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Type: Schemes

  • India’s carbon credit scheme receives U.K. official recognition

    Why in the News

    The United Kingdom has recognised India’s Carbon Credit Trading Scheme (CCTS) as a qualifying overseas carbon pricing scheme for the purpose of carbon price relief. The recognition was conveyed by His Majesty’s Treasury to the Bureau of Energy Efficiency (BEE) under the Ministry of Power. The scheme has been placed on the United Kingdom’s published indicative list of overseas carbon pricing schemes assessed as meeting the qualifying criteria under the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (Calculation of CBAM Rate and Determination of Carbon Price Relief) Regulations 2026. A carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) charges an imported good the gap between the carbon price paid where it was made and the price the importing country’s own producers pay. The recognition therefore lets a carbon price already paid in India be set off, lowering the effective CBAM liability on Indian goods. The relief is calculated on the price a tonne of carbon actually fetches in India, so a domestic market still in its early compliance cycles decides how much of the British levy an exporter escapes.

    What is the Carbon Credit Trading Scheme?

    1. Statutory basis: The scheme rests on the Energy Conservation Act, 2001, as amended by the Energy Conservation (Amendment) Act, 2022. It is administered by the Bureau of Energy Efficiency under the Ministry of Power.
    2. Compliance mechanism: Obligated entities in notified industrial sectors receive greenhouse gas emission intensity targets, stated as emissions per unit of output. An entity that beats its target earns carbon credit certificates, and one that misses it must buy them.
    3. Offset mechanism: An entity outside the compliance list can register an emission reduction project voluntarily. It earns certificates once the reduction is verified.
    4. Trading venue: Certificates are traded on the power exchanges. That trade is what produces a domestic price for a tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent.

    How does the recognition change the cost of exporting to the United Kingdom?

    1. Carbon price relief: The British levy is charged on the embedded emissions of an imported good at a British carbon rate. A carbon price already paid in the country of production is deducted from that rate where the paying scheme qualifies.
    2. The indicative list is the administrative gate: Placement on the list is what makes the deduction available to goods produced under the scheme. The list is indicative, so it fixes eligibility rather than the final rate an exporter pays.
    3. Exposed sectors: The United Kingdom’s mechanism applies from 1 January 2027 to imports of aluminium, cement, fertiliser, hydrogen, iron and steel. Indian steel and aluminium shipments are the largest exposures within that set.
    4. The obligation on the exporter survives: Recognition attaches to the scheme, not to any single firm. Each consignment must still be accompanied by emissions data for the goods concerned.

    Challenges to the Carbon Credit Trading Scheme

    1. A weak price yields a weak set off: The deduction is worth only what a carbon credit certificate sells for in India, so a low clearing price transfers most of the levy to the British exchequer anyway. Eg. Energy saving certificates under the Perform, Achieve and Trade scheme, the country’s earlier market based instrument, cleared at prices too low to change investment behaviour.
      The Fix: Set a floor price for compliance certificates, so the market cannot clear below the level at which abatement becomes worth financing.
    2. Target setting is based on intensity, not absolute emissions: An obligated entity meets its target by cutting emissions per tonne of output while expanding total output, so national emissions can rise inside a compliant market. Eg. Cement plants raise clinker substitution to cut intensity while adding fresh capacity.
      The Fix: Convert the compliance mechanism to a declining absolute cap once the first two cycles have established a reliable emissions baseline.
    3. Narrow coverage of the emitting base: The compliance mechanism reaches only large notified industrial sectors, leaving out transport, buildings and the bulk of smaller industrial units. Eg. Foundries and re-rolling mills in industrial clusters sit outside the obligated list despite being coal fired.
      The Fix: Extend the offset mechanism with sector specific methodologies for small units, so a cluster level project can be registered rather than a single plant.
    4. Measurement and verification capacity is thin: Credits are only as sound as the emissions data behind them, and accredited carbon verifiers in India are few relative to the number of obligated entities. Eg. Voluntary carbon markets globally have been discredited by projects whose claimed reductions could not be reproduced on audit.
      The Fix: Accredit and licence verification agencies ahead of the compliance deadline, with random re-audit of a fixed share of issued certificates.
    5. Overlap with earlier instruments confuses the signal: Renewable energy certificates and energy saving certificates already price parts of the same abatement, so a firm can face several partially overlapping obligations. Eg. A cement plant may hold energy saving certificates for efficiency gains that also lower its greenhouse gas emission intensity.
      The Fix: Publish a single conversion and transition schedule that folds legacy certificates into the carbon credit market on a stated date.

    Conclusion

    Recognition removes a trade barrier only to the extent that the domestic carbon market becomes real. The set off is a pass through of a price India charges itself, so the instrument that protects exporters is the same one that has to discipline them. What to watch is the clearing price at the first compliance cycle auctions and whether the European Union grants an equivalent recognition, since the European market absorbs a far larger share of Indian steel and aluminium than the British one.

    Back2Basics: Bureau of Energy Efficiency

    1. Statutory body: The Bureau was set up in 2002 under the Energy Conservation Act, 2001, and functions under the Ministry of Power.
    2. Mandate: It is charged with reducing the energy intensity of the Indian economy, meaning energy consumed per unit of gross domestic product.
    3. Standards and labelling: It runs the star rating programme for appliances and the Energy Conservation Building Code for commercial buildings.
    4. Market instruments: It designed and administers the Perform, Achieve and Trade scheme and now the carbon credit market, making it the nodal agency for India’s carbon pricing architecture.

    “[2023] Consider the following statements :

    Statement-I: Carbon markets are likely to be one of the most widespread tools in the fight against climate change.

    Statement-II : Carbon markets transfer resources from the private sector to the State.

    Which one of the following is correct in respect of the above statements?

    (a) Both Statement-I and Statement-II are correct and Statement-II is the correct explanation for Statement-I

    (b) Both Statement-I and Statement-II are correct and Statement-II is not the correct explanation for Statement-I

    (c) Statement-I is correct but Statement-II is incorrect

    (d) Statement-I is incorrect but Statement-II is correct

  • The political cost of UCT schemes

    Why in the News

    Unconditional cash transfer schemes aimed at women have become a standard electoral instrument in India since 2020, and the argument now is that they carry a political cost their designers cannot remove.

    What is an unconditional cash transfer scheme?

    1. Cash paid without a behavioural condition: The transfer reaches an identified beneficiary on eligibility alone, with no requirement to enrol a child, attend a clinic or perform work.
    2. The named State schemes: Kalaignar Magalir Urimai Thittam in Tamil Nadu, Lakshmir Bhandar in West Bengal and Gruha Lakshmi Yojana in Karnataka are the principal instances.
    3. The stated welfare purpose: The schemes provide financial support to women, and partially advance Sustainable Development Goal 5.4 (recognition and valuation of women’s unpaid domestic and care work).

    Why can beneficiary targeting not be made accurate?

    1. Incomes are not observable: Governments cannot directly observe the incomes of most workers in the informal sector.
    2. Proxies stand in for income: Eligibility is inferred from land ownership, electricity consumption or household assets.
    3. Both errors follow from the proxy: Inclusion errors send benefits to ineligible households. Exclusion errors leave eligible households out.

    What does the Kalaignar Magalir Urimai Thittam experience show?

    1. The promise was universal: Rs 1,000 a month was promised to all women-headed households before the 2021 election.
    2. The launch was restricted: Fiscal constraints produced eligibility limits on income, land ownership and other criteria at launch in September 2023, covering about 1.13 crore women.
    3. Expansion followed complaints, not review: Another 16.94 lakh beneficiaries were added in December 2025 after widespread complaints from women who believed they met the criteria. The scheme cost Rs 13,807 crore in 2025-26.
    4. The expansion did not settle the grievance: Women who considered themselves unfairly excluded became more aggrieved when beneficiaries received an advance of three months’ entitlement along with a special summer relief payment.

    Why does a perceived error cost as much as a real one?

    1. Belief drives grievance, not eligibility: An individual who fails the official criteria may still believe the treatment was unfair, and votes on that belief.
    2. Qualifying households attract resentment: A household that legally qualifies may be regarded as undeserving where it appears relatively affluent.
    3. The two logics pull in opposite directions: Economics favours targeting so that scarce public resources reach those most in need. Politics rewards broader inclusion, because voters weigh benefits they believe were unfairly denied to them.
    4. Small shifts decide outcomes: The precise electoral impact cannot be measured, and modest shifts in voter preference decide closely contested constituencies.

    What is the fiscal case against unconditional transfers?

    1. The national bill: States are expected to spend about $18 billion on unconditional cash transfers in 2025-26, according to the latest Economic Survey.
    2. The money is switched rather than raised: Financing requires expenditure switching or a larger fiscal deficit.
    3. Productive spending is displaced: Resources available for employment generation and self-employment programmes fall.
    4. Withdrawal is not an option once dependence sets in: Parties escalate the amount instead of ending the transfer, which produces competitive welfarism.

    Does a conditional design perform better?

    1. The benefit is tied to an outcome: Conditional and incentive-linked transfers link payment to a socially desirable behaviour, so the money buys a developmental gain alongside relief.
    2. Self-selection replaces verification: Participation in Tamil Nadu’s Midday Meal Scheme depends on school enrolment, so beneficiaries select themselves and grievances fall.
    3. The political cost falls with the targeting burden: A programme tied to education or another desirable behaviour needs no proxy means test, so it generates no perceived exclusion error.

    Challenges to unconditional cash transfers

    1. There is no current income record to target on: Welfare lists rest on a deprivation ranking that ages faster than household circumstances change. Eg. The Socio-Economic and Caste Census of 2011 remains the base for several central and State beneficiary lists.
      The Fix: Re-run the deprivation survey on a fixed cycle and publish the ranking rules, so exclusion can be contested against a stated test.
    2. Exclusion falls hardest on those without documents: Authentication failure removes a household that is eligible on every substantive criterion. Eg. Aadhaar authentication failures in ration distribution in Jharkhand’s Simdega district were linked to a starvation death in 2017.
      The Fix: Mandate an offline exception route at every disbursement point, with the exception count published monthly.
    3. The transfer amount is fixed in nominal terms and erodes: Inflation cuts the real value of a flat monthly figure that no rule revises. Eg. The maternity benefit under the Pradhan Mantri Matru Vandana Yojana has stayed at Rs 5,000 since 2017.
      The Fix: Index the transfer to the consumer price index with an automatic annual revision.
    4. Cash cannot substitute for a service that does not exist: A transfer lets a household buy a service only where a provider is present. Eg. A cash benefit cannot purchase schooling or primary care in a block that has neither a functioning school nor a health centre.
      The Fix: Pair every new transfer with a published service-availability audit for the districts it covers.

    Conclusion

    Targeting error is not an implementation defect in an unconditional cash transfer. It is a property of paying cash on an inferred income in an economy where income cannot be observed. The design therefore buys relief at a political price the government cannot negotiate down, and raising the amount does not buy it down either. The alternative on offer is not universality but conditionality: tie the payment to a behaviour the household chooses, and the household sorts itself.

    Cash Transfer Based Welfare in India

    1. About: Benefit is paid in cash directly into a beneficiary’s bank account in place of a subsidised good, a price support or an in-kind entitlement.
    2. The delivery rails: The Jan Dhan-Aadhaar-Mobile combination supplies the account, the identity and the confirmation, and the Public Financial Management System routes the payment.
    3. Where it began at scale: Cooking gas subsidy transfer under the PAHAL scheme in 2014-15 was the first large national rollout.
    4. Present spread: Direct Benefit Transfer now runs across more than 300 central schemes in addition to State transfers.

    Government Initiatives for Cash Transfer Based Welfare

    1. Pradhan Mantri Kisan Samman Nidhi: Rs 6,000 a year in three instalments to landholding farmer families, run by the Ministry of Agriculture and Farmers’ Welfare.
    2. National Social Assistance Programme: Old age, widow and disability pensions to below poverty line households, run by the Ministry of Rural Development.
    3. Direct Benefit Transfer Mission: Housed in the Cabinet Secretariat, it coordinates transfer implementation across ministries and maintains the scheme-wise public dashboard.

    [2022, GS2, 10 marks] Reforming the government delivery system through the Direct Benefit Transfer Scheme is a progressive step, but it has its limitations too. Comment.

  • NAMASTE Cards distributed to waste pickers in Najafgarh zone

    NAMASTE Cards distributed to waste pickers in Najafgarh zone

    Why in News

    The Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment (MoSJE) inaugurated distribution of NAMASTE Cards to waste pickers in the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD) Najafgarh Zone on 4 September 2026.

    Core facts

    1. Scheme name: NAMASTE stands for National Action for Mechanised Sanitation Ecosystem. It is a central scheme for the safety and dignity of sanitation workers.
    2. Implementing bodies: The scheme is run jointly by the MoSJE and the Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs (MoHUA).
    3. Event substance: Profiled waste pickers received NAMASTE identity cards. The cards formally recognise the worker and link the worker to scheme benefits.
    4. Officeholder: The distribution was inaugurated by the Union Minister of State for Social Justice and Empowerment. The individual identity is not material to the policy content.

    Static Context

    1. Objective: NAMASTE targets zero fatalities in sanitation work in India. It seeks to end direct human contact with faecal matter in sewer and septic tank cleaning.
    2. Coverage expansion: NAMASTE originally covered sewer and septic tank workers (SSWs). The scheme was later extended to enumerate and cover waste pickers. A national digital application for profiling waste pickers was launched on World Environment Day 2025.
    3. Benefits design: The scheme provides occupational profiling, Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) kits, Ayushman Bharat health cover, and a capital subsidy for sanitation related livelihoods.
    4. Predecessor: NAMASTE subsumed the earlier Self Employment Scheme for Rehabilitation of Manual Scavengers (SRMS).
    5. Governing law: Manual scavenging is prohibited under the Prohibition of Employment as Manual Scavengers and their Rehabilitation Act, 2013.

    Prelims angle

    1. Scheme full form and nodal ministries: NAMASTE is run by the MoSJE with the MoHUA. Expect a purpose or ministry match question.
    2. Beneficiary categories: Sewer and septic tank workers, and waste pickers. The waste picker inclusion is the newest hook.
    3. Benefit bundle: PPE, Ayushman Bharat health cover, capital subsidy, occupational profiling.
    4. Predecessor scheme: SRMS. Governing Act: Manual Scavengers Act, 2013.

    Mains angle

    GS Paper 2, welfare schemes for vulnerable sections. A question can frame the shift from a rehabilitation model (SRMS) to a mechanisation and formalisation model (NAMASTE), and ask whether profiling and card based inclusion secures the rights of informal sanitation workers.

    “[2016] Rashtriya Garima Abhiyaan’ is a national campaign to

    (a) rehabilitate the homeless and destitute persons and provide them with suitable sources of livelihood

    (b) release the sex workers from their practice and provide them with alternative sources of livelihood

    (c) eradicate the practice of manual scavenging and rehabilitate the manual scavengers

    (d) release the bonded labourers from their bondage and rehabilitate them.

  • Play leading role in skilling push: Govt tells industry

    Play leading role in skilling push: Govt tells industry

    Why in the News

    The Ministry of Skill Development and Entrepreneurship has asked industry to take the leading role in the Pradhan Mantri Skilling and Employability Transformation through Upgraded ITIs (PM-SETU) scheme. The scheme’s own design already places industry there. Industry partners take a controlling 51 percent stake in the Section 8 companies (not for profit companies registered under the Companies Act, 2013, which cannot pay dividends to their members) that will manage clusters of Industrial Training Institutes (ITIs). The Centre and the States put up the bulk of the money. Industry’s 17 percent share qualifies as Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) spending. Control over curriculum, technology and delivery therefore passes to a partner whose own contribution comes out of a statutory obligation rather than commercial risk capital.

    What is PM-SETU?

    1. What it is: A central scheme carrying an outlay of Rs 60,000 crore to upgrade government Industrial Training Institutes.
    2. What it funds: Upgraded laboratories, new machines and revised trade curricula at the institutes it covers.
    3. What it is measured on: Employability, since the stated purpose is the quality and relevance of vocational training rather than the number of training seats created.

    What does the ownership structure change?

    1. Industry holds control of the managing entity: Industry partners take a controlling 51 percent stake in the Section 8 companies that will manage ITI clusters.
    2. The state pays and industry decides: The Centre and the States provide the bulk of the funding, against an industry contribution of 17 percent.
    3. The industry share is a statutory obligation, not risk capital: That 17 percent is eligible under Corporate Social Responsibility, so the controlling partner can meet it from money the Companies Act, 2013 already requires it to spend.
    4. What moves into the partner’s hands: Curriculum design, technology adoption and the running of skill development pass to the industry partner.

    Why is industry being asked to lead?

    1. The demand side gets to write the syllabus: Placing curriculum and technology decisions with employers is meant to keep trade training aligned to the machines and processes actually in use.
    2. The immediate driver is the energy and manufacturing transition: The appeal was addressed to the power and utilities industry, whose workforce requirements are changing as generation and grid technology change.
    3. A working cluster is being held up as the model: ArcelorMittal’s leadership of the Vizag cluster has been cited as the benchmark for what the arrangement should produce.
    4. Institute workshops lag the shop floor: ITIs have long trained on equipment that industry has already replaced, which is the specific gap upgraded labs and employer set curricula are meant to close.

    Challenges to PM-SETU

    1. Most trades have no anchor employer: A cluster needs a large firm willing to hold a controlling stake and carry the management burden, which exists in steel or power and not across most trades an ITI teaches. Eg. Plumbing, welding and electrical work are served largely by contractors and micro enterprises, with no single firm able to lead a cluster.
      The Fix: Allow a sector skill council or an industry association to hold the controlling stake in trades where no single anchor firm exists.
    2. Corporate Social Responsibility money contracts in a downturn: A partner funding its share from CSR can redirect that spending in a year when its own hiring slows. Eg. The obligation is calculated at two percent of average net profits of the preceding three financial years, so it falls exactly when industrial demand falls.
      The Fix: Fix the industry contribution as a multi year commitment inside the cluster agreement, so a cluster’s operating budget does not track one partner’s profits.
    3. Control is granted without an outcome obligation: A controlling stake gives industry decision rights over publicly funded assets with no placement or wage commitment attached to those rights. Eg. The National Apprenticeship Promotion Scheme has repeatedly recorded engagement below its sanctioned targets, since participation carried no binding hiring commitment.
      The Fix: Tie renewal of a cluster’s management contract to verified placement and wage outcomes for its trainees.
    4. Clusters will form where industry already is: The model reproduces the existing gap between industrialised and lagging States, because the anchor employer is the precondition. Eg. Institutes in the north eastern States operate with far thinner employer presence than those in Tamil Nadu, Gujarat or Maharashtra.
      The Fix: Reserve a share of central funding for clusters in districts with no large anchor employer, with a public sector undertaking as the lead partner.
    5. The trained worker is a poachable asset: A Section 8 company cannot distribute surplus, so a firm’s only return is the workers it hires, and a competitor can hire them instead. Eg. A firm that trains a welder who then joins a rival bears the full cost and gets none of the benefit, which is the standard problem in employer funded training.
      The Fix: Publish cluster wise trainee supply data so participating firms recruit from a pool they collectively financed rather than each underwriting a rival’s hiring.

    Conclusion

    The scheme moves the state from provider of vocational training to financier of it. That works where a large employer wants the workers and is willing to run the institution, and the scheme has not said who takes charge in the trades where neither condition holds. The marker to watch is the first set of cluster agreements, and specifically whether any hiring or wage commitment is attached to the controlling stake.

    Back2Basics: Industrial Training Institutes

    1. What they are: Post school institutions offering trade level vocational training in engineering and non engineering trades, entered after Class 8, 10 or 12 depending on the trade.
    2. Who runs them: Government institutes are run by State governments alongside a large private sector, with standards set by the Directorate General of Training under the Ministry of Skill Development and Entrepreneurship.
    3. What a trainee gets: Trainees sit the All India Trade Test and are awarded the National Trade Certificate.
    4. Where they sit in the system: They form the country’s oldest and largest formal vocational training network, run under the Craftsmen Training Scheme since 1950.

    [2023, GS2, 15 marks] Skill development programs have succeed in increasing human resources supply to various sectors. In the context of the statement analyze the linkages between education, skill and employment.

  • No takers for govt’s ₹37,500-crore coal gasification scheme

    Why in the News

    The coal ministry’s ₹37,500 crore financial incentive scheme for surface coal and lignite gasification has drawn no application from any private or public player. The last date for submission is 7 September 2026, fixed by a Request for Proposal issued on 7 July 2026. The Union Cabinet had approved the scheme to gasify 75 million tonnes of coal and lignite and to cut imports of liquefied natural gas, urea and methanol. The ministry attributes the absence of bids to the time a project proposal of this scale takes to prepare. An incentive of this size drawing nothing at its first deadline points at the economics of a gasification project rather than at the paperwork.

    How does coal gasification work?

    1. From solid fuel to gas: Dry fuel is converted into synthetic gas, known as syngas.
    2. What syngas is used for: Syngas serves as an alternative fuel and as the feedstock for methanol, fertilisers, hydrogen and chemicals.
    3. The stated emissions gain: Converting coal into gas rather than burning it directly is counted as a reduction in carbon emissions.

    What was the scheme designed to achieve?

    1. A volume target: The programme is built around gasifying 75 million tonnes of coal and lignite.
    2. Import substitution: The scheme is aimed at reducing dependence on imports of liquefied natural gas, urea and methanol.
    3. Insulation from external shocks: Domestic production of these inputs is intended to shield the country from global price volatility and supply chain disruption.
    4. The instrument: A financial outlay of ₹37,500 crore was approved for surface coal and lignite gasification projects.

    How has the coal ministry explained the empty first round?

    1. Proposal preparation takes time: Given the scale of funds each project involves, the preparation of pre-feasibility reports and project proposals runs long.
    2. Interest without applications: Several industries have communicated their interest in participating, and none has filed.
    3. The count is not final: The number of applications cannot be stated before the deadline passes, since submission is entirely online.
    4. The window reopens: Application rounds are envisaged every two months, giving industry repeated opportunities to enter.

    Challenges to the coal gasification incentive scheme

    1. High ash domestic coal raises the cost: Indian coal carries a high ash content, which lowers gas yield per tonne and raises the capital cost of the gasifier. Eg. Gasifier designs proven on low ash imported coal need modification before they run on Indian coal.
      The Fix: Tie the incentive to a gasifier configuration demonstrated on high ash domestic coal, rather than to project cost alone.
    2. The output price is set by policy, not by the market: Urea sold to farmers carries a maximum retail price fixed by the Centre, so a coal based producer’s revenue depends on the subsidy regime. Eg. Urea remains outside the Nutrient Based Subsidy regime and continues to be sold at a controlled price.
      The Fix: Offer a long term offtake price for coal based urea and methanol, so a project’s revenue is known before financial closure.
    3. No assured buyer for the other outputs: Lenders fund a plant only where a committed purchaser exists for its methanol or hydrogen. Eg. India has no binding methanol blending obligation comparable to the dated targets under the ethanol blending programme.
      The Fix: Notify a methanol blending obligation with dated targets, so demand exists independently of the capital subsidy.
    4. A coal based route to a fuel sold as clean: The process begins with coal, so the emissions case rests on capturing the carbon dioxide the process concentrates. Eg. Coal to methanol carries higher lifecycle emissions than natural gas based methanol.
      The Fix: Make carbon capture capability a condition of the incentive rather than an optional addition.
    5. Clearances have to be assembled before a bid: A promoter needs a coal linkage, land and water in place before a proposal is fileable, and the incentive supplies none of them. Eg. The Talcher Fertilizers coal to urea project in Odisha has run well past its original commissioning timeline.
      The Fix: Bundle a coal linkage and a land allotment with the incentive award, so a bidder is not chasing clearances and funding at the same time.

    Conclusion

    The obstacle here is not the size of the incentive but the absence of a price and a buyer for what a gasification plant would make. A capital subsidy lowers the cost of building the plant. It does not tell the promoter what the output will sell for, or who is obliged to buy it. The marker to watch is whether the next round is paired with an assured offtake price or a blending obligation, and whether a public sector energy company files before any private promoter does.

    Back2Basics: Lignite

    1. What it is: Lignite is the lowest rank of coal, high in moisture and low in fixed carbon, also called brown coal.
    2. Why it is used near the mine: Its calorific value is lower than that of bituminous coal, so transporting it long distances is uneconomic and it is burned or gasified close to the pithead.
    3. Where India’s reserves lie: The bulk of the country’s lignite sits in Tamil Nadu, with further deposits in Rajasthan, Gujarat and Jammu and Kashmir.
    4. Who mines it: NLC India Limited, a central public sector enterprise under the Ministry of Coal, is the largest lignite producer in the country.

    [2025] Consider the following substances:

    I. Ethanol

    II. Nitroglycerine

    III. Urea

    Coal gasification technology can be used in the production of how many of them?

    (a) Only one

    (b) Only two

    (c) All three

    (d) None

  • Govt. to spend Rs 24,000 crore to modernise police force

    Govt. to spend Rs 24,000 crore to modernise police force

    Why in the News

    The Union government has told the Supreme Court that it has begun implementing an umbrella Police Modernisation Mission worth Rs 24,000 crore over the next five years.

    What is the Police Modernisation Mission?

    1. Its form: It is an umbrella scheme, meaning several police modernisation components are funded through a single mission rather than as separate schemes.
    2. Its size and horizon: The outlay is Rs 24,000 crore, to be spent over five years.
    3. Who it covers: It targets the internal security capabilities of both State police forces and the Central Armed Police Forces.
    4. Its stated route: The capability gain is to come through greater use of technology, which is the only delivery mechanism named in the submission.

    Why was the disclosure made in a court proceeding?

    1. The proceeding was begun by the Court itself: The suo motu case was initiated in 2025 after the Court took note of a media report on non functional CCTV cameras at Udaipur police stations.
    2. The Court widened it into a compliance review: It sought compliance reports from the Centre, the States and the Union Territories on the installation and functioning of cameras.
    3. The Bench: The matter is before a Bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta, with the Centre represented by an Additional Solicitor-General.
    4. The mission answers the compliance question with an outlay: The Centre’s response to a record of equipment not working is a larger programme to buy equipment, and no separate maintenance or functioning guarantee was placed before the Court.

    What did Paramvir Singh Saini versus Baljit Singh require?

    1. Cameras at specified locations: The 2021 judgment mandated CCTV cameras at key locations in police stations, including lock ups and the rooms of inspectors and sub-inspectors.
    2. Cameras of a specified capability: The directions required night vision and audio recording, so that an interrogation is recorded and not merely observed.
    3. Footage retention: Recordings were to be preserved for a stated minimum period, so that a complaint filed months later can still be tested against the record.
    4. Oversight bodies: State level and district level oversight committees were to be constituted to purchase, maintain and monitor the systems and to review footage.
    5. Notice to the public: Police stations were to display notices telling visitors that the premises are under camera cover and that a complaint of human rights violation may be made.

    Challenges to the Police Modernisation Mission

    1. Modernisation money has historically gone unspent: Releases under police modernisation schemes stall on State matching shares and pending utilisation certificates. Eg. Successive Comptroller and Auditor General audits have flagged underutilisation of police modernisation grants by States.
      The Fix: Release tranches against verified physical milestones, meaning equipment installed and functioning, rather than against expenditure statements.
    2. Central money buys equipment, not reform: Police is a State subject under Entry 2 of the State List, so a central mission can fund hardware without touching recruitment, tenure or accountability. Eg. Directions in Prakash Singh versus Union of India (2006) on fixed tenure and a State Security Commission remain only partly implemented across States.
      The Fix: Condition a share of each State’s mission grant on enactment of the police board and fixed tenure directions.
    3. Technology fails at the point of maintenance: Installed systems stop working for want of annual maintenance contracts, spares and power backup, and the capital grant does not cover them. Eg. Audits have found Crime and Criminal Tracking Network and Systems terminals installed but not in use at a large number of police stations.
      The Fix: Fund a five year maintenance and consumables line inside each equipment sanction, instead of leaving it as a separate State liability.
    4. Manpower shortfall caps what technology can deliver: A camera or a database still needs an officer to operate, review and act on it, and State forces run well below sanctioned strength. Eg. Bureau of Police Research and Development data records an actual police strength close to 150 personnel per lakh population, against the United Nations recommended figure of 222.
      The Fix: Tie mission approval to a State recruitment schedule closing sanctioned vacancies across the same five years.
    5. Surveillance capacity grows faster than the oversight around it: Equipment installed for accountability also expands the force’s own recording and identification capability, with no independent auditor of its use. Eg. Access logs for police station footage are held and reviewed by the same force whose conduct the footage records.
      The Fix: Place footage access logs and retention compliance under an independent State level oversight body publishing an annual report.

    Conclusion

    The mission has moved from announcement to implementation, and it was disclosed in a proceeding about equipment already mandated and not functioning. Buying capability and sustaining it are different problems, and only the first has an outlay attached to it. The next point to watch is the compliance reports the Court has sought from the Centre, the States and the Union Territories, which is where the gap between equipment sanctioned and equipment working becomes visible.

    Back2Basics: Central Armed Police Forces

    1. What they are: Seven armed forces of the Union under the Ministry of Home Affairs, distinct both from the armed forces under the Ministry of Defence and from State police.
    2. The seven forces: Central Reserve Police Force, Border Security Force, Central Industrial Security Force, Indo-Tibetan Border Police, Sashastra Seema Bal, Assam Rifles and the National Security Guard.
    3. How they are used: They are deployed to States on requisition for internal security duty, election duty and disaster response, and guard specified international border sectors.
    4. Command and recruitment: Each is headed by a Director General, with officer recruitment through the Union Public Service Commission and other ranks through the Staff Selection Commission.

    [2023, GS3, 15 marks] What are the internal security challenges being faced by India? Give out the role of Central Intelligence and Investigative Agencies tasked to counter such threats.

  • Progress review of Prime Minister Dhan Dhaanya Krishi Yojana

    Progress review of Prime Minister Dhan Dhaanya Krishi Yojana

    Why in News

    The Union Minister of Agriculture and Farmers Welfare reviewed the implementation progress of the Prime Minister Dhan Dhaanya Krishi Yojana (PMDDKY).

    Core facts

    1. What it is: PMDDKY is a district focused agriculture development scheme. It converges existing schemes to raise farm productivity in India’s weakest performing agricultural districts.
    2. Implementing ministry: Ministry of Agriculture and Farmers Welfare is the nodal ministry. Multiple line departments contribute converged schemes.
    3. Coverage: The scheme targets 100 districts. Districts are selected on three parameters. The parameters are low agricultural productivity, low cropping intensity, and low credit disbursement.
    4. Convergence design: The scheme pools 36 existing schemes across 11 departments. It layers these on a single district plan rather than creating a new fund line.
    5. Release specific review figures: The specific progress numbers, district status, and targets reported in PRID 2305501 could not be verified from PIB this run. They are not reproduced here.

    Static Context

    1. Origin: The scheme was announced in the Union Budget 2025 to 2026. The Union Cabinet approved it in July 2025.
    2. Duration: The scheme runs for 6 years from 2025 to 2026.
    3. Model: The scheme is modelled on the Aspirational Districts Programme. That programme uses ranking, convergence, and competitive monitoring to lift the weakest districts.
    4. Focus areas: The scheme covers productivity, crop diversification, sustainable agriculture, irrigation and water conservation, post harvest storage at panchayat and block level, and farm credit.
    5. Monitoring: District, State, and National level committees oversee the scheme. NITI Aayog and assigned Central Nodal Officers support monitoring.

    Prelims angle

    1. Number of districts covered: 100 districts.
    2. Selection parameters: low productivity, low cropping intensity, low credit disbursement.
    3. Number of converged schemes: 36 schemes across 11 departments.
    4. Parent design model: Aspirational Districts Programme.
    5. Nodal ministry: Ministry of Agriculture and Farmers Welfare.

    Mains angle

    GS3, agriculture theme (major crops, cropping patterns, agricultural productivity, and scheme convergence). A question can ask how a convergence and district targeting model raises productivity in low performing agricultural districts. It can also ask how crop diversification and integrated farming raise small farmer incomes.

    “[2022, GS3, 15] What is Integrated Farming System ? How is it helpful to small and marginal farmers in India ?”

    “[2025, GS3, 10] Explain the factors influencing the decision of the farmers on the selection of high value crops in India.”

  • Majority of India’s gig workers remain out of govt’s reach

    Majority of India’s gig workers remain out of govt’s reach

    Why in the News

    Only 8.58 lakh gig workers stood registered on the e-Shram portal as of the Ministry of Labour and Employment’s reply in the Rajya Sabha in January 2026, the latest publicly available figure.

    How far has the Budget’s health cover promise actually reached?

    1. Registration against the promise: The Budget’s beneficiary figure of over one crore compares with 8.58 lakh registrations on e-Shram, the figure the Ministry gave Parliament in January 2026.
    2. The optimistic case still falls short: A doubling of registrations since January would still cover only around 15 percent of the estimated gig workforce.
    3. The promise itself drove enrolment: Registrations of gig workers on e-Shram rose sharply from 2025, and the health cover announcement is the visible cause of that surge.
    4. Registration is the gate to every benefit: Registration on e-Shram is a prerequisite for availing benefits, so an unregistered gig worker is invisible to the scheme by design.

    Why does the government not know how many gig workers India has?

    1. One source for every estimate: The figure of over one crore gig workers, quoted in many government replies in Parliament last year, comes from a single document, the NITI Aayog report “India’s Booming Gig and Platform Economy” released in June 2022.
    2. What that report estimated: It put the gig workforce at around 77 lakh in 2020-21 and projected 1.27 crore in 2024-25 and 1.43 crore in the year after.
    3. No dedicated measurement effort exists: In the absence of any effort to measure the gig workforce, official estimates rely solely on this NITI Aayog report.
    4. The national labour survey does not count them: The Periodic Labour Force Survey (PLFS) reports do not capture gig workers as a distinct category, even though the estimated gig workforce is about 2 percent of India’s total workforce of 61.6 crore as cited by the 2025 PLFS report.

    What has the government built for gig workers, and what has not arrived?

    1. e-Shram as the single register: The portal, launched in 2021, is conceptualised as an Aadhaar-seeded National Database of Unorganised Workers (NDUW) and has become the unified platform for tracking the unorganised workforce, including gig workers.
    2. A legal definition came only in 2020: The government officially defined a gig worker only in the Code on Social Security, 2020, which came into force last year.
    3. The Code’s promises remain largely on paper: The Code promised accident insurance, maternity benefits and a dedicated social security fund for gig workers, and most of these are yet to materialise.

    Where are the registered gig workers, by State and by sector?

    1. Registrations are uneven across States: The ten States with the most registered gig workers as of January 2026 are led by West Bengal (54,734), Delhi (49,479), Andhra Pradesh (39,212), Rajasthan (38,205), Karnataka (37,871), Gujarat (34,756) and Madhya Pradesh (34,351), with Maharashtra, Uttar Pradesh and Bihar completing the list.
    2. Urbanised southern States are missing from the top ten: Tamil Nadu (31,654), Telangana (29,951) and Keralam (11,219) are not among the ten States with the highest registrations, despite their high urbanisation.
    3. Twenty one sectors on paper, three in practice: NITI Aayog’s 2022 report listed 21 sectors with gig workers, including agriculture, healthcare, education and retail, but e-Shram registrations concentrate in the food industry, transportation, and domestic and household work.
    4. The sector shares are lopsided: The largest single sector accounts for 32.8 percent of registered gig workers, and construction (3.6 percent) and agriculture (3.4 percent) are the smallest of the top five sectors.

    Challenges to e-Shram as the gateway for gig worker welfare

    1. Enrolment depends on the worker, not the platform: e-Shram is a self-registration portal, and no aggregator is obliged to enrol the workers it engages. Eg. The Rajasthan Platform Based Gig Workers (Registration and Welfare) Act, 2023 instead makes aggregators register their workers with a State welfare board.
      The Fix: Require aggregators to push worker data into e-Shram at onboarding under the Code on Social Security, 2020, so registration stops depending on individual initiative.
    2. No survey category means no target to measure against: Without a gig work module in the labour survey, the government cannot say what share of the workforce any scheme covers. Eg. The Ministry’s January 2026 reply to Parliament could cite portal registrations but no survey count.
      The Fix: Add a platform and gig work classification to the PLFS questionnaire so coverage is measured against a surveyed denominator.
    3. The funding source has not been built: The Code provides for aggregator contributions of 1 to 2 percent of annual turnover, capped at 5 percent of payments to workers, and the fund those contributions were to feed has not materialised. Eg. Karnataka’s Platform Based Gig Workers (Social Security and Welfare) Act, 2025 levies its own transaction fee because no central fund is flowing.
      The Fix: Notify the contribution rules and the social security fund so central benefits do not depend on Budget-by-Budget announcements.
    4. State schemes fragment portability: State-level gig worker boards create separate registrations and benefits for a workforce that moves across State lines. Eg. A delivery worker registered in Rajasthan gains nothing from Karnataka’s fund on relocating.
      The Fix: Make e-Shram the single identifier that State boards read from, so benefits follow the worker across States.

    Conclusion

    The health cover promise has produced registrations faster than any earlier measure, but the register still holds a fraction of the workforce the promise was made for. The deeper problem is a denominator the state has never measured. The next e-Shram registration figure released to Parliament, and whether the Code’s social security fund is finally notified, are the two markers to watch.

    Back2Basics: Gig worker and platform worker under the Code on Social Security, 2020

    1. Gig worker: A person who performs work or participates in a work arrangement and earns from such activities outside the traditional employer-employee relationship.
    2. Platform worker: A person in platform work, meaning work arranged through an online platform that connects organisations or individuals with workers to provide specific services for payment.
    3. Aggregator: A digital intermediary or marketplace through which a buyer or user connects with a seller or service provider, the entity the Code identifies for contributions.
    4. Why the definitions matter: They are the first statutory recognition of gig work in India, and eligibility for the Code’s social security schemes is tied to them.

    [2024, GS3, 15 marks] Discuss the merits and demerits of the four ‘Labour Codes’ in the context of labour market reforms in India. What has been the progress so far in this regard?”

  • Foreign Assets Disclosure Scheme: Concerns rise over high fee on ESOPs, small investments

    Why in the News

    The Foreign Assets of Small Taxpayers – Disclosure Scheme (FAST-DS), launched on 16 August, charges a flat Rs 1 lakh fee to disclose a foreign asset that was already taxed or acquired as a non-resident but was not declared in the income tax return. Salaried employees holding unreported employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) and restricted stock units (RSUs) (shares granted by an employer as part of pay, vesting over time) must pay the fee even where they made no gain. The scheme was proposed in this year’s Budget to address the “practical issues of small taxpayers like students, young professionals, tech employees, relocated NRIs”. The tension is between a fee designed as a low-cost route to compliance and a flat amount that exceeds the value of many of the assets it is meant to regularise.

    What are the two categories under FAST-DS?

    1. Where the complaints sit: The dispute is entirely about Category (ii), where the asset was never untaxed and the only lapse is non-disclosure in the return.
    2. The alternative the Act blocks: The Black Money (Undisclosed Foreign Income and Assets) and Imposition of Tax Act, 2015 does not recognise an updated return for income that was never taxed or disclosed, so an updated return does not cure the lapse.

    Why does a flat fee fall hardest on the smallest disclosers?

    1. Fee exceeding the asset: A salaried individual who invested Rs 90,000 in United States-listed stocks, now trading at a loss, must pay Rs 1 lakh upfront to disclose the loss-making holding. The transfer already appeared in the Annual Information Statement (AIS) of his return; only the separate Schedule FA entry was missing.
    2. Fee on salary already reported: An employee of a foreign company operating in India had the vesting details of his ESOPs in his salary but not in Schedule FA. He must pay Rs 1 lakh as a disclosure charge on income that was already part of his taxed pay.
    3. The employee’s objection: ESOPs are part of salary, and Rs 1 lakh for disclosure alone is too high a price for a reporting omission.
    4. The materiality test: Materiality is the maximum error allowed in financial statements before they are considered wrong. Where the amounts fall below any reasonable materiality threshold, a Rs 1 lakh penalty is disproportionate to the error.

    Why are ESOPs and residency status at the centre of the dispute?

    1. Non-residents who became residents: Many employees received ESOPs from their global companies as non-resident Indians (NRIs) and were later deputed to India, becoming residents. They did not disclose the old grants earlier and are disclosing them now.
    2. Disclosure invites a notice: After disclosure, the discloser receives a notice asking how the asset was acquired. The position put to the authorities is that the change from non-resident to resident status must be recorded before such notices issue.
    3. ESOPs as a mainstream pay component: ESOPs are a key salary component in the technology sector, startups and foreign companies. The scale shows in the Balance of Payments (BoP) line for “financial derivatives (other than reserves) and employee stock options”.
    4. The outflow figures: Net outflows under that BoP line stood at just under $24 billion in 2025-26, up 8 per cent from about $22 billion in 2024-25. The 2024-25 figure had itself almost tripled from nearly $8 billion in 2023-24.

    Is the updated return a way around the scheme?

    1. What employees are considering: Many employees are weighing an updated return for such anomalies instead of disclosing under the scheme, with greater scrutiny after disclosure the key concern.
    2. The tax department’s position: Even if an updated return is filed, the discloser remains liable to tax and penalty under the Black Money Act, because the Act does not recognise updated returns for income never taxed or disclosed. Disclosure under FAST-DS is therefore the safer route, and the department states there is no intention of additional scrutiny of such declarations.

    Challenges to FAST-DS

    1. A flat fee suppresses uptake: A disclosure window succeeds only if the cost of using it is below the cost of staying hidden, and a fee larger than the asset inverts that calculation for small holders. Eg. The 90-day compliance window under the Black Money Act in 2015 drew only 644 declarations totalling Rs 4,164 crore.
      The Fix: Slab the Category (ii) fee by asset value, with a nominal fee below a stated threshold.
    2. The department already holds the data: For many disclosers the asset is visible in the AIS or through automatic exchange of financial account information, so the fee is charged for reporting what the department can see. Eg. India receives account data on residents’ foreign holdings under the Common Reporting Standard, with exchanges running since 2017.
      The Fix: Pre-fill Schedule FA from AIS and exchanged data and treat a confirmed pre-filled entry as compliance without a separate fee.
    3. Post-disclosure notices deter the target group: Relocated professionals who disclose and then receive an acquisition notice signal to others that disclosure invites inquiry. Eg. Notices asking how an ESOP grant was acquired reach employees whose grant date predates their residency.
      The Fix: Issue a standing instruction that Category (ii) disclosures carrying non-resident acquisition dates close without notice unless a third-party data mismatch exists.

    Conclusion

    The scheme’s design assumes the small taxpayer’s problem is fear of the Black Money Act, when for ESOP holders the problem is a fee unrelated to the size of the lapse. That mismatch is unresolved and no revision of the fee has been announced. The scheme is open and the source states no closing date. What to watch is whether the Central Board of Direct Taxes slabs the Category (ii) fee or clarifies the treatment of grants acquired as a non-resident.

    Back2Basics

    1. Schedule FA: Schedule FA (Foreign Assets) is the part of the income tax return in which a resident and ordinarily resident taxpayer must list every foreign asset held at any time in the year, including shares, ESOPs, bank accounts and immovable property, whether or not it produced income.
    2. Who must file it: The obligation applies to residents only, so a non-resident who acquired an asset abroad first becomes liable to report it in the year he becomes resident.
    3. The penalty it carries: Failure to report attracts a penalty of Rs 10 lakh under the Black Money Act, relaxed from 2024 for movable foreign assets, other than immovable property, of up to Rs 20 lakh in aggregate.

    [2026] Which one of the following best describes the ‘Crowding Out Effect’ in the context of fiscal policy?

    (a) A situation where private investment increases due to increased Government spending

    (b) A situation where Government borrowing leads to higher interest rates, which reduces private investment

    (c) A situation where an increase in taxes leads to increased private sector investment

    (d) A situation where Government spending has no impact on aggregate demand

  • Domestic chip design to receive a boost with Rs 1.27 lakh cr push

    Domestic chip design to receive a boost with Rs 1.27 lakh cr push

    Why in the News

    The Centre has notified the operational framework for its Rs 1.27 lakh crore Semicon 2.0 programme, placing the design of Indian chips and the intellectual property behind them at the front of the country’s semiconductor strategy.

    Components of the Semicon 2.0 programme

    1. Support runs across six pillars: At least three of them are devoted entirely to chip design.
    2. Three design incentives are on offer: Chips designed for strategic purposes, chips for the commercial market, and domestically developed chips deployed at scale each attract separate support.
    3. The upstream chain has its own track: Makers of semiconductor materials, chemicals and manufacturing equipment are eligible outside the design pillars.
    4. Fabrication and packaging remain funded: Fabrication plants and advanced chip packaging continue to draw subsidy alongside the design tracks.

    How will the strategic chip design track work?

    1. The government picks the technologies first: It will identify technologies and building blocks, including intellectual property for compute, memory, radio frequency, power, networking and sensors, that it wants developed in India.
    2. The trigger is national importance: The track covers chips meant for areas of national importance and for critical infrastructure.
    3. Selection runs through competitive bidding: The Centre for Development of Advanced Computing (C-DAC), the government’s high performance computing research organisation under the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology, will issue requests for proposals and select developers.
    4. The state keeps a share of the intellectual property: The intellectual property created under these projects will be jointly owned by the developing company and C-DAC.
    5. Consortiums are permitted: Indian owned and controlled companies can participate independently or alongside global companies, research organisations and academic institutions.

    What does the commercial design track offer?

    1. The target is a fabless industry: The track aims to build commercially viable Indian fabless chip companies, meaning firms that design chips and contract out their manufacture.
    2. Firms get access to design infrastructure: Eligible firms receive electronic design automation (EDA) tools, multi-project wafer fabrication, intellectual property cores, compute sub-systems and post-silicon validation.
    3. Small firms receive seed money: Start-ups and micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) designing commercial chips can receive up to Rs 15 crore or 50 per cent of project cost, whichever is lower.
    4. The government can take equity: It can make equity co-investments alongside venture capital or private equity investors.
    5. Large firms repay through royalty: Larger companies can opt for royalty financing and pay 5 per cent of a product’s net revenue until 1.5 times the government’s financial support has been recovered.
    6. Eligibility now reaches Overseas Citizens of India: Companies incorporated and headquartered in India qualify if they are owned and controlled by Indian citizens or Overseas Citizens of India (OCIs) and maintain a significant operational and manpower presence in the country.

    What does the framework do for the upstream supply chain?

    1. Capital support is set at 30 per cent: Research and development facilities for semiconductor equipment, plants making semiconductor grade wafers, photomasks, photoresists, substrates, chemicals and gases, testing facilities, and units producing equipment and components can each claim that share of capital expenditure.
    2. Equipment makers get a declining incentive: A production linked incentive of 10, 8, 6, 4 and 2 per cent runs over five years beginning FY 2028-29.
    3. The incentive is tied to domestic sourcing: It is paid on the value of the bill of materials that an equipment maker sources from domestic manufacturers.
    4. Total support carries a ceiling: Combined support for these units is capped at 50 per cent of eligible capital expenditure.
    5. The chain being targeted is largely imported today: The upstream inputs needed to operate semiconductor factories are currently brought in from abroad.

    Challenges to India’s semiconductor design push

    1. A design still has to be turned into silicon: A fabless firm depends on a foundry, and the wafers for an Indian design are fabricated abroad until domestic plants reach production. Eg. Indian design centres of global chip firms already complete chip designs that are fabricated in Taiwan and South Korea.
      The Fix: Tie the later tranches of design support to committed capacity bookings at Indian fabrication plants, so domestic demand and domestic supply arrive together.
    2. The talent sits inside multinational captive centres: India supplies a large share of the world’s chip design engineers, and most of them work on parts of products owned elsewhere. Eg. Global semiconductor companies run large design centres in Bengaluru, Hyderabad and Noida.
      The Fix: Subsidise multi-project wafer runs for university teams so student designs reach silicon and full product ownership is learned before graduation.
    3. The design tools are a concentrated import: Electronic design automation software comes from a small number of United States based vendors and is subject to export control. Eg. The United States restricted sales of that software to Chinese customers in 2025 before reversing the order weeks later.
      The Fix: Secure long term licence access inside technology partnership agreements and fund an indigenous tool stack for mature process nodes.
    4. Approved outlay is not disbursed money: A start-up carries the working capital cost of a delayed claim, and slow disbursal has followed earlier electronics incentive schemes. Eg. Disbursals under production linked incentive schemes have repeatedly trailed the amounts approved across sectors.
      The Fix: Set a claim settlement deadline in the scheme guidelines with interest payable on delayed disbursal.
    5. Utilities decide where a plant can go: A fabrication plant requires ultrapure water and uninterrupted power at a scale few industrial locations can guarantee. Eg. Taiwan’s 2021 drought forced its foundries to truck in water and to cut consumption.
      The Fix: Pre-certify candidate sites for water and power reliability before approving a plant at that location.

    Conclusion

    Semicon 2.0 can transform India into a global semiconductor powerhouse by nurturing indigenous chip design, strengthening manufacturing, reducing import dependence, creating high-value jobs, and boosting technological self-reliance.

    Back2Basics: Centre for Development of Advanced Computing

    1. Establishment: Set up in 1988 as a scientific society under what is now the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology.
    2. Origin: It was created to build indigenous supercomputers after India was refused access to imported high performance computing systems.
    3. Flagship line: It developed the PARAM series of supercomputers, beginning with PARAM 8000 in 1991.
    4. Present mandate: It works on high performance computing, microprocessors, language computing and cyber security, and implements the National Supercomputing Mission alongside the Indian Institute of Science.

    “[2025, GS3, 15 marks] India aims to become a semiconductor manufacturing hub. What are the challenges faced by the semiconductor industry in India? Mention the salient features of the India Semiconductor Mission.”