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Type: Explained

These Newscards correspond to the explained section of various newspapers. They become immensely important for both prelims and mains and special attention needs to be paid to them

  • Viruses don’t respect borders: the case for timely, fair global vaccine access for zoonotic outbreaks

    Why in the News?

    An International Centre for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology (ICGEB) scientist has argued that timely and fair global vaccine access for zoonotic outbreaks, such as Ebola, Nipah and hantavirus, requires academia-industry partnerships and a shared risk funding model. This is because such vaccines are not commercially attractive to manufacturers.

    Why are zoonotic outbreak vaccines commercially unattractive?

    1. Small, unpredictable markets: Ebola, Nipah and hantavirus outbreaks are episodic and geographically concentrated, giving manufacturers no stable, predictable market to justify sustained investment.
    2. High development cost, low return: Vaccine development costs remain similar regardless of market size, so a vaccine with a small addressable market offers manufacturers a poor return relative to vaccines for widespread diseases.
    3. Outbreak timing mismatch: Vaccine demand spikes only during an active outbreak, while development must happen years in advance, a mismatch that discourages manufacturers from investing ahead of demonstrated demand.

    What would a shared risk funding model change?

    1. Risk redistribution: A shared risk funding model spreads the financial risk of vaccine development across academia, industry and public funders, rather than leaving it entirely on a manufacturer’s commercial judgment.
    2. Academia-industry partnership: Academic institutions like ICGEB can carry early stage research risk, handing over a de-risked candidate for industry to scale, lowering the barrier for private investment.
    3. Access consequence: A funding model that does not depend on commercial viability alone can keep resulting vaccines priced for equitable global access rather than for cost recovery in a niche market.

    Conclusion

    The central idea is that zoonotic outbreak vaccines fail a commercial viability test that has nothing to do with their public health importance. A shared risk funding model, built on academia-industry partnership, is the mechanism proposed to close that gap between epidemic risk and market incentive.

    Back2Basics

    International Centre for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology (ICGEB): An intergovernmental organisation with a component in New Delhi, conducting research in genetic engineering and biotechnology, including vaccine and infectious disease research.

    PYQ Relevance

    [UPSC 2022] What is the basic principle behind vaccine development? How do vaccines work? What approaches were adopted by the Indian vaccine manufacturers to produce COVID-19 vaccines?

    Linkage: The PYQ examines the scientific principles of vaccine development and the challenges in developing vaccines for emerging infectious diseases. The article explains why vaccines for zoonotic diseases require shared-risk funding and academia-industry partnerships to overcome weak commercial incentives and ensure equitable access.

  • Delhi High Court’s ANI v OpenAI ruling offers a better path on copyright and AI than a training licensing regime

    Why in the News?

    The Delhi High Court’s ruling in ANI v OpenAI, addressing technological neutrality and the research exemption, offers a framework for copyright and AI. At the same time, there is a growing criticism about the Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade (DPIIT) committee’s proposed AI training licensing regime as potentially harmful to innovation.

    What did the Delhi High Court’s ANI v OpenAI ruling establish?

    1. Technological neutrality: The ruling applies existing copyright principles to AI training without creating a separate, more restrictive legal category just because the technology involved is new.
    2. Research exemption: The ruling recognises a research exemption relevant to how AI systems process copyrighted content during training, rather than treating every instance of AI training on copyrighted material as infringement by default.

    How is the DPIIT new hybrid licensing system (One Nation – One License – One Payment) different from the Delhi High Court (ANI v OpenAI) judgment?

    1. DPIIT Proposal: AI seeks to bring in a statutory licensing mechanism that requires companies to pay compensation (royalties) to content creators through a centralized government system.
    2. Delhi High Court verdict: The court in its latest order refused to impose any strict or prior licensing norms, stating that AI training can be considered ‘fair dealing’ (under research purposes).

    Why does the proposed licensing regime as a step backward?

    1. Compliance burden: A mandatory AI training licensing regime would require AI developers to negotiate and pay for licenses before training on copyrighted content, raising the cost of building AI systems in India.
    2. Innovation chilling effect: Smaller AI developers and startups, unable to absorb licensing costs at the scale large technology companies can, would face a higher barrier to entry than the court’s technological neutrality approach imposes.
    3. Inconsistency with the ruling: A DPIIT-driven licensing regime would move policy in a more restrictive direction than the judiciary’s own reading of technological neutrality and the research exemption, creating a mismatch between executive rule making and judicial precedent.

    Conclusion

    The Delhi High Court’s ANI v OpenAI ruling offers a workable copyright and AI framework built on existing legal principles rather than new restrictions. DPIIT’s proposed licensing regime would discard that workable framework in favour of a compliance heavy structure that risks innovation without a clear corresponding gain for rights holders.

    Back2Basics

    The Proposed Licensing system by DPIIT:

    The Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade (DPIIT) proposed a new hybrid licensing systemin December 2025 called “One Nation – One License – One Payment”. Its main purpose is to strike a balance between creators’ rights and technological innovation on the use of copyrighted content for artificial intelligence (AI) training.

    The important aspects and provisions of this proposed policy are as follows:

    Mandatory Blanket License

    1. Data usage rights: AI developers can use any copyrighted content that is legally accessible (for example, freely available online) to train their models without seeking separate permission. [1, 2]
    2. No Opt-Out: Content creators or organizations do not have the right to opt-out of having their content used for AI training.

    Royalty Structure

    1. Payment after commercialization: AI developers do not have to pay any fees upfront. Royalties apply only after the AI ​​tool or product starts generating revenue commercially.
    2. Centralized Body: The government will set up a non-profit centralized nodal agency called “Copyright Royalties Collective for AI Training” (CRCAT) to collect royalties and distribute them to copyright holders .
    3. Pricing: Royalty rates are determined independently by a special expert committee appointed by the government

    Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade (DPIIT)

    1. It is a Union government department under the Ministry of Commerce and Industry.
    2. It is responsible for industrial policy, including the committee that proposed the AI training licensing regime referenced here.

    PYQ Relevance

    [UPSC 2024] What is the present world scenario of intellectual property rights with respect to life materials? Although India is second in the world to file patents, still only a few have been commercialized. Explain the reasons behind this less commercialization.

    Linkage: The PYQ examines India’s intellectual property rights framework and the balance between protection of intellectual property and innovation. The article discusses whether India’s copyright framework should promote AI innovation through existing legal principles or impose a mandatory licensing regime. It highlights the broader challenge of designing an IPR regime that protects creators without discouraging technological innovation.

  • Political executive control over Delhi Police under Article 239AA comes under fresh scrutiny

    Why in the News

    The Supreme Court is hearing petitions on the police crackdown during the NEET protest. The case has brought attention to the political control over the Delhi Police under Article 239AA and renewed debate on police independence in light of the Ramlila Maidan and Prakash Singh judgments.

    What does Article 239AA provide for policing in Delhi?

    1. Definition: Article 239AA, inserted by the 69th Amendment Act, 1991, gives Delhi a Legislative Assembly and Council of Ministers but excludes police, public order and land from the elected government’s jurisdiction, keeping them with the Union government.
    2. Effect: Delhi Police answers to the Union Ministry of Home Affairs rather than the elected Delhi government, unlike police forces in full states.
    3. Ramlila Maidan precedent: The Supreme Court’s Ramlila Maidan ruling addressed the limits of police force against a peaceful assembly, a precedent invoked whenever Delhi Police’s crowd control conduct is questioned.
    4. Prakash Singh precedent: The Prakash Singh v Union of India ruling laid down police reform directions aimed at insulating police from political direction, directions Delhi Police’s Union government control tests differently than in the states.

    Why does this arrangement resurface during the NEET protest crackdown hearing?

    1. Command versus accountability: Delhi Police’s actions during the NEET protest crackdown are being scrutinised even though the elected Delhi government has no command authority over the force to answer for its conduct.
    2. Union political exposure: Because Delhi Police reports to the Union Home Ministry, its conduct during politically sensitive protests places the central government, not the local elected government, in direct line of accountability.

    Conclusion

    Article 239AA’s exclusion of police from Delhi’s elected government means every controversial policing decision in the capital, including the NEET protest crackdown, becomes a Union government accountability question by constitutional design. The Supreme Court’s hearing will test whether the Ramlila Maidan and Prakash Singh standards can be enforced within this centralised command structure

    Back2Basics

    Article 239AA:

    1. It was inserted by the 69th Constitutional Amendment Act, 1991.
    2. It grants Delhi a special Union Territory status with an elected Assembly, while reserving police, public order and land for the Union Government.

    Prakash Singh v. Union of India:

    It is a landmark 2006 Supreme Court of India public interest litigation judgment that issued seven binding directives to reform police forces, ensure fixed tenures for top officials, and insulate law enforcement from political control.

    Key Directives of the Judgment

    1. State Security Commission: Set up a body to check that state governments do not exercise unwarranted influence over the police.
    2. Fixed Tenure for DGP: Give the Director General of Police a minimum stable tenure of two years regardless of their retirement date.
    3. Fixed Tenure for Officers: Ensure field-level police officers (like SPs and SHOs) have a minimum two-year tenure on their postings.
    4. Separation of Functions: Separate the investigation of crime from day-to-day law and order duties.
    5. Police Establishment Board: Create a board to handle transfers, postings, and promotions for junior officers.
    6. Police Complaints Authority: Establish independent state and district bodies to handle public complaints against police misconduct.
    7. National Security Commission: Form a federal panel to pick and manage top-tier police standards at the national level.

  • Protecting protest: on mass protests

    Why in the News?

    The Supreme Court is hearing petitions on alleged excessive police force during recent protests, while the CJI’s remarks on protests requiring due permission have sparked debate. The case has also revived the question of whether public inconvenience caused by peaceful protests should be conflated with violence, and the need for a national protocol on crowd-control measures.

    Why does conflating inconvenience with violence weaken the right to protest?

    1. Legal standard blurred: Treating traffic disruption or public inconvenience as equivalent to violence lowers the threshold at which force can be used against a peaceful gathering.
    2. Judicial remark’s weight: A “due permission” framing from the Chief Justice of India carries institutional weight that can shape how lower courts and police read the limits of Article 19(1)(b), the right to assemble peaceably.
    3. Precedent tension: Existing case law distinguishes disruptive but peaceful assembly from violent assembly, and collapsing that distinction narrows the constitutional space for protest.

    What does the absence of a national crowd control protocol expose?

    1. No uniform threshold: Without a national protocol, the force threshold used against protestors varies by state and by individual police commander’s judgment.
    2. Accountability gap: No standard mechanism currently holds police accountable for disproportionate force used to disperse a protest deemed merely inconvenient.
    3. Comparative absence: Other democracies operationalise proportionality standards for crowd control through documented use of force continuums, a structure India’s policing framework lacks in codified form.

    Conclusion

    Peaceful protests that cause public inconvenience should not be treated the same as violent acts. A national crowd-control protocol with clear rules on the use of force and strong accountability can help protect both the right to protest and public order.

    Back2Basics

    The right to protest in India is an implied fundamental right derived from Article 19(1)(a) (freedom of speech and expression) and Article 19(1)(b) (freedom to assemble peaceably and without arms) of the Constitution of India.

    Constitutional Basis and Rules

    1. No Absolute Right: Protests must remain completely peaceful and unarmed.
    2. Reasonable Restrictions: Under Articles 19(2) and 19(3), the state can limit protests to protect the sovereignty and integrity of India, security of the state, and public order.
    3. No Blocking Roads: The Supreme Court has ruled that public ways and spaces cannot be permanently blocked or occupied, balancing protester rights with public movement.

    Legal Obligations and Permissions

    1. Prior Permission: Organizers must generally seek local police or municipal permissions to hold public gatherings or marches.
    2. Designated Spaces: Authorities often restrict demonstrations to specific assigned areas (like designated grounds or parks) to prevent traffic and safety hazards.
    3. Police Action Limits: Courts maintain that mere assembly or peaceful agitation does not justify excessive police force or lathi-charges.

    PYQ Relevance

    [UPSC 2022] Right of movement and residence throughout the territory of India are freely available to the Indian citizens, but these rights are not absolute. Comment.

    Linkage: The PYQ tests the scope of Fundamental Rights under Article 19 and reasonable restrictions. The editorial examines the limits of the right to peaceful protest under Article 19, and whether restrictions on protests satisfy the test of proportionality.

  • “Tigers Outside Tiger Reserves” initiative targets the 35 to 40% of India’s tigers living outside protected areas

    Why in the News

    The Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change’s (MoEFCC) new “Tigers Outside Tiger Reserves” (TOTR) initiative addresses the 35 to 40% of India’s tiger population living outside formally protected areas. It is built on two pillars, conflict reduction and community coexistence, across 40 forest divisions in nine states.

    Pillars of the Tigers Outside Tiger Reserves (TOTR) initiative

    1. Conflict reduction: The first pillar focuses on reducing human-tiger conflict incidents in forest divisions where tigers range outside the boundaries of formally notified reserves.
    2. Community coexistence: The second pillar builds mechanisms for local communities to coexist with tigers present in shared, non-reserve landscapes, rather than treating their presence as purely a conservation enforcement problem.
    3. Coverage: The initiative spans 40 forest divisions across nine states, reflecting the geographic spread of India’s tiger population beyond reserve boundaries.

    Why does India need a policy specifically for tigers outside reserves?

    1. Population share at stake: With 35 to 40% of India’s tiger population living outside protected areas, conservation policy focused only on reserve boundaries misses a large share of the actual tiger population.
    2. Corridor dependence: Tigers outside reserves typically use forest corridors connecting reserves, and conflict in these corridors threatens the genetic connectivity between reserve populations.
    3. Land use pressure: Non-reserve forest divisions face agricultural and settlement pressure that formally protected reserves do not, making conflict management here structurally harder than inside a reserve.

    Conclusion

    1. The Tigers Outside Tiger Reserves initiative extends India’s tiger conservation focus beyond reserve boundaries to the corridors and shared landscapes where a large share of the tiger population actually lives. Its success will depend on whether conflict reduction and community coexistence measures can be sustained in areas without a reserve’s formal protection status.

    Back2Basics

    Conservation Status

    • IUCN Red List: Endangered (EN)
    • Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972: Schedule I species (highest level of legal protection).
    • CITES: Appendix I.

    Tiger Reserves in India

    • Total Tiger Reserves: 58 (under the National Tiger Conservation Authority).
    • Largest Tiger Reserve: Nagarjunsagar Srisailam Tiger Reserve (Andhra Pradesh & Telangana).
    • Smallest Tiger Reserve: Bor Tiger Reserve (Maharashtra).
    • State with the most Tiger Reserves: Madhya Pradesh (9).
    • Latest Tiger Reserve: Madhav Tiger Reserve (Madhya Pradesh), notified in 2025.

    Tiger Population

    • India’s tiger population increased from 1,411 (2006) to 3,682 (2022), reflecting the success of sustained conservation efforts under Project Tiger and landscape-based protection.
    • India is home to over 70% of the world’s wild tiger population, making it the global stronghold for tiger conservation.

    Project Tiger

    • Launched in 1973 by the Government of India to ensure a viable population of tigers in their natural habitats through habitat protection, anti-poaching measures, scientific monitoring, and community participation.

    National Tiger Conservation Authority (NTCA)

    • The NTCA is a statutory body established under the Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972 (through the 2006 amendment) under the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change.
    • It formulates policies and standards for tiger conservation, oversees the management of Tiger Reserves, approves reserve notifications, and monitors implementation of Project Tiger across the country.

  • Over 70% of police personnel favour immunity for use of force, “Status of Policing in India 2025” finds

    Why in the News

    The “Status of Policing in India 2025” report finds that over 70% of police personnel favour immunity for using force without accountability. The report also flags that National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) custodial injury data is unreliable, undermining independent verification of police conduct.

    Why does the immunity preference expose an accountability gap?

    1. Majority preference: A 70% plus preference for immunity among serving police personnel indicates the demand for accountability protection is not a fringe view but a majority institutional stance.
    2. Data unreliability: If NCRB custodial injury data is unreliable, external oversight bodies cannot independently verify whether force used against civilians was proportionate, regardless of internal police attitudes.
    3. Compounding effect: An accountability averse police culture combined with unreliable official data on custodial injury creates a structure where excessive force is both preferred by personnel and difficult to prove externally.

    Conclusion

    1. The central idea is that police demand for immunity and unreliable custodial injury data reinforce each other, since neither internal culture nor official data currently supports independent verification of force used against civilians. Addressing this requires fixing NCRB data reliability before any accountability reform on use of force can be meaningfully enforced.

    Back2Basics

    National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB): Statutory body under the Ministry of Home Affairs that compiles crime and criminal justice statistics across India, including custodial injury and death data.

    1. India’s strategic thinking should shift from border “geography” to a “geometry of interests”

      Why in the News

      India’s strategic thinking should shift from a border centric “geography” view to a broader “geometry of interests” spanning the Gulf, Central Asia, the Indo-Pacific and maritime domains.

      Why is a border centric strategic view seen as inadequate?

      1. Narrow threat framing: A geography centric view concentrates strategic attention on land borders with Pakistan and China, underweighting maritime and extended neighbourhood interests.
      2. Expanding interest map: India’s energy security, diaspora, and trade interests in the Gulf, Central Asia and the Indo-Pacific now carry strategic weight comparable to border security concerns.
      3. Maritime domain gap: A geography first framing has historically under-prioritised India’s maritime domain, despite its growing dependence on sea lanes for energy and trade.

      Conclusion

      The central idea is that India’s strategic doctrine has not kept pace with the expansion of its actual interests beyond its land borders. A “geometry of interests” framing would reallocate strategic attention toward the Gulf, Central Asia, the Indo-Pacific and maritime domains in proportion to their real weight in India’s security and economic interests.

    2. NCRB data shows chronic pendency under the National Honour Act, even as government moves to add Vande Mataram

      Why in the News?

      National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) data spanning 2014 to 2024 on the Prevention of Insults to National Honour Act, 1971 shows pendency above 90% and a conviction rate below 16%. The government is simultaneously pushing an amendment to criminalise insult to Vande Mataram on par with the national anthem, despite the existing law’s poor enforcement record.

      What is the Prevention of Insults to National Honour Act, 1971?

      1. The Prevention of Insults to National Honour Act, 1971 is an Indian law that bans the burning, mutilation, destruction, or disrespect of the national flag, the Constitution, and the national anthem.

      Key Rules and Penalties

      1. National Flag and Constitution: Section 2 prohibits burning, damaging, defacing, or showing disrespect to the flag or Constitution in any public place.
      2. National Anthem: Section 3 penalizes anyone who stops people from singing the national anthem or creates a disturbance during it.
      3. Punishment: Violations are punishable by up to three years in prison, a fine, or both. Repeat offenders face a minimum prison term of one year.
      4. Exceptions: Peaceful or lawful criticism aimed at changing or amending the Constitution or flag does not count as a crime

      Why does the enforcement record complicate the case for expanding the law?

      1. Pendency scale: Over 90% of cases registered under the Act between 2014 and 2024 remain pending, indicating a chronic backlog rather than an occasional delay.
      2. Low conviction: A conviction rate below 16% suggests weak evidentiary standards, prosecutorial capacity constraints, or both, in cases actually brought to trial.
      3. Expansion without fixing enforcement: Adding Vande Mataram to the Act’s protected symbols expands what the law covers without addressing why the existing provisions on the national anthem and flag are so poorly enforced.
      4. Symbolic versus functional legislation: A law with a sub-16% conviction rate functions more as a symbolic statement of state intent than as an operative deterrent.

      Conclusion

      The government’s push to expand the Prevention of Insults to National Honour Act, 1971 proceeds without addressing why the existing law convicts fewer than one in six prosecuted cases. Enforcement capacity, not statutory scope, is the constraint the amendment leaves unaddressed.

        Back2Basics

        The Prevention of Insults to National Honour (Amendment) Bill, 2026:

        1. It is a legislative proposal introduced in the Rajya Sabha on July 24, 2026. It amends the Prevention of Insults to National Honour Act, 1971, to extend statutory protection to India’s national song, Vande Mataram.

        Key Provisions

        1. Inclusion of the National Song: Amends Section 3 of the 1971 Act to place Vande Mataram under the same legal umbrella as the national anthem, Jana Gana Mana.
        2. Offenses Covered: Criminalizes intentionally preventing the singing of the national song or causing a disturbance at an assembly engaged in its rendition.
        3. Penalties: Proposes imprisonment for up to three years, a monetary fine, or both for first-time offenders, and a mandatory minimum of one year in prison for subsequent convictions

      1. West Bengal strips panchayat pradhans of registration and cheque signing powers, reopening the devolution debate

        Why in the News

        West Bengal Government has stripped elected panchayat pradhans of birth and death registration powers and cheque signing authority, transferring them to bureaucrats. The state cites the need to curb corruption after the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) exercise, but the move raises questions about devolution of powers to elected local bodies.

        Why does shifting these powers to bureaucrats raise a devolution question?

        1. Constitutional mandate: The 73rd Amendment Act, 1992 envisages panchayats as institutions of local self-government with functional autonomy, not merely implementing agencies for state bureaucrats.
        2. Elected versus appointed authority: Registration and cheque signing powers are everyday functions through which an elected pradhan exercises visible authority over local administration, and removing them shifts real power to an appointed official.
        3. Corruption justification: The stated reason, curbing corruption, does not explain why oversight rather than outright transfer of power was not chosen as the remedy.
        4. Precedent risk: A state government’s ability to strip elected local body powers by executive order, without a corresponding law reform process, sets a precedent other states could follow.

        Conclusion

        The central idea is that a corruption justification is being used to recentralise powers that the 73rd Amendment Act, 1992 assigned to elected local government. Whether West Bengal reverses this transfer, or other states adopt the same approach, will determine if devolution in India remains a one way commitment or a reversible administrative choice.

        Back2Basics

        Devolution of powers under the 73rd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1992: Functional Devolution (The 3 Fs [Functions, Funds, and Functionaries] and Eleventh Schedule)

        1. 29 Subjects: Article 243-G empowers state legislatures to devolve responsibilities to Panchayats for economic development and social justice across 29 areas listed in the Eleventh Schedule (such as agriculture, drinking water, health and sanitation, and primary education).
        2. The “3 Fs” Challenge: Real devolution relies on transferring Functions (the tasks), Funds (the money), and Functionaries (the administrative staff).
        3. State Discretion: Because local government is a state subject, actual transfer of these powers depends entirely on individual state laws rather than automatic constitutional enforcement.

        Institutional and Financial Framework

        1. Three-Tier System: Established a uniform structure of Panchayats at the village (Gram Panchayat), intermediate (Block/Taluk Panchayat), and district (Zilla Panchayat) levels.
        2. Gram Sabha: Positioned as the foundational base comprising all registered voters in a village area to ensure direct local oversight and social audit.
        3. State Finance Commission (SFC): Mandated the creation of an SFC every five years to recommend tax assignments, tolls, fees, and grants-in-aid to improve local fiscal autonomy.

        PYQ Relevance

        [UPSC 2023] ‘The states in India seem reluctant to empower urban local bodies both functionally as well as financially.’ Comment.”

        Linkage: The PYQ tests the extent of functional and financial devolution to local bodies. The article highlights the rollback of Panchayat powers, reflecting weak implementation of the 73rd Amendment.

      2. Rupee’s Real Effective Exchange Rate turns undervalued, more so than the yuan

        Why in the News

        India’s Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER) has moved from overvalued, above 100 until mid-2025, to undervalued at around 91 in June 2026. The rupee is now more undervalued than China’s yuan, a shift driven by oil price volatility and the West Asia war.

        What is the Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER)?

        1. Definition: REER measures a currency’s value against a trade weighted basket of other currencies, adjusted for inflation differentials, with 100 as the base year benchmark.
        2. Above 100: A REER above 100 signals overvaluation, meaning the currency is more expensive than its trade weighted fair value, hurting export competitiveness.
        3. Below 100: A REER below 100 signals undervaluation, meaning exports become cheaper and more competitive in foreign markets.
        4. Current reading: The rupee’s REER at around 91 in June 2026 places it firmly in undervalued territory, a reversal from above 100 as recently as mid-2025.

        Why does rupee undervaluation matter now?

        1. Export competitiveness: An undervalued rupee makes Indian exports cheaper relative to competitors, a potential offset to the tariff pressure Indian exporters face from the United States.
        2. Oil price link: Volatility from the West Asia war affects oil import costs, which in turn move the rupee’s value against the dollar and the wider currency basket.
        3. Comparative position: The rupee being more undervalued than the yuan reverses a longstanding pattern where China’s currency was seen as the more actively managed, undervalued one.
        4. Policy dilemma: Sustained undervaluation aids exporters but raises import costs, including for oil, creating a trade off the Reserve Bank of India must weigh in its currency management.

        Conclusion

        The rupee’s shift from overvalued to undervalued reflects oil price and West Asia conflict volatility more than a deliberate policy choice. Whether this undervaluation becomes a durable export advantage or reverses with oil price stabilisation remains the open question.