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Type: Op-ed

  • Two countries and a shared river: Mistrust is not inevitable

    Two countries and a shared river: Mistrust is not inevitable

    Why in the News

    India’s most important rivers rise in a region it cannot see into, controlled by China, which treats the data about them as an asset to switch on and off. The Brahmaputra rises as the Yarlung Tsangpo in Tibet and enters Arunachal Pradesh as the Siang, and the Sutlej and the Indus rise there too. The arrangement that governs what India learns about them, a pair of flood-season memorandums, lapsed in June 2025. China broke ground in July 2025 on the Medog project at the Great Bend of the Yarlung Tsangpo, immediately upstream of the point where the river turns towards Arunachal Pradesh. The tension is that hydrological data on rivers India depends on is a discretionary favour rather than a treaty right, and India practises the same discretion on the rivers where it sits upstream.

    What is the India-China hydrological data arrangement?

    1. No water treaty exists between the two countries: The relationship rests on two flood-season memorandums, one on the Brahmaputra signed in 2002 and one on the Sutlej signed in 2005.
    2. India pays for the data it receives: India pays roughly Rs 1 crore a year for the flood-season information supplied under those memorandums.
    3. A consultative body that convenes at China’s convenience: An expert-level consultative mechanism sits alongside the memorandums and meets when relations allow.
    4. The instrument is seasonal by design: The memorandums cover the flood season, so hazards arising outside that window carry no notification obligation at all.

    Why is there no legal floor under the arrangement?

    1. Both states sit outside the governing convention: The 1997 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses would oblige an upstream state to give prior notice of works and not to cause significant harm to those below. China voted against it and India abstained.
    2. A non-binding memorandum can be suspended without breach: Withholding data under such an arrangement carries no legal consequence, so there is nothing for India to invoke when supply stops.

    Why does shared data function as a lever rather than a right?

    1. Supply tracks the state of the boundary dispute: China stopped sharing Brahmaputra data during the Doklam standoff of 2017, blaming damaged collection sites, even as that summer’s floods killed scores in Assam.
    2. The pattern repeated and then ended the arrangement: Sharing resumed once relations thawed, dried up after the Galwan clash of 2020, and the memorandum lapsed in June 2025.
    3. Flood prediction data is not a neutral public good: It is released when ties are warm and withdrawn when they are not, which makes it a bargaining instrument rather than a technical input.
    4. Reassurances cannot be checked: Beijing attributes the stoppages to technical faults, calls the dam “fully within China’s sovereignty” and promises it will “prevent and mitigate disasters”. Those meant to be reassured cannot verify any of it, because the region is sealed and India, which hosts the Dalai Lama and the largest Tibetan exile community, is viewed with particular suspicion.

    What does the Medog project add to India’s exposure?

    1. The largest hydropower project in the world, at the worst possible point: The Medog project at the Great Bend will run to 60 GW, sited just before the Yarlung Tsangpo turns towards Arunachal Pradesh.
    2. It sits on the seam that generates the hazard: The site lies in one of the planet’s most seismically violent zones, the same tectonic seam that produces the outburst floods now hitting the border.
    3. Downstream states have been told nothing: Arunachal Pradesh’s Chief Minister has called the project an “existential threat” to the Siang valley. Bangladesh, at the river’s end, sought details in early 2026 and received none.

    Where does India’s own record cut against its demand?

    1. India settled for paid data instead of pressing for a right: Successive governments accepted the paid-data memorandum and did not push for the binding, basin-wide architecture that would make information an entitlement rather than a favour.
    2. India is an upstream withholder on its own rivers: It shares thinly with Bangladesh, and it has placed the Indus Waters Treaty, 1960 in abeyance following the Pahalgam terror attack.
    3. The same logic runs in both directions: The reasoning India faces on the Brahmaputra is the reasoning it practises on the Indus, which removes the ground from which it could demand a rule of general application.

    What do the Senegal and Mekong models show is possible?

    1. Poverty is not the constraint: On the Senegal River, four of the world’s poorest African countries jointly own their dams as “common and indivisible property”.
    2. Nor is conflict: That joint ownership was sustained even through a war between two of the member states, so mistrust between riparian governments does not by itself prevent pooled sovereignty over a river.
    3. China’s absence is a choice, not a limitation: Its neighbours built the Mekong River Commission and China stayed outside it, which shows the refusal to enter a basin institution is political rather than structural.

    Challenges to a binding India-China river arrangement

    1. Forecasting depends on a single unverifiable supplier: Flood forecasting for the Brahmaputra rests on upstream gauge readings that no Indian agency can independently audit, so a stoppage removes the input rather than degrading it. Eg. Central Water Commission forecasts for the Assam valley are built on flows measured at stations India cannot access.
      The Fix: Fund independent satellite-based flow and precipitation estimation for the upper basin, so a data cut-off reduces accuracy instead of ending the forecast.
    2. The hazards that kill fall outside the covered season: Glacial lake outburst floods and landslide-dam breaches occur without regard to the monsoon calendar the arrangement is built around. Eg. The South Lhonak glacial lake outburst flood of October 2023 destroyed the Teesta-III dam in Sikkim and killed dozens, outside any flood-season notification window.
      The Fix: Negotiate a year-round hazard-notification obligation covering lake formation, landslide damming and reservoir release, separately from seasonal flow data.
    3. Water has no forum of its own: The boundary question runs through the Special Representatives channel, and water sits in a separate expert mechanism with no power to compel a meeting or an answer. Eg. An interruption in data supply has no body before which it can be formally raised as a breach.
      The Fix: Give the expert mechanism a fixed annual calendar and a standing agenda item on notification failures, so a stoppage produces a documented exchange.
    4. The lower riparians negotiate separately on the same river: India, Bangladesh and China each deal bilaterally, so the basin’s downstream users never present a common position. Eg. India and Bangladesh’s Joint Rivers Commission covers 54 shared rivers and has produced only two water-sharing treaties in five decades.
      The Fix: Raise the Yarlung Tsangpo-Brahmaputra as a joint India-Bangladesh agenda item so notification is sought by the whole downstream reach at once.
    5. India’s own counter-project is contested at home: Storage proposed on the Siang as a strategic answer to Medog is opposed by the communities it would displace, which weakens the case India makes about consultation. Eg. Survey work for the Siang Upper Multipurpose Project has faced sustained local protest in Arunachal Pradesh.
      The Fix: Settle consent and compensation on the Indian side of the border before advancing a counter-dam as a security argument.

    Conclusion

    India cannot compel China to open the plateau, and the question is therefore not about leverage but about design. What is missing is an architecture that makes hazard information an obligation owed to everyone downstream rather than a concession granted when relations permit. Building it requires India to accept the same obligation on the rivers where it sits upstream, since a rule it will not apply to itself is not a rule it can ask for. The unresolved point is whether a shared river is treated as a common lifeline or as a weapon held in reserve, and neither government has yet chosen.

    Transboundary River Water Sharing in India

    1. About: A transboundary river crosses an international boundary, and its use is governed by bilateral treaties and memorandums between the riparian states rather than by a single binding global law.
    2. India’s position is both upstream and downstream: India is the lower riparian to China on the Brahmaputra, the Sutlej and the Indus headwaters, and the upper riparian to Pakistan on the Indus system and to Bangladesh on the Ganga and the Teesta.
    3. The dependence is agricultural: Around 45% of irrigation in the Indo-Gangetic plain depends on water from the Himalayan rivers, which is why control of the headwaters translates directly into food security.

    Laws and Agreements Governing Transboundary River Water Sharing

    1. Indus Waters Treaty, 1960 (India-Pakistan): Brokered by the World Bank, it assigns the Eastern Rivers (Ravi, Beas, Sutlej) to India and the Western Rivers (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab) to Pakistan, with run-of-the-river hydropower and limited storage permitted to India on the Western Rivers.
    2. Article XII: Termination is possible only through a ratified treaty between both governments, and the text carries no suspension provision.
    3. Ganga Waters Treaty, 1996 (India-Bangladesh): It fixes the sharing of dry-season flows at the Farakka Barrage and runs for 30 years, expiring in December 2026.
    4. Kushiyara River Treaty, 2022 (India-Bangladesh): It provides for withdrawal of an agreed quantum from the Kushiyara in the dry season, and is only the second water-sharing treaty between the two countries.
    5. Kosi Agreement, 1954 and Gandak Agreement, 1959 (India-Nepal): These provide for flood control, barrage construction and irrigation management on shared rivers, with India funding and operating the structures on Nepali territory.
    6. Mahakali Treaty, 1996 (India-Nepal): It covers the integrated development of the Mahakali river, including the Pancheshwar Multipurpose Project, which remains stalled over disagreement on benefit-sharing.

    Challenges in Transboundary River Water Sharing

    1. The customary principles bind weakly without a forum: Equitable and reasonable utilisation and the obligation not to cause significant harm are widely accepted in principle, and no standing tribunal exists to apply them to a river basin. Eg. The Mekong River Commission can review a member’s dam proposal and cannot stop it.
      The Fix: Build compulsory technical arbitration into each treaty at renewal, so a disputed project has a named forum rather than a bilateral stalemate.
    2. Treaties fix volumes that the climate then moves: Allocations negotiated on decades-old flow records become unworkable as glacier melt, monsoon variability and river morphology change the water actually available. Eg. Negotiations over the Ganga sharing formula are complicated by changing river morphology and by disagreement over water levels at Farakka.
      The Fix: Replace fixed quantum allocations with percentage-of-flow formulas carrying explicit dry-year and surplus-year rules.
    3. Domestic federal politics stalls bilateral agreements: A riparian State’s objection can hold up an agreement the two national governments have already negotiated. Eg. The draft Teesta agreement of 2011, providing for a 50:50 sharing arrangement, has never been implemented.
      The Fix: Include the riparian State in the negotiating delegation from the outset, rather than seeking its concurrence after a text is settled.
    4. Third parties build in the same basin without notice: A neighbour can bring in external financing and construction for a project on a shared river without consulting the other riparian. Eg. Bangladesh has re-engaged China on the Teesta River Management Project.
      The Fix: Write a prior-notification and joint-appraisal requirement for any new structure into every treaty renewal, applying to externally financed projects as well.

    [2016, GS1, 12 marks] Present an account of the Indus Water Treaty and examine its ecological, economic and political implications in the context of changing bilateral relations.

  • Judicial integrity – a case the Court cannot ignore

    Why in the News

    A sitting judge of the Supreme Court of India, Justice Sandeep Mehta, wrote three letters to the Chief Justice of India (CJI) on 2, 10 and 17 August seeking the immediate transfer of the Acting Chief Justice of the Rajasthan High Court, Justice Sanjeev Prakash Sharma. The letters allege victimisation of judges, maladministration, improper shifting of cases to his own Bench, and nepotism in appointments to the Permanent Lok Adalat. The last of the three records concern at the CJI’s inaction, with Justice Sharma due to retire on 26 September. The stated response is that allegations cannot be treated as findings and must be dealt with strictly through the established institutional mechanism. The tension is that the established mechanism is precisely what has not worked, since the appointment system carries no published criteria and the removal machinery has never removed a judge.

    What is the “master of the roster” power?

    1. What the power is: The Chief Justice of a court holds the exclusive administrative authority to constitute Benches and to assign cases among them.
    2. Where it comes from: It rests on convention and on the Supreme Court’s own rulings treating the Chief Justice as first among equals for administrative purposes, not on any statutory provision.
    3. Its reach in this case: The power covers roster allocation for the whole court, and it is exercised by the Acting Chief Justice wherever the office of Chief Justice is vacant.

    What do the letters allege?

    1. Interference with the roster: Cases were allegedly shifted improperly to the Acting Chief Justice’s own Bench, in misuse of the master of the roster power.
    2. Pressure on colleagues: Judges were allegedly intimidated with the threat of retributive measures including transfers, on the basis of claimed proximity to the CJI.
    3. Favouritism at the Bar: The letters refer to specific instances of alleged favouritism towards a chosen few among the lawyers.
    4. Appointments outside the court: Nepotism is alleged in appointments to the Permanent Lok Adalat, the statutory body that decides disputes relating to public utility services and whose award is final and binding.
    5. The state of the record: There has been no official denial of the reports concerning the contents of the letters, and Justice Sharma has publicly denied the accusations as baseless.

    What is the record behind the appointment itself?

    1. A long acting tenure: The High Court functioned under an Acting Chief Justice for about 11 months, which is not a sound institutional arrangement for a court of that size.
    2. An earlier transfer out: Justice Sharma was transferred to the Patna High Court in 2022.
    3. A rejected repatriation: His request to return to the Rajasthan High Court was rejected by the Collegium in 2023, which instead proposed his transfer to the Punjab and Haryana High Court.
    4. A reversal without a stated reason: He was nonetheless retransferred to the Rajasthan High Court in 2025 and then allowed to function as Acting Chief Justice with wide administrative and judicial powers.

    How did the institution respond?

    1. The Bar acted first: Lawyers staged a sit-in protest on the High Court premises, following which Justice Sharma opted out from hearing cases.
    2. The Collegium moved on the vacancy: On 31 August the Supreme Court Collegium recommended the appointment of Justice Sanjay Agrawal as the new Chief Justice of the Rajasthan High Court, and that appointment has since been made.
    3. The complaint itself drew no step: For several weeks no cogent step was initiated on the letters, with the retirement date approaching.
    4. The trust cost is measurable: Transparency International’s 2002 report, based on a household survey, identified the judiciary as the second-most corrupt institution in certain South Asian countries including India.

    Why does the appointment system produce this?

    1. There are no criteria at all: The selection of judges proceeds without published standards against which a candidate can be assessed or a rejection explained.
    2. The Collegium and the Executive must collaborate: The unavoidable joint working of the Collegium and the Union Executive under the present system makes appointments partisan, opaque and often arbitrary.
    3. The filter cannot do the job asked of it: A process built this way is incapable of identifying the cleanest and most meritorious candidates.
    4. The link to corruption is direct: Corruption in the judiciary is inseparable from the method of selecting candidates for judicial office, so the accountability problem starts at entry rather than at removal.

    Why does the removal machinery not work?

    1. The inquiry statute is dormant: The Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 is inadequate to tackle judicial corruption and has for all practical purposes become defunct.
    2. A criminal investigation cannot begin: In K. Veeraswami vs Union of India (1991) the Supreme Court held that the permission of the CJI is a necessary precondition for registering a First Information Report against a judge of the higher judiciary. The requirement is circular in practice, because the police will not seek permission without clinching evidence and cannot obtain that evidence without investigating.
    3. Impeachment has failed as a route: Removal on the ground of proved misbehaviour or incapacity, as provided by Articles 124(4) and 217(1)(b) of the Constitution, has not worked in practice.
    4. The internal route has no teeth: The in-house mechanism adopted by the Supreme Court in 1999 has not proved fault-free or effective.
    5. The legislative fix lapsed: The Judicial Standards and Accountability Bill passed the Lok Sabha in 2012 and lapsed with the dissolution of the 15th Lok Sabha in 2014, and the later effort to revive it with changes remained a non-starter.

    What do other systems do differently?

    1. Canada invites applications: Candidates apply for judicial office rather than being identified privately, so the pool and the criteria are both visible before a selection is made.
    2. The United Kingdom uses an independent body: Judicial selection is conducted by a body separate from both the judiciary and the executive, which breaks the circularity of judges choosing judges.
    3. Neither is currently available in India: Both arrangements remain unthinkable in the Indian setting, which is why the accountability argument keeps returning to the removal stage rather than the entry stage.

    How have earlier Chief Justices responded to comparable situations?

    1. The 1990 precedent, advice to step back: When an inquiry was underway against Justice V. Ramaswami for alleged misconduct, the then CJI advised him to take leave and keep away from judicial work.
    2. The 1993 precedent, work withheld after a failed motion: The impeachment motion against him failed in Parliament following the Congress party’s strategic abstention. He attempted to resume judicial work with about nine months of tenure remaining, and the then CJI refused to allocate any cases to him for hearing.
    3. The recent precedent, immediate transfer: After partly burnt currency notes were reportedly found at the Delhi residence of Justice Yashwant Varma, the then CJI quickly transferred him to the Allahabad High Court, where he was practically not allocated judicial work.
    4. The Court’s own statement of the duty: In XXX vs Union of India (2025) the Supreme Court emphasised the responsibility of the CJI in matters relating to judicial integrity and allegations of corrupt practices.

    Challenges to judicial accountability in India

    1. Asset declaration rests on resolution rather than statute: Judges of the higher judiciary declare their assets under an internal resolution, so a failure to declare carries no legal consequence. Eg. Publication of the declarations on the Supreme Court’s website began only in 2025.
      The Fix: Place the declaration requirement in statute, with an annual filing deadline and a public register maintained by an authority outside the court.
    2. The selection record stays outside disclosure: The reasons recorded for an elevation, a rejection or a transfer are not published, so a questionable appointment cannot be traced to a reasoning. Eg. The 2023 rejection of a repatriation and the 2025 reversal of that position were never explained on the record.
      The Fix: Publish the Collegium’s recorded reasons for every recommendation and every transfer at the time the decision is communicated.
    3. The in-house procedure runs to no timeline: An internal inquiry proceeds at the discretion of the CJI, with no fixed stage limits and no published outcome. Eg. The procedure can end in advice to resign, leaving no finding on the record at all.
      The Fix: Fix statutory timelines for each stage of the inquiry and require publication of the finding, with reasons, on completion.
    4. Removal depends on parliamentary arithmetic: The final step turns on the numbers in both Houses rather than on the inquiry’s finding, so a party decision can defeat a proved case. Eg. No judge of the higher judiciary has ever been removed under the constitutional procedure.
      The Fix: Make an adverse inquiry finding trigger the automatic withdrawal of judicial work, so the consequence does not wait on a vote.

    Conclusion

    Two failures are operating at once and neither can substitute for the other. Entry into the higher judiciary is decided without published criteria, and exit from it is governed by a statute that has never produced a removal, which leaves everything in between resting on how quickly one officeholder chooses to act. That is not accountability but discretion, and discretion is what the present controversy has tested. The measure of what follows is whether a complaint carrying verifiable material now generates a recorded step with a date attached to it, rather than a retirement that closes the file.

    Back2Basics: The Collegium system

    1. What it is: The mechanism through which the higher judiciary selects its own judges, evolved through the Supreme Court’s judgments rather than from the text of the Constitution.
    2. Its origin: The Second Judges Case (1993) and the Third Judges Case (1998) read the word “consultation” in Articles 124 and 217 as requiring the concurrence of the CJI, and fixed the collegium’s composition.
    3. Its composition: The CJI and the four senior most judges of the Supreme Court decide Supreme Court appointments; the CJI and the two senior most judges decide High Court appointments and transfers.
    4. The failed replacement: The National Judicial Appointments Commission, created by the 99th Constitutional Amendment, was struck down by the Supreme Court in 2015 as violating judicial independence, leaving the collegium in place.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2019] Consider the following statements: 1. The- motion to impeach a Judge of the Supreme Court of India cannot be rejected by the Speaker of the Lok Sabha as per the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968. 2. The Constitution of India defines and gives details of what Constitutes ‘incapacity and proved misbehaviour’ of the Judges of the Supreme Court of India. 3. The details of the process of impeachment of the Judges of the Supreme Court of India are given in the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968. 4. If the motion for the impeachment of a Judge is taken up for voting, the law requires the motion to be backed by each House of the Parliament and supported by a majority of total membership of that House and by not less than two-thirds of total members of that House present and voting. Which of the statements given above is/are correct? (a) 1 and 2 (b) 3 only (c) 3 and 4 only (d) 1, 3 and 4 (c)”

  • [7th September 2026] The Hindu OpED: India’s unemployment data dilemma

    [7th September 2026] The Hindu OpED: India’s unemployment data dilemma

    Question (2023, GS3): “Most of the unemployment in India is structural in nature. Examine the methodology adopted to compute unemployment in the country and suggest improvements.
    Linkage: This is the most direct match. The transition to high-frequency monthly indicators based on CWS directly challenges how India computes its unemployment. CWS captures employment status over a short seven-day reference period (which is why seasonal peaks like the kharif sowing season show a temporary drop to 5.1%), but it fails to address the underlying structural nature of informal underemployment.

    Mentor Comment

    India has converted its official unemployment estimate from a quarterly and yearly release into a monthly indicator, measured on the Current Weekly Status approach. The latest Periodic Labour Force Survey (PLFS) reports the unemployment rate for those aged 15 years and above at a four-month low of 5.1 per cent in July. The review period coincided with the peak of the kharif season, when demand for agricultural labour rises for land preparation and transplanting. The tension is that a higher frequency reading is being asked to measure a labour market where roughly 90 per cent of the workforce is informal and tens of millions of workers circulate seasonally. A rate can be published every month without becoming a measure of the quality of work behind it.

    What is the Periodic Labour Force Survey, and what changed?

    1. What it is: The Periodic Labour Force Survey is the household survey through which India produces its official employment and unemployment estimates.
    2. The reference period: Under the Current Weekly Status (CWS) approach, a person’s activity status is determined on the basis of the preceding seven days.
    3. What the change is: The survey has moved from quarterly and yearly unemployment data to a monthly indicator, raising the frequency of the headline rate without altering the sample’s household basis.

    What does the July reading actually show?

    1. The headline: The unemployment rate for those aged 15 and above marked a four-month low.
    2. The rural share of the move: The overall decline was owing to rural areas, where unemployment fell to 4.5 per cent from 5 per cent.
    3. A supply side signal: The month recorded an increase in the labour force participation rate, meaning a larger share of the working age population entered the labour market.

    Why is a seasonal reading not a structural improvement?

    1. The month is the agricultural peak: July hiring rises for land preparation, transplanting and allied activities, so the decline reflects the calendar rather than a turn in the market.
    2. The affected sectors are the seasonal ones: Construction, agriculture, small trade, logistics and local services all fluctuate seasonally, and the fall concentrates there rather than in formal sector jobs.
    3. A falling rate can mark distress: A decline in unemployment can indicate distress-driven entry into low-productivity jobs rather than genuine employment creation.
    4. The correct status of the number: A monthly unemployment figure functions at best as a leading indicator, not as a comprehensive measure of labour market health.

    Why does informality defeat a high-frequency headline rate?

    1. The scale of the informal market: Various reports place around 90 per cent of the population in informal work, where wage payments are negotiated informally rather than contracted.
    2. The workers the frame misses: Independent labour studies estimate 30 to 35 million seasonal labourers moving across India annually, forming the backbone of urban construction and infrastructure.
    3. Underemployment does not register: Disguised employment and underemployment are widespread, and neither shows up in a status that records whether a person worked.
    4. The granularity is missing: Data is sketchy on wage growth, hours worked, job quality, occupational shifts and sector-wise employment trends, so the rate carries no information about the nature of the job.

    What do mature labour markets do differently?

    1. The common benchmark: Most advanced nations count unemployment through a Labour Force Survey built on the definition of the International Labour Organization (ILO), which fixes what counts as employment, unemployment and labour force participation.
    2. The depth behind the number: The United States, Japan, the European Union and the United Kingdom hold decades of household survey data carrying full-time versus part-time status, hourly wages, job duration, labour mobility and unemployment spells.
    3. The administrative spine: Those markets run payroll surveys, unemployment insurance records, formal contracts and extensive administrative databases alongside the survey, so the headline rate is corroborated rather than standalone.

    Can administrative data close the gap?

    1. The sources already exist: Employees’ Provident Fund Organisation and Employees’ State Insurance Corporation payroll data, Goods and Services Tax based enterprise information, income tax records, corporate payroll data, gig economy employment data and rural wage indicators are all being built up.
    2. They do not yet speak to each other: These sources remain fragmented, so none can be used to cross-check the survey’s monthly movement.
    3. The gap they would close: A large informal employment market is difficult to track through a household survey alone, which is precisely the market these registers touch at the formal edge.

    Challenges to the revamped Periodic Labour Force Survey

    1. A short reference period counts any work as employment: A person engaged for as little as an hour on a single day in the reference week is recorded as employed, so a full-time job and a day of casual work carry the same weight. Eg. Unpaid work in a family enterprise is counted as employment.
      The Fix: Publish hours worked and earnings distributions alongside the headline rate, so the composition of employment is visible.
    2. The household frame loses the circulating worker: A survey records a person at their usual residence, so a worker moving between a home district and a distant worksite can be missed at both ends. Eg. Urban construction runs on labour that its home district still records as resident.
      The Fix: Link the survey frame to social security registration numbers, so a worker traced at the destination is not lost at the origin.
    3. Unemployment is the wrong headline where there is no income support: Without unemployment insurance a worker cannot afford to remain unemployed, so joblessness appears as low-paid self-employment rather than in the rate. Eg. A person selling goods on the street with no earnings floor is counted as employed.
      The Fix: Publish an underemployment and working poverty series with each monthly release.
    4. Monthly sampling limits disaggregation: A monthly sample supports a national and rural-urban split, not a State, district or occupational reading. Eg. The release carries no monthly breakdown by sector or by occupational shift.
      The Fix: Pool three consecutive monthly rounds into a rolling State level estimate published alongside the headline.

    Conclusion

    A statistical system has been made faster without being made deeper, and the two are not substitutes. The unresolved question is whether the survey will be judged on how often it reports or on whether it captures the working lives of a largely informal workforce. Frequency answers a demand from markets and commentary; job quality answers the policy question of whether participation is converting into stable, higher-productivity work. Until the administrative registers are integrated into a single frame, the monthly rate will keep being read as a verdict it cannot deliver.

    Back2Basics: International Labour Organization

    1. Formation: Established in 1919 under the Treaty of Versailles, and it became the first specialised agency of the United Nations in 1946.
    2. Headquarters: Geneva, Switzerland.
    3. Structure: It is the only tripartite United Nations agency, bringing together governments, employers and workers of member States with equal standing in its decision making.
    4. Why it matters here: Its conferences of labour statisticians set the international statistical definitions of employment, unemployment and the labour force that national surveys are benchmarked against.

  • The economy, its math and politics

    Why in the News

    A former Economic Affairs Secretary in the Ministry of Finance has claimed that nominal Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth in the first quarter of 2026-27 was 2.6 per cent, against the 10.3 per cent estimated by the Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation (MoSPI). Adjusted for inflation of 2 to 2.5 per cent, that arithmetic puts real growth at zero rather than at the official 7.8 per cent. The claim was built by comparing the April-June 2025 GDP level computed on the old 2011-12 base year with the April-June 2026 level computed on the 2022-23 base year that MoSPI adopted in February 2026. Splicing two series produces a growth rate that measures neither of them. The contest is between an official estimate the government spent a week publicly defending and a public mood in which a very low growth number was readily believed.

    What is a base year in GDP computation?

    1. The purpose: A base year fixes the set of prices at which output in every later year is valued, so a change in the measured total reflects a change in volume and not a change in prices.
    2. Nominal against real: Nominal GDP values output at the prices ruling in the year it was produced. Real GDP values that same output at base year prices, which is what makes growth comparable across years.
    3. The worked illustration: A country producing only crude oil sells 10 million barrels at $10 in year 1, giving a GDP of $100 million, then 5 million barrels at $30 in year 2, giving $150 million. Measured at year 1 prices, year 2 output is $50 million, so the economy has contracted by half even though its nominal GDP rose 50 per cent.
    4. What the base year carries: It fixes the relative prices and the weights of the period chosen, and those weights then run through every year of the series.

    Why is the base year revised every five to six years?

    1. Consumption patterns move: What households spend on shifts substantially over a decade, so an old price structure misvalues what the economy now produces. Eg. Telecom tariffs collapsed after 2016 and digital services barely existed as a separate category in 2011-12.
    2. Measurement itself improves: Technology and method allow faster and more precise capture of output and prices than were available when the previous base was set.
    3. Administrative data replaces proxies: The 2022-23 series draws on Goods and Services Tax returns, the Public Financial Management System for central government accounts, e-Vahan for transport spending, and the Annual Survey of Unincorporated Sector Enterprises and the Periodic Labour Force Survey for the informal economy.
    4. Every earlier year is restated: When the base moved from 2011-12 to 2022-23, the GDP values changed for all years from 2011-12 onwards, so growth must be computed between two comparable periods within the new series.

    Where did the disputed calculation go wrong?

    1. The splice: The claim took the April-June 2025 level from the 2011-12 series and the April-June 2026 level from the 2022-23 series, then divided one by the other.
    2. What that number actually measures: A ratio across two series captures the gap between two different valuations of the economy, not the change in output between two quarters.
    3. The office lent the claim weight: The claimant had headed the Department of Economic Affairs and was designated Finance Secretary, which is why the government machinery responded for most of a week rather than ignoring the claim.
    4. The rebuttal crossed party lines: A Congress Rajya Sabha member who is himself critical of the government’s economic management wrote publicly that the arithmetic behind the real growth estimate was not among the things wrong with India’s economy.

    Why did a wrong number travel so far?

    1. Perception ran ahead of the arithmetic: A low growth number was plausible to a section of readers before any of them checked how it was derived.
    2. The protest backdrop: The claim landed during the Jantar Mantar protests, which had already made the government’s economic record a live public argument.
    3. The employability gap: An education system that does not leave its graduates job ready weakens the link between a headline growth number and what people observe.
    4. The demographic pressure: More than a crore young people enter the job market every year, so growth is judged against absorption rather than against output.
    5. Political amplification and its limit: The Congress and several of its leaders amplified the claim. The Leader of the Opposition in the Lok Sabha, a standing critic of the government’s economic policy, did not comment on it.

    Challenges to the 2022-23 GDP series

    1. The deflator is built for goods: Converting nominal output into real output leans heavily on the Wholesale Price Index, which carries no services component at all. Eg. Services are close to 55 per cent of gross value added and are deflated using price indices constructed for wholesale goods transactions.
      The Fix: Complete the Wholesale Price Index base revision and introduce a Producer Price Index, which is the standard deflator in most large economies.
    2. The corporate database carries inactive firms: Private corporate value added is estimated from company filings, which can include shell and dormant entities. Eg. A National Sample Survey Office technical report on the corporate affairs database found a large share of sampled companies untraceable or wrongly classified.
      The Fix: Publish an annual reconciliation of the active company frame against Goods and Services Tax filings before the frame is used for estimation.
    3. Independent verification lags the release: The detailed sources and methods document that lets researchers reproduce the estimates is published well after the series itself. Eg. After the 2011-12 revision, the back series for years before that base remained contested for years, with a committee estimate and the official estimate disagreeing about growth in the 2000s.
      The Fix: Release the sources and methods volume on the same day as the new series rather than as a follow-up publication.
    4. Growth is not tracked by tax collections: High measured nominal growth that is not matched by proportionate corporate tax receipts leaves the estimate open to challenge. Eg. Direct tax buoyancy has repeatedly diverged from nominal GDP growth in years of strong headline expansion.
      The Fix: Publish the nominal GDP to tax base reconciliation alongside quarterly estimates, so the divergence is explained rather than argued over.

    Conclusion

    The arithmetic is settled and the credibility question is not. Two incompatible growth claims about the same quarter circulated side by side because most readers have no way to adjudicate between them. A statistical office that must be publicly defended each time a headline number is disputed is carrying a trust problem that no revision of the base year resolves. The transition to the 2025 System of National Accounts, due by 2029-30, is the next occasion on which that gap is either closed or carried forward.

    What is National Income Accounting?

    1. About: National income accounting is the set of methods used to measure economic activity across a national economy as a whole, producing indicators such as GDP, Gross National Product and Net National Income.
    2. Rationale: National accounts give fiscal policy, monetary policy, welfare targeting and cross-country comparison a single common measurement base.
    3. Named typology, the three methods: The production method sums value added at each stage across agriculture, industry and services. The income method sums rent, wages, interest, profit, mixed income and net income from abroad. The expenditure method totals consumption, investment, government spending and net exports.
    4. Who compiles it in India: The National Statistical Office under MoSPI prepares the estimates using the benchmark indicator method.

    Laws and Rules Governing National Income Accounting

    1. Collection of Statistics Act, 2008: Empowers the Centre, State governments and local bodies to collect statistics on economic, demographic, social, scientific and environmental matters, and makes furnishing the information a legal obligation.
    2. Collection of Statistics Rules, 2011: Prescribe how a statistical collection is notified and how statistics officers are appointed and their powers exercised.
    3. Collection of Statistics (Amendment) Act, 2017: Extended the parent Act to Jammu and Kashmir, closing a jurisdictional gap in national statistical collection.

    Key Facts about National Income Accounting

    1. National Statistics Day is observed on 29 June, the birth anniversary of P.C. Mahalanobis.
    2. MoSPI was created in 1999 by merging the Department of Statistics with the Department of Programme Implementation.
    3. The National Statistical Commission was set up in 2005 on the recommendation of the Rangarajan Commission and remains a non-statutory advisory body.
    4. The first estimate of India’s national income was made by Dadabhai Naoroji in 1868, and the first official post-Independence estimates came from the National Income Committee of 1949.

    Challenges in National Income Accounting

    1. The unorganised economy resists direct measurement: A large share of output comes from unregistered enterprises that file no accounts, so their contribution is surveyed and then projected forward. Eg. The informal sector contributed roughly 45 per cent of gross value added in 2022-23.
      The Fix: Shorten the interval between unincorporated enterprise surveys so projection periods are measured in months rather than years.
    2. Final and intermediate goods are hard to separate: Counting the same output twice inflates the total, and the distinction depends on who buys the good rather than on the good itself. Eg. Flour bought by a bakery is an intermediate input, and the identical flour bought by a household is final consumption.
      The Fix: Extend the Supply and Use Tables framework, which balances production against consumption and forces the discrepancy to surface.
    3. Non-market work is excluded by construction: Subsistence farming, barter and unpaid care work produce real output that no price attaches to, so they never enter the total. Eg. Time use survey data shows women performing several hours of unpaid domestic and care work daily, none of which is counted.
      The Fix: Publish satellite accounts for household and care production alongside the main accounts, as several statistical systems already do.
    4. Natural capital depletion is treated as income: Resource extraction adds to measured output and the loss of the resource is not netted out anywhere. Eg. Groundwater drawn beyond recharge in Punjab and Haryana raises agricultural value added. The stock that produced it shrinks, and nothing in the accounts records the loss.
      The Fix: Build a Green GDP series that deducts resource depletion and pollution costs, reported as a companion to the headline estimate.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “Explain the difference between computing methodology of India’s Gross Domestic Product(GDP) before the year 2015 and after the year 2015.”

  • [5th September 2026] The Hindu OpED: Warning on warming

    [5th September 2026] The Hindu OpED: Warning on warming

    Question (2025, GS3 – 15 Marks): “Write a review on India’s climate commitments under the Paris Agreement (2015) and mention how these have been further strengthened in COP26 (2021). In this direction, how has the first Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) intended by India been updated in 2022?
    Linkage: This is the most direct conceptual parallel. To analyze the gap between “climate pledges” and “actual policy trajectory” highlighted by the UNEP, candidates must evaluate India’s specific NDCs under the Paris Agreement, how they were upgraded at COP26, and their final 2022 formalization

    Mentor Comment

    The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) has found that breaching the 1.5 degrees Celsius global warming limit brings irreversible losses that adaptation cannot undo. Its report, Limiting Overshoot, accepts that the limit has already been breached. Full delivery of every existing national climate pledge still puts the world on course for 1.8 degrees Celsius, and current policies point to 2.6 degrees Celsius. The report’s new emphasis falls on greenhouse gases other than carbon dioxide, and on methane above all. The disagreement it reopens is between assessments that measure climate progress by mitigation and major developing economies that measure it by the finance and technology they receive. That disagreement now reaches India directly, because a smaller neighbour hit by a glacial disaster has named India among the emitters responsible.

    What is the “overshoot, peak and decline” pathway?

    1. What it describes: Average global temperatures rise above the 1.5 degrees Celsius limit, countries hold that peak as low as they collectively can, and temperatures are brought back below the limit by the end of the century.
    2. Why the peak is the variable that matters: Neutralising the heating effect of even a tenth of a degree is far harder than preventing that rise in the first place, so every fraction avoided at the peak is a fraction that never has to be reversed.
    3. What it refuses to concede: The pathway accepts the scientific reality of a 1.5 degrees Celsius world and rejects the conclusion that nothing further can be done once the threshold is crossed.

    Why has the report shifted attention to gases other than carbon dioxide?

    1. Methane carries a large share of present warming: It is responsible for about 0.5 degrees Celsius of current warming, so cutting it changes the temperature curve within years rather than decades.
    2. It is the fastest available brake: Action on methane is treated as the most effective way to slow warming in the near term, which is precisely the window in which the peak is decided.
    3. The collective instrument already exists: More than 155 countries have joined the Global Methane Pledge, committing to cut anthropogenic methane at least 30 percent below 2020 levels by 2030.
    4. India stands outside it: India has not joined the Pledge, so the single fastest near term lever is not one the country has committed to pull.

    Why do major developing economies resist a mitigation first framing?

    1. They claim the transition is already under way: These economies argue that they are moving away from fossil fuels and should not be assessed as though they were not.
    2. The damage they face comes from someone else’s stock: Their vulnerability arises from historical accumulations of carbon released by richer developed countries, which is the basis of their claim to greater financial support and affordable technology.
    3. The report is silent where they are loudest: Limiting Overshoot has little to say on adaptation finance, so the question these economies bring to every negotiation goes unanswered in the assessment they are asked to act on.

    How does the Bhotekoshi disaster complicate India’s position?

    1. A vulnerable neighbour has named India: Nepal’s Foreign Affairs Minister has said that major industrial emitters such as China, the United States and India must consider the impact of rising temperatures on small countries such as Nepal.
    2. The victim framing no longer holds unchallenged: India’s per capita emissions remain below the world average, and a section of the world nonetheless now places India within the group causing the problem rather than the group suffering it.
    3. The next negotiation is dated: Countries convene in Turkiye in November for COP31, where the familiar disagreements over mitigation and finance are expected to resurface with this new complication attached.

    Challenges to the overshoot, peak and decline pathway

    1. The return leg depends on removal capacity that does not exist at scale: Bringing temperatures back below the limit assumes large volumes of carbon dioxide will be removed from the atmosphere later in the century. Eg. The direct air capture plants operating in Iceland remove tens of thousands of tonnes a year at most, against annual global emissions measured in tens of billions of tonnes.
      The Fix: Treat removal as a supplement to be verified and funded now, and set peak temperature targets that assume no removal beyond capacity already demonstrated.
    2. Some losses do not reverse when the temperature does: Ice sheets, coral reefs and glaciers respond to the peak rather than to the eventual average, so returning below 1.5 degrees Celsius does not restore what the overshoot destroyed. Eg. The August 2026 glacial collapse on the Nepal China border destroyed valleys that no later cooling will reconstitute.
      The Fix: Attach separate thresholds for irreversible systems to the pathway, so peak height is judged against them rather than against the century end average alone.
    3. The methane lever sits with countries that have not pulled it: The largest sources of anthropogenic methane are concentrated in a handful of economies outside the Pledge. Eg. India’s methane arises chiefly from livestock and paddy cultivation, which are livelihood activities rather than industrial infrastructure that can be shut down.
      The Fix: Fund livestock feed and paddy water management programmes that cut methane without cutting output, so the reduction is not paid for by farm incomes.
    4. The pathway offers nothing to those already past adaptation: A framework organised around peak management assumes adaptation absorbs the interim, and for the most exposed countries it does not. Eg. Nepal contributes a negligible share of global emissions and has lost roughly a tenth of its economy to a single event.
      The Fix: Pair every overshoot pathway with a stated adaptation finance figure, so the interim period carries a costed obligation rather than an assumption.

    Conclusion

    The threshold argument is over and the argument about who pays for its consequences is not. India has spent three decades arguing that historical responsibility sits elsewhere, and that argument is now being made about India by a country downstream of the Himalayas. Refusing the mitigation frame no longer settles the question, because the objection is arriving from the Global South rather than from the West. What to watch is whether India carries a methane position and an adaptation finance demand into COP31 as a single package, or continues to press the second while declining the first.

    Back2Basics: United Nations Environment Programme

    1. What it is: The United Nations body responsible for setting the global environmental agenda and coordinating environmental work across the UN system.
    2. When it was created: It was established in 1972, following the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment held at Stockholm that year.
    3. Where it sits: Its headquarters are at Nairobi, making it the first UN agency headquartered in a developing country.
    4. What it publishes: Its recurring assessments include the Emissions Gap Report, the Adaptation Gap Report and the Global Environment Outlook.
  • [4th September 2026] The Hindu OpED: For newborns, the answer is hospital plus home

    [4th September 2026] The Hindu OpED: For newborns, the answer is hospital plus home

    Question (2024, GS2): “In a crucial domain like the public healthcare system, the Indian State should play a vital role to contain the adverse impact of marketisation of the system. Suggest some measures through which the State can enhance the reach of public healthcare at the grassroots level.
    Linkage: The proposed solution to move a portion of newborn care back to the home is a direct attempt to “enhance the reach of public healthcare at the grassroots level”. This question prompts candidates to suggest structural measures to decentralise care, relieving the burden on overloaded urban hospitals.

    Mentor Comment

    Three newborns died in an accidental fire at the government women’s hospital in Amravati, Maharashtra. That episode is placed alongside a list of clustered newborn deaths in government institutions since 2017, running from BRD Medical College in Gorakhpur and a government hospital in Ahmedabad through JK Lon Hospital in Kota, and on to district and medical college hospitals in Shahdol, Bhandara, Bhopal, Ambikapur, Nanded, Jhansi and Budaun. The argument drawn from that list is that these are a recurring pattern produced by the system, not a series of isolated accidents. The tension is that the policy success which moved birth out of the home is what has overloaded the units that receive the sick newborn, and the proposed answer is to move part of newborn care back to the home.

    What is home based newborn care?

    1. Trained community health workers deliver care where the baby is: They identify and manage neonatal infections at home, support breastfeeding and warmth, and manage low birth weight and preterm babies.
    2. It is already a package inside the public system: The Ministry of Health and Family Welfare adopted it in 2011, and roughly 8,00,000 Accredited Social Health Activists (ASHAs) have been trained on modules built from the Gadchiroli experience.
    3. It does not replace intensive care: A baby with severe prematurity, respiratory distress, shock, severe sepsis or serious birth asphyxia needs immediate facility based treatment.

    Why are newborn deaths clustering in government units?

    1. Overcrowding is the first reason: Institutional deliveries rose from 39 percent in 2005-06 to 90 percent in 2023-24 under the National Family Health Survey-6, and the absolute number of institutional deliveries rose from 109 lakh to 194 lakh. Admissions to public Special Newborn Care Units (SNCUs), the secondary level units that treat sick newborns, rose 28 percent in two years, from 11.3 lakh in 2021-22 to 14.45 lakh in 2023-24.
    2. The case mix has become sicker: Government hospitals now receive premature, low birth weight and sick newborns referred from peripheral facilities, alongside the normal deliveries they always handled.
    3. Infrastructure failure is the third reason: The Gorakhpur deaths of August 2017 were attributed by a district level inquiry to oxygen deprivation following an interruption in supply. Fires at Bhandara in January 2021, Bhopal in November 2021 and Jhansi in November 2024 show the electrical and fire risk in units running warmers, incubators and ventilators.
    4. Infection and staffing form the fourth: Inadequate nurse-to-baby ratios, equipment shortages and weak infection prevention practice let hospital acquired infection spread quickly through a crowded unit.

    What is the evidence that care at home works?

    1. A field trial cut neonatal mortality by 62.2 percent: The Society for Education, Action and Research in Community Health (SEARCH) ran the trial in rural Gadchiroli using trained community health workers, and published the result in The Lancet in 1999.
    2. Most small babies were managed without a bed: Between 1996 and 2003, 97 percent of low birth weight and preterm babies in Gadchiroli, including those above 1,800 g and beyond 34 weeks of gestation, were managed at home with a very low case fatality rate, published in the Journal of Perinatology in 2005.
    3. The delivery channel already exists nationally: India does not have to invent a system, so the binding constraint is training, supervision and support of the workers already deployed.

    What is the three part strategy proposed?

    1. Decongest the neonatal units: Strengthen home based care by ASHAs so that appropriate, stable newborns receive care at home rather than occupying a scarce SNCU bed.
    2. Staff and equip the units properly: Adequate numbers of doctors and nurses, appropriate nurse-to-baby ratios, functioning equipment, reliable oxygen and electricity with backup systems, and rigorous infection prevention.
    3. Make the units intrinsically safe: Fire detection and suppression systems, electrical and oxygen system safety measures, emergency evacuation drills and independent safety audits, all made mandatory rather than advisory.

    Challenges to home based newborn care

    1. The worker carrying the package is not an employee: An ASHA is an honorary volunteer paid through task linked incentives, so an expanded clinical role rests on availability that is not contractually owed. Eg. The fixed monthly incentive for routine tasks is Rs 2,000, with the remainder paid activity by activity.
      The Fix: Create a semi-formal cadre under the National Health Mission with a fixed salary component, insurance and pension attached to the newborn care role.
    2. Skill retention needs supervision that is not staffed: A worker trained once and never observed loses the clinical judgement the package depends on. Eg. The Auxiliary Nurse Midwives who supervise ASHAs also carry immunisation, antenatal and reporting duties at the same sub-centre.
      The Fix: Fund a dedicated supervisory post per cluster of workers with a fixed monthly schedule of observed home visits.
    3. Home care fails when referral fails: A baby that deteriorates at home needs transport and a bed within hours, and neither is guaranteed. Eg. A newborn deteriorating at night depends on a district ambulance network reached through the 102 service.
      The Fix: Link every worker to a live bed availability record for her referral unit and a guaranteed transport response window.
    4. The model was proven rural and remains rural: Urban newborns in slum and peri-urban households sit largely outside the package. Eg. Urban worker deployment norms are pitched at one worker per 1,000 to 2,500 slum population, and non-slum urban households fall outside that count.
      The Fix: Extend the package through urban primary health centres with a stated urban deployment norm and a defined household list.

    Conclusion

    Institutional delivery moved birth out of the home and saved both mothers and babies. It did not create the capacity to look after every newborn who arrives with the mother. The next phase has to divide the work, sending the sick newborn to a unit that is staffed and safe and keeping the stable newborn with a trained worker at home. The measure to watch is whether SNCU admissions fall and neonatal mortality keeps falling, since that combination is what separates decongestion from denial of care.

    Newborn and Child Health in India

    1. The mortality position: The Neonatal Mortality Rate stands at about 17 per 1,000 live births, the Infant Mortality Rate at about 25 and the Under-5 Mortality Rate at about 28 per 1,000 live births.
    2. Maternal mortality has fallen alongside it: The Maternal Mortality Ratio is about 80 per lakh live births.
    3. Immunisation coverage is high: Full immunisation coverage reached 93.5 percent under Mission Indradhanush 5.0.
    4. The disease mix has shifted: The share of communicable, maternal and neonatal conditions in India’s total disease burden fell to 33 percent, from 61 percent in 1990.

    Government Initiatives for Newborn and Child Health

    1. Janani Shishu Suraksha Karyakram: Provides free and cashless treatment to sick infants up to one year of age in government institutions, covering drugs, diagnostics and transport.
    2. Rashtriya Bal Swasthya Karyakram: Screens children for the four Ds, meaning defects at birth, deficiencies, diseases and developmental delays, with tertiary care for those identified.
    3. Mission Indradhanush 6.0: Targets 95 percent full immunisation coverage and tracks every pregnant woman and child through the U-WIN portal.
    4. Saksham Anganwadi and Poshan 2.0: Delivers supplementary nutrition aimed at reducing stunting and wasting among children under six.

    Key Facts about Newborn and Child Health

    1. National Newborn Week is observed from 15 to 21 November each year.
    2. The India Newborn Action Plan, 2014 set the goal of a single digit neonatal mortality rate by 2030.

    Challenges in Newborn and Child Health

    1. Specialist posts at the referral tier stay unfilled: A district newborn unit needs a paediatrician on its roster, and the sanctioned post is often vacant. Eg. Rural Community Health Centres carry a shortfall of about 80 percent against sanctioned specialist posts.
      The Fix: Build district paediatric cadres with a rural service obligation tied to postgraduate admission.
    2. Nursing supply is the binding constraint on every unit level standard: A nurse-to-baby ratio cannot be enforced where the nurses do not exist. Eg. India needs an additional 6.5 lakh nurses by 2030 to meet basic World Health Organization staffing norms.
      The Fix: Fund nursing school expansion in the districts with the highest birth volumes rather than in State capitals.
    3. Public health spending sits below its own policy target: Unit upgrades compete with every other demand inside a constrained health budget. Eg. Public health expenditure stands at about 1.9 percent of gross domestic product against the National Health Policy, 2017 target of 2.5 percent.
      The Fix: Ring-fence a newborn care line within National Health Mission allocations so unit safety upgrades are not crowded out.

    Back2Basics

    1. Janani Suraksha Yojana was launched in 2005 under the National Rural Health Mission, now the National Health Mission.
    2. It is a conditional cash transfer paid to promote institutional delivery among poor pregnant women.
      • Its benefits are differentiated between low performing and high performing States, and between rural and urban beneficiaries.
    3. The ASHA is its link worker, escorting the woman to the facility for a performance linked incentive.
  • [3rd September 2026] The Hindu OpED: Reducing India’s exposure to U.S. tariff risks

    [3rd September 2026] The Hindu OpED: Reducing India’s exposure to U.S. tariff risks

    Question (2025 – GS2): “Energy security constitutes the dominant kingpin of India’s foreign policy, and is linked with India’s overarching influence in Middle Eastern countries.” How would you integrate energy security with India’s foreign policy trajectories in the coming years?
    Linkage: This question directly addresses the concept of energy security as a “kingpin” of foreign policy. The U.S. sanctions act forces India to navigate its sovereign energy import strategy (specifically from Russia) while attempting to shield its vital foreign policy trajectories and trade arrangements with Western partners from massive tariff penalties.

    Mentor comment

    The U.S. Senate has passed the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026, authorising tariffs of up to 100% on countries among the top five importers of Russian crude or gas. Combined with existing forced-labour tariffs, India’s cumulative U.S. tariff exposure could reach 110%. The Act exposes a conflict between India’s energy security strategy and its trade relationship with the United States.

    Why has Russian crude become a trade exposure rather than an energy choice?

    1. Diversification of supply produced concentration of risk: India moved towards Russian crude to reduce its import bill and gain room to manoeuvre amid global uncertainty, and that single decision now determines its tariff status in an unrelated market.
    2. The volumes are still rising: Imports nearly doubled within 2026, from 4.54 million metric tonnes (MMT) in January to 8.96 MMT in May.
    3. The cost is diplomatic before it is fiscal: Securing the supply has complicated the management of ties with the United States, which seeks to discourage these purchases, and the Russia sanctions legislation is the formal expression of that pressure.

    How does India’s cumulative tariff reach 110 per cent?

    1. A tariff was already imposed before this Bill: The United States applied forced labour tariffs on 60 countries, including India, under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, adding a 10% tariff on India in place of an expired 10% duty levied under Section 122.
    2. The sanctions provision stacks on top: If the Russia sanctions legislation becomes law, the additional 100% authorisation takes India’s cumulative tariff to 110%, among the highest applied to any country.
    3. The comparator is also India’s competitor: China’s cumulative tariff would reach 112.5%, since both countries are major importers of Russian crude, so relative price competitiveness in the United States market shifts less than the absolute number suggests.

    What does a tariff confrontation cost the Indian economy?

    1. The method: Two global trade simulations were run using the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) dataset and model, a general equilibrium framework that traces how a tariff shock in one market propagates through production, demand and trade flows in every other.
    2. The sanction scenario: Modelling a 110% United States tariff on India, with other countries facing forced labour tariffs and China facing 112.5%, India’s welfare declines by nearly $47 billion, and gross domestic product, output, domestic demand, exports and imports all contract.
    3. The trade contraction is the largest single effect: Aggregate exports fall by 5.1% and imports by 5.2%, reflecting disrupted trade flows and weaker economic activity. A prolonged tariff confrontation imposes substantial costs on India’s growth and trade performance.

    Does export diversification offset the shock?

    1. The second scenario changes only the destination mix: The same tariff environment was modelled alongside export diversification, proxied by a full India-European Union free trade agreement.
    2. The direction of the result reverses: Welfare improves by $26.3 billion, gross domestic product turns positive, and sectoral output and domestic demand recover by around 1%.
    3. Trade integration replaces the lost market: Aggregate exports rise by 3.1% and imports by a moderate 2.6%, indicating stronger production and deeper integration with alternative markets.
    4. The policy implication is separable from the oil question: Even if India continues procuring Russian crude for energy security, the adverse effects of the tariffs are mitigated to a large extent by diversifying where it exports.

    Why is diversification not a sufficient answer on its own?

    1. It depends on demand India does not control: Diversification works only to the extent that other markets can absorb additional Indian exports, and without adequate external demand it remains limited on paper.
    2. The United States cannot be written off: It remains one of India’s largest export destinations, so diversification is an addition to that market rather than a replacement for it.
    3. Domestic constraints cap the gain: Trade facilitation delays, non tariff barriers, weak logistics and standards, and a product mix concentrated in lower value goods all limit how much of a new market India can actually capture.

    Challenges to export diversification as a response to tariff risk

    1. A free trade agreement is not the same as realised exports: Tariff concessions deliver nothing where Indian exporters cannot meet the destination market’s standards and compliance requirements. Eg. Indian shrimp and spice consignments have faced repeated European Union border rejections over antibiotic and pesticide residue limits.
      The Fix: Fund accredited testing and certification laboratories at export clusters, so conformity assessment happens before shipment rather than at the importing port.
    2. Rules of origin can neutralise a preference: A partner country can grant duty free access and still block goods that use imported inputs beyond a stated value addition threshold. Eg. Indian electronics assembly relies heavily on imported components, which restricts qualification under strict origin rules.
      The Fix: Negotiate cumulation provisions that count inputs sourced from other partner economies towards the value addition requirement.
    3. Logistics cost erodes the tariff advantage: Higher freight and dwell times offset the duty saved when the alternative market is farther away than the one being replaced. Eg. Container dwell time and inland haulage costs remain a recognised drag on the delivered price of Indian goods.
      The Fix: Sequence dedicated freight corridor and port connectivity completion against the entry into force dates of the trade agreements being signed.
    4. Concentration simply moves rather than disappears: Replacing dependence on one large market with dependence on one large agreement reproduces the same vulnerability under a different flag. Eg. The exposure being addressed here arose precisely because a single destination carried a disproportionate share of Indian exports.
      The Fix: Set a ceiling share for any single destination in the export promotion strategy, and target Africa, Latin America and West Asia alongside the European Union.

    Conclusion

    The finding that matters here is that the loss is a function of market concentration rather than of the tariff itself. That reframes the policy problem: the question is not how to make the tariff go away, but how to make the destination mix wide enough that a tariff in any one market cannot set the direction of the whole economy. Trade agreements deliver that only when the supply side can use them, which means testing and certification capacity, faster clearance, and movement up the goods quality ladder have to be built before the agreements enter into force rather than after. The measure of success is not the number of agreements signed but the share of exports the largest single destination accounts for.

    About India-United States Trade and Investment Ties

    1. Scale of the relationship: Bilateral trade between the two countries stood at $149.84 billion in 2025-26.
    2. India runs a surplus, and it is narrowing: India’s trade surplus with the United States narrowed to $34.4 billion in 2025-26 from $40.89 billion in the previous financial year.
    3. Investment flows both ways: The United States is the third largest investor in India, with cumulative foreign direct investment inflows of $70.65 billion between 2000 and 2025.
    4. Indian capital in the United States: About 163 Indian companies operating there have created over $40 billion in tangible investments.

    Challenges in India-United States Relations

    1. Preferential access has already been withdrawn once: Trade concessions granted unilaterally can be revoked without negotiation, which makes them an unreliable base for export planning. Eg. The United States revoked India’s benefits under the Generalized System of Preferences in 2019, citing a lack of equitable access.
      The Fix: Convert the interim trade arrangement into a binding bilateral trade agreement, so market access rests on treaty commitment rather than on unilateral grant.
    2. Digital and data rules pull in opposite directions: Indian data localisation requirements conflict with the operating models of United States technology firms. Eg. The Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 and its rules govern cross border transfer of personal data on terms those firms have contested.
      The Fix: Negotiate an adequacy style mutual recognition arrangement covering data transfer, so compliance is assessed once rather than jurisdiction by jurisdiction.
    3. Intellectual property standards remain contested: India is placed on the United States Priority Watch List for what is described as weak patent protection in pharmaceuticals. Eg. The dispute centres on Section 3(d) of the Patents Act, 1970, which bars patents on new forms of known substances without enhanced efficacy.
      The Fix: Run a standing bilateral working group on patent examination practice, so the disagreement is litigated technically rather than through annual watch list designations.
    4. Mobility restrictions hit India’s largest services export: Immigration and visa restrictions raise the cost of the delivery model on which Indian information technology services depend. Eg. A $100,000 fee on H-1B petitions materially changes the economics of onsite deployment.
      The Fix: Conclude a social security totalisation agreement and push services mobility commitments into the trade negotiation rather than treating them as an immigration matter.

    Back2Basics: Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974

    1. What it is: A provision of United States trade law that allows the United States Trade Representative to act against a foreign country’s acts, policies or practices that are found to be unjustifiable or unreasonable and to burden United States commerce.
    2. What action it permits: It authorises retaliatory measures, including additional duties on imports from the country concerned, without requiring a prior finding by any multilateral body.
    3. Why it is contentious: Unilateral retaliation under it sits uneasily with the World Trade Organization dispute settlement system, which requires disputes to be adjudicated before countermeasures are applied.
    4. How India has encountered it: India has been the subject of Section 301 action before, including the investigation into its equalisation levy on digital services.
  • China, US are in race to connect science with industry. India must catch up [Express]

    China, US are in race to connect science with industry. India must catch up [Express]

    Mentor Comment

    Beijing’s second World Humanoid Games has showcased a Chinese project to become the world’s leading science power, rooted in the Chinese President’s call to mobilise “new quality productive forces” released by the current revolutions in science and technology. The US administration has released Science: A New Golden Age, billed as the first major reset in US science policy since World War II, aimed at reintegrating discovery with production. Both powers are building an ecosystem that connects science with industry, from opposite starting points. India has launched missions on artificial intelligence (AI), semiconductor production and quantum technologies, but its private capital has retreated from science and its state-led scientific institutions remain unreformed.

    How are China and the United States racing toward the same goal from opposite directions?

    1. China’s break with the old growth model: The Chinese President holds that the next phase of growth cannot rely on cheap labour, large-scale manufacturing, infrastructure and capital accumulation, and must come from innovation.
    2. AI diffused across the physical economy: Beijing’s objective is to diffuse AI across robotics, machine tools, automobiles, biotechnology, materials, energy, agriculture and scientific research.
      • It bets that fusing digital intelligence with the world’s largest industrial ecosystem will make China the leading technological power.
    3. From adaptation to original discovery: For decades China absorbed foreign technology, improved it through manufacturing and dominated production. It now wants to move upstream to original discovery.
    4. China’s spending signal: China spent 2.8 per cent of GDP on research and development (R&D) in 2025, and its basic-research expenditure rose by 11 per cent.
    5. China’s four-step logic: AI accelerates discovery; discovery produces technology; technology transforms industry; industrial strength generates national power and a geopolitical edge.
    6. The US reset names its own weakness: Science: A New Golden Age, released in July, recognises American strengths in universities, laboratories, technology companies and capital markets. It acknowledges the erosion of the capacity to turn discoveries into production.
    7. How globalisation split US innovation from manufacturing: Companies designed at home, produced abroad and depended on long supply chains. That model generated wealth and also the vulnerabilities exposed by the pandemic, China’s rise and geopolitical rivalry.
    8. Mirror-image fears: China begins with the largest manufacturing base and moves upstream into science. The US begins with the strongest scientific system and moves downstream into manufacturing. China fears dependence on American technology; the US fears dependence on Chinese production.

    What does “connecting science with industry” actually mean in this contest?

    1. AI as an accelerator of knowledge, not a product: Washington and Beijing see AI not merely as a general-purpose technology but as an accelerator central to the production of new knowledge that in turn transforms industry.
    2. Discovery made continuous with manufacturing: By making discovery continuous with design and manufacturing, AI-driven science transforms production itself and converts scientific speed into economic power and geopolitical capability.
    3. The ecosystem, not the model, is the prize: The contest is not about who unveils the cleverest AI model or the most sophisticated humanoid. It is about building the most effective ecosystem connecting universities, laboratories, entrepreneurs, finance, energy, factories, supply chains and markets.

    Where does India stand as the race intensifies?

    1. Missions exist on paper: Delhi recognises the trend and has launched missions on AI, semiconductor production and quantum technologies, and has a draft robotics policy.
    2. The spending gap: The Economic Survey 2025-26 puts India’s R&D expenditure at 0.64 per cent of GDP, against about 2.8 per cent for China and 3.5 per cent for the US.
    3. The absolute gap is wider: The World Intellectual Property Organisation estimates India’s total R&D spend at $75 billion in purchasing-power-adjusted dollars, against $786 billion for China and $782 billion for the United States. In nominal dollar terms India looks even smaller.

    Why does the first weakness, the retreat of private capital from science, matter most?

    1. Ambition lives in government declarations: Ambition and imagination are concentrated in government declarations at a time when the private sector contributes more than ever to producing knowledge in the US and China.
    2. Indian capital has no science project: Indian capital rarely articulates a project for mastering the new forces of production or a new project for science and basic research.
    3. It was not always so: Jamsetji Tata helped create the Indian Institute of Science in 1909. The Kirloskars and other western Indian business families sent their children to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology from the 1920s, recognising that independent India’s future lay in mastering modern science.
    4. Private philanthropy built the strategic programmes: The Sir Dorabji Tata Trust supported Homi Bhabha in establishing the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research, which formed the nucleus of India’s atomic energy and space programmes. Indian capital has retreated from that tradition.

    Why does the second weakness, unreformed scientific institutions, compound the first?

    1. No overhaul in India’s reform era: China’s reform era, launched in the late 1970s under Deng Xiaoping, put the revitalisation of science and technology at the heart of the Four Modernisations. India’s reform era, beginning in the 1990s, produced no comparable overhaul.
    2. Same American training, different follow-through: India and China both benefited from access to American universities that trained their vast talent pools. China combined that opportunity with massive domestic investment in science and higher education and incentives for researchers to return.
    3. India does not draw talent back: India’s science sector fails to attract its trained talent home, and the shortfall is severe rather than marginal.

    Can “technological sovereignty” be built without global science?

    1. Bureaucratisation, then cultural nationalism: The Congress era saw the steady bureaucratisation of Indian science, and the BJP era is adding cultural nationalism to it.
    2. Mythology is not evidence: Civilisational pride cannot make mythology a substitute for evidence, experiment and scientific temper. India’s most confident claim should be that the greatest Indian contributions lie in the future, not that all modern science was discovered in its past.
    3. The cost of talking tall, once before: Delhi’s radical posturing on technological “self-reliance” in the 1970s and 1980s isolated India from global technological advances. Today there is grandiose talk of “technological sovereignty”.
    4. Two tracks at once: India must deepen cooperation with global science, capital, technology and talent, and at the same time build domestic research, industrial and institutional capacity. Neither track substitutes for the other.

    Challenges to India’s science-industry linkage

    1. Research sits outside the universities that supply the workforce: Most public research is done in mission agencies and Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) laboratories, so graduates and firms rarely meet discovery where it happens. Eg. The Defence Research and Development Organisation, the Indian Space Research Organisation, the Department of Atomic Energy and CSIR absorb the bulk of central research spending, and State universities receive a marginal share.
      The Fix: Route Anusandhan National Research Foundation grants preferentially to State universities with mandatory industry co-investment.
    2. Industry does not fund its own research: The private sector contributes 36 per cent of India’s gross R&D expenditure, against 77 per cent in China and 79 per cent in the US and Japan. Eg. The weighted tax deduction on in-house R&D under Section 35(2AB) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 was cut from 200 per cent to 100 per cent from 2020-21, removing the one fiscal incentive firms used.
      The Fix: Restore a weighted deduction tied to patents filed and products commercialised rather than to spending alone.
    3. Deep technology has no patient capital: Venture funds back consumer applications that return within five years, not fabs or materials that need fifteen. Eg. Micron’s assembly and test plant at Sanand, approved in 2023, needed roughly 70 per cent of its project cost as central and Gujarat subsidy before private capital moved.
      The Fix: Deploy the Research Development and Innovation scheme corpus as long tenure, low interest loans and fund-of-funds equity for private deep technology projects.
    4. Public procurement does not buy the first unit: Government buyers demand a track record, so an Indian prototype finds no first customer and licenses abroad. Eg. The United States’ Small Business Innovation Research programme reserves a fixed share of federal agency R&D budgets for small firms’ first contracts, and India has no equivalent set-aside.
      The Fix: Add a first-buyer set-aside in the General Financial Rules for Indian deep technology products validated by a designated national laboratory.

    Conclusion

    The contest India has to enter is an ecosystem contest, and an ecosystem cannot be declared into existence by a mission document. Two things remain unreconciled: a state-led science system that has never been restructured, and a private sector that has stopped funding discovery. Whether Indian capital returns to the tradition that built the Indian Institute of Science and the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research is the marker to watch, and the disbursal of the new research finance corpus to private laboratories is where it will first show.

    About India’s Research and Innovation Ecosystem

    1. What the ecosystem measures: Gross expenditure on R&D (GERD) counts spending by government, industry and higher education on basic research, applied research and experimental development.
    2. Who does the research: Central agencies dominate, with a small set of premier institutes such as the Indian Institutes of Technology, the Indian Institute of Science and the National Institute of Immunology providing the academic base.
    3. Global standing: India ranked 39th of 133 economies in the World Intellectual Property Organisation’s Global Innovation Index 2024, first among lower middle income economies.

    Laws and Rules Governing India’s Research and Innovation Ecosystem

    1. Anusandhan National Research Foundation Act, 2023: Creates an apex body to seed, grow and promote research in universities and laboratories, with a planned Rs 50,000 crore over 2023-28 of which Rs 36,000 crore is to come from non-government sources.
    2. The Act repealed the Science and Engineering Research Board Act, 2008 and subsumed that board into the new foundation.
    3. Patents Act, 1970: Governs the grant and enforcement of patents; the 2005 amendment introduced product patents in pharmaceuticals, chemicals and food to comply with the World Trade Organisation’s TRIPS agreement.

    Government Initiatives for India’s Research and Innovation Ecosystem

    1. Research Development and Innovation scheme: Approved by the Union Cabinet in July 2025 with a Rs 1 lakh crore corpus to finance private sector research in sunrise sectors through long tenure, low or nil interest loans and equity.
    2. IndiaAI Mission: Launched in 2024 by the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology, anchored in shared compute of 38,000-plus GPUs, the AI Kosh open dataset platform, and 570 FutureSkills and AI Labs in Tier 2 and Tier 3 cities.
    3. National Quantum Mission: Launched in April 2023 with an outlay of Rs 6,003 crore for 2023-31, building four Thematic Quantum Technology Hubs in computing, communication, sensing and metrology, and materials and devices.
    4. India Semiconductor Mission: Approved in December 2021 with a Rs 76,000 crore outlay to subsidise fabrication, display and assembly plants and to fund chip design startups.
    5. VAIBHAV Fellowship: Launched in 2023 by the Department of Science and Technology to bring diaspora scientists to Indian institutions for collaborative research stints.

    Key Facts about India’s Research and Innovation Ecosystem

    1. National Science Day, 28 February: Marks the announcement of the Raman effect in 1928.
    2. National Technology Day, 11 May: Marks the Pokhran-II nuclear tests of 1998 and the first flight of the indigenous Hansa aircraft the same day.

    Back2Basics

    1. What they were: China’s programme to modernise agriculture, industry, national defence, and science and technology.
    2. When adopted: First articulated by Premier Zhou Enlai in 1963 and again in 1975, and made the centrepiece of the reform era at the Third Plenum of December 1978.
    3. Why science was listed: Science and technology was named as the modernisation that enabled the other three, which is why the reform era began by rehabilitating scientists and reopening universities to competitive entrance examinations.

    [2019, GS3, 10 marks] How was India benefited from the contributions of Sir M.Visvesvaraya and Dr. M. S. Swaminathan in the fields of water engineering and agricultural science respectively?”

  • [2nd September 2026] The Hindu OpED: The two balance sheets behind every e-waste decision

    [2nd September 2026] The Hindu OpED: The two balance sheets behind every e-waste decision

    Question (2018): “What are the impediments in disposing the huge quantities of discarded solid wastes which are continuously being generated? How do we remove safely the toxic wastes that have been accumulating in our habitable environment?
    Linkage: Discarded computers, servers, and networking systems are a rapidly growing source of toxic and solid electronic waste. This question directly addresses the core administrative and logistical bottlenecks that prevent advanced recycling from becoming the default choice in India.

    Mentor Comment

    Governments and companies replace thousands of computers, servers, networking devices and storage systems every few years, and this discarded equipment holds copper, aluminium, gold, silver, palladium and critical minerals. Advanced recycling of such equipment has still not become the default choice in India. The reason is that procurement in both the public and private sectors rewards the lowest visible cost at the point of disposal. Every disposal decision creates two balance sheets, one financial and closed with the transaction, the other strategic and open long after it. The lowest-price principle that secures transparency and fiscal discipline in public procurement now sits in tension with the lifetime cost of decisions in electronics, batteries and renewable energy.

    What is urban mining?

    1. Definition: Urban mining is the recovery of valuable materials from products that have already served their purpose, in place of extracting fresh ore from the earth.
    2. The ore body: Discarded IT equipment is among the largest untapped sources of strategic raw materials as economies digitise, and it is hazardous waste when poorly handled.
    3. What safe recovery needs: Sophisticated technology, secure data destruction, environmentally compliant processing and traceable supply chains, with collection and segregation adding to the cost.

    Why has advanced recycling not become the default choice in India?

    1. Procurement rewards the lowest visible cost: Public and private buyers maximise resale value and minimise processing cost when they dispose of equipment.
    2. Strategic value stays off the invoice: Recovery of critical minerals, secure data destruction, environmental benefit and domestic industrial capability rarely appear in the price that decides the contract.
    3. The gains accrue to others: Less virgin mining, stronger domestic supplies of critical materials, lower import dependence and responsible handling of hazardous components are benefits the disposing organisation does not book.

    What are the two balance sheets every disposal decision creates?

    1. The first, financial and immediate: Purchase price, resale value and savings achieved, all measurable, auditable and reflected in annual budgets.
    2. The second, strategic and open ended: It stays open long after the transaction and records resource security, environmental sustainability, industrial capability, supply-chain resilience, public health and national competitiveness.
    3. Good governance manages both: Some investments look expensive at first and later transform economies. Eg. Fifteen years ago solar power struggled to compete with conventional electricity on cost and governments that invested early were criticised for paying too much. Scale and learning have since made solar one of the world’s cheapest sources of electricity, and countries that built manufacturing capacity early hold advantages a cost comparison could not have predicted.

    How do the costs left off the invoice return later?

    1. Recovery priced against disposal: Investment in urban mining infrastructure looks expensive when judged only against the cost of disposing of a computer. The calculation changes when recovered materials, avoided imports, environmental safeguards, data security and future industrial capability are counted together.
    2. Pollution becomes health-care expenditure: The public health cost of unsafe processing lands on the exchequer years after the disposal saving was booked.
    3. Resource depletion becomes import dependence: Metals not recovered at home are bought abroad, raising manufacturing costs.
    4. Weak domestic capability becomes strategic vulnerability: An economy without recovery capacity depends on others for the materials its industry runs on.
    5. Environmental costs turn economic: Governments spend more on remediation, businesses face higher compliance costs and citizens pay through taxes and lost productivity. The costs are delayed or redistributed and rarely avoided.

    What should an organisation ask before selecting a recycler?

    1. Secure data destruction: Whether sensitive data on the equipment is securely destroyed before any material moves.
    2. Refurbishment before recycling: Whether working equipment is refurbished for reuse before it is broken down for materials.
    3. Efficient and transparent mineral recovery: Whether critical minerals are recovered efficiently and the recovery is traceable.
    4. The cost of skipping the questions: A marginal gain today becomes tomorrow’s cybersecurity risk, import dependence, reputational damage and permanent loss of strategic resources.

    Can the lowest-price principle survive in sectors where acquisition cost is not lifetime cost?

    1. What the principle protects: Governments have relied on the lowest-price rule to ensure transparency and fiscal discipline in public spending.
    2. Where it fails: Renewable energy systems, batteries, electronics and advanced manufacturing are sectors where the lowest acquisition cost is rarely the lowest lifetime cost.
    3. The alternative many countries have adopted: Life-cycle costing (pricing an option across purchase, operation, disposal and recovery rather than at purchase alone) and value-based procurement ask which option delivers the greatest long-term public value. Procurement then becomes a tool of industrial policy that shapes which technologies scale and which capabilities are built.
    4. The same logic in compliance markets: Judging Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR, the obligation on a producer to finance the collection and recycling of the products it sells) compliance on the cheapest available certificate rewards the lowest-cost provider over the highest-quality outcome. Rewarding traceability, recovery efficiency and technological capability would instead draw investment into advanced recycling and strengthen India’s domestic supply of critical minerals.

    Challenges to urban mining of e-waste in India

    1. Fake certificates break traceability: An EPR certificate market cannot reward quality when the certificates themselves are unverified. Eg. The Central Pollution Control Board (CPCB) found over 600,000 fake recycling certificates in 2023 across Gujarat, Maharashtra, Karnataka.
      The Fix: Digitise certificate tracking against audited mass balance at each registered recycler, with cancellation of registration for a fake certificate.
    2. A floor price too low to sustain formal recycling: EPR pricing set below the cost of compliant recovery pushes material to informal and fraudulent channels. Eg. In April 2025 Daikin, Hitachi and Samsung sued the government opposing the mandated minimum recycler price.
      The Fix: Index the floor price to the audited cost of compliant recovery and revise it annually through a published formula.
    3. Inefficient recovery loses the minerals the policy exists to secure: Crude recycling wastes lithium, cobalt, nickel, copper, gold and silver. Eg. Improper battery handling alone could cost India over USD 1 billion in foreign exchange by 2030.
      The Fix: Fund research in advanced shredding, bioleaching and non-thermal recovery and tie EPR credit to recovery efficiency rather than to tonnage collected.
    4. No domestic refining of precious metals: Indian recyclers dismantle equipment and export the printed circuit boards, so the highest-value step happens abroad. Eg. Circuit boards from Indian dismantlers are shipped to integrated smelters in Belgium, Japan and South Korea for gold and palladium refining.
      The Fix: Mandate a minimum domestic refining share within EPR targets and treat integrated refining as eligible infrastructure under the critical mineral recycling incentive.

    Conclusion

    India’s discarded IT equipment will become either a strategic reserve or an environmental liability, and the deciding instrument is the procurement rule rather than the recycling technology. The reform that follows is to score public disposal tenders on lifetime value. That means amending the General Financial Rules, 2017, the rules for central procurement, so that a tender can weigh quality of recovery against the immediate price. The unresolved question is who pays: the buyer who funds advanced recycling is not the one who gains from resource security, and no mechanism yet closes that gap.

    E-Waste Management in India

    1. Scale: As per the CPCB, India generated 14,14,645 metric tonnes (about 1.41 million tonnes) of e-waste in 2025-26 till March 2026, of which 9,79,080 metric tonnes (about 0.98 million tonnes) was recycled.
    2. Global standing and growth: India is the third largest generator behind China and the United States. Volumes surged over 150 percent in six years from 0.71 million tonnes in 2017-18 and are projected to nearly double by 2030.
    3. Formal capacity: 386 registered recyclers across 19 States and Union Territories offer a capacity of about 34.66 lakh metric tonnes per annum.
    4. Concentration: Just 65 cities generate over 60 percent of total e-waste, and 10 States account for around 70 percent.

    Laws and Rules Governing E-Waste Management

    1. Environment (Protection) Act, 1986: The parent statute under which every set of e-waste rules is notified.
    2. E-Waste (Management) Rules, 2016: Introduced the Producer Responsibility Organisation (PRO) concept.
    3. E-Waste (Management) Rules, 2022: Make EPR the core engine, mandate registration of all producers, refurbishers and recyclers on the CPCB portal, and expand coverage from 21 to 106 electrical and electronic equipment items.
    4. E-Waste (Management) Second Amendment Rules, 2023: Added provisions for safe, sustainable refrigerant management in refrigeration and air-conditioning manufacturing.
    5. E-Waste (Management) Amendment Rules, 2024: Enabled CPCB supervised platforms for trading EPR certificates, priced between 30 percent and 100 percent of the environmental compensation for non-compliance.
    6. Hazardous and Other Wastes (Management and Transboundary Movement) Amendment Rules, 2025: Introduced an EPR framework for non-ferrous metal scrap, with targets rising from 10 percent in 2026-27 to 75 percent in 2032-33.
    7. Basel Convention, 1989: India is a signatory to this treaty limiting the transboundary movement of hazardous waste, including e-waste.

    Challenges in E-Waste Management

    1. Informal-sector dominance: Over 50 percent of e-waste is handled informally through open-air burning and acid leaching, exposing workers and residents to respiratory illness, neurological damage and DNA damage. Eg. Acid leaching of circuit boards in Moradabad releases toxic slurry into the Ramganga and local groundwater.
      The Fix: Train waste-pickers as certified green collar technicians with protective gear, certification and links to healthcare, insurance and pensions.
    2. Illegal imports: Developed nations export e-waste to India under cover of used goods. Eg. 29 illegal-import instances were identified during 2019-22 across Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra, Gujarat, West Bengal and Uttar Pradesh.
      The Fix: Pre-shipment inspection of used electronics consignments at ports under the Basel Convention notification procedure.
    3. Low awareness in the trade itself: The people who handle discarded electronics first do not know the rules. Eg. A 2021 Delhi study found 70 percent of repair workers and 79 percent of scrap dealers unaware of e-waste rules.
      The Fix: Run registration and awareness campaigns through resident welfare associations and self-help groups linked to registered collection points.
    4. Uneven infrastructure: Recycling capacity and expertise are concentrated in a few States. Eg. Telangana has built formal capacity, and Chandigarh lacks formal facilities.
      The Fix: Set up decentralised recycling hubs in every State with a collection target tied to the State’s generation share.
  • Step up regulation

    Step up regulation

    Question (2024, GS2 – 15 Marks): “In a crucial domain like the public healthcare system, the Indian State should play a vital role to contain the adverse impact of marketisation of the system. Suggest some measures through which the State can enhance the reach of public healthcare at the grassroots level.”
    Linkage: The fact that non-government institutions account for 85–86% of AYUSH colleges is a stark example of the “marketisation” of healthcare education. The incentive of private players to “maximise student intake without matching increases in faculty and laboratory infrastructure” illustrates the precise “adverse impacts” of market-led growth that the state must step in to regulate.

    Mentor Comment

    Non-government institutions accounted for 86 per cent of Ayurveda colleges and 85 per cent of homoeopathy colleges in 2024, according to government data. Permitted seats rose by 43 per cent and total admission capacity by 25 per cent between 2021 and 2024. The Centre’s AYURGYAN allocation for AYUSH education, training, research, innovation and capacity building increased nearly sixfold over the same period, AYUSH being the group of systems covering Ayurveda, Yoga and Naturopathy, Unani, Siddha and Homoeopathy. Through that expansion the sector’s regulators have been denying permissions and grading colleges poorly. The tension is that private led growth carries an incentive to maximise student intake without matching increases in faculty and laboratory infrastructure, and the regulatory answer to it arrives one inspection at a time.

    How fast has AYUSH education expanded, and who is running it?

    1. The private sector runs the great majority of colleges: Non-government institutions accounted for 86 per cent of Ayurveda and 85 per cent of homoeopathy colleges in 2024.
    2. Seats grew faster than institutions: Permitted seats rose by 43 per cent and total admission capacity by 25 per cent between 2021 and 2024.
    3. Public funding rose alongside private capacity: The AYURGYAN allocation increased nearly sixfold over the same period.
    4. The private sector is leading the build out: The expansion of AYUSH medical education infrastructure is being driven by non-government institutions rather than by State run colleges.

    Why do the quality questions differ from those in allopathic education?

    1. The allopathic concern is narrower: Debate there has been confined to whether institutions adequately prepare students for evidence-based practice.
    2. AYUSH raises two questions at once: The first is the quality of training delivered, and the second is what students are being trained to practise.
    3. The evidence base is itself in question: Tougher quality control does not settle the separate question of the evidence backing AYUSH medicinal systems.

    Do the quality problems predate the current expansion?

    1. A 2005 audit found widespread deficiencies: The Comptroller and Auditor General found insufficient hospital beds, outpatient services or staff to be widespread among homoeopathy colleges.
    2. Bed occupancy ranged from 1 per cent to 71 per cent: The same audit recorded that spread across the colleges it examined.
    3. Faculty shortfalls exceeded half the requirement: A 2020 article in the Journal of Ayurveda and Integrative Medicine reported that many institutions fell short by more than 50 per cent of the teaching staff required by the standards then in force.

    What are the regulators finding now?

    1. The Ayurveda regulator has denied 17 permissions: As of 21 August the National Commission for Indian System of Medicine (NCISM) had listed 17 Ayurveda colleges, all private, whose permissions it had denied.
    2. Several denials were for obstructing the process itself: The stated reason in several cases was non-compliance with the inspection process.
    3. The homoeopathy regulator graded 41 per cent of colleges lowest: The National Commission for Homoeopathy placed that share at the bottom grade, including nearly half of all private institutions.
    4. The recorded failures are specific and repeated: They include inadequate or disputed faculty strength, failures in inspection requirements and student intake numbers, and allegations of fictitious faculty.

    What incentive does private led expansion create?

    1. Intake is the revenue lever: Expansion led by private institutions is accompanied by an incentive to maximise student intake while holding faculty size and laboratory infrastructure at existing levels.
    2. A court has recorded the practice: The Karnataka High Court in Hillside Ayurveda Medical College (2023) acknowledged that educational institutions are often guilty of admitting excess students for financial gains.
    3. The regulatory response is retrospective: Permission withheld after an inspection corrects a college that has already been built and has already admitted students.
    4. Causation is not yet established: It is premature to infer that the rapid expansion has amplified these problems, and the persistent non-compliance is established on its own.

    Challenges to regulating AYUSH medical education

    1. Faculty can be produced on paper: A college can satisfy a faculty norm on inspection day by listing teachers who do not actually teach there. Eg. Aadhaar linked biometric attendance was introduced in allopathic medical colleges precisely because faculty were being shown only for inspections.
      The Fix: Extend biometric and payroll linked faculty verification to every AYUSH college and publish the verified roll monthly.
    2. Approval and assessment sit with the same body: A regulator that grants permission to a college also rates it, so a poor rating is a verdict on its own earlier approval. Eg. Allopathic regulation separated the two, creating a distinct Medical Assessment and Rating Board under the National Medical Commission.
      The Fix: Split permission and rating into separate boards with published criteria, on the model already used in allopathic regulation.
    3. Seats are cheaper to add than laboratories: Where fees are capped, a college raises revenue by raising intake rather than by improving what it teaches with. Eg. Private professional education in India has produced capitation fee litigation running from T.M.A. Pai Foundation (2002) onward.
      The Fix: Link seat sanction to an audited per student cost of teaching and clinical infrastructure rather than to floor space and declared faculty strength.
    4. Clinical exposure is measured by beds, not patients: An attached hospital can meet a bed norm without meeting an occupancy norm, so a student can qualify with very little clinical contact. Eg. Minimum standard requirements for AYUSH colleges specify bed numbers, which a college can satisfy with wards that stay largely empty.
      The Fix: Make verified average bed occupancy and outpatient footfall a condition of annual permission renewal.
    5. Efficacy sits outside the regulator’s remit: A regulator can enforce faculty and infrastructure norms without settling whether the therapy being taught works. Eg. Research on Ayurvedic medicine is largely funded and evaluated by the Central Council for Research in Ayurvedic Sciences, a body under the same ministry that promotes the system.
      The Fix: Route efficacy trials for AYUSH therapies through independently assessed, pre-registered protocols outside the promoting ministry.

    Conclusion

    AYUSH education can expand meaningfully only when capacity growth is matched by quality assurance. Stronger faculty verification, independent assessment, outcome based accreditation and evidence based research can ensure that expansion delivers credible, high quality healthcare education.

    Back2Basics: National Commission for Indian System of Medicine

    1. Governing Act: Established under the National Commission for Indian System of Medicine Act, 2020 as the statutory regulator for Indian systems of medicine.
    2. Predecessor: It replaced the Central Council of Indian Medicine, which had regulated the sector since 1970.
    3. Jurisdiction: It covers education and practice in Ayurveda, Unani, Siddha and Sowa-Rigpa.
    4. Structure: It works through autonomous boards handling education standards, assessment and rating of institutions, and ethics and registration of practitioners.