💥Join UPSC 2027,2028 Mentorship (August Batch) + XFactor Notes & Microthemes PDF
Talk to Mentor

Civilsdaily

Login

Type: op-ed snap

  • [6th August 2026] The Hindu OpED: A climate resilience pathway between India and China

    PYQ Relevance
    [UPSC 2024]     The West is fostering India as an alternative to reduce dependence on China’s supply chain and as a strategic ally to counter China’s political and economic dominance.’ Explain this statement with examples.
    Linkage: The PYQ examines India-China strategic competition and the scope for selective cooperation amid geopolitical rivalry. The article shows how climate resilience and disaster management can provide a limited, low-risk avenue for India–China engagement despite strategic distrust.

    Mentor’s Comment

    El Niño delayed India’s monsoon, followed by intense rainfall that caused severe flooding in Mumbai, Surat, Assam, and Odisha. Similar extreme weather also affected Guangxi, Shaanxi, and Gansu in China, highlighting the increasing frequency of climate-related disasters. Shared exposure to extreme climate events is proposed as a low risk avenue for India China cooperation. The tension is between deep strategic rivalry and a narrow band of mutual interest in disaster resilience.

    How do India and China face similar climate challenges?

    1. Urbanisation: Wetlands, forests and permeable land are replaced by concrete, reducing natural water absorption.
    2. Drainage Deficit: Outdated drainage systems and poor waste management aggravate urban flooding.
    3. Loss of Green Spaces: Shrinking green cover increases runoff and weakens climate resilience.
    4. Coastal Risks: Coastal megacities face extreme rainfall, storm surges and sea-level rise.
    5. Inland Extremes: Inland cities experience recurring heatwaves, droughts and flash floods.
    6. Economic Costs: Climate disasters disrupt supply chains, reduce productivity and cause economic losses.
    7. Health Impacts: Frequent floods and heat events increase disease burden and public health risks.

    Past Engagement: How have India and China cooperated on climate resilience?

    1. Climate Frameworks: Since the early 1990s, summit-level joint statements, MoUs and agreements have promoted practical climate cooperation.
    2. Disaster & Data Cooperation: Collaboration covered floods, earthquakes, droughts, extreme weather, along with hydrological, oceanic and seismic data sharing, joint R&D and governance exchange.
    3. Strategic Economic Dialogues: Six dialogues focused on sustainable urban planning, waste management, sewage treatment, water efficiency and capacity building.
    4. Sister City Agreements: Delhi-Beijing, Mumbai-Shanghai and Chennai-Chongqing were created to implement joint urban resilience projects, but diplomatic tensions limited execution.
    5. Mutual Learning: China offers data-driven planning (transport, housing, drainage), while India contributes early warning systems, Heat Action Plans, cool roofs, nature-based solutions and community-led adaptation.
    6. Future Cooperation: Scope exists for sponge cities, resilient agriculture, hydrological modelling, Himalayan glacier monitoring and revival of shared water agreements (which ceased in 2022).

    What is the proposed cooperation pathway?

    In April 2026, the visit by a Chinese delegation led by China’s Special Envoy for Climate Change to New Delhi suggests that climate cooperation remains a priority.

    1. Shared exposure: Both countries face recurring monsoon floods and urban flooding disasters.
    2. Low risk domain: Disaster mitigation and urban resilience avoid the sensitivities of border and trade disputes.
    3. Existing channels: An April 2026 visit by a Chinese Special Envoy and past sister city agreements offer a base.

    What models could underpin it?

    1. Sponge cities: China’s urban water absorption model is cited as a resilience approach.
    2. Glacier concerns: Shared Himalayan glacier risks link both countries’ water security.
    3. City linkages: Past agreements between major cities offer a template for exchange.

    Why is the pathway limited?

    1. Strategic distrust: Border tensions constrain deeper engagement.
    2. Asymmetry: Cooperation must manage a large power imbalance.
    3. Narrow scope: Resilience cooperation cannot resolve the core rivalry.

    How can India and China bridge the climate finance gap?

    1. Public Funding Dependence: Climate adaptation is financed mainly through public funds in both countries.
    2. Private Capital: Expand blended finance, municipal bonds and credit enhancement to mobilise private investment.
    3. Ecosystem Gaps: Climate finance markets remain nascent, constrained by weak local capacity and regulatory gaps.
    4. Knowledge Exchange: Share evidence-based practices on innovative climate finance models.
    5. Global South Leadership: Develop common standards, metrics and fiscal frameworks for climate resilience financing.
    6. Win-Win Cooperation: Climate finance collaboration offers a low-risk pathway to strengthen India–China engagement and resilience.

    Conclusion

    Climate resilience offers a contained space for engagement without touching the strategic core. The unresolved question is whether either side will invest political capital in so narrow a domain.

  • GST must be fuelled by domestic production, not inflation or imports

    Why in the News

    Record monthly Goods and Services Tax collection was driven more by imports and price rise than by domestic output. The tension is between a headline revenue high and a weak production base underneath it.

    What is the Goods and Services Tax (GST)?

    1. Indirect tax: The Goods and Services Tax (GST) is a destination based tax on the supply of goods and services, in force since July 2017.
    2. Dual structure: It has a Central component and a State component, with an Integrated GST (IGST) on inter state and import transactions.
    3. Council: Rates are set by the GST Council, a federal body of the Union and States.

    What does the latest collection actually show?

    1. Headline figure: July GST touched Rs 2.11 lakh crore, up 15.4% year on year.
    2. Import driven: Integrated GST (IGST) on imports grew 26.9%, against just 4.5% for the domestic component.
    3. Price effect: Rupee depreciation and high Wholesale Price Index manufacturing inflation of 7.18% inflated the nominal figure.

    Why is the revenue base narrow?

    1. Geographic concentration: Collection is heavily skewed toward a handful of industrialized or consumption-heavy regions. Only 16 States and Union Territories were above the national average collection.
    2. Weak domestic demand: Sluggish home production limits the tax base.
    3. Inflation illusion: A rising nominal collection can mask flat real activity. Rising nominal collection numbers can be deceptive, as high wholesale price inflation and currency depreciation artificially inflate transaction values.

    Conclusion

    Strong collection numbers are being read as growth when they partly reflect imports and inflation. A broad based GST 3.0 must widen the domestic production base rather than lean on price rise.

    Back2Basic

    GST 2.0

    Launched in 2025, GST 2.0 is a major overhaul of India’s indirect taxation system. It simplifies the multi-tier structure into core merit (5%) and standard (18%) slabs, eliminates the old 12% and 28% categories for most items, and introduces a 40% demerit rate for luxury and sin goods.

    Key Tax Slab Changes

    1. Nil / 0%: Life and health insurance, basic food staples (UHT milk, paneer, Indian breads), and 33 life-saving medicines.
    2. 5% (Merit Rate): Common household essentials, agricultural machinery (tractors, harvesters), gym/fitness services, and handicrafts.
    3. 18% (Standard Rate): Consumer durables (TVs, ACs), small cars, two-wheelers, and cement.
    4. 40% (Demerit Rate): Luxury cars, aerated drinks, pan masala, and tobacco products

    PYQ Relevance

    [UPSC 2019] Enumerate the indirect taxes which have been subsumed in the goods and services tax (GST) in India. Also, comment on the revenue implications of the GST introduced in India since July 2017.

    Linkage: The PYQ examines the revenue implications of GST and its impact on India’s indirect tax system. The article evaluates GST revenue quality, showing that recent collections are driven more by imports and inflation than broad-based domestic economic growth.

  • [5th August 2026] The Hindu OpED: Jammu and Kashmir: the elusive quest for Statehood

    PYQ Relevance
    [UPSC 2016]     To what extent is Article 370 temporary? Discuss future prospects.
    Linkage: The PYQ directly tests the constitutional character of Article 370 that this article’s central event revolves around. Now after its abrogation the theme extends to statehood demand of J&K.

    Mentor’s Comment

    August 5, 2026, marks seven years since Jammu and Kashmir’s special status under Article 370 was revoked; August 9 will mark seven years since it lost Statehood. Seven years on, the promised trade-off of temporary central control for security and economic growth remains unfulfilled, even as the Lieutenant-Governor’s unaccountable powers have expanded further.

    Has the trade-off of temporary central control for security and economic growth delivered its promised outcomes?

    1. No formal emergency, emergency-scale measures: The 2019 actions were accompanied by troop deployment, detention of over 5,000 political leaders and cadre, curfew, and a communications blockade, without any emergency being formally declared.
    2. Violence has spread, not receded: Terrorist attacks continued in 2025 at Pahalgam in April and Delhi’s Red Fort in November, and violence spread to previously dormant areas such as Poonch-Rajouri and adjoining districts.
    3. Economic convergence has reversed: J&K’s per capita income as a share of the national average fell from 79.9% in 2013-14 to 76.6%, per the J&K Economic Survey 2025-26, a decline of 3.3 percentage points.
    4. Unemployment remains structurally high: Overall unemployment is close to twice the national average; graduate unemployment stands at 23.9%.
    5. Peaceful response met with intensified control: Kashmiris responded to the Pahalgam attack with peace marches and candlelit demonstrations, but the Union Home Ministry responded with the most militarised Amarnath Yatra in J&K’s history, routine PSA and UAPA charges, summons to over 2,000 people after a single incident, near-continuous curfews, and the highest number of internet shutdowns of any region in the country since 2019.

    What made the process of revoking Article 370 and Statehood constitutionally unprecedented?

    1. Executive fiat over Article 370: Article 370 was hollowed out through executive action; the Governor later stated he was directed by the Union Home Minister to sign.
    2. Legislative fiat over Statehood: Statehood was removed through Parliament without consulting J&K’s people or its elected political leadership.
    3. First such downgrade since 1956: J&K became the first State since Delhi in 1956 to lose Statehood.
    4. Basic structure implications: Together, the two actions represent a departure from constitutional principles and the basic structure of the Union.
    5. Treated as an exception, not a precedent: The actions were framed as specific to a conflict-ridden J&K rather than examined as part of a broader strain on India’s constitutional democracy.

    Why have judicial and administrative checks failed to restore accountable government in J&K?

    1. Prolonged judicial deference: The Supreme Court allowed the Union’s security-justification argument to stand unchallenged for four years before weakly recommending that Statehood be restored “as soon as possible.”
    2. No timeline since: Three years after that recommendation, the Court has not heard petitions seeking a definite restoration timeline.
    3. No test of necessity: At no point has the Court examined the Union’s measures against constitutional or pragmatic standards of necessity.
    4. Six-month limit bypassed: The Constitution caps emergency conditions at six months, yet J&K has remained under emergency-like conditions for seven years without formal invocation.
    5. Lieutenant-Governor holds core powers: Under the 2024 Transaction of Business Rules, the Lieutenant-Governor, an appointee, controls the administration, police, and government prosecutors, despite J&K having had an elected government since 2024.
    6. Powers still expanding: The Lieutenant-Governor has since been granted emergency powers over telecommunications.
    7. High Court strictures without reform: The J&K High Court has repeatedly criticised the police’s misuse of draconian laws, without this leading to institutional reform.

    Why is the security-driven justification for prolonged unaccountable rule fundamentally flawed?

    1. Moral flaw: The claim that subjugation is a means to a desirable end conceals the fact that subjugation is a repugnant end in itself, never a legitimate means.
    2. Pragmatic flaw: Subjugation breeds disaffection, which expresses itself as violence once peaceful means of expression are disallowed, a pattern India has already experienced under colonial rule.
    3. Empirical failure confirms the flaw: The continued rise and spread of violence, alongside declining economic indicators, demonstrates that the justification has failed on its own practical terms.
    4. Judicial non-scrutiny entrenches the flaw: The absence of any judicial test of the argument’s utility has allowed it to function as a durable substitute for accountable governance rather than a genuinely temporary emergency measure.

    What would it take for J&K to move from unaccountable control to democratic accountability?

    1. Constitutional design points to elected government: The Constitution recognises an elected administration as the only structure capable of delivering accountability.
    2. Downstream institutions depend on it: An independent legislature, institutional oversight, autonomous bodies, and a free media all require an elected administration to develop.
    3. Civil society space is conditional: Civil society gains room to push for reform under an elected administration that it lacks under an appointed one.
    4. Renewed political campaign: J&K’s National Conference has renewed the campaign for Statehood restoration, earlier pursued only fitfully by the Congress, now framed explicitly around accountability.
    5. A record of “ugly firsts”: J&K has been the first State to see wide use of semi-lethal pellet guns (2016), the first to lose special status and Statehood (2019), and the first to undergo a communal delimitation altering Jammu’s demography through additional Hindu-majority constituencies (2022).
    6. A possible “positive first”: The 2024 State election produced a majority for the pluralist National Conference-Congress alliance despite the delimitation exercise, showing that engineered political outcomes can be overcome through the ballot; Statehood restoration would be a fitting next “first.”

    Conclusion

    Seven years of Central rule in Jammu and Kashmir have not delivered the promised improvements in security or economic development. Instead, power has become concentrated in the Lieutenant Governor, reducing the role of the elected government. The argument that prolonged Central control is necessary for security is flawed because it weakens democratic accountability and can increase public alienation. Restoring Statehood remains the constitutional path to accountable governance, but it requires timely political and judicial action rather than indefinite delay.

  • Why mineral rich districts stay poor: On the District Mineral Foundation Trust

    Why in the News

    Jharkhand holds nearly 40% of India’s mineral wealth, yet many of its mining districts remain among the least developed. The gap exposes the failure of the District Mineral Foundation Trust (DMFT) to channel mining revenue to affected communities.

    What is the District Mineral Foundation Trust (DMFT)?

    1. Origin: The DMFT is a trust established in 2015 in every district affected by mining to reinvest a share of mining revenue in local welfare.
    2. Statutory backing: Formulated under Section 9B of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 (amended in 2015).
    3. Rationale: It was set up because mining affected communities bear the greatest social and environmental costs of extraction but receive the least share of its benefits.
    4. Funding: It is financed by contributions that mine lease holders pay as a proportion of royalty.

    Why do mineral rich districts stay poor?

    1. Auction delay: Jharkhand delayed auctions after leases expired, while Odisha auctioned promptly.
    2. Production stagnation: Delayed auctions cut production, which stayed near 23 million tonnes in Jharkhand.
    3. Royalty shortfall: Lower production means lower royalty collections.
    4. Fund starvation: Lower royalties translate into reduced DMFT contributions, so affected villages receive fewer resources.
    5. Spillover decline: As mines shut and leases expired, transport operators, eateries and shops lost business and youth migrated for work.

    How do Jharkhand and Odisha compare?

    1. Auctions: Since 2019-20 India auctioned 434 mineral blocks, Odisha 45 and Jharkhand only three, despite Jharkhand being the richest mineral bearing state.
    2. Production: Between 2018-19 and 2024-25 Odisha’s iron ore output rose from about 120 to nearly 180 million tonnes, while Jharkhand stayed near 23 million tonnes.
    3. Revenue: In 2025-26 Odisha earned nearly Rs 46,000 crore in mining revenue against Jharkhand’s Rs 22,000 crore, though its deposits are less than half of Jharkhand’s.
    4. DMFT accumulation: Nearly Rs 3,700 crore accumulated under West Singhbhum’s DMFT between 2016 and 2026 with little visible welfare gain.

    Why has the money not reached communities?

    1. Missing disclosures: DMFT Rules require every district to publish annual reports, budgets, approved works and beneficiary details.
    2. Opaque records: Across Jharkhand these disclosures are missing, outdated or inaccessible.
    3. Accountability gap: Communities have little means of knowing how thousands of crores collected in their name were spent.

    What are the challenges to the DMFT?

    1. Transparency deficit: Poor disclosure prevents communities from tracking fund use.
    2. Governance and political will: Delayed auctions reflect weak administrative resolve to run the mining economy.
    3. Fund underutilisation: Accumulated funds often stay unspent or are diverted to works unrelated to affected people.
    4. Elite capture: Weak beneficiary identification lets benefits bypass the poorest households.
    5. Cyclical dependence: Fund inflows fall whenever production and royalties decline, starving welfare when it is most needed.
    6. Weak grievance redress: Affected communities lack a clear channel to question spending decisions.

    Conclusion

    The DMFT debate is about restoring trust, not merely accounting. Before announcing new investment summits, Jharkhand must first show it can manage the mineral resources and welfare funds it already possesses.

    Back2Basics: District Mineral Foundation (DMF)

    1. Basis: established under the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Act, 2015.
    2. Nature: a statutory non profit trust in every mining affected district.
    3. Funding: contributions from mine lease holders as a percentage of royalty.
    4. Fund use: implemented through the Pradhan Mantri Khanij Kshetra Kalyan Yojana (PMKKKY) for welfare of mining affected people.
    5. Objective: to work for the interest and benefit of persons and areas affected by mining.

    PYQ Relevance

    [2016] What is/are the purpose/purposes of ‘District Mineral Foundations’ in India?
    1. Promoting mineral exploration activities in mineral-rich districts
    2. Protecting the interests of the persons affected by mining operations
    3. Authorizing State Governments to issue licenses for mineral exploration
    (a) 1 and 2 only
    (b) 2 only
    (c) 1 and 3 only
    (d) 1, 2 and 3
    Answer: (b)

  • AI and cyber, the double helix of today’s security threats

    Why in the News?

    Artificial Intelligence (AI) and cyber threats have merged into a single, compounding security risk that traditional defences cannot contain. AI-powered malware now adapts on its own, autonomous agents undermine established protocols, and the newest models can find and exploit vulnerabilities faster than humans. The deeper conflict is that the technology capable of defending systems is the same technology enabling attacks, while the rules to govern it remain undeveloped.

    What is Agentic AI?

    1. Definition: Agentic AI refers to systems that act autonomously to pursue goals, taking sequential actions with minimal human prompting. It differs from Generative AI, which produces content in response to a user request.
    2. Significance: Autonomous agents can perform complex tasks once reserved for people. As agentic operations grow more sophisticated, threat levels rise further.

    Working

    1. Perception: Gathers real-time data from tools, screens, or sensors.
    2. Reasoning: Uses large models to break a big goal into small steps.
    3. Action: Uses external software or APIs to complete the work.
    4. Learning: Adapts its future choices based on past results

    What is Zero Trust?

    1. Definition: Zero Trust is a security model that assumes no user or device is trustworthy by default, verifying every access request continuously. It replaces the older assumption that anything inside a network is safe.
    2. Erosion: Malicious autonomous agents are positioned to undermine Zero Trust protocols. This aggravates insider threat vectors within organisations.

    How is AI transforming cyber threats?

    1. Adaptive malware: AI-powered malware can adapt and evolve in response to its environment. This makes it harder for traditional anti-virus software to detect. Example: Self-Modifying Code: Rewrites internal structures or instructions continuously to change file fingerprints
    2. Vulnerability discovery: The latest AI systems can detect zero-day vulnerabilities across major operating systems. A zero-day is a software flaw unknown to the vendor and unpatched at the time of attack.
    3. Capability transfer: Newer AI machines let rogue groups demonstrate capabilities once limited to nation states. This lowers the barrier to sophisticated attacks.
    4. Dual-use warning: The World Economic Forum warns AI will strengthen cyber defences while also enabling more sophisticated automated attacks. The same model can render current Zero Trust protocols ineffective.

    How is AI reshaping warfare?

    1. Precision targeting: AI-powered smart systems detect, track and predict missile trajectories with high accuracy. This was demonstrated in recent conflicts.
    2. Autonomous munitions: Systems can independently identify and strike targets. This shifts elements of the kill decision away from human operators.
    3. Multi-source intelligence: AI can fuse intelligence from photos, text, radio and electromagnetic signals. This denies adversaries a tactical advantage.
    4. Cognitive core: Automated analytics platforms (such as Palantir Technologies or military software like Ukraine’s Delta) manage vast data inputs to recommend strikes and run logistics.
    5. Drone accuracy: Software upgrades have pushed first-person view drone hit rates from roughly 30–50% up to 80%.

    Where does the deeper tension lie?

    1. Concentrated power: A handful of Western firms hold the most advanced models and behave as owners of future technology. Control over the mightiest technology is concentrating in a few private hands.
    2. Governance vacuum: AI has the potential to become the dominant source of military and economic power. The rules to govern it remain in a fledgling state.
    3. Escalating rivalry: The United States has accused China of stealing from its most advanced language model to build a rival. This reflects the intensity of the US-China technology competition.

    What are the challenges to safe AI and cyber governance?

    1. Hallucinations: Advanced models produce distortions and misleading outputs. Judgments built on them become unreliable and subjective.
    2. Algorithmic bias: Biases creep into AI-driven decisions, including a bias towards national security framing. Unrestricted reliance on such outputs magnifies risk.
    3. Algorithmic radicalisation: AI platforms can push opinion makers towards extreme views. Guarding against this requires active oversight.
    4. Warning-understanding gap: In defence sensing, AI-dictated warnings can outrun proper understanding of reality. Acting on premature warnings carries strategic danger.
    5. Loss of human control: Increasingly capable models and robots are replacing human roles in critical decisions. Keeping machines under human oversight is becoming harder.

    Conclusion

    The convergence of AI and cyber capability creates a civilisation-scale threat because the technology that defends systems is the same one that attacks them, and no adequate governance exists. The single most important precondition, human oversight backed by enforceable rules, is missing, and altruism from AI firms is not a substitute for it.

    Back2Basics

    CERT-In:

    1. Indian Computer Emergency Response Team is the national nodal agency for cyber security incidents under the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology.
    2. Statutory basis: Operates under the Information Technology Act, 2000.

    Generative vs Agentic AI

    Generative AIAgentic AI
    Creates content (text, images, code, audio) from user prompts.Performs tasks autonomously to achieve a goal.
    Responds to instructions but does not independently plan actions.Plans, reasons, makes decisions, and executes multi-step workflows.
    Output-focused.Outcome-focused.
    Requires frequent human prompts for each step.Needs minimal human intervention after receiving the objective.
    Limited memory and action capability.Can use memory, APIs, tools, and feedback to adapt actions.
    Example: ChatGPT writing an essay or generating code.Example: An AI assistant that books travel, compares prices, sends emails, and updates the calendar automatically.

    PYQ Relevance

    [UPSC 2022] What are the different elements of cyber security? Keeping in view the challenges in cyber security, examine the extent to which India has successfully developed a comprehensive National Cyber Security Strategy.

    Linkage: UPSC has examined India’s cyber security architecture and the challenges in developing a comprehensive cyber security strategy. The article shows how AI-powered cyber threats and autonomous agents demand an AI-enabled, adaptive cyber security framework beyond traditional defences.

  • The dilemma over PM SHRI in Kerala

    Why in the News?

    Kerala’s Congress-led United Democratic Front (UDF) government is caught between the need for withheld central education funds and its declared opposition to the National Education Policy, 2020 (NEP 2020). The funds are tied to the PM SHRI scheme, whose memorandum of understanding the earlier Left government had signed. The bind exposes the conflict between fiscal dependence and ideological consistency in India’s education federalism.

    What is the PM SHRI scheme?

    1. Core design: PM SHRI (Pradhan Mantri Schools for Rising India) upgrades selected government schools into model schools that showcase the NEP 2020. It is a centrally sponsored scheme of the Ministry of Education.
    2. Access condition: A State must sign a memorandum of understanding to receive funds. The framework requires the school curriculum to follow the National Curriculum Framework aligned with the NEP.
    3. Funding link: Kerala has around Rs 1,158.13 crore in education funds held up by the Centre. Access depends on continuing with the PM SHRI commitment.

    What is the National Education Policy, 2020?

    1. Definition: The NEP 2020 is the Union government’s framework for restructuring school and higher education, replacing the 1986 policy. It covers curriculum, pedagogy, and school structure.
    2. Curriculum clause: The NEP allows States to prepare their own curricula and textbooks. It also states that the NCERT curriculum is to be treated as the nationally acceptable criterion.

    Why is the UDF government in a bind?

    1. Reversed roles: The UDF had attacked the previous Left Democratic Front (LDF) government for signing the PM SHRI memorandum. The current government now argues it is bound because Kerala became a party once the deal was signed.
    2. Coalition fault lines: The Indian Union Muslim League and other allied organisations oppose implementation and want the Cabinet sub-committee’s report first. The internal split has produced repeated flip-flops on the government’s stance.
    3. Fiscal pressure: The Union Minister of State for Education said in the Rajya Sabha that States that do not sign or withdraw miss out on PM SHRI benefits. Punjab opted out in 2023 and reversed course after the Centre froze its funds.

    What is the deeper federalism concern?

    1. Curriculum autonomy: The memorandum asks States to implement all NEP provisions in their entirety. Kerala fears this narrows its freedom to design its own curriculum.
    2. Funding leverage: The Union government declared in 2022 that the Samagra Shiksha scheme’s objective was to help implement the NEP. Regular school funding is thereby tied to policy acceptance.
    3. Creeping intervention: Even without direct curriculum control now, the State fears future prescription of teaching materials and assessment patterns. Curriculum-based programme implementation could later be imposed.

    What are the challenges before the UDF government?

    1. Legal route risk: Following Tamil Nadu’s litigation path is available but slow. It offers no guarantee of releasing the frozen funds in time.
    2. Reputational cost: Writing to the Centre to demand curricular freedom exposes the government to the charge of letting the NEP enter Kerala by the back door. Its earlier opposition sharpens this criticism.
    3. Loss of funds: Refusing PM SHRI forfeits crucial federal education funding. A cash-strained State cannot easily absorb the shortfall.
    4. Precedent of coercion: The Punjab episode shows the Centre freezes funds to force compliance. The leverage limits how far any State can resist.

    Conclusion

    The dispute reflects how conditional central funding narrows a State’s room to hold an independent education stance. The UDF loses either way: implementing PM SHRI concedes its NEP opposition, while refusing forfeits over Rs 1,158 crore. The resolution rests on whether cooperative federalism can separate routine school funding from acceptance of a contested national policy.

    Back2Basics

    PM Shri

    1. Full form: Pradhan Mantri Schools for Rising India, a centrally sponsored scheme to develop model schools aligned with the NEP 2020.
    2. Ministry: Ministry of Education, launched in 2022.
    3. Objective: Upgrade and strengthen selected existing schools run by Central, State, and local bodies into exemplar schools.
    4. Funding pattern: Shared between the Centre and States, contingent on a signed memorandum of understanding.
    5. Linked scheme: Samagra Shiksha is the umbrella school-education programme through which much of this funding is routed.

    The National Education Policy (NEP) 2020:

    It replaces the 34-year-old 1986 policy with a focus on a 5+3+3+4 school structure, mother tongue instruction, and flexible higher education. You can read the official document on the Ministry of Education portal.

    School Education Changes

    1. 5+3+3+4 Design: Covers ages 3 to 18, broken into foundational (5 years), preparatory (3 years), middle (3 years), and secondary (4 years) stages.
    2. Language: Mother tongue or local language used as the medium of instruction until at least Grade 5, and ideally Grade 8.
    3. No Hard Separations: Mixing of science, arts, vocational crafts, and sports streams.
    4. Assessments: Focus on regular, competency-based testing instead of rote memory, with school exams in grades 3, 5, and 8.

    PYQ Relevance

    [UPSC 2020] ‘Education is not an injunction, it is an effective and pervasive tool for all-round development of an individual and social transformation’. Examine the New Education Policy, 2020 (NEP, 2020) in light of the above statement.

    Linkage: UPSC has examined NEP 2020 as a tool for educational and social transformation. The article highlights the federal and implementation challenges of NEP 2020, especially when central funding is linked to policy adoption.

  • The problem with India’s free trade agreement strategy

    India has embraced trade diplomacy, signing Free Trade Agreements with the UAE, Australia, Oman, the United Kingdom, the European Union and New Zealand, with more under negotiation. The record with Asian partners undercuts the assumption that these agreements automatically boost exports and integrate India into regional production networks. Trade with partners such as ASEAN has become import-driven, with deficits widening even as export shares erode.

    What is a Free Trade Agreement and Global Value Chain integration?

    1. Free Trade Agreement (FTA): An FTA is a pact between two or more countries that reduces or removes tariffs and other barriers on goods and services traded between them. It is meant to expand market access on both sides.
    2. Global Value Chain (GVC) integration: A Global Value Chain is a production network where different stages of making a product occur in different countries. Integration means a country supplies or assembles components within these cross-border networks rather than trading only finished goods.

    How has India’s trade balance shifted under Asian FTAs?

    1. Widening deficit with ASEAN: India’s trade deficit with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) rose sharply from USD 10.4 billion in 2012 to USD 51.2 billion in 2025, driven by rapidly rising imports.
    2. Faster imports with Japan and South Korea: Imports grew much faster than exports with Japan and South Korea over the same period, deepening the imbalance.
    3. Surplus turned to deficit with Singapore: India’s trade surplus with Singapore turned into a deficit after the trade agreement, signalling weakening export competitiveness.
    4. Import-driven pattern: Trade with key FTA partners has become increasingly import-driven rather than export-led.

    Why have export shares eroded despite tariff preferences?

    1. Declining share in partners’ import baskets: India’s share of ASEAN’s import basket dropped from 3.42% to 1.71% between 2012 and 2025, and its share of Singapore’s imports fell from 2.27% to 1.71%.
    2. Losses in Korea and mixed Japan trend: India’s share in South Korea’s import basket declined from 1.33% to 1.02%, while its share in Japan’s imports showed mixed trends.
    3. Tariff cuts cannot offset weak capability: The inability to use tariff preferences shows that market access based on tariff elimination alone cannot compensate for weak domestic industrial capabilities, logistical inefficiencies and infrastructure constraints.

    Why does the case that FTAs drive GVC integration break down?

    1. GVC trade share has fallen: India’s GVC-related trade as a share of gross trade declined from 37.13% to 34.38%, showing weakening integration rather than deepening.
    2. Decline across most partners: GVC trade as a share of gross trade fell with South Korea, Japan, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam and Cambodia, rising only with Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines.
    3. Access is not participation: FTAs may raise market access in some product categories, but their ability to build productive capabilities remains contested.

    What must change beyond signing more FTAs?

    1. Fix domestic capacity first: India’s trade challenge is not negotiating more FTAs but strengthening domestic productive capabilities and removing associated impediments.
    2. Link trade to industrial policy: FTA strategy should connect to an industrial-policy framework emphasising technological upgrading, strategic investment, supply-chain realignment and domestic value addition.
    3. Avoid asymmetric outcomes: Without industrial transformation, FTAs increase import penetration faster than export competitiveness, widening asymmetrical trade outcomes and structural vulnerabilities.

    Conclusion

    The core problem is that India’s FTAs have become instruments of import penetration rather than drivers of export growth or GVC integration, because tariff access cannot substitute for weak industrial capacity. The strategy must move beyond market access toward domestic industrial transformation, technological upgrading and value addition. Until domestic productive capabilities strengthen, additional agreements will deepen deficits rather than reverse them.

    Back2Basics

    1. Free Trade Agreement: A treaty that reduces or eliminates tariffs and trade barriers between member countries.
    2. ASEAN: Association of Southeast Asian Nations, a regional grouping of ten Southeast Asian countries; India signed an FTA in goods with ASEAN in 2009.
    3. Global Value Chain: A cross-border network in which successive stages of production are spread across multiple countries.
    4. Types of trade pacts: Preferential Trade Agreement, Free Trade Agreement, Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement and Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement, differing by depth of liberalisation.
    5. Trade deficit: The amount by which a country’s imports exceed its exports.

    PYQ Relevance

    [UPSC 2018] Consider the following countries: 1. Australia 2. Canada 3. China 4. India 5. Japan 6. USA

    Which of the above are among the ‘free-trade partners’ of ASEAN?

    (a) 1, 2, 4 and 5 (b) 3, 4, 5 and 6 (c) 1, 3, 4 and 5 (d) 2, 3, 4 and 6

    Answer: (c)

  • [4th August 2026] The Hindu OpED: Critical minerals, the foundation of strategic power

    Mentor’s Comment

    Critical minerals have moved from the margins of resource policy to the centre of industrial strategy and national security. China’s dominance in refining, sharpened by rare-earth export controls announced in 2025, has exposed how concentrated the global supply chain is and how vulnerable importing economies remain. India holds domestic reserves but lacks the processing and refining capacity that decides who actually controls supply.

    What are critical minerals?

    1. Definition: Critical minerals are metals and elements that are essential to modern technology and defence but face a high risk of supply disruption due to concentrated production. Lithium, cobalt, nickel, graphite, copper and rare earth elements are the core group.
    2. Why they matter now: They are foundational to electric vehicles, battery storage, renewable power, semiconductors, defence systems and advanced manufacturing. As decarbonisation and digitalisation accelerate, mineral security is becoming as strategically important as oil once was.

    Why is the global supply picture a strategic risk, not a commercial one?

    1. Refining is concentrated in a few countries: For copper, lithium, nickel, cobalt, graphite and rare earths, the average market share of the top three refining countries rose to 86% in 2024 from around 82% in 2020. Supply now depends on a handful of nodes.
    2. China leads across nearly all strategic minerals: China is the leading refiner in 19 of 20 strategic minerals, with an average market share of about 70%. This concentration turns minerals into geopolitical leverage rather than ordinary traded commodities.
    3. Processing is the true chokepoint: In 2024, China accounted for over 90% of rare earths and graphite processing, nearly 75% of cobalt and 70% of lithium chemicals. Control of the midstream, not the mine, confers power.
    4. Export controls have weaponised supply: China’s rare-earth export controls announced in 2025 raised alarm across energy, automotive, defence, aerospace, Artificial Intelligence and semiconductor sectors. A single supplier’s policy decision can now disrupt entire industries.

    What do foreign responses show about the value of processing capacity?

    1. European Union, mandated benchmarks: The Critical Raw Materials Act sets 2030 targets of 10% domestic extraction, 40% processing and 25% recycling, with no more than 65% of any strategic mineral sourced from a single country. It builds integrated supply chains through binding mandates.
    2. United States, mine-waste refining and defence dependence: Firms such as Phoenix Tailings use electrolysis to extract rare earths from mine tailings, backed by a USD 500 million Pentagon loan to expand separation and metallization, the weakest stage of the mines-to-magnets chain. Weapons such as Tomahawk cruise missiles, THAAD interceptors and F-35 jets fail without these inputs.
    3. United States, samarium bottleneck: The defence sector needs 50 to 100 tonnes of samarium each year, yet domestic capacity is tiny, forcing reliance on revived European sites. Solvay restarted separating rare earths at La Rochelle in France after China choked processed-material outflows in April 2025.
    4. United States, tungsten deadline: The Pentagon has set a January 2027 cut-off for China-sourced tungsten, but China controls roughly 80% of global mine supply and a larger share of downstream processing. Building domestic capacity will take years, forcing reliance on existing inventories.

    How is India positioned, and where is the gap?

    1. Reserves exist but supply security does not: India holds reserves of cobalt, copper, graphite and nickel, plus monazite deposits containing rare-earth oxides. It still imports lithium, cobalt and nickel.
    2. The critical gap is processing and refining: India has bulk-mineral experience but relies on imports for high-purity critical mineral products. Capacity and high-purity production remain constrained.
    3. Structural constraints slow progress: Exploration is shallow, regulatory clearances are time-consuming, private participation is limited and remote-region project economics are weak. Recycling cannot substitute for primary supply in the near term.
    4. Rising demand widens the exposure: Under a net-zero scenario, cumulative demand for critical energy-transition minerals could reach roughly 169 million tonnes by 2070, well above a current-policy pathway.

    What is India’s policy response since 2023?

    1. National Critical Mineral Mission: The government has identified 30 critical minerals and launched the Mission to support the value chain, targeting 1,200 domestic exploration projects by 2030-31, production of at least 15 critical minerals, and acquisition of 50 overseas mining assets.
    2. MMDR Act Amendment (2023): Amended the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act to empower the central government to auction mining leases and composite licenses for 24 critical and strategic minerals (like lithium and cobalt).
    3. Overseas acquisition through KABIL: Khanij Bidesh India Limited (KABIL), a joint venture of state-owned firms for overseas mineral assets, has secured acreage in Argentina’s Catamarca province for lithium exploration.
    4. Domestic rare-earth corridors: The 2026-27 Budget proposed rare-earth corridors in Odisha, Kerala, Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu.
    5. Diplomatic diversification: The India-United States critical minerals and rare earths framework signed in May 2026 provides an additional lever to diversify supply away from a single source.

    What are the challenges to India’s critical mineral security?

    1. Midstream absence: Without high-purity refining, India cannot participate meaningfully in supply-chain realignment even where it mines the raw ore.
    2. Import dependence for battery metals: Continued reliance on imported lithium, cobalt and nickel leaves electric-vehicle and storage ambitions exposed to external disruption. India imports more than 70% of its lithium-ion battery requirements from China and Hong Kong.
    3. Long lead times: Exploration, clearances and processing plants take years, so near-term vulnerability persists regardless of policy intent.
    4. Recycling feedstock is thin: Collection systems, feedstock volumes and technology remain limited, so recycling cannot yet offset primary shortfalls. Only 5% to 10% of digital waste in India is being systematically recycled, the rest is being wasted.
    5. No strategic stockpile in place: India has not yet operationalised buffer stocks for critical minerals, leaving it without a cushion against sudden export controls abroad.

    Conclusion

    Mineral security now defines India’s industrial and strategic trajectory, and the decisive gap is not reserves but processing and refining capacity. Individual measures are necessary but insufficient without a comprehensive strategy that sets mineral-specific risk thresholds, integrates recycling, builds strategic stockpiles and creates a coordinated institutional framework. The priority is to convert domestic potential into refining capability and reduce strategic vulnerability through sustained execution.

    Back2Basics

    National Critical Mineral Mission:

    1. Launched by the Union government to secure the critical mineral value chain, from exploration to recycling.
    2. Nodal ministry: Ministry of Mines.
    3. Minerals identified: 30 critical minerals notified for India.
    4. Key targets: 1,200 domestic exploration projects by 2030-31, production of at least 15 critical minerals, and acquisition of 50 overseas mining assets.
    5. KABIL: Khanij Bidesh India Limited, a joint venture of NALCO, Hindustan Copper and Mineral Exploration Corporation, tasked with acquiring strategic mineral assets abroad.
    6. Legal backing: The Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 was amended in 2023 to empower the Central Government to auction leases for specified critical minerals.

    Strategic Critical Minerals Cooperation Framework (India and USA)

    1. India and the United States signed the Strategic Critical Minerals Cooperation Framework on May 26, 2026, in New Delhi.
    2. The agreement was finalized to secure supply chains, boost clean energy manufacturing, and reduce reliance on single-source monopolies like China.

    Key Goals of the Partnership

    1. Supply Chain Security: Protects sensitive mineral and rare earth networks from coercive market practices.
    2. Collaboration Areas: Focuses heavily on joint mining, advanced processing, recycling, and scrap management.
    3. Broader Alignment: Coordinates with plurilateral efforts like the Quad Critical Minerals Initiative and the Forum on Resource Geostrategic Engagement (FORGE).

    PYQ Relevance

    [UPSC 2025] Consider the following statements:

    I. India has joined the Minerals Security Partnership as a member. II. India is a resource-rich country in all the 30 critical minerals that it has identified. III. The Parliament in 2023 has amended the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 empowering the Central Government to exclusively auction mining lease and composite license for certain critical minerals.

    Which of the statements given above are correct? (a) I and II only (b) II and III only (c) I and III only (d) I, II and III

    Answer: (c)

  • An AI and agriculture compact for Andhra Pradesh

    Why in the News

    A proposal ties a planned large data centre in Andhra Pradesh to a new compact between artificial intelligence and agriculture. The idea is to use farmer-owned solar generation and agrivoltaics to power data infrastructure while raising farm incomes, linking a technology investment to rural livelihoods.

    What is agrivoltaics?

    1. Meaning: Agrivoltaics is the practice of using the same land for both solar power generation and crop cultivation.
    2. Dual output: Panels are raised or spaced so crops grow beneath them, producing electricity and food from one plot.
    3. Income effect: Farmers earn from power sales alongside crop income, diversifying their earnings.

    What is the Deemed Distribution Licence (DDL) idea?

    1. Meaning: A Deemed Distribution Licence (DDL) would let farmer solar cooperatives supply power directly to large consumers such as a data centre.
    2. Purpose: It creates a guaranteed buyer for farmer-generated solar power, making the investment viable.

    How would the compact work?

    1. Data centre demand: A proposed data centre provides a large, steady electricity buyer located near farms.
    2. Farmer solar cooperatives: Farmers pool land for solar and agrivoltaics, selling power to that demand.
    3. PM-KUSUM base: The model builds on the PM-KUSUM scheme, which already supports farm-based solar generation.

    What are the challenges to the AI-agriculture compact

    1. Grid and pricing rules: Direct farmer-to-consumer supply needs regulatory clearance that does not yet exist at scale.
    2. Upfront capital: Solar and agrivoltaic installations require finance that smallholders often cannot raise alone.
    3. Crop suitability: Not all crops grow well under panels, limiting where agrivoltaics works.
    4. Water and land tension: Land pooling and water use must not displace food production or small tenants.
    5. Demand certainty: Farmer incomes depend on the data centre actually materialising and buying the power.

    Conclusion

    The compact links a technology investment to rural incomes by making farmers power suppliers to a data centre. Agrivoltaics and a DDL model, built on PM-KUSUM, are the enabling tools. Its viability depends on regulatory clearance, upfront finance and a certain power buyer.

  • Reviving the privatisation question for ONGC and Oil India

    Why in the News

    Shifts in global oil markets have reopened the question of whether the government should privatise its upstream oil producers, ONGC and Oil India Limited. The tension is between raising efficiency and revenue through disinvestment and retaining state control over a strategically sensitive energy sector.

    What is the disinvestment question here?

    1. The proposal: The government should reduce or exit its ownership in Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) and Oil India Limited (OIL), the two major state-owned upstream oil producers.
    2. Efficiency case: Private ownership is argued to improve operational efficiency, capital discipline and exploration performance.
    3. Fiscal case: Sale proceeds would count as capital receipts and support the government’s fiscal position.

    Why is the timing being debated?

    1. Changing oil markets: Global demand patterns and the energy transition are altering the long-term value of oil assets, affecting when a sale makes sense.
    2. Price volatility: OPEC production decisions and the West Asia risk premium make oil revenues and asset valuations unstable.
    3. Energy security tension: Upstream producers underpin domestic supply and Strategic Petroleum Reserves, so full privatisation raises supply-security concerns.

    What must hold for privatisation to deliver?

    1. Genuine competition: Efficiency gains require a competitive market, not the transfer of a public monopoly to a private one.
    2. Regulatory strength: Independent regulation is needed to protect consumers and ensure fair pricing after a sale.
    3. Strategic safeguards: The state must retain mechanisms to secure supply during global disruptions even after reducing ownership.

    Conclusion

    The privatisation of ONGC and OIL turns on whether efficiency and revenue gains outweigh the loss of state control over a strategic sector. Volatile oil markets and energy-security needs complicate the timing. The decision depends on building genuine competition and strong safeguards before, not after, any sale.

    Back2Basics

    Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC)

    1. Founded: August 14, 1956
    2. Headquarters: New Delhi
    3. Status: Maharatna PSU
    4. Role: India’s largest crude oil and natural gas producer, contributing roughly 70% of domestic crude production and 84% of natural gas.
    5. Operations: Extensive onshore and offshore infrastructure across India, alongside global overseas ventures via ONGC Videsh.

    Oil India Limited (OIL)

    1. Founded: February 18, 1959 (with roots tracing back to the 1889 Digboi oil discovery)
    2. Headquarters: Duliajan, Assam
    3. Status: Maharatna PSU
    4. Role: India’s second-largest national upstream oil and gas company, heavily focused on the Northeast region of India as well as pan-India and international blocks.
    5. Operations: Fully integrated exploration, production, and crude oil transportation, plus a majority stake in Numaligarh Refinery Limited (NRL)

    PYQ Relevance

    [UPSC 2025] Consider the following statements: I. Capital receipts create a liability or cause a reduction in the assets of the Government. II. Borrowings and disinvestment are capital receipts. III. Interest received on loans creates a liability of the Government.

    Which of the statements given above are correct? (a) I and II only (b) II and III only (c) I and III only (d) I, II and III

    Answer: (a)