2027 markers: It is the first digital Census, the first to enumerate caste since 1931, and it carries two reference dates, 1 October 2026 for snow bound areas and 1 March 2027 for the rest of the country.

    Government Initiatives Related to Population Data

    1. Census 2027 digital application: Enumerators record household and personal particulars on a mobile application instead of paper schedules.
    2. Self enumeration portal: Households can complete their own schedule online ahead of the enumerator’s visit.
    3. Civil Registration System portal: Births and deaths are registered online through a centralised portal, with certificates issued digitally.
    4. Sample Registration System: Provides annual vital rate estimates for States and districts between Censuses.
    5. National Population Register: Maintains a register of usual residents under the Citizenship Rules, 2003.
    6. Aadhaar: Provides a unique identity number used to authenticate beneficiaries of subsidies and services.
    7. National Data and Analytics Platform: A NITI Aayog platform that puts government datasets in a standardised, machine readable form for public use.

    Key Facts about the Census of India

    1. First post Independence census: The first census of independent India was conducted in 1951.
    2. Phases of Census 2011: House Listing Operations ran from April to September 2010 and Population Enumeration from 9 to 28 February 2011.
    3. Population recorded in 2011: The count stood at 121,08,54,977 persons.
    4. State extremes in 2011: Uttar Pradesh was the most populous State, Sikkim the least populous, Kerala recorded the highest literacy and Bihar the lowest.
    5. Density extremes in 2011: Bihar recorded the highest density among States at 1,106 persons per square kilometre and Arunachal Pradesh the lowest at 17.
    6. Frozen delimitation: Lok Sabha seat allocation remains fixed on the 1971 Census until the first census taken after 2026.
    7. Observance: World Population Day is observed on 11 July every year.

    Challenges in India’s Population Data System

    1. Delay in the decennial count: A postponed Census leaves the country without a fresh headcount for far longer than the ten year cycle allows. e.g. the 2021 Census was deferred and the next reference date is 1 March 2027, a gap of sixteen years.
    2. Outdated policy denominators: Welfare entitlements are calculated on population shares that are more than a decade old. e.g. National Food Security Act, 2013 coverage still rests on 2011 population, and estimates placed before the Supreme Court in 2021 put the excluded number at about 10 crore people.
    3. Under registration of births and deaths: Incomplete civil registration prevents the Census from being cross checked against a continuous record. e.g. excess mortality during the COVID 19 pandemic could not be settled because registration completeness varied sharply across States.
    4. Weak measurement of migration: The Census captures migration by last residence and misses seasonal and circular movement. e.g. the 2011 Census counted about 45.6 crore internal migrants, yet in 2020 no State held a usable register of returning migrant workers.
    5. Caste data gap: The absence of a modern caste count forces policy to rely on pre Independence figures. e.g. the Mandal Commission derived its estimate of Other Backward Classes at about 52 percent from the 1931 Census.
    6. Data privacy architecture: Collection of identity numbers by a field officer proceeds without an independent oversight body in place. e.g. the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 permits the Centre to exempt State instrumentalities from key obligations by notification.
    7. Delayed release and access: Long gaps between collection and release reduce the value of the data for planning. e.g. SECC 2011 caste data were never released at all.

    Way Forward

    1. Publish a State wise caste directory: Prepare and release a standardised caste list for each State before tabulation, so open column returns can be mapped consistently.
    2. Legislate a fixed census calendar: Amend the Census Act, 1948 to bind the Centre to a stated reference date and a stated release schedule for each decennial round.
    3. Separate the statistical count from citizenship registers: Notify expressly that data collected under the Census Act, 1948 will not be used to prepare or verify any register under the Citizenship Rules, 2003.
    4. Strengthen the Civil Registration System: Raise registration completeness to near universal levels so annual vital statistics reduce dependence on a ten year count.
    5. Constitute an independent data audit: Route quality assurance of the caste and identity fields through the National Statistical Commission before publication.
    6. Release anonymised unit level data: Publish anonymised microdata on a fixed timetable so researchers can test tabulations rather than accept them.
    7. Train enumerators on caste recording: Run a dedicated module for enumerators on recording caste responses and on handling refusals, before the February 2027 round.

    “[2009] Consider the following statements :

    1. Between Census 1951 and Census 2001, the density of the population of India has increased more than three times.

    2. Between Census 1951 and Census 2001, the annual growth rate (exponential) of the population of India has doubled.

    Which of the statements given abova is/are correct ?

    (a) 1 only

    (b) 2 only

    (c) Both 1 and 2

    (d) Neither 1 nor 2

  • Kashmir’s willow bat industry strains under cleft shortage, smuggling and wetland loss despite the 2025 GI tag

    Why in the News

    Kashmir’s ₹700 crore cricket bat industry supports around 50,000 livelihoods, but faces a shortage of quality willow. English willow prices have risen from ₹300 to ₹4,250 per foot since 2021.

    Key Facts

    1. Raw material: Mainly Salix alba (English willow).
    2. Industry: 195 registered manufacturers and around 150 cleft dealers.
    3. Production: Around 30 lakh bats annually.
    4. Trees: Nearly 1.2 lakh mature trees are felled annually.
    5. Maturity: Willow requires about 12 to 15 years to reach harvest maturity.
    6. Smuggling: Over 25 lakh clefts are reportedly smuggled out annually.
    7. GI Tag: Kashmir willow bats received a GI tag in 2025.

    Why is the industry facing a crisis?

    • Scarcity of quality willow
    • Wetland and spring degradation
    • Smuggling of clefts
    • Long 12 to 15 year plantation cycle
    • Inconsistent timber quality

    What does the GI Tag do?

    • Protects the Kashmir willow name from misuse.
    • Enhances product reputation and market value.
    • Provides legal protection to registered producers.
    • Does not increase willow supply or shorten the growth cycle.

    Government Response

    • Plantation of 2.2 lakh willow trees across 200 hectares.
    • Introduction of improved willow clones.
    • Identification of new plantation sites.
    • Greater farmer participation and scientific plantation management.

    Prelims Pointers

    • GI Act: Geographical Indications of Goods (Registration and Protection) Act, 1999.
    • First Indian GI: Darjeeling Tea, 2004.
    • GI validity: 10 years, renewable indefinitely.
    • GI ownership: Collective, not individually transferable.
    • Kashmir willow species: Salix alba.

    [2018] India enacted The Geographical Indications of Goods (Registration and Protection) Act, 1999 in order to comply with the obligations to
    (a) ILO
    (b) IMF
    (c) UNCTAD
    (d) WTO

  • Monsoon session passes Bills with minimal deliberation as legislative scrutiny weakens

    Why in the news?

    The monsoon session that began on 20 July passed nine of its eleven Bills with only the minister in charge speaking, and recorded a productivity rate of 15 per cent. Legislation that redraws Centre State powers over minerals therefore cleared Parliament without the examination the House exists to provide. Two further proposals, on delimitation and on foreign contributions, were stalled rather than scrutinised, and both remain alive.

    What is the Pre-Legislative Consultation Policy, 2014?

    1. About: It is a policy of the Department of Legal Affairs requiring every department to place a draft Bill in the public domain before it is introduced in Parliament.
    2. What must be disclosed: The draft, an explanatory note in simple language, the financial implications, and an estimate of the impact on the environment, fundamental rights and livelihoods.
    3. Consultation period: A minimum of thirty days is to be given for public feedback, and a summary of the responses received is to be published.
    4. Link to the House: The summary of feedback is to be placed before the departmentally related standing committee that examines the Bill.
    5. Status: The policy is executive and not statutory, so it carries no enforcement mechanism and departments comply selectively.

    What is a Joint Parliamentary Committee?

    1. About: It is an ad hoc committee constituted by a motion adopted in one House and concurred in by the other, carrying members from both Houses.
    2. Function: It examines a specific Bill or subject, takes evidence from officials, experts and the public, and reports its recommendations to Parliament.
    3. Composition: Membership is proportional to party strength, which gives the ruling party a majority within the committee.
    4. Binding force: Its recommendations are advisory, and the government may accept or reject them when the Bill returns to the House.

    What is delimitation?

    1. About: It is the redrawing of the boundaries and the allocation of parliamentary and Assembly constituencies to reflect population change.
    2. Machinery: A Delimitation Commission constituted under a law made by Parliament carries it out, and its orders cannot be called in question in any court.
    3. The freeze: The 42nd Amendment froze seat allocation on the 1971 Census, and the 84th Amendment, 2001 extended that freeze until the first Census taken after 2026.
    4. Why it is contested: States that reduced fertility fastest stand to lose relative weight in the Lok Sabha once the freeze lapses, which makes the design of the exercise a federal question.

    What is the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act, 2010?

    1. About: It regulates the acceptance and use of foreign contributions and foreign hospitality by persons, associations and companies in India.
    2. Mechanism: It requires registration or prior permission from the Ministry of Home Affairs, and after the 2020 amendment every contribution must first be received in a designated State Bank of India, New Delhi account.
    3. Restrictions: The 2020 amendment barred the transfer of foreign contributions to any other person and capped administrative expenses at 20 per cent.
    4. Why it recurs: Cancellations and refusals of renewal have repeatedly been challenged as a control on civil society rather than a check on funding.

    How is parliamentary productivity measured?

    1. About: It is the ratio of the time a House actually transacts its listed business to the time for which it was scheduled to sit.
    2. What lowers it: Adjournments caused by disruption, sittings cut short, and business dropped without being taken up.
    3. What it does not capture: A Bill passed in minutes without discussion raises legislative output while reducing scrutiny, so productivity and deliberation can move in opposite directions.

    What did the monsoon session pass and what did it leave pending?

    1. Session dates: The session began on 20 July.
    2. Volume and debate: Nine of the eleven Bills passed had only the minister concerned speaking on them.
    3. Productivity: The session recorded a productivity rate of 15 per cent.
    4. National song Bill: A Bill was passed facilitating the operation of a February guideline of the Ministry of Home Affairs on mandatory singing of the full version of Vande Mataram, the national song, at state functions.
    5. Mines and minerals: The Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Bill was passed amid Opposition protests.
    6. Examinations: The session legislated stronger measures against malpractices in examinations, in an effort to address student anger.
    7. Delimitation: An attempt to rush through a new architecture for the delimitation process did not entirely materialise.
    8. Foreign contributions: The Bill to amend the law on foreign contributions was not passed and stands referred to a Joint Parliamentary Committee.
    9. Both alive: Neither the delimitation proposal nor the foreign contribution amendments have lapsed, and both can be brought back.

    Why did the session’s political context override its legislative function?

    1. The trigger: The student protest demanding the resignation of the Union Education Minister gathered momentum just as the session began.
    2. The governing party’s expectation: The ruling party entered the session with the context and the confidence to make it a theatre of triumph, powered by its victory in the West Bengal Assembly election.
    3. What reversed it: Public reaction to the crackdown on the protesting students by the Delhi Police, with police personnel filmed assaulting and attempting to sexually abuse young people.
    4. Accountability gap: No accountability has yet been fixed for those blatant violations of the law by police personnel.
    5. Absent leadership: The Prime Minister and the Union Home Minister barely attended the proceedings.
    6. The one resolution: The Union Education Minister eventually resigned during the session.

    What does hurried lawmaking do to federalism?

    1. The specific Bill: The mineral law amendment was passed without addressing its potential to undermine federalism.
    2. Whose rights were skipped: The concerns of those living on resource rich land were not examined during its passage.
    3. The pattern: Hurried lawmaking has accompanied a continuing expansion of the powers of the central government at the cost of States and local communities.
    4. Why deliberation matters here: A Bill that redistributes power between the Union and the States requires the States to be heard, which only committee examination provides.
    5. The missing step: No all party meeting and no consultation with State Chief Ministers preceded either this Bill or the delimitation proposal.

    Why does a single minister speaking on a Bill amount to a scrutiny failure?

    1. What passage then means: The House records its assent without testing the Bill against any competing view or amendment.
    2. Whose loss it is: The electorate is deprived of its representatives’ scrutiny, which is the service a legislature exists to deliver.
    3. Disruption as an alibi: Disruption is routinely blamed, but a 15 per cent productivity rate points to a structural failure rather than an episodic one.
    4. Committee substitution: Referral to a committee is the standard remedy for a truncated floor debate, and it was used for only one of these Bills.
    5. Consequence for the statute: A Bill passed without debate leaves no legislative record from which courts can read its purpose when it is later challenged.

    Is a stalled Bill a win for parliamentary scrutiny?

    1. The case for the Opposition: It prevented passage of the delimitation architecture and the foreign contribution amendments without examination.
    2. The case against triumph: Blocking a Bill is not the same as examining it, and both proposals remain alive for reintroduction on the same terms.
    3. The committee risk: The Joint Parliamentary Committee on the foreign contribution Bill can be reduced to a mere numbers game in which the majority records its own view.
    4. The reversibility point: Political circumstances turn rapidly, as the governing party discovered within this very session.
    5. What is actually needed: An all party meeting, circulation of draft legislation and consultation with State Chief Ministers, none of which a stalling tactic delivers.
    6. The framing error: Treating the House as a gladiatorial arena where one side vanquishes the other removes the possibility of a collective solution.

    What would genuine consultation on these two proposals look like?

    1. All party meeting: The Centre convening a meeting of all parties before introducing the delimitation architecture.
    2. Draft in the public domain: Circulation of the draft legislation so that affected parties can respond before introduction rather than after passage.
    3. Consulting the States: Consultation with State Chief Ministers, since delimitation redistributes representation between States.
    4. Substance in committee: The Joint Parliamentary Committee on the foreign contribution Bill taking evidence from affected organisations rather than voting on party lines.
    5. Transparency of feedback: Publication of the responses received and the reasons for accepting or rejecting each substantive objection.

    Challenges to Parliamentary Scrutiny of Legislation

    1. Falling committee referrals: The share of Bills sent to departmentally related standing committees has collapsed, e.g. about 16 per cent of Bills were referred in the 16th Lok Sabha against 71 per cent in the 15th.
    2. Passage without debate: Bills clear the House in minutes when it is in disorder, e.g. nine of the eleven Bills of this monsoon session were passed with only the minister in charge speaking.
    3. The Money Bill route: Certifying a Bill as a Money Bill removes the Rajya Sabha’s power to amend it, e.g. the Aadhaar Act, 2016, whose certification was referred to a larger Bench in Rojer Mathew v. South Indian Bank (2019).
    4. Ordinance dependence: The executive legislates between sessions and seeks ratification later, e.g. the Supreme Court in Krishna Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar (2017) held that repeated re promulgation of ordinances is a fraud on the Constitution.
    5. Shrinking sitting days: The House now sits far fewer days than in its early decades, e.g. average annual sittings have fallen from over 120 days in the 1950s to around 60 days in recent years.
    6. Anti defection chill: The Tenth Schedule ties a member’s vote to the party whip, which removes the incentive to argue a case on the floor, e.g. a member voting against a party direction on a Bill faces disqualification.
    7. No review after enactment: No standing mechanism examines whether an enacted law achieved its stated purpose, e.g. the Pre-Legislative Consultation Policy, 2014 carries no compliance audit and is bypassed routinely.

    Conclusion

    A session that passed nine of eleven Bills with a single speaker each and closed at 15 per cent productivity did not fail merely because of disruption; it failed because passage was decoupled from examination. Blocking two proposals gave the Opposition a tactical result without restoring scrutiny, since both remain available for reintroduction unchanged. What must change is procedure rather than temper: mandatory committee referral, circulation of draft legislation, and consultation with the States before any Bill that alters their powers is introduced.

    What is Executive Accountability to the Legislature?

    1. About: It is the principle that the council of ministers holds office only while it retains the confidence of the popularly elected House and must answer to it for every executive act.
    2. Rationale: In a parliamentary system the executive is drawn from the legislature, so scrutiny by the House is the only continuous check between two elections.
    3. Collective responsibility: Article 75(3) makes the council of ministers collectively responsible to the Lok Sabha, which is the constitutional root of the principle.
    4. Question Hour and Zero Hour: Members question ministers on administrative action, and raise urgent matters without prior notice.
    5. Motions: Adjournment motions, calling attention notices, censure motions and the no confidence motion allow the House to force a discussion or remove the government.
    6. Financial control: Cut motions, the demands for grants, and the Comptroller and Auditor General’s reports examined by the Public Accounts Committee control the executive’s use of money.
    7. Committee scrutiny: Departmentally related standing committees, joint committees and select committees examine Bills, budgets and departmental performance away from the floor.

    Key Concerns Regarding Legislative Oversight

    1. Guillotine on budget scrutiny: Most demands for grants are voted without discussion when the guillotine is applied at the end of the budget session.
    2. Truncated Question Hour: Question Hour is frequently lost to disruption or curtailed by the presiding officer, which removes the routine accountability mechanism.
    3. Committee reports without follow up: Recommendations are advisory, and no mechanism tracks whether the government acted on them.
    4. Weak research support: Individual members lack dedicated legislative research staff to interrogate a technical Bill.
    5. Party control over speech: The whip system converts a member’s vote into a party decision, which removes the incentive to examine a Bill independently.
    6. Declining sittings: Fewer sitting days compress every function of oversight into a shorter window each year.

    Constitutional Framework Governing Parliamentary Lawmaking and Oversight

    1. Article 75(3): Makes the council of ministers collectively responsible to the House of the People.
    2. Article 79: Constitutes Parliament as the President, the Council of States and the House of the People.
    3. Article 85: Requires that six months not elapse between two sittings, and governs prorogation and dissolution.
    4. Article 93: Provides for the Speaker and Deputy Speaker of the House of the People.
    5. Article 100: Governs voting, the quorum of one tenth of the total membership, and the effect of vacancies.
    6. Article 105: Confers freedom of speech in Parliament and the privileges of the Houses and their members.
    7. Article 107: Governs the introduction and passing of Bills in both Houses.
    8. Article 108: Provides for a joint sitting of both Houses to resolve a deadlock over a Bill.
    9. Articles 109 and 110: Define a Money Bill and confine the Rajya Sabha to recommendations on it.
    10. Article 111: Governs assent, withholding of assent and the return of a Bill by the President.
    11. Article 117: Requires the President’s recommendation for financial Bills.
    12. Article 118: Empowers each House to make rules of procedure for the conduct of its business.
    13. Article 122: Bars courts from inquiring into proceedings of Parliament on the ground of irregularity of procedure.
    14. Article 82: Requires readjustment of seats and constituencies after every Census, which is the basis of delimitation.
    15. Article 148: Establishes the Comptroller and Auditor General, whose reports anchor financial oversight.
    16. Tenth Schedule: Provides for disqualification on the ground of defection, which binds a member to the party whip.

    Back2Basics: Parliamentary Committees in India

    1. Constitutional basis: Article 105 and Article 118 supply the privileges and the rule making power under which committees function.
    2. Two broad types: Standing committees, which are permanent and reconstituted every year, and ad hoc committees, which cease to exist once they report.
    3. Financial committees: The Public Accounts Committee, the Estimates Committee and the Committee on Public Undertakings.
    4. Public Accounts Committee: Constituted in 1921, it has 22 members and is chaired by convention by a member of the Opposition.
    5. Departmentally related standing committees: Introduced in 1993, now 24 in number, each with 31 members drawn from both Houses.
    6. Ad hoc committees: Select committees of one House and joint committees of both Houses, constituted to examine a particular Bill or subject.
    7. Nature of reports: Committee recommendations are recommendatory and do not bind the government.
    8. Value of the forum: Committees work outside the glare of the House, which allows cross party agreement that floor debate rarely produces.

    Government Initiatives for Legislative Process and Transparency

    1. Pre-Legislative Consultation Policy, 2014: Requires publication of draft Bills with an explanatory note and a minimum thirty day window for public feedback.
    2. National e-Vidhan Application (NeVA): Makes legislatures paperless by digitising notices, questions, bulletins and Bills for members.
    3. One Nation One Application initiative: Brings all State legislatures and Parliament onto a common digital platform for legislative business.
    4. Digital Sansad: Provides public access to debates, member profiles, questions and legislative documents in searchable form.
    5. Parliamentary Research and Information Support to Members (PRISM): Supplies research responses to members on subjects of their choice through the Parliament Library.
    6. Parliamentary Research and Training Institute for Democracies (PRIDE): Trains members and legislature staff in parliamentary procedure and legislative drafting.

    Key Facts about the Parliament of India

    1. Composition: The President, the Rajya Sabha with a maximum of 250 members and the Lok Sabha with a maximum of 550 members drawn from States and Union Territories.
    2. Sessions: Three sessions each year by convention, namely budget, monsoon and winter, with the six month rule set by Article 85.
    3. Quorum: One tenth of the total membership of the House, under Article 100.
    4. Joint sitting: Provided by Article 108 and used three times, for the Dowry Prohibition Bill in 1961, the Banking Service Commission Repeal Bill in 1978 and the Prevention of Terrorism Bill in 2002.
    5. Departmentally related standing committees: Introduced in 1993 and now numbering 24.
    6. Anti defection law: Introduced by the 52nd Amendment, 1985 through the Tenth Schedule, and amended in 2003 to remove the split exemption.
    7. New building: Parliament shifted to the new building in September 2023, with the Lok Sabha chamber seating 888 members.

    Challenges in Ensuring Legislative Scrutiny in India

    1. Disruption as a strategy: Both sides use disorder to avoid a debate they expect to lose, e.g. the monsoon session of 2026 closed at 15 per cent productivity with the presiding officers unable to restore order.
    2. Budget passed without discussion: The guillotine forces demands for grants through in a single vote, e.g. most ministry demands are guillotined every year with only a handful discussed on the floor.
    3. Weak private member legislation: Private member Bills are rarely taken up and almost never passed, e.g. only fourteen private member Bills have become law since 1952.
    4. Vacancy in the Deputy Speaker’s office: Article 93 requires the post to be filled, and prolonged vacancies weaken the presiding structure, e.g. the office remained vacant through the entire 17th Lok Sabha.
    5. Thin State legislature calendars: Many State Assemblies sit for a fraction of the days Parliament sits, e.g. several State Assemblies have recorded fewer than twenty sitting days in a year.
    6. Limited member capacity: Members lack dedicated legislative staff to examine technical Bills, e.g. a data protection or nuclear liability Bill reaches the floor with no independent member analysis available.
    7. Delayed committee constitution: Committees are reconstituted late in the parliamentary year, which shortens the time available to examine Bills referred to them.

    Way Forward

    1. Mandatory referral rule: Amend the rules of procedure so that every Bill stands referred to a committee unless the House expressly resolves otherwise, with reasons recorded.
    2. Statutory pre legislative consultation: Convert the 2014 policy into a binding requirement, with introduction barred until the consultation summary is tabled.
    3. Fixed legislative calendar: Adopt a minimum number of sitting days each year, fixed in advance, so that the executive cannot compress the session.
    4. Independent scheduling authority: Vest the power to convene sittings in a business advisory committee rather than in the executive alone.
    5. Automatic budget scrutiny: Require at least a fixed number of ministries’ demands to be discussed before the guillotine can be applied.
    6. Action taken discipline: Require the government to table a reasoned response to every committee recommendation within a fixed period.
    7. Strengthen member research: Fund dedicated legislative research staff for members and expand the Parliament Library’s analytical output on pending Bills.
    8. Federal consultation before federal Bills: Institutionalise consultation with State Chief Ministers through the Inter State Council before any Bill that alters State powers is introduced.

    “[2021, GS2, 10 marks] To what extent, in your view, the Parliament is able to ensure accountability of the executive in India?”

  • Section 79(3)(b) of the IT Act as a takedown route that bypasses judicial scrutiny

    The Union government summoned senior staff of Meta, the parent company of Facebook and Instagram, and reprimanded them over the brief removal in India of a video message by the Prime Minister. The confrontation exposed a takedown route under Section 79(3)(b) of the Information Technology Act, 2000, which allows an agency to declare content unlawful without a court ever examining the claim. Content from the Jantar Mantar protests has already been erased or suppressed through a barrage of such notices.

    What is Section 79(3)(b) of the Information Technology Act, 2000?

    1. About: Section 79 grants an intermediary immunity from liability for content that its users post, and Section 79(3)(b) is the condition on which that immunity is lost.
    2. How it operates: The immunity ends if the intermediary fails to remove the content expeditiously after receiving actual knowledge or a notification from the appropriate government or its agency.
    3. What the notice contains: It records only that the reporting agency considers the content referred to it illegal.
    4. No judicial step: No court order and no reasoned adjudication is required before such a notice is issued.
    5. The incentive it creates: An intermediary that refuses risks losing safe harbour across its entire platform, so compliance is cheaper than contest.
    6. Distinction from Section 69A: Section 69A is a formal blocking power with a designated committee and recorded reasons, while Section 79(3)(b) carries none of that structure.

    What is an intermediary under the Information Technology Act, 2000?

    1. Definition: Any person who receives, stores or transmits an electronic record on behalf of another person, or provides any service in relation to that record.
    2. Coverage: The term includes telecom and network service providers, search engines, online marketplaces, payment sites, cyber cafes and social media platforms.

    What is safe harbour?

    1. About: It is a statutory immunity that protects a platform from liability for third party content that it did not create, initiate or modify.
    2. Conditions: The platform must remain a passive conduit, must not select the receiver or alter the transmission, and must observe the due diligence and removal requirements the law imposes.

    What is Section 69A of the Information Technology Act, 2000?

    1. About: It empowers the Central Government to direct any agency or intermediary to block public access to information through any computer resource.
    2. Grounds and safeguards: Blocking is confined to the grounds in Article 19(2), the reasons must be recorded in writing, and the procedure is set by the Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking for Access of Information by Public) Rules, 2009.

    What did the Supreme Court hold in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015)?

    1. Section 66A struck down: The provision punishing grossly offensive or menacing online messages was held void for vagueness and for travelling beyond Article 19(2).
    2. Section 79(3)(b) read down: Actual knowledge was confined to a court order or a government notification, so a private complaint alone cannot trigger a takedown obligation.
    3. Section 69A upheld: The blocking power survived because it is tied to the Article 19(2) grounds and requires written reasons.
    4. The governing test: A restriction on speech must have a proximate connection to public order, and advocacy or discussion remains protected.

    What is the current status of free speech online in India?

    1. The right: Article 19(1)(a) covers online expression, and Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India (2020) held that expression and trade through the Internet are constitutionally protected.
    2. The limits: A restriction must fall within the eight grounds in Article 19(2) and must satisfy the proportionality test.
    3. The blocking regime: Section 69A survives with recorded reasons and a review committee, and blocking orders are treated as confidential under the 2009 Rules.
    4. The takedown regime: Section 79(3)(b) as read down requires a court order or a government notification, which agencies now issue at scale.
    5. The compliance layer: The Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021 require removal within 36 hours of a court order or government notice, and significant platforms must appoint a chief compliance officer, a nodal contact person and a resident grievance officer.
    6. The live dispute: The Karnataka High Court in 2025 rejected a platform’s challenge to the Sahyog portal, which lets authorised officers across States issue takedown notices, and the question remains under appeal.

    Which constitutional provisions govern freedom of speech and its restriction?

    1. Article 19(1)(a): Guarantees freedom of speech and expression to citizens.
    2. Article 19(2): Permits reasonable restrictions only on the grounds of sovereignty and integrity of India, security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency, morality, contempt of court, defamation and incitement to an offence.
    3. Articles 19(1)(g) and 19(6): Protect the right to carry on a business, which platforms invoke against arbitrary compliance burdens.
    4. Article 21: Covers privacy and the right to receive information, recognised in K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017).
    5. Article 14: Requires that any classification of content or of speakers be reasonable and not arbitrary.
    6. Article 13(2): Voids any law that abridges a fundamental right, which is the basis on which takedown provisions are challenged.
    7. Articles 32 and 226: Provide the remedy against an unconstitutional restriction on speech.

    What triggered the confrontation between the government and the platform?

    1. The summons: The Union government called in senior staff of Meta, the parent company of Facebook and Instagram, and reprimanded them.
    2. The stated reason: The brief removal in India of a video message by the Prime Minister.
    3. The unstated objective: Pressure on the platform to suppress posts from protests such as the demonstration at Jantar Mantar.
    4. The scale of removal: A barrage of takedown notices has already erased or suppressed the more emblematic forms of those protests.
    5. Why the platform matters: Instagram Reels shows users automatically recommended posts from creators they do not follow, which has made it one of the most influential mass media formats in the country.

    Why does Section 79(3)(b) work as a censorship route without judicial scrutiny?

    1. The notice is an assertion, not a finding: It merely records that the reporting agency feels the content referred to is illegal.
    2. No court tests it: Posts taken down under this section almost never go to court, so the assertion is never examined.
    3. The platform bears the risk: Refusal exposes the intermediary’s safe harbour, while compliance costs it nothing.
    4. Volume replaces reasoning: A route that requires no order can be used at a scale that a blocking committee could never process.
    5. The speaker is not heard: The user whose content is removed is not a party to the notice and receives no reasons.
    6. No precedent is built: Because nothing is adjudicated, the boundary of lawful online speech is never judicially clarified.

    What do the Pakistani and Chinese examples show about where this path leads?

    1. Pakistan: TikTok was banned for a period in 2021 and restored only after the platform agreed to control content described as immoral or indecent, which made market access conditional on an editorial concession.
    2. China: A single party system with a stated ideological commitment to centralised control wipes out nearly all dissent within minutes of posting.
    3. The Chinese precondition: The conditions that enabled that level of censorship were fostered over the decades preceding the Internet’s growth, not built after it.
    4. What the comparison establishes: Seeking suppression of political speech on a recommendation driven platform would place India in the company of these two systems rather than that of open democracies.
    5. The limit of the comparison: Neither example carries a constitutional court that can strike down a restriction, which is the one structural difference India retains.

    Is the platform a target of state pressure or a participant in censorship?

    1. The case for target: The company was summoned and given a dressing down, and its safe harbour is the leverage being used against it.
    2. The case for participant: For months it has taken down every post referred to it under Section 79(3)(b) without contesting a single one.
    3. Compliance as a choice: The section requires expeditious removal on a valid notification, not uniform removal of everything referred.
    4. What the pattern created: Consistent automatic compliance established that pressure works, which set the stage for the current arm twisting.
    5. The central site problem: The platform was also the main venue for the mobilisations, so its compliance decisions determined what the protests looked like in public memory.
    6. The unresolved point: A platform that never litigates a takedown converts a contestable statutory condition into an unreviewable administrative power.

    Why does the absence of Chinese preconditions not make Indian speech safe?

    1. The structural argument: Without decades of conditioning before the Internet grew, and without a single party system committed to centralising control, the Internet cannot be tamed.
    2. The capacity gap: What currently limits Indian censorship is the inability to check posts in real time, which is a capacity constraint and not a legal safeguard.
    3. The technology that closes the gap: Automated screening supplies exactly the real time capacity that is missing, which makes it a destructive solution to that gap.
    4. The cultural harm: Warping the public’s cultural self perception damages society regardless of whether full control is ever achieved.
    5. The successor problem: A draconian power created without checks passes intact to every government that follows.
    6. The wrong lesson: Mass mobilisation is being treated as an aberration to be prevented, when it is the lifeblood of a democracy.

    What are the major debates surrounding online speech regulation in India?

    1. Actual knowledge after Shreya Singhal: Whether an executive notification under Section 79(3)(b) can carry the same force as a court order.
    2. Formal against informal blocking: Section 69A carries safeguards and Section 79(3)(b) carries none, and agencies prefer the route without safeguards.
    3. Confidentiality of blocking orders: Rule 16 of the 2009 Rules keeps blocking orders secret, which prevents the affected user from challenging them.
    4. Traceability and encryption: Rule 4(2) of the 2021 Rules requires significant messaging platforms to identify the first originator of a message, which is challenged as incompatible with end to end encryption and privacy.
    5. The Sahyog portal: Whether large numbers of authorised officers across States may issue takedown notices without a central record or a reasoned order.
    6. Government fact checking: The Bombay High Court struck down the 2023 amendment creating a government fact check unit for online content about government business in Kunal Kamra v. Union of India (2024).
    7. Proportionality in practice: Whether the least restrictive means test laid down in Anuradha Bhasin is actually applied to content removal.
    8. The future of safe harbour: Whether narrowing or removing intermediary immunity would increase platform accountability or simply increase over removal.

    Challenges to the Section 79(3)(b) takedown framework

    1. Absence of a reasoned order: The notice states a conclusion without disclosing the legal ground, e.g. the removal of posts and reels documenting the Jantar Mantar protests, where users were given no ground for takedown.
    2. No hearing for the speaker: The person whose content is removed is never a party, e.g. Rule 16 of the 2009 Blocking Rules keeps orders confidential, so users blocked during the 2021 farm protest removals were never served the reasons.
    3. Over removal by platforms: The safe harbour risk pushes a platform to remove first and assess later, e.g. Meta’s uniform compliance with every referral made to it under this section over recent months.
    4. Decentralised issuing authority: A large number of officers can issue notices without a common standard, e.g. the Sahyog portal, whose challenge by X Corp was rejected by the Karnataka High Court in 2025.
    5. Automation risk: Machine screening at scale extends removal to lawful speech without human review, e.g. algorithmic suppression of Reels cuts reach without a formal takedown, leaving nothing for the user to challenge.
    6. Chilling effect on creators: Repeat removals lower a creator’s distribution, so creators censor themselves, e.g. accounts covering the protests reduced posting after the most emblematic footage was suppressed.
    7. Misuse after invalidation: An unchecked power outlives the government and even the statute that created it, e.g. arrests under Section 66A continued for years after it was struck down in 2015, until the Supreme Court issued fresh directions in People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India (2021).

    Conclusion

    Section 79(3)(b) has become the preferred route for removing online speech precisely because it needs no court, no reasons and no hearing, and a platform that complies with every referral has converted a contestable statutory condition into an unreviewable administrative power. The outcome is not Chinese style control, which India lacks the political architecture to build, but a censorship practice that is invisible, unaccounted and inheritable by every future government. What must change is the trigger itself: a notification under this section must carry a reasoned order, a record open to the user, and a route of appeal.

    What is Intermediary Liability?

    1. About: It is the legal question of when a platform is answerable for content that its users create and publish.
    2. Rationale: Platforms cannot screen the volume of user content in advance, so the law exempts them from liability in exchange for cooperation with lawful removal.
    3. Conditional immunity: The exemption applies only while the platform remains a passive conduit and acts on a qualifying notice.
    4. Notice and takedown: The standard model requires removal on receipt of a qualifying notice, and jurisdictions differ on who may issue that notice.
    5. Due diligence obligations: The platform must publish rules, appoint officers, run a grievance process and file compliance reports to retain the immunity.
    6. Significant platforms: Larger platforms carry heavier obligations, which in India begin above a threshold of 50 lakh registered users.

    Key Concerns Regarding Intermediary Liability

    1. Privatised adjudication: A company decides what is unlawful, without the procedure and reasoning a court would apply.
    2. Asymmetric incentives: The cost of wrongful removal falls on the user, while the cost of wrongful retention falls on the platform, so removal is always the safer choice.
    3. Opaque enforcement: Neither the volume nor the grounds of removals are systematically disclosed to the public.
    4. Immunity as leverage: The threat of losing safe harbour can be used to obtain compliance on matters unconnected to the notice.
    5. Automated moderation: Scale forces machine decisions on speech whose legality depends entirely on context.
    6. Jurisdictional conflict: A global platform faces contradictory removal orders from different countries over the same content.

    Constitutional and Statutory Framework Governing Online Speech

    1. Article 19(1)(a): Guarantees freedom of speech and expression, which extends to expression on the Internet.
    2. Article 19(2): Permits reasonable restrictions on that freedom only on the eight enumerated grounds.
    3. Section 69, Information Technology Act, 2000: Allows interception, monitoring and decryption of information through a computer resource in specified circumstances.
    4. Section 69A, Information Technology Act, 2000: Empowers the Central Government to block public access to information, with reasons recorded in writing.
    5. Section 79, Information Technology Act, 2000: Grants intermediaries immunity from liability for third party content.
    6. Section 79(3)(b), Information Technology Act, 2000: Withdraws that immunity if the intermediary does not expeditiously remove content after actual knowledge or a government notification.
    7. Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021: Prescribe due diligence, a 36 hour removal timeline, grievance officers and a traceability requirement for significant messaging platforms.
    8. Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking for Access of Information by Public) Rules, 2009: Set the committee procedure, the hearing stage and the confidentiality of blocking orders.

    Laws, Acts and Rules Governing Online Content Regulation in India

    1. Information Technology Act, 2000: The parent statute covering electronic records, cyber offences, intermediary liability and blocking of information.
    2. Information Technology (Amendment) Act, 2008: Inserted Section 66A, Section 69A and the present safe harbour scheme in Section 79.
    3. Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021: Created the due diligence, grievance redress and digital media ethics framework for intermediaries and online publishers.
    4. Information Technology Amendment Rules, 2023: Created a government fact check unit for content about government business, struck down by the Bombay High Court in 2024.
    5. Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking for Access of Information by Public) Rules, 2009: Govern the process for orders under Section 69A.
    6. Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023: Regulates processing of digital personal data and creates the Data Protection Board of India.
    7. Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023: Replaced the Indian Penal Code and carries the offences of promoting enmity between groups and of statements prejudicial to national integration that are routinely invoked against online speech.
    8. Telecommunications Act, 2023: Allows suspension of telecom services and interception of messages on public emergency grounds, replacing the corresponding power in the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885.
    9. Cable Television Networks (Regulation) Act, 1995 and the Cinematograph Act, 1952: The older content regulation model on which the digital ethics code was patterned.

    Back2Basics: Information Technology Act, 2000

    1. Enacted: 2000, modelled on the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce, 1996.
    2. Purpose: Gave legal recognition to electronic records and digital signatures and created a framework for cyber offences.
    3. Major amendment: The 2008 amendment, brought after the Mumbai attacks, added Sections 66A and 69A and rewrote the safe harbour provision.
    4. Bodies under it: The Indian Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-In) under Section 70B and the Controller of Certifying Authorities.
    5. Appellate route: The Cyber Appellate Tribunal’s functions were merged into the Telecom Disputes Settlement and Appellate Tribunal in 2017.
    6. Judicial history: Section 66A was struck down in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015).
    7. Extraterritorial reach: Section 75 applies the Act to offences committed outside India where a computer or computer network located in India is involved.

    Government Initiatives for Digital Content and Cyber Governance

    1. Sahyog portal: A central platform through which authorised officers of States and central agencies issue notices to intermediaries under Section 79(3)(b).
    2. Indian Cyber Crime Coordination Centre (I4C): Coordinates action against cybercrime across States and runs the national cybercrime reporting portal and helpline 1930.
    3. Indian Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-In): The national agency for cyber incident response, advisories and coordination under Section 70B.
    4. Grievance Appellate Committees: Constituted in 2023 under the 2021 Rules to hear user appeals against a platform’s content decision.
    5. Information Security Education and Awareness programme: Builds capacity and public awareness on safe digital practices.
    6. Digital India programme: The umbrella mission for digital infrastructure, services and literacy under which the intermediary framework operates.

    Key Facts about Online Speech Regulation in India

    1. Significant social media intermediary: A platform with more than 50 lakh registered users in India, which carries the additional obligations under the 2021 Rules.
    2. Removal timelines: 36 hours for a court order or government notice, 24 hours for non consensual intimate imagery, and 72 hours for information sought by an authorised agency.
    3. Compliance officers: A chief compliance officer, a nodal contact person and a resident grievance officer must be appointed by significant platforms.
    4. Landmark ruling: Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015) struck down Section 66A and read down Section 79(3)(b).
    5. Follow up ruling: People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India (2021) directed States to stop registering cases under the struck down Section 66A.
    6. Internet shutdowns: India records among the highest numbers of Internet shutdowns in the world, and Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India (2020) required shutdown orders to be published and periodically reviewed.
    7. Fact check unit: The government fact check unit under the 2023 amendment was struck down by the Bombay High Court in 2024.

    Challenges in Regulating Online Speech in India

    1. No independent oversight of removals: The executive is the issuing authority, the reviewing authority and the beneficiary of a takedown, e.g. review committees under the 2009 Blocking Rules are composed entirely of government officers.
    2. Scale of misinformation: Removal cannot keep pace with coordinated falsehood on closed messaging groups, e.g. the lynchings triggered by forwarded rumours in 2018, after which a limit on message forwards was introduced.
    3. Vague statutory grounds: Terms such as public order and decency are applied without a defined test, e.g. Section 66A was struck down in 2015 precisely for that vagueness, yet similar phrasing survives in the 2021 Rules.
    4. Encryption against traceability: A traceability mandate cannot be met without weakening security for every user, e.g. the challenge by WhatsApp to Rule 4(2) of the 2021 Rules pending before the Delhi High Court.
    5. Capacity of enforcement agencies: Police and prosecutors lack the technical training to distinguish unlawful speech from lawful criticism, e.g. arrests for social media posts continued under Section 66A for six years after it ceased to exist.
    6. Economic dependence of platforms: A large user market gives the state leverage that no legal safeguard offsets, e.g. TikTok’s restoration in Pakistan in 2021 only after it accepted content conditions.
    7. Absence of transparency data: Neither the number nor the grounds of Section 79(3)(b) notices are published, e.g. platform transparency reports record aggregate requests without disclosing the legal basis of each.

    Way Forward

    1. Require a reasoned order: Mandate that every notification under Section 79(3)(b) record the specific Article 19(2) ground and the material relied on.
    2. Notify the user: Require the intermediary to serve the ground of removal on the person who posted the content, so that a challenge becomes possible.
    3. Publish takedown statistics: Require the government and platforms to publish the number, source and legal ground of takedown notices at fixed intervals.
    4. Independent review: Reconstitute the review committee under the blocking rules with non official members, including a retired judge and a technical expert.
    5. Centralise issuing authority: Restrict the power to issue notices to a designated senior officer, ending the dispersal created by portal based issuance.
    6. Statutory appeal: Provide a time bound appeal against a takedown to a tribunal, rather than leaving writ jurisdiction as the only route.
    7. Codify proportionality: Write the least restrictive means test from Anuradha Bhasin into the rules, so that suspension of reach or a geographic block is preferred to full removal.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2013, GS2, 10 marks] Discuss Section 66A of IT Act, with reference to its alleged violation of Article 19 of the Constitution.”

  • Bar Council of India’s blanket enrolment bar on a law school batch tests the limits of the Advocates Act

    The Bar Council of India directed every State Bar Council to stop enrolling the 2026 graduating batch of the National Academy of Legal Studies and Research, after about 450 of its students objected to the Chief Justice of India attending their convocation as chief guest. The directive was withdrawn within a day, but it had already treated a peaceful protest as a bar on entry to a profession, a ground the Advocates Act, 1961 does not recognise. The Supreme Court barred coercive action against the students and gave the Council two weeks to explain itself.

    What is the Bar Council of India?

    1. About: It is a statutory body established under the Advocates Act, 1961 to regulate the legal profession and legal education in India.
    2. Composition: The Attorney General of India and the Solicitor General of India are ex officio members, and each State Bar Council elects one member to it.
    3. Core functions: It lays down standards of professional conduct and etiquette for advocates, exercises disciplinary jurisdiction, and recognises universities whose law degrees qualify a person for enrolment.
    4. Supervisory role: Section 7(1)(g) gives it general supervision and control over State Bar Councils.
    5. What it cannot do: No provision of the Advocates Act, 1961 gives it the power to enrol a person as an advocate.

    What is the National Academy of Legal Studies and Research (NALSAR)?

    1. About: It is a national law university at Hyderabad, created by a State Act in 1998, and among the earliest institutions built on the five year integrated law degree model.
    2. Relevance here: Its 2026 graduating batch was the subject of the enrolment freeze directed at all State Bar Councils.

    What is moral turpitude?

    1. About: It refers to conduct that is inherently base or depraved and contrary to accepted standards of honesty and justice, judged by the nature of the act rather than the length of the sentence.
    2. Statutory use: Section 24A of the Advocates Act, 1961 bars enrolment of a person convicted of an offence involving moral turpitude.

    What is a chilling effect?

    1. About: It is the deterrent effect a threatened penalty has on lawful speech, where a person stays silent to avoid risk rather than because the speech is unlawful.
    2. Why withdrawal does not cure it: The deterrent operates from the moment the threat is made, so revoking the order does not restore the confidence it removed.

    What is the current status of the right to practise a profession in India?

    1. The right: Article 19(1)(g) guarantees every citizen the right to practise any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade or business.
    2. Permissible limits: Article 19(6) allows reasonable restrictions in the public interest, including professional or technical qualifications prescribed by law.
    3. Entry to the Bar: Section 24 of the Advocates Act, 1961 fixes the qualifications for enrolment, which include Indian citizenship, completion of 21 years of age and a law degree from a recognised university.
    4. The only bars: Section 24A lists the disqualifications, and each of them lapses two years after the disqualifying event.
    5. The gatekeeper: Enrolment is granted by a State Bar Council under Section 6(1)(a), not by the Bar Council of India.
    6. The added filter: The All India Bar Examination must be cleared for a certificate of practice after enrolment.

    Which constitutional provisions govern free expression and entry to a profession?

    1. Article 19(1)(a): Guarantees freedom of speech and expression, which includes the right to protest peacefully.
    2. Article 19(1)(b): Guarantees the right to assemble peaceably and without arms.
    3. Article 19(1)(c): Guarantees the right to form associations, which covers student bodies and campus collectives.
    4. Article 19(1)(g): Guarantees the right to practise a profession.
    5. Article 19(2): Permits restrictions on speech only on eight enumerated grounds, and every restriction must be reasonable.
    6. Article 19(6): Permits reasonable restrictions on the right to a profession, including prescribed qualifications.
    7. Article 14: Bars arbitrary state action, which reaches a statutory body imposing a collective penalty.
    8. Articles 32 and 226: Provide direct recourse to the Supreme Court and the High Courts against the action of a statutory body.

    What exactly did the Bar Council of India direct, and how did it unravel?

    1. The first letter: The Council’s chairperson wrote to the NALSAR Vice Chancellor seeking a report identifying the persons who initiated, organised, coordinated or mobilised the campaign against the Chief Justice of India.
    2. The enrolment bar: The same letter prohibited State Bar Councils from enrolling any 2026 passed out student of NALSAR until further orders.
    3. The two hour reversal: A second communication issued within two hours declared the vast majority of NALSAR students innocent, while retaining the direction to hold an inquiry and submit a report.
    4. The university’s response: NALSAR stated that it would have to examine the constitutionality of such an inquiry.
    5. Full withdrawal: The Council withdrew both letters entirely the following day and closed the proceedings.
    6. The stated reason: The Council accepted that it was not proceeding under Section 24A, and argued that enrolment during a pending inquiry would create a fait accompli.

    Why does the power to enrol sit with State Bar Councils and not the Bar Council of India?

    1. Two tier design: Section 3 creates State Bar Councils and Section 4 creates the Bar Council of India, with distinct functions assigned to each.
    2. The enrolling authority: Section 6(1)(a) makes the admission of persons as advocates on its roll a function of the State Bar Council.
    3. The apex body’s list: Section 7 confines the Bar Council of India to professional standards, supervision of State Bar Councils, promotion of legal education and recognition of universities.
    4. No enrolment power: None of those provisions gives the Bar Council of India the power to enrol a person as an advocate.
    5. Individual assessment: Every application has to be dealt with independently, and an applicant who meets the statutory requirements is entitled to be enrolled.
    6. Limits of supervision: Section 48B permits directions to State Bar Councils, but a direction cannot create a bar that the Act itself does not contain.

    What are the only statutory grounds on which enrolment can be denied?

    1. Conviction for moral turpitude: Section 24A bars a person convicted of an offence involving moral turpitude.
    2. Untouchability offences: A conviction under the Untouchability (Offences) Act, 1955 is a separate statutory bar.
    3. Dismissal from service: Dismissal or removal from government employment on a charge involving moral turpitude disqualifies a person.
    4. Time limit: The disqualification lapses two years after the release, dismissal or removal.
    5. Nothing on dissent: The list contains no ground relating to protest, opinion or a campus campaign.
    6. Conduct before enrolment: Such conduct becomes relevant only when it attracts a statutory disqualification, and a peaceful protest or an expression of opinion does not.

    Where does the Bar Council of India legitimately enter the enrolment process?

    1. The carve out: Section 26 requires a State Bar Council’s enrolment committee that proposes to reject an application to refer the matter to the Bar Council of India with a statement of the grounds of refusal.
    2. Binding opinion: Section 26(3) requires the State Bar Council to dispose of the application in conformity with the opinion of the Bar Council of India.
    3. Reasons in writing: Section 26(2) requires the State Bar Council to record its grounds for refusing enrolment in writing.
    4. Only after a proposed refusal: The referral arises only once a State Bar Council has decided to reject an individual application.
    5. No advance freeze: Section 26 does not contemplate a blanket bar on an entire graduating class before any application has been filed.
    6. Removal from the roll: Where a name already on the roll is to be removed for fraud or misrepresentation, the person must first be given a hearing.

    Why do the Council’s disciplinary powers not reach a law graduate?

    1. Chapter V: It deals with disciplinary proceedings, and Sections 35 to 37 cover misconduct by advocates, the powers of the disciplinary committee and appeals from disciplinary orders.
    2. Whom they bind: Those provisions apply only to persons already enrolled on a State roll.
    3. Status of a graduate: A law graduate who has not yet been enrolled is not an advocate.
    4. Consequence: The disciplinary framework does not extend to a student, so a campus protest cannot be treated as professional misconduct.
    5. Effect of the letters: They attempted to add the expression of dissent as a fresh ground of disqualification for enrolment.

    What did the Supreme Court settle when the Council last created a disqualification?

    1. The case: Indian Council of Legal Aid and Advice v. Bar Council of India (1995).
    2. The rule struck down: The Court invalidated a Bar Council of India rule barring persons above 45 years of age from enrolment.
    3. The reasoning: Rule making power under Section 49 cannot be used to create an additional disqualification that the Advocates Act does not provide.
    4. The jurisdictional holding: Admission of persons to the roll and removal of their names lie within the exclusive domain of the State Bar Councils.
    5. The parallel: The age bar and the batch bar both add a disqualification by executive direction rather than by statute.

    How did the Court and the legal community respond this time?

    1. Interim protection: A three judge Bench barred the Council from taking coercive action against NALSAR students, faculty and administrators on the basis of the incidents named in the letters.
    2. Explanation sought: The Council was given two weeks to file an affidavit explaining its actions.
    3. The Court’s position: The fundamental right to a profession cannot be threatened for expressing dissent, and students have the right to protest.
    4. Jurisdictional rebuke: The Chief Justice of India described the Council’s intervention as unnecessary interference in a dialogue between the students and himself.
    5. The petitioners’ case: Neither the Advocates Act, 1961 nor the Rules of Legal Education permits the Council to regulate students’ conduct or to direct universities to inquire against them.
    6. Institutional criticism: The university’s alumni called the letters arbitrary and high handed, and the Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad asked the Council to act only on facts, due process and a fair inquiry.
    7. Editorial demand: The episode was described as a misuse of statutory power for which the chairperson’s exit is the minimum course correction.

    Does the withdrawal of the directive settle the question it raised?

    1. The case for closure: The letters stand withdrawn, the proceedings are closed, and the 2026 graduates may now seek enrolment in the ordinary course.
    2. The case against closure: A regulator has demonstrated that it will use enrolment as leverage over student speech, and that demonstration survives the withdrawal.
    3. Speed as the problem: The bar was imposed and lifted without any meeting of the full Council, using interim powers meant for supervisory emergencies.
    4. The absent remedy: No accountability attaches to a direction withdrawn before it is tested, so the cost of issuing it is zero.
    5. The deterrent that remains: A student weighing a future campus campaign now knows that entry to the profession can be made the subject of an inquiry.
    6. The unresolved question: Whether a supervisory power over State Bar Councils can ever be used to suspend a statutory function that those councils alone hold.

    What are the major debates surrounding regulatory control over entry to the legal profession?

    1. Supervision against exclusivity: Section 7(1)(g) and Section 48B give the Council supervisory control, while Section 6(1)(a) gives State Bar Councils exclusive power over enrolment.
    2. Rule making against statute: The 1995 ruling confines Section 49 rules to what the Act permits, and successive Council rules have tested that boundary.
    3. The Bar examination question: Bar Council of India v. Bonnie Foi Law College (2023) upheld the All India Bar Examination as a valid precondition for practice, unsettling the earlier view that only Parliament could add entry conditions.
    4. An elected regulator: The Council is elected by practising advocates, which makes independent enforcement of discipline against advocates contested.
    5. Education and practice in one body: The Council both recognises law degrees and regulates practitioners, concentrating academic and professional gatekeeping in a single institution.
    6. Speech of future professionals: How far a professional regulator may police the political expression of persons not yet within its jurisdiction remains untested.
    7. Opening the profession: The 2023 rules permitting foreign lawyers in non litigious matters reopened the question of who defines the boundaries of the profession.

    Challenges to the Bar Council of India

    1. Jurisdictional overreach: The Council repeatedly claims powers that the Advocates Act, 1961 does not confer, e.g. the rule barring entrants above 45 years of age, struck down in Indian Council of Legal Aid and Advice v. Bar Council of India (1995).
    2. Decisions by individual direction: Rule 18 interim powers of the chairperson allow directions of general effect without a Council meeting, e.g. the enrolment bar on the 2026 NALSAR batch, issued and withdrawn within a day in August 2026.
    3. Disciplinary delay: Section 36B transfers a misconduct case to the Council if a State disciplinary committee does not conclude it within a year, which pushes complaints further from the complainant, e.g. the Law Commission’s 266th Report (2017) recorded that this one year limit is routinely missed.
    4. Unverified enrolments: State rolls carry names that cannot be matched to verified degrees, e.g. the verification drive under the Certificate and Place of Practice Verification Rules, 2015 found large numbers of enrolled advocates who never filed verification papers.
    5. Strikes by the Bar: Court boycotts continue despite a binding ruling against them, e.g. the boycott by advocates in Delhi district courts after the Tis Hazari clash in 2019, which stalled hearings for several days.
    6. Legal education oversight: Approvals of law colleges have outpaced inspection capacity, e.g. the Council imposed a moratorium on approving new law colleges after approvals crossed well over a thousand institutions.
    7. Collision with university autonomy: The education mandate is used to direct internal university action, e.g. the letter requiring NALSAR to inquire into and report on the students behind a campus campaign, which the university said raised constitutional questions.

    Conclusion

    The Bar Council of India used a supervisory power over State Bar Councils to suspend a function that only those councils hold, and it did so to penalise speech that the Advocates Act, 1961 does not recognise as a disqualification. The withdrawal closed the file without answering the question, because the deterrent created by a regulator that can threaten entry to a profession does not lapse with the letter. What must change is the source of the power: a disqualification can come only from statute, and an interim supervisory order cannot be used to manufacture one.

    Regulation of the Legal Profession in India

    1. About: The legal profession is a statutory self regulating profession governed by the Advocates Act, 1961, which created a single unified Bar for the whole country.
    2. Structure: State Bar Councils enrol and discipline advocates, and the Bar Council of India supervises them and sets professional standards.
    3. Scale: India has more than 15 lakh enrolled advocates and over 1,700 approved law colleges, among the largest legal professions in the world.
    4. Entry route: A five year integrated law degree after school or a three year degree after graduation, followed by enrolment with a State Bar Council and the All India Bar Examination.
    5. Single class of practitioners: The Act abolished the earlier categories of vakils, pleaders and attorneys, leaving advocates as the only recognised class, divided into senior advocates and other advocates.
    6. National law universities: The model began with the National Law School of India University, Bengaluru in 1987 and now covers more than 25 such universities.

    Statutory Framework Governing Enrolment of Advocates

    1. Section 3: Constitutes a Bar Council for each State and sets its composition and term.
    2. Section 4: Constitutes the Bar Council of India, with the Attorney General and the Solicitor General as ex officio members.
    3. Section 6: Lists the functions of a State Bar Council, including the admission of persons as advocates on its roll under Section 6(1)(a).
    4. Section 7: Lists the functions of the Bar Council of India, including professional standards, supervision of State Bar Councils under Section 7(1)(g), promotion of legal education and recognition of universities.
    5. Section 24: Prescribes the qualifications for admission as an advocate on a State roll.
    6. Section 24A: Prescribes the disqualifications for enrolment and the two year period after which they lapse.
    7. Section 25: Names the authority to which an application for enrolment must be made.
    8. Section 26: Governs disposal of applications, reference of a proposed refusal to the Bar Council of India, and removal of a name obtained by misrepresentation.
    9. Sections 35 to 37: Govern punishment of advocates for professional misconduct, the powers of disciplinary committees and appeals to the Bar Council of India.
    10. Section 48AA: Allows the Bar Council of India or its committees, other than a disciplinary committee, to review any order within sixty days.
    11. Section 48B: Allows the Bar Council of India to give directions to a State Bar Council in exercise of its general supervision.
    12. Section 49: Confers general rule making power on the Bar Council of India to discharge its functions.

    Laws, Acts and Rules Governing the Legal Profession in India

    1. Advocates Act, 1961: Created a unified national Bar, established the Bar Council of India and State Bar Councils, and consolidated the law on legal practitioners.
    2. Advocates Act, 1961, landmark change: It abolished the earlier categories of vakils, pleaders, attorneys and revenue agents, leaving a single class of advocates with an all India right to practise under Section 30.
    3. Bar Council of India Rules: Framed under Section 49, covering standards of professional conduct and etiquette, legal education and the internal working of the Council.
    4. Bar Council of India Rules, key provisions: Rule 15 gives the chairperson general control and supervision over the Council’s affairs, and Rule 18 allows interim orders in revisional and supervisory matters.
    5. Bar Council of India Rules of Legal Education, 2008: Govern recognition of law degrees, the five year and three year course structures, and inspection of colleges.
    6. All India Bar Examination Rules, 2010: Made the examination a condition for the certificate of practice for advocates enrolled after 2009.
    7. Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987: Created the National, State and District Legal Services Authorities and the Lok Adalat mechanism for free legal aid.
    8. Contempt of Courts Act, 1971: Defines civil and criminal contempt and governs the conduct of advocates before courts.
    9. Untouchability (Offences) Act, 1955, renamed the Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955: A conviction under it is a statutory disqualification for enrolment under Section 24A.
    10. Bar Council of India Rules for Registration of Foreign Lawyers and Foreign Law Firms, 2022, amended in 2023: Permit foreign lawyers to advise on foreign law and international arbitration in non litigious matters.
    11. Advocates (Amendment) Act, 2023: Repealed the Legal Practitioners Act, 1879 and inserted provisions empowering courts to frame and act against lists of touts.

    Back2Basics: Advocates Act, 1961

    1. Enacted: 1961, on the recommendations of the All India Bar Committee, 1953 and the Fourteenth Report of the Law Commission of India.
    2. Purpose: Consolidated the law relating to legal practitioners and created a single class of advocates for the whole country.
    3. Bodies created: State Bar Councils under Section 3 and the Bar Council of India under Section 4.
    4. Right to practise: Section 30 gives an advocate on a State roll the right to practise before all courts, tribunals and authorities in India.
    5. Senior advocates: Section 16 divides advocates into senior advocates and other advocates, with designation by the Supreme Court or a High Court.
    6. Discipline: Chapter V provides for disciplinary committees, punishment for professional misconduct, and appeals to the Bar Council of India and then to the Supreme Court.
    7. Autonomy: The Bar Council of India is an independent statutory authority and not a department of government.

    Government Initiatives for Legal Education and Access to Justice

    1. National Legal Services Authority (NALSA): Provides free legal aid to eligible persons under the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 and organises Lok Adalats for settlement of pending and pre litigation disputes.
    2. Tele-Law: Connects citizens in rural areas to panel lawyers through Common Service Centres for free advice before litigation begins.
    3. Nyaya Bandhu: A pro bono legal services programme that links volunteer advocates with litigants who cannot afford representation.
    4. Legal Aid Defense Counsel System: Provides full time defence counsel at the district level for accused persons who cannot afford a lawyer.
    5. e-Courts Mission Mode Project: Digitises case records, enables virtual hearings and publishes case status through the National Judicial Data Grid.
    6. Nyaya Vikas: Centrally sponsored scheme funding court halls and residential units for judicial officers of district and subordinate courts.
    7. Pan India Legal Awareness and Outreach Campaign: A village level drive by NALSA to inform citizens of their legal entitlements and aid options.

    Key Facts about the Bar Council of India

    1. Established: 1961 under the Advocates Act, 1961, with its headquarters in New Delhi.
    2. Ex officio members: The Attorney General of India and the Solicitor General of India.
    3. Elected members: One member elected by each State Bar Council from among its own members.
    4. Office bearers: The chairperson and the vice chairperson are elected by the Council for a term of two years.
    5. All India Bar Examination: Introduced in 2010 and required for the certificate of practice.
    6. First national law university: National Law School of India University, Bengaluru, established in 1987.
    7. Landmark ruling on enrolment: Indian Council of Legal Aid and Advice v. Bar Council of India (1995).
    8. Landmark ruling on strikes: Ex-Captain Harish Uppal v. Union of India (2003) held that advocates have no right to strike or boycott courts.

    Challenges in Regulating Legal Education and the Legal Profession in India

    1. Uneven quality of law colleges: Approvals have expanded faster than inspection capacity, so degree standards vary sharply, e.g. the moratorium the Council imposed on approving new law colleges after approvals crossed well over a thousand institutions.
    2. Fake and unverified degrees: Rolls carry entries that cannot be matched to a verified degree, e.g. the verification exercise under the Certificate and Place of Practice Verification Rules, 2015, in which lakhs of advocates did not submit verification papers.
    3. Cost of entry: Enrolment fees, examination costs and unpaid junior years restrict first generation entrants, e.g. the Supreme Court in Gaurav Kumar v. Union of India (2024) capped State Bar Council enrolment fees at ₹750 for general category candidates and ₹125 for Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe candidates.
    4. Under representation of women: Women form a small share of the senior Bar, e.g. women constitute about 3.4 per cent of senior advocates in India.
    5. Court boycotts and strikes: Work withdrawal continues despite a binding ruling against it, e.g. the Delhi district courts boycott after the Tis Hazari clash in 2019.
    6. Case backlog and delay: Adjournment practice by the Bar contributes directly to pendency, e.g. more than five crore cases were pending across Indian courts as recorded on the National Judicial Data Grid.
    7. Regulatory overlap: Legal education is governed simultaneously by the Council and the University Grants Commission, e.g. the Law Commission’s 266th Report (2017) recommended a separate body for legal education to end the overlap.

    Way Forward

    1. Codify the limits of supervisory power: Amend Section 48B to state that a direction to a State Bar Council cannot suspend a function that Section 6(1)(a) confers on it.
    2. Require a Council resolution for general directions: Confine Rule 18 interim orders to individual revisional matters and require a full Council decision for any direction of general effect.
    3. Separate legal education from professional regulation: Create a distinct legal education council with academic membership, as recommended by the Law Commission’s 266th Report.
    4. Enforce time bound discipline: Make the one year limit in Section 36B operational through mandatory public reporting of pending complaints and their age.
    5. Publish enrolment data: Require every State Bar Council to publish the number of applications received, decided and refused, with the recorded grounds of refusal.
    6. Protect lawful student expression: Frame a rule under Section 49 stating that lawful expression before enrolment is neither a ground for refusal nor a basis for inquiry.
    7. Create an appellate route: Provide a statutory appeal against general directions of the Bar Council of India, so that every affected person is not forced to approach the Supreme Court.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2022] With reference to India, consider the following statements :
    1. Government law officers and legal firms are recognised as advocates, but corporate lawyers and patent attorneys are excluded from recognition as advocates.
    2. Bar Councils have the power to lay down the rules relating to legal education and recognition of law colleges.
    Which of the statements given above is/are correct ?
    (a) 1 only
    (b) 2 only
    (c) Both 1 and 2
    (d) Neither 1 nor 2

    Answer: (b)”

  • Mines and Minerals Amendment Bill 2026 curbs State taxing powers over mineral rights

    Why in the News

    Parliament passed the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Bill, 2026 on 13 August 2026, restricting the power of States to levy taxes on mineral rights and mineral bearing lands. The measure reverses in statute the fiscal gain that a nine judge Bench of the Supreme Court gave mineral rich States in 2024, and it has united ruling and opposition parties in Kerala, Odisha and Jharkhand against it.

    What is the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957?

    1. About: The Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 is the central law regulating the grant of mineral concessions and the development of mines in India.
    2. The declaration it carries: Section 2 declares it expedient in the public interest that the Union take control of the regulation of mines and mineral development, which activates Entry 54 of the Union List.
    3. Royalty setting: Section 9 empowers the Central Government to fix and revise royalty rates, and revision is permitted not more than once every three years.
    4. Concession route: Since the 2015 amendment, mineral concessions are granted by States through competitive auction rather than by discretionary allotment.
    5. Local sharing: Section 9B requires a District Mineral Foundation in every district affected by mining, funded by a contribution linked to royalty.

    What is a royalty on minerals?

    1. Definition: Royalty is the payment a lessee makes to the owner of the mineral for the privilege of extracting and removing it, calculated on the quantity or value produced.
    2. Legal character: The Supreme Court has held royalty to be a contractual consideration flowing from the mining lease, not a tax levied by the state.

    What is a cess?

    1. Definition: A cess is a levy imposed for a specified purpose, with its proceeds earmarked for that purpose rather than merged into general revenue.
    2. Why it matters here: Mineral bearing States had imposed cesses on royalty and on mineral bearing land, and it is this class of levy that the amendment restricts.

    What is the District Mineral Foundation (DMF)?

    1. Definition: The District Mineral Foundation is a non profit trust established in every mining affected district to work for the benefit of persons and areas affected by mining.
    2. Funding: Lessees contribute a share of royalty to the Foundation, and the money is spent through the Pradhan Mantri Khanij Kshetra Kalyan Yojana on health, education, drinking water and livelihood in mining affected areas.

    What is the current status of State taxing power over mineral rights in India?

    1. Constitutional entry: Entry 50 of the State List gives States the power to tax mineral rights, expressly subject to any limitations imposed by Parliament by law relating to mineral development.
    2. Judicial position since 2024: A nine judge Bench held that royalty is not a tax and that States retain legislative competence to tax mineral rights and mineral bearing land.
    3. Retrospective effect: The Court permitted recovery of dues from 1 April 2005, to be paid in staggered instalments over twelve years beginning 1 April 2026, without interest or penalty for the earlier period.
    4. State levies in force: Mineral rich States including Odisha, Jharkhand and West Bengal had enacted or revived levies on mineral rights in reliance on that ruling.
    5. The new limitation: The 2026 amendment now exercises the limitation power in Entry 50 to restrict those levies and vests sole authority to frame rules in the Centre.
    6. Central levies unaffected: Royalty under Section 9, the District Mineral Foundation contribution and the National Mineral Exploration Trust contribution of 2 per cent of royalty continue to be fixed centrally.

    Constitutional Provisions Related to Mineral Rights and State Taxation

    1. Article 246: Distributes legislative power between Parliament and State legislatures through the three lists of the Seventh Schedule.
    2. Entry 54, Union List: Gives Parliament power over the regulation of mines and mineral development to the extent that such control is declared by law to be expedient in the public interest.
    3. Entry 23, State List: Gives States power over the regulation of mines and mineral development, expressly subject to Entry 54 of the Union List.
    4. Entry 18, State List: Places land, including rights in land and land tenures, within the exclusive competence of the States.
    5. Entry 49, State List: Gives States the power to tax lands and buildings, which covers mineral bearing land as a class of land.
    6. Entry 50, State List: Gives States the power to tax mineral rights, subject to limitations imposed by Parliament by law relating to mineral development.
    7. Article 265: Provides that no tax shall be levied or collected except by authority of law.
    8. Article 254: Governs repugnancy between a central and a State law on a concurrent subject, and gives the central law primacy.

    What does the 2026 amendment actually change?

    1. Restriction on State taxes: The Bill restricts the power of States to levy taxes on mineral rights and on mineral bearing lands.
    2. Restriction on cesses: The restriction extends to cesses and other levies imposed on the same subject matter.
    3. Rule making centralised: An amendment grants sole authority over the framing of rules to the Centre.
    4. The Centre’s stated purpose: The government has argued that the amendment will promote mineral production, ensure mineral security and create a more uniform regulatory framework.
    5. Passage: The Bill was cleared by the Rajya Sabha and passed by Parliament on 13 August 2026 amid Opposition protests.

    How did the 2024 nine judge ruling set up this legislative response?

    1. The question referred: Whether royalty under the 1957 Act is a tax, and whether States retain independent power to tax mineral rights and mineral bearing land.
    2. The holding: By a majority of eight to one the Court held that royalty is not a tax, and that State competence under Entry 50 survives.
    3. The precedent overruled: The 1990 ruling that had treated royalty as a tax, and had thereby denied States a separate taxing field, was overturned.
    4. The fiscal consequence: Mineral rich States became entitled to arrears accumulated since 2005, an amount running into more than a lakh crore rupees across States.
    5. The opening the Court left: The judgment expressly preserved Parliament’s power under Entry 50 to impose limitations on State taxation of mineral rights, and the 2026 amendment uses exactly that power.

    Why do mineral rich States say the Bill strips their revenue base?

    1. Encroachment on land: The Kerala Chief Minister described the legislation as a serious encroachment on the State’s constitutional powers over land and a grave threat to India’s federal structure, and said the State would mount political and, if necessary, legal opposition.
    2. Land is a State subject: The Leader of the Opposition in Kerala argued that land falls under Entry 18 of the State List and that taxation of land is also a State subject, so the restriction enters the States’ constitutional domain.
    3. Disproportionate impact: Odisha’s former Chief Minister wrote that the provisions would disproportionately impact mineral rich States and cause massive revenue losses that would stifle the State’s developmental agenda.
    4. What the revenue funds: He stated that mining revenue finances healthcare, education, welfare schemes and infrastructure development across the State, and demanded a special Assembly session and a unanimous resolution.
    5. Fiscal autonomy claim: He described fiscal autonomy as a constitutional principle built into the federal system, and said stripping States of the power to tax their own mineral bearing lands strikes at cooperative federalism.
    6. Protest in Jharkhand: The Jharkhand Chief Minister called it a black Bill and warned of protests in every district, block, panchayat and town of the State.
    7. The privatisation charge: The Kerala Opposition alleged that the larger objective was to weaken the public sector and create opportunities for corporates to earn windfall profits.

    How was the Bill carried through Parliament?

    1. Passage amid protest: The Bill was passed while the Opposition was protesting, and the concerns raised about federalism were not addressed on the floor.
    2. Rights of affected people: The legislation overlooks the rights of those living on resource rich land, who are the first to bear the cost of expanded extraction.
    3. A pattern, not an exception: The amendment follows an established pattern of hurried lawmaking and continuing expansion of central powers at the cost of States and local communities.
    4. Session context: The monsoon session that began on 20 July 2026 passed several Bills with inadequate deliberation.
    5. What deliberation would have required: An all party meeting, circulation of the draft and consultation with State Chief Ministers were available and were not used.

    Can a Bill be constitutionally valid and still weaken federalism?

    1. The text supports the Centre: Entry 50 has always made State taxation of mineral rights subject to limitations imposed by Parliament, so the amendment uses a power the Constitution itself confers.
    2. The Court anticipated it: The 2024 judgment recognised that parliamentary limitation was available, so the amendment is a legislative answer within the space the ruling left open.
    3. The effect side: A limitation that removes the entire field converts a qualified State power into no power at all, which is a different thing from regulating its exercise.
    4. Who bears the loss: The States that lose most are the poorest resource States, whose own tax base is narrow and whose transfers do not compensate for mineral revenue.
    5. The federal principle at stake: Fiscal autonomy is not merely a revenue question, because a State that cannot tax its own resource base cannot plan expenditure independently of central transfers.
    6. The objection is not uniformly principled: The Kerala Opposition itself pointed out that the State government’s Revised Budget and White Paper on State finances proposed full privatisation of beach sand mining, which is the same direction it attacks in the Centre.

    Major Debates Surrounding Mineral Taxation and Federalism

    1. Royalty as tax or consideration: The 1990 ruling treated royalty as a tax, the 2004 five judge ruling read that as a drafting error, and the 2024 nine judge ruling settled it as a contractual consideration.
    2. How far a limitation may go: Whether Parliament’s power to impose limitations under Entry 50 extends to extinguishing the State’s taxing field altogether remains contested.
    3. Retrospective recovery burden: The staggered recovery of arrears from 2005 falls heavily on public sector miners and steel producers, and industry has argued it will be passed into input costs.
    4. Uniformity against autonomy: The Centre’s case for a single national regulatory framework for mineral security runs directly against the States’ claim to price their own resource endowment.
    5. Resource curse: Mineral rich States record among the highest poverty rates despite the highest extraction, which raises whether royalty and District Mineral Foundation flows compensate the host population at all.
    6. Community consent: The rights of Scheduled Area residents under the Fifth Schedule and the 1996 Panchayats Extension to Scheduled Areas Act sit uneasily with a centralised concession regime, as the Samatha and Niyamgiri rulings demonstrated.
    7. District Mineral Foundation utilisation: Large unspent balances and expenditure outside mining affected areas have raised the question whether local sharing works in practice.

    Challenges to the Mineral Taxation Framework after the Amendment

    1. Revenue substitution gap: No mechanism replaces the levies the States lose, e.g. Odisha’s mining revenue funds a large share of its own tax receipts and no equivalent central transfer has been announced.
    2. Litigation risk: The amendment invites a fresh constitutional challenge, e.g. the Kerala Chief Minister has already said the State will consider legal opposition to the Act.
    3. Investment uncertainty: Repeated changes to the fiscal regime deter long lead mining investment, e.g. bidders in mineral auctions price in future levy changes through lower premium bids.
    4. Local community exclusion: Centralised rule making distances the decision from those displaced, e.g. Niyamgiri in Odisha showed that consent of gram sabhas can defeat a project cleared at higher levels.
    5. Auction premium distortion: High auction premiums already compress operating margins, e.g. several iron ore blocks won at premiums above 100 per cent of sale value have remained unoperated.
    6. Enforcement of illegal mining controls: Restricting State fiscal powers does not address extraction outside the legal framework, e.g. illegal sand and iron ore mining continues to be reported across multiple States despite the auction regime.
    7. Environmental cost transfer: The framework does not price ecological damage into the concession, e.g. mining in the Aravallis and in central Indian forest belts has continued alongside contested clearances.

    Conclusion

    Entry 50 always made State taxation of mineral rights subject to limitation by Parliament, so the amendment uses a power the Constitution grants. Its effect is to reverse in statute the fiscal gain that a nine judge Bench gave mineral rich States in 2024. What remains unresolved is whether a formally valid limitation that removes an entire revenue base is compatible with fiscal federalism, and that question is now headed back to the courts.

    What is Fiscal Federalism?

    1. About: Fiscal federalism is the division of taxation powers, expenditure responsibilities and transfer mechanisms between the Union and the States in a federal system.
    2. Rationale: Revenue raising capacity is concentrated at the centre while service delivery responsibility sits with the States, so a transfer system is required to close the gap.
    3. Vertical fiscal imbalance: The mismatch between the Union’s revenue powers and the States’ expenditure responsibilities, corrected through tax devolution.
    4. Horizontal fiscal imbalance: The mismatch between States of differing income and need, corrected through the Finance Commission’s inter se distribution formula.
    5. Third tier imbalance: The mismatch at the level of panchayats and municipalities, whose own revenue is minimal and whose transfers depend on State Finance Commissions.

    Key Concerns Regarding Fiscal Federalism

    1. Shrinking divisible pool: Cesses and surcharges are not shared with States, so a growing share of central revenue sits outside the devolution formula.
    2. Loss of taxation autonomy under GST: States surrendered most of their independent indirect taxing power, leaving mineral rights and land among the few residual fields.
    3. Conditional transfers: Centrally sponsored schemes come with matching share and design conditions that constrain State expenditure choices.
    4. Weak third tier finance: Local bodies remain dependent on State transfers because property tax and user charge collection is under exploited.
    5. Borrowing limits: State borrowing under Article 293 requires central consent where the State is indebted to the Union, which constrains counter cyclical spending.

    Constitutional Framework Governing Mineral Rights and State Taxation

    1. Article 246: Distributes legislative competence between the Union and the States through the Seventh Schedule.
    2. Seventh Schedule: Contains the Union List, the State List and the Concurrent List that operationalise Article 246.
    3. Entry 54, Union List: Regulation of mines and mineral development to the extent declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest.
    4. Entry 23, State List: Regulation of mines and mineral development, subject to Entry 54 of the Union List.
    5. Entry 18, State List: Land, rights in land, land tenures and the relation of landlord and tenant.
    6. Entry 49, State List: Taxes on lands and buildings.
    7. Entry 50, State List: Taxes on mineral rights, subject to any limitations imposed by Parliament by law relating to mineral development.
    8. Article 265: No tax shall be levied or collected except by authority of law.
    9. The Mineral Area Development Authority line of cases: India Cement in 1990 treated royalty as a tax, Kesoram Industries in 2004 read that as a drafting error, and Mineral Area Development Authority in 2024 held by eight to one that royalty is not a tax and that Entry 50 competence survives.

    Laws and Rules Governing Mining in India

    1. Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957: The parent statute for mineral concessions; its Section 2 declaration is what brings mineral regulation under Union control.
    2. MMDR Amendment Act, 2015: Introduced auction as the only route for granting mineral concessions and created the District Mineral Foundation and the National Mineral Exploration Trust.
    3. MMDR Amendment Act, 2021: Removed the distinction between captive and merchant mines and allowed transfer of statutory clearances with the lease.
    4. MMDR Amendment Act, 2023: Created the exploration licence and moved twelve critical and deep seated minerals, including lithium and beryllium, to central auction under a new Part D.
    5. Mines Act, 1952: Governs worker safety, working hours and welfare in mines, enforced through the Directorate General of Mines Safety.
    6. Offshore Areas Mineral (Development and Regulation) Act, 2002: Governs mineral rights in territorial waters and the exclusive economic zone, amended in 2023 to introduce auctions.
    7. Mineral Conservation and Development Rules, 2017: Prescribe scientific mining, mine closure and conservation obligations for lessees.
    8. Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 and Forest Rights Act, 2006: Govern diversion of forest land and require settlement of individual and community forest rights before diversion.
    9. Panchayats (Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996 (PESA): Requires consultation with the gram sabha before granting a mineral concession in a Scheduled Area.

    Back2Basics: Mineral Area Development Authority v. Steel Authority of India (2024)

    1. Bench strength: It was decided by a nine judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, the largest bench to sit on the question.
    2. Majority: The ruling was by a majority of eight to one.
    3. Core holding: Royalty payable under Section 9 of the 1957 Act is a contractual consideration and not a tax.
    4. Competence upheld: States retain legislative competence under Entry 50 of the State List to tax mineral rights, and under Entry 49 to tax mineral bearing land.
    5. Precedent overruled: It overruled India Cement Limited v. State of Tamil Nadu (1990), which had treated royalty as a tax.
    6. Limitation preserved: The Court recorded that Parliament may impose limitations on the Entry 50 power through a law relating to mineral development.
    7. Prospectivity ruling: In a separate order the Court allowed recovery of dues from 1 April 2005 in instalments over twelve years starting 1 April 2026, and waived interest and penalty for the period before the judgment.

    Government Initiatives for the Mineral Sector

    1. National Mineral Policy, 2019: Sets the policy framework for sustainable mining, exploration expansion and a right of first refusal in auctions for existing lessees.
    2. National Critical Mineral Mission: Launched to secure supply of critical minerals, targeting 1,200 domestic exploration projects by 2030 to 2031, production of 15 critical minerals and acquisition of 50 overseas assets.
    3. Khanij Bidesh India Limited (KABIL): A joint venture of three public sector undertakings to acquire mineral assets abroad, including lithium acreage in Argentina.
    4. Pradhan Mantri Khanij Kshetra Kalyan Yojana: Spends District Mineral Foundation funds on drinking water, health, education, sanitation and livelihoods in mining affected areas.
    5. National Mineral Exploration Trust: Funded by a levy of 2 per cent of royalty, it finances regional and detailed exploration by notified agencies.
    6. Mining Tenement System and Star Rating of Mines: Digitise concession records and grade operating mines on sustainable development performance.

    Key Facts about India’s Mineral Sector

    1. Production base: India produces 95 minerals, comprising fuel, metallic, non metallic, atomic and minor mineral categories.
    2. Global standing: India is the world’s second largest producer of coal and among the largest producers of iron ore and crude steel.
    3. Leading States: Odisha, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Karnataka and Rajasthan account for the bulk of the value of mineral production.
    4. Critical minerals list: India notified a list of 30 critical minerals in 2023, of which twelve were moved to central auction under the 2023 amendment.
    5. Foundation contribution: Lessees contribute 10 per cent of royalty to the District Mineral Foundation for auctioned leases and 30 per cent for older leases.
    6. Sector share: Mining and quarrying contribute roughly 2 to 3 per cent of gross value added, well below the share in comparable resource economies.

    Challenges in India’s Mining Sector

    1. Exploration deficit: Only a small fraction of the obvious geological potential area has been explored in detail, e.g. India still imports the bulk of its lithium, cobalt and rare earth requirement despite favourable geology.
    2. Land and forest clearance delays: Concession holders wait years for statutory clearances, e.g. blocks auctioned in central India have remained unoperated pending forest diversion approval.
    3. Displacement and rehabilitation: Mining displaces tribal populations without durable resettlement, e.g. the Niyamgiri hills case turned on the Dongria Kondh community’s rights over the proposed bauxite site.
    4. Illegal mining: Extraction outside the legal framework persists in high value and low value minerals alike, e.g. river sand mining continues to be reported across States despite auction and monitoring rules.
    5. Environmental damage: Overburden, dust and water table impact are inadequately priced, e.g. coal mining in the Singrauli belt has produced sustained air and water contamination.
    6. Occupational safety: Accident rates in mines remain high, e.g. rat hole coal mining in Meghalaya has caused repeated fatal flooding incidents despite prohibition.
    7. Value addition gap: India exports ore and imports processed metal, e.g. iron ore fines have historically been exported while high grade steel inputs are imported.

    Way Forward

    1. Compensate the fiscal loss: Route a defined share of central mineral levies back to producing States to replace the revenue the amendment removes.
    2. Legislate the limitation narrowly: Define the scope of the Entry 50 limitation in the statute so that the residual State field is stated rather than left to litigation.
    3. Institutionalise consultation: Refer contested federal legislation to a Joint Parliamentary Committee and consult State Chief Ministers before introduction.
    4. Strengthen local sharing: Audit District Mineral Foundation spending and restrict it to a defined radius around mining affected habitations.
    5. Expand exploration: Use the exploration licence route to bring private and junior exploration capital into deep seated and critical mineral search.
    6. Build processing capacity: Support domestic refining and separation of critical minerals so that concession reform translates into value addition rather than ore export.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2025, GS2, 15 marks] Examine the evolving pattern of Centre-State financial relations in the context of planned development in India. How far have the recent reforms impacted the fiscal federalism in India?”

  • Draft rules under the SHANTI Act open nuclear power to captive industrial use and a composite licence

    Why in the News

    The Department of Atomic Energy released draft rules under the Sustainable Harnessing and Advancement of Nuclear Energy for Transforming India (SHANTI) Act on 14 August 2026, opening nuclear power generation to private and captive users. Comments are invited until 4 September 2026.

    What is the SHANTI Act?

    • Replaces the earlier state monopoly framework with a licensing regime for non-government operators.
    • Covers private participation, captive generation, foreign reactor technology, safety and nuclear liability.
    • Provides a single composite licence for building, owning, operating and decommissioning a reactor.

    Key Provisions

    1. Captive nuclear power: Industries can generate nuclear electricity mainly for their own consumption.
    2. In-principle approval: Allows land acquisition and vendor negotiations before final licensing.
    3. Foreign technology: Imported designs must be certified by the regulator in the country of origin and already operational.
    4. Nuclear liability: Operators must maintain insurance or financial security; a Nuclear Liability Fund is proposed.
    5. Eligible users: Aluminium, cement, data centres, semiconductor fabs and Artificial Intelligence (AI) facilities.

    Key Concern

    • The country-of-origin certification may speed up safety approval but restrict technology sourcing to a few countries. Requiring continued support and retaining Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) with foreign developers could also limit technology transfer and indigenous reactor design.

    India’s Nuclear Programme

    • Stage 1: Pressurised Heavy Water Reactors (PHWRs) using natural uranium.
    • Stage 2: Fast Breeder Reactors (FBRs) using plutonium.
    • Stage 3: Thorium-based reactors using Uranium-233 (U-233).
    • Target: 100 GW nuclear capacity by 2047.

    Challenges

    • Supplier liability concerns
    • Limited regulatory independence
    • Land and public acceptance
    • Uranium and fuel constraints
    • Nuclear waste management
    • High project costs and long construction timelines

    Prelims Pointers

    • DAE: Department of Atomic Energy
    • AERB: Atomic Energy Regulatory Board
    • NPCIL: Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited
    • BHAVINI: Bharatiya Nabhikiya Vidyut Nigam Limited
    • NPT: Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
    • NSG: Nuclear Suppliers Group
    • India is not a signatory to NPT and received an NSG waiver in 2008.

    [2018, GS3, 15 marks] With growing energy needs should India keep on expanding its nuclear energy programme? Discuss the facts and fears associated with nuclear energy.”

    [2020]  In India, why are some nuclear reactors kept under “IAEA safeguards” while others are not ?

    a) Some use uranium and others use thorium
    b) Some use imported uranium and others use domestic supplies
    c) Some are operated by foreign enterprises and others are operated by domestic enterprises
    d) Some are State-owned and others are privately-owned

  • Socialism as the shackle: revisiting the four decades before the 1991 reforms

    Why in the News

    India holds foreign exchange reserves of $700 billion, including 880 tonnes of gold, on its 80th Independence Day. In early 1991 the same reserves had fallen below $1 billion, and the escape required a Prime Minister formed in socialist politics to pledge the country’s gold to foreign banks.

    What was the licence permit quota system?

    1. About: The administrative regime under which a private firm needed a government licence to set up capacity, expand output, change product mix or import inputs.
    2. Legal basis: The Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 reserved industrial licensing to the Centre and listed the industries requiring approval.
    3. Delivery vehicle: Investment was allocated through five year plans, which placed the public sector first in the commanding heights of the economy.
    4. Effect on entry: Capacity was fixed by the licence rather than by demand, so a firm could not expand even when the market grew.
    5. Effect on competition: New entrants competed for approvals rather than for customers, which made the licence itself the scarce asset.

    What is a balance of payments crisis?

    1. Definition: A country cannot meet payments for imports and external obligations because its foreign exchange earnings and reserves fall short of what it owes.
    2. The operative measure: Severity is read in import cover, that is the number of weeks of imports the reserves can finance, not in the absolute size of the reserves.

    What was the socialist pattern of society resolution?

    1. Adoption: The Congress session at Avadi in Tamil Nadu in 1955 passed a resolution declaring a socialist pattern of society to be the goal of government policy.
    2. Content: It committed the government to state ownership and state direction of the principal means of production.

    What is the Bank for International Settlements (BIS)?

    1. Definition: A Basel based institution owned by central banks that functions as a bank to central banks, with operations that made it one of the two lenders against India’s gold in 1991.
    2. Function: It accepts deposits and gold from member central banks and extends short term credit against that collateral.

    What was the 42nd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1976?

    1. Preamble change: It inserted the words socialist, secular and integrity into the Preamble of the Constitution.
    2. Wider effect: It also expanded the protection given to laws implementing Directive Principles and curtailed the scope of judicial review, and much of it was reversed by the 44th Amendment.

    Why did the 1991 crisis force India to pledge its gold?

    1. Reserve collapse: Foreign exchange reserves fell below $1 billion in early 1991, producing a full balance of payments crisis.
    2. Import cover: The remaining reserves covered only about two weeks of imports.
    3. The only option left: The Reserve Bank Governor advised that India’s gold be mortgaged to the Bank of England and the Bank for International Settlements in Switzerland, and dollars borrowed against it.
    4. Quantum pledged: About 67 tonnes of gold moved out in two consignments during 1991.
    5. Closed markets: A downgrade below investment grade had shut India out of ordinary commercial borrowing, which left collateralised lending as the only route.

    How did socialism become the organising idea of Indian economic policy?

    1. 1927: A visit to Moscow for the decennial celebration of the October Revolution converted Jawaharlal Nehru to socialism.
    2. 1929: As president of the Indian National Congress he declared that India will have to go the socialist way.
    3. 1936: A revolt in the Congress Working Committee followed, in which seven senior leaders including Sardar Patel, Rajendra Prasad, C Rajagopalachari, J B Kripalani and Jamnalal Bajaj resigned.
    4. Gandhi’s condition: Mahatma Gandhi extracted a commitment that socialism would not become the Congress’s official policy, and it was honoured as long as Gandhi and Patel were alive.
    5. After 1950: The theme returned, and the 1955 Avadi resolution made a socialist pattern of society the declared goal of government.
    6. Instrumentation: The goal was executed through five year plans and the licence permit quota system, which emphasised state led growth and discouraged individual entrepreneurship.

    What did four decades of state led growth actually deliver?

    1. Poverty rose: Decadal data published in 1965 showed the poverty rate had risen from 52.66 per cent to 58.60 per cent.
    2. Food rationing persisted: India was the only country still running food rationing two decades after the Second World War.
    3. Agriculture stagnated: Agricultural productivity remained among the lowest in the world.
    4. The income floor: In Parliament in 1963 it was asserted that 270 million Indians lived on three annas, that is 19 paise, a day while the Prime Minister’s pet dog cost nearly three rupees a day.
    5. Enterprise discouraged: Licensing made official approval rather than consumer demand the binding constraint on production.

    Where did ideological commitment collide with fiscal solvency?

    1. The formation: The Prime Minister of 1990 to 1991 had begun his political life under the socialist leaders Acharya Narendra Dev and Ram Manohar Lohia.
    2. The dilemma: Pledging national gold to foreign banks contradicted the economic doctrine he had held throughout that political life.
    3. The counter argument: The Reserve Bank Governor’s case was that the country ranked above the doctrine, and it prevailed.
    4. Who acted: A lame duck government running on a thin majority took the decision that kept India solvent until a reform government could be formed.
    5. Who is credited: The turnaround is attributed to the Prime Minister and Finance Minister who followed, not to the government that pledged the gold.

    How much of the 1991 collapse can be attributed to socialism alone?

    1. Oil shock: The Gulf conflict of 1990 raised crude prices and cut worker remittances from West Asia at the same time.
    2. Deposit flight: Non resident deposits were withdrawn rapidly as confidence in repayment fell.
    3. Fiscal position: The fiscal deficit had reached about 8.4 per cent of gross domestic product in 1990 to 1991, financed by borrowing.
    4. Political instability: Three governments in two years delayed every corrective decision.
    5. Model exhaustion: The licensing system had already produced four decades of low growth, so an external shock met an economy with no buffer.

    What did other countries do when the same model failed?

    1. China: The Four Modernisations introduced by Deng Xiaoping in 1978 opened agriculture, industry, defence and science and technology to market incentives, with special economic zones as the entry point for foreign capital.
    2. Soviet Union: The planned economy did not reform in time and collapsed along with the state itself in the early 1990s.
    3. Vietnam: The Doi Moi programme from 1986 replaced collective farming with household production and legalised private enterprise.
    4. Poland: The stabilisation programme of 1990 freed prices and made the currency convertible in a single step rather than in stages.

    Challenges to the post 1991 reform model

    1. Manufacturing share stagnation: Industry has not absorbed labour at the expected scale, e.g. manufacturing has remained near 17 per cent of gross value added against the 25 per cent target set under Make in India.
    2. Factor market reform stalled: Land and agricultural marketing reform remain politically blocked, e.g. the three farm laws enacted in 2020 were repealed in 2021 after a year of protest.
    3. Labour codes unimplemented: Consolidation of labour law has not translated into uniform practice, e.g. the four labour codes passed by 2020 waited years for States to notify matching rules.
    4. Disinvestment slippage: Public sector exits are announced faster than they are completed, e.g. the sale of Air India concluded in 2022 after two decades of failed attempts.
    5. Credit cycle damage: Directed and concentrated lending has repeatedly produced stress, e.g. the asset quality review of 2015 exposed non performing assets built up in infrastructure and power lending.
    6. Policy predictability: Retrospective changes deter long term capital, e.g. the retrospective tax amendment of 2012 triggered the Vodafone and Cairn arbitrations and was withdrawn only in 2021.

    Conclusion

    The crisis of 1991 was the terminal cost of a model in which official approval, not consumer demand, set the limit on production. The decisive moment came when a Prime Minister formed in socialist politics accepted that solvency outranked doctrine. Liberalisation removed the licence, but factor markets, manufacturing scale and policy predictability remain unresolved three decades later.

    What is Economic Liberalisation?

    1. About: Economic liberalisation is the removal of state controls on entry, capacity, prices and trade so that market signals rather than administrative permission allocate resources.
    2. Rationale: It addresses the shortages, rent seeking and low productivity that follow when output is capped by licence rather than by demand.
    3. Liberalisation: The first element removes industrial licensing, price controls and import restrictions on domestic producers.
    4. Privatisation: The second element transfers ownership or management of state enterprises to private hands and opens reserved sectors to private entry.
    5. Globalisation: The third element integrates the domestic economy with world markets through trade, investment and currency convertibility.

    Key Concerns Regarding Economic Liberalisation

    1. Jobless growth: Output growth has not produced proportionate formal employment, leaving a large workforce in low productivity informal work.
    2. Regional divergence: Investment concentrates in States with existing infrastructure, widening the gap with lagging States.
    3. Concentration of market power: Deregulation without strong competition enforcement allows dominant firms to entrench themselves.
    4. External vulnerability: Open capital accounts transmit global shocks quickly through portfolio flows and the exchange rate.
    5. Weak social protection: Removal of administered prices raises the burden on households where targeted transfers are incomplete.

    Constitutional Framework Governing Economic Policy in India

    1. Preamble: The word socialist, inserted by the 42nd Amendment in 1976, declares a normative economic orientation without prescribing a specific model.
    2. Article 19(1)(g): Guarantees the freedom to practise any profession or carry on any occupation, trade or business.
    3. Article 19(6): Permits reasonable restrictions on that freedom, including the creation of a complete or partial state monopoly in any trade.
    4. Article 39(b): Directs that ownership and control of material resources be distributed to best subserve the common good.
    5. Article 39(c): Directs that the operation of the economic system not result in concentration of wealth to the common detriment.
    6. Article 31C: Protects laws made to give effect to Articles 39(b) and 39(c) from challenge on specified fundamental rights grounds.
    7. Article 246 with Union List Entry 52: Places industries whose control by the Union is declared expedient in the public interest within Parliament’s exclusive competence, which is the basis of central industrial licensing.
    8. Article 301: Guarantees freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse throughout the territory of India.

    Laws and Rules Governing Industrial Policy in India

    1. Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951: Created the licensing system for industrial capacity; it remains in force but licensing now applies to only four industries.
    2. Industrial Policy Resolution, 1956: Classified industries into three schedules and reserved the commanding heights for the public sector.
    3. Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969: Restricted expansion by large firms above an asset threshold, and was repealed and replaced by the Competition Act, 2002.
    4. Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973: Capped foreign equity and criminalised exchange violations, and was replaced by the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999, which shifted violations from crime to civil penalty.
    5. New Industrial Policy, 1991: Abolished industrial licensing except for a short list, opened reserved sectors and raised the automatic route for foreign investment.
    6. Competition Act, 2002: Shifted regulation from restricting size to prohibiting anti competitive agreements and abuse of dominance.
    7. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016: Created a time bound resolution process, which supplied the exit mechanism the licence era economy never had.

    Back2Basics: The 1991 New Economic Policy

    1. Trigger: Foreign exchange reserves below $1 billion and import cover of about two weeks.
    2. Gold pledge: About 67 tonnes of gold were pledged to the Bank of England and to a Swiss bank across two consignments in 1991.
    3. Devaluation: The rupee was devalued in two steps on 1 and 3 July 1991, by roughly 9 per cent and 11 per cent.
    4. External support: India drew on an International Monetary Fund standby arrangement, conditioned on fiscal correction and structural reform.
    5. Industrial delicensing: Licensing was abolished for all but 18 industries, a list since reduced to four.
    6. Trade and investment: Import tariffs were cut sharply and foreign direct investment up to 51 per cent was permitted through an automatic route in listed industries.

    Government Initiatives for Industrial Growth

    1. Make in India: Launched to raise manufacturing’s share of output and employment through sector specific facilitation.
    2. Production Linked Incentive schemes: Pay incentives on incremental sales in named sectors such as electronics, pharmaceuticals and solar modules.
    3. National Single Window System: Consolidates central and State approvals for a new industrial project into one application portal.
    4. PM GatiShakti National Master Plan: Coordinates infrastructure planning across ministries to reduce logistics cost for industry.
    5. Jan Vishwas (Amendment of Provisions) Act, 2023: Decriminalised a large number of minor business offences to reduce compliance risk.
    6. Startup India: Provides tax benefits, a fund of funds and simplified compliance for recognised new enterprises.

    Key Facts about the 1991 Reforms

    1. The Budget of 1991: The reform Budget was presented in July 1991 and paired fiscal correction with trade liberalisation.
    2. Licensing today: Only four industries still require an industrial licence, including alcoholic drinks, tobacco products, defence and aerospace equipment, and industrial explosives.
    3. Reserve position now: Foreign exchange reserves stand at about $700 billion, with gold holdings of 880 tonnes.
    4. Rate of change: Reserves more than doubled over the last twelve years.
    5. Preamble litigation: The presence of the word socialist in the Preamble has been repeatedly challenged, and the Supreme Court has declined to read it as mandating a specific economic model.

    Challenges in India’s Industrial Economy

    1. Scale deficit in manufacturing: Firms stay small to retain benefits tied to size, e.g. the majority of registered manufacturing units remain micro enterprises with fewer than ten workers.
    2. Import dependence in key inputs: Assembly has grown faster than component making, e.g. India still imports the bulk of active pharmaceutical ingredients and advanced electronic components from China.
    3. Logistics cost: Freight moves disproportionately by road, e.g. rail’s share of freight traffic has fallen steadily since the 1950s, raising delivered cost for bulk industry.
    4. Land acquisition friction: Project land remains slow and contested to assemble, e.g. the Nandigram and Singur episodes in West Bengal ended two large industrial projects outright.
    5. Skills mismatch: Formal training does not match employer requirements, e.g. employability surveys repeatedly report that a minority of engineering graduates are job ready without retraining.
    6. Power reliability and cost: Industrial tariffs cross subsidise other consumers, e.g. energy intensive units in several States run captive diesel or solar capacity to avoid grid interruption.

    Way Forward

    1. Complete factor market reform: Move on land assembly, tenancy and labour rule notification instead of amending statute without implementation.
    2. Tie incentives to competitiveness: Structure production incentives to expire on a fixed schedule so that supported sectors face world prices.
    3. Deepen component ecosystems: Extend support beyond final assembly to component, material and capital goods manufacturing.
    4. Cut logistics cost: Shift bulk freight to rail and coastal shipping through dedicated corridors and multimodal terminals.
    5. Stabilise tax and regulatory expectations: Rule out retrospective taxation by statute and publish advance rulings to reduce litigation.
    6. Align skilling with employers: Fund apprenticeships tied to firm level hiring rather than to enrolment targets.

    “[2017, GS3, 15 marks] “Industrial growth rate has lagged behind in the overall growth of Gross-Domestic-Product (GDP) in the post-reform period” Give reasons. How far the recent changes is Industrial Policy are capable of increasing the industrial growth rate?”