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  • Navy Chief: INS Nipun will enhance our critical underwater capabilities

    Navy Chief: INS Nipun will enhance our critical underwater capabilities

    Why in the News

    The Indian Navy has commissioned INS Nipun at Mumbai, a dedicated Diving Support and Submarine Rescue Vessel built for work beneath the surface.

    What capability does INS Nipun add?

    1. It is a specialist platform for underwater work: The vessel is built for deep sea diving, underwater intervention and submarine rescue.
    2. It can carry the rescue submersible: Its ability to embark and operate the Indian Navy’s Deep Submergence Rescue Vessel is what converts it into a rescue platform.
    3. The rescue role extends beyond Indian submarines: It can respond to a distressed submarine of the Indian Navy or of a partner navy, which is the basis of the claim that India can emerge as the region’s preferred submarine rescue partner.
    4. Its diving capability supports relief work: The specialised diving capability can assist partner nations in underwater salvage and in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) missions.
    5. Few navies hold the combination: The vessel brings together a range of capabilities possessed by only a handful of navies.

    Why does the Navy frame this as a strategic requirement?

    1. The maritime environment is described as contested: The Chief of the Naval Staff assessed that threat perceptions are constantly evolving and morphing into newer forms.
    2. Preparedness is the stated response: The exact nature of future threats cannot be predicted, so robust capability has to be built against anticipated threats in advance.
    3. The Western Naval Command gains a full column capability: The addition allows the command to operate above, on and beneath the waves.
    4. Integration is the immediate task: The command is to fold the vessel into operational plans, exercise her capabilities rigorously and develop proficiency around her systems.

    What does the vessel mean for indigenous shipbuilding?

    1. The builder is an Indian yard: Hindustan Shipyard Limited at Visakhapatnam designed and built the vessel indigenously.
    2. The class is new to the fleet: INS Nipun is the second ship of the Nistar class of diving support vessels.
    3. The Ministry of Defence frames it as self-reliance: The induction is presented as a further step towards self-reliance in defence shipbuilding.
    4. The platform type is rarely built domestically: A diving and rescue vessel is a niche design, so building it in India establishes a capability that cannot be sourced quickly from imports.

    Challenges to India’s submarine rescue and underwater capability

    1. Rescue is a race against the air supply: A disabled submarine’s crew survives on limited oxygen, so a rescue system has to be transported and mated within hours. Eg. All 118 crew aboard the Russian submarine Kursk died in the Barents Sea in 2000 before foreign rescue assistance was accepted.
      The Fix: Keep rescue systems prepositioned on both seaboards with standing mating certification against partner navy hatch designs.
    2. The fleet operates on two seaboards with few rescue platforms: Indian submarines patrol the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal, and dedicated rescue assets are limited in number. Eg. India inducted its first Deep Submergence Rescue Vehicle system only in 2018, with the second following the next year.
      The Fix: Retain air transportable rescue systems that can be flown to the nearest usable port instead of sailed from a home base.
    3. Rescue only works where the hatch fits: A rescue vehicle can dock only with a submarine whose escape hatch matches its mating skirt, so cross navy rescue depends on standardisation. Eg. The International Submarine Escape and Rescue Liaison Office exists to run exercises that test exactly this compatibility.
      The Fix: Certify Indian rescue systems against partner navy hatch standards and publish the compatibility list to regional navies.
    4. Naval shipbuilding timelines stretch: Indian yards have delivered warships and submarines behind their original schedules, which delays the capability rather than the contract. Eg. Deliveries under the Scorpene class submarine programme ran years behind the timeline set at signing.
      The Fix: Link yard payments to certified milestone completion rather than to calendar tranches.
    5. Saturation diving is a scarce skill: Deep diving support needs trained saturation divers and chamber operators, and that trained pool is small worldwide. Eg. Offshore energy operators and navies draw saturation divers from the same limited global workforce.
      The Fix: Run a joint naval and commercial diving training school whose certification is recognised for offshore industry work, so the pool grows beyond service requirements.

    Back2Basics: Hindustan Shipyard Limited

    1. Status: A shipyard at Visakhapatnam that was transferred to the Ministry of Defence in 2010 from the Ministry of Shipping.
    2. Origin: It was founded in 1941 as Scindia Shipyard and built India’s first indigenous merchant ship, Jala Usha, in 1948.
    3. Work: It builds and repairs merchant and naval vessels and carries out submarine refits for the Indian Navy.
    4. Current orders: It is building the Nistar class diving support vessels and the fleet support ships ordered for the Navy.

    [2026] Which of the following items of defence hardware is/are manufactured in India?

    1. Su-30 MKI Fighter Jets

    2. T-90 MK-III Tanks

    3. Akula Class Submarine

    (a) 1 and 2

    (b) 1 and 3

    (c) 1 only

    (d) 2 only

  • Domestic chip design to receive a boost with Rs 1.27 lakh cr push

    Domestic chip design to receive a boost with Rs 1.27 lakh cr push

    Why in the News

    The Centre has notified the operational framework for its Rs 1.27 lakh crore Semicon 2.0 programme, placing the design of Indian chips and the intellectual property behind them at the front of the country’s semiconductor strategy.

    Components of the Semicon 2.0 programme

    1. Support runs across six pillars: At least three of them are devoted entirely to chip design.
    2. Three design incentives are on offer: Chips designed for strategic purposes, chips for the commercial market, and domestically developed chips deployed at scale each attract separate support.
    3. The upstream chain has its own track: Makers of semiconductor materials, chemicals and manufacturing equipment are eligible outside the design pillars.
    4. Fabrication and packaging remain funded: Fabrication plants and advanced chip packaging continue to draw subsidy alongside the design tracks.

    How will the strategic chip design track work?

    1. The government picks the technologies first: It will identify technologies and building blocks, including intellectual property for compute, memory, radio frequency, power, networking and sensors, that it wants developed in India.
    2. The trigger is national importance: The track covers chips meant for areas of national importance and for critical infrastructure.
    3. Selection runs through competitive bidding: The Centre for Development of Advanced Computing (C-DAC), the government’s high performance computing research organisation under the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology, will issue requests for proposals and select developers.
    4. The state keeps a share of the intellectual property: The intellectual property created under these projects will be jointly owned by the developing company and C-DAC.
    5. Consortiums are permitted: Indian owned and controlled companies can participate independently or alongside global companies, research organisations and academic institutions.

    What does the commercial design track offer?

    1. The target is a fabless industry: The track aims to build commercially viable Indian fabless chip companies, meaning firms that design chips and contract out their manufacture.
    2. Firms get access to design infrastructure: Eligible firms receive electronic design automation (EDA) tools, multi-project wafer fabrication, intellectual property cores, compute sub-systems and post-silicon validation.
    3. Small firms receive seed money: Start-ups and micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) designing commercial chips can receive up to Rs 15 crore or 50 per cent of project cost, whichever is lower.
    4. The government can take equity: It can make equity co-investments alongside venture capital or private equity investors.
    5. Large firms repay through royalty: Larger companies can opt for royalty financing and pay 5 per cent of a product’s net revenue until 1.5 times the government’s financial support has been recovered.
    6. Eligibility now reaches Overseas Citizens of India: Companies incorporated and headquartered in India qualify if they are owned and controlled by Indian citizens or Overseas Citizens of India (OCIs) and maintain a significant operational and manpower presence in the country.

    What does the framework do for the upstream supply chain?

    1. Capital support is set at 30 per cent: Research and development facilities for semiconductor equipment, plants making semiconductor grade wafers, photomasks, photoresists, substrates, chemicals and gases, testing facilities, and units producing equipment and components can each claim that share of capital expenditure.
    2. Equipment makers get a declining incentive: A production linked incentive of 10, 8, 6, 4 and 2 per cent runs over five years beginning FY 2028-29.
    3. The incentive is tied to domestic sourcing: It is paid on the value of the bill of materials that an equipment maker sources from domestic manufacturers.
    4. Total support carries a ceiling: Combined support for these units is capped at 50 per cent of eligible capital expenditure.
    5. The chain being targeted is largely imported today: The upstream inputs needed to operate semiconductor factories are currently brought in from abroad.

    Challenges to India’s semiconductor design push

    1. A design still has to be turned into silicon: A fabless firm depends on a foundry, and the wafers for an Indian design are fabricated abroad until domestic plants reach production. Eg. Indian design centres of global chip firms already complete chip designs that are fabricated in Taiwan and South Korea.
      The Fix: Tie the later tranches of design support to committed capacity bookings at Indian fabrication plants, so domestic demand and domestic supply arrive together.
    2. The talent sits inside multinational captive centres: India supplies a large share of the world’s chip design engineers, and most of them work on parts of products owned elsewhere. Eg. Global semiconductor companies run large design centres in Bengaluru, Hyderabad and Noida.
      The Fix: Subsidise multi-project wafer runs for university teams so student designs reach silicon and full product ownership is learned before graduation.
    3. The design tools are a concentrated import: Electronic design automation software comes from a small number of United States based vendors and is subject to export control. Eg. The United States restricted sales of that software to Chinese customers in 2025 before reversing the order weeks later.
      The Fix: Secure long term licence access inside technology partnership agreements and fund an indigenous tool stack for mature process nodes.
    4. Approved outlay is not disbursed money: A start-up carries the working capital cost of a delayed claim, and slow disbursal has followed earlier electronics incentive schemes. Eg. Disbursals under production linked incentive schemes have repeatedly trailed the amounts approved across sectors.
      The Fix: Set a claim settlement deadline in the scheme guidelines with interest payable on delayed disbursal.
    5. Utilities decide where a plant can go: A fabrication plant requires ultrapure water and uninterrupted power at a scale few industrial locations can guarantee. Eg. Taiwan’s 2021 drought forced its foundries to truck in water and to cut consumption.
      The Fix: Pre-certify candidate sites for water and power reliability before approving a plant at that location.

    Conclusion

    Semicon 2.0 can transform India into a global semiconductor powerhouse by nurturing indigenous chip design, strengthening manufacturing, reducing import dependence, creating high-value jobs, and boosting technological self-reliance.

    Back2Basics: Centre for Development of Advanced Computing

    1. Establishment: Set up in 1988 as a scientific society under what is now the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology.
    2. Origin: It was created to build indigenous supercomputers after India was refused access to imported high performance computing systems.
    3. Flagship line: It developed the PARAM series of supercomputers, beginning with PARAM 8000 in 1991.
    4. Present mandate: It works on high performance computing, microprocessors, language computing and cyber security, and implements the National Supercomputing Mission alongside the Indian Institute of Science.

    “[2025, GS3, 15 marks] India aims to become a semiconductor manufacturing hub. What are the challenges faced by the semiconductor industry in India? Mention the salient features of the India Semiconductor Mission.”

  • Will ‘talking’ cars reduce road accident deaths?

    Why in the News

    The Union Ministry of Road Transport and Highways will mandate Vehicle to Vehicle (V2V) communication, a system through which vehicles exchange movement data wirelessly and warn drivers of an approaching collision risk. The draft Central Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Rules, 2026 set out that mandate and invited public objections within 30 days of publication.

    How does Vehicle to Vehicle communication work?

    1. An on board unit does the exchanging: An On Board Unit (OBU) fitted in the vehicle sends data to and receives data from other vehicles wirelessly.
    2. The data exchanged is movement data: Vehicles continuously share real time speed, position, direction and acceleration.
    3. The carrier is cellular Vehicle-to-Everything technology: The system uses cellular Vehicle-to-Everything (C-V2X), a mobile network based standard for vehicle communication, in the 5.875 GHz to 5.925 GHz band.
    4. The alert reaches the driver before the hazard is visible: A vehicle braking suddenly triggers a slow down alert in nearby vehicles ahead of any driver seeing the brake lights.

    What do the draft Rules mandate, and by when?

    1. Compliance begins with voluntarily fitted vehicles: Two and three wheelers, cars, buses and goods vehicles manufactured on or after 1 October 2027 must meet Automotive Industry Standard 230 (AIS-230) if they carry a V2V system.
    2. Fitment becomes compulsory a year later: Vehicles manufactured on or after 1 October 2028 must be fitted with a V2V system meeting AIS-230 specifications.
    3. AIS-230 is the technical backbone: The standard lists the requirements a V2V system must satisfy and provides for phased introduction of other safety features.
    4. The spectrum was cleared first: The Centre exempted the 5.875 GHz to 5.925 GHz band from licensing requirements in June 2026, so original equipment manufacturers can use it in new vehicles.
    5. The cost sits on the new vehicle: On Board Units are expected to cost Rs 5,000 to Rs 7,000 and will be installed in new vehicles first.

    What can V2V do that camera based systems cannot?

    1. Existing systems are bounded by the line of sight: Camera based advanced driver assistance systems (ADAS), which use sensors to warn a driver or intervene in braking and steering, work only as far as the road is visible.
    2. V2V works around obstructions: It establishes contact with other vehicles at blind corners and behind large trucks.
    3. The warnings cover named hazards: Alerts flag sudden braking, black spots, unsafe lane changes, obstacles such as parked vehicles on roadsides, fog and potential collision risk.
    4. The detection range is about 300 metres: V2V systems typically identify vehicles within that distance.
    5. The two systems are complementary: V2V is expected to add forward collision prediction to what camera based systems already do.

    What does the limited deployment record show?

    1. Deployment abroad is narrow: V2V is working in a few countries, including the United States.
    2. Aviation already runs the same idea: Aircraft broadcast their position, speed and altitude, and nearby aircraft and ground stations receive that broadcast.
    3. The road sector is at an earlier stage: The broadcast approach is standard in global aviation and is still evolving on roads.

    Challenges to the Vehicle to Vehicle mandate

    1. The benefit depends on how many vehicles carry the unit: A network that warns only about equipped vehicles is worth little until a large share of the fleet carries the equipment. Eg. A mandate applying to vehicles manufactured from 2028 reaches none of the vehicles already registered, which stay on the road for well over a decade.
      The Fix: Fund retrofitment of On Board Units in commercial goods and public transport fleets first, since those vehicles cover the highest annual mileage.
    2. The allocated band may not carry the traffic load: It is unclear whether the frequency band set aside can support all vehicles broadcasting at once. Eg. A single congested urban intersection can hold several hundred vehicles inside the 300 metre broadcast range.
      The Fix: Fix a tested message capacity per square kilometre inside AIS-230 before the compulsory fitment date arrives.
    3. Continuous broadcasting creates a movement record: The system stores a large volume of data about vehicles, which exposes it to cyber attack and to surveillance use. Eg. FASTag toll crossings already generate a dated record of where a vehicle has been.
      The Fix: Mandate rotating pseudonymous vehicle identifiers and a fixed data retention limit in the final Rules.
    4. A wrong message can cause the crash it exists to prevent: Miscommunication between vehicles can trigger braking or a lane change that was never warranted. Eg. Automatic emergency braking systems have drawn regulatory investigation abroad over unprompted braking on highways.
      The Fix: Require cryptographic message authentication and a fail safe that suppresses alerts when integrity checks fail.
    5. The group most at risk is the hardest to equip: Two wheeler riders account for the largest share of road deaths in India, and the unit price is a significant fraction of an entry level motorcycle’s cost. Eg. Two wheelers account for roughly 44 per cent of road accident fatalities recorded in the Ministry’s annual Road Accidents in India report.
      The Fix: Subsidise On Board Units for two wheelers through the existing vehicle scrappage and safety incentive route rather than loading the cost onto the buyer.

    Conclusion

    V2V communication can make Indian roads significantly safer by enabling vehicles to detect hazards beyond line of sight and warn drivers earlier. With strong cybersecurity, privacy safeguards, affordable adoption, and wider fleet coverage, the mandate can become a major step toward smarter, safer and more connected mobility in India.

    Back2Basics: Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989

    1. Parent statute: They are framed under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, which governs registration, licensing, permits, insurance and road safety in India.
    2. What they cover: They set vehicle construction and maintenance standards, driving licence procedure, registration requirements and control of traffic.
    3. How they are changed: The Union Ministry of Road Transport and Highways notifies amendments, publishing a draft for public objections before final notification.
    4. Enforcement: Penalties for non-compliance flow from the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, whose 2019 amendment sharply raised fines for traffic offences.
  • After hottest August, bleak outlook for September rain

    After hottest August, bleak outlook for September rain

    Why in the News

    The India Meteorological Department (IMD) has forecast September rainfall at least 9 per cent short of the long period average of 167.9 mm, the average rainfall recorded for that month over several decades against which every seasonal forecast is stated.

    What does the September outlook actually say?

    1. September carries about a fifth of the season’s rain: July contributes 32 per cent and August 29 per cent of the June to September monsoon total.
    2. Some regions are exempt from the deficit call: Parts of northwest, northeast, east and east-central India and isolated areas of southeast peninsular India could receive “normal to above-normal rainfall”.
    3. Temperatures are forecast above normal at both ends: Maximum temperatures are expected above normal over most of India and minimum temperatures above normal over most areas.
    4. Recent Septembers have run against the longer pattern: September rainfall has seen a relative uptick in recent years.
    5. The previous outlook proved accurate: The IMD’s 31 July outlook had indicated below normal rainfall for August over much of the country, and the agency assessed that it matched observations over many regions.

    What made August the hottest since 1901?

    1. The average minimum temperature was the highest on record: It reached 24.36 degrees Celsius for the month.
    2. Rainfall was among the lowest for the month this century: India received 213.3 mm in August, the seventh lowest since 2001.
    3. El Nino is the stated cause: The IMD Director General attributed the heat to the ongoing El Nino, which dries out the atmosphere and raises temperatures.
    4. The month was not uniformly dry: Repeated low pressure systems brought heavy rain across the Indo-Gangetic Plains and parts of central and eastern India.
    5. The warming phase is expected to strengthen: IMD models indicate El Nino conditions will intensify through the remainder of the 2026 southwest monsoon season.

    Why did an unusually long run of low pressure days not lift the rainfall total?

    1. Four systems persisted for 26 days: Low pressure systems, the precursors to cyclonic storms, lasted a combined 26 days in August against a climatological average of 16.3 days.
    2. The systems all took the same track: They formed repeatedly over the Bay of Bengal, moved west-northwest and weakened over central and northern India.
    3. Their rain stayed within one belt: Rainfall activity from those systems was confined to the Indo-Gangetic Plain.
    4. Western Disturbances narrowed the spread further: These extra-tropical storms originating in the Mediterranean interacted with the monsoon circulation and with low pressure and cyclonic circulations. The interaction concentrated intense rainfall over eastern, east-central and parts of northwestern India rather than producing a widespread monsoon revival.

    How uneven has the season been across regions?

    1. Only central India ended August in surplus: Every other region closed the month below its normal cumulative rainfall.
    2. Three large regions carry the shortfall: The northwest, the east and northeast, and the south peninsula all recorded deficits.
    3. The deficit is deepest in the east and the south: The shortfall was particularly pronounced in the east and northeast and in the southern peninsula.
    4. A dry September would land on the same regions: Many parts of the country are expected to remain drier than normal, so the areas already short of rain gain no correction from the final month.

    Challenges to seasonal monsoon forecasting in India

    1. Seasonal skill is weakest exactly where it is needed: A national rainfall percentage carries far more confidence than the district level distribution a farmer sows against. Eg. The August forecast was correct on direction at the national level and did not anticipate that the month’s rain would concentrate on the Indo-Gangetic Plain.
      The Fix: Publish probabilistic district level outlooks with stated confidence intervals alongside the national figure, so an advisory can be issued at the scale sowing decisions are taken.
    2. The benchmark itself shifts: The long period average is recalculated against a moving set of decades, so a deficit against one baseline is not comparable with a deficit against another. Eg. The IMD revised the all-India seasonal normal downward when it updated the reference period, which changed what counted as a normal monsoon year.
      The Fix: Fix a published revision cycle for the normals and report every seasonal figure against both the old and the new baseline in the transition year.
    3. A normal seasonal total conceals destructive intensity: Rainfall delivered in a few heavy spells produces flooding and crop loss even where the season closes at normal. Eg. Kerala in 2018 recorded heavy concentrated spells in August that caused the State’s worst floods in a century.
      The Fix: Report the number of heavy and very heavy rainfall days alongside the seasonal total, so intensity enters the headline measure.
    4. El Nino does not translate into deficit with any reliability: The correlation between a warm Pacific and a weak Indian monsoon holds on average and fails in individual years. Eg. 1997 was among the strongest El Nino years on record and India’s monsoon rainfall that year was normal.
      The Fix: Report the Indian Ocean Dipole state and the Madden-Julian Oscillation phase alongside El Nino, since these are the drivers that offset it.
    5. A rainfall deficit becomes a crop loss through irrigation gaps: Under half of India’s net sown area is irrigated, so a shortfall passes directly into kharif output and food prices. Eg. Marathwada’s consecutive deficit years in 2015 and 2016 emptied reservoirs and forced water to be moved to Latur by rail.
      The Fix: Tie contingency crop planning and seed buffer releases to the mid-season forecast rather than to the end of season assessment.

    Conclusion

    Overall, the September outlook highlights the increasing variability of India’s monsoon. Better regional forecasting, climate monitoring, water management and timely farm advisories can help reduce the impact of rainfall deficits and build greater climate resilience.

    Back2Basics: El Nino Southern Oscillation

    1. What it is: The El Nino Southern Oscillation (ENSO) is the coupled ocean and atmosphere cycle in the tropical Pacific that redistributes rainfall across the tropics on a two to seven year rhythm.
    2. Three phases: El Nino is the warm phase, La Nina the cool phase, and the neutral phase sits between them.
    3. How it is measured: The Oceanic Nino Index tracks sea surface temperature anomalies in the central Pacific Nino 3.4 region, and the Southern Oscillation Index tracks the sea level pressure difference between Tahiti and Darwin.
    4. Why India tracks it: El Nino years are statistically associated with weaker southwest monsoon rainfall, and a positive Indian Ocean Dipole can partly offset that effect.

    “[2015, GS1, 12.5 marks] How far do you agree that the behavior of the Indian monsoon has been changing due to humanizing landscapes? Discuss.”

  • Jharkhand, Bihar sign pact on Sone water sharing

    Jharkhand, Bihar sign pact on Sone water sharing

    Why in the News

    Bihar and Jharkhand have signed a memorandum of understanding on sharing the water of the Sone river, allocating 5.75 million acre feet to Bihar and 2 million acre feet to Jharkhand.

    What has been agreed on the Sone, and what was in dispute?

    1. The dispute was over one inherited allocation: The 1973 agreement allotted 7.75 million acre feet (MAF), one acre foot being the volume that covers an acre of land to a depth of a foot, or about 1,233 cubic metres, to then undivided Bihar.
    2. Bihar takes the larger share: The formal consensus allocates 5.75 MAF of the river’s water to Bihar.
    3. Jharkhand takes the remainder: The remaining 2 MAF is allocated to Jharkhand.
    4. The route chosen is agreement rather than adjudication: The States settled by memorandum instead of taking the claim to a tribunal constituted under the Inter-State River Water Disputes Act, 1956.

    What does the settlement change on the ground?

    1. A long-pending eastern India dispute closes: The agreement resolves a water dispute that had run unresolved between the two States since the bifurcation.
    2. Irrigation is the stated primary gain: It is expected to provide irrigation water to lakhs of farmers in rural Bihar and rural Jharkhand.
    3. Drinking water supply is the second use: It is also expected to supply drinking water to a large population across both States.
    4. It is the fourth such deal this year: This is the fourth water agreement concluded between States in the year, each intended to raise water availability for irrigation, rural development and drinking purposes.

    Challenges to the Sone water sharing agreement

    1. An executive memorandum carries no adjudicatory backing: A memorandum binds two governments politically and gives neither a forum to enforce it when a release is withheld. Eg. The Krishna and Cauvery allocations required tribunal awards under the Inter-State River Water Disputes Act, 1956 and were litigated for decades afterwards.
      The Fix: Convert the split into a scheduled allocation under a joint Sone board with a statutory review clause and a defined dispute reference.
    2. A fixed annual quantity assumes a fixed annual yield: An allocation stated in acre feet holds only in a normal year, and the Sone’s flow is monsoon dominated and highly variable. Eg. The Indrapuri barrage at Dehri has repeatedly failed to fill its canal command in deficit years.
      The Fix: Restate the split as a share of realised flow measured at agreed gauging points, with a separate lean season protocol.
    3. No joint measurement machinery is named: Neither State is committed to a common gauging point or a common data record, so each will compute its own entitlement from its own readings. Eg. The Cauvery dispute turned for years on the absence of agreed real-time flow data at the inter-State point.
      The Fix: Install telemetered gauges at the State boundary and publish daily flow and release data on a single public portal.
    4. Upstream storage decisions sit outside the deal: New reservoirs and diversions on tributaries above the boundary change what reaches the downstream State without breaching any allocation figure. Eg. Storage projects on Sone basin tributaries in Jharkhand alter the flow arriving at Bihar’s canal headworks.
      The Fix: Make any new storage above the boundary subject to prior consultation with a defined objection window for the downstream State.
    5. Delivery efficiency is untouched by the allocation: A larger paper share does not reach a farmer where the canal system loses much of the release before the tail end. Eg. Unlined and silted distributaries in the Sone canal command leave tail end villages dependent on groundwater in the same season the head reach is irrigated.
      The Fix: Tie the drawal of the agreed share to verified canal lining and command area development milestones reported annually.

    Conclusion

    Bihar-Jharkhand Sone water agreement is a positive step toward cooperative river management, improving irrigation and drinking water availability. With transparent monitoring, flexible sharing during droughts and joint planning, it can ensure long-term water security and regional development.

    Back2Basics: Sone River

    1. Source and course: It rises on the Amarkantak plateau in Madhya Pradesh, close to the source of the Narmada, and flows in the opposite direction to it.
    2. Status in the Ganga system: It is the largest of the southern tributaries of the Ganga, and it joins the main river upstream of Patna.
    3. States traversed: Its course runs through Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Bihar.
    4. Principal structure: The Indrapuri barrage at Dehri feeds the Sone canal system, among the oldest large canal networks built in India.

    “[2013, GS2, 10 marks] Constitutional mechanisms to resolve the inter-state water disputes have failed to address and solve the problems. Is the failure due to structural or process inadequacy or both? Discuss.”

  • Lessons India, China, and Nepal must learn

    Lessons India, China, and Nepal must learn

    Why in the News

    A catastrophic flood in Nepal’s Rasuwa district, triggered by a glacial collapse near Langtang Lirung, has exposed vulnerabilities in Himalayan border management, infrastructure, disaster response and regional climate cooperation.

    Why does a border not contain a Himalayan disaster?

    1. A natural disaster does not recognise the line: The border as a geometric line, whose breach by another sovereign nation is treated as the uppermost national security concern, is not respected by a flood or an avalanche.
    2. Dependence-generating diplomacy no longer works: Nation states cannot afford to treat the sharing of information and expertise as a favour extended by one side to the other.
    3. Interdependence is the operating requirement: Data sharing, joint studies, institutional collaboration, non-sovereignty-centric treatment of climate change impact and a close inter-governmental early warning framework have become central.
    4. Science has to be converted into a public good: Translating findings into simple public awareness material is part of the same task.
    5. Border forces face a different threat set: Border defence personnel need retraining for security threats that now arrive as physical hazards rather than as incursions.
    6. Traditional knowledge belongs in operations: Human security in far-flung terrain depends on drawing on local knowledge in response operations rather than on external protocols alone.

    What does the flood expose in the region’s power system?

    1. Over 15 hydro projects were damaged on one river: The flood struck that many projects along the Trishuli, and the downstream exposure it created runs from national to trans-border scale.
    2. The cascade crosses four countries: Effects within Nepal, China and India, and further downstream in Bangladesh, can disrupt cross-border energy trading and regional power pools, producing energy insecurity.
    3. India’s oldest stake on the river is destroyed: India’s Central Water and Power Commission initiated the first hydel project on the Trishuli in 1953, an agreement was signed in 1958, and the 21 MW run-of-the-river project was commissioned at Tuphe in June 1972 at a cost of Rs 13.55 crore. It supplied power to Kathmandu for decades and now remains largely decimated.
    4. Highways were built along the river belts: Many China-built highways to Kathmandu run through valleys, including the 115 km Kathmandu to Kodari highway built in 1967 through the Sunkoshi valley, sited for strategic reasons and for easy access to sand and boulders.
    5. Ribbon development followed the alignment: Huge settlements have grown along those highways, which places population directly in the river’s path.
    6. Donors are reconsidering large infrastructure: This flood and others have pushed the funders of big infrastructure projects to rethink their strategies.

    Why does the response arrive from the wrong place?

    1. The first responder is the first victim: The impact falls at a very local level, where the area’s residents are both, and the response comes from distant capital-centric institutions in Kathmandu.
    2. Sikkim recorded the same pattern in 2023: Massive calving from the South Lhonak glacier’s snout triggered a glacial lake outburst flood in North Sikkim in October that year, and the Teesta rose 15 to 20 metres within hours.
    3. The damage crossed two States and a border: Downstream townships in Sikkim, West Bengal and Bangladesh were buried in slush and debris.
    4. The loss was 60 per cent of a State’s output: Damage was estimated at over Rs 25,000 crore, close to that share of Sikkim’s 2022-23 Gross State Domestic Product.
    5. Generation loss alone crossed Rs 19,000 crore: The 1,800 MW of capacity destroyed accounted for that much of the total.
    6. Local institutions had no capacity to absorb it: Municipalities and panchayats stood helpless before the scale of destruction, without training, technique, orientation, awareness, preparedness or the means to cope.
    7. No agency owned the warning function: No early warning mechanism existed, and no agency was responsible for creating one.
    8. The remedy named is relocation of capacity: National institutions and resources need to be based at the local level rather than at the capital.

    Why is there no common Himalayan climate policy?

    1. The region has no framework spanning its levels: The Himalayan region lacks a robust climate policy framework covering the local, national and regional levels together.
    2. The scientific warning is already published: The International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD), the Kathmandu based intergovernmental knowledge centre for the Hindu Kush Himalaya, has published evidence-based reports warning of tipping points in the region’s deteriorating glaciology.
    3. India’s own instruments are national and sectoral: India has a National and State Action Plan on Climate Change with eight sectoral missions, including one for the Himalayas.
    4. The regional treaty exists on paper: The SAARC Convention on Cooperation on Environment was signed and took effect in 2013.
    5. The problem is fragmentation rather than absence: These scattered approaches have to be brought onto a common platform.

    Challenges to disaster preparedness in the Himalaya

    1. Disaster money is triggered by damage, not by risk: Spending flows overwhelmingly to relief and compensation after an event rather than to the monitoring and evacuation capacity that would reduce it. Eg. A separate National Disaster Mitigation Fund had to be created under the Disaster Management Act, 2005 precisely because response funds were not being spent on mitigation.
      The Fix: Ring-fence a fixed share of the mitigation fund for high altitude monitoring and evacuation infrastructure, with annual utilisation published State by State.
    2. Hill towns are built without a carrying capacity assessment: Settlements expand on slope debris and old landslide material without any study of how much construction the ground will bear. Eg. Land subsidence at Joshimath in January 2023 forced the evacuation of hundreds of families from a town built on old landslide debris.
      The Fix: Complete and publish carrying capacity studies for Himalayan towns, and hold new construction approvals until each town’s study is on record.
    3. No single agency owns glacier hazard: Glacier and glacial lake monitoring is split across geological, polar research and university institutions, so no body publishes a standing national risk list. Eg. India’s glacial lake inventories have been compiled separately by different agencies using different thresholds for what counts as a risk lake.
      The Fix: Designate one nodal agency to maintain and annually publish a national inventory of high risk glaciers and lakes.
    4. Reconstruction rebuilds the same exposure: Post-disaster funding restores roads, bridges and power projects on their original alignments, which returns the assets to the position that failed. Eg. Highways and hydel assets damaged in the 2013 Kedarnath floods were substantially rebuilt along the same valley routes.
      The Fix: Make a relocation-or-redesign assessment a condition of releasing post-disaster reconstruction funds for any asset in a hazard zone.
    5. Transboundary rivers carry no data obligation: Upstream flow, lake level and slope movement data are treated as strategic information rather than as a safety input owed to a downstream population. Eg. Countries in the region share river data under bilateral arrangements limited to defined seasons and defined stations.
      The Fix: Put glacier, lake and flow monitoring data into a standing regional exchange with agreed release timelines and an automatic alert threshold.

    Conclusion

    The Rasuwa flood underscores that Himalayan disasters demand cross-border cooperation, not isolated national responses. India must strengthen valley-level early warning systems, ensure real-time upstream data sharing, and establish clear institutional responsibility to prevent future disasters.

    Back2Basics: International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development

    1. Formation: An intergovernmental knowledge and learning centre established in 1983, with its headquarters at Kathmandu in Nepal.
    2. Membership: It serves eight regional member countries, namely Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, China, India, Myanmar, Nepal and Pakistan.
    3. Coverage: Its mandate is the Hindu Kush Himalaya region, spanning the mountain systems from Afghanistan to Myanmar.
    4. Function: It produces regional assessments on glaciers, water, biodiversity and mountain livelihoods, including the Hindu Kush Himalaya Assessment reports.

    [2019, GS3, 10 marks] Disaster preparedness is the first step in any disaster management process. Explain how hazard zonation mapping will help in disaster mitigation in the case of landslides.”

  • Himalayas’ hanging glacier threat

    Himalayas’ hanging glacier threat

    Why in the News

    A Nature study identified 219 hanging glaciers in the Alaknanda basin, highlighting rising Himalayan flood risks as glacier instability assessments remain limited despite repeated major incidents.

    What is a hanging glacier?

    1. A perched ice mass: It is ice sitting on a steep slope in a position from which it can detach as a mass rather than melt away in place.
    2. Instability is defined by velocity: An unstable glacier is one whose velocity may change by an order of magnitude or more over a comparatively short period.
    3. The instability redistributes the ice: That change redistributes ice across the glacier, accompanied by geometric, structural and tectonic shifts, and the redistribution is what produces a hanging glacier on a steep slope.
    4. Detachment starts a chain rather than an event: A break-off can trigger secondary hazards such as a glacial lake outburst flood, where a lake dammed by loose moraine debris is breached and releases its water downstream.

    What did the Alaknanda inventory actually measure?

    1. 219 hanging glaciers in one basin: The study identified that number across the Alaknanda basin of the Garhwal Himalaya.
    2. The unstable ice clusters upstream: Nearly a third of it is concentrated in the Upper Alaknanda basin.
    3. The inventory carries area and volume: The glaciers cover 71.7 ± 3.5 sq km with an estimated ice volume of 2.39 ± 0.42 cubic km, including 0.74 ± 0.14 cubic km of hanging ice mass.
    4. The named driver is warming and variability: Himalayan glaciers are increasingly exhibiting geometric and dynamic instability owing to rapid warming and climate variability.
    5. The method is new to this range: Hanging glaciers have been studied extensively in the Alps, and basin scale assessments in the Himalaya remain limited.
    6. The work is Indian institutional: It was carried out by researchers at the School of Earth, Ocean and Climate Sciences at the Indian Institute of Technology Bhubaneswar and the Divecha Centre for Climate Change at the Indian Institute of Science, Bengaluru.

    What would a break-off do in the Badrinath and Mana sector?

    1. Simulated avalanche flows exceed 50 metres in height: The study’s simulations place flows above that height in that sector of Uttarakhand.
    2. Settlements sit directly in the path: A severe event on that scale would swallow major settlements and infrastructure.
    3. The exposed population is seasonal as well as resident: Badrinath is one of the Char Dham shrines and Mana sits at the head of the same route, so footfall peaks in the months when the slopes are least stable.

    Why is exposure rising faster than the ice is failing?

    1. Built exposure more than doubles by 2030: Buildings and infrastructure land area at risk in the basin is projected to be 120 per cent higher in 2030 than in 2000.
    2. The exposed population rises by 17 per cent: The number of people living in those at-risk areas is projected to surge by that share.
    3. Identification and monitoring are the first response: Systematic identification and monitoring of high-risk glaciers is what the study calls for to reduce downstream hazard.
    4. Land-use planning is the second half of it: Risk-informed land-use planning has to run alongside monitoring in mountain regions.
    5. Monitoring is cheap against the loss it prevents: Much greater funding of monitoring programmes is required, and that funding is small compared with the cost of lost lives and livelihoods, per the Director of the International Cryosphere Climate Initiative.

    What separated Chamoli from Blatten?

    1. Chamoli killed over 200 people in 2021: A massive wall of ice and rock collapsed into the Rishiganga valley, destroying hydropower plants and sweeping away bridges.
    2. Blatten killed one person: A large ice-rock avalanche buried most of that Swiss village four years later.
    3. The difference was preparedness, not luck: A second study published in Nature in March attributes the survival to preparedness, monitoring and rapid response.
    4. Precursory signs were acted on: Authorities and residents in Blatten responded to signs of slope instability, which enabled a timely evacuation.
    5. The hazards are cascading rather than isolated: These events should be treated as cascading hazards rather than as separate landslides, avalanches or floods, per the head of planetary sciences at the University of Aberdeen’s School of Geosciences.
    6. Attribution should not be rushed during the emergency: Establishing which process caused an event should not be hurried during the immediate emergency response.

    Challenges to monitoring hanging glaciers in the Himalaya

    1. The instrument network is sparse and seasonal: High altitude weather and movement sensors are few and go offline through winter, so precursor slope movement is unobserved in the months it develops. Eg. Glacier mass balance in India is measured on a handful of benchmark glaciers such as Gangotri and Chhota Shigri rather than basin wide.
      The Fix: Fund a permanently telemetered high altitude sensor network, with satellite radar interferometry as the standing backup layer.
    2. A hazard map does not bind a builder: Slope and glacier instability assessments are advisory inputs, so they do not stop an approval for a road or a power project below an unstable face. Eg. Construction continued in the Rishiganga and Dhauliganga valleys after repeated warnings about instability in those catchments.
      The Fix: Make valley level hazard zonation a statutory input to environmental clearance for any project above a set altitude.
    3. Warning does not reach the valley floor: An identified hazard produces a scientific alert rather than a siren in the settlement that would be hit. Eg. Workers at downstream barrage sites in the 2021 Chamoli event had no alert before the flood wave arrived.
      The Fix: Install siren based valley warning tied to the sensor network, with a mandated evacuation drill calendar for every downstream settlement and project.
    4. Pilgrim traffic concentrates people in the exposed months: The season when the route is open is the season when avalanche and outburst risk is highest, so peak exposure and peak hazard coincide. Eg. Char Dham footfall peaks between May and October, which is also the melt and monsoon window.
      The Fix: Route daily pilgrim entry against a published hazard advisory rather than against a fixed carrying capacity number alone.

    Conclusion

    The hanging glacier threat shows that Himalayan disaster risk is becoming a race between environmental instability and expanding human exposure. Continuous monitoring, enforceable hazard zoning, real-time warnings and evacuation preparedness can turn scientific knowledge into lives saved and resilient mountain development.

    Back2Basics: Alaknanda River

    1. Source: It rises at the Satopanth and Bhagirath Kharak glaciers in the Chamoli district of Uttarakhand.
    2. Status in the Ganga system: It is one of the two headstreams of the Ganga, and it carries the larger discharge of the two at their meeting point.
    3. Panch Prayag: Its five confluences are Vishnuprayag, Nandprayag, Karnaprayag, Rudraprayag and Devprayag.
    4. Formation of the Ganga: It joins the Bhagirathi at Devprayag, and the river takes the name Ganga from that point onward.

    [2020, GS1, 10 marks] How will the melting of Himalayan glaciers have a far-reaching impact on the water resources of India?

  • What two districts can teach us about dealing with rural waste

    What two districts can teach us about dealing with rural waste

    Why in the News

    The Supreme Court has demanded functional waste regulators, exposing weak institutionalisation. While India generates 1.7 lakh tonnes daily, successful community systems in Majuli and Tawang show operational gaps, especially rurally.

    Why does India’s waste system not see the countryside?

    1. Rural waste data are not collected: Waste data for rural areas do not exist, according to the Centre for Science and Environment (CSE), a New Delhi based research and advocacy body.
    2. The duty sits with bodies that do not discharge it: Urban and rural local bodies are tasked with solid waste management and with recording volumes and expenses, and they rarely do the needful.
    3. The gap is global and overwhelmingly rural: Around 2.7 billion people worldwide have no waste collection, and 2 billion of them live in rural areas, per an analysis by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP).
    4. Uncollected waste goes to land, water or fire: Where people cannot manage waste, they dump it on land or in rivers, streams and seas, or they burn it, which is a major concern in India.

    Why has rural waste grown without collection following it?

    1. Rural spending has risen: Data show a rise in per capita spending in India’s rural areas, and more consumption produces more waste.
    2. Packaging reached the remotest markets: Food, beverages and personal care or hygiene products are almost all wrapped in plastics or multi layered packaging, and those goods have penetrated the remotest rural markets.
    3. Waste management did not follow the goods: Collection systems did not extend into those markets alongside the products that created the waste.
    4. Organic waste had a use and mixed waste does not: Organic waste fed livestock or served as manure for centuries, and plastics and other non-biodegradable materials have produced a mixed waste that is harder to decompose.

    What did Majuli change after its facilities went unused?

    1. The sheds were built years before the system was: The Swachh Bharat Mission and the Public Health Engineering Department built Central Material Collection Facilities (CMCFs), the village level sheds where sorted waste is received and stored, in 19 of 20 panchayats between 2017 and 2022, along with mini collection facilities in most of the 160 villages.
    2. Neither the sheds nor the workers were put to use: The tin sheds went unused and the workers were not mobilised until the departments teamed up with the waste management non-profit Sahaas in 2024.
    3. The missing components were operational rather than physical: Funding, staffing and training of sanitation workers, vehicles for transport, operation of the collection facilities and buyers for the sorted material all had to be arranged.
    4. Participation was organised before collection began: Village leaders, homestay and hotel owners, schools and self-help groups (SHGs) ran awareness programmes and handed out bags for storage and segregation.
    5. Collection now runs in 19 of 20 panchayats: Garbage is now collected across them, in a district that faces flooding and erosion every year.
    6. Staffing remains thin against the population: Majuli’s 1.67 lakh people are served by 37 sanitation workers and 19 sorting staff.
    7. The fleet was funded only recently: The district departments purchased 21 e-vehicles and 15 tricycles and approved funds for the collection crew.
    8. The first river crossing was in April 2025: A tonne of waste left Majuli by boat across the Brahmaputra, the first time the island’s waste crossed the river instead of being dumped into it.
    9. The tonnage is now measurable: Majuli has collected 82.4 tonnes of waste since 2024, and it transferred 16.78 tonnes and earned Rs 1.47 lakh between April 2025 and May 2026.

    How does Tawang collect waste without sanitation workers?

    1. Scattered settlements rule out door to door collection: Households in these land-locked mountain villages sit too far apart for a sanitation worker to cover on a route.
    2. The pilot began in one village in 2024: Local officials and village leaders piloted a community led model in Chullyu in Keyi Panyor district through the Himalayan Fringes Project of the Further and Beyond Foundation.
    3. It spread across three districts in two years: A third of Tawang district and parts of Keyi Panyor and Upper Siang districts have adopted the model.
    4. Households store their own waste: Every household segregates biodegradable from non-biodegradable waste and keeps it at home until the collection day.
    5. Collection is a monthly village event: Each village organises a Swachchata Divas, or Cleanliness Day, at a designated point where residents arrive with sacks and sort the waste into 22 categories.
    6. The volumes are recorded: 26 villages in the project have organised more than 150 Swachchata Divas and collected 30 tonnes of waste.
    7. Secondary sorting happens at recovery facilities: The waste moves to material recovery facilities (MRFs), the sites where it is received, sorted and processed, at Zemithang, Lumla and Daporijo, with smaller community run facilities at Chullyu and Gobuk.
    8. Sorting deepens to 35 categories there: 12 full time MRF operators and dozens of women from self-help groups perform that second sort.
    9. Sanitary waste is handled rather than dumped: Sanitary napkins and diapers are washed, dried and stored at the facilities, and more than 20 tonnes have been sold to recyclers for Rs 3.53 lakh.
    10. One residue stream found a local use: About two tonnes of multi layered plastics went to a processing plant at Lhou in Jang sub-division and were used to make paver blocks.
    11. The first consignment left on Independence Day 2024: Villagers from Zemithang Circle, settled between 6,900 and 8,000 feet, sent 4.4 tonnes of garbage on a 390 km lorry journey of over 12 hours to scrap dealers in Tezpur in Assam.

    Who pays for rural collection, and who is accountable for it?

    1. Collection is the most expensive step in the chain: Crew wages, vehicle fuel and maintenance, insurance and other indirect costs make it the costliest link, per UNEP.
    2. Indian cities show the same cost structure: Primary collection and transportation account for the bulk of costs, per a CSE report on plastic waste management.
    3. Manpower dominates the rural cost: Nearly 50 per cent of the primary collection cost in rural Dharamshala was attributed to manpower.
    4. The Tawang model removes that cost line: Eliminating sanitation workers and door to door collection took the largest single expense out of the system.
    5. Households pay a monthly fee: Each household pays Rs 50 a month and shops and cafes pay Rs 100.
    6. Authority is vested in a village committee: A gaon bura, or village head, and a treasurer lead committees that draft waste management policies and set the rules, responsibilities and fines.
    7. A regional committee sits above them: Each region has a central committee chaired by a Circle Officer with a Lama, an influential religious leader, as secretary, and the committees meet every quarter.
    8. Financing remains the binding constraint: Money is the biggest problem in running such a system, per the officer who led the Zemithang effort.

    Where does the chain still break?

    1. Distance sets the transport economics: Waste travels farther from rural areas to reach recyclers, which renders the task less attractive for scrap dealers.
    2. One truckload costs Rs 45,000: Sending a truckload from Arunachal Pradesh to Assam costs that much, and fuel and the driver still cost Rs 20,000 a trip after State officials donated a truck.
    3. Boat transfers proved too costly to repeat: Majuli made three transfers across the Brahmaputra and now sells to local scrap dealers as well.
    4. Two streams have no buyer at all: Black polythene and textile scrap have found no takers.
    5. Storage is filling faster than offtake: Many CMCFs are filling up quickly, and rural collection facilities are commonly found full of baled waste with few takers.
    6. Processing capacity sits idle: Majuli’s long defunct plastics management facility is undergoing repairs.
    7. Segregation compliance is not universal: About 30 households in every 100 still hand over mixed waste.

    Challenges to rural solid waste management

    1. Panchayats have no funded sanitation establishment: A rural local body carries the duty without a permanent staffing line or a recurring budget head for waste, so the work depends on scheme money and an outside partner. Eg. Solid and liquid waste management money for gram panchayats arrives through Swachh Bharat Mission Grameen allocations and tied Fifteenth Finance Commission grants rather than through an own-source revenue stream.
      The Fix: Make a collected user fee a mandatory own-source revenue head for the panchayat, and release the matching grant only against fee actually collected.
    2. Legacy rural dumps are not inventoried: Remediation and bio-mining targets are written for urban dumpsites, so village dumps sit outside any list anyone is accountable for clearing. Eg. Dumpsite remediation targets under the second phase of the Swachh Bharat Mission are set for urban local bodies.
      The Fix: Require every gram panchayat development plan to carry a mapped inventory of existing dump points with a dated clearance commitment.
    3. Producer responsibility is verified on paper: A packaging producer discharges its obligation by buying a recycling certificate, and the certificate is easier to obtain than the collection is to perform. Eg. The CPCB has cancelled extended producer responsibility certificates issued by recyclers whose claimed processing capacity could not be verified.
      The Fix: Tie certificate issue to plant level input and output data reported from the processor’s own weighbridge.
    4. Rural sanitation work carries no protection: Workers handle mixed waste, including sanitary and medical items, without the equipment, registration or insurance that municipal employment carries. Eg. Rural collection crews are engaged on scheme funds rather than on a municipal payroll, which leaves them outside standing occupational safety obligations.
      The Fix: Register every rural sanitation worker on a State database and make supply of protective equipment a condition of releasing collection funds.
    5. Reported waste figures have no verification layer: Where a local body does report a number, no independent audit checks it against what a facility actually received. Eg. Swachh Survekshan Grameen scoring rests substantially on self-declared and observation based inputs rather than on weighed tonnage.
      The Fix: Make weighbridge or facility receipt records the reporting unit, and publish district level tonnage every month.

    Conclusion

    Rural India’s waste challenge is fundamentally an operational gap, not an infrastructure gap. Majuli and Tawang show that community-led collection can work, but sustained funding, accountable institutions, worker protection and reliable recycling markets are essential for a truly circular rural waste system.

    Back2Basics: Solid Waste Management Rules, 2016

    1. Legal basis: Notified by the Union Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, replacing the Municipal Solid Wastes (Management and Handling) Rules, 2000.
    2. Coverage beyond municipalities: They extend to census towns, notified industrial townships, and areas under railways, airports, defence establishments, special economic zones and places of pilgrimage.
    3. Source segregation is mandatory: A waste generator must separate waste into wet, dry and domestic hazardous streams and hand it to an authorised collector.
    4. Producers carry a post-consumer duty: Brand owners and manufacturers of non-biodegradable packaging must arrange to collect that packaging back from the market.

    [2019] As per the Solid Waste Management Rules, 2016 in India, which one of the following statements is correct?

    (a) Waste generator has to segregate waste into five categories.

    (b) The Rules are applicable to riotified urban local bodies, notified towns and all industrial townships only.

    (c) The Rules provide for exact and elaborate criteria for the identification of sites for landfills and waste processing facilities.

    (d) It is mandatory on the part of waste generator that the waste generated in one district cannot be moved to another district.

  • Deadly span

    Deadly span

    Why in the News

    Electrocution on India’s expanding power infrastructure is emerging as a threat to vultures capable of overtaking the chemical poisoning that caused their collapse.

    How far did the chemical crash take India’s vultures?

    1. The loss was among the world’s worst recorded: Numbers fell by 99.5 per cent by 2007 from a high of around four crore in the 1980s.
    2. Three species were nearly wiped out: The white-rumped, Indian and slender-billed vultures were the worst affected.
    3. The cause was a veterinary painkiller: Diclofenac administered to cattle destroyed the kidneys of vultures that fed on the carcasses.
    4. The regulatory response came in stages: The government banned diclofenac first, then added bans in 2023 on aceclofenac and ketoprofen among other NSAIDs.
    5. The population has not returned: One official survey reported in 2025 that vultures were nesting at only 50 per cent of their historic nesting sites.

    What did the collapse cost beyond the birds?

    1. Carcasses stayed exposed for longer: The loss of scavengers left livestock carcasses in the open, which supported feral dog populations.
    2. Rabies outbreaks followed: The growth in feral dog numbers led to outbreaks of rabies.
    3. Human mortality rose 4 per cent: A 2024 study in the American Economic Review estimated that increase as a consequence of the vulture decline.
    4. The damages were valued at 69.4 billion dollars a year: The same study put the associated cost to India at that figure.

    Why does power infrastructure kill vultures specifically?

    1. A wingspan can bridge two conductors: A large individual can contact two conductors at once, which is what completes the circuit through the bird.
    2. The birds seek elevated perches: Vultures habitually perch on elevated structures and are drawn to open landscapes, which is what a transmission corridor provides.
    3. Predictable food concentrates them: Vultures congregate where food availability is predictable, and dumping of food waste around electrical installations creates exactly that draw.
    4. Medium-voltage lines are also lethal: An assessment prepared for the State Climate Resilient Power System Development Project recorded an Egyptian vulture and steppe eagles electrocuted on medium-voltage rather than high-voltage lines.

    Why is the evidence on electrocution weaker than the threat?

    1. The deaths are removed before they are recorded: Avian electrocution is likely under-documented in India, since a dead bird can be taken by people or eaten by scavengers.
    2. The comparison with drugs understates the risk: Electrocution has not become as deadly as NSAIDs were, and the population it now acts on is a fraction of the one the drugs acted on.
    3. A local population can be lost to it alone: Research has noted that persistent mortality from electrocution by itself could render a local population extinct.
    4. Waiting for the data repeats the first failure: The fragility of the surviving population and the proliferation of unsafe power infrastructure are together the case for acting before the mortality record matures.

    Which interventions has the evidence actually tested?

    1. Moving the food source worked: Relocating a livestock carcass dump 2.4 km away from high-tension power infrastructure near Dehradun in Uttarakhand may have saved these scavengers from electrocution, per a recent study in the Journal of Threatened Taxa.
    2. Separation is the cheapest measure available: Keeping vulture feeding sites away from power infrastructure is a siting decision rather than a capital works programme.
    3. Insulating conductors removes the contact risk: Covering energised components stops a bird bridging them.
    4. Increasing clearances answers the wingspan: Widening the gap between energised and grounded components has to be sized against vulture wingspans rather than against smaller birds.
    5. Safe perches redirect the birds: Installing perches that carry no current gives raptors an alternative to the energised structure.

    Challenges to vulture conservation in India

    1. Human formulations substitute for the banned veterinary drug: Multi-dose human vials of diclofenac remain on sale and are diverted to cattle, so the ban is defeated at the pharmacy counter. Eg. India capped the human diclofenac vial at 3 ml in 2015 because larger vials were being used on livestock.
      The Fix: Make sale of injectable diclofenac without a veterinary prescription an enforceable offence policed by drug inspectors rather than by forest staff.
    2. New painkillers enter the market faster than they are tested: A molecule is approved for cattle without a vulture safety trial, so each ban is followed by the next drug. Eg. Nimesulide has been shown to be toxic to Gyps vultures and remains in veterinary use.
      The Fix: Require safety testing on Gyps vultures as a condition of veterinary marketing approval for any NSAID, with meloxicam as the reference safe alternative.
    3. Captive breeding cannot outpace adult mortality: Vultures lay a single egg a year and mature slowly, so releases add birds far more slowly than a landscape threat removes them. Eg. The Jatayu Conservation Breeding Centre at Pinjore has released birds only in small annual batches.
      The Fix: Certify the release landscape as safe before any release, with drug residue sampling and line insulation audited as the precondition.
    4. The food base has been engineered away: Rendering and burial of livestock carcasses removes the open food supply that once sustained large scavenger populations. Eg. Vulture restaurants in Maharashtra and Punjab exist because the traditional open carcass dump has disappeared from many districts.
      The Fix: Fund supplementary feeding sites from State animal husbandry budgets and site them by rule away from transmission corridors.
    5. No agency is answerable for bird deaths on power lines: Transmission and distribution utilities carry no reporting duty for wildlife mortality, so the threat has no dataset behind it. Eg. Bird deaths on power lines in the Thar landscape became visible only after Great Indian Bustard litigation forced surveys.
      The Fix: Make wildlife mortality reporting a licence condition for transmission and distribution licensees, with the returns published by the State electricity regulator.
    6. Bird safe design is not written into line standards: Construction standards specify electrical clearances, not clearances sized for large raptors. Eg. Directions on undergrounding power lines in Great Indian Bustard habitat were later narrowed on feasibility and cost grounds.
      The Fix: Write raptor safe pole and cross-arm geometry into the national electricity standards for new lines in identified vulture landscapes.

    Conclusion

    The chemical crash was answerable on paper, because a single molecule could be identified and banned. Electrocution offers no such lever, since the killing agent is ordinary infrastructure doing what it was built to do. The unresolved tension is that conservation authority sits with forest departments while the hazard sits with the power sector, and no rule connects the two. Until that link is made, the threat will keep being measured only after the fact.

    Back2Basics: White-rumped Vulture

    1. Status: Listed as Critically Endangered on the IUCN Red List and protected under Schedule I of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972.
    2. Identification: It carries a white neck ruff and a white rump against black and brown plumage.
    3. Range and nesting: It is found near human settlements across northern and central India, nesting in tall trees and on cliffs.
    4. Ecological role: It is a social scavenger that feeds in flocks on carrion, garbage and slaughterhouse waste, which is how a small population clears waste across a wide landscape.

    [2012] Vultures which used to be very common in Indian countryside some years ago are rarely seen nowadays. This is attributed to:

    (a) the destruction of their nesting sites by new invasive species disease among them

    (b) a drug used by cattle owners for treating their diseased cattle persistent and fatal

    (c) scarcity of food available to them

    (d) a widespread, persistent and fatal disease among them

  • V-Dem’s democracy index rates India at its lowest since 1975

    V-Dem’s democracy index rates India at its lowest since 1975

    Why in the News?

    India is in the news after the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) expressed serious concern over reported large-scale violations by law enforcement agencies and the exclusion of voters, particularly Muslims, during the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls. The issue has gained further attention because the V-Dem Institute has also classified India among countries experiencing gradual autocratisation, reporting a decline in its electoral democracy score.

    About the V-Dem Institute

    1. Host and status: Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) is an independent research institute based at the Department of Political Science, University of Gothenburg, Sweden.
    2. Method: It uses a multidimensional approach to conceptualising and measuring democracy, aggregating ratings supplied by country experts rather than issuing a single composite judgement.
    3. Five principles measured: The dataset is organised around the electoral, liberal, participatory, deliberative and egalitarian principles of democracy.
    4. Flagship output: It publishes an annual Democracy Report, releasing the index in March and naming the countries it assesses as autocratising or democratising.

    About the Electoral Democracy Index

    1. What it measures: It scores how far the ideal of electoral democracy is achieved in a country, on a scale from 0 to 1.
    2. Its conceptual base: It builds on the polyarchy concept, which requires elected officials, free and fair elections, freedom of expression, alternative sources of information, freedom of association and inclusive suffrage.
    3. Regime classes: V-Dem sorts countries into closed autocracy, electoral autocracy, electoral democracy and liberal democracy.
    4. The comparator to know: The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index is a separate exercise, scoring 60 indicators from 0 to 10 across five categories and classifying India as a flawed democracy.

    India in the latest reading

    1. The score is a 50 year low: India’s electoral democracy index score was 0.38 in 2025, below the 0.39 recorded in 1975 under Emergency rule.
    2. The ranking: India stands 106th among 179 countries, against Denmark at the top with a score of 0.9 in 2025.
    3. The classification: V-Dem lists India among countries autocratising slowly, with a systematic dismantling of democratic institutions.
    4. The decline is not new: India’s performance on the index has fallen gradually since 2009.
    5. The parameters at 50 year lows: Judicial accountability and judicial corruption, autonomy of the Election Management Body (EMB), impartial administration by public officials, media freedom and academic freedom are all at their lowest in 50 years.
    6. A parallel United Nations finding: The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, in its first review of India since 2007, recorded grave concern over reports of large-scale violations by law enforcement officials and over the exclusion of large numbers of voters, Muslims in particular, under the Special Intensive Revision of electoral rolls.

    [2016] Which of the following is/are the indicator/ indicators used by IFPRI to compute the Global Hunger Index Report?

    1. Undernourishment

    2. Child stunting

    3. Child mortality

    Select the correct answer using the code given below.

    (a) 1 only

    (b) 2 and 3 only

    (c) 1, 2 and 3

    (d) 1 and 3 only