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  • Electric and Hybrid Cars – FAME, National Electric Mobility Mission, etc.

    NITI Aayog’s Draft Battery Swapping Policy

    | Economics | Mains Paper 3: Infrastructure: Energy, Ports, Roads, Airports, Railways Etc.

    The NITI Aayog has released a draft battery-swapping policy targeted at electric two- and three-wheelers as the government think tank aims to expedite large-scale adoption of EVs.

    What is Battery Swapping?

    • Battery swapping is a mechanism that involves exchanging discharged batteries for charged ones.
    • This provides the flexibility to charge these batteries separately by de-linking charging and battery usage, and keeps the vehicle in operational mode with negligible downtime.
    • Battery swapping is generally used for smaller vehicles such as two-wheelers and three-wheelers with smaller batteries that are easier to swap, compared to four-wheelers and e-buses, although solutions are emerging for these larger segments as well.

    What is BaaS?

    • Battery-as-a-service (BaaS) is seen as a viable charging alternative.
    • Manufacturers can sell EVs in two forms: Vehicles with fixed or removable batteries and vehicles with batteries on lease.
    • If you buy an electric scooter with battery leasing, you do not pay for the cost of the battery—that makes the initial acquisition almost 40% cheaper.
    • Users can swap drained batteries for a fully charged one at a swap station. The depleted batteries are then charged on or off-site.
    • The advantages of swapping include low downtimes for commercial fleets, reduced space requirements, and lower upfront costs.
    • It is also a viable solution for those who don’t have parking spots at home.

    Draft Battery Swapping Policy: Key Proposals

    • Rationalizing taxes on battery: The draft policy has suggested that the GST Council consider reducing the differential across the tax rates on Lithium-ion batteries and electric vehicle supply equipment. Currently, the tax rate on the former is 18 per cent, and 5 per cent on the latter.
    • Incentivization for swapping enabled vehicles: The policy also proposes to offer the same incentives available to electric vehicles that come pre-equipped with a fixed battery to electric vehicles with swappable batteries. The size of the incentive could be determined based on the kWh (kilowatt hour) rating of the battery and compatible EV.
    • Terms of contracts for battery providers: The government will specify a minimum contract duration for a contract to be signed between EV users and battery providers to ensure they continue to provide battery swapping services after receiving the subsidy.
    • Public battery charging stations: The policy also requires state governments to ensure public battery charging stations are eligible for EV power connections with concessional tariffs. It also proposes to install battery swapping stations at several locations like retail fuel outlets, public parking areas, malls, kirana shops and general stores etc.
    • Tariff rationalization: It also proposes to bring such stations under existing or future time-of-day (ToD) tariff regimes, so that the swappable batteries can be charged during off-peak periods when electricity tariffs are low.
    • Registration ease: Transport Departments and State Transport Authorities will be responsible for easing registration processes for vehicles sold without batteries or for vehicles with battery swapping functionality.
    • Unique identification number (UIN): The policy also proposes to assign a UIN to swappable batteries at the manufacturing stage to help track and monitor them. Similarly, a UIN number will be assigned to each battery swapping station.
    • Locations: The NITI Aayog has proposed that all metropolitan cities with a population of more than 40 lakh will be prioritized for the development of battery swapping networks under the first phase, which is within 1-2 years of the draft policy getting finalized.

    Why hasn’t BaaS taken off yet?

    • Hefty taxes: There are economic and operational constraints. Energy service providers offering swapping solutions have to charge 18% goods and services tax (GST) for swapping, compared to 5% GST on the purchase of an EV.
    • No incentives yet: Additionally, the government’s FAME-II incentives are not offered to vehicles sold with BaaS or swap station operators.
    • Lack of interoperability infrastructure: While these are economic disadvantages compared to direct charging solutions, the lack of a dense and interoperable battery swap infrastructure has also hindered the roll-out.

    Does the draft policy talk about EV safety?

    • To ensure a high level of protection at the electrical interface, a rigorous testing protocol will be adopted, the draft said, to avoid any unwanted temperature rise at the electrical interface.
    • The battery management system, which is a software that controls battery functions, will have to be self-certified and open for testing to check its compatibility with various systems, and capability to meet safety requirements.
    • This particularly assumes significance given the recent incidents of electric two-wheelers bursting into flames.

    Issues with BaaS

    • Standardization of specifications: There is a need for standardization of safety specifications as well as the battery.
    • Safety hazard: Swapping in the various permutations and combinations of batteries at a station where  they  have not been tested for compatibility could lead to safety hazards.
    • Non-competitive nature: Also, mandating only one type of battery to  be eligible for  concessions  would be  disadvantageous  to  many  players.

    Significance of battery swapping

    • High Cost of EVs: An EV, by industry standards, is 1.5-2x costlier than IC Engine counterpart and at least half the cost is from the battery pack.
    • Cost reduction: Many manufacturers are offering batteries separately from a vehicle, reducing the cost. In that case, a fleet owner can buy vehicles without battery and utilize battery swapping.
    • Range Anxiety: Another major reason stopping people from buying EVs is range anxiety, or in simple terms, the fear of battery getting empty without finding a charging station.
    • Inadequate charging infrastructure: Unlike petrol pumps, EV charging stations are rare to spot and that further increases the range anxiety exponentially, especially while going on a road trip.
    • Hazard management: In case of a Swapping Station, one can simply locate a station, go and replace the empty battery with a new one.

     

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  • Social Media: Prospect and Challenges

    EU member states agrees on Digital Services Act (DSA)

    IOCR | International Relations | Mains Paper 2: Effect Of Policies & Politics Of World On India’S Interests

    The European Parliament and European Union (EU) Member States announced that they had reached a political agreement on the Digital Services Act (DSA).

    What is DSA?

    • DSA is a landmark legislation to force big Internet companies to act against disinformation and illegal and harmful content, and to “provide better protection for Internet users and their fundamental rights”.
    • The Act, which is yet to become law, was proposed by the EU Commission (anti-trust) in December 2020.
    • As defined by the EU Commission, the DSA is “a set of common rules on intermediaries’ obligations and accountability across the single market”.
    • It seeks to ensure higher protection to all EU users, irrespective of their country.
    • The proposed Act will work in conjunction with the EU’s Digital Markets Act (DMA), which was approved last month.

    Whom will the DSA apply?

    • Intermediaries: The DSA will tightly regulate the way intermediaries, especially large platforms such as Google, Facebook, and YouTube, function when it comes to moderating user content.
    • Abusive or illegal content: Instead of letting platforms decide how to deal with abusive or illegal content, the DSA will lay down specific rules and obligations for these companies to follow.
    • Ambit platforms: The legislation brings in its ambit platforms that provide Internet access, domain name registrars, hosting services such as cloud computing and web-hosting services.
    • Very large platforms: But more importantly, very large online platforms (VLOPs) and very large online search engines (VLOSEs) will face “more stringent requirements.”
    • 45 million monthly users-base: Any service with more than 45 million monthly active users in the EU will fall into this category. Those with under 45 million monthly active users in the EU will be exempt from certain new obligations.

    Key features

    A wide range of proposals seeks to ensure that the negative social impact arising from many of the practices followed by the Internet giants is minimised or removed:

    1. Faster removal of illicit content: Online platforms and intermediaries such as Facebook, Google, YouTube, etc will have to add “new procedures for faster removal” of content deemed illegal or harmful. This can vary according to the laws of each EU Member State.
    2. Introduction of Trusted Flaggers: Users will be able to challenge these takedowns as well. Platforms will need to have a clear mechanism to help users flag content that is illegal. Platforms will have to cooperate with “trusted flaggers”.
    3. Imposition of duty of care: Marketplaces such as Amazon will have to “impose a duty of care” on sellers who are using their platform to sell products online. They will have to “collect and display information on the products and services sold in order to ensure that consumers are properly informed.”
    4. Annual audit of big platforms: The DSA adds an obligation for very large digital platforms and services to analyse systemic risks they create and to carry out risk reduction analysis. This audit for platforms like Google and Facebook will need to take place every year.
    5. Promoting independent research: The Act proposes to allow independent vetted researchers to have access to public data from these platforms to carry out studies to understand these risks better.
    6. Ban ‘Dark Patterns’ or “misleading interfaces: The DSA proposes to ban ‘Dark Patterns’ or “misleading interfaces” that are designed to trick users into doing something that they would not agree to otherwise.
    7. Transparency of Algorithms: It also proposes “transparency measures for online platforms on a variety of issues, including on the algorithms used for recommending content or products to users”.
    8. Easy cancellation of subscription: Finally, it says that cancelling a subscription should be as easy as subscribing.
    9. Protection of minors: The law proposes stronger protection for minors, and aims to ban targeted advertising for them based on their personal data.
    10. Crisis mechanism clause: This clause will make it “possible to analyse the impact of the activities of these platforms” on the crisis, and the Commission will decide the appropriate steps to be taken to ensure the fundamental rights of users are not violated.
    11. Others: Companies will have to look at the risk of “dissemination of illegal content”, “adverse effects on fundamental rights”, “manipulation of services having an impact on democratic processes and public security”, “adverse effects on gender-based violence, and on minors and serious consequences for the physical or mental health of users.”

    Bar over Social Media

    • It has been clarified that the platforms and other intermediaries will not be liable for the unlawful behaviour of users.
    • So, they still have ‘safe harbour’ in some sense.
    • However, if the platforms are “aware of illegal acts and fail to remove them, they will be liable for this user behaviour.
    • Small platforms, which remove any illegal content they detect, will not be liable.

    Are there any such rules in India?

    • India last year brought the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021.
    • These rules make the social media intermediary and its executives liable if the company fails to carry out due diligence.
    • Rule 4 (a) states that significant social media intermediaries — such as Facebook or Google — must appoint a chief compliance officer (CCO), who could be booked if a tweet or post that violates local laws is not removed within the stipulated period.
    • India’s Rules also introduce the need to publish a monthly compliance report.
    • They include a clause on the need to trace the originator of a message — this provision has been challenged by WhatsApp in the Delhi High Court.

     

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  • Agricultural Sector and Marketing Reforms – eNAM, Model APMC Act, Eco Survey Reco, etc.

    How Indonesia’s ban on Palm Oil exports will hurt India?

    | Economics | Mains Paper 3: Effects Of Liberalization On The Economy, Changes In Industrial Policy and their effects on Industrial Growth

    The abrupt ban on palm oil exports by Indonesia, its biggest exporter, is expected to rock household economics globally.

    Indonesia curbs palm oil export

    • Indonesia has clamped down on exports starting 28 April primarily because of soaring inflation in the country.
    • This is not the first time the South East Asian country decided to arrest local prices by banning exports—it had announced limited curbs in January too.
    • However, brokerages suggest that the ban will probably be a temporary measure of two to three weeks, as Indonesia cannot afford to lose out on exports for long.
    • Indonesia’s president Joko Widodo has stated that he would ensure that the availability of cooking oil in the domestic market becomes “abundant and affordable”.

    How will this ban affect India?

    • Palm oil is among the world’s most-used cooking oils, and India’s dependence on Indonesia is expected to deal a supply-side shock.
    • The export ban could send food inflation soaring as India is the largest importer of palm oil from Indonesia.
    • It imports about 8 million tonnes of palm oil annually; the commodity accounts for nearly 40% share of India’s overall edible oil consumption basket.
    • Edible oil prices could surge as much as 100-200% in India if the government fails to find a new source of palm oil.
    • Cooking oil prices are already at record levels as the Ukraine war disrupted shipments of sunflower oil.
    • Prior to the war, the Black Sea region made up over 75% of global sunflower oil exports.

    How could it impact packaged goods firms?

    • Since palm oil and its derivatives are used in the production of several household goods, the impact of the ban could eat into the margins of Indian packaged consumer goods players.
    • Analysts said listed firms such as Hindustan Unilever Ltd, Godrej Consumer Products Ltd, Britannia Industries Ltd, and Nestle SA could feel the impact of the ban in the near term.

    What are India’s import options?

    • India is most likely to turn to Malaysia, the second-biggest palm oil exporter, to plug the gap.
    • But Malaysia is also facing a labour shortage owing to the pandemic which has resulted in a production shortfall.
    • Hence Malaysia is unlikely to be able to plug the gap.
    • Also the bilateral ties have soured since few years due to unwarranted comments by its former PM Mahathir Mohammed on Kashmir.
    • India could also explore importing from Thailand and Africa—they produce three million tonnes each.

    How can India mitigate the impact of the ban?

    • Palm oil prices rose by nearly 5% over the weekend after the announcement of the export ban. Finding an immediate solution is going to be a challenge.
    • Even if India manages to find an alternative source, prices will be high as a major exporter is now out of the calculation.
    • The industry expects India to engage with Indonesia on an urgent basis, before the ban comes into effect on 28 April.
    • Besides, the Centre is likely to negotiate with other oil-supplying nations in Latin America and Canada.

    Back2Basics:

    National Edible Oil Mission (OP)

     

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  • North-East India – Security and Developmental Issues

    Explained: Arunachal-Assam Boundary Dispute

    | Polity | Mains Paper 2: Federalism

    Less than a month after the Union government gave the seal of approval to an agreement to partially resolve the disputed sectors on the Assam-Meghalaya border, Arunachal Pradesh CM and his Assam counterpart decided to form district-level committees for settling their inter-state boundary disputes.

    Arunachal-Assam Boundary Dispute

    • Assam has had boundary disputes with all the north-eastern states that were carved out of it.
    • While Nagaland became a State in 1963, Meghalaya first became an Autonomous State in 1970 and a full-fledged State in 1972.
    • Arunachal Pradesh and Mizoram were separated from Assam as Union Territories in 1972 and as States in 1987.
    • None of the new States accepted the “constitutional boundary” that they said was dictated by the partisan administration of undivided Assam without consulting the tribal stakeholders.
    • They also claimed that the disputed areas were traditionally under the control of tribal chieftains before Assam, post-India’s independence, inherited the “imaginary boundaries” drawn during British rule.
    • The issue with Arunachal Pradesh has more to do with a 1951 report prepared by a sub-committee headed by Assam’s first Chief Minister, Gopinath Bordoloi.

    Genesis of the dispute

    • Arunachal Pradesh and Assam have disputes at about 1,200 points along their 804 km boundary.
    • The disputes cropped up in the 1970s and intensified in the 1990s with frequent flare-ups along the border.
    • However, the issue dates back to 1873 when the British government introduced the inner-line permit vaguely separating the plains from the frontier hills.
    • This area became the North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA) in 1954, three years after a notification based on the 1951 report saw 3,648 sq. km of the “plain” area of Balipara and Sadiya foothills being transferred to the Darrang and Lakhimpur districts of Assam.
    • Arunachal has been celebrating its statehood with an eye on China since 1987, but what has been causing resentment is the inability of the people living in the transferred patches.
    • Leaders in Arunachal Pradesh claim the transfer was done arbitrarily without consulting its tribes who had customary rights over these lands.
    • Their counterparts in Assam say the 1951 demarcation is constitutional and legal.

    Earlier attempts for resolving dispute

    • There were several efforts to demarcate the boundary between Assam and NEFA/Arunachal Pradesh between 1971 and 1974.
    • To end the stalemate, a high-powered tripartite committee involving the Centre and the two States was formed in April 1979 to delineate the boundary based on Survey of India maps.
    • About 489 km of the inter-state boundary north of the Brahmaputra River was demarcated by 1984, but Arunachal did not accept the recommendations and staked claim to much of the areas transferred in 1951.
    • Assam objected and approached the Supreme Court in 1989, accusing Arunachal Pradesh of “encroachment”.
    • The apex court-appointed a local boundary commission in 2006 headed by one of its retired judges.
    • In its September 2014 report, this commission recommended that Arunachal Pradesh should get back some of the areas transferred in 1951. However, this did not work out.

    Way forward

    • Following the model adopted in the exercise to resolve the dispute with Meghalaya, Assam and Arunachal Pradesh have agreed to form district-level committees.
    • They will be tasked with undertaking joint surveys in the disputed sectors to find tangible solutions to the long-pending issue based on historical perspective, ethnicity, contiguity, people’s will and administrative convenience.
    • The two States have decided to form 12 such committees involving the districts sharing the boundary. Assam has eight districts touching the boundary with Arunachal Pradesh, which has 12 such districts.

    Conclusion

    • The Assam-Meghalaya boundary agreement has raised hopes of the Assam-Arunachal boundary dispute being resolved.
    • This is especially in light of egging the north-eastern States to end their territorial issues once and for all by August 15, 2022, when the country celebrates 75 years of independence.
    • Moreover, there is a general belief that the region’s sister-States are in a better position to fast-track the resolution since they are ruled by the present regime with the same dispensation at the Centre.

     

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  • Higher Education – RUSA, NIRF, HEFA, etc.

    TN clips Governor’s power to appoint VCs

    | Polity | Mains Paper 2: Indian Constitution – historical underpinnings, evolution, features, amendments, significant provisions and basic structure

    The Tamil Nadu Assembly has adopted two Bills that seek to empower the government to appoint Vice-Chancellors (VCs) to 13 State universities under the aegis of the Higher Education Department by amending the respective Acts.

    Role of Governors in State Universities

    • In most cases, the Governor of the state is the ex-officio chancellor of the universities in that state.
    • Its powers and functions as the Chancellor are laid out in the statutes that govern the universities under a particular state government.
    • Their role in appointing the Vice-Chancellors has often triggered disputes with the political executive.

    Who is a Chancellor of a University?

    • In India, almost all universities have a chancellor as their titular head whose function is largely ceremonial.
    • The governor of the state, appointed as the union’s representative of state by the president, is the honorary chancellor of all State owned universities.
    • The de facto head of any government university is the vice-chancellor.
    • In private non-profit universities, normally the head of the foundation who has established the university is the chancellor of the university and is the head of the university.

    What about Central Universities?

    • Under the Central Universities Act, 2009, and other statutes, the President of India shall be the Visitor of a central university.
    • With their role limited to presiding over convocations, Chancellors in central universities are titular heads, who are appointed by the President in his capacity as Visitor.
    • The VCs too are appointed by the Visitor from panels of names picked by search and selection committees formed by the Union government.
    • The Act adds that the President, as Visitor, shall have the right to authorize inspections of academic and non-academic aspects of the universities and also to institute inquiries.

    What are the highlights of the TN Bills?

    • The Bills passed in Tamil Nadu stress that “every appointment of the Vice-Chancellor shall be made by the Government from out of a panel of three names” recommended by a search-cum-selection committee.
    • Currently, the Governor, in his capacity as the Chancellor of state universities, has the power to pick a VC from the shortlisted names.
    • The Bills also seek to empower the state government to have the final word on the removal of VCs, if needed.
    • Removal will be carried out based on inquiries by a retired High Court judge or a bureaucrat who has served at least as a Chief Secretary, according to one of the Bills.

    Are other states trying to curtail the Governor’s role in appointing VCs?

    • In December, the Maharashtra Assembly passed a Bill amending the Maharashtra Public Universities Act, 2016.
    • Under the original Act, the Maharashtra government had no say in the appointment of VCs.
    • If the changes take effect, the Governor will be given two names to choose from by the state government.
    • In 2019, the West Bengal government took away the Governor’s authority in appointing VCs to state universities.
    • It has also hinted at removing the Governor as the Chancellor of the universities.
    • But all such motives have been challenged by the University Grants Commission (UGC).

    What is at the root of the differences?

    • In West Bengal, Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu, the elected governments have repeatedly accused the Governors of acting at the behest of the Centre on various subjects, including education.
    • The regulations, which differ from state to state, are often open to interpretation and disputes are routine.
    • In fact, the TN Bills make a case for giving the state government the upper hand in the VC appointment process by citing the examples of Gujarat and Telangana.
    • In Karnataka, Jharkhand and Rajasthan, state laws underline the need for concurrence between the state and the Governor.
    • The terms “concurrence” or “consultation” are absent from state legislation in most cases.

    What is the UGC’s role in this?

    • Education comes under the Concurrent List.
    • But entry 66 of the Union List states — “coordination and determination of standards in institutions for higher education or research and scientific and technical institutions”.
    • This gives the Centre substantial authority over higher education.
    • The UGC plays that standard-setting role, even in the case of appointments in universities and colleges.
    • According to the UGC Regulations, 2018, the “Visitor/Chancellor” — mostly the Governor in states — shall appoint the VC out of the panel of names recommended by search-cum-selection committees.
    • Higher educational institutions, particularly those that get UGC funds, are mandated to follow its regulations.
    • These are usually followed without friction in the case of central universities, but are sometimes resisted by the states in the case of state universities.

    Judicial observations in this regard

    • A Bench of Justices M R Shah and B V Nagarathna said “any appointment as a VC contrary to the provisions of the UGC Regulations can be said to be in violation of the statutory provisions, warranting a writ of quo warranto”.
    • It said every subordinate legislation of the UGC, in this case the one on minimum standards on appointments, flows from the parent UGC Act, 1956.
    • Therefore, being a subordinate legislation, UGC Regulations become part of the Act.
    • In case of any conflict between state legislation and central legislation, central legislation shall prevail by applying the rule/principle of repugnancy as enunciated in Article 254 of the Constitution.
    • It reiterated that the subject ‘education’ is in the Concurrent List of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution.

     

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  • Defence Sector – DPP, Missions, Schemes, Security Forces, etc.

    India is now 3rd highest military spender

    | Security Issues | Mains Paper 3: Cyber Security

    World military spending continued to grow in 2021, reaching a record $2.1 trillion despite the economic fallout of the pandemic, according to new data on global military spending published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

    Top defence spenders in 2021

    • The five largest spenders in 2021 were the U.S., China, India, the U.K. and Russia, together accounting for 62% of expenditure.
    • The U.S. and China alone accounted for 52%.

    India’s defence expenditure

    • India’s military spending of $76.6 billion ranked third highest in the world.
    • This was up by 0.9% from 2020 and by 33% from 2012.
    • Amid ongoing tensions and border disputes with China and Pakistan that occasionally spill over into armed clashes, India has prioritised the modernisation of its armed forces and self-reliance in arms production, the report said.

    What about Russia and Ukraine?

    • Russia increased its military expenditure by 2.9% in 2021, to $65.9 billion, at a time when it was building up its forces along the Ukrainian border.
    • On Ukraine, the report remarked that as it had strengthened its defences against Russia, its military spending “has risen by 72% since the annexation of Crimea in 2014”.
    • Spending fell in 2021, to $5.9 billion, but still accounted for 3.2% of the country’s GDP.

    Also read-

    [Sansad TV] Perspective: Self-Reliance in Defence

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  • Russian Invasion of Ukraine: Global Implications

    Places in news: Kuril Islands

    National Parks/WS | International Relations | Mains Paper 2: Important International Institutions

    Japan has recently described the Kuril Islands (which Japan calls the Northern Territories and Russia as the South Kurils) as being under Russia’s “illegal occupation”.

    Note the Islands of Japan in North to South Direction:  Hokkaido, Honshu , Shikoku, and Kyushu

    What are the Kuril Islands/ Northern Territories?

    • These are a set of four islands situated between the Sea of Okhotsk and the Pacific Ocean near the north of Japan’s northernmost prefecture, Hokkaido.
    • Both Moscow and Tokyo claim sovereignty over them though the islands have been under Russian control since the end of World War II.
    • The Soviet Union had seized the islands at the end of World War II and by 1949 had expelled its Japanese residents.
    • Tokyo claims that the disputed islands have been part of Japan since the early 19th century.

    Why in news?

    • This is the first time in about two decades that Japan has used this phrase to describe the dispute over the Kuril Islands.
    • Japan had been using softer language since 2003, saying that the dispute over the islands was the greatest concern in Russia-Japan bilateral ties.

    What lies behind the dispute?

    • Japan’s sovereignty over the islands is confirmed by several treaties since 1855.
    • Russia, on the other hand, claims the Yalta Agreement (1945) and the Potsdam Declaration (1945) as proof of its sovereignty.
    • It argues that the San Francisco Treaty of 1951 is legal evidence that Japan had acknowledged Russian sovereignty over the islands.
    • Under Article 2 of the treaty, Japan had “renounced all right, title and claim to the Kuril Islands.”
    • However, Japan argues that the San Francisco Treaty cannot be used here as the Soviet Union never signed the peace treaty.

    Continuing the WW2

    • In fact, Japan and Russia are technically still at war because they have not signed a peace treaty after World War II.
    • In 1956, during Japanese PM Ichiro Hatoyama’s visit to the Soviet Union, it was suggested that two of the four islands would be returned to Japan once a peace treaty was signed.
    • However, persisting differences prevented the signing of a peace treaty though the two countries signed the Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration, which restored diplomatic relations between the two nations.
    • The Soviet Union later hardened its position, even refusing to recognise that a territorial dispute existed with Japan.
    • It was only in 1991 during Mikhail Gorbachev’s visit to Japan that the USSR recognised that the islands were the subject of a territorial dispute.

    Have there been attempts at resolution?

    • Since 1991, there have been many attempts to resolve the dispute and sign a peace treaty.
    • The most recent attempt was under PM Shinzo Abe when joint economic development of the disputed islands was explored.
    • In fact, both countries had agreed to have bilateral negotiations based on the 1956 Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration.
    • Russia was even willing to give back two islands, the Shikotan Island and the Habomai islets, to Japan after the conclusion of a peace treaty as per the 1956 declaration.
    • Japan’s attempt to improve ties with Russia was driven by its need to diversify energy sources and Russia by its need to diversify its basket of buyers and bring in foreign investments.
    • But nationalist sentiments on both sides prevented resolution of the dispute.

    Implications for Japan

    • Soon after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Japan made its unhappiness with Russia clear.
    • Japan has been among the most steadfast of Western allies in denouncing Russian aggression and punishing it with sanctions.
    • Japan has probably been spurred by its fears of a Russia-China alliance as Japan itself has territorial disputes and an uneasy history with China.
    • Secondly, Japan might have felt that this is a good opportunity to further isolate Russia and paint it as a “habitual offender” of international law.
    • Finally, Tokyo might have been prompted to take this position as it feels that the invasion of Ukraine proves that getting back the Kuril Islands is a lost cause.

     

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  • Zoonotic Diseases: Medical Sciences Involved & Preventive Measures

    Settling India’s COVID-19 mortality data

    op-ed snap | Governance | Mains Paper 2: Health & Education

    Context

    Over the last year, the World Health Organization (WHO) has been busy, in an unprecedented effort, to calculate the global death toll from COVID-19.

    Revision of Covid-19 death toll by WHO

    • Globally from an estimated six million reported deaths, WHO now estimates these deaths to be closer to almost triple the number.
    • The new estimates also take into account formerly uncounted deaths, but also deaths resulting from the impact of COVID-19.
    • For example, millions who could not access care, i.e., diagnosis or treatment due to COVID-19 restrictions or from COVID-19 cases overwhelming health services.
    • India’s stand: India is in serious disagreement with the WHO-prepared COVID-19 mortality estimates.
    • The argument being made by India’s health establishment through a public clarification is that this is an overestimation, and the methodology employed is incorrect.

    India’s Covid response

    • India’s COVID-19 response has been replete with delays and denials.
    • For instance, for the longest time that India’s COVID-19 number rose, the health establishment continued to insist that community transmission was not under way.
    • It took months and several lakh cases before they agreed that COVID-19 was finally in community transmission.
    • The devastation of the second wave showed how unprepared we were to combat the deadly Delta variant.
    •  By the time the wave subsided, India’s population was devastated, and helpless, seeing dignity neither in disease nor in death.

    Conclusion

    The figures ratchet up not only issues of administrative but also moral accountability for governments that they have been previously side stepped.

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  • Foreign Policy Watch: India-Sri Lanka

    Finding workable solutions to India-Sri Lanka fisheries issue

    op-ed snap | International Relations | Mains Paper 2: Bilateral, Regional and Global Groupings and agreements involving India

    Context

    After a gap of 15 months, the India-Sri Lanka Joint Working Group (JWG) on fisheries held its much-awaited deliberations (in virtual format) on March 25.

    Background of the issue

    • As sections of fishermen from the Palk Bay bordering districts of Tamil Nadu continue to transgress the International Maritime Boundary Line (IMBL), cases of many of them getting arrested and their boats being impounded by the Sri Lankan authorities continue.
    • Apart from poaching in the territorial waters of Sri Lanka, the use of mechanised bottom trawlers is another issue that has become a bone of contention between the fishermen of the two countries; the dispute is not just between the two states.
    • Use of mechanised bottom trawlers: This method of fishing, which was once promoted by the authorities in India, is now seen as being extremely adverse to the marine ecology, and has been acknowledged so by India.
    • The actions of the Tamil Nadu fishermen adversely affect their counterparts in the Northern Province.
    • Reason for transgression: The fishermen of Tamil Nadu experience a genuine problem — the lack of fishing areas consequent to the demarcation of the IMBL in June 1974.
    • If they confine themselves to Indian waters, they find the area available for fishing full of rocks and coral reefs besides being shallow.
    • Under the Tamil Nadu Marine Fishing Regulation Act 1983, mechanised fishing boats can fish only beyond 3 NM from the coast.
    • This explains the trend of the fishermen having to cross the IMBL frequently.

    Way forward

    • Transition to deep-sea fishing: While Indian fishermen can present a road map for their transition to deep sea fishing or alternative methods of fishing, the Sri Lankan side has to take a pragmatic view that the transition cannot happen abruptly.
    • In the meantime, India will have to modify its scheme on deep-sea fishing to accommodate the concerns of its fishermen, especially those from Ramanathapuram district, so that they take to deep-sea fishing without any reservation.
    • Alternative livelihood measures: There is a compelling need for the Central and State governments to implement in Tamil Nadu the Pradhan Mantri Matsya Sampada Yojana in a proactive manner.
    • The scheme, which was flagged off two years ago, covers alternative livelihood measures too including seaweed cultivation, open sea cage cultivation, and sea/ocean ranching.
    • During Mr. Jaishankar’s visit, India had signed a memorandum of understanding with Sri Lanka for the development of fisheries harbours.
    • This can be modified to include a scheme for deep-sea fishing to the fishermen of the North.
    • Joint research on fisheries: . It is a welcome development that the JWG has agreed to have joint research on fisheries, which should be commissioned at the earliest.
    • Institutional mechanism: Simultaneously, the two countries should explore the possibility of establishing a permanent multi-stakeholder institutional mechanism to regulate fishing activity in the region.
    • Using common thread of culture, language and religion: The people of the two countries in general and fisherfolk in particular have common threads of language, culture and religion, all of which can be used purposefully to resolve any dispute.

    Conclusion

    What everyone needs to remember is that the fisheries dispute is not an insurmountable problem. A number of options are available to make the Palk Bay not only free of troubles but also a model for collaborative endeavours in fishing.

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  • Food Procurement and Distribution – PDS & NFSA, Shanta Kumar Committee, FCI restructuring, Buffer stock, etc.

    Why reforming the system of free food is necessary

    op-ed snap | Economics | Mains Paper 3: PDS, Buffer Stock & Food Security

    Context

    The release of two new working papers, one from the World Bank and the other from the IMF, has led to a renewed debate on poverty in India.

    A substantial decline in extreme poverty in India

    • Both papers claim that extreme poverty in the country, based on the international definition of $1.90 per capita per day (in purchasing power parity (PPP), has declined substantially.
    • The World Bank paper uses the Consumer Pyramid Household Surveys (CPHS) data to conclude that 10.2 per cent of the country’s population was at extreme poverty levels in 2019.
    • The IMF paper calculates poverty by using the NSO Consumer Expenditure Survey as the base and adjusts it for the direct effect of the massive food grain subsidy given under the National Food Security Act (NFSA, 2013) and PM Garib Kalyan Anna Yojana (PMGKAY) during the pandemic period.
    • It claims that extreme poverty has almost vanished – it was 0.77 per cent in 2019 and 0.86 per cent in 2020.
    • Another estimate of poverty by the NITI Aayog, the multi-dimensional poverty index (MPI), has put Indian poverty at 25 per cent in 2015 based on NFHS data.
    • How MPI is calculated?: This MPI is calculated using twelve key components from areas such as health and nutrition, education and standard of living.

    How much should be the coverage under NFSA, 2013?

    • The offtake of grains under NFSA in FY20 was 56.1 million metric tonnes (MMT).
    • Following the outbreak of Covid-19, the government launched the Pradhan Mantri Garib Kalyan Anna Yojana (PMGKAY) in April 2020 to distribute 25 kg cereals per family per month in addition to food transfers under the NFSA.
    •  That catapulted the offtake to 87.5 MMT (under PMGKAY and NFSA) in FY21.
    • The scheme continued in FY22, and the grain offtake touched 93.2 MMT. 

    Issues with the wide coverage

    • A further extension of free food on top of the NFSA allocations was uncalled for.
    • This will strain the fisc, reduce public investments and hamper potential job creation.
    • A look at the size of food freebies will help understand the gravity of this problem.
    • As of April 1, the Food Corporation of India’s wheat and rice stocks stood at 74 MMT against a buffer stock norm of 21 MMT – there is, therefore, an “excess stock” of 53 MMT. 
    • The cost of excess stock: The economic cost of rice, as given by FCI, is Rs 3,7267.6/tonne and that of wheat is Rs 2,6838.4/tonne (2020/21).
    • The value of “excess stocks”, beyond the buffer norm, is, therefore, Rs 1.85 lakh crore — this, despite a total of 72.2 MMT grains distributed for free under the PMGKAY in FY21 and FY22.
    • Ballooning food subsidy: All this results in a ballooning food subsidy for FY 23, it is provisioned at Rs 2.06 lakh crore, for FY 23, it is provisioned at Rs 2.06 lakh crore.
    • But this amount is likely to go beyond Rs 2.8 lakh crore with the continuing distribution of free food under the PMGKAY.
    • This would amount to more than 10 per cent of the Centre’s net tax revenue (after deducting the states’ share).

    Way forward

    • It is all the more important to change the current policy of free food given the massive leakages in the PDS.
    • As per the High-Level Committee on restructuring FCI, leakages were more than 40 per cent based on the NSSO data of 2011.
    • Ground reports suggest that these leakages hover around 30 per cent or so today.
    • Make PDS more targeted: In reforming this system of free food, wisdom lies in going back to the Antyodaya Anna Yojana (AAY).
    • Under AAy, the “antyodaya” households (the most poor category) get more rations (35 kg per household) at a higher subsidy (rice, for instance, at Rs 3/kg and wheat at Rs2/kg).
    • For the remaining below poverty line (BPL) families, the price charged was 50 per cent of the procurement price and for above poverty line families (APL), it was 90 per cent of the procurement price.
    •  This will make PDS more targeted and lead to cost savings.
    • Use of technology: There could be some problems in identifying the poor. However, technology can help overcome this difficulty.
    • Option of cash transfer: This measure should be combined with giving people the option of receiving cash instead of providing grains to targeted beneficiaries.
    • The savings so generated from this reform can be ploughed back as investments in agri-R&D, rural infrastructure (irrigation, roads, markets) and innovations that will help create more jobs and reduce poverty on a sustainable basis.

    Conclusion

    The government needs to bite the bullet and emulate the Vajpayee  government (which had introduced AAY) in using scarce resources more wisely.

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