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Type: Explained

These Newscards correspond to the explained section of various newspapers. They become immensely important for both prelims and mains and special attention needs to be paid to them

  • What two districts can teach us about dealing with rural waste

    What two districts can teach us about dealing with rural waste

    Why in the News

    The Supreme Court has demanded functional waste regulators, exposing weak institutionalisation. While India generates 1.7 lakh tonnes daily, successful community systems in Majuli and Tawang show operational gaps, especially rurally.

    Why does India’s waste system not see the countryside?

    1. Rural waste data are not collected: Waste data for rural areas do not exist, according to the Centre for Science and Environment (CSE), a New Delhi based research and advocacy body.
    2. The duty sits with bodies that do not discharge it: Urban and rural local bodies are tasked with solid waste management and with recording volumes and expenses, and they rarely do the needful.
    3. The gap is global and overwhelmingly rural: Around 2.7 billion people worldwide have no waste collection, and 2 billion of them live in rural areas, per an analysis by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP).
    4. Uncollected waste goes to land, water or fire: Where people cannot manage waste, they dump it on land or in rivers, streams and seas, or they burn it, which is a major concern in India.

    Why has rural waste grown without collection following it?

    1. Rural spending has risen: Data show a rise in per capita spending in India’s rural areas, and more consumption produces more waste.
    2. Packaging reached the remotest markets: Food, beverages and personal care or hygiene products are almost all wrapped in plastics or multi layered packaging, and those goods have penetrated the remotest rural markets.
    3. Waste management did not follow the goods: Collection systems did not extend into those markets alongside the products that created the waste.
    4. Organic waste had a use and mixed waste does not: Organic waste fed livestock or served as manure for centuries, and plastics and other non-biodegradable materials have produced a mixed waste that is harder to decompose.

    What did Majuli change after its facilities went unused?

    1. The sheds were built years before the system was: The Swachh Bharat Mission and the Public Health Engineering Department built Central Material Collection Facilities (CMCFs), the village level sheds where sorted waste is received and stored, in 19 of 20 panchayats between 2017 and 2022, along with mini collection facilities in most of the 160 villages.
    2. Neither the sheds nor the workers were put to use: The tin sheds went unused and the workers were not mobilised until the departments teamed up with the waste management non-profit Sahaas in 2024.
    3. The missing components were operational rather than physical: Funding, staffing and training of sanitation workers, vehicles for transport, operation of the collection facilities and buyers for the sorted material all had to be arranged.
    4. Participation was organised before collection began: Village leaders, homestay and hotel owners, schools and self-help groups (SHGs) ran awareness programmes and handed out bags for storage and segregation.
    5. Collection now runs in 19 of 20 panchayats: Garbage is now collected across them, in a district that faces flooding and erosion every year.
    6. Staffing remains thin against the population: Majuli’s 1.67 lakh people are served by 37 sanitation workers and 19 sorting staff.
    7. The fleet was funded only recently: The district departments purchased 21 e-vehicles and 15 tricycles and approved funds for the collection crew.
    8. The first river crossing was in April 2025: A tonne of waste left Majuli by boat across the Brahmaputra, the first time the island’s waste crossed the river instead of being dumped into it.
    9. The tonnage is now measurable: Majuli has collected 82.4 tonnes of waste since 2024, and it transferred 16.78 tonnes and earned Rs 1.47 lakh between April 2025 and May 2026.

    How does Tawang collect waste without sanitation workers?

    1. Scattered settlements rule out door to door collection: Households in these land-locked mountain villages sit too far apart for a sanitation worker to cover on a route.
    2. The pilot began in one village in 2024: Local officials and village leaders piloted a community led model in Chullyu in Keyi Panyor district through the Himalayan Fringes Project of the Further and Beyond Foundation.
    3. It spread across three districts in two years: A third of Tawang district and parts of Keyi Panyor and Upper Siang districts have adopted the model.
    4. Households store their own waste: Every household segregates biodegradable from non-biodegradable waste and keeps it at home until the collection day.
    5. Collection is a monthly village event: Each village organises a Swachchata Divas, or Cleanliness Day, at a designated point where residents arrive with sacks and sort the waste into 22 categories.
    6. The volumes are recorded: 26 villages in the project have organised more than 150 Swachchata Divas and collected 30 tonnes of waste.
    7. Secondary sorting happens at recovery facilities: The waste moves to material recovery facilities (MRFs), the sites where it is received, sorted and processed, at Zemithang, Lumla and Daporijo, with smaller community run facilities at Chullyu and Gobuk.
    8. Sorting deepens to 35 categories there: 12 full time MRF operators and dozens of women from self-help groups perform that second sort.
    9. Sanitary waste is handled rather than dumped: Sanitary napkins and diapers are washed, dried and stored at the facilities, and more than 20 tonnes have been sold to recyclers for Rs 3.53 lakh.
    10. One residue stream found a local use: About two tonnes of multi layered plastics went to a processing plant at Lhou in Jang sub-division and were used to make paver blocks.
    11. The first consignment left on Independence Day 2024: Villagers from Zemithang Circle, settled between 6,900 and 8,000 feet, sent 4.4 tonnes of garbage on a 390 km lorry journey of over 12 hours to scrap dealers in Tezpur in Assam.

    Who pays for rural collection, and who is accountable for it?

    1. Collection is the most expensive step in the chain: Crew wages, vehicle fuel and maintenance, insurance and other indirect costs make it the costliest link, per UNEP.
    2. Indian cities show the same cost structure: Primary collection and transportation account for the bulk of costs, per a CSE report on plastic waste management.
    3. Manpower dominates the rural cost: Nearly 50 per cent of the primary collection cost in rural Dharamshala was attributed to manpower.
    4. The Tawang model removes that cost line: Eliminating sanitation workers and door to door collection took the largest single expense out of the system.
    5. Households pay a monthly fee: Each household pays Rs 50 a month and shops and cafes pay Rs 100.
    6. Authority is vested in a village committee: A gaon bura, or village head, and a treasurer lead committees that draft waste management policies and set the rules, responsibilities and fines.
    7. A regional committee sits above them: Each region has a central committee chaired by a Circle Officer with a Lama, an influential religious leader, as secretary, and the committees meet every quarter.
    8. Financing remains the binding constraint: Money is the biggest problem in running such a system, per the officer who led the Zemithang effort.

    Where does the chain still break?

    1. Distance sets the transport economics: Waste travels farther from rural areas to reach recyclers, which renders the task less attractive for scrap dealers.
    2. One truckload costs Rs 45,000: Sending a truckload from Arunachal Pradesh to Assam costs that much, and fuel and the driver still cost Rs 20,000 a trip after State officials donated a truck.
    3. Boat transfers proved too costly to repeat: Majuli made three transfers across the Brahmaputra and now sells to local scrap dealers as well.
    4. Two streams have no buyer at all: Black polythene and textile scrap have found no takers.
    5. Storage is filling faster than offtake: Many CMCFs are filling up quickly, and rural collection facilities are commonly found full of baled waste with few takers.
    6. Processing capacity sits idle: Majuli’s long defunct plastics management facility is undergoing repairs.
    7. Segregation compliance is not universal: About 30 households in every 100 still hand over mixed waste.

    Challenges to rural solid waste management

    1. Panchayats have no funded sanitation establishment: A rural local body carries the duty without a permanent staffing line or a recurring budget head for waste, so the work depends on scheme money and an outside partner. Eg. Solid and liquid waste management money for gram panchayats arrives through Swachh Bharat Mission Grameen allocations and tied Fifteenth Finance Commission grants rather than through an own-source revenue stream.
      The Fix: Make a collected user fee a mandatory own-source revenue head for the panchayat, and release the matching grant only against fee actually collected.
    2. Legacy rural dumps are not inventoried: Remediation and bio-mining targets are written for urban dumpsites, so village dumps sit outside any list anyone is accountable for clearing. Eg. Dumpsite remediation targets under the second phase of the Swachh Bharat Mission are set for urban local bodies.
      The Fix: Require every gram panchayat development plan to carry a mapped inventory of existing dump points with a dated clearance commitment.
    3. Producer responsibility is verified on paper: A packaging producer discharges its obligation by buying a recycling certificate, and the certificate is easier to obtain than the collection is to perform. Eg. The CPCB has cancelled extended producer responsibility certificates issued by recyclers whose claimed processing capacity could not be verified.
      The Fix: Tie certificate issue to plant level input and output data reported from the processor’s own weighbridge.
    4. Rural sanitation work carries no protection: Workers handle mixed waste, including sanitary and medical items, without the equipment, registration or insurance that municipal employment carries. Eg. Rural collection crews are engaged on scheme funds rather than on a municipal payroll, which leaves them outside standing occupational safety obligations.
      The Fix: Register every rural sanitation worker on a State database and make supply of protective equipment a condition of releasing collection funds.
    5. Reported waste figures have no verification layer: Where a local body does report a number, no independent audit checks it against what a facility actually received. Eg. Swachh Survekshan Grameen scoring rests substantially on self-declared and observation based inputs rather than on weighed tonnage.
      The Fix: Make weighbridge or facility receipt records the reporting unit, and publish district level tonnage every month.

    Conclusion

    Rural India’s waste challenge is fundamentally an operational gap, not an infrastructure gap. Majuli and Tawang show that community-led collection can work, but sustained funding, accountable institutions, worker protection and reliable recycling markets are essential for a truly circular rural waste system.

    Back2Basics: Solid Waste Management Rules, 2016

    1. Legal basis: Notified by the Union Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, replacing the Municipal Solid Wastes (Management and Handling) Rules, 2000.
    2. Coverage beyond municipalities: They extend to census towns, notified industrial townships, and areas under railways, airports, defence establishments, special economic zones and places of pilgrimage.
    3. Source segregation is mandatory: A waste generator must separate waste into wet, dry and domestic hazardous streams and hand it to an authorised collector.
    4. Producers carry a post-consumer duty: Brand owners and manufacturers of non-biodegradable packaging must arrange to collect that packaging back from the market.

    [2019] As per the Solid Waste Management Rules, 2016 in India, which one of the following statements is correct?

    (a) Waste generator has to segregate waste into five categories.

    (b) The Rules are applicable to riotified urban local bodies, notified towns and all industrial townships only.

    (c) The Rules provide for exact and elaborate criteria for the identification of sites for landfills and waste processing facilities.

    (d) It is mandatory on the part of waste generator that the waste generated in one district cannot be moved to another district.

  • Deadly span

    Deadly span

    Why in the News

    Electrocution on India’s expanding power infrastructure is emerging as a threat to vultures capable of overtaking the chemical poisoning that caused their collapse.

    How far did the chemical crash take India’s vultures?

    1. The loss was among the world’s worst recorded: Numbers fell by 99.5 per cent by 2007 from a high of around four crore in the 1980s.
    2. Three species were nearly wiped out: The white-rumped, Indian and slender-billed vultures were the worst affected.
    3. The cause was a veterinary painkiller: Diclofenac administered to cattle destroyed the kidneys of vultures that fed on the carcasses.
    4. The regulatory response came in stages: The government banned diclofenac first, then added bans in 2023 on aceclofenac and ketoprofen among other NSAIDs.
    5. The population has not returned: One official survey reported in 2025 that vultures were nesting at only 50 per cent of their historic nesting sites.

    What did the collapse cost beyond the birds?

    1. Carcasses stayed exposed for longer: The loss of scavengers left livestock carcasses in the open, which supported feral dog populations.
    2. Rabies outbreaks followed: The growth in feral dog numbers led to outbreaks of rabies.
    3. Human mortality rose 4 per cent: A 2024 study in the American Economic Review estimated that increase as a consequence of the vulture decline.
    4. The damages were valued at 69.4 billion dollars a year: The same study put the associated cost to India at that figure.

    Why does power infrastructure kill vultures specifically?

    1. A wingspan can bridge two conductors: A large individual can contact two conductors at once, which is what completes the circuit through the bird.
    2. The birds seek elevated perches: Vultures habitually perch on elevated structures and are drawn to open landscapes, which is what a transmission corridor provides.
    3. Predictable food concentrates them: Vultures congregate where food availability is predictable, and dumping of food waste around electrical installations creates exactly that draw.
    4. Medium-voltage lines are also lethal: An assessment prepared for the State Climate Resilient Power System Development Project recorded an Egyptian vulture and steppe eagles electrocuted on medium-voltage rather than high-voltage lines.

    Why is the evidence on electrocution weaker than the threat?

    1. The deaths are removed before they are recorded: Avian electrocution is likely under-documented in India, since a dead bird can be taken by people or eaten by scavengers.
    2. The comparison with drugs understates the risk: Electrocution has not become as deadly as NSAIDs were, and the population it now acts on is a fraction of the one the drugs acted on.
    3. A local population can be lost to it alone: Research has noted that persistent mortality from electrocution by itself could render a local population extinct.
    4. Waiting for the data repeats the first failure: The fragility of the surviving population and the proliferation of unsafe power infrastructure are together the case for acting before the mortality record matures.

    Which interventions has the evidence actually tested?

    1. Moving the food source worked: Relocating a livestock carcass dump 2.4 km away from high-tension power infrastructure near Dehradun in Uttarakhand may have saved these scavengers from electrocution, per a recent study in the Journal of Threatened Taxa.
    2. Separation is the cheapest measure available: Keeping vulture feeding sites away from power infrastructure is a siting decision rather than a capital works programme.
    3. Insulating conductors removes the contact risk: Covering energised components stops a bird bridging them.
    4. Increasing clearances answers the wingspan: Widening the gap between energised and grounded components has to be sized against vulture wingspans rather than against smaller birds.
    5. Safe perches redirect the birds: Installing perches that carry no current gives raptors an alternative to the energised structure.

    Challenges to vulture conservation in India

    1. Human formulations substitute for the banned veterinary drug: Multi-dose human vials of diclofenac remain on sale and are diverted to cattle, so the ban is defeated at the pharmacy counter. Eg. India capped the human diclofenac vial at 3 ml in 2015 because larger vials were being used on livestock.
      The Fix: Make sale of injectable diclofenac without a veterinary prescription an enforceable offence policed by drug inspectors rather than by forest staff.
    2. New painkillers enter the market faster than they are tested: A molecule is approved for cattle without a vulture safety trial, so each ban is followed by the next drug. Eg. Nimesulide has been shown to be toxic to Gyps vultures and remains in veterinary use.
      The Fix: Require safety testing on Gyps vultures as a condition of veterinary marketing approval for any NSAID, with meloxicam as the reference safe alternative.
    3. Captive breeding cannot outpace adult mortality: Vultures lay a single egg a year and mature slowly, so releases add birds far more slowly than a landscape threat removes them. Eg. The Jatayu Conservation Breeding Centre at Pinjore has released birds only in small annual batches.
      The Fix: Certify the release landscape as safe before any release, with drug residue sampling and line insulation audited as the precondition.
    4. The food base has been engineered away: Rendering and burial of livestock carcasses removes the open food supply that once sustained large scavenger populations. Eg. Vulture restaurants in Maharashtra and Punjab exist because the traditional open carcass dump has disappeared from many districts.
      The Fix: Fund supplementary feeding sites from State animal husbandry budgets and site them by rule away from transmission corridors.
    5. No agency is answerable for bird deaths on power lines: Transmission and distribution utilities carry no reporting duty for wildlife mortality, so the threat has no dataset behind it. Eg. Bird deaths on power lines in the Thar landscape became visible only after Great Indian Bustard litigation forced surveys.
      The Fix: Make wildlife mortality reporting a licence condition for transmission and distribution licensees, with the returns published by the State electricity regulator.
    6. Bird safe design is not written into line standards: Construction standards specify electrical clearances, not clearances sized for large raptors. Eg. Directions on undergrounding power lines in Great Indian Bustard habitat were later narrowed on feasibility and cost grounds.
      The Fix: Write raptor safe pole and cross-arm geometry into the national electricity standards for new lines in identified vulture landscapes.

    Conclusion

    The chemical crash was answerable on paper, because a single molecule could be identified and banned. Electrocution offers no such lever, since the killing agent is ordinary infrastructure doing what it was built to do. The unresolved tension is that conservation authority sits with forest departments while the hazard sits with the power sector, and no rule connects the two. Until that link is made, the threat will keep being measured only after the fact.

    Back2Basics: White-rumped Vulture

    1. Status: Listed as Critically Endangered on the IUCN Red List and protected under Schedule I of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972.
    2. Identification: It carries a white neck ruff and a white rump against black and brown plumage.
    3. Range and nesting: It is found near human settlements across northern and central India, nesting in tall trees and on cliffs.
    4. Ecological role: It is a social scavenger that feeds in flocks on carrion, garbage and slaughterhouse waste, which is how a small population clears waste across a wide landscape.

    [2012] Vultures which used to be very common in Indian countryside some years ago are rarely seen nowadays. This is attributed to:

    (a) the destruction of their nesting sites by new invasive species disease among them

    (b) a drug used by cattle owners for treating their diseased cattle persistent and fatal

    (c) scarcity of food available to them

    (d) a widespread, persistent and fatal disease among them

  • UN panel presents legal case for broad slavery reparations

    Why in the News

    The United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) has issued a fresh interpretation of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 1965.

    What is a general recommendation, and what weight does it carry?

    1. It is a treaty body’s authoritative reading of the text: A general recommendation is an interpretation of a convention’s provisions issued by the expert committee that monitors it, addressed to every State party rather than to one government.
    2. It creates no new obligation: The instrument does not amend the convention. It states what the committee holds the existing text already requires.
    3. It is unenforceable but not without effect: The findings carry authoritative weight and can inform judicial review, serve courts as an interpretative tool, and be relied on in litigation.

    What does the interpretation require of States parties?

    1. The measures must be comprehensive: States parties are required to implement reparatory measures for people of African descent covering all aspects of remedies.
    2. Three classes of measure are named: Reparatory justice is stated to combine a wide range of measures conceived as monetary, non monetary and structural.
    3. Indirect involvement is included: The duty attaches to States that profited from or facilitated the trade, not only to those that transported and sold people.
    4. Redress is framed as an obligation: The Committee treats reparation as flowing from the convention itself rather than as a policy choice available to a government.

    What is the historical record the finding rests on?

    1. At least 12.5 million Africans were taken and sold: The Committee places that transport and sale between the fifteenth and nineteenth centuries.
    2. It is characterised as the largest forced displacement in history: That characterisation is the basis on which the Committee treats the harm as continuing rather than closed.
    3. The United Nations has already classed slavery a crime against humanity: The Durban Declaration and Programme of Action, adopted at the World Conference against Racism in 2001, recorded slavery and the slave trade as crimes against humanity.
    4. A standing forum already exists: The General Assembly established the Permanent Forum on People of African Descent in 2021 as an advisory body on the rights of that population.
    5. The observance period has been extended: The International Decade for People of African Descent ran from 2015 to 2024, and a second decade was proclaimed for 2025 to 2034.

    Challenges to reparations for the transatlantic slave trade

    1. No forum can compel a State to pay: The Committee reviews reports and issues findings, and it holds no power to order a remedy against a State party. Eg. An inter-State claim under the convention reaches the International Court of Justice only where both States accept that jurisdiction, and several former slave trading States have entered reservations to the clause.
      The Fix: Route the claim through a negotiated inter-governmental commission with a fixed mandate and a reporting cycle, so the obligation is settled by agreement rather than left to a forum neither side can reach.
    2. Successor States dispute liability for pre-independence conduct: A modern government argues it is not the legal person that carried on a trade abolished two centuries ago. Eg. The United Kingdom has expressed regret for the slave trade and has declined to accept legal liability for reparations.
      The Fix: Separate acknowledgement from transfer by fixing a development finance commitment tied to identified harms, which avoids the succession question without abandoning the remedy.
    3. Quantifying the harm has no accepted method: Monetary, non monetary and structural measures rest on different bases, and no agreed formula converts historical injury into a present figure. Eg. The Caribbean Community’s Ten Point Plan for Reparatory Justice, adopted in 2013, sets out categories of remedy without attaching a sum to any of them.
      The Fix: Commission a standing statistical exercise on health, education and land outcomes for the affected population, so remedies are sized against measurable present day gaps.
    4. Domestic litigation fails on procedure before it reaches merit: Claims are dismissed on limitation, standing and sovereign immunity rather than decided on the underlying wrong. Eg. Reparations suits filed in United States courts against corporations linked to slavery were dismissed on standing and limitation grounds.
      The Fix: Enact a statutory limitation waiver for historic gross rights violations, which is what allowed residential school and forced sterilisation claims to be heard in other jurisdictions.
    5. A non binding finding can harden a State’s position: A government that rejects the interpretation gains a reason to disengage from the reporting process the Committee depends on. Eg. Treaty body reporting is already years in arrears across the system, with overdue State reports running into the hundreds.
      The Fix: Pair the interpretation with a technical assistance track, so a State that accepts the framing has a route to comply that does not begin with a payment.

    Conclusion

    The Committee has moved reparations from a political demand to a stated treaty obligation. What it cannot supply is the machinery that would make the obligation operate. The unresolved tension is that the same text a claimant will now cite in court is one a government can decline to act on without breaching anything enforceable. The point to watch is whether a national court anywhere treats the interpretation as a live legal standard rather than as commentary.

    Back2Basics: Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination

    1. Parent instrument: Created by the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 1965, which entered into force in 1969.
    2. Composition: Eighteen independent experts elected by States parties, serving in their personal capacity rather than as government representatives.
    3. Core function: It examines periodic reports from States parties on the measures taken to give effect to the convention.
    4. Additional procedures: It operates an early warning and urgent action procedure, and it can consider individual complaints against a State that has made a declaration under Article 14.

    [2017, GS2, 10 marks] What are the main functions of the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)? Explain different functional commissions attached to it.”

  • In India, a hard limit for X’s transparency pledge

    In India, a hard limit for X’s transparency pledge

    Why in the News

    X has pledged to publicly disclose government censorship and content-removal requests, while MeitY has warned that such disclosures may violate India’s Section 69A blocking framework.

    What is the Section 69A blocking framework?

    1. Statutory basis: Section 69A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 empowers the Union government to direct an intermediary to block public access to online content on specified grounds.
    2. The operative rules: The Information Technology (Blocking) Rules, 2009 are the framework under which a blocking direction is issued and acted on.
    3. Rule 16 mandates secrecy: It requires strict confidentiality over all blocking requests and the actions taken on them.
    4. Non-compliance is a criminal offence: An intermediary that fails to comply attracts imprisonment up to seven years.

    What exactly does the pledge collide with?

    1. The pledge names three disclosures: X proposes to publish that an order exists, which body issued it, and on what basis it was issued.
    2. Rule 16 forbids each of the three: The confidentiality mandate covers the existence of a request, its author and its stated grounds alike.
    3. Secrecy is what enables an unreasoned block: Confidentiality lets the executive block content without a reasoned public order and without notifying the person whose content is blocked.
    4. The liability lands on individuals: X’s Indian entity carries resident compliance and grievance officers, so criminal consequences attach to identifiable people inside the country.

    Does the announced mechanism do what was claimed?

    1. The release paired two separate things: X open-sourced its “Phoenix” recommendation code alongside a pilot feature called “Under the Hood”.
    2. Under the Hood shows platform labels, not state orders: It gives selected users visibility labels on their own accounts, such as spam flags and reach restrictions.
    3. A blocking order runs on a separate track: A Section 69A order operates outside that feature entirely.
    4. The user still sees only the old notice: The withheld content carries a “withheld in India” label naming neither the order nor the agency.

    Why does Section 69A no longer describe the whole takedown picture?

    1. Order volumes have roughly quadrupled: Section 69A orders rose from about 6,000 a year through 2023 to about 24,300 in 2025.
    2. A second route now carries a growing share: Since a 2023 MeitY memorandum, ministries, States and police issue orders under Section 79(3)(b) of the same Act.
    3. The Sahyog portal is the channel: Those orders are routed through the Ministry of Home Affairs portal, which X calls a censorship portal.
    4. An unreasoned order leaves nothing to publish: Where an order arrives without a stated basis, X has little to surface even if it intended to.

    What does X’s own compliance record show about the pledge?

    1. The stated identity is free speech absolutism: X brands itself in those terms.
    2. Actual compliance runs between 83 and 99 per cent: That is the share of demands the platform acts on.
    3. One order covered 2,355 accounts: In July 2025 X said the government ordered that many accounts blocked, including Reuters, within an hour.
    4. Objection was followed by compliance: X objected loudly and then complied, restoring the Reuters account only after a public outcry.

    Where does the litigation now stand?

    1. The Karnataka High Court dismissed the challenge: In September 2025 it rejected X’s petition against the Sahyog portal and called the portal “an instrument of public good”.
    2. Parallel proceedings ran in Bombay: X’s appeal and its Bombay petitions were consolidated.
    3. The Supreme Court stayed all four in July 2026: No court has ruled on the merits of the disclosure question.

    Challenges to the Section 69A blocking framework

    1. Blocking orders are never published: The framework produces no public record of what was blocked or why, so its use cannot be reviewed by anyone outside the executive. Eg. Directions issued during the farmers’ protest in 2021 covering over a thousand accounts were never published in any form.
      The Fix: Publish a redacted version of every blocking direction carrying the ground invoked, withholding only operational detail.
    2. The person whose content is blocked is rarely heard: The 2009 Rules provide for notice to the originator where identifiable, and in practice the intermediary alone appears before the committee. Eg. In Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015) the Supreme Court upheld Section 69A partly on the strength of that hearing, which originators seldom receive.
      The Fix: Make service of notice on an identifiable account holder a condition of validity of a blocking direction.
    3. Emergency powers bypass the review committee: An interim block can be ordered by the Secretary, Information Technology, before the committee that is meant to examine it has met. Eg. The 2020 ban on 59 Chinese applications was issued as an interim emergency measure under this framework.
      The Fix: Cap an emergency block at 48 hours unless the committee ratifies it within that period.
    4. Section 79(3)(b) carries none of the 69A safeguards: Safe harbour is lost on a government notification alone, with no committee, no periodic review and no defined issuing authority. Eg. Thousands of police units and State departments can issue takedown notices through a single portal.
      The Fix: Extend the 2009 Rules’ committee examination and periodic review to every order issued under Section 79(3)(b).
    5. Enforcement is aimed at individuals rather than the company: Criminal liability on a resident grievance officer converts a corporate regulatory dispute into personal jeopardy for an employee. Eg. The resident officer requirements of the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021 were challenged on exactly this ground.
      The Fix: Confine non-compliance penalties to corporate monetary fines, and reserve imprisonment for wilful obstruction established in court.

    Conclusion

    A platform cannot publish what a statute makes an offence to publish, whatever it announces. The pledge and the confidentiality mandate are not two competing policies. They are a company’s stated practice set against a criminal provision, and only a court can move one of them. What remains unresolved is whether transparency about a restriction on speech is itself part of the speech that is being restricted, since no Indian judgment has answered that question. The marker to watch is the disposal of the consolidated challenge now before the Supreme Court.

    Laws and Rules Governing Online Content Regulation in India

    1. Information Technology Act, 2000: The parent statute governing electronic records, cyber offences and the obligations of intermediaries.
    2. Section 69A grounds: Blocking is permitted on grounds of sovereignty and integrity of India, defence, security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, and preventing incitement to a cognisable offence relating to these.
    3. Section 79 safe harbour: An intermediary is not liable for third party content it hosts, provided it observes due diligence, and it loses that protection where it fails to act on a government notification.
    4. Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021: Impose due diligence on intermediaries, require significant platforms to appoint a resident grievance officer, and fix timelines to acknowledge and resolve complaints. Amended in 2023.
    5. Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023: Governs the processing of digital personal data and establishes the Data Protection Board of India to adjudicate breaches.
    6. Telecommunications Act, 2023: Provides for interception and for suspension of telecommunication services on grounds of public emergency and public safety.
    7. Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023: Criminalises circulation of false information likely to cause public disorder and speech promoting enmity between groups.
    8. Cable Television Networks (Regulation) Act, 1995: Regulates television content through a Programme Code barring material that threatens communal harmony or national security.

    [2024, GS3, 10 marks] Describe the context and salient features of the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023.

  • Political demography, the future of democracy

    Why in the News

    Census 2027 operations are under way in India, and delimitation of Lok Sabha constituencies is to follow the first Census after 2026. Political and religious leaders across parties and across countries are separately urging their own communities to have more children.

    Who is making the pronatalist call, and what are they asking for?

    1. A technology entrepreneur frames it as civilisational: Elon Musk describes falling birth rates as a major threat to civilisation, particularly western civilisation.
    2. The Andhra Pradesh appeal is addressed to Telugu families: The president of the Telugu Desam Party, who is also Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh, has urged Telugu families to have more children.
    3. The Tamil appeal was made rhetorically: The president of the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam and former Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu invoked the idea of having “16 children” for Tamils.
    4. The Sangh call names a number: The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) chief has explicitly called for Indian, and specifically Hindu, families to have three children.
    5. A religious institution makes the same ask: The Catholic Church asks its members to have bigger families.
    6. Tamil Nadu has converted rhetoric into an entitlement: The State government has extended one year maternity leave to women government employees who have a third child.
    7. A demographic remark drew censure from within: A Trinamool Congress Minister in West Bengal remarked in 2024 that Muslims could soon become a majority in the State, and the party distanced itself from the comment and condemned it.

    Why is political demography a thin field of study?

    1. The field treats population change as a political variable: Political demography studies how births, deaths, ageing and migration affect government policies, political power and international security.
    2. Two opposite pressures suppress the scholarship: Conspiracy theorists seeking political capital and demographic sceptics who read any discussion as nativism both crowd out serious work.
    3. It is marginal within both parent disciplines: The subject sits at the edge of political science and of demography rather than at the centre of either.
    4. Federal structure raises the stakes: In countries such as the United States and India, federalism interacts with demography and the economy at the same time.

    What does India’s fertility data actually show?

    1. The total fertility rate has fallen to 2.0: India is below replacement level at 2.0 children per woman according to the National Family Health Survey (NFHS)-5.
    2. Every major religious community has seen decline: Fertility fell across all of them, and the gap between communities is narrowing.
    3. Muslim fertility nearly halved in three decades: Pew Research using NFHS data found it fell from 4.4 children per woman in 1992 to 2.4 in 2019-21.
    4. The pace of decline is uneven: Regions and communities moved through the transition at different speeds even as the endpoint converged.

    Why is ageing, not fertility, the variable that separates States?

    1. Kerala is the oldest State: Its median age is estimated at 37 years in 2026 and projected to reach 47 years by 2051.
    2. Uttar Pradesh is among the youngest: Its median age is approximately 26.9 years.
    3. The national figure sits between the two: India’s projected median age is about 29.2 years in 2026.
    4. The gap will not close within a decade: Uttar Pradesh is projected to reach a median age of only 31.7 years even by 2036.
    5. Early success brings early ageing: Southern States achieved fertility decline earlier and face the possibility of ageing faster than States with younger populations.

    What does the international record show about reversing fertility decline?

    1. No country has reversed a sustained decline: Japan, South Korea, China and Italy introduced financial incentives, childcare support and parental leave, and none restored fertility to the levels seen in earlier decades.
    2. South Korea shows the limit of policy generosity: It continues to record extraordinarily low fertility despite extensive family policies.
    3. Italy repeats the result in Europe: Births have continued to decline there despite financial incentives and family support measures.
    4. Money is not the binding constraint: Fertility is tied to housing, employment, education, gender relations, the cost of raising children and people’s expectations about the future.

    How does the movement of people complicate representation?

    1. Internal migration is on a very large scale: The 2011 Census recorded about 45 crore internal migrants in India.
    2. Emigration is steady at the top end: Around two lakh Indians have given up Indian citizenship on average each year in recent years.
    3. The poor move for opportunity: Movement runs from places with fewer opportunities to places with greater opportunities, and the rich move for their own reasons.
    4. Vote value is not applied blindly: The principle of one person, one vote, one value operates in consonance with group rights of representation, so social federalism and political federalism are both part of India’s democratic design.

    What do demographic differences do to planning and politics?

    1. Larger groups will claim greater power: Groups whose numbers rise will press for a bigger share of political authority.
    2. Shrinking groups will feel insecure: A group losing share experiences that change as a threat to its standing.
    3. Care of the old becomes a fiscal claim: As the number of older and retired people grows relative to the working age population, their care requires a higher commitment of national resources.
    4. Movement of people and resources creates friction between States: Both flow from regions where there is more to regions where there is less.
    5. The disputes surface as fiscal and electoral questions: Regional demographic differences generate disputes over taxation, fiscal transfers, development and political representation.

    Why is the problem not that groups exist?

    1. Recognition of group identity is integral to democracy: Democratic practice already accommodates group identity rather than treating it as alien to itself.
    2. The political question is not who has more people: It is who has invested in development, who has fewer young people entering the workforce, who needs resources, and how representation should respond to those differences.
    3. The risk is permanence, not difference: Demographic difference becomes a democratic problem only when institutions convert it into permanent political antagonism.

    Challenges to pronatalism as a response to fertility decline

    1. Incentives do not reach the decision they target: Cash transfers and leave entitlements address the cost of a birth rather than the conditions that make raising a child feasible. Eg. Hungary exempted mothers of four children from personal income tax for life, and its fertility rate has stayed below replacement level.
      The Fix: Move spending from birth linked bonuses to childcare places, housing supply and secure employment, which are what the decision actually turns on.
    2. Pronatalist rhetoric attaches fertility to group identity: A call addressed to one’s own community converts a household decision into a demographic contest between communities. Eg. Replacement theory has moved from fringe forums into mainstream electoral campaigning in Europe and the United States.
      The Fix: Publish community wise fertility trends from official surveys at fixed intervals, so contested claims are settled against data rather than assertion.
    3. A higher birth rate cannot fix an ageing ratio in time: A child born today enters the workforce two decades later, and the care burden of an ageing population is immediate. Eg. Japan’s working age population began shrinking in the 1990s, and three decades of family policy have not altered its dependency trajectory.
      The Fix: Build long term care financing and raise participation by women and older workers, which change the ratio within the same decade.
    4. The cost of pronatalism falls on women: Higher birth targets translate into unpaid care time that reduces women’s participation in paid work. Eg. Domestic duties are recorded as the main reason women in India remain outside the labour force.
      The Fix: Tie any natalist entitlement to matched investment in creches, safe transport and paid paternity leave, so the time cost is shared.
    5. Population based seat allocation penalises the State that succeeded: A State that reduced fertility earlier ends with a smaller share of seats under any strictly population based formula. Eg. Tamil Nadu’s share of Lok Sabha seats would fall relative to its 1971 based share if seats were reallocated purely on current population.
      The Fix: Weight seat allocation with development and demographic performance indicators alongside population, rather than on population alone.

    Conclusion

    Demographic change in India is real, uneven and slow to reverse, and no political appeal has altered that pattern anywhere it has been tried. The democratic problem it creates is not that groups exist. It is how seats and money are divided between them at the moment the next redistribution falls due. What must change is that the formula be agreed before the population count is in hand, since every State’s position hardens the day its own number becomes public.

    Current Status of Delimitation in India

    1. Seat allocation is frozen on the 1971 Census: The 42nd Amendment, 1976 froze the allocation of Lok Sabha seats among States on 1971 population figures until 2000.
    2. The freeze was extended to the first Census after 2026: The 84th Amendment, 2001 carried it forward, which is why the next Census is the trigger for the exercise.
    3. Four Delimitation Commissions have been constituted: They were set up in 1952, 1963, 1973 and 2002.
    4. The 2002 exercise changed boundaries, not State shares: Constituency boundaries within States were readjusted while each State’s total number of seats stayed at its 1971 based level.

    Constitutional Framework Governing Delimitation

    1. Article 81: Fixes the composition of the Lok Sabha and the principle that seats are allotted to States in proportion to population.
    2. Article 82: Requires Parliament to enact a Delimitation Act after every Census for readjustment of Lok Sabha seats.
    3. Article 170: Provides for readjustment of seats in State Legislative Assemblies after every Census.
    4. Article 327: Empowers Parliament to make provisions on all matters relating to elections, including delimitation.
    5. Article 329: Bars courts from interfering in electoral matters, including a delimitation order, except through an election petition.

    Major debates surrounding delimitation

    1. The value of a vote is unequal across States: A member from a populous State represents several times the electorate of a member from a small one, and correcting that is the case for revision.
    2. Federal balance sits against numerical parity: A revision keyed to current population moves weight towards States with slower fertility decline, which raises the question of what weight the Council of States should carry to offset it.
    3. The size of the House is contested: A substantially larger Lok Sabha raises questions about the quality of deliberation and the recurring cost of the institution.
    4. The women’s quota is linked to the exercise: The Constitution (One Hundred and Sixth Amendment) Act, 2023 makes the 33 per cent reservation for women in the Lok Sabha and State Assemblies operative only after the next Census and delimitation.
    5. Boundary drawing is itself disputed: Redrawing constituencies invites gerrymandering allegations, and in the Northeast it runs into ethnic tension over tribal and non-tribal representation.

    [2024] How many Delimitation Commissions have been constituted by the Government of India till December 2023?

    (a) One

    (b) Two

    (c) Three

    (d) Four

  • Subhash Chandra case: why are creditors set to recover only ₹6.5 cr. against ₹22,006 cr. claims?

    Why in the News

    The NCLT approved Subhash Chandra’s personal insolvency repayment plan, allowing creditors with ₹22,006.57 crore in admitted claims to recover just ₹6.25 crore, a 99.97% haircut.

    Core issue: The case highlights how personal insolvency under the IBC, 2016 works when a guarantor’s admitted liability is much larger than the assets available in their personal estate. Dissenting creditors, including HDFC Bank, are considering an appeal.

    How does personal guarantor insolvency work under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016?

    1. A personal guarantee is a promise to pay another’s debt: An individual undertakes to repay a borrower’s debt if the borrower defaults.
    2. The firm and the guarantor are separate legal persons: Proceedings against a company and against its personal guarantor are separate proceedings even when they arise from the same borrowing.
    3. The guarantor proposes, the creditors vote: In personal insolvency the first step is for the borrower to propose a repayment plan, which the creditors then vote on.
    4. Approval triggers a statutory discharge: Once the creditors and the NCLT approve the plan, Section 119 of the Code passes a discharge order giving the guarantor a fresh start.

    Why do the corporate and personal proceedings run in parallel?

    1. Section 60 sends the guarantor to the same tribunal: The IBC provides for insolvency of a personal guarantor of a corporate debtor to be dealt with by the NCLT where proceedings against the corporate debtor are pending.
    2. A guarantor’s liability is coextensive and independent: Contract law treats that liability as running alongside the principal borrower’s rather than only after it.
    3. A corporate process seeks a buyer, a personal process seeks a plan: Corporate insolvency resolves a firm’s debt by taking over its management and finding a buyer or revival plan, and failing that leads to liquidation.
    4. The personal order settles nothing for the firms: The founder’s personal insolvency does not extinguish the liabilities of the Essel linked firms that borrowed the money.

    Why does the 99.97 per cent haircut overstate what was lost?

    1. The comparison is against admitted claims, not realisable assets: The haircut measures the gap between claims admitted in the proceedings and the amount proposed for distribution.
    2. The disclosed estate was Rs 31.79 crore: The resolution professional assessed the guarantor’s disclosed personal assets at that figure.
    3. The tribunal applied a better off test: The NCLT considered whether creditors would recover more under the repayment plan than if the guarantor were pushed into bankruptcy.
    4. The guarantor disputes the claim base: His office has stated that he borrowed no money, and that the claim against him by the objectors to the plan is Rs 3,992 crore.

    How did the plan clear the creditors despite objections?

    1. The plan carried 80.814 per cent of voting share: The statutory threshold is more than three-fourths, so the requirement was met.
    2. No individual creditor holds a veto: A plan sanctioned by the tribunal binds every creditor covered by it, including those who voted against it.
    3. Five entities were alleged to be associates: Dissenting creditors argued those entities were connected to the founder and should not have been permitted to vote. The NCLT did not accept the objection.
    4. The Bench itself was divided: The original NCLT Bench differed over the plan, and a third judicial member decided the matter.

    What did the tribunal do with the net worth discrepancy?

    1. Earlier certificates showed a far larger figure: A 2017 net worth certificate furnished to RBL Bank put his net worth at about Rs 45,888 crore, and a 2018 certificate at about Rs 40,562 crore.
    2. Creditors sought a forensic audit: They asked for an examination of the gap between those certificates and the assets disclosed in the present proceedings.
    3. Suspicion was held not to be proof: The NCLT held that the creditors had not shown with evidence that specific assets were transferred, concealed or diverted to defraud them.
    4. A forensic audit is not a precondition: The tribunal held that such an audit is not mandatory before a repayment plan can be approved.

    What grounds remain if the creditors appeal?

    1. The appeal lies to the appellate tribunal: Creditors can challenge the order before the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT).
    2. The challenge must be legal or procedural: Available grounds include ineligible creditors being allowed to vote, the statutory majority being wrongly calculated, or the law being wrongly applied.
    3. A low recovery is not itself a ground: A creditor cannot overturn a plan merely because it considers the amount recovered too small.
    4. The associate votes are the strongest ground: If the appellate tribunal finds those votes were wrongly counted and the required majority was consequently not reached, it can interfere with the approval.
    5. The corporate borrowers stay exposed: Creditors can continue to pursue the principal borrowers through separate legal or insolvency proceedings.

    Is this outcome exceptional or the norm?

    1. 5,186 cases have produced 64 repayment plans: Since the personal guarantor provisions came into force, creditors have filed about that many cases and only 64 ended in a repayment plan.
    2. Recovery across those plans is about 1 per cent: Creditors recovered roughly that share of what they were owed in the cases that did reach a plan.
    3. The case is therefore representative: A near total haircut is the ordinary result of this regime rather than an outlier produced by one guarantor’s circumstances.

    Challenges to the personal guarantor insolvency regime

    1. Admitted claims bear no relation to the estate: A guarantor is admitted for the whole defaulted corporate debt, and the recovery pool is one individual’s property, so the ratio is guaranteed to look catastrophic. Eg. Guarantees securing multi-thousand crore project loans are routinely taken from promoters whose personal balance sheets are a fraction of that size.
      The Fix: Require lenders to record and periodically revalue the guarantor’s net worth against the guaranteed exposure, so the guarantee is priced as security rather than counted at face value.
    2. Voting power can sit with connected parties: The Code sets a voting threshold without a tested standard for excluding creditors related to the guarantor, so a majority can be assembled from within the group. Eg. Related party voting was the reason corporate insolvency law had to bar connected persons from the committee of creditors through Section 29A.
      The Fix: Extend a Section 29A style disqualification expressly to voting in personal guarantor repayment plans, with the burden of disclosure on the guarantor.
    3. Asset disclosure is self reported: The estate rests on what the individual declares to the resolution professional, who has limited power to trace assets held through family members or offshore structures. Eg. Benami holdings and trust structures sit outside the disclosure a resolution professional can compel.
      The Fix: Give the resolution professional statutory access to income tax, benami property and foreign asset reporting records for the guarantor and immediate family.
    4. The process is slow relative to the value at stake: A guarantor’s estate does not appreciate during the proceedings, and delay erodes the small recovery that exists. Eg. Corporate insolvency resolution has routinely overrun the 330 day outer limit the Code prescribes.
      The Fix: Set a hard outer timeline for personal guarantor cases with automatic escalation to the appellate tribunal on breach.
    5. Discharge closes the file without closing the debt: A discharge order releases the guarantor while the borrowing companies remain in default, so lenders keep the exposure and lose the security. Eg. Group structures allow the operating company, the borrower and the guarantor to fail in three separate forums on different timelines.
      The Fix: Require the corporate and personal proceedings arising from the same borrowing to be heard by a single Bench, so the two outcomes are decided against one record.

    Conclusion

    The regime was built to do two things at once. It gives an honest guarantor a fresh start, and it gives a lender a second claim on a defaulted loan. It cannot do both when the claim admitted is the whole debt and the estate is one person’s property. The marker to watch is whether the appellate tribunal treats disqualification of connected voters as a live standard, since that is the only part of this process a dissenting creditor can still reach.

    Back2Basics: Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India

    1. Establishment: Set up in 2016 as the regulator created by the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.
    2. Regulated entities: It regulates insolvency professionals, insolvency professional agencies and information utilities.
    3. Powers: It carries legislative, executive and quasi-judicial functions, framing regulations under the Code and enforcing them.
    4. Data role: It publishes case level outcomes of the insolvency process through periodic newsletters.

    [2017] Which of the following statements best describes the- term ‘Scheme for Sustainable Structuring of Stressed Assets (S4A)’, recently seen in the news?

    (a) It is a procedure for considering ecological costs of developmental schemes formulated by the Government.

    (b) It is a scheme of RBI for reworking the financial structure of big corporate entities facing genuine difficulties.

    (c) It is a disinvestment plan of the Government regarding Central Public Sector Undertakings.

    (d) It is an important provision in ‘The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code’ recently implemented by the Government.

  • Reasons why GDP growth overshot expectations, and what lies ahead

    Why in the News

    India’s real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew 7.8 per cent in April to June, above the 7 per cent estimated by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI).

    Which sectors produced the 7.8 per cent print?

    1. Manufacturing accelerated to 9.2 per cent: The sector grew from 8.3 per cent a year earlier.
    2. Services grew at 10 per cent: The sector expanded from 8 per cent in the same quarter last year.
    3. Agriculture slowed to 3.6 per cent: Growth fell from 4.4 per cent a year earlier.
    4. The farm number still beat its own forecast: The Chief Economic Adviser assessed that agriculture fared better than expected in June, when the monsoon shortfall was high.

    What is holding up demand?

    1. Household spending grew 7.1 per cent: Private Final Consumption Expenditure rose from a growth rate of 6.8 per cent last year.
    2. Urban and rural proxies both performed: Indicators tracking demand in both segments held up over the last three months.
    3. Three rural income measures supported the number: Income transfers under PM Kisan, higher minimum support prices and steps to keep fertiliser affordable aided rural demand.

    Why does the investment number matter more than the headline?

    1. Gross Fixed Capital Formation jumped 11.9 per cent in real terms: This measure of additions to the economy’s fixed assets grew at double last year’s 5.8 per cent.
    2. The nominal increase was 20.4 per cent: Without adjusting for inflation, investment rose by that much.
    3. Investment’s share of GDP reached 34.3 per cent: The share climbed from 31.4 per cent a year earlier.
    4. That share is the threshold for sustaining high growth: The Chairman of the Economic Advisory Council to the Prime Minister has held that investment must rise to 34 to 35 per cent of GDP to sustain growth above 7 per cent.

    What could reverse the outcome?

    1. Crude oil prices carry a supply risk: Disruption to crude supply from the war between the United States and Iran will likely prevent prices falling materially and sustainably below 80 dollars a barrel.
    2. Export demand is the second order effect: Indian households have been partially shielded from higher energy prices, and other countries facing a demand hit would dim the prospects for India’s exports.
    3. El Nino is expected to peak in late 2026: Its implications for rainfall, crop outcomes and food inflation warrant close monitoring, per the Ministry of Finance’s monthly economic review.
    4. All three sectors contributed this quarter: The message from the data is resilience, since agriculture, manufacturing and services each added to growth despite the West Asia war.

    Challenges to sustaining the growth rate

    1. Crude import dependence transmits every price shock: India imports the large majority of the crude oil it consumes, so a price rise lands on the trade balance and on fuel inflation at the same time. Eg. The price surge after the Ukraine war in 2022 pushed Indian retail inflation above the 6 per cent upper tolerance band for three consecutive quarters.
      The Fix: Expand strategic petroleum reserve capacity and spread long term supply contracts across more than one producing region.
    2. The investment cycle is still publicly led: Central government capital spending has carried the recovery, and private corporate capital expenditure has followed later and unevenly. Eg. Central capital expenditure was raised sharply in successive post-pandemic budgets while private project announcements lagged.
      The Fix: Clear land acquisition, contract enforcement and approval delays that raise the fixed cost of starting a private project.
    3. Farm output remains rain dependent: Under half of India’s net sown area is irrigated, so a rainfall shortfall passes directly into crop output and food prices. Eg. The 2015 El Nino year cut kharif sowing and pushed pulse prices to record levels.
      The Fix: Expand micro irrigation coverage and hold larger buffer stocks in the pulses and oilseeds where price spikes originate.
    4. Services exports face demand and technology risk together: Growth in services exports depends on client spending abroad and on how much of the work automation absorbs. Eg. Global capability centres employ a large share of India’s services export workforce, and their scope of work is the part most exposed to automation.
      The Fix: Shift the export base towards higher value engineering and design work rather than volume based delivery.

    Conclusion

    Growth beat the projection because investment and services carried the quarter and agriculture did not. That composition has to repeat for the rest of the year, and two of its supports sit outside the domestic economy. The marker to watch is the next monetary policy review, where the central bank must either revise its full year projection upward or hold it against the energy and monsoon risks the government’s own economists have flagged.

    Back2Basics: Economic Advisory Council to the Prime Minister

    1. Status: An independent advisory body that is neither constitutional nor statutory, reconstituted in its current form in 2017.
    2. Mandate: Advises the Prime Minister on economic and related issues, particularly from a neutral and non-departmental viewpoint.
    3. Composition: Headed by a Chairman, with full time and part time members drawn from academia and policy practice.
    4. Support: It is serviced administratively by NITI Aayog.

    [2020, GS3, 10 marks] Define potential GDP and explain its determinants. What are the factors that have been inhibiting India from realizing its potential GDP?”

  • Next employment challenge is better jobs

    Next employment challenge is better jobs

    Why in the News

    India’s employment has grown from 47.15 crore in 2014-15 to 64.33 crore in 2023-24, according to RBI’s KLEMS database, shifting the debate from job quantity to job quality and employability.

    Core issue: Aggregate employment data does not reveal formalisation, real wages, social security, or career stability. NITI Aayog’s skilling blueprint therefore emphasises industry-linked, demand-driven and outcome-oriented skilling for future employment.

    What has the employment base actually delivered?

    1. The foundations were widened through five channels: Infrastructure development, formalisation, financial inclusion, skilling and encouragement to entrepreneurship together expanded the base of paid work.
    2. The addition is 17.18 crore workers over nine years: The provisional KLEMS series records that increase through 2023-24, averaging about 1.9 crore workers a year.
    3. The 2 crore aspiration needs a definition: It cannot mean 2 crore salaried government posts created every year.
    4. An aggregate count cannot settle the debate: A number of workers added says nothing about whether the work is formal, better paid or capable of progression.

    Why do the labour data series not answer the same question?

    1. The monthly bulletin measures a seven day window: The Periodic Labour Force Survey (PLFS), the official household survey of employment, publishes a monthly bulletin whose Current Weekly Status classifies activity over the preceding seven days.
    2. The annual survey measures the year: Usual status captures the durable yearly pattern of a person’s activity.
    3. The two series answer different questions: Monthly and weekly status figures track short term movement, and annual usual status figures assess structural progress.
    4. Mixing them distorts the reading: The two are not interchangeable, so a monthly movement cannot stand as evidence of structural gain.
    5. A national employment dashboard is the proposed instrument: It would report formalisation, real wage growth, social security, hours worked, sectoral productivity and movement from low income work into stable careers.

    What does the 9 crore figure actually describe?

    1. 9 crore young Indians sit outside all three activities: They were neither in education, employment nor training, excluding those actively seeking jobs.
    2. Most of that group is in domestic duties: About 88 per cent were engaged in unpaid household work.
    3. The group is not the same as the unemployed: Describing all 9 crore as unemployed is inaccurate, since a person in domestic duties is not seeking paid work.
    4. Five constraints keep young women out of paid work: Unpaid care, safety, mobility, social norms and limited local opportunities restrict the choices available to them.

    Is educated unemployment the same as graduate unemployment?

    1. Educated unemployment among first time entrants is real: Graduates leaving education face a genuine gap between qualification and placement.
    2. The two claims are not equivalent: Graduates forming a large share of unemployed youth does not mean most graduates are unemployed.
    3. Training volume is already large: More than 1.64 crore candidates have been trained or oriented under the Pradhan Mantri Kaushal Vikas Yojana.
    4. Apprenticeship has scaled since 2016: Over 56.08 lakh apprentices have been engaged in that period.

    What does the start-up record show about job creation beyond the state?

    1. Start-ups report more than 23 lakh direct jobs: Recognised start-ups had reported that figure by April 2026.
    2. The unicorn count moved from four to over 120: India had four firms valued above one billion dollars in 2014 and now has over 120, with a combined valuation exceeding 350 billion dollars.
    3. Half the ventures come from outside the metros: Around half of recognised start-ups emerge from Tier II and Tier III cities.
    4. Nearly half carry a woman in a leadership role: Over 45 per cent of recognised start-ups had at least one woman director or partner by December 2025.

    Where does public employment fit in the next decade?

    1. Public hiring must be transparent and timely: Sanctioned vacancies should be filled through transparent processes, with examination integrity and timely results treated as non-negotiable.
    2. The state cannot be the sole employer: A country adding millions of workers each year cannot place them all in government posts.
    3. Enterprise scale-up is the next step: Helping viable micro-enterprises grow, formalise and hire is the route to the volume public hiring cannot supply.

    Why are women the decisive measure of the next transformation?

    1. Participation rose by 18 percentage points in six years: Female labour force participation in usual status rose from 23.3 per cent in 2017-18 to 41.7 per cent in 2023-24.
    2. Women already hold the financial access base: Women hold 56 per cent of Pradhan Mantri Jan Dhan Yojana accounts and receive about two-thirds of Micro Units Development and Refinance Agency (MUDRA) loans.
    3. Self-help group membership crosses 10 crore: More than 10 crore women are members of self-help groups.
    4. Basic services cut unpaid work time: Tap water, clean cooking fuel and sanitation reduce drudgery, and housing ownership strengthens household assets.
    5. The next set of supports is different in kind: Affordable childcare, safe transport, working women’s hostels, flexible formal work, digital access and quality jobs closer to home are what convert participation into stable employment.

    Challenges to raising job quality in India

    1. Informality caps wage and social security gains: Over 90 per cent of India’s workforce is informal, so an added job does not automatically carry provident fund cover, a written contract or paid leave. Eg. Food delivery and ride hailing platform workers are engaged as partners rather than employees, which keeps them outside provident fund and gratuity cover.
      The Fix: Make registration of workers on the e-Shram database a condition of enterprise credit and subsidy eligibility, so formal status follows the finance.
    2. Services led growth absorbs few workers: Services drive output growth but employ under 30 per cent of the workforce, so the fastest growing sector is the weakest job creator. Eg. India’s information technology and business services exports are among the largest in the world, and the sector employs a small fraction of the non-farm workforce.
      The Fix: Tie manufacturing incentives to verified employment created rather than to output or investment alone.
    3. Skill supply is not matched to demand: About half of Indian graduates are assessed as employable, so training volume does not convert into placement. Eg. The India Skills Report has repeatedly placed graduate employability near the 50 per cent mark.
      The Fix: Make industry co-certification and verified placement outcomes the release condition for skilling programme funds.
    4. Weak manufacturing limits absorption of semi-skilled labour: Manufacturing contributes about 16 to 18 per cent of India’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) against roughly 26 per cent in China. Eg. Textiles, leather and food processing remain fragmented across units too small to enter export supply chains.
      The Fix: Direct production incentives towards labour intensive sectors rather than towards capital intensive electronics assembly alone.
    5. Rural distress is measured too late to act on: High frequency labour surveys have historically been confined to urban areas, so rural conditions are captured only once a year. Eg. The quarterly PLFS bulletin covered urban areas alone for years after its launch.
      The Fix: Extend quarterly survey coverage to rural areas and integrate provident fund and National Career Service records into a single release.

    Conclusion

    The employment question India argues about is no longer the employment question it measures. Scale has been settled by the last decade. Quality has not, and no official series reports it as one trackable outcome. The unresolved tension is that a government judged on a headline count has little incentive to build the measure that would show whether the count is worth having.

    Unemployment in India

    1. Definition: The International Labour Organization (ILO) treats a person as unemployed when they are of working age, meaning 15 years and above, without work, currently available for work and actively seeking it in a reference period.
    2. Nodal measurement body: The National Sample Survey Office under the Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation is the principal body estimating unemployment in India.
    3. Recognised types: Frictional, structural, cyclical, seasonal and disguised unemployment are the standard categories, with disguised unemployment concentrated in agriculture where marginal productivity is near zero.
    4. Administrative sources supplement surveys: Employees’ Provident Fund Organisation, Employees’ State Insurance Corporation and National Pension System payrolls are used to estimate formal job creation.

    Government Initiatives for Employment Generation

    1. Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, 2005: Guarantees 100 days of wage employment in a financial year to a rural household whose adult members volunteer for unskilled manual work.
    2. e-Shram portal: A national database that issues unorganised workers a Universal Account Number and gives them single point access to welfare schemes.
    3. PM SVANidhi: Provides collateral free working capital loans to street vendors to restart and expand their businesses.
    4. PM Vishwakarma: Offers collateral free credit, skilling and toolkits across 18 traditional artisan and craft trades.
    5. Pradhan Mantri Viksit Bharat Rozgar Yojana: An employment linked incentive approved in July 2025 with a Rs 99,446 crore outlay, targeting 3.5 crore jobs over two years.
    6. PM Internship Scheme: Launched in 2024 to place 1 crore young people in internships with large companies over five years.
    7. National Career Service portal: Matches job seekers with employers, adding 17.23 lakh employers and 1.38 crore new job seekers in 2024.

    [2023, GS3, 15 marks] Most of the unemployment in India is structural in nature. Examine the methodology adopted to compute unemployment in the country and suggest improvements.

  • Why India took 16 years to acquire fire-and-forget Javelin missiles

    Why India took 16 years to acquire fire-and-forget Javelin missiles

    Why in the News

    India has finalised a deal to purchase the Javelin anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) system from the United States through its Foreign Military Sales (FMS) process. The purchase closes a process that began in 2010 and was shelved and revived several times in between. The original attempt collapsed over the American refusal to release the missile’s core seeker technology, and the alternative India turned to in its place, Israel’s Spike system, also failed to convert into a contract. The tension is that the deal has now closed on terms India rejected sixteen years ago, since co-production of a finished round is a different thing from the full transfer of technology that was demanded the first time.

    What is the Javelin anti-tank guided missile?

    1. What it is: A third generation, man portable anti-tank guided missile produced in the United States, designed to be carried and fired by a two person infantry team.
    2. Fire and forget guidance: The operator locks the missile onto the target before launch and the missile then guides itself to impact. The firing team can leave the position immediately, which a wire guided missile does not allow.

    Why did India want the Javelin in 2010?

    1. The stated intent: In August 2010 the Defence Minister told Parliament that the government intended to procure third generation Javelin missiles through the FMS route, and that the procurement would include a transfer of technology.
    2. The inventory gap: The move was driven by a shortage of anti-tank guided missiles in the Indian Army’s inventory.
    3. The indigenous programme slipped: The original timelines for the indigenous systems being developed by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) had been delayed.
    4. What it was meant to replace: The idea was to replace the ageing Milan-2T and Konkurs missile systems then in use with the Army.
    5. Where the preference came from: United States forces actively showcased the system during the 2009 bilateral exercise Yudh Abhyas, after which it was highlighted as the choice to immediately fill the gap.

    Why did the first attempt collapse?

    1. The technology restriction: The acquisition was shelved because of stringent technology transfer restrictions imposed by Washington.
    2. The specific component withheld: The United States refused to share the missile’s core seeker technology, the imaging sensor that identifies and tracks the target, under a 100 per cent transfer of technology model.
    3. The consequence: The refusal caused India to pivot to Israel’s Spike missile system, manufactured by Rafael Advanced Defense Systems, in 2014.

    What happened to the Spike alternative?

    1. Why Spike was chosen: In 2014 India went ahead with Spike over the Javelin, on the understanding that it could offer greater flexibility of technology transfer and local production.
    2. The order cleared: The Defence Acquisition Council cleared the purchase of over 8,000 Spike missiles.
    3. Why it was cancelled: Concerns over the system’s performance in trials, over technology transfer, and over progress in India’s own man portable missile programme led to cancellation of the $500 million order in 2017.
    4. Revived and shelved again: The deal was revived in 2018 following the Israeli Prime Minister’s visit, and was subsequently shelved again.
    5. The stopgap purchase: India undertook an emergency purchase of a limited quantity of the fourth generation Spike-LR missiles in 2019 to meet an immediate operational gap.
    6. What did get built: In August 2023 Kalyani Rafael Advanced Systems, a joint venture between the Kalyani Group and Rafael, said it had won a Rs 287.51 crore order from the Defence Ministry for the supply of the missile systems.

    What changed to make the second attempt succeed?

    1. A different bilateral setting: The Javelin reappeared in India United States strategic discussions at a point when defence cooperation between the two countries had deepened.
    2. Co-production replaced technology transfer as the ask: A United States Congressional Research Service report updated in 2025 noted that co-production discussions involving the missile were ongoing.
    3. The industrial tie-up: In February 2025 the Javelin Joint Venture, a partnership between Lockheed Martin and Raytheon, said it was exploring co-assembly and co-production in India. It signed a memorandum of understanding with Bharat Dynamics Limited.
    4. The operational trigger: Discussions gained pace after Operation Sindoor in May 2025.
    5. The two track negotiation: By July 2025 India was negotiating for the systems both as an emergency procurement and through a long term contract, the latter likely involving co-production of the weapon systems.
    6. The clearance: Washington officially cleared the sale in November 2025.

    Challenges to the Javelin acquisition

    1. A government to government sale surrenders schedule control: Under Foreign Military Sales the buyer contracts with the United States government rather than with the manufacturer, so delivery follows the seller’s production queue. Eg. GE Aerospace’s F404 engine deliveries for the Tejas Light Combat Aircraft programme ran late as European demand for American systems surged after 2024. Fix. Write dated delivery milestones with defined penalties into the Letter of Offer and Acceptance rather than relying on the standard schedule.
    2. Co-assembly is not the technology that was withheld: An arrangement to assemble finished rounds in India leaves the guidance package as an imported item, which is the precise gap that stalled the 2010 attempt. Eg. Indian co-production of imported systems has historically stopped at airframe and integration work. Fix. Tie offset credit to manufacture of the seeker and its imaging components rather than to assembly hours.
    3. Unit cost limits how deep the stock can go: A fire and forget round with an imaging seeker costs many times what a wire guided round costs, which restricts the number of rounds a formation can hold. Eg. The 2019 purchase of Spike-LR was a limited emergency buy rather than an inventory replacement. Fix. Pair the import with volume production of DRDO’s Man Portable Anti-Tank Guided Missile so the expensive round is reserved for the hardest targets.
    4. Four missile families in one role: The Army would operate legacy Milan and Konkurs stock, Spike, Javelin and the indigenous system together, multiplying training pipelines and spares chains. Eg. The Kalyani Rafael line and a Bharat Dynamics Limited line would produce competing rounds for the same infantry task. Fix. Fix a role split by range band and phase the legacy systems out on a published timetable.

    Conclusion

    India has been short of man portable fire and forget anti tank missiles for more than a decade. The purchase answers that operational gap rather than any shift in acquisition policy, and the indigenous programme’s repeated slippage is what left the gap open. The marker to watch is whether the domestic arrangement moves past final assembly into seeker manufacture, since that is the component the first attempt broke on. If it does not, the deal has bought rounds rather than capability, and a one time exception starts to look like the practice.

    Back2Basics: Foreign Military Sales

    1. What it is: The United States government’s programme for selling defence articles, services and training to foreign governments and international organisations.
    2. How the transaction runs: The buyer contracts with the United States government, which then places the order with the manufacturer on the buyer’s behalf, so there is no direct commercial contract with the company.
    3. Who administers it: The Defense Security Cooperation Agency, under the Department of Defense, runs the programme under the Arms Export Control Act, 1976.
    4. The Congressional step: Sales above set value thresholds must be notified to the United States Congress before a Letter of Offer and Acceptance is issued to the buyer.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2021, GS3, 10 marks] How is S-400 air defence system technically superior to any other system presently available in the world?”

  • Atmanirbharta in fuel must strengthen, not undermine, India’s food security

    Atmanirbharta in fuel must strengthen, not undermine, India’s food security

    Why in the News

    The all India modal retail price of sugar has climbed from around Rs 45 a kg to about Rs 65 a kg within a month, an increase of nearly 44 per cent. The Union government has attributed the rise to hoarding by traders and millers and has threatened strict action. The rise follows a tightening of supply on three counts at once, arriving just before the festive season when sugar demand typically rises. The tension is that the same government fixes cane prices, sugar sales, imports, exports and the allocation of feedstock to ethanol, so a price spike inside a fully administered chain is a policy outcome rather than a market one.

    What is the Ethanol Blended Petrol Programme?

    1. What it requires: Oil marketing companies blend a mandated share of ethanol into the petrol they sell, which substitutes domestically produced fuel for imported crude.
    2. What it runs on: Ethanol is produced from sugarcane juice, syrup and molasses, and from surplus foodgrain such as rice and maize.
    3. How fast it scaled: Blending stood at 1.53 per cent in 2013-14, reached around 5 per cent by 2019-20 and 20 per cent in 2025-26, and feedstock supply did not keep pace with that trajectory.

    Why did sugar prices spike?

    1. The opening cushion had halved: Stocks at the start of the current sugar year, which runs October to September, were 5 million tonnes against 8 million tonnes a year earlier, leaving little room to absorb a fresh shock.
    2. Production came in below estimate: The 2025-26 output estimate was cut from about 34.3 million tonnes to 30.6 million tonnes on damage from red rot, a fungal disease that rots the cane stalk and destroys sucrose, and from top borer. About 27.35 million tonnes had been produced by June, so 3.25 million tonnes would have to arrive between July and September against a six season average of only 0.38 million tonnes for those months, pointing to a further cut to between 28 and 29 million tonnes.
    3. Ethanol removed supply at the worst moment: The ethanol programme diverted about 2.75 million tonnes of sugar at a time when supplies were already tight. That diversion is what turns energy policy into a competitor of the food market.

    Why can the market not correct the shortage on its own?

    1. Price signals are not allowed to act: In a more open economy a production shortfall corrects itself as higher prices pull in imports and trim consumption.
    2. Every step is administered: Sugarcane pricing, sugar sales, imports, exports and ethanol feedstock allocation are all decided by the government, so a correction has to be ordered rather than triggered.
    3. The calendar closes the escape route: Fresh cane will not reach mills in significant quantity until mid October, so the market must run on existing stocks through the festive demand peak.

    What correction does the assessment call for?

    1. Imports opened too narrowly: One million tonnes of duty free raw sugar has been allowed, against an assessed requirement of at least 3 to 4 million tonnes of refined sugar reaching the open market before and during the festive season. The 100 per cent import duty on refined sugar should be cut to zero or to 5 per cent.
    2. Shift the ethanol feedstock temporarily: Sugar based ethanol should be reduced sharply, with rice from Food Corporation of India (FCI) stocks held far above buffer norms taking its place. FCI should charge ethanol plants at least the procurement price of rice, if not its full economic cost.
    3. Import ethanol or lower the mandate: Ethanol can be imported directly when domestic feedstock is pushing up food prices, or the blending share can be brought down from 20 per cent to about 15 per cent.

    Does switching feedstock end the food versus fuel trade off?

    1. Maize is the least thirsty option: Maize does not consume as much water as rice or sugarcane, and it is already being used as a primary ethanol feedstock.
    2. Yield is the binding constraint: Maize productivity in India hovers around 3.5 tonnes per hectare against about 11 tonnes per hectare in the United States, so the surplus that fuel demand needs does not exist.
    3. The pressure moves to protein: Diverting more maize without a matching rise in output raises maize prices, and that passes into poultry meat, eggs and milk, where maize is the main feed.
    4. The trade off relocates rather than ends: Moving from sugar to rice or maize shifts the food versus fuel choice to a different crop, and closing it requires a large maize surplus, which raises the question of whether India will permit the genetically modified maize that drives United States yields.

    How should the ethanol programme be recalibrated?

    1. The basic number is missing: The net energy balance of each feedstock, meaning the energy returned against the energy spent producing it, has not been established, so allocation is being decided without it.
    2. Let the buyer choose the feedstock: Oil marketing companies could be given flexibility to source ethanol from the most economical feedstock, subject to safeguards for food security, farmers and the environment, in place of a rigid allocation from sugar, rice and maize.
    3. The state’s role narrows to the buffer: Government should hold strategic buffers and enforce food security safeguards rather than manage every feedstock allocation, and the programme itself needs a full evaluation of its design.

    Challenges to the Ethanol Blended Petrol Programme

    1. Capacity was financed against a fixed mandate: Distillery capacity was built on the assurance of a fixed blending share and long term offtake, so any temporary cut leaves loans outstanding against idle plants. Eg. The Ethanol Interest Subvention Scheme financed new and expanded distilleries through soft loans carrying a 6 per cent interest subvention. Fix. Convert the fixed target into a band with a stated floor, so capacity is financed against the floor rather than against a single number.
    2. The efficiency cost sits with the vehicle owner: Ethanol carries lower energy density than petrol, so mileage falls in engines not calibrated for the blend. Eg. Vehicles built before E20 compatibility became standard draw the same blend at the pump with no compensating price difference. Fix. Retain a lower blend grade at outlets serving older fleets, and publish blend specific mileage data at the pump.
    3. Two administered prices move at different speeds: The government fixes both the cane price and the ethanol procurement price, and only the cane price has been revised upward in successive seasons. Eg. Mills carrying distillation capacity report underutilisation as the margin on ethanol narrows. Fix. Index the ethanol procurement price to the cane price fixed under the same control order.
    4. The gains cluster geographically: Distillery capacity follows cane and grain surpluses, so the income the programme creates concentrates in a few States. Eg. Uttar Pradesh and Maharashtra, the two largest cane producing States, hold the bulk of cane based distillation capacity. Fix. Weight new capacity approvals toward maize growing districts, where the water saving is also largest.

    Conclusion

    Fuel self reliance and food security are traded against each other because the blending target was fixed as a number and the feedstock left to catch up. What to watch is whether the correction stops at emergency imports or reaches the design: a blending band replacing a fixed share, and feedstock chosen by the buyer against a stated food security safeguard. The maize yield gap decides whether the trade off can be closed at all rather than merely moved.

    The Sugar Industry in India

    1. Scale and geography: India is the second largest sugarcane producer, with output of 454.61 million tonnes in 2024-25, drawn mainly from Uttar Pradesh and Maharashtra.
    2. The dependent population: About five crore cane farmers and their families depend on the crop, alongside mill and ancillary unit workers.
    3. Mills are multi product units: Beyond sugar, a mill earns from ethanol, bagasse co-generated power, and press mud biogas and bio-fertiliser.

    Laws and Rules Governing the Sugar and Ethanol Sector

    1. Essential Commodities Act, 1955: Sugar is a scheduled commodity under it, so the Centre can impose stock limits and regulate sale and distribution.
    2. Sugarcane (Control) Order, 1966: Issued under that Act, it is how the Centre fixes the Fair and Remunerative Price payable by mills to cane growers.
    3. National Policy on Biofuels, 2018: Sets ethanol blending targets and permits cane juice, syrup, molasses and surplus foodgrain as feedstock, its 2022 amendment advancing the 20 per cent target.
    4. Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992: Sugar exports are regulated through notifications issued under it, which placed raw, white and refined sugar in the prohibited category.

    Government Initiatives for the Sugar Sector

    1. Sugar Development Fund: Provides concessional loans for mill modernisation, crushing capacity expansion, co-generation and cane development.
    2. Pradhan Mantri JI-VAN Yojana: Supports second generation ethanol from crop residue rather than food grade feedstock.

    Challenges in the Sugar Sector

    1. Cane price and sugar price move independently: The Fair and Remunerative Price rose from Rs 285 a quintal in 2020-21 to Rs 340 in 2024-25 and Rs 355 for 2025-26, and the minimum selling price of sugar has stayed at Rs 31 a kg since 2019. Eg. Cane arrears recur in Uttar Pradesh whenever mill realisation lags the obligatory cane price. Fix. Adopt the Rangarajan Committee’s revenue sharing formula, linking cane payment to realisation from sugar and by-products.
    2. Export policy doubles as an inflation tool: Raw, white and refined sugar sit in the prohibited export category to protect domestic stocks and ethanol feedstock, costing mills global market access. Eg. Exporters lose long term contracts each time the category is switched mid season. Fix. Announce an export quota at the start of each sugar season against a stated closing stock norm, letting mills contract ahead.
    3. The highest recovery belt is the most water stressed: Maharashtra, Karnataka and Tamil Nadu record higher sucrose recovery and face the sharpest groundwater depletion. Eg. El Nino years have cut cane availability in Maharashtra and Karnataka and closed crushing seasons early. Fix. Make drip irrigation and fertigation under the Pradhan Mantri Krishi Sinchayee Yojana a condition for cane area expansion, with early maturing drought resistant varieties.
    4. The northern belt crushes longer and recovers less: Uttar Pradesh and Bihar run longer crushing seasons on lower sucrose recovery, with fragmented landholdings raising cane aggregation costs. Eg. A single national recovery benchmark treats a Bihar mill and a Kolhapur mill as comparable. Fix. Set belt specific recovery, crushing and payment benchmarks rather than one national norm.

    “[2025] Consider the following statements:

    Statement I: Of the two major ethanol producers in the world, i.e., Brazil and the United States of America, the former produces more ethanol than the latter.

    Statement II: Unlike in the United States of America, where corn is the principal feedstock for ethanol production, sugarcane is the principal feedstock for ethanol production in Brazil.

    Which one of the following is correct in respect of the above statements?

    (a) Both Statement I and Statement II are correct and Statement II explains Statement I

    (b) Both Statement I and Statement II are correct but Statement II does not explain Statement I

    (c) Statement I is correct but Statement II is not correct

    (d) Statement I is not correct but Statement II is correct