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Type: SC Judgements

SC Judgements are very important for Mains Paper

  • OBC creamy layer and the income test

    Why in the News

    The Supreme Court will consider setting up a Bench to hear the Centre’s application seeking clarification on its judgment on the income test used to identify the creamy layer among the Other Backward Classes (OBC). The judgment, Union of India vs Rohith Nathan, was delivered by a Division Bench on 11 March. It held that salary income cannot be used to exclude OBC candidates whose parents work in public sector undertakings or in private employment where the equivalence of those posts with government service has not been established. The Centre says implementing that reading retrospectively is “extremely difficult” and would have a “cascading effect” on services settled from 2012 onwards, with the impact extending to all categories including the Unreserved category. The contest has therefore moved from what the income test means to how far back the corrected meaning reaches.

    What is the creamy layer income and wealth test?

    1. Origin: The creamy layer concept among OBCs emerged from the Supreme Court’s 1992 ruling in the Indra Sawhney case, which paved the way for OBC reservations, and was meant to exclude families that had accumulated social and economic privilege.
    2. The governing instrument: The Department of Personnel and Training (DoPT) issued an Office Memorandum in September 1993 laying down the exclusion categories, including children of senior constitutional, judicial, government and armed forces officers.
    3. The test itself: A candidate falls in the creamy layer if the parents’ gross family income exceeds the prescribed limit for three consecutive years, or if the family holds wealth above the exemption limit under the Wealth Tax Act, 1957.
    4. What the 1993 Memorandum left out: Income from salaries and from agricultural land was consciously excluded from the calculation, with income from property, business or capital gains counted instead. The income limit was Rs 1 lakh in 1993 and now stands at Rs 8 lakh, last revised in 2017.

    What did the Court hold in Union of India vs Rohith Nathan?

    1. Parity across employment categories: OBC candidates whose parents work in public sector undertakings or the private sector, where post equivalence with government service is not established, cannot be treated differently from OBC candidates in other categories.
    2. The income test is a residual filter: The income and wealth component of the exclusion exercise must be seen and operated as a “residual filter”, not as the primary basis for exclusion.
    3. The test applies equally until equivalence exists: Until the government establishes equivalence between public sector undertaking posts and government service posts, the income and wealth test must continue to apply equally to both.
    4. A specific remedy was ordered: The Centre was directed to implement this reading within six months by creating supernumerary posts for the petitioners and allotting them services according to their ranks in their respective Civil Services Examination years.

    How did the discrimination arise between the 1993 Memorandum and the 2004 letter?

    1. The 2004 letter reopened a settled exclusion: The DoPT issued a letter in October 2004 to clarify interpretive issues, and paragraph 9 of it dealt with OBCs whose parents held posts in Central or State public sector undertakings without established equivalence.
    2. It appeared to reverse the salary exclusion: The letter suggested that salary income was to be counted in testing whether the family crossed the threshold for three consecutive years, in circumstances the letter did not clearly specify.
    3. Two identically placed groups were tested differently: Children of government servants were tested without salary income. Children of public sector and private employees were tested with it, which the Court called “hostile discrimination”.
    4. The Court stated the equality failure directly: Excluding children of public sector or private employees on the basis of salary income alone, without reference to whether the post was Group A or B or Group C or D, amounted to equals being treated unequally.

    Who was affected by the old reading?

    1. The petitioners were serving aspirants: At least 50 OBC candidates who had appeared in the Civil Services Examination since 2015 were excluded from consideration for OBC reserved posts.
    2. The exclusion turned on one variable: They were classified as creamy layer solely on the basis of their parents’ income, with the parents working in public sector undertakings or the private sector.
    3. The dispute is not recent: The batch of cases had been pending for close to a decade before judgment.

    Why does the Centre call retrospective implementation extremely difficult?

    1. The reach extends beyond the reserved category: Reopening allocations settled from 2012 onwards would affect all categories, including the Unreserved category.
    2. Adjustment generates its own claims: The DoPT reports an increasing number of claims for adjustment and consequent disputes over seniority.
    3. The remedy could produce fresh unfairness: The Centre argues the supernumerary posts exercise could itself be unfair to a different category of OBC candidates.
    4. The precedent has already multiplied: 22 other judgments have applied the principles laid down in the ruling, and 12 new cases have been filed by candidates who had not previously approached the courts, seeking reconsideration of their non creamy layer status.

    What has the government actually done since the ruling?

    1. The file moved between ministries: The Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions wrote to the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment on 3 June seeking advice on implementing the directions.
    2. The referral rested on a rules point: The Personnel Ministry cited the Allocation of Business Rules, under which the Social Justice Ministry formulates policy on reservations, and sought advice on the instructions the DoPT should notify.
    3. The stated position changed within days: As of 19 August the Centre told the Central Administrative Tribunal, in an identical matter, that it was in the process of implementing the judgment. The DoPT then filed an application setting out why the directions were not workable retrospectively.
    4. A parallel application seeks an interim carve out: The Centre has asked to continue allotting services on the old reading of the income test for Civil Services Examination 2025 candidates, since more than 950 of them were recommended on that basis and were about to begin their Foundation Course.

    What is contested about the Centre’s position?

    1. The timing of the objection is questioned: The affected candidates ask why the DoPT did not raise these implementation difficulties earlier in a litigation that ran for close to a decade.
    2. The scope of the old practice is disputed: The candidates say the reading the Court found discriminatory was applied only by the DoPT, and applied arbitrarily at that.
    3. The Centre defends salary as a distinguishing factor: It argues that salary income may in some cases be the “sole intelligible differentia” between two OBC candidates from similar social backgrounds.
    4. It raises an outer limit case: Without salary consideration, candidates whose parents earn up to Rs 1 crore could be treated as non creamy layer.

    Challenges to the creamy layer exclusion

    1. Post equivalence has never been completed: The entire dispute exists because the government has not established which public sector undertaking posts correspond to which government service grades, decades after the requirement was written in. Eg. The 1993 Office Memorandum itself made the income test conditional on equivalence, and the 2004 letter was issued precisely because equivalence was still absent. Fix. Set a statutory deadline for the Department of Public Enterprises to notify a grade to grade equivalence table, after which the income test lapses for unequated posts.
    2. The income ceiling is revised by discretion, not by rule: With no indexation formula, the threshold stays static through years of inflation and then jumps, so the excluded population changes for reasons unrelated to backwardness. Eg. The ceiling moved from Rs 1 lakh in 1993 to Rs 8 lakh in 2017 through irregular administrative revisions. Fix. Link the ceiling to a published price or income index with automatic annual revision.
    3. Verification of income claims is weak: Certificates rest on self declaration and local revenue verification, which produces both wrongful exclusion and wrongful inclusion. Eg. Recruitment bodies routinely cancel candidatures years after selection on the ground of a defective non creamy layer certificate. Fix. Validate income declarations against the income tax database at the certificate issuing stage rather than at the appointment stage.
    4. There is no data on who captures the benefit: Without caste and sub caste wise data on selections, the argument that a small set of OBC families corners reserved posts cannot be tested either way. Eg. The Rohini Commission on sub categorisation of OBCs worked without a comprehensive survey of the actual distribution of benefits across OBC communities. Fix. Publish anonymised, sub caste wise selection data for central services on a fixed annual cycle.
    5. Central and State lists diverge: A community treated as OBC by a State may not be on the central list, and the income test is administered differently across the two. Eg. Candidates have been denied central reservation benefits despite holding a State issued OBC certificate. Fix. Publish a reconciled concordance between the central list and each State list, updated whenever either changes.

    Conclusion

    An equality finding that identifies discrimination and then applies only prospectively leaves the identified wrong unremedied for everyone it already hit, and that is the contradiction the clarification application asks the Court to resolve. What to watch is whether a Bench is constituted, and whether it permits the interim carve out for the 2025 examination cohort until the wider question of reach is decided.

    Back2Basics

    1. Constitutional basis: It was established under Article 323A, which permits Parliament to provide for adjudication of service disputes of public servants by tribunals.
    2. Governing statute: It functions under the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, and began working in 1985.
    3. Jurisdiction: It hears recruitment and service matters of persons appointed to All India Services, central civil services and posts under the Union.
    4. Appeals: Its orders are challengeable before the High Court, following the Supreme Court’s ruling in L. Chandra Kumar vs Union of India (1997).

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2023] Consider the following statements : Statement-I: The Supreme Court of India has held in some judgements that the reservation policies made under Article 16(4) of the Constitution of India would be limited by Article 335 for maintenance of efficiency of administration. Statement-II : Article 335 of the Constitution of India defines the term ‘efficiency of administration’. Which one of the following is correct in respect of the above statements? (a) Both Statement-I and Statement-II are correct and Statement-II is the correct explanation for Statement-I (b) Both Statement-I and Statement-II are correct and Statement-II is not the correct explanation for Statement-I (c) Statement-I is correct but Statement-II is incorrect (d) Statement-I is incorrect but Statement-II is correct ANSWER: (c)”

  • How the Supreme Court ruling redefined ‘industry’

    Why in the News

    A nine-judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court revisited the definition of “industry” laid down in Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa (1978), examining how that definition interacts with the term “industry” as newly defined under the Industrial Relations Code, 2020. The 1978 ruling had given “industry” a wide, functional definition covering any organised activity involving cooperation between employer and employee for producing goods or services, regardless of profit motive. The Industrial Relations Code, 2020 narrows this definition by carving out specific exclusions. The Bench’s majority and minority opinions diverge on whether Parliament’s narrower statutory definition can override the Bangalore Water Supply test for constitutional purposes.

    What did the Bangalore Water Supply test originally hold?

    1. Triple test for “industry”: The 1978 ruling held that any activity involving systematic cooperation between an employer and workers to produce or distribute goods or services qualifies as an industry, irrespective of whether the entity is charitable, religious, sovereign, or run by the government.
    2. Sovereign function exception, narrowly read: The 1978 Bench exempted only inalienable sovereign functions of the State, such as legislation, defence, and the administration of justice, from the definition.
    3. Wide coverage of welfare and professional bodies: The test brought hospitals, educational institutions, and clubs employing staff within the definition of “industry,” extending industrial-dispute protections to their employees.
    4. Persistent legislative attempts to narrow it: Parliament had earlier attempted to codify a narrower definition through an amendment that was never brought into force, leaving the 1978 test operative for over four decades.

    What does the Industrial Relations Code, 2020 change?

    1. Statutory definition narrows the exclusions: The Industrial Relations Code, 2020 (the law consolidating the Trade Unions Act 1926, the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act 1946 and the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 into a single code) defines “industry” with specific carve-outs for institutions engaged in charitable, social, or philanthropic services not for profit.
    2. Government departments performing sovereign functions excluded: The Code writes into statute an exclusion for departments discharging sovereign functions, aligning more closely with a narrower reading than the 1978 test.
    3. Domestic and hospital work carved out selectively: The Code excludes certain categories, such as purely domestic service, while leaving other categories, including some hospitals, to be decided case by case.

    Where do the majority and minority views diverge?

    1. Majority view on legislative competence: The majority holds that Parliament may legislatively define “industry” for the purposes of a labour statute, and that a narrower statutory definition prevails over the judicially evolved 1978 test within the Code’s own field of operation.
    2. Minority view on protective intent: The minority holds that a legislative narrowing of “industry” risks excluding workers in charitable, educational, and welfare institutions from industrial-dispute protections that the 1978 Bench extended to them.
    3. Divergence on precedent’s continuing force: The majority treats Bangalore Water Supply as persuasive but non-binding once Parliament legislates a definition, while the minority treats it as continuing to bind interpretation of undefined terms outside the Code’s specific carve-outs.

    Conclusion

    The ruling settles, for now, that Parliament’s statutory definition of “industry” under the Industrial Relations Code, 2020 governs disputes falling within the Code, narrowing the wide protective sweep the Bangalore Water Supply test had given workers across charitable, educational and welfare institutions for over four decades. Litigation over which specific institutions fall inside or outside the Code’s carve-outs is expected to continue as the Code is implemented.

    Back2Basics: Industrial Relations Code, 2020

    1. One of the four labour codes consolidating 29 central labour laws, this one merging the Trade Unions Act, 1926, the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, and the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
    2. Raises the threshold for prior government permission before layoffs, retrenchment or closure from 100 to 300 workers in an establishment.
    3. Introduces a statutory recognition mechanism for trade unions and a two-member negotiating council where no single union has majority membership.
    4. Notified but implemented in phases, with States framing their own rules under it.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2024, GS3, 15 marks] Discuss the merits and demerits of the four ‘Labour Codes’ in the context of labour market reforms in India. What has been the progress so far in this regard?”

  • Triple test, adrift

    Why in the News

    On 20 August 2026, a nine judge Bench of the Supreme Court of India delivered a judgment on the correctness of the ruling in Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board vs A. Rajappa (1978). That 1978 judgment laid down the “Triple Test” for what counts as an “industry” under Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The present Bench left the Triple Test standing for all pending disputes under the older Act. A majority of the same Bench also ruled that the 1978 judgment will not be a “sheet anchor” for interpreting Section 2(p) of the Industrial Relations Code, 2020. The tension is that Section 2(p) itself reproduces much of the Triple Test’s essence, so an interpretive framework has been severed from a provision that continues to embody it.

    What is the “Triple Test” on what counts as an “industry”?

    1. The three conditions: An activity qualifies as an industry where three conditions are met together: a systematic activity, employer-employee cooperation, and production or distribution of goods and services to satisfy human wants other than those that are purely religious or spiritual.
    2. Profit is irrelevant: Profit motive plays no part in the determination. What matters is the nature of the activity itself, so a loss making or non-commercial body can still be an industry.
    3. The single exclusion: Only “sovereign functions” stand outside the definition, which is a narrow carve out rather than a general exemption for the State.

    How did the reference reach a nine judge Bench?

    1. The origin: The Triple Test was laid down in the 1978 judgment, which read Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 expansively.
    2. The doubt: A five judge Bench in State of U.P. vs Jai Bir Singh (2005) raised a doubt about that definition.
    3. The escalation: A seven judge Bench then sent the question to the current nine judge Bench.
    4. The statute changed while the reference was pending: The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was repealed on 21 November 2025, when the Industrial Relations Code, 2020 came into force.
    5. The Bench therefore faced two statutes: It had to decide the status of the Triple Test both for disputes still pending under the repealed Act and for interpretation of the successor provision, which is why the ruling splits along those two lines.

    What did the majority and the dissent hold?

    1. Pending disputes are unaffected: The Bench, led by the Chief Justice of India, left the Triple Test standing for all pending disputes under the older Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
    2. The anchor was removed for the new Code: A majority of the nine judge Bench ruled that the 1978 judgment will not be a “sheet anchor” for interpreting Section 2(p) of the Industrial Relations Code, 2020.
    3. The dissent went further than disagreement: The dissenting opinion held that the reference itself was unnecessary and that the Triple Test requires no interference at all.
    4. The dissent was not isolated: That view was shared by three other judges on the Bench, so the split on the reference question was narrow rather than lopsided.

    Why does an expansive definition of “industry” matter more now than in 1978?

    1. The workforce has moved: Since 1978, and particularly after the liberalisation and privatisation reforms of 1991, a far higher number of workers have moved to the private sector, out of the security of public employment.
    2. Security no longer comes from the employer: For a worker outside public employment, statutory coverage rather than employment status is what provides protection.
    3. Definition decides access: Whether an establishment is an “industry” determines whether its workers can raise an industrial dispute at all, so the definition is the gateway to every protection that follows.
    4. Most of the workforce is outside formal protection: About 90 per cent of India’s workforce is informal, and nearly 58 per cent of salaried workers still lack a written contract.
    5. The expansive reading is therefore a bulwark: An expansive definition of industry is more necessary now than it was in 1978, precisely because the cushion of public employment has shrunk.

    Was the Triple Test a pro-labour device or a framework for industrial peace?

    1. It was not merely pro-labour: The Triple Test was not only a device for extending worker protection, though it is usually described that way.
    2. It brought restrictions with it: An expansive definition of industry brought with it not just the protections of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 but also its restrictions.
    3. The employer gained a defined route: It gave employers a regulated route to retrenchment and closure, rather than leaving those decisions to be contested without a framework.
    4. Workers accepted a limit in return: It carried a bar on workers striking at will, so the coverage came with a procedural discipline on industrial action.
    5. The net effect was industrial peace: In essence the Triple Test allowed for industrial peace rather than worker welfare alone, which is what makes its removal a loss to both sides rather than to one.

    Why is setting the 1978 judgment aside difficult to justify?

    1. The successor provision did not change the test: Section 2(p) of the Industrial Relations Code, 2020 does not move away from the Triple Test formula and reproduces much of its essence.
    2. The reasoning does not follow: It is therefore difficult to understand why the 1978 judgment has to be set aside when Section 2(p) itself comes up for interpretation.
    3. A framework, not just a precedent, was cut away: Severing that principle from the Code cuts away the interpretive framework that allowed such disputes to be resolved at all.
    4. Two footings now coexist: Pending disputes under the repealed Act will be decided on the Triple Test, and disputes under the Code will be decided without it as an anchor, on a definition that says much the same thing.
    5. The burden shifts to the lower courts: It is now incumbent upon courts and tribunals to ensure that a change of statute is not read as a change of intent, and they must do so with the anchor removed.

    Challenges to the definition of “industry” under the Industrial Relations Code, 2020

    1. Litigation will restart from zero: With the 1978 judgment displaced as the anchor, every category of establishment settled over four decades becomes arguable again. Eg. Hospitals, educational institutions and charitable bodies were brought within the definition on the strength of that judgment. Fix. Insert a statutory explanation to Section 2(p) listing the categories expressly included and excluded, so the question is settled by text rather than by fresh litigation.
    2. The “sovereign functions” exclusion has no statutory boundary: The carve out is judicially defined, so its width expands or contracts with each ruling rather than by legislative choice. Eg. Municipal and public utility bodies performing statutory duties have repeatedly contested their status as industries. Fix. Define sovereign functions in the Code by reference to a listed set of constitutional functions.
    3. Threshold changes shrink the protected group: Raising the retrenchment and closure approval threshold reduces how many workers the framework covers regardless of how “industry” is defined. Eg. The Industrial Relations Code, 2020 raises the closure and retrenchment threshold from 100 to 300 workers. Fix. Pair the higher threshold with a statutory retrenchment compensation escalator and a funded reskilling entitlement.
    4. Platform and contract work sits outside the frame: The employer-employee cooperation limb assumes an identifiable employer, which app-mediated and multi-layered contract work does not supply. Eg. Aggregator platforms classify workers as partners rather than employees, which places them outside the industrial dispute route. Fix. Deem an aggregator to be the principal employer for the purpose of dispute resolution where it controls pricing and task allocation.
    5. Two parallel regimes will run for years: Pending disputes under the repealed Act and new disputes under the Code will be decided on different interpretive footings for as long as the backlog lasts. Eg. Industrial disputes routinely take a decade or more to reach final decision. Fix. Issue a transitional provision directing that Section 2(p) be construed consistently with the settled position under Section 2(j) for a stated period.
    6. Tribunal capacity has not been strengthened: A framework that shifts interpretive burden to tribunals fails where those tribunals are understaffed and slow. Eg. Industrial tribunals and labour courts carry long standing vacancies alongside a large pending case load. Fix. Fill sanctioned tribunal posts on a fixed calendar and publish disposal timelines for industrial dispute references.

    Conclusion

    The nine judge Bench preserved the Triple Test where it no longer decides much and removed it where it would have decided most. The relationship between the successor provision and the test, set out above, is what makes that split hard to defend. The dissenting view, that the reference was unnecessary and the test required no interference, is the more coherent reading of a workforce that has moved into private employment since 1978 and needs an expansive definition more, not less. It now falls to courts and tribunals to ensure that a change of statute is not read as a change of intent, without the anchor that would have made that straightforward.

    “[2024, GS3, 15 marks] Discuss the merits and demerits of the four ‘Labour Codes’ in the context of labour market reforms in India. What has been the progress so far in this regard?”

  • SC lauds repealed MGNREGA as ‘neither freebie nor exploitation’

    Why in the News

    The Supreme Court has described the repealed Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, 2005 (MGNREGA) as a “salutary scheme” that was neither a freebie nor an exploitation of rural workers. A three judge Bench made the observation. It was hearing a petition seeking directions to the government to pay delayed wages under that Act along with compensation. Civil rights groups have meanwhile claimed that the successor law has produced a 50 per cent fall in employment generation. What is now contested is whether a guarantee of work rests on an enforceable right or on a Directive Principle that Parliament may redesign at will.

    What did the Court say about the repealed employment guarantee law?

    1. The Bench recorded an unqualified endorsement: The Chief Justice of India, heading a three judge Bench, orally observed that the repealed Act was a good and effective scheme.
    2. The reach was part of the praise: The observation noted that the scheme did a wonderful job in rural areas and was implemented across the whole country.
    3. It rejected both political labels attached to the scheme: The Bench held that the scheme was neither a freebie nor exploitation, which answers the charge that guaranteed public work is a handout and the charge that it is underpaid labour.
    4. The endorsement carries no operative effect: These were oral observations in a hearing, not a finding recorded in a judgment, so they bind nothing.

    What has changed under the successor law?

    1. A new statute has replaced the 2005 Act: The Viksit Bharat Guarantee for Rozgar and Ajeevika Mission (Gramin) Act, 2025, or VB-G RAM G Act, is now the governing law for rural employment guarantee.
    2. Guaranteed days have gone up: The entitlement rises from 100 days to 125 days of work per household each year.
    3. Employment generated has gone down: Civil rights groups claim a 50 per cent decline in employment generation under the new law, despite the higher entitlement.
    4. The design has moved from demand to allocation: The new law reflects a shift from a demand driven, rights based framework to a centrally controlled model.
    5. The funding split has been rewritten: The Centre to State ratio moves from 90:10 to 60:40, which raises the funding burden on States threefold.

    What did the petition ask the Court to do?

    1. Payment of arrears with compensation: The petition sought directions for the government to pay wages already delayed under the repealed Act, together with compensation for the delay.
    2. A test of the wage floor: The Court was urged to examine whether a law may prescribe minimum wages lower than the threshold determined by the State concerned.
    3. Elevation of the work guarantee: The petition asked that the statutory guarantee of rural work be raised to the status of a fundamental right under Article 21.
    4. The fiscal claim behind the numbers: It was submitted that States must now find nearly half the funds under the new law, that employment has halved, and that States do not have the money.

    Can a statutory guarantee of work be raised to a fundamental right?

    1. The Bench located the right in Part IV: A judge on the Bench observed that the Constitution does not make the right to work a fundamental right, and that it is more a democratic aspiration under the Directive Principles of State Policy.
    2. The consequence of that placement: To achieve that aspiration the state formulates a policy providing work at a graded, compensatory level. That is a matter of legislative choice rather than of enforceable entitlement.
    3. The petitioner’s route runs through dignity: It was argued that the right to lead a dignified life is part of Article 21, that a dignified life requires employment at minimum wages, and that anything below minimum wages amounts to forced labour.
    4. The question the Bench put remains open: Whether a Directive Principle worked out through a statute should be treated on par with Article 21 was posed from the Bench and not answered.

    Why did the Bench doubt a judicially fixed wage floor?

    1. A floor can shrink the work available: A judge on the Bench noted that mandating a minimum wage threshold might risk reducing the number of employment opportunities offered.
    2. Wages track local conditions: The Chief Justice of India observed that wages are usually linked to prevailing local conditions rather than to a single national figure.
    3. The two positions are not reconcilable within the scheme: A wage set by dignity produces one number, a wage set by local labour market conditions produces another, and only a legislature can choose between them.
    4. The judicial instrument is blunt here: A court can strike down a wage as unconstitutional, but it cannot fund the difference, which is why the Bench treated the question as a fiscal one.

    How did the Court dispose of the matter?

    1. The old law is no longer the right frame: A judge on the Bench stated that the issues raised must be examined afresh in the light of the new law rather than under the repealed Act.
    2. The petition was disposed of: The Court disposed of the present petition rather than deciding the questions it raised.
    3. Liberty was granted to start again: The petitioner was asked to file a fresh petition, which resets the challenge against the successor statute.
    4. The practical effect is delay: Both questions the petition raised survive, but only in a proceeding that has yet to be filed.

    Challenges to the rural employment guarantee framework

    1. A demand driven scheme collapses if funds are capped: Where the budget is fixed in advance, field staff suppress the registration of work demand rather than record an unmet entitlement. Eg. Work demand under the earlier scheme was routinely recorded only after funds were released for the block. Fix. Make the budget line for the guarantee an open ended charge that is revised at the supplementary stage against recorded demand.
    2. Delayed wages convert a guarantee into a loan from the worker: Payment beyond the statutory window pushes households into informal borrowing at the exact moment the scheme is meant to protect them. Eg. A large share of wage payments under the earlier scheme was released beyond the fifteen day statutory window in successive financial years. Fix. Automate the delay compensation payment through the same payment system that releases the wage, without requiring a claim.
    3. A higher State share transfers the risk to the weakest States: Poorer States with the largest demand for guaranteed work are least able to fund a 40 per cent share. Eg. States facing the highest rural distress also carry the highest ratio of committed expenditure to revenue. Fix. Apply a differentiated matching ratio linked to a State’s own revenue capacity rather than a uniform national split.
    4. Asset quality is weakly monitored: Works are selected for their ability to absorb labour rather than for durable value, so the assets created decay within seasons. Eg. Earthen works taken up before the monsoon are frequently washed out before they are measured. Fix. Require every work above a threshold cost to carry a technical sanction and a geotagged completion audit.
    5. Social audit is the design safeguard and the weakest link: The Gram Sabha audit is meant to catch fake muster rolls, but audit units are staffed and funded by the same administration they examine. Eg. Social audit units in several States operate with a fraction of their sanctioned staff. Fix. Fund social audit units directly from the central share and place their reporting line under the State Accountant General.
    6. Women’s participation depends on facilities that are rarely provided: Creche facilities and worksite shade are statutory entitlements that are treated as optional. Eg. Worksites routinely operate without the creche required where more than five children under six are present. Fix. Make release of the next tranche of administrative expenditure conditional on verified worksite facility compliance.

    Conclusion

    The Court’s endorsement of the repealed Act is a comment on record and nothing more, and the Bench made clear that the live questions must now be argued against the successor statute rather than the one it replaced. The petition was accordingly disposed of with liberty to file afresh, so both questions it raised remain undecided. The next milestone is the filing of that fresh petition. That petition will test the constitutional status of the work guarantee and the legality of a wage below a State determined minimum against the VB-G RAM G Act for the first time.

    “[2011] Among the following who are eligible to benefit from the “Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act”?

    (a) Adult members of only the scheduled caste and scheduled tribe households

    (b) Adult members of below poverty line (BPL) households

    (c) Adult members of households of all backward communities

    (d) Adult members of any household

  • SC trims law practice requirement to 1 year for judicial service

    Why in the News

    The Supreme Court has upheld the requirement of prior legal practice for entry into the judicial service. The same order cuts the mandated experience from three years to one. The decision came on review petitions filed against All India Judges Association v. Union of India (May 2025). That judgment had reintroduced a minimum practice condition for candidates applying to the post of Civil Judge (Junior Division), reversing an earlier position that allowed fresh law graduates to sit the examination. The present order was passed by a majority of 2:1 in a three judge Bench headed by the Chief Justice of India. What is contested is whether one year at the Bar can supply the courtroom exposure that the three year rule was designed to guarantee, or whether the shortfall has simply been shifted into training the judiciary itself will now have to deliver.

    What has the Court now ordered on eligibility for judicial service?

    1. The principle survives: Prior legal practice remains a precondition for applying to the judicial service, so the 2025 position that a law degree alone is insufficient is undisturbed.
    2. The quantum is cut by two thirds: The required period of active legal practice falls from three years to one year.
    3. The margin was narrow: The majority opinion was delivered by two judges of a three judge Bench, with the Chief Justice of India authoring it.
    4. The vehicle was a review: The order was passed on review petitions filed against the May 2025 verdict, so it revisits that judgment rather than deciding a fresh challenge.

    How is the shortened practice requirement compensated?

    1. A year at a judicial academy follows selection: A successful applicant carrying one year of legal practice undergoes a one year intensive training programme at the State judicial academy concerned.
    2. A clerkship year follows the academy: That training is followed by a final year of law clerkship with senior judicial officers and High Court judges.
    3. The total exposure is rebuilt to three years: One year of practice, one year of academy training and one year of clerkship together restore the three year period the 2025 judgment had demanded at the Bar alone.
    4. The locus of training shifts: Two of those three years are now delivered inside the judicial system rather than in independent practice.

    What happens to candidates who applied in the interregnum?

    1. A year has already elapsed: The majority noted that a full year has passed since the May 2025 judgment, during which recruitment continued under uncertainty.
    2. Interregnum applicants are deemed compliant: Candidates who applied for the post of Civil Judge (Junior Division) in that period are treated as having completed the required one year of active legal practice.
    3. No proof will be demanded from them: They will not be asked to furnish certificates of proof of practice.
    4. The rule bites from a fixed date: The one year prior practice requirement comes into force in earnest from 1 April 2027.

    Does a one year requirement still deliver what Bar experience was meant to supply?

    1. The dissent rejects the reduction: One judge on the Bench dissented from the majority view on the shortened period.
    2. The stated ground is readiness: The dissenting opinion holds that experience at the Bar is essential for students coming straight out of college, which is an argument about courtroom judgement rather than about length of service.
    3. The majority’s answer is substitution, not agreement: The majority accepts that one year of practice is by itself insufficient, and supplies the balance through the two internal years set out above.
    4. The unresolved question is equivalence: Structured training gives uniform instruction, and practice gives exposure to litigants, adversarial pressure and case failure. The order does not establish that the two are interchangeable.

    Challenges to a prior practice requirement for judicial service

    1. It delays entry and shrinks the applicant pool: A compulsory year at the Bar pushes the earliest entry age up and deters graduates who cannot fund an unpaid year. Eg. Stipends for junior advocates in district courts frequently fall below minimum wage levels in the same district. Fix. Make the practice year count only where the candidate is paid a notified minimum stipend, funded through a Bar Council administered corpus.
    2. Proof of practice invites certification abuse: Practice is usually certified by a senior advocate or a judicial officer, which turns an eligibility condition into a patronage transaction. Eg. Certificates of practice have historically been contested in service litigation over district judiciary appointments. Fix. Replace discretionary certificates with an objective test of appearances recorded on the National Judicial Data Grid.
    3. It falls unevenly on first generation and women entrants: Candidates without family in the profession lack the chambers access that makes a practice year viable. Eg. Women have been the majority of successful candidates in several State judicial service examinations, a pattern that a mandatory chambers year puts at risk. Fix. Create funded court attachment schemes at every district court reserved for first generation law graduates.
    4. Vacancies are already the binding constraint: Adding a filter at entry slows recruitment into a cadre where roughly one fourth of sanctioned posts already lie vacant. Eg. Subordinate courts carry a pendency of about 49 million cases, with over 1.8 lakh cases pending for more than thirty years. Fix. Run recruitment cycles on a fixed annual calendar so the eligibility change does not compound the delay in filling posts.
    5. Training capacity has not been sized for the new load: The academy year now required of every recruit assumes faculty and residential capacity that most academies do not have. Eg. Several State judicial academies run induction courses of a few months rather than a full year. Fix. Fund academy expansion under the Centrally Sponsored Scheme for judicial infrastructure before the rule takes effect in 2027.
    6. The reform addresses quality of entrants, not throughput: Better prepared judges do not by themselves raise disposal where procedure, adjournments and clerical load consume court time. Eg. The case clearance rate in subordinate courts stands at about 89 per cent, so pendency accumulates even with sitting judges at work. Fix. Appoint professional court managers at every district court complex to take administrative work off judicial officers.

    Conclusion

    The Court has retained the principle that a judicial officer should reach the bench with courtroom exposure. It conceded at the same time that a three year bar at the Bar was too heavy a filter for a cadre already short of judges. The compromise moves two of the three years inside the system, and defers the whole scheme so it applies in earnest from 1 April 2027. The next step is with the State High Courts and Public Service Commissions, which must align their service rules and academy capacity before that date.

    Subordinate judiciary in India

    1. Where it sits: The subordinate judiciary comprises the district and taluka level civil and criminal courts, and it is where the overwhelming majority of litigation begins and ends.
    2. The staffing position: India has roughly 21 judges per million people, against the Law Commission’s recommended benchmark of 50.
    3. Who controls it: The High Court of each State exercises administrative and disciplinary control over the subordinate courts within its jurisdiction.

    Constitutional framework governing the subordinate judiciary

    1. Article 233: Provides for the appointment of District Judges by the Governor in consultation with the High Court.
    2. Article 234: Governs the recruitment of persons other than District Judges to the judicial service, by the Governor in consultation with the State Public Service Commission and the High Court.
    3. Article 235: Vests administrative and disciplinary control over the subordinate judiciary in the High Court.
    4. Article 236: Defines “district judge” and “judicial service” for the purposes of this Chapter.
    5. Article 312: Empowers Parliament to create an All India Judicial Service on a Rajya Sabha resolution passed by a two thirds majority.

    Government initiatives for the subordinate judiciary

    1. eCourts Mission Mode Project, Phase III: Funds digitisation of case records, virtual courts and paperless court rooms across district judiciary establishments.
    2. Centrally Sponsored Scheme for Development of Infrastructure Facilities for the Judiciary: Finances court halls, residential units, lawyers’ halls and digital computer rooms at the district and subordinate level.
    3. Fast Track Special Courts: Dedicated courts set up to try offences under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 and rape cases within statutory timelines.
    4. National Judicial Data Grid: A public dashboard publishing case pendency, disposal and age of cases for every district court, which makes court level performance comparable.

    Back2Basics: Civil Judge (Junior Division)

    1. The entry post: It is the lowest rung of the State judicial service and the post through which most judicial officers enter the district judiciary.
    2. How recruitment happens: Candidates are selected under Article 234 through an examination conducted by the State Public Service Commission or the High Court, in consultation with the High Court.
    3. What the court tries: A Civil Judge (Junior Division) exercises original civil jurisdiction up to a pecuniary limit fixed by State law, and the corresponding criminal post is Judicial Magistrate First Class.
    4. Career path: Promotion runs to Civil Judge (Senior Division) and then to the cadre of District Judge, with a share of District Judge posts filled by direct recruitment from the Bar.

    “[2025, GS2, 15 marks] Discuss the evolution of collegium system in India. Critically examine the advantages and disadvantages of the system on appointment of the Judges of the Supreme Court of India and that of the USA.”

  • English indigenous or foreign language? Supreme Court for examining constitution

    Why in the News

    The Supreme Court on 20 August 2026 said the constitutionality of treating English as a non indigenous language under the three language policy will have to be examined, given the extent of its roots in Indian society. That classification decides which languages compete for a student’s single foreign language slot, so a descriptive label is operating as a rationing rule.

    What is the Three-Language Formula?

    1. What it requires: The three language formula requires a school student to learn three languages, of which at least two must be native Indian languages, described in the policy as Bhartiya Bhashas.
    2. Source and timing: The Central Board of Secondary Education (CBSE) is introducing it under the National Education Policy, 2020 from the academic year 2026-27.
    3. Sequence prescribed: The policy begins a child with the mother tongue, moves to another indigenous language, and leaves the third open to being either indigenous or foreign.

    What is the National Council for Teacher Education (NCTE)?

    1. National Council for Teacher Education: The National Council for Teacher Education (NCTE) is the statutory body that lays down norms for teacher education programmes and recognises the institutions running them. Its rules decide whether a school’s language teacher holds the Bachelor of Education qualification that recognition requires.

    Why is the classification of English as non-indigenous a constitutional question?

    1. The label under scrutiny: The bench said it will have to see whether English can be classified as a non indigenous language or an indigenous one, given the historical perspective of English and the extent of its roots into Indian society.
    2. Objection to the word native: A judge on the bench recorded a serious reservation about the expression native, holding that it carries a very colonial import and that indigenous is the correct term.
    3. Source of the expression: The Additional Solicitor General told the Court that non native is an expression coming from the new education policy, and the bench replied that the framers of the policy ought to have been conscious of the words they chose.
    4. The Board’s position: English is an official language under the Constitution and that status cannot be taken away, it is not treated like a foreign language, and it cannot be treated like a native language either.
    5. The presiding judge’s view: The Chief Justice of India said English could hardly be considered a foreign language.
    6. Why the label is reviewable: A classification that determines which language a student may take up is State action affecting a class of students, which brings it within constitutional review rather than leaving it to policy discretion alone.

    How does the classification restrict the study of other foreign languages?

    1. Two slots pre committed: Mandating at least two native Indian languages leaves a student only one slot for a foreign language.
    2. English absorbs that slot: Nearly all students choose English for the single slot, so French, Japanese and Spanish are effectively pushed out of the main curriculum.
    3. Enrolled students displaced: A large number of students already studying French and Japanese have to switch to a native language.
    4. Employment argument: Counsel for the petitioners argued that a second foreign language increases employment opportunities, and that the students affected come from middle and lower income homes.
    5. Textbook design problem: Textbooks placed online under the scheme begin with compound sentences rather than with the first letter, which makes learning an unfamiliar script from them impractical.

    Why is the Class 6 batch at the centre of the dispute?

    1. Cohort singled out: Classes 7 to 9 were exempted under Board guidelines, and the present Class 6 batch was slated to face full implementation.
    2. Terminal assessment: That batch faces a mandatory third language paper in the Class 10 Board examination by 2031.
    3. Reprieve proposed: The bench asked why the Class 6 students could not be given a reprieve from writing the third language paper in the Class 10 examination.
    4. Infrastructure not in place: The Court tied the reprieve to the fact that school infrastructure is still not adequately in place across the various education Boards.
    5. Start earlier instead: The bench held that the scheme should begin in a lower class, which would give students, families and school administrations elbow space to adapt.

    What capacity gaps does the Court identify in implementation?

    1. Choice on paper only: The option is 23 languages in theory, and in practice the range a school can actually offer is far narrower.
    2. Board asymmetry: Only around 4 per cent of schools are under the Central Board of Secondary Education and 96 per cent are under State Boards, so a Board level rule reaches a small share of the school system.
    3. Teacher education compliance: There are asymmetries in compliance with National Council for Teacher Education rules across schools and Boards.
    4. Qualified teacher shortage: There are inadequate numbers of Bachelor of Education qualified teachers for the languages the scheme would add.
    5. Sanskrit as the illustration: The bench asked how many Sanskrit teachers hold a Bachelor of Education qualification, noting that deep subject learning does not substitute for the prescribed teaching qualification.
    6. Compliance regime required: Schools will need an administrative compliance regime for the additional language, which they can absorb only if the change is phased in.

    What has the Court asked the Board to return with?

    1. One time reprieve: Whether a one time reprieve can be given to the current batch of Class 6 students from the third language Board examination.
    2. Human resources: How human resources are to be built to meet the demands of the three language scheme.
    3. Starting class: Whether the scheme should ideally be started in earlier classes rather than at Class 6.
    4. Response undertaken: The Additional Solicitor General said she would place these questions before the experts and appraise the Court.

    Does a mother tongue first policy expand or narrow a student’s choices?

    1. Cognitive case accepted: Early instruction in the mother tongue improves comprehension and retention, which the bench acknowledged as a good policy foundation.
    2. The count is not the constraint: The dispute is not over learning three languages but over the rule that two of them must be indigenous, which fixes the composition rather than the number.
    3. Choice shrinks at the top: Fixing two slots turns the third into the only site of choice, so every additional foreign language competes against English instead of sitting alongside it.
    4. Distributional effect: Students from middle and lower income homes depend on institutional provision for a second foreign language, and better resourced students can purchase it outside the school.
    5. Supply decides the outcome: A student in a school with two language teachers has a choice of two, whatever the 23 language menu states, so teacher supply and not the rule is the binding constraint.

    Challenges to implementing the Three-Language Formula

    1. Teacher cadre does not exist: A third language cannot be staffed from an establishment that was never recruited for it. Eg. Tamil Nadu has not maintained a Hindi teaching cadre in its government schools, so the posts a third language would require have no incumbents to draw on.
    2. State resistance on federal grounds: School education sits on the Concurrent List and States have rejected the formula as imposition. Eg. Tamil Nadu has followed a two language policy since 1968 and has declined central school scheme agreements that carry the three language requirement.
    3. Persistent non implementation: The formula has been official policy for six decades without uniform adoption. Eg. It was recommended by the Kothari Commission and adopted in the National Policy on Education, 1968, and no decade since has seen it implemented across all States.
    4. Migration breaks continuity: A child who moves between States loses the second indigenous language on transfer. Eg. A student learning Marathi in Maharashtra who relocates to West Bengal has to restart a new regional language at the same class level.
    5. Assessment weight against learning time: A Board paper in a language begun at Class 6 carries the same weight as papers in subjects taught from Class 1. Eg. The current Class 6 batch faces a third language paper in the 2031 Class 10 examination after five years of instruction.
    6. Material for less taught languages: Beginner grade teaching material is thin for classical and less taught languages. Eg. Textbooks placed online under the scheme open with compound sentences, which suits a scholarly reader rather than a Class 6 beginner.
    7. Private school offer disrupted: Schools that market a second foreign language lose that offer when the slot is taken. Eg. Private schools offering French, German and Japanese from Class 6 draw fee paying enrolment on that basis.

    Conclusion

    The dispute has moved from how many languages a school child must learn to who decides that English is not one of India’s own. The Court has said the constitutionality of classifying English as non indigenous will have to be examined, and has asked the Board to return on a one time reprieve for the Class 6 batch, on building teacher capacity, and on shifting the scheme to earlier classes. The Board has undertaken to place these questions before its experts, so the policy stands notified for 2026-27 with its core classification still under judicial scrutiny.

    “[2020, GS2, 15] National Education Policy 2020 is in conformity with the Sustainable Development Goal-4 (2030). It intends to restructure and reorient education system in India. Critically examine the statement.”

  • The Vanashakti verdict is balanced and pragmatic

    Why in the News

    The Supreme Court of India delivered its judgment in Vanashakti vs Union of India on 29 July 2026, on the fate of projects that began construction or operation without obtaining prior Environmental Clearance (EC). The ruling shuts the executive routes to regularisation while holding that the statutory power to create a fresh one survives, which moves the question of legacy violations from administrative discretion to statutory law making.

    What is prior Environmental Clearance under the Environment Impact Assessment Notification, 2006?

    1. The requirement: Prior Environmental Clearance is the approval a project proponent must obtain before commencing construction or operation of a listed project, based on an assessment of the project's likely environmental consequences.
    2. The legal source: It is mandated by the Environment Impact Assessment Notification, 2006. That notification is issued under Section 3 of the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, the provision empowering the central government to take measures to protect and improve environmental quality.
    3. Coverage: It applies to listed sectors including mining, thermal power, infrastructure, construction and building projects above notified thresholds, and to real estate developments above specified built up area.
    4. Why the word prior matters: The clearance is a precondition for starting work, so an approval granted after work has begun cannot perform the function the law assigns it, which is to shape the project before its impact occurs.

    What is an ex post facto environmental clearance?

    1. Definition: An ex post facto environmental clearance is an approval granted to a project that has already commenced construction or operation without clearance, regularising the completed activity after the fact.

    What is an Office Memorandum in environmental regulation?

    1. Definition: An Office Memorandum is an internal executive communication issued by a ministry to set out an administrative procedure, and it carries no independent statutory force of its own.
    2. Its limit: It cannot create an exception to a requirement imposed by a statutory notification, since an administrative instrument cannot override the instrument that ranks above it.

    What did the Supreme Court hold on the 2017 Notification and the 2021 Standard Operating Procedure?

    1. Prior clearance reaffirmed as mandatory: The Court firmly reiterated that obtaining prior Environmental Clearance is a mandatory legal requirement under the Environment Impact Assessment Notification, 2006.
    2. The 2017 window is closed: Project proponents who commenced construction or operations without prior clearance and did not apply under the earlier violation mechanisms cannot now seek regularisation under the 2017 Notification.
    3. The 2021 Standard Operating Procedure struck down: The 2021 Standard Operating Procedure, issued as an Office Memorandum, was held legally unsustainable because an administrative memorandum cannot override the requirement of prior clearance.
    4. No fresh applications: Both mechanisms are no longer available for fresh cases, so the immediate operative message to project developers, industries and infrastructure agencies is that no fresh application can be made under them.
    5. What survives: The central government retains its Section 3 power to frame a fresh statutory mechanism for violation cases, if it considers this necessary in the larger public interest.

    Why did so many projects proceed without prior environmental clearance?

    1. Regulatory uncertainty: Some projects proceeded because the applicable regime was unsettled at the time work began, and the proponent could not identify with certainty which approval its category required.
    2. Incorrect interpretation of the law: Others proceeded on a mistaken reading of the requirement, treating a clearance as inapplicable to their category or their scale of activity.
    3. Failure to obtain approvals: A third set simply failed to obtain the necessary approvals before commencement, without any question of ambiguity in the law.

    Why does the distinction between an administrative memorandum and a statutory notification decide the outcome?

    1. Source of authority: A statutory notification draws its force directly from Section 3. An Office Memorandum draws only on the executive's power to instruct its own officials.
    2. Capacity to modify a legal requirement: Only an instrument of equal statutory standing can qualify a requirement imposed by the Environment Impact Assessment Notification, 2006, which is why the 2021 memorandum failed and a fresh notification would not.
    3. Procedural discipline: A statutory notification must be published, is open to legislative and judicial scrutiny in the form it takes, and cannot be varied by an internal circular.
    4. The practical consequence: The Court has not foreclosed relief for legacy violations, it has relocated the power to grant that relief from the ministry's administrative desk to a formal statutory instrument.
    5. A limit on the executive's own convenience: The distinction removes the option of granting case by case relief through evolving internal procedure, which is the mechanism through which the earlier windows expanded.

    Does barring post facto regularisation protect the environment or only strand completed projects?

    1. The deterrence claim: Environmental law cannot encourage deliberate violations by allowing routine post facto approvals, since a proponent who knows regularisation is available has no reason to wait for clearance.
    2. The proportionality claim: Indiscriminate closure or demolition of every violation project does not necessarily serve environmental protection or the larger public interest, particularly where the project is otherwise environmentally acceptable.
    3. The sunk investment problem: Numerous industrial units, commercial developments, infrastructure projects and public utility projects across India are in violation, and substantial investments have already been made in them.
    4. The pathway vacuum: Many such projects never applied under the earlier violation windows, so the closure of the 2017 scheme and the striking down of the 2021 memorandum leaves them with no legal pathway at all.
    5. How the judgment resolves the tension: It preserves the mandatory character of prior clearance while acknowledging the practical reality, refusing to convert the acknowledgement into a direction that the government must act.

    What safeguards must any future one time regularisation scheme carry?

    1. No permanent amnesty: Any future scheme cannot become a permanent violate first and regularise later mechanism, which is the specific design failure the Court guarded against.
    2. Strictly one time: The opportunity must be one time and confined to specified categories of violation projects, rather than a standing window that renews itself.
    3. Statutory authority: It must be issued as a notification under Section 3 and not as an administrative memorandum.
    4. Environmental damage assessment: The scheme must require an assessment of the environmental damage that the unauthorised commencement has already caused.
    5. Remediation and compensation: It must attach remediation measures and environmental compensation to the assessed damage, so that regularisation carries a cost proportionate to the harm.
    6. Strict compliance conditions: It must impose strict compliance conditions on the regularised project going forward, and be carefully designed within the framework of environmental law.
    7. No judicial direction to create it: The Court did not direct the central government to introduce such a scheme, it clarified that the government may do so if it considers it necessary in the larger public interest.

    Challenges to implementing the Vanashakti verdict

    1. Projects left without any pathway: Legacy violators outside the earlier windows now have no forum to approach until the government chooses to act, and inaction is a permissible outcome under the judgment. Eg. Real estate developments that exceeded their approved built up area before the 2017 window opened have no application route once the 2021 memorandum stands struck down.
    2. Capacity to assess environmental damage: Damage assessment for an already operating project requires baseline data that was never collected, because the baseline study is precisely what a prior clearance would have produced. Eg. State Pollution Control Boards in several States function with vacant technical posts and rely on proponent submitted monitoring data.
    3. Defining specified categories: Any future notification must draw a line between the proponent who acted in genuine regulatory uncertainty and the one who simply avoided approval, and the source material offers no test for that line. Eg. The 2017 Notification's six month window was criticised for treating a small unit's procedural lapse and a large mining expansion on identical terms.
    4. Fresh litigation risk: A one time notification will itself be challenged, so relief through this route is not quick relief. Eg. The 2021 Standard Operating Procedure survived for close to five years before it was set aside in the present judgment.
    5. Lender and contractual exposure: Projects with no clearance pathway carry impaired security for the banks that financed them, and the exposure does not sit with the proponent alone. Eg. Infrastructure projects halted for want of clearance have previously moved into stressed asset classification with their lending consortia.
    6. Enforcement against operating violators: Closure of the regularisation route does not by itself produce enforcement action, and the Court has not directed any. Eg. Show cause proceedings against units operating without clearance have historically ended in continued operation under interim orders.

    Conclusion

    The judgment settles that ex post facto regularisation cannot be granted by administrative memorandum while holding that Section 3 still permits a carefully framed statutory route. What it changes is the instrument, not the availability of relief, and it attaches damage assessment, remediation and compensation as the price of any such relief. What remains unresolved is whether the central government will exercise that power at all, since the Court has left the decision entirely to it. Until it does, thousands of legacy violation projects sit outside any legal pathway.

    Environmental Impact Assessment in India

    1. What it is: Environmental Impact Assessment is the process of predicting, evaluating and mitigating the environmental consequences of a proposed project before a decision on approval is taken.
    2. When it became mandatory: It was made legally mandatory in India by the Environment Impact Assessment Notification of 27 January 1994, which was superseded by the Environment Impact Assessment Notification, 2006.
    3. Project categorisation: Category A projects are appraised at the central level by the Union Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change on the recommendation of an Expert Appraisal Committee, while Category B projects are appraised by the State Environment Impact Assessment Authority.
    4. The B1 and B2 split: Category B projects are further divided into B1, which require a full impact assessment report, and B2, which are exempted from that requirement.
    5. The four stages: The process runs through screening, scoping, public consultation and appraisal, with public consultation comprising a public hearing at the site and written responses from concerned persons.
    6. The 2020 draft: A draft Environment Impact Assessment Notification was published in 2020 for public comment and was never notified.

    Constitutional Framework Governing Environmental Protection

    1. Article 21: Guarantees the right to life, judicially read to include the right to a clean and healthy environment.
    2. Article 48A: Directs the State to protect and improve the environment and to safeguard the forests and wildlife of the country.
    3. Article 51A(g): Places a fundamental duty on every citizen to protect and improve the natural environment including forests, lakes, rivers and wildlife.
    4. Article 253: Empowers Parliament to legislate for the whole or part of India to implement international agreements, the provision under which the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 was enacted.
    5. Seventh Schedule, Concurrent List Entry 17A: Places forests in the Concurrent List, moved there from the State List by the Forty second Constitutional Amendment.
    6. Seventh Schedule, Concurrent List Entry 17B: Places protection of wild animals and birds in the Concurrent List.

    Laws and Rules Governing Environmental Clearance

    1. Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974: Establishes the Central and State Pollution Control Boards and requires consent to establish and consent to operate for discharging effluent.
    2. Amended by the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Amendment Act, 2024, which replaced imprisonment with monetary penalties for several contraventions.
    3. Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981: Empowers the Boards to declare air pollution control areas and to regulate emissions from industrial plants.
    4. Environment (Protection) Act, 1986: The umbrella statute empowering the central government to take all measures necessary to protect and improve the quality of the environment.
    5. Section 5 empowers the central government to issue directions including closure, prohibition or regulation of any industry.
    6. Environment (Protection) Rules, 1986: Prescribe emission and effluent standards and the procedure for issuing directions under the parent Act.
    7. Environment Impact Assessment Notification, 2006: Lists the projects requiring prior clearance and fixes the appraisal procedure and the authorities at each level.
    8. Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980: Requires prior approval of the central government for diversion of forest land to non forest use.
    9. Renamed the Van (Sanrakshan Evam Samvardhan) Adhiniyam, 1980 by the amendment of 2023, which introduced exemptions for specified categories of land.
    10. Coastal Regulation Zone Notification, 2019: Regulates construction and industrial activity in the coastal stretches and the intertidal zone.
    11. National Green Tribunal Act, 2010: Constitutes a specialised tribunal for effective and expeditious disposal of cases relating to environmental protection and enforcement of legal rights relating to environment.
    12. Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991: Requires owners handling hazardous substances to hold insurance for immediate relief to persons affected by accidents.

    Government Initiatives for Environmental Regulation

    1. PARIVESH portal: A single window online hub for submission, monitoring and management of environment, forest, wildlife and coastal regulation zone clearance proposals, upgraded to its second version in 2023.
    2. National Clean Air Programme: A time bound national framework launched in 2019 to reduce particulate matter concentrations in identified non attainment cities.
    3. Extended Producer Responsibility portals: Digital registration and credit trading platforms for plastic, battery, tyre and electronic waste producers under the respective waste management rules.
    4. Green Credit Programme: A market mechanism notified in 2023 that awards tradable credits for voluntary environmental actions such as plantation and water conservation.
    5. Mission LiFE: A behaviour focused initiative launched in 2022 to shift individual and community consumption patterns towards sustainable practice.
    6. National Adaptation Fund for Climate Change: A central fund supporting State level adaptation projects in vulnerable sectors and regions.

    Key Facts about Environmental Regulation in India

    1. World Environment Day: Observed on 5 June, marking the opening of the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment at Stockholm.
    2. National Pollution Control Day: Observed on 2 December in memory of those who died in the 1984 Bhopal gas disaster.
    3. A dedicated environment court: The establishment of the National Green Tribunal in 2010 made India the third country in the world, after Australia and New Zealand, to set up a specialised environmental court.
    4. Public hearing notice: The Environment Impact Assessment Notification, 2006 requires a minimum notice period of 30 days for the public hearing stage.
    5. Consultant accreditation: Impact assessment consultants are accredited through the National Accreditation Board for Education and Training under the Quality Council of India.
    6. Central Pollution Control Board: Constituted in 1974 under the Water Act, it functions as the technical apex body for pollution monitoring and standards.

    Challenges in Environmental Impact Assessment in India

    1. Proponent funded assessment: The impact assessment report is commissioned and paid for by the project proponent, which places the assessor in a client relationship with the party being assessed. Eg. Accreditation of consultants through the National Accreditation Board for Education and Training was introduced after assessment reports were found to carry copied ecological baseline chapters.
    2. Weak public consultation: Hearings are held at short notice, in venues distant from affected habitations and in a language the affected population does not read the documents in. Eg. Public hearings for coal block expansions in central India have been challenged before the National Green Tribunal on grounds of inadequate local language disclosure.
    3. Expanding exemption categories: Successive amendments have moved project categories out of the assessment requirement or into the B2 exempt class, shrinking the regime's coverage. Eg. Building and construction projects above notified built up area thresholds have repeatedly been shifted between assessment categories through amendment notifications.
    4. Absence of cumulative impact assessment: Each project is appraised in isolation, so the combined load of several projects on the same river basin or airshed is never assessed. Eg. Hydropower projects in the Himalayan river basins have been cleared individually without an assessment of the cumulative effect on downstream flow.
    5. Post clearance compliance monitoring: Half yearly compliance reports are self submitted by proponents and rarely verified through independent field inspection. Eg. Regional offices of the Union environment ministry cover several States each with a small inspection staff, which makes physical verification of every cleared project impossible.
    6. State appraisal authority capacity: State Environment Impact Assessment Authorities carry the bulk of the caseload with limited technical staff and periodic vacancies in their expert committees. Eg. Clearances issued by State authorities during periods when their expert appraisal committees stood unconstituted have been set aside by the National Green Tribunal.

    Back2Basics: Environment (Protection) Act, 1986

    1. Enactment context: It was enacted in the aftermath of the Bhopal gas disaster of December 1984, which exposed the absence of a general statute covering all forms of environmental harm.
    2. Constitutional basis: It was enacted under Article 253 to implement the decisions taken at the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment at Stockholm.
    3. Character: It is umbrella legislation, giving the central government general powers over environmental quality rather than regulating a single medium such as air or water.
    4. Commencement: It came into force on 19 November 1986.
    5. Definition of environment: The Act defines environment to include water, air and land and the interrelationship existing among and between them and human beings, other living creatures, plants, micro organisms and property.
    6. Penalty regime: Section 15 provided for imprisonment and fine for contravention, and was amended by the Jan Vishwas (Amendment of Provisions) Act, 2023 to substitute monetary penalties adjudicated by an appointed authority for several offences.
    7. Administering ministry: It is administered by the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change.

    Way Forward

    1. Frame the statutory notification with a hard sunset: Issue any one time mechanism as a notification under the parent Act with a fixed closing date written into the instrument itself, so it cannot be extended by circular.
    2. Define eligible categories by test, not by sector: Set an objective test distinguishing genuine regulatory uncertainty from avoidance, so that the scheme does not become a general amnesty by default.
    3. Make damage assessment independent: Require the environmental damage assessment for each applicant to be conducted by an accredited third party appointed by the regulator, not commissioned by the proponent.
    4. Link compensation to assessed harm: Calibrate environmental compensation to the damage assessed and the period of unauthorised operation, rather than to a flat percentage of project cost.
    5. Fund and staff the State authorities: Fill technical vacancies in State Environment Impact Assessment Authorities and Pollution Control Boards before loading them with damage assessment for legacy cases.
    6. Digitise post clearance compliance: Route compliance reporting through the PARIVESH platform with automated flagging and mandatory random field verification of a fixed share of cleared projects.
    7. Publish the pending violation inventory: Compile and publish a sector wise and State wise inventory of projects operating without clearance, so that any future scheme is designed against a known caseload.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2020, GS3, 10] How does the draft Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) Notification, 2020 differ from the existing EIA Notification, 2006?”

  • UGC equity rules being reconsidered: Centre to SC

    Why in the News

    The Centre told the Supreme Court on 20 August 2026 that it is reconsidering the University Grants Commission regulations framed to prevent caste discrimination in higher education institutions. The regulations name the Scheduled Castes, the Scheduled Tribes and the Other Backward Classes as the protected groups, and that naming is what general category petitioners have challenged as exclusion.

    What are the UGC (Promotion of Equity in Higher Education Institutions) Regulations, 2026?

    1. What they do: The University Grants Commission (UGC) (Promotion of Equity in Higher Education Institutions) Regulations, 2026 impose a compliance framework on higher education institutions to prevent and redress discrimination against students and faculty.
    2. Notification and stay: They were notified on 13 January 2026 and stayed by the Supreme Court on 29 January 2026, which revived the 2012 framework until further orders.
    3. Two definitions inside them: Regulation 3(1)(c) defines caste based discrimination as discrimination on the basis of caste or tribe against members of the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes. Clause 3(e) defines discrimination more broadly, covering unfair or differential treatment on the ground of caste against any stakeholder.
    4. Present position: The Centre has told the Court that the regulations are being reconsidered, so they stand stayed and unenforced.

    What is a "separate yet equal" classification?

    1. Separate yet equal: A "separate yet equal" classification permits separate facilities for different groups on the argument that the facilities provided are of equal quality. Constitutional courts treat the act of separation as the injury, since equality of facilities does not cure the stigma of being set apart.

    How far are students currently protected against caste discrimination on campus?

    1. Governing regulations restored: The UGC (Promotion of Equity in Higher Educational Institutions) Regulations, 2012 are back in force, requiring institutions to constitute an Equal Opportunity Cell and to publish an anti discrimination policy.
    2. Criminal protection: The Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 covers caste based insult, intimidation and social boycott, including inside educational institutions, and is tried by Special Courts. Its 2015 Amendment added new offences and mandated Exclusive Special Courts and time bound trial.
    3. Separate ragging machinery: The UGC (Curbing the Menace of Ragging in Higher Educational Institutions) Regulations, 2009 mandate an Anti Ragging Committee and an Anti Ragging Squad in every institution, alongside an anti ragging affidavit from every student and parent.
    4. Reservation in admission: The Central Educational Institutions (Reservation in Admission) Act, 2006 reserves 15 per cent of seats for the Scheduled Castes, 7.5 per cent for the Scheduled Tribes and 27 per cent for the Other Backward Classes, alongside 10 per cent for the Economically Weaker Sections.
    5. Reservation in teaching posts: The Central Educational Institutions (Reservation in Teachers' Cadre) Act, 2019 restored the institution rather than the department as the unit for computing reservation in faculty recruitment.
    6. No standalone statute: India has no dedicated anti discrimination Act for education, so protection is assembled from regulations, criminal law and reservation statutes.

    Constitutional Provisions Related to Equality and Non-Discrimination

    1. Preamble: Declares equality of status and of opportunity, and fraternity assuring the dignity of the individual.
    2. Article 14: Guarantees equality before the law and the equal protection of the laws to every person.
    3. Article 15(1): Prohibits the State from discriminating against any citizen on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth.
    4. Article 15(4): Enables special provisions for socially and educationally backward classes and for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.
    5. Article 15(5): Enables reservation in admission to educational institutions, including private unaided institutions, other than minority institutions.
    6. Article 15(6): Enables reservation of up to 10 per cent of seats for the Economically Weaker Sections.
    7. Article 16(4): Enables reservation in public employment for any backward class not adequately represented in State services.
    8. Article 17: Abolishes untouchability and forbids its practice in any form.
    9. Article 21: Guarantees the right to life and personal liberty, read to include the right to live with dignity.
    10. Article 29(2): Bars denial of admission to a State maintained or State aided educational institution on grounds of religion, race, caste or language.
    11. Article 46: Directs the State to promote the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections, particularly the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.
    12. Article 338 and Article 338A: Establish the National Commission for Scheduled Castes and the National Commission for Scheduled Tribes to investigate and monitor constitutional safeguards.

    Why were the 2026 Regulations framed?

    1. Origin in litigation: The regulations stem from a 2019 petition filed in the Supreme Court by the mothers of Payal Tadvi and Rohith Vemula.
    2. The two deaths: Payal Tadvi and Rohith Vemula died by suicide over alleged caste based discrimination in 2019 and 2016 respectively.
    3. Relief sought: The petition asked for enforcement of robust anti discrimination mechanisms across higher education institutions.
    4. Gap in the earlier framework: The 2012 regulations relied on Equal Opportunity Cells without naming caste based discrimination as a distinct wrong.
    5. Regulatory answer: The 2026 regulations responded by carving out caste based discrimination as a separate defined category rather than leaving it inside general discrimination.

    Why did the Supreme Court stay the regulations rather than let them operate?

    1. Sweeping consequences: The bench said the issue raised important questions that, if left unexamined, could have very sweeping consequences and could divide society.
    2. Prima facie ambiguity: The order recorded that on a prima facie consideration some provisions of the impugned regulations suffer from certain ambiguities, and that the possibility of their misuse cannot be ruled out.
    3. Status quo preserved: The Court directed that the 2012 Regulations will continue in force till further orders, so institutions were not left without an equity framework.
    4. Notices issued: Notices were issued to the Centre and to the University Grants Commission, so the challenge proceeds on merits rather than by administrative withdrawal.
    5. Narrow target of challenge: The petitions, filed by Mritunjay Tiwari, Vineet Jindal and Rahul Dewan, primarily challenge Regulation 3(1)(c) and not the regulations as a whole.

    Why has an anti-discrimination rule drawn objections from protected and general categories alike?

    1. General category objection: Naming the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes in Regulation 3(1)(c) is read as excluding general category students and faculty from specific protection against caste based discrimination.
    2. The broader clause cuts against the narrower: Clause 3(e) already covers unfair or differential treatment on the ground of caste against any stakeholder, so the narrower clause adds a group specific label without adding a group specific remedy.
    3. Dalit and Other Backward Class objection: Sections of Dalit and Other Backward Class opinion oppose the stay and any rollback, since deleting the named categories would dissolve the recognition the regulation created.
    4. Division within the protected groups: Some Dalit opinion opposes bringing the Other Backward Classes under the same protective umbrella, treating caste discrimination against the Scheduled Castes as a distinct harm.
    5. Absent machinery: The regulations create a named category of caste based discrimination without prescribing a distinct complaint, inquiry or penalty procedure for it.

    What questions has the Supreme Court framed for examination?

    1. Nexus of Regulation 3(1)(c): Whether Clause 3(1)(c) bears a reasonable and rational nexus to subserve the object and purpose of the 2026 Regulations, particularly since no distinct or special procedural mechanism has been prescribed to address caste based discrimination as against the exhaustive and inclusive definition of discrimination in Clause 3(e).
    2. Effect on sub classification: Whether introducing the term caste based discrimination has any bearing on the existing constitutional and statutory sub classification of the Most Backward Castes within the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes, and whether the new rules provide adequate and effective safeguards to such Extremely Backward Castes against discrimination and structural disadvantage.
    3. Segregation and the equality guarantees: Whether including the expression segregation in the context of allocation of hostels, classrooms, mentorship groups or similar academic or residential arrangements, albeit on transparent and non discriminatory criteria, would amount to a separate yet equal classification infringing the guarantees of equality and fraternity under Articles 14 and 15 and the Preamble.
    4. Omission of ragging: Whether omitting the term ragging as a specific form of discrimination is a regressive and exclusionary legislative omission, and whether that omission creates an asymmetry in access to justice for victims of discrimination and so falls foul of Articles 14 and 21.

    Why has the issue become an electoral question in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar?

    1. Upper caste protest: The rules triggered protests among sections of the upper castes, who argued that the explicit reference to the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes amounted to exclusion of general category students.
    2. Dalit disquiet over rollback: There is concern within the ruling party that the stay and any rollback may cause disquiet among Dalit communities.
    3. Election calendar: Uttar Pradesh Assembly elections are due next year, which places the dispute inside an active campaign in the largest State.
    4. Bypoll reading: One reason attributed within the ruling party for its defeat in the recent Bankipur Assembly bypoll in Bihar was upper caste dissatisfaction over the University Grants Commission issue.
    5. Cost in both directions: Retaining the clause loses general category support and withdrawing it loses Dalit and Other Backward Class support, which is why reconsideration rather than defence is the chosen route.

    Major debates surrounding caste discrimination in higher education

    1. Group specific against universal protection: Whether an anti discrimination rule should name the historically excluded groups, or state a caste neutral prohibition that any student can invoke, is the live legal fault line.
    2. Sub classification within the Scheduled Castes: The Supreme Court's 2024 ruling in State of Punjab v Davinder Singh permitted States to sub classify the Scheduled Castes for reservation, and the debate now extends to whether protection against discrimination can be similarly graded.
    3. Creamy layer for the Scheduled Castes: Judicial opinion is divided on extending the creamy layer exclusion, applied to the Other Backward Classes since Indra Sawhney (1992), to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.
    4. Merit against representation: The framing of open competition as merit and reservation as compensation is contested by the argument that access to coaching, language and schooling already prices the entry test.
    5. Institutional autonomy against central regulation: Whether a central regulator can prescribe internal grievance machinery binding on State and private universities is disputed by State governments.
    6. Empirical gap: Caste wise data on discrimination complaints and on student suicides in higher education institutions is not published in consolidated form, so the scale the dispute turns on is itself contested.

    Challenges to enforcing the UGC Equity Regulations

    1. Grievance machinery controlled by the respondent: Equal Opportunity Cells are constituted by the same administration that a complaint is frequently directed against. Eg. In the Rohith Vemula case, the suspension from the hostel that preceded his death in January 2016 came from the University of Hyderabad's own disciplinary machinery.
    2. Retaliation risk suppresses reporting: A complaint against senior faculty or residents is made inside a hierarchy that controls the complainant's evaluation. Eg. Payal Tadvi's complaint at BYL Nair Hospital in Mumbai in 2019 named senior residents in her own department.
    3. Regulatory reach ends at grant conditionality: University Grants Commission regulations bind institutions that seek its recognition and grants, and enforcement over State universities is weak. Eg. The 2012 regulations required every institution to publish an anti discrimination policy, and publication was never made a condition for release of grants.
    4. A stayed regulation does not operate: A judicial stay leaves the earlier and weaker framework in charge for the entire period of litigation. Eg. The 2026 regulations have been suspended since 29 January 2026, so the 2012 framework they were written to replace still governs every campus.
    5. Faculty representation shortfall: A grievance system staffed almost entirely by unreserved category faculty carries limited confidence among complainants. Eg. Central universities have reported persistent backlogs of unfilled reserved category professor and associate professor posts in successive parliamentary replies.
    6. Definitional contest displaces the remedy: Litigation on who is covered has consumed the entire period in which the compliance machinery was to be built. Eg. Seven months after notification the regulations have produced no Equal Opportunity Cell restructuring, no complaint procedure and no penalty.

    Conclusion

    A regulation written to give caste discrimination a name has become unworkable because targeted protection and formally neutral protection are being demanded of the same clause. The Centre has told the Supreme Court that the University Grants Commission (Promotion of Equity in Higher Education Institutions) Regulations, 2026 are being reconsidered, so the measure stands stayed and the 2012 framework continues in force until further orders. What remains unresolved is the defect the Court itself identified, that the regulations create a distinct category of caste based discrimination without prescribing any distinct procedure to act on it.

    What is Substantive Equality?

    1. About: Substantive equality treats equality as an outcome the law must produce, so it permits differential treatment where identical treatment would preserve entrenched disadvantage.
    2. Rationale: Formal equality applies the same rule to unequally placed persons, which reproduces the existing distribution of advantage; substantive equality asks what the rule does to those on whom the disadvantage already falls.
    3. Redressing disadvantage: The first dimension asks whether a measure removes the material and social disadvantage a group carries, rather than whether it treats everyone alike.
    4. Countering stigma, prejudice and violence: The second dimension asks whether a measure reduces the humiliation, stereotype and hostility attached to group membership.
    5. Enhancing voice and participation: The third dimension asks whether the affected group has a say in the institutions that decide for it, since exclusion from decision making sustains the disadvantage.
    6. Accommodating difference through structural change: The fourth dimension asks whether the institution itself is altered to fit the group, rather than requiring the group to conform to an existing design.

    Key Concerns Regarding Substantive Equality

    1. Ceiling on affirmative action: The 50 per cent limit set in Indra Sawhney (1992) restricts how far redistribution can go, and the 10 per cent Economically Weaker Sections quota upheld in Janhit Abhiyan (2022) breached it for a non caste category.
    2. Benefit capture within the beneficiary group: Reservation gains concentrate among the better placed sections of a reserved category, which is the argument behind creamy layer and sub classification demands.
    3. Absence of enumeration: Caste wise socio economic data has not been published since 1931 in a full Census, so the extent of disadvantage the doctrine seeks to redress is inferred rather than measured.
    4. Reach limited to the public sector: Reservation binds the State and State aided institutions, and the bulk of new employment and higher education capacity has grown in the private sector.
    5. Conflict with efficiency claims: Article 335 requires that claims of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes be considered consistently with the maintenance of efficiency of administration, which is repeatedly invoked against extending measures.
    6. Enforcement gap in horizontal relations: Constitutional equality guarantees bind the State, and discrimination between private individuals on a campus or in housing has no general statutory remedy.

    Laws and Rules Governing Anti-Discrimination in Higher Education

    1. University Grants Commission Act, 1956: Establishes the Commission and empowers it to coordinate and determine standards in universities.
    2. Section 26 gives the Commission power to make regulations, which is the source of both the 2012 and the 2026 equity regulations.
    3. Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955: Penalises the enforcement of any disability arising out of untouchability, including in educational institutions.
    4. Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016: Section 16 requires educational institutions to provide inclusive education and reasonable accommodation.

    Government Initiatives for Equity in Higher Education

    1. Post Matric Scholarship for Scheduled Caste students: Meets tuition and maintenance costs of Scheduled Caste students pursuing post matriculation courses, targeted at students below a stated family income ceiling.
    2. National Fellowship for Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe students: Funds Master of Philosophy and Doctor of Philosophy research by students of these categories in recognised universities.
    3. PM Young Achievers Scholarship Award Scheme for Vibrant India (PM YASASVI): Supports school and higher secondary education of Other Backward Class, Economically Backward Class and De notified Tribe students, feeding the higher education pipeline.
    4. National Overseas Scholarship: Funds postgraduate and doctoral study abroad for Scheduled Caste, De notified Tribe, landless agricultural labourer and traditional artisan category students.
    5. Dr Ambedkar Centres of Excellence: Provide free civil services examination coaching to Scheduled Caste students in selected universities.
    6. Remedial Coaching and Equal Opportunity Cells: University Grants Commission supported cells run bridge and remedial courses for students from reserved categories in colleges and universities.

    Challenges in Ensuring Equity in Higher Education

    1. Enrolment gap by category: Gross Enrolment Ratio in higher education remains below the national average for the Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Castes. Eg. The All India Survey on Higher Education for 2021-22 recorded an overall Gross Enrolment Ratio of 28.4 per cent, against 25.9 per cent for the Scheduled Castes and 21.2 per cent for the Scheduled Tribes.
    2. Language of instruction: Professional and postgraduate programmes are taught almost entirely in English, which disadvantages students from State board schooling in regional languages. Eg. Engineering and medical curricula translated into Indian languages under the National Education Policy, 2020 cover a small share of programmes and enrolment.
    3. Financial barriers and delayed disbursal: Scholarship money arrives after fees fall due, forcing students into private borrowing. Eg. Post Matric Scholarship disbursal depends on release of the State share, and delays in that release have stalled payments across academic years.
    4. Residential segregation on campus: Hostel allotment and mess arrangements reproduce caste separation informally even where no rule prescribes it. Eg. The Supreme Court has framed the allocation of hostels, classrooms and mentorship groups as a separate yet equal question in the present case.
    5. Mental health and support systems: Counselling capacity in most institutions is not staffed to the size of the student body, and first generation learners carry the heaviest adjustment burden. Eg. Successive parliamentary replies have recorded student suicides in central institutions, with a disproportionate share from reserved categories.
    6. Growth outside the reservation perimeter: Capacity expansion has been largest in private unaided institutions, where implementation of Article 15(5) reservation is uneven. Eg. The provision was upheld for private unaided institutions in Ashoka Kumar Thakur (2008) and again in Pramati Educational Trust (2014), and compliance is not centrally monitored.

    Back2Basics: University Grants Commission (UGC)

    1. Formation: Set up in 1953 and given statutory status by the University Grants Commission Act, 1956, which came into force on 3 November 1956.
    2. Parent ministry: Functions under the Ministry of Education, with its headquarters in New Delhi and six regional offices.
    3. Constitutional basis: Draws from Article 246 read with Entry 66 of the Union List, which covers coordination and determination of standards in institutions for higher education.
    4. Composition: Consists of a Chairman, a Vice Chairman and ten members appointed by the Central Government.
    5. Mandate: Coordinates and determines standards in universities, disburses grants, frames regulations and advises the Union and State governments on higher education.
    6. Recognition function: Recognises institutions under Sections 2(f) and 12(B) of the Act, which determines their eligibility for central grants.
    7. Proposed replacement: A Higher Education Commission of India has been proposed to subsume its regulatory functions, with grant disbursal moved to a separate body.

    Way Forward

    1. Prescribe a distinct procedure: Attach a dedicated complaint, inquiry and penalty procedure to caste based discrimination, since the absence of one is the core defect the Court has framed.
    2. Independent grievance forum: Place the inquiry authority outside the institution's own administration, with an external member drawn from a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe commission panel.
    3. Keep the broad clause as the residual protection: Retain the wide definition in Clause 3(e) as the universal guarantee, so no category of student is left without a remedy. The group specific recognition created by Regulation 3(1)(c) is retained alongside it.
    4. Make compliance a grant condition: Tie release of central grants and continuation of Section 12(B) status to the constitution and reporting of a functioning equity mechanism.
    5. Publish disaggregated data: Require every institution to report complaints, outcomes, dropouts and student deaths by category in an annual public return.
    6. Fill reserved faculty posts in mission mode: Run a time bound special recruitment drive for the backlog of reserved category teaching posts, since representation among decision makers is what makes a grievance forum credible.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2018, GS2, 10] Whether National Commission for Scheduled Castes (NCSC) can enforce the implementation of constitutional reservation for the Scheduled Castes in the religious minority institutions? Examine.”

  • Former SC judge-led panel to probe ‘police excesses’ against protesters

    Why in the News

    The Supreme Court has constituted a five member High-Powered Enquiry Committee headed by a former Supreme Court judge to examine alleged excesses and disproportionate use of force by police and security personnel at Jantar Mantar and other locations during last month’s protests over the National Eligibility cum Entrance Test (Undergraduate) paper leak. The Court framed twelve issues for the inquiry, covering both police conduct and violence by protesters. The order therefore turns a policing controversy into an examination of the constitutional limits on how the State may respond to assembly.

    What is the High-Powered Enquiry Committee?

    1. What it is: The High-Powered Enquiry Committee (HPEC) is a fact finding body constituted by the Supreme Court to examine allegations of excessive force by police and security personnel during the protests, and to report back to the Court.
    2. Who heads it and who sits on it: It is headed by former Supreme Court judge R Subhash Reddy. Its members are former Punjab and Haryana High Court Chief Justice Ravi Shankar Jha, former Delhi High Court judge Justice Shalinder Kaur, former Central Bureau of Investigation Director Rishi Kumar Shukla, and retired Director General of Police of Meghalaya L R Bishnoi.
    3. How it must function: The inquiry is not to be a one time exercise. The Committee is to undertake a continuous and periodic assessment of the enumerated issues and submit interim findings periodically, so the Court can issue directions as warranted.
    4. What it does not displace: The Court clarified that the constitution of the Committee shall in no way deter or debar police authorities or security forces from taking administrative or disciplinary action against officers found in contravention of the rules governing their conduct.

    What is the current status of the right to protest in India?

    1. The right itself: The right to protest is drawn from Article 19(1)(a), the freedom of speech and expression, and Article 19(1)(b), the right to assemble peaceably and without arms, read together.
    2. The condition built into the text: The assembly must be peaceable and without arms, so the protection falls away for an assembly that turns violent or armed.
    3. The limits on the right: Restrictions may be imposed under Article 19(2) on speech and Article 19(3) on assembly, and the restriction must be reasonable and imposed by law rather than by executive discretion alone.
    4. No right to occupy a public space indefinitely: The Supreme Court in Amit Sahni v Commissioner of Police (2020) held that public ways and public spaces cannot be occupied indefinitely, and that demonstrations must take place in designated areas.
    5. A blanket ban on a protest site is not permissible: In Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan v Union of India (2018) the Court set aside an absolute prohibition on demonstrations at Jantar Mantar and directed that guidelines be framed regulating rather than eliminating protest there.
    6. Force must be proportionate and compensable: In Anita Thakur v State of Jammu and Kashmir (2016) the Court held that use of excessive force by police against demonstrators violates Article 21 and awarded compensation to the injured.
    7. The operative statutory levers: Prohibitory orders are issued under Section 163 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, and speech and assembly prosecutions have been brought under Section 152 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.

    Constitutional Provisions Related to the Right to Protest and Police Accountability

    1. Article 19(1)(a): Guarantees to all citizens the freedom of speech and expression, from which the right to voice dissent is drawn.
    2. Article 19(1)(b): Guarantees the right to assemble peaceably and without arms.
    3. Article 19(1)(c): Guarantees the right to form associations or unions, under which protest organisations operate.
    4. Article 19(2): Permits the State to impose reasonable restrictions on the freedom of speech and expression on enumerated grounds.
    5. Article 19(3): Permits reasonable restrictions on the right of assembly in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India or public order.
    6. Article 21: Guarantees that no person shall be deprived of life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law, the provision under which bodily harm caused by disproportionate force is examined.
    7. Article 22: Provides safeguards on arrest and detention, including the right to be informed of the grounds of arrest and to consult a legal practitioner.
    8. Article 20(3): Protects a person accused of an offence against being compelled to be a witness against himself.
    9. Article 32 and Article 226: Provide the remedies before the Supreme Court and the High Courts through which protest related grievances and monitored inquiries are brought.
    10. Seventh Schedule, State List Entry 1 and Entry 2: Place public order and police within the legislative and executive competence of the States, which is why a national inquiry into police conduct proceeds through the Court rather than through a central department.

    What is Section 163 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023?

    1. What it does: Section 163 empowers a District Magistrate, a Sub-divisional Magistrate or an Executive Magistrate to issue a written order directing a person or the public generally to abstain from a specified act, where there is an apprehension of obstruction, annoyance, danger to human life or a disturbance of public tranquillity.
    2. Its limits: An order under the section is temporary and cannot ordinarily remain in force beyond two months, and it corresponds to the power earlier exercised under Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

    What is Section 152 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023?

    1. What it criminalises: Section 152 punishes acts that excite secession, armed rebellion, subversive activities or separatist feelings, or that endanger the sovereignty, unity and integrity of India, with punishment extending to life imprisonment or seven years with fine.
    2. What it replaced: It came into force on 1 July 2024 in place of Section 124A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, the sedition provision inserted in 1870, and its constitutional validity is under challenge on grounds of vagueness and overbreadth.

    What are metallic kinetic projectiles?

    1. What they are: Metallic kinetic projectiles, commonly called pellets, are small metal shot fired in a scattering pattern from pump-action rifles or projectile-action guns, used as a crowd control weapon.
    2. Why they are contested: The scatter pattern makes the point of impact uncontrollable, so injuries to the eyes and upper body are common and the resulting harm is often irreversible.

    What are the twelve issues the Committee will examine?

    1. Issue 1, excessive force: Alleged use of excessive force and violence against protesters by police authorities and other agencies, including deployment of pellet guns, electric batons, lathi charges and tear gas without adequate warning or proportionality, resulting in severe bodily harm and injuries, some alleged to be of a grievous and lasting nature.
    2. Issue 2, proportionality of response: Ensuring a proportionate and measured police response during protests, public gatherings and peaceful assemblies, so as to strike an appropriate balance between maintaining public order and exercising the constitutional right to peaceful dissent.
    3. Issue 3, banning pellets: The desirability of banning the use of metallic kinetic projectiles or pellets fired from pump-action rifles or projectile-action guns, having regard to the grave and at times irreversible bodily harm they cause.
    4. Issue 4, identification of officers: The necessity of ensuring that police and security personnel wear proper uniforms and visible nameplates while effecting arrests or using force during crowd control operations, to secure accountability and enable identification of individual officers.
    5. Issue 5, surveillance: Allegations of monitoring and surveillance of protesters by police personnel, and the extent to which such measures were consistent with the protesters’ constitutional rights to privacy and free assembly.
    6. Issue 6, female protesters: Alleged incidents of targeted violence, harassment, molestation and secondary victimisation directed against female protesters, which warrant a focused and expeditious enquiry.
    7. Issue 7, medical support and compensation: The provision of medical and other requisite support, including award of compensation, to victims of alleged police abuse, and the manner and adequacy of the support extended so far.
    8. Issue 8, prohibitory orders: Regulation of the issuance of blanket prohibitory orders under Section 163 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, to prevent their use as a routine or pre-emptive measure that forecloses peaceful assembly rather than as a proportionate response to a real and imminent threat to public order.
    9. Issue 9, thresholds for Section 152: The establishment of strict constitutional thresholds and safeguards to prevent Section 152 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 from being invoked to stifle political dissent and peaceful protest, so that it is not permitted to operate as a chilling restraint on constitutionally protected speech and assembly.
    10. Issue 10, violence by protesters: Alleged use of force and violence by protesters against police officers and other security personnel.
    11. Issue 11, damage to property: Damage to public property caused by the actions of protesters, including destruction of and injury to government installations, vehicles and other assets belonging to the State and to private citizens alike.
    12. Issue 12, injuries to police: The injuries sustained by police forces in the course of discharging their duties, and the consequent mental and emotional trauma borne by their families.

    Which issues has the Court told the Committee to take up first?

    1. The two priority issues: The Committee is to address Issue 1 on excessive force and Issue 6 on targeted violence against female protesters on a priority basis, bearing in mind the sensitivity attendant on them.
    2. The first deliverable: The Committee has been asked to complete its inquiry and deliberations on those two issues and submit its First Interim Report at the earliest.
    3. The additional head opened: The Committee may also examine the grant of interim compensation to those injured on either side, whether police personnel or protesters.
    4. The reporting design: Interim findings are to be submitted periodically rather than a single report at the end, so the Court can issue directions while the inquiry continues.
    5. When the order was made: The order is dated 19 August 2026 and was released on 20 August 2026.

    Why does the Court’s framing place police conduct and protester conduct on the same list?

    1. The list is symmetrical by design: Nine issues concern police and State conduct and three concern protester conduct, so the inquiry is not framed solely as an investigation of the police.
    2. The compensation head runs both ways: Interim compensation is opened for those injured on either side, which places an injured constable and an injured student within the same remedial frame.
    3. Trauma is recognised on the police side: Issue 12 extends to the mental and emotional trauma borne by the families of injured police personnel, a head rarely written into an inquiry mandate.
    4. Symmetry is not equivalence: The two issues marked for priority treatment are both allegations against the police, so the sequencing signals which set of allegations the Court treats as most urgent.
    5. The disciplinary channel stays open in parallel: The Court expressly preserved the power of police authorities to take administrative or disciplinary action against their own officers, so the inquiry does not become a reason to suspend departmental accountability.
    6. The tension the design carries: A committee asked simultaneously to judge police excess and protester violence must apply one standard of proportionality to an armed disciplined force and another to an unorganised crowd, without a settled test for either.

    Major debates surrounding the right to protest and the use of force

    1. Regulation against prohibition: One position holds that designated protest sites and prior permission are reasonable regulation of a public space, and the other holds that permission requirements convert a right into a licence.
    2. Two rulings pulling in opposite directions: Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan (2018) struck down a blanket prohibition at a protest site, and Amit Sahni (2020) held that public ways cannot be occupied indefinitely, so the boundary between the two remains contested.
    3. The proportionality standard for lethal and less lethal weapons: There is no settled judicial test fixing when tear gas, water cannon, batons or pellets may be used, so proportionality is assessed after the event rather than fixed in advance.
    4. Whether pellet weapons can be regulated or must be banned: One position accepts them as a less lethal alternative to firearms, and the other holds that an uncontrollable scatter pattern makes proportionate use impossible in principle.
    5. Prohibitory orders as prevention against pre-emption: Section 163 is defended as a preventive power against imminent threats and contested as a routine instrument that forecloses assembly before any threat materialises.
    6. Whether the narrowing of sedition survives its replacement: The Kedar Nath Singh (1962) requirement of incitement to violence narrowed the old sedition provision, and whether that narrowing automatically transfers to Section 152 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 is unsettled.
    7. Command responsibility against individual liability: Accountability for crowd control failures is contested between the individual officer who used force and the supervising officer who ordered the deployment.
    8. The evidentiary gap the dispute turns on: Without uniforms carrying visible identification, body worn cameras and a contemporaneous record of orders, allegations on both sides rest on competing testimony rather than on documented fact.

    Challenges to the inquiry delivering accountability

    1. A fact finding committee is not a prosecuting authority: The Committee reports to the Court and cannot itself frame charges or convict, so accountability depends on what follows the report. Eg. The Court has separately preserved the departmental power to take disciplinary action, which sits outside the Committee’s control.
    2. Evidence degrades with time in crowd control cases: Injury records, video footage, control room logs and deployment orders have to be secured early or they cease to be reliable. Eg. Issue 4 arises precisely because officers using force were allegedly not identifiable by uniform or nameplate.
    3. Prosecution of police officers requires sanction: Proceeding against a public servant for acts done in the discharge of official duty depends on prior sanction from the government that employs him. Eg. The requirement of prior sanction has historically been the reason many custodial and encounter cases do not reach trial.
    4. Police is a State subject and the incidents spanned States: The Committee’s findings must be implemented by multiple State governments, each of which controls its own force. Eg. The mandate covers Jantar Mantar and other locations across the country during the same protest wave.
    5. Compensation without a fixed scale invites disparity: Interim compensation awarded case by case, on both sides, has no published scale to anchor it. Eg. In Anita Thakur (2016) compensation was fixed by the Court itself in the absence of any statutory schedule for excessive force.
    6. Monitored inquiries lose momentum once attention moves: A periodic assessment mandate depends on the Court continuing to list and act on interim reports over years. Eg. The Prakash Singh directions on police reform were issued in 2006 and remain incompletely implemented across States two decades later.
    7. The unresolved statutory questions sit outside the Committee’s power: Issues 8 and 9 ask for constitutional thresholds on Section 163 and Section 152, which only the Court or Parliament can settle. Eg. The constitutional challenge to Section 152 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 is pending separately before the Supreme Court.

    Conclusion

    The Committee stands constituted with five members under an order dated 19 August 2026, and its immediate task is a First Interim Report on excessive force and on targeted violence against female protesters. The mandate is unusually wide, covering not only what the police did but also the statutory instruments through which protest was restricted, namely prohibitory orders under Section 163 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 and prosecutions under Section 152 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. The constitutional question the order raises is whether the State can be held to a proportionality standard in crowd control when no such standard exists in written form. Until that standard is fixed in advance, each episode will continue to be judged after the fact by a fresh committee.

    “[2013, GS2, 10] Discuss Section 66A of IT Act, with reference to its alleged violation of Article 19 of the Constitution.”

  • In a 5-4 ruling, Supreme Court for tweaking the definition of industry, exempts pending matters

    Why in the News

    A nine-judge Bench of the Supreme Court held on 20 August 2026, by a 5:4 margin, that the expansive 1978 interpretation of the term industry will not govern the Industrial Relations Code, 2020. The ruling preserves that interpretation for disputes already pending under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and withdraws it from every case that follows.

    What is the ‘triple test’ laid down in Bangalore Water Supply (1978)?

    1. Origin: A seven-judge Constitution Bench in Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa (1978), authored by Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer, read Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 expansively.
    2. The three conditions: An undertaking qualifies as an industry where there is systematic activity, organised by cooperation between employer and employee, for the production or distribution of goods or services calculated to satisfy human wants and wishes.
    3. What the test ignores: Profit motive is irrelevant to the classification. Purely spiritual or religious activity stays outside the definition.
    4. Reach: The test brought hospitals, educational institutions and municipalities within the fold of industry, exempting only core sovereign activities such as the judiciary, law and order and defence, in order to protect the state’s functional autonomy.

    What is the Industrial Relations Code, 2020?

    1. About: The Industrial Relations Code, 2020 consolidates the law on trade unions, standing orders and the settlement of industrial disputes into a single statute, and came into force in November 2025.
    2. The operative provision: Section 2(p) of the Code carries its own definition of industry, taking over the function that Section 2(j) of the 1947 Act performed for 48 years.

    What did the Supreme Court actually hold on the reach of the 1978 definition?

    1. A clean slate for the new Code: The majority held that industry under Section 2(p) of the Industrial Relations Code, 2020 would not be burdened by the 1978 interpretation of Section 2(j) of the 1947 Act.
    2. No sheet anchor: The Chief Justice of India stated that the 1978 judgment and its conclusion would not act as the sheet anchor or the foundation for any future interpretation of Section 2(p).
    3. A refinement, not a reversal: The majority found that the essential framework of the 1978 interpretation had withstood the test of time, and that some of its constituent elements could have been articulated differently to better reflect the scope and contours of Section 2(j).
    4. Prospective operation: The refined triple test evolved in the opinion of the Chief Justice of India will operate prospectively, and the modified definition will not apply to pending cases.
    5. Pending disputes protected: All matters presently pending before courts, tribunals and labour authorities under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 are to be adjudicated in accordance with the triple test as laid down in Bangalore Water Supply.
    6. Maintainability settled: The majority held that the reference questioning the correctness of the 1978 ruling was maintainable.
    7. Text still awaited: The fine print of the ruling prescribing the new formulation of the definition has not yet been released.

    Why was the 1978 definition sent to a nine-judge Bench at all?

    1. Docket explosion: Later Benches found that the 1978 definition produced what they called a docket explosion, bringing far more cases to the labour courts.
    2. A failed legislative narrowing: Parliament attempted to narrow the definition through the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1982, excluding several organisations from its scope.
    3. The 2005 admission: The Centre told the Court in 2005 that no alternative dispute resolution mechanism existed for employees who would fall outside the amended definition, so the 1978 position continued to hold.
    4. Divergent readings: Subsequent rulings interpreted the 1978 judgment differently, and the case was referred to a nine-judge Bench for reconsideration.

    What three questions did the reference place before the Bench?

    1. Correctness of the test: Whether the test laid down in Bangalore Water Supply remains the correct interpretation of industry, and whether later legislative developments have any bearing on it.
    2. Welfare schemes: Whether welfare schemes run by the government count as an industrial activity.
    3. Sovereign function: What constitutes a sovereign function of the state, and whether such functions fall outside the ambit of labour law altogether.
    4. When framed: The Court identified these three broad questions for consideration in February 2026.

    Why does preserving the 1978 test only for pending cases divide the workforce in two?

    1. Two regimes running side by side: A dispute already filed under the 1947 Act is decided on the wide 1978 definition. An identical dispute arising under the Code is decided on a definition that has not yet been written out.
    2. The Court’s own reason: The majority stated that it did not intend to displace the governing legal position on pending proceedings, since doing so would create artificial discrimination.
    3. What the wide net secured: The 1978 definition enabled workers across a wide range of jobs to obtain legal recourse on wages, working hours, strikes, collective bargaining and protection against arbitrary dismissal.
    4. What the clean slate removes: Workers whose disputes arise after the Code’s commencement lose the settled presumption that their workplace is an industry, and must establish it afresh under Section 2(p).

    What does the dissent argue about the State as an employer?

    1. Reference itself questioned: Justice B.V. Nagarathna found the reference against the 1978 verdict unwarranted and not maintainable, and held that the ruling required no interference or modification.
    2. Identity of the employer is irrelevant: The dissent held that merely because a function is performed by the State, it cannot be exempted from the definition of industry, so the test of who carries out the activity is not relevant.
    3. Nature of the activity governs: Social welfare activities and schemes undertaken by government departments or their instrumentalities can be construed as industrial activities for the purpose of Section 2(j), depending on the nature of the activity and all other relevant factors.
    4. Why it matters now: The dissent held that it was important, now more than ever, to retain the inclusive definition of industry to safeguard workers’ rights.
    5. Split within the majority side: Justice Joymalya Bagchi recorded disagreement with the majority on the reformulation of the triple test, and Justices Dipankar Dutta and Ujjal Bhuyan wrote dissenting opinions.

    What challenges follow from redefining ‘industry’ under the new Code?

    1. Coverage uncertainty until the operative text arrives: The modified formulation was pronounced without the wording that prescribes it being available, so adjudicating authorities have no text to apply. Eg. The hour-long pronouncement on 20 August 2026 ended with the fine print of the new formulation still awaited.
    2. Identical workplaces treated differently by filing date: The cut-off is the date of the proceeding, not the nature of the work, so two workers in the same undertaking can face different definitions. Eg. A dispute in a municipal water supply undertaking filed under the 1947 Act is decided on the triple test, and one arising afterwards is not.
    3. No fallback forum for excluded categories: Narrowing the definition removes workers from the industrial adjudication machinery without putting anything in its place. Eg. The Centre itself told the Court in 2005 that no alternative dispute resolution mechanism existed for employees who would fall outside a narrowed definition.
    4. Threshold effects that discourage firms from growing: The Code applies its stricter obligations only above stated headcounts, which gives firms a reason to stop hiring below the line. Eg. Standing orders now apply at 300 employees and prior approval for layoff, retrenchment and closure applies at 300 workers, both raised from far lower thresholds.
    5. The sovereign function boundary left to case-by-case litigation: The Court has framed the question of what a sovereign function is without settling a workable test for it. Eg. Whether a government-run welfare scheme is an industrial activity was one of the three questions placed before the Bench in February 2026.
    6. A definition built for a standard employment relation: The triple test turns on cooperation between employer and employee, which platform-mediated work does not fit. Eg. Gig and platform workers are addressed through the Code on Social Security, 2020 rather than through the industrial dispute machinery.

    Conclusion

    The Court has separated the past from the future of a single statutory term, keeping Justice Krishna Iyer’s wide definition alive for disputes already in the system and denying it any authority over the Code that now governs Indian industrial relations. The substantive contest has therefore moved from the judiciary to the text of Section 2(p) and to whoever interprets it first. The Industrial Relations Code, 2020 has been in force since November 2025, and the next milestone is the release of the full text of the judgment carrying the refined formulation of the triple test.

    “[2024, GS3, 15] Discuss the merits and demerits of the four ‘Labour Codes’ in the context of labour market reforms in India. What has been the progress so far in this regard?”