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  • AI is now a great-power game. Three difficult questions for India

    Why in the News

    The United States and China are opening a formal bilateral dialogue on artificial intelligence (AI) and its risks, with the Chinese President received in Washington by the US President on Thursday for their third summit in less than 10 months. The meeting comes barely 10 days after the Delhi BRICS summit, where China offered its own vision of international cooperation on AI. The two events set out opposite agendas for the same technology, one built on openness and diffusion and the other on preventing accidents, miscalculation and misuse. BRICS rhetoric on AI may be multipolar. Technological power at the frontier remains concentrated in the United States and China.

    What is strategic stability in the AI age?

    1. Strategic stability: A condition in which neither of two rival powers has an incentive to strike first or to race, sustained by shared understanding of each other’s capabilities and by channels that stop an accident being read as an attack.
    2. Origin of the term: It comes from nuclear arms control, where the United States and the Soviet Union negotiated rules to reduce mutual risk during an active contest for advantage.
    3. What it covers in AI: Preventing accidents, miscalculation and misuse arising from the most capable models, including their military applications.
    4. What it does not cover: It is narrower than agreement on the technological order as a whole, so a strategic stability understanding can be reached with chips, export controls and market access still contested.

    What does China’s BRICS offer on AI amount to?

    1. Openness, access and diffusion: The Chinese framing at Delhi placed the emphasis on spreading AI capability rather than on containing its risks.
    2. World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organisation (WAICO): BRICS members were invited to join this body, which China launched in Shanghai this summer as a venue for international AI cooperation.
    3. Open models for the forum: China proposed that BRICS host an open-source AI community, which makes models and tools available for others to use and adapt.
    4. Champion of affordable access: China presented itself as the advocate of developing countries seeking affordable access to AI models and applications.

    Why does the Washington agenda invert the BRICS agenda?

    1. Subject of the conversation: The Washington discussion concerns the dangers generated by increasingly powerful models and the need to prevent accidents, miscalculation and misuse, which is the opposite end of the technology from access and diffusion.
    2. Who is writing the security rules: As the world’s leading AI powers, the United States and China are beginning to shape the security and geopolitical architecture of the new technology.
    3. The distance between rhetoric and capability: Multipolar language at BRICS does not change where the most advanced capability sits, and the journey from Delhi to Washington in barely 10 days is what makes that visible.
    4. Cold War precedent: The United States and the Soviet Union competed and cooperated in the nuclear and space domains at the same time, and the rules they negotiated inevitably affected the rest of the world.

    What has the US-China AI channel produced, and where does it still diverge?

    1. Opening of the channel: A tentative channel was opened by the Biden administration after the two leaders met at Woodside, California, in November 2023.
    2. The one concrete outcome: At Lima a year later the two leaders affirmed that humans, not artificial intelligence, must control decisions on the use of nuclear weapons.
    3. Guardrails discussed without result: The two leaders discussed possible AI “guardrails” when they met in Beijing in May, and no formal arrangement followed.
    4. What is now on the table: After talks in New York last weekend between the US Treasury Secretary and the Chinese Vice-Premier, Washington said the two sides had considered a standing AI dialogue and a notification system for incidents with national-security consequences.
    5. Why such a mechanism matters: In a crisis the first requirement is not agreement on the entire technological order. It is the ability to establish what has happened, whether it was accidental or deliberate, and who is responsible.
    6. The American objective: The United States wants a framework to manage the risks posed by powerful models and their military applications.
    7. The Chinese objection: China treats safety discussions as a possible instrument for preserving American technological advantage and for legitimising restrictions on its own access to advanced computing.
    8. The named disagreements: The two also disagree on open-source models, data governance, state regulation and the legitimacy of export controls.
    9. Entanglement with trade: Safety discussion under the present US administration runs alongside disputes over advanced chips, export controls, rare earths, tariffs, computing power and the race to build the most capable models, so no grand bargain is at hand and what is sought is a narrower understanding on strategic stability.

    What three questions does this leave India?

    1. Navigating the technological contest: India sits inside the US-led Pax Silica initiative on technology and supply chains, which follows from its deep integration with the American digital and AI ecosystem, and it has stayed out of China’s WAICO amid enduring security problems and mutual distrust. As a BRICS member it still cannot avoid AI rhetoric shaped by the forum’s dominant power.
    2. Competing offers to developing societies: India’s emphasis on making AI work for developing societies found considerable resonance at the Delhi AI summit earlier this year. China’s deeper capabilities in computing, infrastructure, hardware and advanced models let it offer the Global South a wider package of technological cooperation.
    3. Rule-setting by two powers: A dialogue that begins on strategic stability could become an effort to set rules for everyone else, producing discriminatory technology controls against states outside it.
      Counter-pressure: Geopolitical rivalry and competition for markets between the two powers could limit such collusion and create leverage for emerging technological powers such as India.

    Challenges to a US-China understanding on AI risk

    1. Absence of a countable unit: Model capability cannot be counted or inspected the way delivery systems were, so compliance with any understanding cannot be confirmed. Eg. The New START treaty rested on declared launcher numbers and on-site inspection, and neither has an analogue for a training run or a set of model weights.
      The Fix: Anchor the dialogue on physical proxies such as data-centre compute capacity and chip transfers, which are countable and already tracked.
    2. Controls that leak through third countries: Export controls bind firms rather than territory, so restricted chips move through intermediaries in jurisdictions outside any bilateral arrangement. Eg. Washington’s October 2022 controls on advanced computing chips were widened a year later after routes through third countries emerged.
      The Fix: Tie the notification commitment to a shared list of controlled items, so a transfer is traceable rather than disputed after the fact.
    3. Capability held by private developers: The most capable models are built by companies, so a state-to-state understanding does not bind the actors doing the building. Eg. The 2023 Bletchley Park declaration on frontier model safety rested on voluntary commitments from developers rather than obligations on them.
      The Fix: Require incident reporting from developers under domestic law, so a state can honour a notification commitment over conduct it does not itself control.
    4. Exclusion of the states the rules will govern: Terms settled between two powers become conditions of access for everyone else without their participation. Eg. India stayed outside the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and needed a separate Nuclear Suppliers Group waiver in 2008 before it could trade in nuclear material.
      The Fix: Route AI risk rules through a body with wider membership, so conditions of access are negotiated by the states they bind.

    Conclusion

    Two states are writing the safety rules for a technology they also lead, and the rules will reach states that were not in the room. India’s exposure is therefore not the rhetoric of any forum but the possibility of inheriting terms it did not negotiate. What decides its position is measurable and domestic: computing power, semiconductors, models, research, capital and talent. The thing to watch is whether the risk channel the two powers settle on is opened to third states or kept strictly bilateral.

    What is technology diplomacy?

    1. About: The use of a state’s technological assets, innovation ecosystem and digital standards to build international partnerships, influence global governance and secure national interests.
    2. Two halves: Tech-cooperation shares working tools such as digital payment systems with other states. Tech-governance shapes the norms for artificial intelligence and 6G.
    3. Named pillars: Exporting digital public infrastructure as a public good, securing lithium and cobalt through the Mineral Security Partnership, building trusted semiconductor supply chains, and cyber diplomacy.
    4. Why it is a distinct instrument: A state that sets a standard shapes the conduct of every state that adopts it, which gives technological capability a diplomatic return that trade or aid does not.

    Government Initiatives on artificial intelligence

    1. IndiaAI Mission (2024): Approved with an outlay of Rs 10,371 crore and implemented by IndiaAI under the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MeitY), it builds compute, datasets, models, skills and safety capacity for startups, researchers and students.
    2. IndiaAI Compute: A national AI compute grid of over 38,000 graphics processing units, offering eligible users up to 40 per cent lower compute costs.
    3. AIKosh: The national AI dataset repository, carrying over 3,000 datasets and 243 models across 20 sectors for developers who cannot assemble their own data.
    4. IndiaAI Safety Institute: The mission’s trust pillar, covering bias mitigation, privacy, explainability and AI governance.

    Back2Basics: Pax Silica

    1. What it is: A United States-led initiative on technology and supply chains, which India is part of.
    2. Purpose: Building resilient semiconductor and electronics supply chains among trusted partners, so production is not concentrated in a single jurisdiction.
    3. Why it matters for India: Membership follows from India’s integration with the American digital and AI ecosystem, and it sits opposite the China-led venue India has declined to join.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026, GS2, 10 marks] “BRICS acts as a powerful counterweight in global governance, actively amplifying the voice and influence of the Global South.” Explain the role of BRICS in projecting itself as an alternative to other groupings.”

  • Greenland standoff ends. But with costs to NATO

    Greenland standoff ends. But with costs to NATO

    Why in the News

    The United States, Denmark and Greenland have announced a deal on the status of Greenland, a semiautonomous territory of Denmark. The agreement expands the American military presence on the island. It also gives Washington a veto over third party military activity and over certain sensitive investments there. The deal closes a sustained episode of coercion by the United States President over a stated desire to “own” Greenland, which had driven Denmark and other North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies to deploy troops to Greenland only nine months ago. What is now contested is whether a settlement extracted from an ally through threats leaves the mutual trust that NATO rests on intact.

    What is the Greenland Defence Agreement, 1951?

    1. Legal basis of the American presence: The pact was signed in 1951 between the United States and Denmark against the backdrop of the emerging Soviet threat in the Arctic.
    2. Rights conferred: It gave the United States broad rights to construct and operate military facilities in Greenland.
    3. Access beyond bases: It also gave the United States access to Greenland’s airspace and waters for military purposes.

    What does the new deal actually add to the 1951 arrangement?

    1. Expanded military footprint: The agreement widens the American military presence on the island beyond what the 1951 pact already supported.
    2. Veto over third party activity: Washington gains a veto over military activity by any third country in Greenland.
    3. Veto over investment: The same veto extends to certain sensitive investments in the territory, which converts a defence pact into an economic screening instrument.
    4. “Permanent control” is largely a restatement: Much of what the United States President presents as permanent control has roots in rights the 1951 agreement already conferred.
    5. Terms are not public: The full details of the deal have not been released, so the incremental gain cannot yet be measured against the existing pact.

    Why does each party present the outcome as a win?

    1. American domestic politics: The United States President, with an approval rating well under water, can present the deal as a diplomatic victory to American voters ahead of the November midterm elections.
    2. Danish and Greenlandic relief: For Denmark and Greenland the deal removes, at least for now, the threat of an American attempt to take control of the territory.
    3. Scale of the threat removed: The value of that relief is measured by the fact that NATO allies had deployed troops to Greenland in response to the takeover threat.

    Why does a bilateral settlement bear on NATO cohesion?

    1. Alliance rests on assurance, not on bases: NATO’s value to a small member is the assurance that a larger member will not turn on it, and the Greenland episode tested exactly that assurance.
    2. Wider pattern of signals: The overtures of the United States President to Russia and his criticism of Europe over the past 18 months form the context in which allies read the Greenland outcome.
    3. Timing against a live threat: Europe is bracing for the possibility of a Russian escalation on its eastern flank, so a loss of internal confidence lands at the point of maximum need.
    4. Precedent, not incident: A settlement reached through threat, demand and concession sets a template that any member can expect to face next.

    How are allies responding to coercion within the alliance?

    1. Diversification as the default reply: No country accepts heavy dependence on an ally that can issue threats, demand negotiations and then extract concessions, so spreading risk becomes the rational response.
    2. Canada’s move to Europe: The Canadian Prime Minister has announced that Canada would seek some form of associate membership in the European Union.
    3. Trust is slow to rebuild: The immediate Greenland crisis is settled, and the trust lost in reaching that settlement will not be regained quickly.

    Challenges to the Greenland deal

    1. Opacity of the terms: An agreement whose text is not public cannot be scrutinised by the legislature of any of the three parties, so its limits are unverifiable. Eg. The scope of the American veto over “sensitive investments” has not been defined in any released document.
      The Fix: Publish the operative text and the investment screening criteria, so the veto’s reach is bounded by a stated standard rather than by discretion.
    2. Greenlandic consent is thin: An arrangement negotiated chiefly between Washington and Copenhagen can bind a territory of about 57,000 people that has its own legislature. Eg. Greenland’s self government under the 2009 Self Government Act gives it authority over most domestic matters, with Denmark retaining defence and foreign affairs.
      The Fix: Attach a periodic review requiring the assent of the Greenlandic legislature, so continued consent rather than a single signature carries the arrangement.
    3. Investment veto can bite non adversaries: A screening power drafted against one rival applies equally to allied and Arctic partner capital in mining and shipping. Eg. Greenland’s rare earth and critical mineral deposits, including the Kvanefjeld project, are the main draw for outside investors.
      The Fix: Carve out allied and European Union investment from the veto, leaving it scoped to entities from states the parties jointly designate.
    4. Arctic militarisation feeds a spiral: An enlarged American footprint in the high north invites matching deployments by Russia across its Arctic coast. Eg. Russia has reopened and expanded Soviet era Arctic bases such as the Nagurskoye airbase on Franz Josef Land.
      The Fix: Route the expansion through NATO’s own Arctic planning and restore military transparency talks in the Arctic Council framework.
    5. Damage to alliance discipline: A member that wins concessions by threatening another member weakens the case for restraint by every other member. Eg. Turkey’s prolonged block on Swedish accession to NATO showed how a single member can hold alliance business hostage.
      The Fix: Record an alliance level understanding that territorial claims between members are not negotiable subjects, enforced through the North Atlantic Council.

    Conclusion

    The Greenland dispute is settled on paper and unsettled in practice. A deal that mostly restates rights the 1951 agreement already gave has cost the alliance the assumption that members do not coerce one another. What follows is a quiet reordering of hedges, of which Canada’s approach to the European Union is the first visible instance. The marker to watch is whether other small NATO members begin seeking comparable second anchors outside the alliance.

    Back2Basics: North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

    1. Formation: Established by the North Atlantic Treaty signed in 1949, with headquarters at Brussels.
    2. Collective defence: Article 5 treats an armed attack against one member as an attack against all members.
    3. Membership: It has 32 members following the accession of Finland in 2023 and Sweden in 2024.
    4. Decision making: The North Atlantic Council is its principal political decision making body and works by consensus.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    [2023, GS2, 15 marks] ‘The expansion and strengthening of NATO and a stronger US-Europe strategic partnership works well in India.’ What is your opinion about this statement? Give reasons and examples to support your answer.”

  • Unsafe space: deployment of weapons calls for multilateral governance in space

    Why in the News

    The United States has confirmed that it has deployed on orbit space control weapons to defend against what it terms hostile adversary action. The disclosure was made on September 14 by the U.S. Air Force Secretary and confirmed by the chief of the U.S. Space Force, and it converts a doctrinal possibility into a declared deployment. United States military doctrine had already been openly considering offensive and defensive space control by 2025, so the admission closes the gap between stated doctrine and acknowledged capability. The weapon has been described as defensive, and the same doctrine defines space control as covering offensive operations too. What is contested is that the governing legal regime, built around the Outer Space Treaty and the Liability Convention, has become too coarse to define thresholds of action or to assign accountability for an autonomous, dual use orbital asset.

    What is “space control” in United States military doctrine?

    1. Scope of the term: Space control in United States doctrine covers both offensive and defensive operations, so a system fielded under it is not confined to defence by definition.
    2. Stated purpose of the deployment: The declared function is defence against hostile adversary action in orbit.
    3. What remains undisclosed: What constitutes hostile action, and what the weapon is actually able to do, have not been specified.
    4. Why the gap matters: A weapon whose capability and triggering conditions are unspecified cannot be assessed by other operators, which is the condition under which miscalculation becomes likely.

    Why has earth orbit become a contested military domain?

    1. Civilian dependence on satellites: Satellite systems increasingly underpin communications, energy and financial networks, so an attack in orbit propagates into infrastructure on the ground.
    2. Counter space capability is widespread: The United States, Russia, China and India, among others, have been developing counter space capabilities and have shaped the environment that makes earth orbit the next major battlefield.
    3. India’s own demonstration: India demonstrated a direct ascent anti satellite capability in Mission Shakti in March 2019, conducted at a low altitude chosen to limit persistent debris.
    4. Commercial systems carry military traffic: Many commercial systems serve civilian and military users at once, and their rising military use can endanger the protections they enjoy under international humanitarian law.

    Where does the existing legal regime fall short?

    1. The Outer Space Treaty does not ban weapons outright: Article IV prohibits nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in orbit, and it does not prohibit weapons in orbit as such.
    2. A fluid line: The distinction is unstable given the centrality of satellite based networks to contemporary society and the ability of conventional weapons to cause damage at scale.
    3. The general obligation: Article III requires space activities to comply with international law, which states a standard without defining the thresholds it applies to.
    4. Accountability cannot be assigned: Where an autonomous, dual use orbital asset operated by a commercial entity initiates an unwanted defensive strike, the Liability Convention and the rest of the existing rules cannot be applied straightforwardly to determine responsibility.
    5. Humanitarian law is unprepared: International humanitarian law is underprepared for satellites that are highly interconnected and often dual use.

    Why do poorly specified weapons create instability?

    1. Ambiguity of intent between satellites: Two steerable satellites approaching each other without understanding the other’s intentions is a confusion that the absence of policy detail compounds.
    2. Autonomy removes the human check: Future autonomous satellites running artificial intelligence models onboard would act on that ambiguity without a person in the decision loop.
    3. Justification cuts both ways: The same details that justify a need for orbital defence systems also make a poorly specified weapon a potential cause of instability.
    4. Erosion of the wider order: The rules have become too coarse for what contemporary technologies and the declining esteem for a rules based world order together demand.

    Challenges to multilateral governance of space weapons

    1. No verification mechanism exists: No party can independently confirm what another state has placed in orbit or what it can do, so any commitment rests on self declaration. Eg. The deployment became known through a voluntary statement rather than through any reporting obligation.
      The Fix: Build a registry requiring declaration of manoeuvre capable and armed payloads, verified through shared space situational awareness data.
    2. Dual use design defeats category bans: Any satellite with rendezvous and proximity capability can inspect, repair or disable another, so the same hardware is servicing equipment and a weapon. Eg. On orbit inspector and servicing satellites operated by several states perform close approach manoeuvres indistinguishable from an attack run.
      The Fix: Regulate behaviour rather than hardware, by requiring advance notification and minimum separation distances for proximity manoeuvres.
    3. Debris outlasts the conflict: A destructive strike in orbit creates fragments that threaten every operator for decades, including the attacker’s own assets. Eg. Russia’s 2021 anti satellite test against the Cosmos 1408 satellite generated more than 1,500 trackable debris fragments.
      The Fix: Convert the voluntary moratorium on destructive direct ascent anti satellite missile testing into a binding instrument with stated altitude and debris thresholds.
    4. Consensus fora are deadlocked: Disarmament negotiation on outer space runs by consensus, so a single objection blocks any text. Eg. The prevention of an arms race in outer space has been on the United Nations disarmament agenda since 1981 without an agreed treaty text.
      The Fix: Route substantive drafting through a General Assembly mandated working group operating on majority procedural rules, keeping consensus only for adoption.
    5. Private operators sit between regimes: States are internationally responsible for national activities in space including those of non governmental entities, and national licensing standards differ sharply. Eg. A commercial constellation operator can hold launch and operating licences in one jurisdiction while serving military users in several others.
      The Fix: Agree a minimum common licensing standard covering armed and manoeuvre capable payloads, applied as a condition of launch authorisation.

    Conclusion

    An acknowledged deployment is harder to reverse than a doctrine. The immediate requirement is disclosure of the particulars of what has been placed in orbit, followed by a multilateral arrangement that states exact thresholds of action and escalation rather than restating a general duty to comply with international law. The forum able to take this up is the United Nations Open Ended Working Group on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, and whether it puts the disclosure on its agenda is the near term thing to watch.

    Back2Basics: UN Open Ended Working Group on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space

    1. Mandate: It considers and makes recommendations on substantial elements of an international legally binding instrument to prevent an arms race in outer space.
    2. Parent body: It was established by the United Nations General Assembly and reports through the First Committee, which handles disarmament and international security.
    3. Participation: It is open ended, meaning every United Nations member state may take part, and it meets in Geneva.
    4. Background: The prevention of an arms race in outer space has been a standing item on the United Nations disarmament agenda since 1981.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “No direct PYQ traced in the provided files. Closest microtheme: Space ProgramsXIntl”

  • Nepal’s climate call is a test for India

    Why in the News

    Nepal has moved from seeking relief after disaster to claiming climate justice and financial liability following catastrophic flash floods. Kathmandu has appealed to the UN backed Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage and called on developed countries to deliver compensation and concessional climate finance. It has separately pressed regional neighbours, including China and India, for cooperation on preparedness, data sharing and resilience. Nepal has clarified that it is not seeking damages from any single country, and its Prime Minister will take the case to the UN General Assembly on September 24. The tension for India is that accepting liability invites identical claims against it, while refusing outright cedes ground in the Himalayas to China.

    What is the Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage?

    1. Purpose: It is a dedicated climate finance fund created to address irreparable climate impacts that neither mitigation nor adaptation can prevent.
    2. What loss and damage covers: It covers harm that has already occurred and cannot be reversed, such as land lost to sea level rise or settlements destroyed by a flood, as distinct from the cost of cutting emissions or of building defences in advance.
    3. Standing limitation: Its capital reserves remain a small fraction of actual reconstruction costs in affected countries.

    What has changed in Nepal’s ask?

    1. From relief to liability: For decades India acted as a friendly first responder when cloudbursts, landslides or flash floods struck Nepal, and that ad hoc relief paradigm has been replaced by a framework of climate justice and financial liability.
    2. Claim on the developed world: Kathmandu has asked developed countries to deliver compensation and concessional climate finance for the damage recorded.
    3. Ask directed at neighbours: It has pressed regional neighbours on preparedness, data sharing and resilience rather than on cash transfers.
    4. No named respondent: Nepal has stated it is not seeking damages from any single country, and the expectation placed on its neighbours is nonetheless unmistakable.
    5. Escalation to a global forum: The Nepalese Prime Minister will carry the case to the UN General Assembly on September 24, which moves a bilateral question into a multilateral setting.

    Why do existing global mechanisms fail a fast moving disaster?

    1. Approval cycles outrun the hazard: A $49.9 million project designed to protect vulnerable Nepalese communities from glacial lake outburst floods, meaning sudden floods released when a lake dammed by ice or moraine breaches, sat in the Green Climate Fund (GCF) pipeline for over seven years, and the waters had already broken by the time bureaucratic approvals cleared.
    2. Capital is not to scale: The Loss and Damage Fund’s reserves are a drop in the ocean against the actual costs of the damage it is meant to address.
    3. Reconstruction bill for Nepal: Nepal faces a reconstruction bill of nearly 10 per cent of its GDP, which no existing multilateral window is sized to meet.
    4. Design mismatch: Global climate finance mechanisms are built for planned projects and are unsuited to fast moving, compounding ecological disasters.

    Why is Nepal’s claim an uncomfortable precedent for India?

    1. India’s own emissions position: India’s per capita emissions remain low and its historical contribution to global warming is minimal compared with the West.
    2. India is itself a victim: India is a climate change affected country in its own right, which is the basis of its negotiating position against the Global North.
    3. Liability is reciprocal: Accepting direct liability or paying explicit climate damages would expose India to similar claims from other countries.
    4. Loss of leverage: The same admission would weaken India’s leverage in demanding finance from the Global North, since it would concede the principle it has used against developed countries.
    5. CBDR turned inward: Downstream and mountain nations are applying the Common But Differentiated Responsibilities principle locally, arguing that adjacent high emitting economic engines share an immediate physical footprint in their backyard.

    What does India lose by refusing?

    1. Geopolitical cost of an evasive reply: Rejecting Kathmandu’s appeals carries a geopolitical cost that no amount of disaster relief offsets.
    2. Chinese climate outreach: China is stepping up its climate and green outreach across the Himalayas, so a vacuum is filled rather than left open.
    3. Public opinion in Nepal: An evasive response could turn Nepal’s people away from India and give Beijing more room to operate.
    4. Exposure through infrastructure: India’s emissions footprint and its infrastructure investments are tied to the fragile ecology of the Third Pole, so it cannot rely on global support alone.

    What would a regional alternative look like?

    1. South Asian Resilience and Insurance Facility: India should champion a facility that delivers the substance of loss and damage funding without the fault based compensation terminology that triggers liability claims.
    2. Payout on a trigger, not on a finding: Operating as a rapid payout insurance pool, it would release funds upon satellite detection of threshold climate triggers, bypassing diplomatic wrangling and producing predictable finance for both Nepalese reconstruction and annual Indian disaster allocations.
    3. Existing institutional routes: The facility can be built through the New Development Bank, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), BIMSTEC or a proposed Third Pole Compact rather than through a new treaty.
    4. Resilience first project design: Part of the funds for joint infrastructure projects should be directed to an adaptation fund for climate proof local works, safer slopes and mountain livelihoods.
    5. Early warning as a shared asset: India’s space capabilities should be used to create a real time, open access early warning system for the Himalayan belt.
    6. Co owned monitoring data: Sharing glacial lake outburst flood monitoring and lake volume tracking with Nepalese agencies converts tactical intelligence into a shared regional security asset.

    Challenges to a South Asian Resilience and Insurance Facility

    1. Basis risk in trigger based payouts: A payout fired by a satellite measured threshold can miss real damage that falls below the trigger, leaving the worst hit unpaid. Eg. Under India’s own Pradhan Mantri Fasal Bima Yojana, weather index based settlements have repeatedly diverged from assessed crop loss on the ground.
      The Fix: Pair the index trigger with a rapid ground verification window that releases a supplementary tranche where measured damage exceeds the index payout.
    2. Capitalisation depends on one contributor: A regional pool in which India is the dominant underwriter becomes an aid programme in insurance clothing and carries the same political weight it was meant to avoid. Eg. The SAARC Development Fund has remained thinly capitalised and largely inactive for the same reason.
      The Fix: Anchor the corpus in the New Development Bank and the AIIB with graduated member premiums, so no single state’s contribution determines solvency.
    3. Regional bodies are blocked by politics: A facility housed in a South Asian institution inherits that institution’s paralysis. Eg. No SAARC summit has been held since the 2014 Kathmandu summit.
      The Fix: Build it under BIMSTEC, which excludes the bilateral dispute that has frozen SAARC, and keep membership open to later accession.
    4. Data sharing is treated as strategic: Hydrological and glacial data in the Himalayas is handled as security information rather than as a public good, which defeats early warning. Eg. China suspended hydrological data sharing with India on the Brahmaputra during the 2017 Doklam standoff.
      The Fix: Route Himalayan lake and river data through an open access civilian platform with automatic publication, so supply does not turn on the state of relations.
    5. Insurance does not fund what is already lost: A payout pool covers future events and leaves the existing reconstruction bill untouched. Eg. Nepal’s current bill of nearly 10 per cent of GDP arises from floods that have already occurred.
      The Fix: Add a concessional reconstruction window alongside the insurance pool, so past damage and future risk are financed through separate instruments.

    Conclusion

    Nepal has converted a relief relationship into a claim of entitlement, and that reframing will not be withdrawn. India’s interest lies in supplying the money and the warning systems while refusing the vocabulary of fault, because the vocabulary is what travels to the next claimant. Whether New Delhi can build that distinction into an institution rather than assert it in a speech is the open question. The immediate marker is the position India takes when the Nepalese case reaches the UN General Assembly on September 24.

    What is climate finance under the UNFCCC?

    1. About: Climate finance is the flow of funds from public and private sources to developing countries to meet the costs of responding to climate change under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).
    2. Rationale: It exists because the states least responsible for accumulated emissions face the largest relative costs, which is the operating logic of the Common But Differentiated Responsibilities principle.
    3. The three streams it is divided into: Mitigation finance pays to cut emissions, adaptation finance pays to build defences against impacts that are coming, and loss and damage finance pays for harm that has already occurred and cannot be reversed.
    4. Current headline commitments: COP30 called for tripling adaptation finance to US$120 billion annually by 2035 within a broader US$1.3 trillion climate finance pathway, and adopted the Baku to Belem Roadmap for 2026 to 2028 to expand grants and non debt finance for vulnerable countries.

    Key Concerns Regarding Climate Finance

    1. Delivery lags pledges: Headline sums announced at negotiations are not matched by disbursement, and the gap is widest for adaptation.
    2. Debt rather than grants: A large share arrives as loans, which adds to the debt burden of the very countries the finance is meant to protect.
    3. Scale against need: The pledged global goal of about $300 billion a year from developed nations is far below assessed requirements, with NITI Aayog alone estimating that India needs $5.2 trillion by 2050.
    4. Definitional looseness: There is no agreed accounting standard for what counts as climate finance, so existing development aid is relabelled and counted twice.

    Government Initiatives on Climate Finance and Resilience

    1. National Adaptation Fund for Climate Change (NAFCC): It funds climate resilient projects in agriculture, water, forestry and coastal management for States facing adaptation costs.
    2. State Action Plans on Climate Change (SAPCC): 34 States and Union Territories have prepared these plans, which align local development planning with national climate goals under the National Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC).
    3. Sovereign Green Bonds: The Union government issues these to diversify climate finance sources and lower the cost of capital for long gestation green projects.
    4. National Disaster Response Fund and State Disaster Response Fund: These carry the domestic fiscal response to disaster relief and recovery, which is the channel any regional facility would have to work alongside.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2015] Which of the following statements regarding ‘Green Climate Fund’ is/are correct? (1) It is intended to assist the developing countries in adaptation and mitigation practices to counter climate change. (2) It is founded under the aegis of UNEP, OECD, Asian Development Bank and World Bank. Select the correct answer using the code given below. (a) 1 only (b) 2 only (c) Both 1 and 2 (d) Neither 1 nor 2 | Answer: (a)”

  • Urban demand is reorganising global wildlife trafficking web

    Why in the News

    Five critically endangered baby orangutans, each around a year old, have been recovered from a forest in Odisha, roughly 2,000 km from their natural range in the rainforests of Borneo and Sumatra. The animals showed no fear of humans, which indicates they had been held in captivity for a period before the recovery. India’s Wildlife Crime Control Bureau (WCCB) has been asked to investigate how they entered the country and who held them. The recovery coincides with a study in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (PNAS) that combined thirty years of confiscation records with spatial network analysis and found that urban centres, rather than source habitats, are now the demand nexuses of the wildlife trade. The tension is that enforcement is built around seizures at the point of recovery, while the network that produced the consignment is organised around a city thousands of kilometres away.

    What does the Odisha recovery reveal about the route?

    1. Condition at recovery: The five apes were found on 8 September with limited mobility, huddled together and feeding from a container, and are now being monitored at a zoo in Bhubaneswar.
    2. Evidence of captivity: The complete absence of fear of humans indicates the animals had been kept in captivity for a while, according to the chief executive of the Wildlife Trust of India.
    3. A prohibited trade with a market price: The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) prohibits commercial trade in orangutans, and they are nonetheless sold routinely as exotic pets at up to Rs 20 lakh each.
    4. Not the first instance: Two baby orangutans were found abandoned near the Assam and Mizoram border in 2022.
    5. What remains unknown: The route taken, whether by sea, air or road, the identity of those who captured and smuggled the animals, and the identity of the intended collectors are all still open.

    How was the trafficking network mapped?

    1. The dataset: The study integrated thirty years of confiscation data with spatial network analysis to reconstruct trade routes end to end.
    2. The species studied: It traced the movement of Mexico’s parrots from biodiverse habitats to urban centres around the world.
    3. A transferable method: The same approach can be adapted to map other complex illicit networks, including the trafficking of timber, marine life, drugs and weapons.
    4. What it offers enforcement elsewhere: The reconstruction provides clues to criminal networks in parts of the world that hold no comparable confiscation record of their own.

    What does the shift of demand to cities do to the trade?

    1. Cities as the demand nexus: Urban centres are now the nexuses of demand, and that demand is reorganising the global trafficking network rather than merely feeding it.
    2. Distance between habitat and seizure: For many commonly traded species, confiscations occurred hundreds of kilometres from native habitats, frequently in major cities such as Mexico City.
    3. Extinction risk from trade alone: No less than half of Mexico’s native parrot species are directly threatened by the illegal wildlife trade, which elevates their risk of extinction.
    4. Selective poaching: Poachers consistently targeted charismatic and high value species at unsustainable rates, particularly macaws and Amazon parrots.

    Where does wildlife trafficking converge with organised crime?

    1. Shared logistics with narcotics: Drug cartels in Mexico run illegal logging operations, sharing transport logistics and laundering illicit timber alongside narcotics.
    2. Scale of the enterprise: The illegal wildlife trade comprises global, multibillion dollar criminal enterprises rather than a set of opportunistic local offences.
    3. A public health dimension: The trade threatens biodiversity and elevates the risk of zoonotic disease transfer and emergence.
    4. Why these networks resist mapping: The networks are complex, adaptive and largely invisible, which makes them difficult to map, to track and to disrupt.

    What does this mean for India’s own trafficking profile?

    1. Most smuggled groups: Primates, turtles and lizards are the species most smuggled into India.
    2. Principal route: The movement runs primarily through land routes between India and Myanmar.
    3. How the network behaves: The criminal network reconfigures itself to safeguard the business, so a disrupted route is replaced rather than closed.
    4. The enforcement gap: The lacunae in understanding the mechanisms that feed these networks obstruct law enforcement, which is why a seizure rarely reaches the network behind it.

    Challenges to curbing wildlife trafficking

    1. Seizure based enforcement measures the wrong thing: A confiscation records the failure of one consignment, not the disruption of a network, so a rising seizure count is fully consistent with a growing trade. Eg. The Wildlife Crime Control Bureau runs periodic pan India drives such as Operation Save Kurma for turtles and Operation Lesknow for lesser known species, built around recovery rather than prosecution of the network.
      The Fix: Require every confiscation to open a parallel financial investigation under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, so a recovery starts a case rather than closing one.
    2. Penalties are set against the offence, not the market: Statutory punishment is fixed by schedule while the return is fixed by the buyer, so the expected cost of detection stays below the commercial value of the animal. Eg. The Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 prescribes imprisonment of up to seven years for a Schedule I offence.
      The Fix: Add a proceeds linked fine calculated on the traded value of the specimen, imposed in addition to the statutory term.
    3. Exotic species sit outside domestic schedules: The Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 protects species listed in its own schedules, and a foreign species such as an orangutan historically fell outside that list. Eg. The Wild Life (Protection) Amendment Act, 2022 added a schedule for CITES listed specimens precisely because the earlier schedules did not reach them.
      The Fix: Make registration of every live exotic specimen mandatory against a traceable identifier, so possession without a record is itself the offence.
    4. Detection capacity sits at the wrong points: Customs and forest staff are posted at ports and protected areas while the demand nexus is an urban household, so a consignment is intercepted only while in transit. Eg. The Wildlife Crime Control Bureau operates through a small set of regional, sub regional and border units for the entire country.
      The Fix: Extend enforcement to the demand side by requiring online marketplaces and pet traders to verify a legal acquisition record before listing any exotic specimen.

    Conclusion

    The unit of the wildlife trade has moved. It is no longer the forest the animal came from, it is the city that ordered it, and a network organised around demand will not be broken by enforcement organised around habitat. What the confiscation study offers is not another inventory of losses but a method, since the same records that currently close a case can be read as a map of where a network is thin. What stays unresolved is that the authority to act on such a map sits with forest and customs enforcement, while the vulnerability it identifies lies in urban markets that no wildlife agency polices.

    Back2Basics: CITES

    1. What it is: The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora is an agreement between governments regulating trade in listed species across national borders.
    2. Origin: It was drafted in 1973 and entered into force in 1975, and its Secretariat is administered by the United Nations Environment Programme.
    3. How it lists species: Appendix I bars commercial international trade in species threatened with extinction, Appendix II regulates trade in species that could become threatened, and Appendix III covers species a member country asks others to help protect.
    4. Legal character: It is legally binding on the States that have joined it, and it does not take the place of national laws, which each party has to enact to give the convention effect.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “With reference to the International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN) and the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), which of the following statements is/are correct? (1) IUCN is an organ of the United Nations and CITES is an international agreement between governments. (2) IUCN runs thousands of field projects around the world to better manage natural environments. (3) CITES is legally binding on the States that have joined it, but this Convention does not take the place of national laws. Select the correct answer using the code given below. (a) 1 only (b) 2 and 3 only (c) 1 and 3 only (d) 1, 2 and 3”

  • India’s BRICS diplomacy is more than one summit’s result

    Why in the News

    Eleven members of BRICS have adopted the New Delhi Declaration 2026 by consensus, reiterating the importance of the Palestinian question and the two state solution. The Rio BRICS Declaration 2025 had gone further, condemning the military strikes against Iran as a violation of international law and the United Nations Charter. That formula was no longer available in Delhi. Iran had by then struck targets across the Gulf, including the territory of fellow BRICS members. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) had suspended trade and financial dealings with Tehran. The tension is whether a plurilateral forum is judged by the settlements it produces or by the dialogue it makes possible between members who have become belligerents against one another.

    Why was the Rio formula unavailable in New Delhi?

    1. Position in June 2025: Iran was a BRICS member that had been attacked, so every other member could condemn the strikes without contradicting its own position.
    2. The February 2026 escalation: The United States and Israel struck Iran again. Iran responded by striking targets across the Gulf, including the territory of fellow BRICS members.
    3. The UAE’s exposure: The UAE absorbed more Iranian projectiles than any other member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the six state grouping of Arab Gulf monarchies. It then suspended trade and financial dealings with Tehran.
    4. Why the formula lapsed: The condemnation language became unavailable because members had become belligerents against one another, not because the chair lacked resolve.

    What makes consensus among eleven members the achievement?

    1. The ministerial failure: BRICS foreign ministers met in New Delhi in May 2026 and produced no outcome document at all.
    2. The chair’s own assessment: The Ministry of External Affairs conceded in March that members were directly involved in the conflict, and that India as chair was working the Sherpa channel, the track of leaders’ personal representatives who negotiate summit texts before the leaders meet, to narrow differences.
    3. The turnaround: Four months after the ministerial failure, eleven members adopted a declaration by consensus.
    4. Precision where agreement existed: On the Palestinian question and the two state solution the language stayed precise rather than general.
    5. A floor where it did not: On the contested questions the text built a floor instead of delivering a verdict.

    Does a dialogue floor count as an outcome?

    1. The competing standard: One view tests a forum such as BRICS on the tangible outcomes it produces, not on the agency for dialogue and diplomacy it provides.
    2. Why that test misfires in a live conflict: The initiation of a dialogue cannot be expected to produce an immediate settlement, so judging it by the ends it may ultimately achieve dismisses it before it can work.
    3. The first bilateral since the war: Iran and the UAE used the summit for their first high level bilateral meeting since the war began.
    4. The declaration’s own significance: The importance of the West Asia text lies not only in what it says but in the fact that there was a declaration at all.
    5. Means as outcome: Where members are themselves parties to the conflict, the floor a summit provides is the result rather than a step toward one.

    What has a decade of Gulf engagement built?

    1. A changed agenda: India’s engagement with the Gulf has shifted from oil and trade toward defence, technology and security.
    2. Relationships across binaries: India’s relationships in West Asia are not organised as mutually exclusive choices between Iran and the Arab Gulf states.
    3. Access on the Arab Gulf side: India can register the security anxieties of the Arab Gulf without treating Iran’s isolation as an objective.
    4. Access on the Iranian side: India can engage Iran without appearing indifferent to Gulf security.
    5. Strategic autonomy restated: Strategic autonomy does more than create manoeuvring room for India. It creates diplomatic room between others.

    What are the limits of India’s position?

    1. Not a mediator: A summit declaration does not make India a direct mediator in West Asia.
    2. What formal mediation requires: Mediation requires acceptance by the parties, a mandate and a negotiating agenda, none of which a consensus text confers.
    3. What India can offer instead: Trusted channels where they are scarce, political access across opposing capitals, and the ability to enlarge the space for accommodation.
    4. The price not charged: That access is offered without demanding geopolitical allegiance from any of the parties.

    Challenges to India’s BRICS diplomacy

    1. Consensus rule lowers the ceiling: Every member holds an effective veto over the text, so an expanded membership reduces what any declaration can say. Eg. BRICS declarations record national positions on the Ukraine conflict rather than a common one.
      The Fix: Move contested items to issue based coalitions of willing members and keep the leaders’ declaration to the ground the whole group holds.
    2. No standing institutional memory: The grouping has no charter and no permanent secretariat, so continuity depends on the capacity of each rotating chair. Eg. The New Development Bank in Shanghai is the only permanent BRICS institution with a headquarters and a staff.
      The Fix: Establish a small standing secretariat to carry the Sherpa agenda across chairs rather than rebuilding it annually.
    3. Rivalry between the two largest members: India and China carry an unresolved boundary dispute into every agenda, which limits how far the group can act as a bloc. Eg. Disengagement along the Line of Actual Control has proceeded patrol point by patrol point through bilateral talks, never through a BRICS channel.
      The Fix: Keep bilateral disputes on bilateral tracks and confine the BRICS agenda to finance, health, space and technology, where member interests converge.
    4. Expansion dilutes coherence: A grouping spanning democracies and autocracies finds shared positions on norms harder to draft as it grows. Eg. Full membership has moved from five states to eleven within two years.
      The Fix: Publish admission criteria tied to economic and functional contribution, so each addition does not further widen the range of positions to be reconciled.
    5. Dollar dependence persists: The group’s financial alternatives remain marginal against dollar clearing, so the autonomy claimed in declarations is not matched by settlement practice. Eg. The US dollar still settles over 80% of global trade.
      The Fix: Extend existing bilateral local currency settlement arrangements to the trade flows that already run a recurring surplus, rather than pursuing a common currency.

    Conclusion

    The standard applied to a plurilateral grouping decides what it is seen to be worth. Judged by settlements signed, a forum whose members are firing at one another will always read as a failure. Judged by whether hostile parties still meet inside it, Delhi did the one thing that was no longer available to the chair at Rio. What to watch is whether the channels opened at the summit produce a second Iran and UAE meeting away from a summit setting, and whether the next chair carries the same text forward rather than reopening it.

    About BRICS

    1. Origin: The acronym BRIC was coined in 2001 to group high growth emerging economies, the first foreign ministers’ meeting was held on the margins of the United Nations General Assembly in 2006, and the first leaders’ summit was held at Yekaterinburg in 2009.
    2. Membership: South Africa joined in 2011, expansion opened at the 2023 Johannesburg summit, and Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and the UAE joined in 2024 and Indonesia in 2025, taking full membership to eleven.
    3. Weight: Members account for over 45% of world population, roughly 37% of global Gross Domestic Product measured at purchasing power parity, which exceeds the G7 share, and about 42% of global oil production.
    4. Partner tier: A partner country category introduced in 2024 engages states such as Malaysia, Thailand and Nigeria without granting full membership.

    Schemes and Initiatives for BRICS

    1. New Development Bank (NDB): Headquartered in Shanghai, it finances infrastructure and sustainable development projects in member states and has approved over $35 billion in loans.
    2. Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA): A $100 billion pool providing short term liquidity support to members facing balance of payments pressure.
    3. BRICS Pay: A cross border payment system in pilot stage, intended to settle trade between members outside the SWIFT messaging network.
    4. BRICS Vaccine Research and Development Centre: Launched during the pandemic to facilitate technology transfer and vaccine access across members.
    5. Partnership on New Industrial Revolution (PartNIR): A standing cooperation track on artificial intelligence, digitalisation and green technology.
    6. Remote Sensing Satellite Constellation: Six satellites contributed by member states sharing earth observation data for disaster management, alongside a BRICS Space Council set up in 2025 to coordinate deep space and lunar research.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    ““BRICS acts as a powerful counterweight in global governance, actively amplifying the voice and influence of the Global South.” Explain the role of BRICS in projecting itself as an alternative to other groupings.”

  • BRICS backs an Expert Group on Traditional Medicine [Examples]

    Why in News

    BRICS members agreed to support an Expert Working Group on Traditional Medicine and called for cooperation grounded in evidence. AYUSH stands for Ayurveda, Yoga and Naturopathy, Unani, Siddha and Homoeopathy, the traditional and complementary systems of medicine promoted by the Ministry of AYUSH.

    Core facts

    The outcome advances a standing BRICS track on Traditional, Complementary and Integrative Medicine (TCIM). The proposed expert group aims to build a shared, evidence based approach to traditional medicine across member states. The nodal ministry on the Indian side is the Ministry of AYUSH.

    Static Context

    India hosts the World Health Organization (WHO) Global Traditional Medicine Centre at Jamnagar, Gujarat, established under a host country agreement with the WHO. The Ministry of AYUSH signed a project collaboration agreement with the WHO on traditional and complementary medicine. Traditional medicine cooperation is a recurring instrument of India’s health diplomacy within plurilateral groupings.

    Prelims angle

    Remember the full form of AYUSH, the location of the WHO Global Traditional Medicine Centre at Jamnagar, and that BRICS runs sectoral working groups beyond trade and finance.

    Mains angle

    GS2, groupings and India’s soft power. Useful as an illustration of how India uses sectoral cooperation within BRICS to project traditional knowledge systems and health diplomacy.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “No direct PYQ traced in the provided files for traditional medicine cooperation. Closest tracked Microthemes are GroupingsXRegional (International Relations) for the BRICS dimension and SchemeXHealth (Governance) for the health systems dimension.”

    PIB Link

    https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2309695&reg=3&lang=1

  • 18th BRICS Summit concludes in New Delhi with the New Delhi Declaration

    Why in News

    The 18th BRICS Summit was held in New Delhi on 12 and 13 September 2026 under India’s BRICS Chairship. The grouping adopted the New Delhi Declaration on 12 September 2026.

    Core facts

    BRICS is a plurilateral grouping originally of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, now expanded to 11 members. India’s presidency theme is “Building for Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation and Sustainability”. The PIB Backgrounder records the bloc’s weight as 49.5% of global population, 40% of global Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 26% of global trade. Named institutional outcomes across ministerial tracks include a BRICS Centre of Excellence on Agro Ecology and a Digital Agriculture Network, a BRICS Mission for Healthy Lifestyle (2026 to 2029), BRICS CONNECT for Skilling, a Smart Grids and Energy Storage Digital Centre of Excellence, an MSME Cooperation Portal, a Startup Innovation Fund and a Logistics Supply Chain Cooperation Framework. Alongside the summit, the BRICS Bharat Innovates Exposition at Bharat Mandapam showcased 37 Indian deep technology startups.

    Static Context

    The first BRICS summit was held in 2009 at Yekaterinburg, Russia, as BRIC. South Africa joined in 2010, making it BRICS. The bloc runs the New Development Bank (NDB), headquartered in Shanghai, and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA), a currency swap facility for members facing balance of payments pressure. The 2014 Fortaleza Declaration established the NDB. India previously chaired the grouping in 2012, 2016 and 2021. Membership expansion has added Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Indonesia in recent cycles, with a separate partner country category.

    Prelims angle

    Track the host city and chair of each recent summit, the members added in the latest expansion, the theme wording, and the two BRICS institutions (NDB and CRA) with their headquarters and functions. Fortaleza links to the NDB.

    Mains angle

    GS2, groupings involving or affecting India. Frame BRICS as a counterweight in global governance that amplifies the Global South, its role in multilateral reform, and the friction between expansion and cohesion. India’s bilateral engagements with African and Global South leaders on the summit sidelines illustrate the outreach dimension.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2025] Consider the following statements with regard to BRICS:
    I. The 16th BRICS Summit was held under the Chairship of Russia in Kazan.
    II. Indonesia has become a full member of BRICS.
    III. The theme of the 16th BRICS Summit was Strengthening Multiculturalism for Just Global Development and Security.
    Which of the statements given above is/are correct?
    (a) I and II
    (b) II and III
    (c) I and III
    (d) I only
    Answer: (a)”

    “[2026, GS2, 10 marks] BRICS acts as a powerful counterweight in global governance, actively amplifying the voice and influence of the Global South. Explain the role of BRICS in projecting itself as an alternative to other groupings.”

    PIB Link

    https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2309642&reg=3&lang=1 and the BRICS PIB Backgrounder https://www.pib.gov.in/PressNoteDetails.aspx?NoteId=159946&ModuleId=3&reg=3&lang=1

  • There is no such thing as a ‘UN map with borders’: UN Secretary-General

    Why in the News

    The United Nations Secretary General has stated that the United Nations has not published any map with borders and that it is not for the United Nations to define borders. The statement answers India’s objection to “anomalies” in a “Map of the World” published by UN Geospatial on 1 July and used during the consultation process for the “Correct the Map” resolution. That map showed the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir as a dotted line with an explanatory note attached, and omitted the Indian and Chinese “claim lines” in Arunachal Pradesh and Aksai Chin that previous United Nations maps carried, with no note explaining the omission. India voted in favour of the resolution, which the United Nations General Assembly passed on 3 September to replace the Mercator map with maps following the “equal area” principle. The contest is that a map disowned as unofficial has stayed on the United Nations website and circulated as the artefact accompanying a resolution India supported.

    What is the “Correct the Map” resolution?

    1. Replacement of the Mercator map: The resolution, passed by the United Nations General Assembly on 3 September, seeks to replace the Mercator map with maps that follow the “equal area” principle.
    2. Distortion of landmass sizes: The Secretary General’s stated position is that there are distortions in the landmasses relative to their real sizes, that these come from power relations of the past, and that those distortions should be corrected.
    3. Scope of the resolution: The resolution is not a map, and the approval of a resolution in the General Assembly does not amount to the adoption of any cartographic depiction.

    What did the disputed map actually show?

    1. “Map of the World”, published 1 July: The artefact is titled the “Map of the World”, was published by UN Geospatial on 1 July, and was later taken up for discussion at the General Assembly.
    2. The Line of Control was marked and explained: The map showed the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir as a dotted line, with a note stating that the dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control agreed upon by India and Pakistan and that the final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties.
    3. The claim lines were dropped without explanation: It depicted Arunachal Pradesh and Aksai Chin without the Indian and Chinese “claim lines” that previous United Nations maps used, and carried no note explaining that omission.
    4. Continued hosting on the United Nations website: The map published by UN Geospatial has remained on the United Nations website.

    What is the United Nations position on maps and borders?

    1. No map with borders exists: The Secretary General’s position is that there is no such thing as a United Nations map with borders and that it is not for the United Nations to define borders.
    2. The artefact is attributed elsewhere: The map on the website is described as not an official United Nations map and as the contribution of a non governmental organisation.
    3. Indicative status of the depiction: The map is treated as indicative, with no definition by the United Nations of what borders should be.

    What position has India taken?

    1. The vote was on the principle: The Ministry of External Affairs stated on 8 September that India’s vote for the resolution was in support of the underlying principle of “equal area representation”.
    2. The map question was separated from the vote: The Ministry’s stated position is that the United Nations does not endorse any map and does not issue any map, and that maps may exist for reasons of consultation.
    3. The omission has been formally raised: The Ministry stated that India has taken note of the anomaly and is taking it up with the United Nations.

    Challenges in the depiction of disputed boundaries on international maps

    1. An unofficial map acquires official standing by association: A map circulated during a General Assembly process is read as carrying institutional authority whatever its disclaimer says. Eg. The “Map of the World” was used during the consultation process for a resolution and has remained on the United Nations website.
      The Fix: Require any cartographic material circulated in a General Assembly process to carry the producing entity’s name and the standard territorial disclaimer on the artefact itself.
    2. Disclaimers are applied inconsistently across disputes: Explaining one disputed line and silently dropping another creates an asymmetry that reads as a position. Eg. The same map annotated the Line of Control and carried no note on the omitted claim lines in Arunachal Pradesh and Aksai Chin.
      The Fix: Apply a single annotation standard to every disputed boundary on a map, so a line is either shown with its note or its absence is explained.
    3. Correction has no procedural route: A member state that objects to a depiction can raise it bilaterally with the Secretariat, and there is no mechanism that compels a revision or a withdrawal. Eg. India has taken note of the anomaly and is taking it up with the United Nations.
      The Fix: Create a published register of member state objections to circulated maps, with a stated time limit for the producing entity to respond.
    4. Domestic law and international depiction diverge: India’s own legal position on depicting its external boundaries binds publishers within India and has no effect on material produced abroad. Eg. Indian law requires the depiction of Indian territory as claimed, which the circulated map did not follow.
      The Fix: Route the objection through the United Nations Group of Experts on Geographical Names and the regional cartographic conferences, where standards are set rather than only contested after publication.

    Conclusion

    The resolution and the map are two different objects and the Secretary General’s answer rests entirely on that separation. It resolves the legal question, since no cartographic depiction was adopted by anyone, and leaves the practical one open, because the artefact that dropped the claim lines is still hosted where a reader will find it. The status is that India’s vote stands on the equal area principle, the objection has been raised with the United Nations, and the map has not been altered. The marker to watch is whether UN Geospatial reissues the map with the claim line annotation restored or withdraws it from the website.

    Back2Basics: UN Geospatial

    1. UN Geospatial: UN Geospatial, formerly the United Nations Cartographic Section, is the Secretariat unit that produces maps and geospatial products for United Nations use.
    2. Map products supplied: It supplies general reference maps, maps for peace operations and thematic maps requested by United Nations bodies.
    3. The status of its maps: Its maps carry a disclaimer that the designations used and the presentation of material do not imply any official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
    4. Relevance to the disputed artefact: The artefact at issue was produced by this unit yet has been described as not an official United Nations map.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026] Which of the following with reference to Indian States is/are NOT correct? 1. Uttar Pradesh shares its boundary with the highest number of other Indian States. 2. Rajasthan shares the longest international border among all Indian States. 3. Sikkim is the only State that shares its boundary with just one other Indian State. (a) 1 only (b) 1 and 2 (c) 2 and 3 (d) 3 only ANSWER: C”

  • Members call for cooperation over pathogen research, access

    Why in the News

    The New Delhi Declaration adopted at the 18th BRICS Summit calls for constructive engagement in negotiations for the Pathogen Access and Benefit Sharing (PABS) Annex to the World Health Organization (WHO) pandemic agreement. The Declaration attaches a condition to that call, reaffirming the sovereign rights of States over their biological resources and the sovereign right to legislate and implement laws, including national access and benefit sharing legislation. The pandemic agreement itself was adopted at last year’s World Health Assembly, and this one annex is what still holds it short of ratification. The unresolved question is whether a country that shares a dangerous pathogen sample must be guaranteed a share of whatever is developed from it.

    What is the Pathogen Access and Benefit Sharing Annex?

    1. Purpose of the Annex: The PABS Annex will set out a roadmap for the sharing of dangerous pathogens and of the medicines, diagnostics or vaccines developed from them.
    2. Status as an annex to the pandemic agreement: It is an annex to the WHO pandemic agreement rather than a standalone instrument, so it has no effect independent of that agreement.
    3. The remaining bar to ratification: Once agreement is reached on the PABS Annex, the pandemic agreement can be approved or ratified by member states.

    Why is one annex holding up an adopted agreement?

    1. The parent agreement was already negotiated: Amid the Covid-19 pandemic the WHO planned a legally binding pandemic agreement for better response to any future pandemic, and it was adopted during last year’s World Health Assembly.
    2. Adoption is not ratification: One annex continues to hold the agreement hostage, and member states cannot approve or ratify until it is settled.
    3. The single disputed question: Countries are yet to agree on whether the sharing of pathogen samples should be linked mandatorily with the sharing of the benefits developed.

    What position did the New Delhi Declaration take?

    1. Call for constructive engagement: The Declaration calls for constructive engagement in the PABS negotiations rather than endorsing either side of the mandatory linkage question.
    2. Sovereign rights over biological resources: It reaffirms the sovereign rights of States over their biological resources.
    3. The right to national access and benefit sharing law: It reaffirms the sovereign right of States to legislate and implement laws, including national access and benefit sharing legislation.
    4. Effect of the combined position: A call for engagement paired with an assertion of sovereign control keeps the option of conditioning sample sharing on domestic law open.

    Challenges to the Pathogen Access and Benefit Sharing Annex

    1. Sharing and benefit are separated in time: A sample is needed within days of an outbreak while a vaccine takes many months, so a country is asked to give first and trust later. Eg. Indonesia withheld H5N1 avian influenza samples from the WHO network in 2007 after finding that vaccines developed from them were priced beyond its reach.
      The Fix: Write a pre agreed allocation percentage of real time production into the Annex itself, so entitlement is fixed before the sample is shared rather than negotiated after a product exists.
    2. Genetic sequence data escapes any physical sharing rule: A pathogen’s genome can be uploaded and used to design a product without the physical sample ever changing hands, which makes a sample based obligation easy to bypass. Eg. Covid-19 vaccine design began from a published genome sequence rather than from a transferred isolate.
      The Fix: Bring genetic sequence information expressly within the Annex’s definition of pathogen material, with database access conditioned on the same benefit sharing terms.
    3. Manufacturing capacity is concentrated in a few countries: A guaranteed share of output is worth little to a state that cannot produce, fill or distribute the product it is promised. Eg. Most African countries imported nearly all Covid-19 vaccines rather than producing any.
      The Fix: Pair the benefit share with a technology transfer obligation through the WHO mRNA technology transfer hub model, so capacity is built alongside the entitlement.
    4. A sovereignty first reading can slow outbreak response: Treating pathogens as national property lets a state delay sharing while it negotiates terms, and an outbreak does not wait for that negotiation. Eg. The Nagoya Protocol on access and benefit sharing was drafted for genetic resources generally and its permit procedures were not designed for an epidemic timeline.
      The Fix: Create a standing fast track permit under the Annex, valid on notification of a public health emergency, so sharing proceeds while the commercial terms are settled separately.
    5. Compliance rests on no enforcement mechanism: A treaty annex binds only those who ratify it, and a manufacturer outside a ratifying state carries no obligation at all. Eg. The pandemic agreement takes effect only once member states ratify it, and ratification is voluntary.
      The Fix: Route access to the WHO coordinated laboratory network through a binding contract with each participating manufacturer, so the obligation attaches to the user of the sample rather than only to its government.

    Conclusion

    The agreement is complete except for the one question that decides who benefits from it, which is why the annex and not the treaty is where the negotiation now sits. The grouping’s formal position does not resolve that question, since a call for constructive engagement alongside an assertion of sovereign control over biological resources is compatible with either outcome. What it does record is that a large bloc of developing countries will not accept an unconditional sharing obligation. The marker to watch is the next World Health Assembly, since the annex has to be settled there before any state can ratify the pandemic agreement.

    Back2Basics: World Health Assembly

    1. The WHO’s decision making body: The decision making body of the World Health Organization, attended by delegations from all WHO member states.
    2. Meeting schedule and venue: It meets annually, usually in May, at Geneva.
    3. Functions of the Assembly: It determines WHO policies, appoints the Director General, supervises financial policies and reviews and approves the programme budget.
    4. Relevance to the PABS Annex: It is the forum that adopted the pandemic agreement and the forum in which the PABS Annex has to be settled.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2020, GS2, 10 marks] Critically examine the role of WHO in providing global health security during the Covid-19 pandemic.”