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Type: States

Many questions regarding developments in specific states are asked in both prelims and mains. These Newscards correspond to such developments.

  • For Bihar flood problem, solution lies beyond

    Why in the News

    Bihar received 27 per cent below normal rainfall between 1 June and the first week of September, and large parts of the state are still under water. Six rivers, the Ganga, Gandak, Kosi, Budhi Gandak, Punpun and Ghaghra, have risen above danger levels in different stretches. The flooding therefore cannot be explained by how much rain fell on the state, which locates the cause in how its rivers and channels are managed. The state’s inherited answer has been containment, holding rivers inside defined channels behind embankments since colonial times. That method separates a river from its floodplain, and with silt raising the bed year on year it reduces the channel’s capacity to carry the discharge it is given. The contested question is whether flood works should keep aiming to hold the river in, or to give it space to spread safely.

    Why did rivers cross danger levels in a deficit monsoon?

    1. The rainfall record for the season: The state recorded 27 per cent below normal rainfall for the period from 1 June to the first week of September.
    2. Two causes acting together: High upstream river flows combined with erratic weather, meaning spells of heavy localised rainfall inside an overall seasonal deficit, pushed rivers over their banks.
    3. A tributary can flood because the main river is high: The unusually high level of the Ganga created a backwater effect in the Gandak and the Punpun, the condition where a high level in the receiving river obstructs the outflow of a river draining into it.
    4. What that effect did: Both tributaries drain into the Ganga, and its high level made their discharge difficult, so water backed up in the tributaries and added to the flooding.
    5. Danger level is a gauge based threshold: It is the level fixed for each gauge site above which a river threatens habitation and property, so six rivers crossing it in different stretches describes localised failures rather than one basin wide event.

    What does containment by embankment do to a river?

    1. It cuts the river off from its floodplain: Embankments separate rivers from the floodplains that would otherwise absorb and spread a high discharge.
    2. The bed rises inside the confined channel: Continuous silt deposition raises the riverbed and reduces the channel’s capacity to carry flow.
    3. A breach concentrates the damage: When an embankment breaches, artificially contained water rushes into homes and fields at a depth and force an unconfined flood would not produce.
    4. Each year of containment narrows the next year’s margin: A rising bed inside fixed embankments means the same discharge sits higher against the same defences, so the safety margin shrinks with no change in rainfall.

    Why will higher embankments not settle the problem?

    1. The premise needs revisiting: The state needs to reconsider the idea that higher or stronger embankments will by themselves contain floods, since the containment is what raises the bed against them.
    2. Maintenance remains an obligation: Existing embankments protect settlements and land that have grown up behind them, so the choice is not between maintaining them and abandoning them.
    3. The stated objective is the opposite of containment: Persistent monsoon floods point to the need to give the river space to spread safely during periods of high discharge, which a confined channel is designed to prevent.
    4. This is an execution problem, not a knowledge problem: The measures required are already identified in policy, and the flooding continues, which places the failure in implementation rather than in diagnosis.

    What must accompany embankment maintenance?

    1. Restoration of drainage channels: The natural and constructed drains that carry water off the land have to be reopened, since water that cannot drain stays on fields after the river level falls.
    2. Protection of floodplains: The land a river needs during high discharge has to be kept free of the construction and occupation that turns a spread into a disaster.
    3. Better land use planning: Where settlement, cropping and infrastructure are permitted has to follow the flood behaviour of the stretch rather than precede it.
    4. Restoration of wetlands: Wetlands in the basin hold and release flood water, and their loss transfers that volume to the channel and to the settlements behind the embankment.
    5. Deployment of early warning systems: Warning converts an unavoidable flood into an evacuated one, and it is the only measure on this list that reduces loss without altering the river.

    Why has an existing basin plan not changed the outcome?

    1. The imperatives are already on record: The Ganga Basin River Management Plan, implemented for more than a decade, acknowledges these requirements.
    2. The outcome has not followed: Persistent monsoon floods in Bihar show how much remains to be done to give the river room to spread during high discharge.
    3. One requirement sits outside the state’s control: Addressing Bihar’s concerns requires greater coordination between the riverine states on reservoir releases, since a downstream state’s peak is partly set by upstream release decisions.

    Where does the Farakka question sit in this argument?

    1. The state’s long standing contention: Bihar has argued that the barrage and the India-Bangladesh Ganga water sharing treaty compounded its river management challenges.
    2. The mechanism it alleges: Its case is that the barrage altered the Ganga’s flow regime, affecting the movement and deposition of the river’s sediment load.
    3. The causal claim is not settled: The extent to which this contributes to flooding in Bihar remains contested, so it cannot carry the whole explanation for the season’s flooding.
    4. The claim still belongs in the negotiation: Renegotiation of the 1996 treaty, which expires in December, should take account of Bihar’s concerns over silt accumulation and the state’s river management needs.
    5. The evidence base has to be current: Any new arrangement needs to be informed by updated data on river flows and climate change projections rather than on historical records alone.
    6. The principle extends past this treaty: In a period of erratic weather, states and countries sharing a river basin have to strengthen coordination to manage flows and reduce flood related distress.

    Challenges to embankment based flood control in Bihar

    1. The network is too long to maintain to standard: Bihar carries roughly 3,800 km of flood embankments, and every weak section of it is tested in the same few weeks each year. Eg. Breaches are recorded each season at several points across different river systems rather than at one predictable location.
      The Fix: Publish a stretch wise condition rating for the full embankment length before each monsoon, with repair funds released against the ratings rather than spread evenly.
    2. Containment creates waterlogging behind the line: An embankment that keeps a river out also keeps rainwater and local drainage in, so land behind it is lost to standing water rather than to flooding. Eg. Large areas in the Kosi and Gandak belts of north Bihar remain waterlogged well after river levels have fallen.
      The Fix: Build and maintain sluice and pump drainage at every point where an embankment crosses a natural drain, and treat the outfall as part of the embankment asset.
    3. People live between the embankments: Villages inside the embanked corridor are flooded every year by design, without the protection the structure was built to provide. Eg. Settlements between the eastern and western Kosi embankments are inundated annually while the land outside them is defended.
      The Fix: Fix a statutory resettlement and compensation entitlement for households inside the embanked corridor, separate from general flood relief.
    4. The decisive failure point can lie outside the state: The Kosi and the Gandak are regulated by structures in Nepalese territory, so a breach beyond Bihar’s jurisdiction can determine its flood year. Eg. The 2008 Kosi flood followed a breach at Kusaha, upstream of the barrage in Nepal, and displaced close to three million people in Bihar.
      The Fix: Establish a joint pre monsoon inspection and certification regime with Nepal for the Kosi and Gandak structures, with agreed repair timelines.
    5. Warning lead time is short because the catchment is foreign: Rainfall and discharge data from the upper catchments decide how much notice a district can be given, and that data is not generated within India. Eg. A peak on the Kosi can reach the Bihar plains within a day of heavy rainfall in its Nepalese catchment.
      The Fix: Extend real time telemetry sharing across the upper catchments and route it directly to district administrations rather than only to state control rooms.
    6. Silt removal has no funded programme: Reversing a raised bed is slow work with no annual budget head behind it, so the only measure reliably funded is raising the embankment. Eg. Dredging in the state is undertaken for navigation on specific stretches rather than for restoring channel capacity across a river.
      The Fix: Create a standing sediment management head in the state’s water resources budget, reporting channel capacity rather than embankment height as its outcome.

    Conclusion

    A flood season inside a rainfall deficit places the cause in the river system rather than in the monsoon, and that changes what a flood programme should be measured against. Protection built on confining rivers cannot hold once the beds inside those confinements keep rising. The question Bihar now faces is whether it makes channel capacity and floodplain space the stated objective of its flood works, or continues to judge success by the height and length of its defences. The water negotiation ahead is where the state’s sediment case will either become an operating rule or remain a grievance.

    Back2Basics: Ganga Basin River Management Plan

    1. What it is: A basin scale plan that treats the Ganga as a single hydrological unit, covering environmental flows and sediment alongside pollution abatement, rather than as a set of separate state level works.
    2. Why a basin frame: The Ganga basin covers about 861,000 sq km in India, close to 26 per cent of the country’s geographical area, spread across 11 states.
    3. Who carries the Ganga programme: The National Mission for Clean Ganga, under the Ministry of Jal Shakti, is the implementing arm of the National Ganga Council and was constituted as an authority under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986.
    4. What a basin plan can and cannot do: It sets requirements across the basin and depends on state departments and inter state coordination to execute them, which is how its imperatives can stand on record for years without changing outcomes on the ground.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2017, GS1, 15 marks] In what way can floods be converted into a sustainable source of irrigation and all – weather inland navigation in India?”

  • Farakka treaty nearing expiry, JDU revives campaign against barrage

    Why in the News

    Janata Dal (United), a partner in the ruling coalition in Bihar, has launched a campaign across 12 districts of the state along the Ganga demanding that the Farakka barrage be dismantled, and opposing any renewal of the India-Bangladesh Ganga water sharing treaty. The treaty it is targeting was signed in December 1996 and set a 30 year framework for sharing Ganga waters at the barrage during the dry season. That framework lapses this December, which converts a standing state grievance into a live negotiating question. The state government’s own position is narrower, that Bihar’s interest should be guarded in the treaty, with the Chief Minister stating in Munger that the state receives Ganga water for only four months of the year against a need for year round flow. A bilateral water sharing arrangement is the Union government’s to negotiate, and what is now being pressed is not a better share but the removal of the structure the sharing is measured at.

    What does the 1996 Ganga water sharing treaty do?

    1. Who it binds and what it covers: It is a bilateral agreement between India and Bangladesh, signed in December 1996, regulating the sharing of Ganga waters at the Farakka barrage in West Bengal.
    2. The season it governs: It applies primarily to the dry season, running from 1 January to 31 May, which is when the flow available at the barrage is least able to meet both countries’ requirements.
    3. Why a 30 year term was written in: The treaty established a binding framework for 1996 to 2026 to replace the earlier short term stopgap arrangements and give both sides predictable distribution.
    4. Where it now stands: That framework lapses this December, so continuation requires a fresh negotiation rather than an automatic rollover.

    Why was the barrage built, and what did it change on either side?

    1. The purpose it was built for: The barrage was built in 1975 to divert water from the Ganga into the Hooghly river, to flush out silt and keep Kolkata Port navigable.
    2. The downstream effect in Bangladesh: The diversion reduced downstream flow into Bangladesh, producing severe water shortages, increased soil salinity and ecological stress in the south of that country.
    3. The upstream effect Bihar reports: Heavy silt trapped behind the barrage has raised the Ganga’s riverbed, destroying the river’s natural storage capacity and driving seasonal floods.
    4. One structure sits behind both complaints: The diversion that sustains a port channel downstream is the same arrangement that holds sediment upstream, so the barrage is what both sets of grievances point at.

    What is Bihar’s stated grievance?

    1. A flood and parch cycle upstream: The state government’s position is that the barrage has created a severe flood and parch dynamic upstream of it, alternating inundation with shortage rather than steadying the flow.
    2. Four months of water against a year round need: The Chief Minister has stated that Bihar currently receives Ganga water only from July to October, and requires flow throughout the year.
    3. What the state asks of the Union government: Its stated demand is that the treaty safeguard Bihar’s interest, which places a riparian state’s claim inside a negotiation it is not a party to.

    What is the campaign demanding, and how is it being run?

    1. A demand to dismantle, not to renegotiate: The party is demanding that the barrage be dismantled, citing a stance its chief and former Chief Minister has repeatedly taken with the Union government that the structure causes heavy siltation and floods.
    2. Outright opposition to renewal: The party’s stated position is that it is completely against renewal, on the ground that the treaty fails to serve the state’s interests and remains a primary cause of flooding.
    3. Where it is being taken: The ‘Nitish Samvad’ campaign covers the 12 districts through which the Ganga flows in Bihar, and has so far covered four, Buxar, Bhojpur, Begusarai and Khagaria.
    4. How it is being conducted: It is led by the party’s national working president, a Rajya Sabha member, and carries recorded audio messages of the party chief, who is not travelling for it.
    5. The timetable it is working to: The party intends to finish the campaign well before the treaty ends in December, which places it ahead of any decision on renewal.

    Challenges to renegotiating the Ganga water sharing framework

    1. A riparian state has no seat at the table: Water is a State subject, and a treaty with a foreign country is the Union government’s exclusive power, so a state can press a claim and cannot block an agreement. Eg. The India-Bangladesh Teesta water sharing draft has remained unsigned since 2011 over West Bengal’s objections, without the state being a party to it.
      The Fix: Constitute a standing consultative mechanism with the basin states before negotiation opens, with their submissions placed on record as part of the Indian position.
    2. The sharing formula rests on historical flows: The arrangement was built on the average dry season availability recorded at the barrage over four earlier decades, and that baseline no longer describes current or projected flows. Eg. Its operation depends on how much water actually arrives at the barrage in each ten day period of the dry season.
      The Fix: Write the next arrangement on a rolling flow record revised at fixed intervals, rather than on a single fixed historical average.
    3. Sediment has no institutional owner: The dispute Bihar raises is about silt rather than volume, and no authority holds the power to order desilting or to set a sediment budget for the river. Eg. The approach channel at Farakka itself requires repeated dredging to stay open, which relocates silt rather than reducing the load.
      The Fix: Attach a sediment management protocol to the barrage’s operating rules, naming the responsible authority and the annual dredging and disposal obligation.
    4. The flood peaks are set outside India: The Kosi and the Gandak, the rivers that deliver Bihar’s worst flood peaks, rise in Nepal, so peak discharge is governed by catchments and structures beyond this treaty’s scope. Eg. The Kosi and Gandak barrages stand in Nepalese territory and are operated by India under the 1954 Kosi Agreement and the 1959 Gandak Agreement.
      The Fix: Pair the Ganga negotiation with a flow data sharing and release coordination arrangement with Nepal on the Kosi and Gandak.
    5. Removing the structure moves the problem rather than ending it: Dismantling the barrage would restore downstream flow and withdraw the diversion that keeps the Bhagirathi-Hooghly channel and the Kolkata port route navigable. Eg. The feeder canal at Farakka exists solely to carry that diverted flow into the Bhagirathi-Hooghly system.
      The Fix: Commission an independent flow and sediment study of the barrage’s upstream and downstream effects, so the dismantling demand is tested against measured alternatives rather than settled politically.

    Conclusion

    A dry season sharing arrangement is now being contested on grounds it was never written to address, since the demand from Bihar concerns sediment and flood behaviour rather than the volume of water allotted. That mismatch is what makes renewal harder than an extension of terms. The decision to watch is whether the Union government opens the negotiation with a stated position on siltation upstream of the barrage, or confines it to the dry season allocation. Confined to allocation, a new agreement settles the bilateral question and leaves the domestic one exactly where it started.

    Back2Basics: Farakka Barrage

    1. Where it stands: Across the Ganga in Murshidabad district of West Bengal, a short distance upstream of the point where the river enters Bangladesh.
    2. Its scale: The barrage runs about 2,240 metres across the river and carries a road and rail link over it.
    3. How the diversion works: A feeder canal roughly 38 km long carries water from above the barrage into the Bhagirathi-Hooghly, the channel the diversion was designed to sustain.
    4. Who operates it: The Farakka Barrage Project authority, under the Union Ministry of Jal Shakti, runs the structure and its regulating gates.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2016, GS1, 12 marks] Present an account of the Indus Water Treaty and examine its ecological, economic and political implications in the context of changing bilateral relations.”

  • Looking up at the drones

    Why in the News

    Data pooled from over 1,200 drones intercepted in Punjab since 2024 has mapped the cross border smuggling network that flies them. The mapping names the launch pads inside Pakistan’s Punjab, the Indian villages where payloads are dropped, the hours of peak activity and the altitudes flown. It follows an interception count that has held steady rather than fallen, with 294 Pakistani drones downed by the Border Security Force (BSF) and allied agencies in Punjab in 2024, 287 in 2025 and roughly the same number again by August 2026. Punjab had answered the threat in August 2025 with the Rs 51.4 crore ‘Baaz Akh’ (Hawk Eye) Anti-Drone System (ADS), the first state level anti-drone grid in the country. The same dataset shows why that answer is not holding, since drones now carry satellite links and a return to home fail-safe that turns them back before they can be brought down. The network along Punjab’s 550-km International Border is therefore better understood than at any point since 2019 and no easier to stop.

    What is the ‘Baaz Akh’ Anti-Drone System?

    1. What it is: A state funded anti-drone grid deployed by the Punjab government as a second line of defence behind the BSF’s own portable interception equipment.
    2. The four functions it performs: It detects a drone’s movement and signal, tracks it on a digital map, jams its control link, and forces an emergency landing for ground recovery.
    3. What it jams: It disrupts either radio frequency control signals or satellite navigation frequencies, and can identify the ground control station operating the drone.
    4. Its reach: The system works over a range of 8 to 10 km and issues automated alerts to security agencies.

    What does the intercepted drone data reveal about the network’s geography?

    1. Eight launch pads, two of them primary: Sustained sorties come from at least eight launch pads in Pakistan’s Punjab, with the villages of Jahman and Masteki as the main two.
    2. Both primary pads face Tarn Taran: Jahman sits directly across from the Khalra sector in Tarn Taran district. Masteki lies in the Sehjra enclave, a pocket of Pakistani territory surrounded by India on three sides, roughly opposite Khem Karan town.
    3. The remaining pads: They lie near Kasur, opposite Khem Karan; Qila Jiwan Singh, opposite Rajatal in the Attari sector; Wagah, opposite Attari; and Narowal, across from Dera Baba Nanak in Gurdaspur district.
    4. The landing areas: Payloads are dropped at Bhindi Saidan, Attari, Rajatal, Dall, Daleri, Maari Meghaan, Wan and villages around Khem Karan including Kals and Mastgarh.
    5. Where the drones are recovered: The highest number of interceptions on the Indian side occur 3.5 km to 10 km from the International Border.

    What do the timing and flight patterns show?

    1. A fixed nightly window: Maximum activity falls between 10 pm and 4 am, at an average of 12 to 15 drones an hour.
    2. The drops cluster on two days: The highest number of consignment drops take place on Thursdays and Saturdays.
    3. Sortie length separates stock from modified platforms: The average sortie runs 45 minutes, and modified drones average 24 minutes. Eg. One DJI Matrice drone recorded 42.67 minutes and a DJI Matrice 4 Pro recorded 15 minutes before it was downed.
    4. Altitude separates them too: Commercial DJI platforms fly at about 500 feet, and a modified eight rotor platform, the octocopter, was tracked at 2,500 feet.
    5. The drop point is chosen for pickup, not for accuracy: Consignments are dropped on agricultural fields for couriers to collect. Navigational error and incorrect GPS data put some payloads onto farmhouses and homes instead.

    How has the technology changed since the incursions began?

    1. The 2019 baseline: Pakistani drones were first noticed in Punjab around 2019, operating on rudimentary radio frequency direction control.
    2. The 2026 platform: Drones now operating in Punjab carry satellite communication and anti-jamming capability, and some downed in Punjab were navigating on Starlink satellite links.
    3. The airframes are commercial and Chinese made: The platforms in use for drug smuggling include the DJI Mavic 4 Pro, which can fly multiple sorties, and the DJI Matrice 300 RTK, which carries a large payload.
    4. The payload has not narrowed: The consignments carry narcotics, weapons and explosives, launched from pads deep inside Pakistan’s Punjab and dropped across the border under cover of darkness.

    Why does the fence no longer decide what crosses the border?

    1. It was built for a different mode of entry: The 462-km fence along the International Border went up mainly in the late 1980s and early 1990s to stop infiltration and smuggling during the militancy years.
    2. What it consists of: It is a multi-layered barrier of 8 to 12 feet, topped with rows of concertina and razor wire and, in places, high voltage ‘cobra’ wires, with a patrol track, observation towers and border outposts along it. Most of the feasible land border had been fenced and floodlit by 1993.
    3. It does not stand on the border: Older ground rules placed it some 150 yards inside Indian territory. In many stretches it was built two to three km in, leaving large tracts of farmland between the fence and the Zero Line.
    4. The gaps are physical as well as aerial: The line carries riverine and flood related gaps, and the incursions it was built to stop now arrive over it rather than through it.

    Why does detection not translate into seizure?

    1. The return to home fail-safe defeats the jam: Drones detect the interference from jamming, locking or control signal disruption and fly back to their launch point in Pakistan before they can be neutralised or recovered on the Indian side.
    2. Jamming weakens with distance: Some attempts fail simply because the drone is too far from the jamming unit when it is engaged.
    3. Autonomous platforms are not vulnerable to the method: Current systems fail against resilient drone networks built with features that reduce dependence on radio frequency control, which is what jamming targets.
    4. Coverage is thin: Security officers put the requirement at at least 100 jamming units for effective wider coverage, against the units now deployed on vehicles and in fixed positions.
    5. Recovery depends on people, not the grid: Interception is a layered system requiring coordination between the BSF, police quick reaction teams and ground recovery parties, so detection without a rapid ground response yields no seizure.
    6. Three threats the grid does not yet address: Small and low signature drones go undetected, drones operating together in swarms on artificial intelligence and decentralised communication are anticipated, and remote terrain with harsh weather leaves some drop zones inaccessible.

    What role do the border villages play in interception?

    1. They are the first reporting layer: Punjab set up village defence committees to help tackle cross border smuggling and drones, and their members coordinate with the BSF and local authorities on stray drones and recovered weapons.
    2. The reporting chain is unreliable: A committee member in Gilpan, where a drone dropped a kg of contraband in his kitchen garden 700 metres from the fence, got no response from the local police station or the Deputy Superintendent of Police, and the local police moved only after the Senior Superintendent of Police in Tarn Taran was called.
    3. Recovery is a race the couriers usually win: In the same village a second drone dropped a payload at the village edge that evening. The BSF received the location and moved to cordon the area, and the men had already collected the consignment and fled by the time it arrived.
    4. Farmers fear prosecution more than the drop: A farmer whose field received a consignment in Mahawa, Amritsar, approached the committee fearing arrest, and the police eventually filed a case against unidentified persons.
    5. Some settlements sit inside the flight path: Mahawa lies a kilometre from the Zero Line with nearly 150 of its 2,800 acres between the Zero Line and the fence, and drones travel up to six kilometres inside the border directly over houses and fields.
    6. Activism against the trade carries a cost: The sarpanch of Attari village, a settlement of around 25,000 known for its campaigning against drugs and smuggling, was injured in an alleged attack by narcotics smugglers.

    Challenges to countering cross border drone smuggling

    1. The cost asymmetry runs the wrong way: A commercial quadcopter costs a fraction of the detection and jamming equipment needed to stop it, so the defender pays more per sortie than the smuggler. Eg. The DJI platforms recovered in Punjab are off the shelf civilian models sold for survey and photography work.
      The Fix: Shift procurement toward cheap distributed sensors feeding one command picture, rather than a small number of high cost integrated units.
    2. Jamming cannot be used freely in civil airspace: Broad spectrum jamming and navigation spoofing interfere with civil aviation and telecom signals, which limits where and how long a grid can be switched on. Eg. Amritsar’s Sri Guru Ram Dass Jee International Airport sits within a few tens of kilometres of the border stretches under surveillance.
      The Fix: Authorise narrow band directional jamming tied to a designated counter drone corridor, cleared in advance with the civil aviation regulator.
    3. Attribution stops at the launch pad: A recovered drone establishes the route and the airframe, and it does not establish who financed or ordered the consignment. Eg. Cases from border villages routinely close against unidentified persons because the courier is the only link recoverable on the ground.
      The Fix: Treat each recovered drone as a forensic exhibit, with serial, flight log and payload traced through a single dedicated investigation unit rather than by the local police station.
    4. Responsibility is split across agencies: Border guarding, state policing and airspace regulation sit with different authorities, so no single body owns the counter drone task end to end. Eg. Punjab’s grid is a state asset operating alongside the BSF’s own portable interception equipment on the same stretch of border.
      The Fix: Place the state grid, the border force’s equipment and police response under one joint operations centre per border district.
    5. Interdiction does not touch demand: Stopping a consignment in the air does nothing to the narcotics market that pays for the next one. Eg. Village committee members link the drone drops directly to drug use among young people in the border belt.
      The Fix: Pair the counter drone grid with treatment and de-addiction capacity in the border districts, so the seized supply is not simply replaced.
    6. Legal cover for the technology is thin: Bringing down an aircraft, jamming a signal and seizing a payload each rest on different statutory powers, and none was written with armed drones in mind. Eg. Civil drone operations in India are governed by the Drone Rules, 2021, which regulate lawful operators rather than hostile cross border flights.
      The Fix: Enact a standing counter unmanned aircraft framework naming the authorities empowered to detect, jam, down and seize, and the evidentiary status of what is recovered.

    Conclusion

    The border belt’s smuggling geography is no longer a matter of inference, since the launch pads, the drop villages, the flying hours and the altitudes are now on record. That record shifts the problem from intelligence to coverage, because a mapped network still needs equipment dense enough to engage it before it turns back. The measure to watch is whether the jamming grid reaches the density its own operators have asked for, and whether the annual interception count starts falling rather than holding flat. A count that stays level while the grid expands would show the platforms are outrunning the countermeasure rather than being contained by it.

    Back2Basics: Border Security Force

    1. What it is: India’s primary border guarding force, raised on 1 December 1965 after the India-Pakistan war exposed the limits of relying on state armed police on the border.
    2. Who it reports to: It is a Central Armed Police Force under the Ministry of Home Affairs, and it guards the India-Pakistan and India-Bangladesh borders in peacetime.
    3. Where its powers come from: The Border Security Force Act, 1968 gives its personnel powers of search, seizure and arrest within a notified belt running inland from the border.
    4. How far that belt extends: The Union government extended that jurisdiction to 50 km from the border in Punjab, West Bengal and Assam in 2021, up from 15 km in Punjab.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2023, GS3, 10 marks] The use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) by our adversaries across the borders to ferry arms / ammunitions, drugs, etc., is a serious threat to internal security. Comment on the measures being taken to tackle this threat.”

  • Failing at ABC

    Why in the News

    An investigation across Tamil Nadu and Puducherry into the outsourced Animal Birth Control (ABC) programme, under which local bodies contract organisations to sterilise and vaccinate community dogs, records starved animals, botched mass surgeries, broken vaccine cold chains and fabricated organ counts.

    What do the Animal Birth Control Rules, 2023 require?

    1. Humane capture and return to the same place: Capture with nets, feeder outreach before capture, and geotagging of both capture and release at the same location.
    2. Surgical and shelter standards: Closed circuit cameras in the operation theatre, pre-operative and post-operative care, clean and spacious kennels, food twice a day and water at all times.
    3. Verification tied to billing: Organ inspection committees are to be constituted to count organs against billing claims.
    4. Disposal after the count: Organs are to be destroyed immediately by deep burial or incineration.

    What did the investigation find at the centres?

    1. Oulgaret, Puducherry: An internal municipal dossier recorded 50 emaciated dogs released from an ABC centre in late 2025, 20 dog deaths and 50 complaints against the veterinarian. The animals were released hastily just before an inspection, with sutures falling apart.
    2. Velankanni, Nagapattinam district: On 23 July dogs were found alive with loose sutures and no post-operative care, and carcasses were found in garbage with bloody sutures and with wires and ropes around their necks, both banned in the catching process. The District Animal Welfare Officer’s report recorded 70 dogs, 64 males and six females, sterilised in three days by two veterinarians.
    3. Mannargudi, Tiruvarur district: On 2 September a female dog was found alive with its intestines spilling out after sterilisation at the centre there.
    4. Pollachi: At a board-run centre the post-operative care unit sits 2 km away from the surgery centre, and a female dog died of evisceration after surgery.
    5. Relocation instead of return: Dogs picked up for sterilisation are extensively relocated in violation of the Rules, and a healthy dog returned to its own locality is the community’s only real-time audit of the money spent.

    Why do the surgeries fail?

    1. Suturing is rushed: The distance between two suture bites should be under half a centimetre, which takes time. Centres press young veterinarians to complete more surgeries instead.
    2. Pain relief is skipped to cut cost: Multi-modal analgesia is omitted, so the animal licks the surgical site and opens the sutures.
    3. Suture material is reused: Leftover material causes surgical site infections.
    4. The faster male technique is the unsuitable one: The on-scrotal method leaves gaps between sutures for fluid drainage and raises infection risk on unhygienic shelter floors. A veterinarian left an organisation that insisted on more on-scrotal procedures.

    How does the payment design create the incentive?

    1. The rate is fixed per dog: Rs 1,650 is allocated per dog, including Rs 450 for sterilisation and vaccination and Rs 200 for catching and release.
    2. Payment follows projected numbers, not outcomes: Local bodies reward claimed counts rather than verified results, which turns sterilisation into assembly-line work at scale.
    3. Catchers are paid per catch: Pups, lactating dogs, pregnant dogs and already sterilised dogs are picked up to raise the count.
    4. Ethical care is affordable and skipped anyway: Factoring in economies of scale, a centre can make about Rs 66,000 in profit while still meeting ethical standards of care.

    What is the state of verification?

    1. Bills clear on the contractor’s own evidence: Payment rests on the organisation’s claims, photographs of surgery, photographs of dogs and occasional organ counts by municipal sanitation officers.
    2. The organ count is gamed: A bucket of organs stored at the Oulgaret centre was transported to Neyveli township in Cuddalore district in 2025 to supply an organ counting committee inspection, with the same veterinarian performing surgeries at Neyveli.
    3. The committees arrive after the money: In Tiruppur the organ counting committee was constituted only after more than 9,000 surgeries had been billed.
    4. The audit questions went unanswered: The Director of Municipal Administration did not answer whether time-tagged photographs, videos of the organ count and destruction of organs were audited for each batch of sterilisation bills, or what the targets were.
    5. The corrective is administrative and recent: Corporations have withheld payment on bills raised over the last three months, and a member of the State Monitoring Committee has written to the Municipal Administration Department to withhold bills and constitute panels. Activists have asked instead that community animals be brought under an animal management framework of the Animal Husbandry Department.

    Why does blacklisting fail to remove a contractor?

    1. Recognition is scarce and contracting is not: Only six organisations hold recognition for ABC procedures in the State, against about 15 contractor organisations operating in the space.
    2. A blacklisted operator is re-engaged elsewhere: Pranimitran’s contract was terminated by the Hosur Corporation over animal mutilation, botched surgeries and non-disclosure, and it was blacklisted by the Animal Welfare Board of India. The Tiruppur Corporation engaged it anyway, stating that no replacement contractor could be found.
    3. Others continue in place: Jeeva Karunyam of Nagercoil and Rajeshwari Goshala of Tirunelveli continue to work for their local bodies, and two First Information Reports were filed against International Peace Trust at Avadi in Chennai.
    4. A criminal case does not interrupt a contract: A First Information Report was filed against Pranimitran over the death of two pups in Tiruppur, and in April 2026 an already sterilised six-year-old dog with a notched ear was found anaesthetised at its centre.

    What does the broken cold chain mean for rabies control?

    1. Refrigeration is missing: A large majority of centres lack refrigerators capable of holding anti-rabies vaccine at 2 degrees Celsius.
    2. Vaccination is simply skipped: A doctor who worked at the Hosur centre states that no vaccines were administered across an average of 650 surgeries a month, with power cuts, no generator and no fresh vaccine batches supplied.
    3. Responsibility is contested: The organisation’s position is that the cold chain is supplied and inspected by the Corporation, and that ineffective vaccines would have produced a rabies outbreak.
    4. Half the programme then disappears: Sterilisation without a viable vaccine delivers population control alone, and leaves the rabies control purpose of the programme unmet.

    Conclusion

    The programme’s failure is not a supervision gap that better inspection would close. Payment attaches to a number the contractor supplies, the committee that would verify the number is constituted late or supplied with borrowed evidence, and the certificate that would screen the contractor has been made optional. Blacklisting is therefore a label rather than a disqualification, and a contractor removed in one district is hired in the next. Until money moves against a verified sterilisation and a verified vaccination rather than against a claimed count, no participant in the chain carries a cost for the outcome.

    Back2Basics: Animal Welfare Board of India

    1. Statutory origin: Established in 1962 under Section 4 of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960, as the first national animal welfare body of its kind.
    2. Function: It advises the Government of India on animal welfare laws and on measures to prevent unnecessary pain to animals, and its recommendations are advisory.
    3. Role in this programme: It issues Project Recognition Certificates to organisations conducting Animal Birth Control work, and can blacklist an organisation for violations.
    4. Administrative location: It works under the Department of Animal Husbandry and Dairying, and its headquarters moved from Chennai to Ballabhgarh in Haryana.

    [2014] Consider the following statements:

    1. Animal Welfare Board of India is established under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986.

    2. National Tiger Conservation Authority is a statutory body.

    3. National Ganga River Basin Authority is chaired by the Prime Minister.

    Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

    (a) 1 only

    (b) 2 and 3 only

    (c) 2 only

    (d) 1, 2 and 3

  • 1.85 lakh names out of Manipur, Sikkim poll rolls after SIR

    Why in the News

    The Election Commission of India has published the final photo electoral rolls of Manipur and Sikkim following the Special Intensive Revision. The revision removed 1,32,456 names in Manipur and 52,614 in Sikkim, 1.85 lakh in all, amounting to 6.3 per cent of the Manipur roll and 11.2 per cent of the Sikkim roll. The bulk of the removals were not adjudicated findings of ineligibility. They followed from enumeration forms that were never received in Manipur and from electors who could not be matched to an earlier roll in Sikkim. Kuki-Zo groups have said that community members displaced by the ethnic conflict that erupted on 3 May 2023 stand to be struck off, and the government has sought to dispel that apprehension.

    What is the Special Intensive Revision?

    1. The roll is rebuilt rather than carried forward: An intensive revision generates an enumeration form for every existing elector and requires it back, in place of the summary practice of amending the previous roll.
    2. A form not returned means a name not carried: An elector whose form is not received is excluded from the draft roll at the outset, before any question of eligibility is examined.
    3. Claims and objections follow the draft: The draft roll is published, claims and objections are filed and processed within a fixed window, and the final photo electoral roll issues after that.

    What do the Manipur numbers show?

    1. The roll shrank by 1,32,456: Manipur held 20,93,076 electors before the revision and holds 19,60,620 after it.
    2. The draft did the deleting: The draft roll published on 5 July carried 19,34,399 electors, against 1,58,677 whose enumeration forms were not received and who were excluded at that stage.
    3. The exclusion heads: Of those excluded, 72,473 were identified as shifted, 43,000 as deceased, 34,740 as absent, 7,394 as duplicate entries and 1,070 under other categories.
    4. The claims stage added more than it removed: 96,985 claims and objections were processed, 56,871 electors were included and 30,650 were deleted from the draft roll.

    What do the Sikkim numbers show?

    1. The roll shrank by 52,614: Sikkim held 4,71,081 electors before the revision and holds 4,18,467 after it.
    2. Mapping decided who was questioned: Of the 4,33,294 electors in the July draft, 3,61,159 or 83.35 per cent were mapped to their own or their parents’ details in a previous qualifying roll or the last revision. The remaining 72,135, or 16.65 per cent, could not be mapped.
    3. A digital flag added a second category: Among the mapped electors the Election Commission’s system identified 52,384 as carrying “logical discrepancies”.
    4. Notices ran far ahead of findings: 1,24,519 electors from the unmapped and discrepancy categories were issued notices for hearings, and 16,485 were found ineligible after verification.
    5. A separate deletion route: Another 324 electors were deleted through Form 7 on grounds including death or shifting, taking deletions during claims and objections to 16,809.

    Why do the Kuki-Zo objections matter to these figures?

    1. Displacement and shifting look identical on the roll: The largest single exclusion head in Manipur is 72,473 electors recorded as shifted, and internal displacement is precisely what produces an elector who is not found at a registered address.
    2. The instrument has no displaced category: A person living in a relief camp is neither a resident at the registered address nor an elector anywhere else, and the enumeration exercise offers no third classification.
    3. The apprehension preceded the exercise: Kuki-Zo groups raised the fear both before and during the revision, and the assurance offered was administrative rather than a change in the classification rules.

    What does the composition of the final rolls show?

    1. Manipur’s roll is majority women: 10,06,962 women electors against 9,53,350 men, a ratio of 1,056 women for every 1,000 men, alongside 308 third gender electors.
    2. Sikkim’s roll runs the other way: 2,12,534 men against 2,05,931 women, with two third gender electors.

    Challenges to the Special Intensive Revision

    1. The burden of proof moves onto the elector: A person already on the roll must re-establish entitlement rather than have it presumed. Eg. In the Bihar revision of 2025, Aadhaar did not figure among the documents initially listed for establishing eligibility.
      The Fix: Fix the admissible document list before the enumeration begins and bar additions or subtractions to it mid-exercise.
    2. Migrant and displaced electors are structurally disadvantaged: Enumeration works from a fixed address, and a seasonal migrant or a person in a relief camp has none for the reference period. Eg. An elector sheltering after the 2023 Manipur conflict cannot register at the camp and cannot be enumerated at home.
      The Fix: Recognise a relief camp or worksite address as ordinary residence for the duration of the revision.
    3. Deletion takes effect before an appeal is decided: A name goes off the roll on the officer’s finding, and the appeal runs afterwards. Eg. Appeals against inclusion or exclusion lie to the District Magistrate and then the Chief Electoral Officer under Section 24 of the Representation of the People Act, 1950.
      The Fix: Suspend the deletion until the statutory appeal window closes, so the roll reflects a final decision.
    4. A deleted elector has no automatic route back: Restoration is a fresh application rather than a correction of the same file. Eg. An elector deleted as absent must apply again under Form 6 to be re-enrolled.
      The Fix: Restore a name automatically on production of proof within the same revision cycle, without a fresh application.

    Conclusion

    The revision has produced a smaller and internally consistent roll, and it has not produced a finding that 1.85 lakh people were ineligible to vote. Two different tests are being reported as one: a documentary test of whether a form came back or a record could be matched, and a substantive test of citizenship, age and residence. The exercise is now closed in both States and the appeal machinery is the only route left for a person struck off. Whether that machinery can absorb objections at this scale, in a State where a section of the electorate has been displaced for three years, is the open question.

    Back2Basics: Revision of electoral rolls under the Representation of the People Act, 1950

    1. Statutory basis: Section 21 empowers the Election Commission to prepare and revise electoral rolls, either as a matter of course before an election or by special direction.
    2. Two modes of revision: An intensive revision prepares the roll afresh through house-to-house enumeration. A summary revision carries the existing roll forward and invites claims and objections against it.
    3. The forms: Form 6 seeks inclusion of a name, Form 7 objects to an inclusion or seeks a deletion, and Form 8 covers correction of particulars and transposition within a constituency.
    4. Qualifying dates: Eligibility is tested with reference to 1 January, with 1 April, 1 July and 1 October added as further qualifying dates from 2022.

    [2026, GS2, 10 marks] Is the right to vote a fundamental right? Discuss the position of the Election Commission of India while undertaking the revision of electoral rolls. Can it also examine the question of citizenship of voters?”

  • State consent not taken, put HC Chief Justice appointment on hold: Punjab Govt

    Why in the News

    The Punjab Cabinet has passed a resolution demanding that the appointment of Justice Ashwani Kumar Mishra as Chief Justice of the Punjab and Haryana High Court be put on hold. The resolution states that the Centre notified the appointment without obtaining the State government’s views, as the Memorandum of Procedure for the appointment of High Court judges requires. The Supreme Court Collegium had recommended four High Court Chief Justices on 6 August. The Centre sought the views of the Chief Ministers and Governors of the four States on 12 August, and notified the appointments on 5 September. The contest is over a document that gives a State a consultative role, sets no period within which the State must use it, and creates no right the State can enforce.

    What is the Memorandum of Procedure?

    1. A working document, not a statute: The Memorandum of Procedure sets out the steps by which judges of the Supreme Court and the High Courts are recommended, consulted on and appointed. It carries no statutory force and confers no enforceable right on any party.
    2. It came out of the Judges cases: The Supreme Court’s Second Judges case (1993) and Third Judges case (1998) placed primacy in a Collegium of senior judges. The Memorandum was drawn up afterwards to record how the Collegium and the executive would process an appointment.
    3. The State enters as a consultee: For a High Court appointment the Centre seeks the views of the Chief Minister and the Governor of the State before the recommendation is processed for notification.

    What has Punjab demanded, and on what ground?

    1. A hold on the appointment and the oath: The Cabinet resolved at an emergency meeting that the appointment and the administration of oath be put on hold until Punjab’s views are obtained and duly considered.
    2. The stated ground is procedural bypass: The Cabinet described the appointment as “yet another instance” of the Centre bypassing Punjab’s constitutional rights and established procedure.
    3. The objection was escalated to the constitutional heads: The Chief Minister wrote to the President, the Prime Minister and the Governor, enclosing the resolution. The Chief Minister is not expected to attend the oath ceremony.
    4. The Bar has framed it as executive overreach: The Punjab and Haryana High Court Bar Association has read the notification as the executive acting past a procedural safeguard rather than as a routine posting.

    Why did the appointment proceed without Punjab’s response?

    1. The document fixes no time period: Nothing in the Memorandum states how long a State may take to send its views.
    2. Convention supplies the missing clock: Consent for a Chief Justice is conventionally dealt with immediately, and inputs from a Chief Minister on a High Court judge take four to six weeks.
    3. Silence is read as assent: After a certain period the Law Ministry deems that the State government had no objection to the recommendation.
    4. Three other States had already replied: Bihar, West Bengal and Maharashtra sent their inputs immediately. The delay by Punjab held up those three appointments as well.

    Where does this leave the wider appointments cycle?

    1. Every High Court now has a regular Chief Justice: Eight appointments were notified on Collegium recommendations of 6 August and 31 August, filling all 25 High Courts. The Chhattisgarh appointment followed separately after its sitting Chief Justice retired on 4 September.
    2. The Collegium’s attention shifts to the top court: Four vacancies remain in the Supreme Court, which trace to the Supreme Court (Number of Judges) Amendment Ordinance, 2026 raising the sanctioned strength in May. The Court currently sits at 34 judges.
    3. The window is narrow: A fifth seat falls vacant on 29 November on a retirement, and the Chief Justice of India retires on 9 February 2027. These are the last recommendations the present Collegium can make.

    Challenges to the Memorandum of Procedure

    1. The revised document has stayed unsettled for a decade: After the Supreme Court struck down the National Judicial Appointments Commission in Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India (2015), a five judge Constitution Bench directed the government to finalise a revised Memorandum. Eg. Successive drafts have moved between the Collegium and the Law Ministry without agreement on a national security exception or on a permanent secretariat.
      The Fix: Settle the revised document against a dated deadline set by the Court, so that the operative rulebook is a published text rather than a decade of correspondence.
    2. No clause binds the executive to notify within a period: A recommendation the Collegium reiterates is binding in substance, and nothing fixes when the notification must issue. Eg. Justice K M Joseph’s elevation was recommended in January 2018, returned by the government, reiterated in July 2018 and notified only in August 2018.
      The Fix: Write a fixed outer limit for notification into the revised Memorandum, with the recommendation taking effect on its expiry.
    3. The criteria for selecting a Chief Justice are unpublished: Seniority combined with suitability operates as a convention rather than as a stated test, so a comparative assessment cannot be examined. Eg. Collegium resolutions record the name recommended without the assessment that produced it.
      The Fix: Publish the criteria and an anonymised comparative note with each Chief Justice recommendation.
    4. A State’s view has no remedy attached to it: The Memorandum creates no right, so a State that believes it was not consulted has no forum that can stay the appointment. Eg. Punjab’s objection could travel to the President and the Prime Minister and to no authority able to halt the oath.
      The Fix: Record the State’s response, or its absence, on the file as a dated entry that the notification must recite.

    Conclusion

    The dispute is not about the individual appointed. It sets a State’s claim to be consulted against a document that binds nobody and can be satisfied by the passage of time. A State that responds late has its silence converted into consent, and a State that objects afterwards has nowhere to take the objection. Until the Memorandum of Procedure is itself settled, a State’s dissent on a judicial appointment will keep arriving as a political resolution rather than as a step in the appointment process.

    Back2Basics: The Collegium system

    1. What it is: A body of the senior most judges of the Supreme Court that recommends appointments and transfers of judges to the Supreme Court and the High Courts.
    2. Composition: The Chief Justice of India and the four senior most judges of the Supreme Court for Supreme Court appointments. A smaller collegium of the Chief Justice of India and two senior most judges handles High Court recommendations.
    3. Source of authority: It is a judicial creation, not a constitutional provision. Articles 124 and 217 speak only of consultation with the judiciary.
    4. The executive’s residual role: The government may return a recommendation once with its objections. A reiterated recommendation is binding on it.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2025, GS2, 15 marks] Discuss the evolution of collegium system in India. Critically examine the advantages and disadvantages of the system on appointment of the Judges of the Supreme Court of India and that of the USA.”

  • Fear revisits residents of Western Ghats

    Why in the News

    The Centre has issued its seventh draft notification proposing to declare 56,825.7 sq km of the Western Ghats an Ecologically Sensitive Area (ESA). Of that, 29,668 sq km spread across 1,449 villages in ten Karnataka districts falls in the State. Hundreds of farmers in the Malnad region have marched against the draft, and their central demand is not that the notification be dropped. They want the Karnataka government to conduct a physical survey of the land and to exclude human settlements and cultivated areas from the proposed ESA boundary. The tension is that the people most opposed to the notification already live under forest restrictions that deny them roads, schools, electricity and clear title, and they read the ESA as freezing those unsettled claims permanently.

    What is an Ecologically Sensitive Area?

    1. The legal basis: An ESA is an area notified under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, within which specified activities are prohibited, restricted or made subject to closer scrutiny.
    2. How it is created: The Centre issues a draft notification proposing the boundary and the restrictions, and allows a fixed period for objections before a final notification can issue. The seventh draft allows 60 days.
    3. What it is not: An ESA is a land use regime layered over existing ownership, so it does not by itself transfer land or extinguish a title.

    How did the Western Ghats ESA proposal originate?

    1. A march, not a ministry: On 1 November 1987 two groups of scientists, ecologists, environmentalists and activists began walking simultaneously from Navapur in Maharashtra’s Dhule district and from Kanyakumari in Tamil Nadu towards a common meeting point in Goa, documenting the ecological condition of the landscape along the route.
    2. The Goa conference: The effort culminated in a conference in Goa in February 1988, where the ecologist Madhav Gadgil of the Indian Institute of Science, Bengaluru chaired the technical session on the region’s ecological status.
    3. The demand for an expert panel: The group stayed active through a 1998 yatra and meetings in 2009 and on 18 February 2010 at the Keystone Foundation in Kotagiri, Nilgiris, where the then Union Minister for Environment and Forests was asked to constitute an expert panel on the Western Ghats.
    4. The panel: On 4 March 2010 the Ministry of Environment and Forests set up the Western Ghats Ecology Expert Panel (WGEEP) under Gadgil, with nine non-government and five official members, to assess the ecological status of the Ghats, demarcate areas to be notified as ecologically sensitive, and recommend conservation measures through wide consultation.

    What did the WGEEP recommend, and how was its report handled?

    1. A people-oriented model: The report went beyond regulation to propose science-based incentives, including financial rewards for individual farmers and payments for ecosystem services to communities. It cited the Australian Soil Carbon Accreditation Scheme, under which farmers were paid retrospectively for verified increases in soil carbon on regeneratively managed farmland.
    2. The restrictions it proposed: These included a complete ban on mining and sand extraction with existing operations phased out within five years or on expiry of lease, restrictions on housing and construction projects exceeding 20,000 sq m, a ban on all “red category” highly polluting industries with existing units to close or relocate within five years, encouragement of organic farming, and closer scrutiny of other development activities.
    3. The report was withheld for months: The panel submitted its final report on 31 August 2011. The Ministry resisted disclosure through repeated applications under the Right to Information Act, 2005 and an order of the Central Information Commission, and approached the Delhi High Court seeking a stay, before uploading the report on its website on 23 May 2012.
    4. Every State government objected: All the States concerned, including Karnataka and Kerala, opposed the recommendations, and elected representatives particularly in Kerala argued they would severely disrupt local livelihoods.

    What did the Kasturirangan High-Level Working Group change?

    1. Why it was constituted: Taking the criticism of the WGEEP report into account, the Union Ministry set up a High-Level Working Group (HLWG) under K. Kasturirangan to prepare a “workable and implementable” report on conserving the Western Ghats.
    2. What it recommended: The panel visited several places, including Sakleshpur in Hassan district, and submitted its report on 15 April 2013. It recommended that about 37 per cent of the Western Ghats, 59,940 sq km forming a continuous band of natural vegetation stretching roughly 1,500 km across six States, be declared an ESA. Karnataka accounted for the largest share, around 20,668 sq km.
    3. The objection from the earlier panel: Gadgil objected strongly in an open letter, stating that the WGEEP had proposed a graded, participatory approach with a major role for grassroots input.
    4. What the letter said the HLWG did instead: It had effectively partitioned the landscape, with roughly a third to be protected by “funds and guards” as natural landscape and the remaining two-thirds labelled cultural landscape and left open to development.

    What does the seventh draft propose for Karnataka?

    1. Seven drafts, none finalised: The Ministry has issued seven draft notifications since 2014. All six earlier drafts were opposed by the States concerned, and residents of the affected regions filed numerous objections against them.
    2. The Karnataka share: The 29,668 sq km proposed in the State is spread across 1,449 villages in Belagavi, Chamarajanagar, Chikkamagaluru, Dakshina Kannada, Hassan, Kodagu, Mysuru, Shivamogga, Udupi and Uttara Kannada districts.
    3. The instrument has not changed: The draft still rests on the boundary the HLWG proposed, which is why the objection filed against it is the same objection filed against the six drafts before it.

    What are the Malnad protests demanding?

    1. The march: On 29 August hundreds of farmers from Hosanagara taluk in Shivamogga district marched about nine kilometres from the Ganesha temple in Karanagiri to Hosanagara town, and farmers across Shivamogga and neighbouring Malnad districts are planning similar protests.
    2. The demand has narrowed: The central demand is a physical survey of the land by the State government and the exclusion of human settlements and cultivated areas from the proposed boundary.
    3. The Kerala model they cite: Kerala reduced its proposed ESA area from 13,108 sq km to 9,937 sq km, comprising 9,107 sq km of forest and 886.7 sq km of non-forest land, after conducting a physical survey. That reduction of more than 3,000 sq km has since been incorporated into the revised notification.
    4. The organising vehicle: A large section of farmers has been brought together under the banner of the Western Ghats Raitha Sahakari Vedike, which has launched a website with a tool to help the public file objections online.
    5. The shift in position: The organisation is not opposing the notification outright this time, and is instead demanding that the State government follow the Kerala model to minimise the impact.

    How has the Karnataka political establishment responded?

    1. The stated concerns: The Member of Parliament from Shivamogga, who joined the protest marches, said restrictions on township projects and the push for organic farming were the primary concerns in the Malnad region.
    2. The plantation economy’s objection: Many farmers in Shivamogga, Uttara Kannada, Chikkamagaluru and Kodagu who grow plantation crops such as coffee and areca use chemical fertilizers to protect their crops from disease, and ask how plantations are to be protected if such inputs are restricted. Restrictions on house construction are the second stated objection.
    3. A legislative airing: The Karnataka Cabinet announced on 3 September 2026 a three-day special session of the legislature from 21 September to discuss drought, which will also take up a detailed discussion on the Kasturirangan report. The Chief Minister agreed to convene it after leaders across parties urged a physical survey, and the decision was welcomed across party lines.
    4. The State’s declared position: The Minister for School Education, who is also in charge of Shivamogga district, has said the State government will oppose the draft notification. A former Minister and Congress leader burnt a copy of the Kasturirangan report at a press conference in Tirthahalli.

    Why is the fear about existing forest rules rather than the ESA?

    1. A displaced village still without power: Uralagallu in Sagar taluk of Shivamogga district houses families displaced by the Linganamakki dam across the Sharavathi river in the 1960s. The village has roughly 50 to 56 families and a population of 150 to 200, with no proper road, school or primary health centre, its nearest bus stop about 10 km away, and no ambulance visit in recent years. It still has no electricity, because the Forest Department has repeatedly denied clearance for road and power-supply works.
    2. Children leave the village to study: A majority of parents there send their children to hostels or to relatives’ homes early. One resident’s two children stay about 50 km away at Mavinagundi, and villagers walk 10 km to Kanuru to catch a bus.
    3. Roads are blocked in conflict-prone stretches: At Byrapura in N.R. Pura taluk of Chikkamagaluru district, schoolchildren recently encountered a leopard on their way home, and stayed away from school for several days. Parents say a proper road would allow safer transport, and forest regulations continue to block it.
    4. Even the local government has no title: In Karimane village of Hosanagara taluk, large parts of the settlement including the gram panchayat building stand on forest land, leaving the panchayat office without an official khata, or title, and the community in administrative limbo.
    5. Unsettled claims are the real anxiety: Bagair hukum, or unauthorised, cultivators and people displaced by dam projects are yet to receive the compensatory land promised to them under existing rules, and they fear that an ESA in force would leave those claims unresolved indefinitely.

    What is the case for the notification?

    1. The rejected report is held to be the better one: Several environmentalists argue that the Kasturirangan report was a “diluted version” of the WGEEP report, which they consider better suited to conserving the Ghats with active local participation.
    2. The argument surfaces only after a disaster: Whenever landslips or flash floods strike Kerala or Kodagu, environmentalists blame policymakers for ignoring the WGEEP recommendations. The debate typically subsides within days, as routine concerns over access, amenities, roads and electricity take over.
    3. Much of the proposed area is already forest: An environmentalist based in Sagar taluk states that a major portion of the area proposed for the ESA in Karnataka is already notified forest, that the remainder is small, and that there should be no opposition to including it.
    4. The restrictions are said to be misread: The same view holds that people with vested interests are misleading the public with false information about the restrictions, that ordinary people have no reason to fear a ban on mining or on red-category industries, and that the push for organic farming benefits everyone.

    Challenges to the Western Ghats ESA notification

    1. A draft that never becomes a notification produces neither protection nor certainty: Each draft lapses and is reissued, so landowners cannot plan and the ecologically sensitive designation has no legal force in the interim. Eg. The proposal has now run through more than a decade of successive drafts without a single final notification issuing.
      The Fix: Fix a statutory outer limit within which a draft issued under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 must be finalised or formally withdrawn.
    2. ESA status does not stop the land use changes that do the most damage: Large hydel, transmission and road projects are cleared through separate forest and wildlife clearance processes that an ESA notification does not displace. Eg. The Athirappilly hydel project in Kerala’s Chalakudy basin has been proposed and revived repeatedly in a stretch the ecology panel placed in its highest sensitivity zone.
      The Fix: Write the prohibition on new hydel and mining leases into the notification itself, rather than leaving each project to a case-by-case clearance.
    3. Forest rights claims in the same landscape are unsettled: Restricting land use before individual and community claims are decided converts a pending claim into a permanent denial. Eg. The Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006 requires gram sabha verification of every claim, and recognition remains incomplete across the Western Ghats States.
      The Fix: Settle pending claims before the final notification takes effect, and attach the gram sabha resolution to the boundary record for each village.
    4. Tighter protection without habitat management raises human-wildlife conflict: Restricting access and infrastructure inside a landscape does nothing about crop raiding and encounters on the forest edge, which is what residents experience daily. Eg. Kodagu and Hassan districts record repeated elephant crop damage and human casualties, and conflict compensation in Karnataka runs among the highest in the country.
      The Fix: Fund a dedicated conflict mitigation line inside the ESA framework, covering barriers, rapid response teams and time-bound ex gratia payment.

    Conclusion

    The dispute is no longer about whether the Western Ghats need protection. It is about who verifies the boundary, and on what evidence. A line drawn from remote sensing and contested for over a decade has delivered neither conservation on the ground nor certainty for the people living inside it, and each reissued draft resets the argument to where it began. The question that decides the outcome is whether Karnataka answers this draft with a completed ground survey or with another objection.

    Back2Basics: Western Ghats

    1. What it is: The Western Ghats is a chain of hills running parallel to India’s western coast, older than the Himalaya, and it intercepts the south-west monsoon to produce the heavy orographic rainfall of the west coast.
    2. Global recognition: It is one of the world’s recognised biodiversity hotspots, a designation given to regions with exceptional endemism and severe habitat loss.
    3. World Heritage status: UNESCO inscribed a serial property of 39 sites across the Western Ghats on the World Heritage List in 2012.
    4. Why endemism matters here: A large share of its amphibians, fish and flowering plants are found nowhere else, and species such as the lion-tailed macaque and the Nilgiri tahr are restricted to this range.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “Gadgil Committee Report’ and ‘Kasturirangan Committee Report’, sometimes seen in the news, are related to (a) constitutional reforms (b) Ganga Action Plan (c) linking of rivers (d) protection of Western Ghats”

  • Bihar makes consent mandatory for CBI to probe public servants

    Why in the News

    The Bihar Home Department has issued a notification regulating the jurisdiction of the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) in the State under Section 6 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946. It widens the agency’s standing general consent over offences involving employees of the Government of India, central Public Sector Undertakings (PSUs) and private persons implicated alongside them. A proviso then removes that automatic authority over public servants appointed in connection with the affairs of the Bihar government and over State-owned, State-controlled and State-aided bodies. The notification supersedes every previous notification on the subject. The result is a two-tier regime. The same agency needs no permission to investigate a central employee in Bihar. It needs case-by-case permission to investigate a State employee.

    What is consent under Section 6 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946?

    1. The statute is the CBI’s source of police powers: The CBI cannot ordinarily exercise its powers and jurisdiction inside a State without that State government’s consent.
    2. Two forms of consent: General consent allows the agency to investigate specified offences or categories of cases without seeking permission each time. Specific consent is granted for an individual case.
    3. Consent is tied to a notified offence list: The offences the agency may investigate are notified under Section 3 of the Act, so a State’s general consent operates only over that notified list.

    What does the Bihar notification alter on each side of the line?

    1. The offence list under general consent is widened: Consent now covers offences under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, the Information Technology Act, 2000, cybercrime, and the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 as amended.
    2. Whom the wider consent covers: It applies to employees of the Government of India, employees of PSUs under the Government of India, and private persons implicated alongside them.
    3. The proviso carves out the State’s own establishment: Prior consent of the Bihar government is mandatory for any probe of public servants appointed in connection with the affairs of the State, and of persons in any corporation, company or bank owned by, controlled by, or receiving financial assistance from the State.
    4. The State decides each request individually: On receiving a proposal from the Delhi Special Police Establishment, the State government considers it and takes a decision on granting powers of investigation case by case.

    Why is the order read as widening the agency’s reach rather than curbing it?

    1. The two-pronged reading inside the police establishment: The stated reading is that the first part of the order lets the CBI investigate cases that were the State’s prerogative, and the second part balances that by requiring the State’s permission.
    2. It is read as a template for other States: The assessment within the agency is that Bihar may have set a precedent for other States, and that the order gives the CBI more scope rather than less.
    3. The consent bar binds the executive alone: The requirement of State consent applies only to executive action by the CBI. It does not restrict a High Court or the Supreme Court from ordering a CBI investigation within a State without the State government’s consent.

    Challenges to the general consent mechanism

    1. Consent is revocable at will and leaves probes suspended: A State can withdraw general consent at any time, and the agency must then seek permission for every fresh case in that State. Eg. West Bengal withdrew its general consent in November 2018 and has required case-by-case permission since.
      The Fix: Prescribe a statutory period within which a State must decide a case-by-case request, with reasons recorded for a refusal.
    2. The agency has no charter of its own: The CBI rests on a 1946 police establishment law and a 1963 executive resolution, so its very constitution has been litigated. Eg. The Gauhati High Court in Navendra Kumar v. Union of India (2013) held the 1963 resolution constituting the CBI to be invalid, and the Supreme Court stayed that order within days.
      The Fix: Enact a dedicated CBI statute fixing its composition, its jurisdiction over notified central offences and the limits of State consent.
    3. Corruption probes against State officials face two separate gates: Consent under Section 6 is only the first permission, and a further approval is needed before an inquiry into a public servant’s official decisions can begin. Eg. Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, inserted in 2018, requires prior approval of the competent authority before any enquiry into a recommendation made or decision taken by a public servant in discharge of official functions.
      The Fix: Run both approvals through a single time-bound window, so a refusal at either gate is recorded once and is appealable.
    4. Selective consent invites a political reading of every case: The State controls access to its own officials, so each grant or refusal is readable as a political act rather than a legal one. Eg. The Supreme Court described the agency as a “caged parrot speaking in its master’s voice” in the coal blocks allocation matter in 2013.
      The Fix: Publish an annual statement of consent requests received, granted, refused and pending, State by State, so the pattern is visible rather than inferred.
    5. Joint cases now straddle two consent regimes: One case involving a central employee and a State public servant is fully open on one accused and permission-dependent on the other, which splits a single investigation. Eg. A corruption case in a centrally funded scheme executed by a State department typically names officials of both.
      The Fix: Provide that where a case includes even one accused covered by general consent, the State decides on the whole case within a fixed period rather than on each accused separately.

    Conclusion

    The notification is in force and it supersedes every earlier consent order in the State. It settles nothing about the underlying arrangement, which lets the same agency be widened and fenced by a single executive order that no legislature debated. What is worth watching is whether other States adopt the split model, and whether Bihar attaches any timeline to the permissions it has now reserved to itself. A permission with no deadline is a refusal that never has to be written down.

    Back2Basics: Central Bureau of Investigation

    1. Constitution: The CBI was set up by a resolution of the Ministry of Home Affairs in 1963, and it is not a statutory body created by its own Act.
    2. Administrative control: It functions under the Department of Personnel and Training in the Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions.
    3. Superintendence is split: For offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, superintendence vests in the Central Vigilance Commission. For all other matters it vests in the Central Government.
    4. Appointment of the Director: The Director is appointed on the recommendation of a committee of the Prime Minister, the Leader of the Opposition in the Lok Sabha and the Chief Justice of India or a Supreme Court judge nominated by the Chief Justice.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “The jurisdiction of the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) regarding lodging an FIR and conducting probe within a particular State is being questioned by various States. However, the power of the States to withhold consent to the CBI is not absolute. Explain with special reference to the federal character of India.”

  • Jharkhand SIR faceoff: BJP agents seek to delete voters, BLOs raise red flag

    Why in the News

    Booth Level Officers (BLOs) in at least four booths of Jharkhand’s Godda district have refused stacks of Form 7 applications seeking deletion of voters from the draft electoral roll, flagging them as not genuine or not procedurally sound. The applications were brought by Booth Level Agents (BLAs) of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), and most of the names on them are from the minority community. The draft roll was published under the State’s Special Intensive Revision (SIR), and the claims and objections round on it is still open. The BJP has complained that the BLOs are at fault for refusing the forms. BLOs are State government employees, and the State is governed by a Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (JMM)-Congress alliance, so the standoff has acquired a party colour and has reached the Chief Electoral Officer (CEO). The tension is that Form 7 requires no evidence and has no filing cap, so the only safeguard against targeted bulk deletion is the inquiry after intake, and the CEO and the local Electoral Registration Officer (ERO) disagree on whether a BLO may refuse a form at all.

    How is a Form 7 deletion supposed to work?

    1. The statutory power sits with the ERO: Section 22 of the Representation of the People Act, 1950 lets the ERO correct or delete an entry on its own motion or on an application. In each case the ERO must hold an inquiry, give the elector time to respond and then pass an order.
    2. Only three grounds justify deletion: The ERO can remove an entry where the person has died, is no longer ordinarily resident in the constituency, or is ineligible because they are not a citizen or are under 18.
    3. Form 7 is the objection instrument: Under the Registration of Electors Rules, 1960, Form 7 carries an objection to a proposed inclusion or a deletion of a name in an existing roll. Any elector may use it to delete their own name or to object to another elector in the same constituency.
    4. The applicant proves nothing but signs a declaration: The form asks for one of five reasons, death, under age, absent or permanently shifted, already enrolled, or not Indian citizen, and needs no evidence. The applicant signs a declaration that a statement known to be false is punishable.

    Where does the online filing system leave the safeguard?

    1. Filing has moved online: The form can be downloaded from the voters’ portal and handed to the BLO, or filed on the portal or the ECINet app after the applicant links a phone number to their Electors Photo Identity Card (EPIC) number. Only a person registered in the same constituency can object to a name in it.
    2. The form identifies both parties: It carries the applicant’s name, EPIC number and phone number, and the name, EPIC number if available and address of the person objected to.
    3. Processing was centralised in 2018 but decisions were not: ERONet replaced the States’ own applications with one portal for EROs, and in 2025 the Election Commission of India (ECI) folded about 40 apps and portals into ECINet. Each form is still decided by the ERO concerned, not centrally.
    4. The portal verifies nothing at filing: No proof is required, and the system does not check that the EPIC number and phone number belong to the applicant.
    5. The inquiry is the safeguard, per the ECI: The ERO must issue a notice to the elector, allow seven days to respond, hold a hearing and pass an order, and the BLO must verify by a field visit. ECI officials say a deletion happens only after this ground inquiry.

    What did the investigation find in Godda’s booths?

    1. One BLA, 25 forms in one booth: At Booth No. 9 of Maheshtikri village a single BJP BLA filed Form 7s against 25 voters.
    2. The forms were not the official ones: The Maheshtikri BLO said the BLA brought forms that were not original, described them as covering voters absent from the village, and promised 50 more. Every form named a Muslim voter.
    3. She accepted the first batch and refused the rest: The BLO took the 25 forms, then declined further forms after the Block Development Officer (BDO) instructed BLOs that such documents were not official forms.
    4. A neighbouring BLA burned 75 forms: At Pachua Kita the BLO was handed around 75 Form 7s that differed from the forms the block office had issued. The BLA said he had been told they were for adding names, and he burned all of them when questioned.
    5. Almost every objected name was Muslim: At Pachua Kita almost all the names on the 75 forms were of Muslims, and at Maheshtikri all the forms carried Muslim voters.
    6. Complaints reached the ERO from four booths: The Basantrai BDO, acting as ERO, received complaints from Maheshtikri, Pachua Kita, Lochni and Baghakol. Villagers of Maheshtikri filed their own complaint against the mass objections in Booth No. 9.

    Why do the targeted voters say the objections cannot stand?

    1. The 2003 roll should protect them: Many of the targeted voters are verified in the 2003 intensive revision, and under the ECI’s own rules this eases their inclusion in the ongoing SIR. The BLOs said every objected voter at Maheshtikri and most at Pachua Kita were mapped to the 2003 roll.
    2. Residence runs back generations: The voters trace their families in the village across generations and hold the khatian, the land record used as proof of being Jharkhandi, along with Aadhaar cards and addresses in the State.
    3. Migration for work is the likely trigger: Several are labourers who work in Delhi, Ghaziabad or outside the State and return to vote in Jharkhand. One learned of the objection against him only from an anganwadi worker.
    4. The fear is benefits and citizenship, not only the vote: Eight voters spoken to feared disenfranchisement, loss of government scheme entitlements or being treated as non-citizens, and several said they were not educated enough to understand the consequences.
    5. Preliminary checks support them: The ERO said preliminary information shows some voters sought to be deleted are living at their registered addresses, and every deletion request will be field verified.

    How does the BJP defend the bulk filings?

    1. Objections are the BLA’s job: The former BJP MLA for Godda said filing objections is part of a BLA’s responsibility. BLAs are trained in Form 6 for new voters, Form 7 for objections and Form 8 for shifting or correction of entries.
    2. Duplicate registration is the stated ground: The party’s position is that a BLA can seek deletion where a name appears at two places, and that verifying the objection is the election authorities’ job.
    3. No cap exists on filings: There is no prescribed limit on the number of applications a BLA can submit, so a single BLA filing dozens breaks no rule.
    4. The BLO breached confidentiality, per the party: A BLO must keep the details of the objected person and of the BLA confidential, and disclosure can amount to a violation of the Representation of the People Act. The BJP says the Booth No. 9 BLO’s disclosure of its BLA’s identity caused pressure and threats against him.
    5. The complaint went to the Additional CEO: The BJP’s Jharkhand SIR convenor submitted a memorandum on discrepancies in the SIR, particularly in Sahibganj and Godda districts, accusing BLOs of two booths of refusing Form 7s from its BLAs.
    6. The BLAs describe a top down supply of forms: The Maheshtikri BLA said the former MLA gave him around 25 forms with the instruction to bring them back if the BLO refused, and some came back. The Pachua Kita BLA said he got the forms from party cadres, barely knew what they were, and thought they added names.

    Why have the ERO and the CEO split on what a BLO may do?

    1. The ERO told BLOs not to act: The BDO said BLOs were instructed not to act on the forms because the source of the forms was unknown, and that an inquiry report will follow field verification.
    2. The ERO wants a complaint route instead: In his view the BLAs should first have filed a written complaint with the Sub Divisional Officer (SDO) or the ERO asking for an investigation. Any objection should come from the family concerned or carry solid evidence.
    3. The CEO found no illegality: After speaking to the Godda Assistant ERO and the Deputy Commissioner, the Jharkhand CEO said objections were filed through Form 7 and can be submitted in bulk.
    4. The CEO holds that filing itself is legitimate: A BLA who believes a voter is registered in multiple States can object, and there is nothing wrong in filing objections.
    5. The CEO says BLOs cannot reject: The BLO must first inform the Assistant ERO (AERO), who decides what is to be done, and the BLO then records a recommendation in the observation report.

    Why has a roll revision become a party contest?

    1. The revision is large and the window is short: The SIR began in Jharkhand on June 30, and the draft roll published on August 5 removed 16.48 percent of voters, around 43 lakh. The claims and objections round closes on September 4.
    2. BLOs answer to a State government of the other side: The BJP frames the refusals as partisan because the BLOs are employees of a State run by its rivals.
    3. Godda is a marginal seat: The BJP candidate lost Godda in the 2024 Assembly election to the Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD) by more than 20,000 votes after winning it in 2020 by around 4,500.
    4. The ruling alliance calls it targeted deletion: The JMM’s local block president called the forms a BJP conspiracy to remove Muslim voters, and the Congress general secretary said the party is monitoring Form 7 deletions across the State. The RJD MLA for Godda said the BDO told him action is being taken.

    Challenges to the Form 7 objection mechanism

    1. The burden shifts to the objected elector: A voter must answer a notice within a week and attend a hearing, and a migrant worker away from home routinely misses both. Eg. In Lal Babu Hussein v Electoral Registration Officer (1995) the Supreme Court set aside deletions in Bombay where names had been struck off on suspicion of foreign nationality without a proper opportunity to be heard.
      The Fix: Serve the notice on the phone number linked to the elector’s EPIC and allow a response through the portal or a family member at the hearing.
    2. The objector’s identity is unverified: An objection can be filed under someone else’s EPIC number and phone number since nothing checks that they belong to the applicant. Eg. In Bengaluru in 2022, staff of a private firm, Chilume Enterprises, posed as Booth Level Officers and collected voter data door to door, showing how easily the intake layer is impersonated.
      The Fix: Require a one time password on the phone registered against the objector’s EPIC before the portal accepts a Form 7.
    3. False declarations carry no practical cost: Section 31 of the Representation of the People Act, 1950 makes a false declaration punishable with imprisonment of up to one year, but prosecutions of objectors are rare, so bulk filing is free. Eg. In the Bihar SIR of 2025 the Supreme Court had to direct the ECI to publish booth wise lists of the about 65 lakh excluded names with reasons before any individual could contest an exclusion.
      The Fix: Track every rejected objection to its filer and prosecute repeat filers under Section 31.
    4. Party appointed agents drive the objection pipeline: BLAs are nominated by political parties, so the volume and targeting of objections follow party incentive rather than roll accuracy. Eg. The Bihar SIR of 2025 let each BLA submit up to 50 certified enumeration forms a day, formally placing party agents inside the roll’s verification chain.
      The Fix: Require the ERO to publish booth wise counts of objections by filer during the claims window so bulk targeting is visible before the roll is finalised.

    Conclusion

    The Godda dispute is about where the safeguard against targeted deletion sits, at the BLO’s counter or in the ERO’s inquiry. The CEO has ruled that intake cannot be refused, so every objection now goes to field verification. The marker to watch is the Basantrai ERO’s inquiry report and how many of the objections it upholds once the claims window closes.

    Back2Basics: Special Intensive Revision (SIR)

    1. Legal basis: Section 21 of the Representation of the People Act, 1950 lets the Election Commission of India direct a special revision of the electoral roll for any constituency, in addition to the annual summary revision.
    2. What makes it intensive: BLOs visit every household with enumeration forms and the roll is rebuilt from those forms, rather than corrected entry by entry as in a summary revision.
    3. The current cycle: The nationwide exercise began with Bihar in June 2025 and has proceeded State by State in phases since.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026, GS2, 10 marks] Is the right to vote a fundamental right? Discuss the position of the Election Commission of India while undertaking the revision of electoral rolls. Can it also examine the question of citizenship of voters?”

  • A.P. to become third subsea hub on data centre buildout

    A.P. to become third subsea hub on data centre buildout

    Why in the News

    Technology majors Microsoft and Google are building new subsea cable landing stations on the coast of Andhra Pradesh as part of an artificial intelligence linked data centre buildout in the State. Microsoft is part of a consortium with Lightstorm and the Singaporean telecom operator Singtel to land the 3,600 kilometre India Southeast Asia Submarine Cable System, while Google’s globe spanning America India Connect system will land at Visakhapatnam, where the company’s own data centre complex is coming up. Once complete, the buildout will give India, after Mumbai and Chennai, a third digital international gateway, even as a global shortage of fibre threatens to slow the inland network these projects still need.

    What is a subsea cable landing station?

    1. Definition: A subsea cable landing station is the facility where an undersea fibre optic cable comes ashore and connects to a country’s terrestrial network, carrying the bulk of international internet traffic.
    2. Global reliance: The overwhelming majority of the world’s international data traffic travels through such undersea cable systems rather than satellites, making landing stations critical infrastructure.
    3. India’s current concentration: India’s existing landing stations are concentrated in Mumbai and Chennai, leaving the country reliant on a small number of routes.

    What new cable infrastructure is being built off Andhra Pradesh’s coast?

    1. Microsoft’s consortium project: Microsoft, alongside Lightstorm and Singtel, is landing the 3,600 kilometre India Southeast Asia Submarine Cable System, expected to be ready for service in the fourth quarter of 2029.
    2. Google’s own system: Google’s America India Connect system will land at Visakhapatnam, alongside the data centre complex the company is building there as part of what a Google executive described as an artificial intelligence hub.

    What does this make Visakhapatnam?

    1. India’s third gateway: After Mumbai and Chennai, Visakhapatnam becomes India’s third digital international subsea gateway, connecting the country directly with Southeast Asia, Australia and the Middle East.
    2. A new corridor: Lightstorm’s chief executive has described the India Southeast Asia system, which also connects to Chennai, as providing a fresh corridor to South Asia from Singapore and Malaysia.

    Why are companies building on the east coast now?

    1. Ageing existing infrastructure: Most cables currently connecting India’s east coast are old, are already filled to capacity and are approaching the end of their working life.
    2. A search for resilience: Companies are also seeking to reduce the risk of relying on a single route by adding cables on India’s east coast, citing instability in West Asia as a reason to build in an alternate location.

    What inland infrastructure does this buildout require?

    1. A nationwide undertaking: Both projects require installing and lighting thousands of kilometres of new terrestrial fibre linking the coast to major cities, a scale one company executive described as spanning the entire country.
    2. A dedicated corridor: Lightstorm is expected to build a terrestrial corridor connecting Machilipatnam to Mumbai and Hyderabad, and Chennai to Hyderabad and Mumbai, with matching bandwidth.
    3. A global fibre shortage: Fibre, its components and its raw material are in short supply worldwide, including from Indian manufacturers, a constraint industry executives describe as unprecedented in over a decade.

    What will Google’s Visakhapatnam facility do?

    1. Focused on inference: The facility will focus on inference work rather than power intensive training runs, serving domestic enterprises and government agencies given the deep adoption of artificial intelligence across government service delivery.
    2. Power and water choices: Google is seeking to source as much renewable power for the project as possible and is using air cooling technology to minimise water use.

    Challenges to the subsea cable buildout

    1. A global fibre shortage: A worldwide shortage of fibre and its raw material, unprecedented in over a decade, could delay the inland network these projects still need. Eg. Industry executives report that fibre is out of stock across the globe, including from Indian manufacturers. Fix. Expand domestic fibre manufacturing capacity through targeted incentives so the inland rollout is not held back by global supply constraints.
    2. Physical vulnerability of undersea cables: Undersea cables remain exposed to accidental damage from fishing and anchoring activity and to disruption in contested waters. Eg. India’s existing east coast cables are already ageing and running close to capacity, leaving few redundant routes today. Fix. Build multiple, geographically separated landing points and routes, as the new Visakhapatnam gateway is itself intended to do, so a single cable fault cannot isolate India’s connectivity.
    3. Concentration of ownership with foreign firms: The new cable systems and the data centres they serve are being built and operated by foreign technology majors, so India’s expanding gateway capacity depends on the investment decisions of a small number of firms. Eg. Both the India Southeast Asia system and the America India Connect system are anchored by Microsoft and Google respectively rather than Indian carriers. Fix. Encourage Indian telecom operators to invest jointly in landing station capacity so gateway control is not concentrated entirely with foreign firms.

    Conclusion

    Andhra Pradesh’s coastline is emerging as India’s third major digital gateway, as Microsoft and Google build new subsea cable systems into Visakhapatnam alongside the data centres driving the region’s artificial intelligence buildout. Delivering on that promise depends on inland fibre rollout keeping pace despite a global supply crunch, and on India diversifying its cable landing points and ownership so its expanding digital infrastructure does not remain concentrated in a handful of ageing routes and foreign owned systems.

    [2023] “What is the status of digitalization in the Indian economy? Examine the problems faced in this regard and suggest improvements.”