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Context

The brief visit by the United States House Speaker, Nancy Pelosi, to Taiwan, against stern warnings issued by China, has the potential to increase the already deteriorating relationship between the U.S. and China. For those of us in India watching the events as they unfold around Taiwan, there are valuable lessons to be learnt.

Background

• The crisis that began with the visit of Ms. Pelosi to Taipei is still unfolding and there is little clarity today on how it will wind down.
•  For China, its claims about a rising superpower might ring hollow if it is unable to unify its claimed territories, in particular Taiwan.
• For the U.S., it is about re-establishing steadily-diminishing American credibility in the eyes of its friends and foes.
• For Taiwan, it is about standing up to Chinese bullying and making its red lines clear to Beijing.
• Lessons for India: To be fair, there is growing recognition in New Delhi that it is important to meet the challenge posed by a belligerent China, but there appears to be a lack of clarity on how to meet this challenge.
• To that extent, the Taiwan crisis offers New Delhi three lessons, at the very least.

Takeaways for India

1] Articulate red lines

• The most important lesson from the Taiwan standoff for policymakers in New Delhi is the importance of articulating red lines and sovereign positions in an unambiguous manner.
•  New Delhi needs to unambiguously highlight the threat from China and the sources of such a threat.
• Any absence of such clarity will be cleverly utilised by Beijing to push Indian limits, as we have already seen.
• Stop confusing international community: Even worse, ambiguous messaging by India also confuses its friends in the international community.
• If India does not clearly articulate that China is in illegal occupation of its territory, how can it expect its friends in the international community to support India diplomatically or otherwise?
• In other words, India’s current policy amounts to poor messaging, and confusing to its own people as well as the larger international community, and is therefore counterproductive.

2] Avoid appeasement

• Taiwan could have avoided the ongoing confrontation and the economic blockade during Chinese retaliatory military exercises around its territory by avoiding Ms. Pelosi’s visit to Taipei, or perhaps even keeping it low key.
• Appeasement of China, Taiwan knows, is not the answer to Beijing’s aggression.
•  India’s policy of meeting/hosting Chinese leaders while the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) continue(d) to violate established territorial norms on the LAC is a deeply flawed one.
• Unilaterally catering to Chinese sensitivities even during the standoffs between the two militaries is a mistake.
• For instance, the parliamentary delegation visits and legislature-level dialogues between India and Taiwan have not taken place since 2017.
• Soft-peddling of the Quad was a mistake: During the 2000s, India (as well as Australia) decided to soft-peddle the Quad in the face of strong Chinese objections.
• It is only in the last two years or so that we have witnessed renewed enthusiasm around the Quad.
• In retrospect, appeasing Beijing by almost abandoning the Quad was bad strategy.

3] Economic relationship is a two way process

• Given that the economic relationship is a two-way process and that, as a matter of fact, the trade deficit is in China’s favour, China too has a lot to lose from a damaged trade relationship with India.
• More so, if the Taiwan example (as well as the India-China standoff in 2020) is anything to go by, trade can continue to take place despite tensions and without India making any compromises vis-à-vis its sovereign claims.
• India for sure should do business with China, but not on China’s own terms.

Conclusion

The recent crisis offers valuable lessons for India in its dealing with China.

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Context

There is a stark contrast contrast between the Indian response to the crisis in Sri Lanka and the dawning civil war in Myanmar.

Crisis in Myanmar

• According to UN human rights monitors, over 2,000 people have been killed, around 14,000 are in prison, including 90 lawmakers, over 7,00,000 are refugees and half a million internally displaced.
• Humanitarian aid to coup opponents is blocked.
• The economy is in free fall.
• Though the international community has not accepted the junta or its nominees as official representatives of Myanmar, it has not recognised the unity government as the legitimate successor of the pre-coup elected administration either.
• Its armed wing, the recently-formed People’s Defence Force (PDF), exists in a shadowy limbo.
• If it is too weak to impose significant costs on the junta, one root cause is the lack of support from neighbours.
• As against Europe’s military support for Ukraine’s defence, no Asian country has stepped up to support the unity government and PDF.
• Role of ASEAN:  It is ASEAN which shouldered the responsibility to mediate in Myanmar, whereas India took the initiative with Sri Lanka.
• But ASEAN has been largely unsuccessful.
• The five-point consensus that the junta agreed on with the regional grouping included an immediate end to violence and resumption of negotiations between the ousted administration and the Tatmadaw.
• ASEAN’s reaction has been weak at best.
• The US, EU, Australia and Canada announced targeted sanctions on the junta, and the EU imposed an embargo on arms sales to the country. ASEAN did not.

India’s response and issues with it

• The contrast between the Indian response to the crisis in Sri Lanka and the dawning civil war in Myanmar could not be starker.
• There is no support from the India administration for Mizoram’s aid effort, and apparently there is no Indian policy vis a vis the coup either.
• Cooperation against cross-border insurgency: Given our land and sea borders with Myanmar, and the troubled history of cross-border insurgencies between our two countries, the India’s inertia is alarming, though not entirely surprising.
• Successive Indian administrations maintained relations with the junta in the hope that they would cooperate against cross-border Indian armed groups.
• But these insurgencies have reduced.
• In fact, over the 10 years of Myanmar’s partial democracy, from 2011 to 2021, cross-border support for Indian insurgents dipped sharply.
• Direct security interest: In other words, we have a direct security interest in the restoration of our neighbour’s democracy.

Way forward

• Stringent sanctions: Sanctions that will starve the junta are a first step that Myanmar’s neighbours are yet to try.
• While ASEAN has the initiative, all Myanmar’s neighbours need to unite on sanctions, especially nations such as Japan, Australia and India that are members of the Quad along with the US.
• Myanmar ought to have topped the recent Quad summit’s agenda and it is shameful that it did not.
• It is still not too late to call a virtual emergency meeting of Quad heads of state, along with ASEAN heads of state, to agree to stringent sanctions.

Conclusion

Our neighbourhood is more unstable today than it has been for decades. Four of our bordering countries are in free fall, while China’s grip comes closer to our shores by the hour. Can India afford to fiddle while wildfires ignite around us?

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