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Type: Op-ed

  • [5th October 2026] The Hindu OpED: The ECI’s constitutional mandate is under strain

    [5th October 2026] The Hindu OpED: The ECI’s constitutional mandate is under strain

    Question (2018, GS2 – 10 Marks): In the light of recent controversy regarding the use of Electronic Voting Machines (EVM), what are the challenges before the Election Commission of India to ensure the trustworthiness of elections in India?
    Linkage: Addresses the primary constitutional burden placed on the ECI—ensuring public confidence, administrative neutrality, and procedural integrity in conducting free and fair elections amidst institutional controversies.
    [2017] Consider the following statements:
    1. The Election Commission of India is a five-member body.
    2. Union Ministry of Home Affairs decides the election schedule for the conduct of both general elections and bye-elections.
    3. Election Commission resolves the disputes relating to splits/mergers of recognized political parties.
    Which of the statements given above is/are correct?
    (a) 1 and 2 only (b) 2 only (c) 2 and 3 only (d) 3 only

    Mentor’s Comment

    The Constituent Assembly made the Election Commission independent so that it could protect voters from the executive. The Special Intensive Revision shows the reverse: independence without accountability allows the Commission itself to exclude voters. The reform question is not the Commission’s autonomy but the checks on the person who exercises it, in removal, appointment and immunity.

    Why in the News

    The Constitution placed the Election Commission of India (ECI) beyond executive control to stop partisan deletion of voters, yet the ECI now faces charges of mass deletion through a revision the law does not name. A former Secretary General of the Lok Sabha argues the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) lacks a legal basis and the Chief Election Commissioner (CEC)‘s unilateral decisions have created a constitutional crisis.

    Why did the Constitution-makers centralise and insulate the ECI?

    1. Original proposal: Draft Article 289 proposed decentralised machinery: a chief election commissioner in each province for State rolls and elections, and one at the Centre for national polls.
    2. Why it was rejected: Provincial commissioners, mostly Chief Ministers’ nominees, had deleted voters seen as opponents. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar moved a new Article centralising the machinery “outside the control of the executive government”.
    3. Loyalist fear: Shibban Lal Saxena feared a loyalist CEC and proposed appointment by a two-thirds parliamentary vote, like United States Senate confirmation.
    4. The takeaway: The mass deletion of voters that drove centralisation is now alleged against the central body itself.

    Does the law provide for a special intensive revision?

    1. Ordinary revision: Section 21(2) of the Representation of the People (RP) Act, 1950 provides for revision before each general election or by-election, or in any year the ECI directs.
    2. Method: Under Rule 25 of the Registration of Electors Rules, 1960, that revision may be intensive (roll prepared afresh), summary (existing roll updated), or partly both.
    3. Special revision: Section 21(3) allows a special revision for reasons recorded, but only for “any constituency or part of a constituency” where special circumstances exist.
    4. Limits of Article 324: Article 324 lets the ECI act where statute is silent, never against the law. Eg. Mohinder Singh Gill (1978) recognised this gap-filling power.

    Why do the deletions and the decision process raise constitutional questions?

    1. Scale of removal: About 13 crore voters have reportedly been removed nationwide, possibly the largest disenfranchisement exercise in any democracy.
    2. Article 326 conflict: Article 326 provides for universal adult suffrage, so its scheme is to include eligible voters. The SIR has instead worked to exclude them.
    3. Unilateral CEC: The two Election Commissioners (ECs) say they were excluded from crucial decisions. The author argues a decision the CEC takes alone is invalid, as is every action that follows.

    Can the CEC be held to account?

    1. Impeachment route: Opposition parties plan an impeachment motion. The CEC is removed like a Supreme Court judge, only on proved misbehaviour.
    2. Threshold barrier: The presiding officers of both Houses can disallow such a motion at the threshold.
    3. Lifelong immunity: Section 16 of the Chief Election Commissioner and Other Election Commissioners (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Act, 2023 shields the CEC and ECs from civil and criminal liability for life, which even the President lacks.

    Challenges

    1. Ambiguous statute: Section 21(3) does not define a special revision’s scale, so a State-wide exercise is contestable.
    2. Burden on electors: Deleted electors must prove eligibility to return. Eg. Lal Babu Hussein (1995) on this burden.
    3. No internal check: Decisions without the full Commission leave no record of dissent.
    4. Accountability gap: Threshold rejection of motions and lifelong immunity together leave little route to examine a CEC’s conduct.

    Way Forward

    1. Amend Section 21: Parliament should define State-wide revision, its procedure and safeguards in the RP Act.
    2. Recorded collective decisions: The ECI should take every SIR decision by a recorded vote of all three members.
    3. Narrow immunity: Parliament should limit Section 16 to acts done in good faith during the term.
    4. Notice before deletion: No name should leave the roll without individual notice and a hearing.

    Conclusion

    The ECI is now accused of the very exclusion it was built to prevent. Whether the Supreme Court tests the SIR’s legal basis before the remaining final rolls are published is what to watch.

    Independence of the Election Commission of India

    1. Appointment: Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India (2023) placed the Chief Justice of India on the selection panel until Parliament legislated. The 2023 Act replaced the Chief Justice with a Cabinet Minister.
    2. Unequal removal protection: An EC, unlike the CEC, can be removed on the CEC’s recommendation, so ECs lack the CEC’s security of tenure.
    3. Financial dependence: The ECI’s expenses are not charged on the Consolidated Fund of India, so they need Parliament’s vote. The Law Commission’s 255th Report recommended charging them.
    4. Post-retirement posts: No constitutional bar stops a CEC or EC taking a later government post.

  • The sore lack of hostels in DU

    Why in the News

    The collapse of a five-storey building in Satya Niketan, New Delhi, killed several students living there as paying guests (PGs) and has exposed the shortage of hostels at the University of Delhi (DU). Only about 10 of DU’s more than 80 constituent colleges offer hostel accommodation, so most outstation students depend on private rented rooms.

    How large is DU’s hostel gap?

    1. Old colleges only: Hostels exist mainly in old main-campus colleges such as Miranda House, St. Stephen’s, Hindu, Hansraj and Ramjas. Outside the main campus, only Lady Shri Ram College has one.
    2. Postgraduate shortage: All postgraduate departments together have only 7 to 8 hostels. The south campus has a single women’s hostel.
    3. Capacity versus need: Undergraduate and postgraduate hostels together hold about 2,500 students, against a need running into tens of thousands.
    4. New colleges without hostels: None of the 30 to 40 colleges set up in Delhi under different governments has provided hostel accommodation.
    5. The takeaway: A university drawing students from across India houses only a small fraction of them, leaving the rest to an unregulated private market.

    Who is responsible for the shortage?

    1. University administration: DU’s administration sees hostels as hard to manage and prone to disorder. Some senior administrators openly oppose more hostels.
    2. University Grants Commission (UGC): The UGC funds and sets standards for universities. It neither requires hostels in new colleges built with its funds nor requires them alongside other college infrastructure.
    3. Central government: Budget allocations for higher education have been substantially cut. The education cess, a levy meant for education, is alleged to have been largely diverted to other heads.
    4. Overstaying residents: Some hostellers, especially in postgraduate hostels, stay 10 to 15 years beyond their tenure, occasionally needing police help to evict.

    What does the shortage do to students?

    1. Paying guest market: PG operators around DU earn heavily from students who have no alternative. Eg. Mukherjee Nagar, Hudson Lane and Vijay Nagar near the north campus.
    2. Unsafe living conditions: Outstation students live in cramped, poorly built rooms. The Satya Niketan collapse is the extreme result of these conditions.
    3. Privatisation without safeguards: Leaving student housing to private operators ignores student welfare, so tragedies like the Satya Niketan collapse follow.

    Is rapid hostel construction feasible?

    1. Political will: Large-scale hostel building at emergency speed is possible where governments commit to it.
    2. EFLU precedent: The English and Foreign Languages University (EFLU), a central university in Hyderabad, built hostels for about 3,000 Indian and foreign students in under three years.

    Challenges

    1. Land scarcity: Delhi colleges sit in dense neighbourhoods with little spare land for new hostels.
    2. Capital competition: Hostels compete with classrooms, laboratories and libraries for limited building funds.
    3. Weak PG oversight: Private student housing operates with little structural safety inspection, as the Satya Niketan collapse showed.
    4. Administrative reluctance: Institutions that see hostels as disciplinary risks resist expanding them.

    Way Forward

    1. UGC hostel norm: The UGC should make hostel capacity a condition for funding and recognising new colleges.
    2. Hostel financing: The Centre should fund hostels through the Higher Education Financing Agency (HEFA), which lends for infrastructure in central institutions.
    3. PG registration: Delhi authorities should register PG accommodation and audit its structural safety.
    4. Tenure enforcement: DU should enforce hostel tenure limits so that places rotate to new students.

    Conclusion

    DU’s hostel shortage is a planning failure: colleges were added without the housing their students need, shifting cost and risk onto students and an unregulated rental market. Whether the UGC ties new college funding to hostel capacity, and whether DU announces a time-bound construction plan, will show if the Satya Niketan collapse changes policy.

    Higher Education in India

    1. Scale: India runs the world’s second-largest higher education system, with enrolment estimated at about 4.65 crore in 2026.
    2. Institutions: India has over 1,168 universities and 45,473 colleges, per the All India Survey on Higher Education (AISHE).
    3. Access gap: The Gross Enrolment Ratio (GER), enrolment as a share of the 18 to 23 age group, stood at 28.4% in AISHE 2021-22, far below the National Education Policy (NEP) 2020 target of 50%.
    4. Public spending: India allocated 1.57% of GDP to higher education in 2021.

    [2026, GS2, 15 marks] Should education be treated primarily as a welfare obligation of the state or as a strategic investment for building a globally competitive, knowledge-driven nation? Critically evaluate.

  • Two or three?

    Two or three?

    Why in the News

    The Central Board of Secondary Education (CBSE) designed its three-language policy to end in a Board examination in the third language, but the Supreme Court keeps cutting it back. Its latest ruling extends to current Class 6 students the relief given to Classes 7 to 9: their final Class 10 test in the third language will only be an internal assessment. In practice, the policy is pushing foreign languages out of CBSE schools.

    What is the three-language policy, and why has the Court stepped in?

    1. What it is: The policy requires CBSE students to study three languages, two of them Indian, with the third examined at Class 10. It is like adding a compulsory subject midway through a course.
    2. Why it was introduced: The National Education Policy (NEP) 2020 advocates two Indian languages. The Court has found merit in learning more Indian languages to strengthen the federal structure.
    3. What went wrong: Students who had not studied a second “Indian” language until Class 8 would suddenly have to learn one in Class 9, which the Court called too disruptive.
    4. Court’s interventions: The Court asked whether the policy could start from 2027 rather than 2026, to lessen the load until schools are fully prepared. The CBSE has resisted compromise.
    5. The takeaway: The Court is easing the policy’s burden on students before its final ruling, which shows the design did not plan for students already midway through school.

    Why does the status of English matter?

    1. Categorisation question: The Court has suggested treating English as an indigenous language instead of classifying it as foreign.
    2. De facto Indian language: English has been used in India for at least 300 years. It leads in education, courts and professions and serves as a link language for many.
    3. Employment edge: English has given Indians an advantage in global industries such as information technology, which the government’s jobs strategy relies on.
    4. NEP on foreign languages: NEP 2020 also stresses learning foreign languages to support the global mobility of Indians seeking jobs.

    What is the policy doing in practice, and does it serve its aim?

    1. English as the sole foreign language: Two of the three languages must be Indian, and English is needed as the medium of instruction in other subjects. So English takes the only remaining slot, leaving no room for another foreign language.
    2. Default choices: Many schools will keep Hindi first and Sanskrit as the second Indian language up to Class 10. Southern schools will continue with a regional language such as Tamil or Kannada.
    3. Foreign languages squeezed out: The practical result is the removal of Spanish, French and other foreign languages from schools.
    4. Weak cross-regional learning: The stated aim of learning another region’s language goes largely unserved. A demanding extra Indian language adds little practical value for students.

    Challenges

    1. Unprepared schools: Schools lack teachers and time to introduce a new language midway, so students carry the adjustment cost.
    2. Narrower global options: Losing foreign languages weakens students’ preparation for jobs and study abroad.
    3. Perceived imposition: Default Hindi and Sanskrit choices feed resistance in non-Hindi States. Eg. Tamil Nadu’s long-standing two-language policy.
    4. Policy by litigation: Repeated court-ordered changes leave students and schools unsure what each cohort must study.

    Way Forward

    1. Two-language core: The CBSE should make English and the mother tongue the compulsory pair.
    2. Internal assessment: Test any third language of the student’s choice through internal assessment, not a Board examination.
    3. Cohort-wise start: Apply new language requirements only to cohorts that can begin them in early grades.
    4. Foreign language slot: Keep foreign languages as a permitted choice for the third language.

    Conclusion

    The dispute is whether school language policy should serve cultural integration or practical mobility, and the current design gives up the second without securing the first. The Court’s final judgment, and whether the CBSE accepts a third language assessed internally, will decide what CBSE students learn.

    Back2Basics: Three-language formula

    1. Origin: Recommended by the Kothari Commission (1964-66) and adopted in the National Policy on Education, 1968.
    2. Original design: Hindi-speaking States teach Hindi, English and another modern Indian language. Non-Hindi States teach the regional language, Hindi and English.
    3. NEP 2020 version: Retains the formula with flexibility, requiring at least two of the three languages to be native to India and imposing no language on any State.

    [2026, GS2, 15 marks] Should education be treated primarily as a welfare obligation of the state or as a strategic investment for building a globally competitive, knowledge-driven nation? Critically evaluate.”

  • Outbound force

    Why in the News

    US troops have left Iraq more than 23 years after the 2003 invasion, at a time when the US fights another war in the region, against Iran. The exit leaves a war-ravaged country with a weak government and powerful militias backed by a resurgent Iran, exposing the limits of regime-change wars in West Asia.

    Why did the US invade Iraq, and why did it take so long to leave?

    1. Stated grounds: The US invaded in March 2003, claiming Saddam Hussein’s regime held weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and harboured terrorist groups. The WMD claim proved false.
    2. Reversed withdrawal: US President Barack Obama announced withdrawal in 2011. Troops returned when the Islamic State captured large territory in Iraq and Syria.
    3. The takeaway: A war launched on a false premise ended as an exit forced by attacks, not by a completed mission.

    How did the invasion reshape Iraq?

    1. State collapse: The destruction of Saddam’s Ba’athist state, run by his Ba’ath Party, and the abrupt rise of Shia parties widened social divisions. The result was a civil war that killed hundreds of thousands of Iraqis.
    2. Rise of the Islamic State: Al-Qaeda in Iraq, one of al-Qaeda’s most violent branches, grew in post-war Iraq. It became the Islamic State by 2014 and spread terror across the region.
    3. State within the state: The Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMFs, or Hashad al-Shabi), an umbrella of Iran-backed Shia militias, now rival the Iraqi state’s authority.

    How did the war tilt the regional balance toward Iran?

    1. Lost buffer: Saddam’s Iraq was hostile to the Gulf monarchies but still served as a buffer between them and Iran.
    2. Iranian reach: After the regime fell, Iran extended its influence across Iraq through Shia parties and militias.
    3. Current war: Hashad joined the war after the US and Israel began bombing Iran on February 28. Iran and its allies have since made at least 600 attacks on US facilities in Iraq.
    4. Timing of the exit: The US is leaving Iraq just as it tries to defeat Iran in a major regional war. Iran and its allies have vowed to push the US out of West Asia.

    What does the exit say about regime-change wars?

    1. Afghanistan parallel: The US left Afghanistan after 20 years, handing it back to the same Taliban it toppled in 2001. Iraq is left to a weak government and Iran-backed militias.
    2. Regional fallout: Regime-change wars destabilised parts of West Asia and gave rise to militias and jihadists.
    3. Limits of power: Keeping troops in Iraq became unsustainable under militia attacks, so the US leaves worn out, if not defeated.

    Challenges

    1. Militia dominance: Armed groups outside state control can override an elected government in Baghdad.
    2. Jihadist revival: A security vacuum can let Islamic State remnants regroup.
    3. Iranian proxy network: Iran-backed groups can widen the regional war from Iraqi soil.
    4. Energy exposure: Instability threatens oil supply to importers like India. Eg. Iraq is among India’s largest crude suppliers.

    Way Forward

    1. Unified command: Baghdad should bring the PMFs under a single civilian chain of command.
    2. Regional dialogue: Gulf states and Iran should keep channels open to limit escalation. Eg. The 2023 Saudi Arabia-Iran normalisation.
    3. Supply diversification: India should spread crude sourcing and keep evacuation plans ready for its nationals in West Asia.

    Conclusion

    The US exit closes an occupation but leaves Iraq’s central question unresolved: whether an elected state or Iran-backed militias hold real power. How Baghdad handles the PMFs as the US-Iran war continues will decide whether Iraq stabilises or becomes the war’s next front.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2024] Consider the following pairs: Country Reason for being in the news 1. Argentina Worst economic crisis 2. Sudan War between the country’s regular army and paramilitary forces 3. Turkey Rescinded its membership of NATO How many of the pairs given above are correctly matched? (a) Only one pair (b) Only two pairs* (c) All three pairs (d) None of the pairs Answer: B”

  • In trade deal with US, India needs to secure terms harder to reverse

    Why in the News

    The India-US interim trade deal has stalled for a third time, 20 months after negotiations began, as the legal basis of US tariffs keeps shifting. India’s narrow tariff edge can vanish under the shifting US system, so the stake is durable terms rather than a wider tariff gap.

    What was the interim deal meant to deliver?

    1. What it is: An interim trade deal covers some tariffs and purchases ahead of a full agreement, like a down payment on a larger bargain.
    2. February framework: The joint statement aimed to cut the US tariff on Indian goods from 50% to 18%.
    3. India’s side of the bargain: India agreed to cut duties on American industrial goods and to buy more from the US.
    4. What went wrong: The rate’s legal basis vanished within two weeks, so India’s promised advantage shrank.
    5. The takeaway: A concession tied to a shifting US legal regime has little lasting value.

    How has the legal ground under US tariffs shifted?

    1. Court ruling: The US Supreme Court struck down the reciprocal tariffs, the country-by-country duties imposed since April 2025 under an emergency law. India’s 18% rate rested on that law.
    2. Temporary global tariff: A temporary tariff on most imports followed, and it expired in July.
    3. Forced-labour tariffs: From July, rates depend on how well a country blocks forced labour goods. India’s proposed 12.5% was cut to 10% after it banned such imports.
    4. Narrow lead: Rival Vietnam pays only slightly more, and several countries pay the same as India.
    5. Repeated stalls: A negotiating round was called off in August 2025, and a February visit was postponed.
    6. Mixed US signals: The State Department called the deal “90 per cent-plus there”. The US Trade Representative saw nothing imminent.

    Why is a tariff advantage a weak thing to rely on?

    1. Relative edge: Washington decides who gets which rate. A US deal with Vietnam, reportedly near completion, could erase India’s margin overnight.
    2. Shifting baseline: The baseline itself can change, through a wider probe or through sector tariffs:
      • a US probe into “structural excess capacity”, meaning output far beyond home demand, covers 16 economies, including India, and its findings, due by a statutory deadline of March 2027, could reset rates regardless of any deal;
      • generic medicines, the backbone of India’s pharma exports to the US, are exempt from new pharma duties only until a review by April 2027, and steep duties on generics are planned from 2028.
    3. Unequal permanence: India’s tariff cuts, farm openings and purchase commitments are long-term and politically hard to reverse. India’s rate is an administrative decision Washington can revise alone.

    Should India chase a wider tariff gap or durable terms?

    1. New Delhi’s logic: Cutting tariffs and buying more gains India little unless its exporters benefit, so it wants a clear advantage over rivals before signing.
    2. Case for durable terms: A rival’s deal, the capacity probe or sector duties can each erase a tariff gap, so bargaining power is better spent on terms harder to reverse.
    3. Predictability as the prize: Uncertainty costs exporters more than any single rate, because it pushes firms to hedge. Washington has based tariffs on three laws in eight months.

    Challenges

    1. Executive discretion: US tariffs can change by presidential action, without legislation.
    2. Farm sensitivities: Openings on farm products face strong domestic political resistance in India.
    3. Unilateral withdrawal history: Washington has withdrawn trade preferences before. Eg. Revocation of India’s Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) benefits in 2019.

    Way Forward

    1. Tariff ceiling: Washington commits not to raise duties on Indian goods above the agreed level for the deal’s life.
    2. Non-discrimination and notice: Bar less favourable treatment of India than of competitors, and require prior notice and consultation before any new tariff.
    3. Written sector carve-outs: Start with pharmaceuticals, where some Indian speciality medicines already pay zero duty under the new pharma tariffs.
    4. Phased, conditional concessions: Phase in India’s tariff cuts and purchase commitments, tied to US compliance.

    Conclusion

    The negotiation now turns on how long agreed terms last, not on how low the US tariff is. Trading India’s concessions for binding ceilings, not a passing rate gap, will decide the deal’s real value.

    About India-US trade relations

    1. Trade volume: Bilateral trade stood at $149.84 billion in 2025-26.
    2. Trade surplus: India’s surplus with the US narrowed to $34.4 billion in 2025-26.
    3. Investment: The US is India’s third-largest investor, with cumulative foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows of $70.65 billion (2000-2025).
    4. Indian investment in the US: About 163 Indian companies have invested over $40 billion there (Confederation of Indian Industry).

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026] The Chancellor of Germany visited India in January 2026. Which of the following is/are NOT correct in terms of outcomes? 1. MoU between All India Institute of Ayurveda and University of Hamburg 2. MoU on Youth Hockey Development between Hockey India and German Hockey Federation 3. Establishment of a bilateral dialogue mechanism on the Indo-Pacific 4. Opening of an Honorary Consul of Germany in Lucknow (a) 2 and 3 (b) 1 and 4 (c) 3 and 4 (d) 1 only Answer: B”

  • Colby’s mid-term report card, what it means for India

    Why in the News

    The US Under Secretary of War for Policy, Elbridge A. Colby, has updated the 2026 National Defense Strategy a month before the US mid-term elections. The strategy asks partners to carry more of the cost of regional security, which changes what the US expects from India.

    What does the 2026 National Defense Strategy aim at?

    1. What it is: The National Defense Strategy is the US defence master plan, like a business plan that ranks threats and assigns resources.
    2. Four goals: Defending the US homeland, deterring China, gaining more support from allies and partners, and rebuilding the US defence industry.
    3. China focus: The strategy aims to stop China dominating the Indo-Pacific through deterrence, especially along the First Island Chain (the island arc from Japan through Taiwan to the Philippines).
    4. Twin track with Beijing: The administration is also negotiating with Beijing on trade, so military competition and economic talks run together.
    5. The takeaway: Washington wants stronger partners that pay more, so a partner’s value now depends on what it contributes.

    What is the new bargain with allies and partners?

    1. Burden shifting: The US once supplied most of its alliances’ military strength. Partners must now take more responsibility for their own regions.
    2. Regional roles: Europe is urged to lead its own defence, South Korea to do more on the Korean Peninsula, and Japan and Australia to play bigger Indo-Pacific roles.
    3. Division of labour: The US keeps advanced capabilities, strategic coordination and extended deterrence (its promise to defend allies, including with nuclear forces). Partners provide troops, infrastructure, funding and industrial support.
    4. Russia calculus: Washington wants to cut its costs in the Ukraine war and push Europe to do more. It still wants to limit Russian military power and influence.

    Where will Indian and US interests overlap, and where not?

    1. India’s value: India’s location, military potential, Indian Ocean position, technology goals and Indo-Pacific role matter to Washington. These interests have stayed largely constant across US administrations.
    2. New expectations: Washington now expects India to help keep the regional balance, work closely on defence, join technology and supply-chain projects, and build military strength.
    3. Shifting China equation: India’s value to Washington is tied to the China challenge. US-China ties swing between competition and cooperation, so their interests will overlap but not always align.
    4. Russia factor: US policy on Russia touches India’s defence ties with Russia, its energy needs and its desire for strategic autonomy.
    5. Diversified partnerships: Ties with France, Europe, Japan, Australia, the Gulf and Russia widen India’s strategic choices.

    Why does leverage matter more than partnership labels?

    1. Importance is not leverage: A country’s importance to Washington does not set the terms on which Washington negotiates with it. Leverage does.
    2. Sources of leverage: Economic scale, military capability, technology, market access and the ability to offer or withhold key capabilities all build bargaining power.
    3. China example: Beijing’s economic and technological strength gives it tools to influence US decisions. India can gain similar influence as its economy grows.
    4. Strategic task: New Delhi must build capability and keep the freedom to use it.

    Challenges

    1. US-China thaw: A trade deal between Washington and Beijing could lower India’s strategic value.
    2. Russia ties under scrutiny: India’s defence and energy links with Russia may clash with US goals.
    3. Capability gap: Building economic and military leverage takes years, but US expectations are immediate.

    Way Forward

    1. Defence industrial base: Expand domestic defence production so India contributes capability, not only demand.
    2. Supply-chain projects: Join US technology and supply-chain initiatives on terms that build Indian manufacturing.
    3. Clear red lines: Define in advance where strategic autonomy will not be traded, including Russia and energy.

    Conclusion

    The next phase of India-US relations turns on the terms of cooperation between two capable powers, not on partnership labels. India’s ability to add capability faster than US expectations rise is the test to watch.

    About the India-US defence partnership

    1. Foundational agreements: Four pacts enable military interoperability:
      • General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA);
      • Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA);
      • Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA);
      • Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA).
    2. Joint exercises and dialogue: Exercises include MALABAR, YUDH ABHYAS and RED FLAG, supported by 2+2 Ministerial Dialogues between foreign and defence ministers.
    3. Technology access: India received Strategic Trade Authorization Tier 1 (STA-1) status in 2018, easing access to US military technology.
    4. Co-development: The Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies (iCET) and India-US Defense Acceleration Ecosystem (INDUS-X) support co-development of jet engines, armoured vehicles and space technology.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2025, GS2, 10 marks] With the waning of globalization, post-Cold War world is becoming a site of sovereign nationalism. Elucidate.”

  • How regulation stifles HEIs

    Why in the News

    The Viksit Bharat Shiksha Adhishthan (VBSA) Bill, 2025, now under legislative review, seeks to overhaul how Higher Educational Institutions (HEIs) are regulated in India. The live question is whether a new overarching regulator will harm the quality it claims to protect, since India’s best institutions already work outside the regulators.

    What is the VBSA Bill, and why is it being questioned?

    1. What it is: The VBSA Bill, 2025 proposes a single, overarching regulatory apparatus for higher education, replacing today’s set of separate regulators. It works like one licensing office for all colleges and universities.
    2. Why it was proposed: The Bill’s stated aims are to ensure quality and accountability, enforce minimum standards, and prevent malpractice.
    3. What the critique says: The problem is regulation’s “governmentality”, the habit of governing through external supervision. When supervision replaces an institution’s own internal integrity, HEIs ask only what minimum must be shown on paper.
    4. The takeaway: A stronger regulator can produce better files without producing better teaching, which is the risk the Bill must avoid.

    How does the regulatory culture hurt teaching?

    1. Fear of the regulator: HEIs optimise academic work for the inspector, not for teaching. Teachers document evidence for annual self-assessment reports instead of asking what makes a class worthwhile.
    2. Rankings over learning: University authorities track ranking and accreditation scores, not how a teacher builds students’ intellectual engagement.
    3. ‘Paper blizzard’: Institutions now produce an evidence blizzard, a flood of digital documents made for inspection. A college can meet every norm and keep perfect files, yet its students stay disengaged.
    4. Contradictory rules: The University Grants Commission (UGC) Regulation (2018) sets norms that do not match each other:
      • it expects a 40-hour working week;
      • it requires teachers on campus for only five hours a day;
      • clarifications issued to fix such mismatches create fresh irregularities.
    5. Trust deficit and risk aversion: Constant surveillance and an assembly line model of work, which treats teaching like factory output, erode trust. Institutions then avoid risk, so innovation stalls and conventional mediocrity becomes the safest option.

    What do India’s autonomous institutions show?

    1. Outside the architecture: India’s top institutions are not bound by the regulators’ uniform formulas:
      • the Indian Institute of Science (IISc);
      • the Indian Institutes of Technology (IITs) and Indian Institutes of Management (IIMs);
      • the National Institutes of Technology (NITs) and Indian Institutes of Science Education and Research (IISERs).
    2. Own rules: They set curricula at their own pace, recruit through their own process and direct resources by their own strategy.
    3. Counter-evidence: If intensive regulation were the engine of quality, the most tightly regulated universities would outperform these institutions. They do not, so the regulatory logic misreads what quality higher education requires.
    4. Risk of a new casualty: Bringing these institutions under the VBSA framework would extend the same constraints to the sector’s best performers.

    Can quality be secured without the inspection model?

    1. Case for autonomy: Regulation built on force and fear ignores the moral base of society, as economist Alan Greenspan observed. Quality rises from internal integrity, not from compliance alone.
    2. The real test: The Bill succeeds only if it makes HEIs bolder hubs of teaching and inquiry, not portals that are updated for inspection.

    Challenges

    1. Compliance burden: Documentation demands take teachers’ time away from teaching and research.
    2. Metric capture: Accreditation and ranking scores reward visible outputs over classroom quality. Eg. Publication counts chased for rankings.
    3. Autonomy at risk: Folding autonomous institutions into one framework could dilute the model that works best.

    Way Forward

    1. Graded autonomy: Give more self-governance to institutions with a proven record, under a “light but tight” approach.
    2. Outcome-based inspection: Replace document checks with assessment of teaching quality and student learning.
    3. Consistent regulations: Audit UGC rules for contradictions before carrying them forward.

    Conclusion

    India’s higher education problem is less a shortage of rules than a shortage of trust in institutions to govern themselves. Whether the Bill widens autonomy or deepens inspection is the decision to watch.

    Higher education regulation in India

    1. Scale: India runs the world’s second-largest higher education system, with about 4.65 crore students enrolled in 2026 (All India Survey on Higher Education (AISHE) and NITI Aayog).
    2. Apex regulators: The UGC funds universities and sets standards. The All India Council for Technical Education (AICTE) regulates technical education, and the National Council for Teacher Education (NCTE) regulates teacher training.
    3. Accreditation bodies: The National Assessment and Accreditation Council (NAAC) grades HEIs. The National Board of Accreditation (NBA) assesses technical and professional programmes.
    4. Fragmentation: Overlapping bodies issue conflicting guidelines, delaying institutional autonomy.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2015, GS2, 12 marks] For achieving the desired objectives, it is necessary to ensure that the regulatory institutions remain independent and autonomous. Discuss in the light of the experiences in recent past.”

  • Global capital is no longer cheap, that’s the challenge

    Why in the News

    Ten-year government bond yields in the United States (US) and France have hit 5.34% and 4.99%, their highest since 2002, and Japan’s has crossed 3.1% for the first time since 1996. Investors now demand higher returns even from rich-country governments, so India must plan for a world where global capital is no longer cheap.

    What is a bond yield, and why does its rise matter?

    1. What it is: A bond yield is the return investors demand for lending to a government through tradable debt. It works like the interest rate a lender charges a borrower.
    2. Why it was seen as safe: Government bonds are treated as default risk-free, because a sovereign can tax and print currency to repay.
    3. What changed: Borrowing costs for rich-country governments rose 1.2 to 1.4 percentage points in a year, roughly twice India’s rise.
    4. No safe-haven discount: Investors now treat advanced and emerging economies as almost equally risky, and advanced-economy bond yields have surged to multi-decade peaks.
    5. The takeaway: When even the safest borrowers pay more, every other borrower, India included, pays more for global money.

    Why are rich-country borrowing costs rising?

    1. Persistent deficits: Developed-country governments keep running deficits because of ageing populations, expanded welfare alongside military build-up, and voter resistance to higher taxes or entitlement cuts:
      • US public debt has crossed $40 trillion;
      • the US defence budget reached a record $1 trillion for 2026;
      • advanced economies paid over $3.3 trillion in interest last year, according to the Institute of International Finance (IIF);
      • China, wary of US fiscal risk, cut its holdings of US Treasuries (US government bonds) to an 18-year low of $618 billion in July 2026.
    2. Commodity inflation: War and weather-driven supply shocks raise commodity prices, so central banks raise interest rates and signal more increases.
    3. Artificial intelligence (AI) infrastructure race: The four hyperscalers (firms running giant cloud data centres), Meta, Microsoft, Amazon and Google, are funding much of their capital spending with debt. As technology firms borrow in bond markets, governments must compete harder for investors, which drives up yields even on “safe haven” long-term US Treasuries.

    What does this mean for India?

    1. Domestic yield: India’s 10-year government security (G-sec) yield rose 0.7 percentage points in a year and closed the week at 7.21%.
    2. Costlier foreign capital: Policymakers and corporates must accept that cheap global capital is no longer available for borrowing or investment plans.
    3. Fiscal discipline: Heavy government borrowing at home pushes up interest rates and leaves less credit for private firms. This is crowding out, so restraint matters for India too.

    Challenges

    1. Portfolio outflows: Higher US yields pull foreign investors out of Indian bonds. Eg. Net foreign portfolio outflows pressured the rupee in 2025.
    2. Large borrowing programme: The Centre still plans heavy market borrowing, competing with firms for domestic savings.
    3. Imported inflation: Commodity shocks raise India’s import bill, so interest rate cuts get delayed.
    4. Corporate foreign debt: Firms with unhedged foreign currency loans, meaning loans not protected against currency swings, face higher refinancing costs.

    Way Forward

    1. Debt anchor: The Centre should hold to its path of cutting debt to about 50% of GDP by March 2031.
    2. Quality of spending: Shift borrowing toward capital expenditure rather than revenue spending.
    3. Deeper bond market: The Reserve Bank of India should widen the domestic investor base for long-term G-secs.
    4. Currency hedging: Regulators should push corporates to hedge external commercial borrowings (loans raised abroad).

    Conclusion

    A world of costlier capital punishes fiscal slippage faster than before, and emerging economies have less room than rich ones to absorb it. Whether India keeps its borrowing in check as advanced-economy deficits and AI-driven debt keep rising is what will set its cost of capital.

    Key numbers

    1. Chinese holdings of US Treasuries, peak: $1.32 trillion, November 2013.
    2. Proposed US defence budget: $1.5 trillion for the coming fiscal year.
    3. Hyperscaler capital spending: $410 billion (2025), $725 billion projected (2026), over $1.1 trillion (2027).

    Back2Basics: Government security (G-sec)

    1. What it is: A G-sec is a tradable debt instrument issued by the Central or a State government, acknowledging its debt.
    2. Types: Short-term Treasury Bills mature in under one year; dated securities run for one year or more.
    3. Who manages it: The Reserve Bank of India issues and manages G-secs on the government’s behalf.
    4. Why its yield matters: The 10-year G-sec yield is the benchmark against which other long-term loans in the economy are priced.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026] Which one of the following best describes the ‘Crowding Out Effect’ in the context of fiscal policy? (a) A situation where private investment increases due to increased Government spending (b) A situation where Government borrowing leads to higher interest rates, which reduces private investment (c) A situation where an increase in taxes leads to increased private sector investment (d) A situation where Government spending has no impact on aggregate demand Answer: B”

  • Next-Gen GST and India’s next phase of growth

    Why in the News

    The Union Finance Minister has said that Next-Gen GST, the rate rationalisation in force since September 2025, has widened reported economic activity without weakening tax revenue. A second round of process reforms on registration, returns, refunds, disputes and input tax credit goes before the GST Council on October 7.

    What is Next-Gen GST, and why was it introduced?

    1. What GST is: The Goods and Services Tax (GST), introduced in 2017, is one national indirect tax. It works like a single checkout counter in place of separate central and State taxes.
    2. What Next-Gen GST is: Next-Gen GST is the next stage of GST reform, built on nine years of taxpayer and State experience.
    3. Two connected purposes: It set out to reduce and rationalise rates and to make compliance easier. The rate changes took effect on 22 September 2025.
    4. The takeaway: The reform is now judged on whether lower rates can expand activity enough to keep revenue growing.

    What has happened to economic activity since the rate cut?

    1. Taxable supplies: The value of reported taxable supplies grew 25.8% in the ten months after the rate cut, compared with a year earlier.
    2. Breadth of growth: Supplies grew across all 11 sector groups and all major States.
    3. Consumer sales: Reported business-to-consumer (B2C) sales, meaning sales to households, rose 26.7%. Lower prices lift household buying, which flows back to retailers, suppliers and producers.

    Has revenue held up alongside the relief?

    1. Gross collections: Gross GST collections reached ₹12.46 lakh crore in the first half of 2026-27, up 11.6% on a year earlier.
    2. Monthly momentum: Collections grew at double digits each month from June to September, nearly 15% combined.
    3. Net collections: Collections net of refunds grew 10.4% over the half year, so lower rates did not shrink the revenue base.
    4. States’ position: Aggregate State GST (SGST) receipts, including their share of Integrated GST (IGST), the tax on supplies between States, grew about 16%, funding infrastructure and public services.

    What do the coming process reforms aim to fix for small firms?

    1. Wider participation: About 1.71 crore businesses were registered under GST by end August, so more firms sell into a national market.
    2. Timely filing: GSTR-3B returns (the monthly summary return through which tax is paid) filed on time rose 12.6% for April to July.
    3. Input tax credit: Input tax credit lets a firm deduct tax already paid on inputs. A larger share of liability is now paid through credits, and idle accumulated credit has declined, which frees working capital.
    4. Refund predictability: Predictable refunds let firms plan purchases and production. Refund speed also shows how well tax administration performs.
    5. Smaller towns: The reforms aim to cut compliance time for firms in Tier-2 and Tier-3 towns.

    Challenges

    1. Self-reported data: The gains rest on reported supplies, so part of the rise may be formalisation, meaning firms newly declaring existing sales, not new activity.
    2. Refund delays: Exporters and firms with an inverted duty structure (higher tax on inputs than outputs) still depend on slow refunds.
    3. Dispute backlog: Appeals pile up because the GST Appellate Tribunal has only recently begun hearing cases.
    4. Excluded items: Petroleum and electricity stay outside GST, so firms cannot claim credit for tax paid on them.

    Way Forward

    1. Refund deadlines: Fix time-bound, risk-based refund processing for small exporters.
    2. Tribunal capacity: The Centre and States should staff all GST Appellate Tribunal benches to clear pending appeals.
    3. Price pass-through data: Publish sector-wise data showing whether rate cuts reached consumer prices.
    4. Energy inclusion roadmap: Set a timeline to bring petroleum products into GST.

    Conclusion

    Next-Gen GST has so far combined tax relief with rising revenue, which strengthens the case for the Council as a forum of cooperative federalism. Whether the Council adopts the process reforms at its coming meeting will decide if the rate gains last.

    Key numbers

    1. Refunds paid: about ₹1.80 lakh crore, April to September 2026.
    2. Growth in registrations: nearly 15% year on year, end August 2026.

    Back2Basics: GST Council

    1. Constitutional basis: The GST Council is a constitutional body under Article 279A, inserted by the Constitution (One Hundred and First Amendment) Act, 2016.
    2. Composition: The Union Finance Minister chairs it, with the Union Minister of State for Finance and the Finance Ministers of all States and Union Territories with legislatures as members.
    3. Voting: Decisions need a three-fourths weighted majority, with the Centre holding one-third of the vote and the States together two-thirds.
    4. Role: It recommends GST rates, exemptions and procedures to keep the tax uniform across States.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2025] Consider the following statements: Statement I: In India, income from allied agricultural activities like poultry farming and wool rearing in rural areas is exempted from any tax. Statement II: In India, rural agricultural land is not considered a capital asset under the provisions of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Which one of the following is correct in respect of the above statements? (a) Both Statement I and Statement II are correct and Statement II explains Statement I (b) Both Statement I and Statement II are correct but Statement II does not explain Statement I (c) Statement I is correct but Statement II is not correct (d) Statement I is not correct but Statement II is correct Answer: B”

  • [3rd October 2026] The Hindu OpED: India’s Model BIT: a decade later, amid changes

    [3rd October 2026] The Hindu OpED: India’s Model BIT: a decade later, amid changes

    Question (2020, GS3 – 15 Marks): Explain the meaning of investment in an economy in terms of capital formation. Discuss the factors to be considered while designing a concession agreement between a public entity and a private entity.
    Linkage: A Bilateral Investment Treaty is effectively a macro-level concession/protection agreement between a host state and foreign private investors. Designing a BIT requires balancing public interest safeguards against the private entity’s need for capital security and predictability.
    [2022] Which one of the following situations best reflects “Indirect Transfers” often talked about in media recently with reference to India ?
    (a) An Indian company investing in a foreign enterprise and paying taxes to the foreign country on the profits arising out of its investment
    (b) A foreign company investing in India and paying taxes to the country of its base on the profits arising out of its investment
    (c) An Indian company purchases tangible assets in a foreign country and sells such assets after their value increases and transfers the proceeds to India
    (d) A foreign company transfers shares and such shares derive their substantial value from assets located in India

    Mentor’s Comment

    India’s treaty practice has already moved ahead of its model. The UAE, Uzbekistan and Israel agreements shortened the remedies period and allowed counterclaims while the 2015 text stayed unchanged. The revision matters only if it writes this practice into the model. If it does not, the model remains a reference that negotiators bypass.

    Why in the News

    The Union Budget 2025-26 announced that India’s Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) would be revamped and made more investor-friendly, and the revised model is reportedly finalised and awaiting Cabinet approval. The real question is not whether investors get more or less protection, but what India has learnt from a decade of treaty practice.

    What is a Model BIT, and why was the 2015 version cautious?

    1. What it is: A BIT protects one country’s investors in the other. A Model BIT is India’s opening template, like a standard contract form, showing the protections it offers and obligations it expects.
    2. Why it turned cautious: The White Industries Australia Limited vs Republic of India award (2011) and worries about investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS), where investors sue states before international tribunals, made India defensive.
    3. Design of the 2015 Model: It narrowed what counts as an investment and kept regulatory exceptions for state action. Investors had to exhaust local remedies for five years, using Indian courts first, before arbitration.
    4. The takeaway: After nearly a decade, the revision decides whether India keeps this defensive design or trades some of it for investor confidence.

    How has India’s own treaty practice moved since 2015?

    1. New-generation agreements: Since 2015, India has concluded newer investment agreements with the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Uzbekistan and Israel.
    2. Shorter local remedies: The India-UAE BIT and the India-Israel Bilateral Investment Agreement, in force since July 2026, cut the local remedies period to three years.
    3. Greater flexibility: These treaties show India has already departed from its own model in practice.

    How has the global investment regime changed?

    1. UNCTAD’s shift: UN Trade and Development (UNCTAD) records treaties moving toward investment facilitation, making investing procedurally easier, with narrower protections. They rely less on ISDS.
    2. UNCITRAL reform agenda: The UN Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) is examining a permanent tribunal with an appellate mechanism to correct errors. It is also studying rules on damages and dispute prevention.
    3. Rule-shaper, not rule-taker: Scholar Makane Moïse Mbengue argues a developing state can shape investment law through its treaties, so India’s model must answer this new regime, not merely edit the old text.

    How should the new model handle the MFN clause?

    1. What MFN does: A Most Favoured Nation (MFN) clause lets one partner’s investor claim any better treatment India gives under another treaty. Most Indian treaties omit it, and a new clause needs precise scope.
    2. Maffezini vs Spain: An investor used MFN to bypass an 18-month local-court requirement by borrowing friendlier dispute rules from another treaty.
    3. Plama vs Bulgaria: The tribunal refused to import such dispute provisions where the treaty did not clearly allow it.
    4. Carve-out practice: Recent treaties expressly exclude dispute settlement from MFN, so a waiting period cannot be bypassed.

    What else must the new model get right?

    1. Counterclaims: The India-Uzbekistan BIT lets a state file a counterclaim, suing the investor back in the same case. The new model can list investor obligations and when counterclaims apply.
    2. Dispute prevention: The model can add consultation and dispute-prevention steps before arbitration, now discussed at UNCITRAL Working Group III (WG III).
    3. Precise protections: Expropriation (the state taking an investment) and fair and equitable treatment (FET) (a broad promise of fair handling) need clear wording. Precise terms protect the state’s right to regulate.
    4. Binding, balanced text: Responsible investment must be written as a legal duty, not a declaration. The model should be clearer for both sides and leave room to adjust each treaty.

    Challenges

    1. MFN imports: Tribunals have used MFN to import stricter standards. Eg. White Industries borrowed an “effective means” duty from the India-Kuwait BIT.
    2. Tax claims: Easier arbitration exposes sovereign tax measures to challenge. Eg. The Vodafone and Cairn Energy awards of 2020.
    3. Thin treaty network: India terminated most older BITs after 2016, so few partners hold treaties under any model.

    Way Forward

    1. MFN carve-out: The Department of Economic Affairs should exclude dispute settlement and procedural rights from any MFN clause.
    2. Closed FET list: Define FET as a closed list of breaches, such as denial of justice and manifest arbitrariness.
    3. Active WG III role: India should help design the permanent tribunal so its appellate review reflects developing country concerns.

    Conclusion

    India must write a model that reassures investors without surrendering the space to regulate in the public interest. Whether the Cabinet-approved text settles MFN scope and investor obligations, or leaves them to tribunals, will show if the decade’s lessons were learnt.