Mentor’s Comment:  India’s Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) project is moving ahead quickly and is seen as a big step forward for the country’s aerospace sector. However, the excitement is being held back by a long-standing reliance on foreign engines. This same problem had earlier affected the HF-24 Marut and is now also troubling the LCA and AMCA fighter jet programs. Even after years of work and investment — including the unsuccessful Kaveri engine project and delays in getting engines from GE — India still depends heavily on other countries for engine technology. This not only affects military preparedness but also raises serious concerns about India’s ability to act independently in defence matters.

Today’s editorial analyses the development of Indian fighter aircraft engines. This content would help in GS Paper II (International Relations) and GS Paper III (Science & Technology) in the mains Paper.

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Why in the News?

Recently, there is growing excitement around India’s AMCA stealth fighter, seen as a major aerospace milestone. However, concerns remain due to a long-standing reliance on imported engines since the HF-24 Marut.

Why has India failed to develop its own jet engine? 

• Technological Challenges in Engine Design: Jet engines require high thrust-to-weight ratios, thermal stability, and advanced metallurgy, which India has struggled to achieve. Eg: The Kaveri GTX-35VS engine, under development since 1989 by DRDO-GTRE, failed to meet performance benchmarks in thrust and thermal management even after 3,000 hours of testing.

• Lack of Core Materials and Manufacturing Capability: India lacks access to critical technologies like single-crystal turbine blades, thermal barrier coatings, and advanced cooling systems, essential for high-performance engines. Eg: Negotiations with GE for F414 engine hit a roadblock because GE refused full transfer of these core technologies despite India’s demand.

• Fragmented and Short-Term Funding: Defence R&D funding in India is project-specific and often lacks a long-term strategic vision, affecting continuity and innovation in complex projects. Eg: Despite spending over ₹2,032 crore on the Kaveri project over 35 years, no operational engine was produced due to inconsistent support and shifting goals.

• Over-Reliance on Foreign Engines: Dependence on foreign suppliers has created a complacency in indigenous R&D, slowing domestic capability-building. Eg: India continues to rely on GE F404 and F414 engines for its LCA Tejas variants, instead of pursuing an urgent push for domestic alternatives.

• Institutional Inertia and Missed International Collaborations: Bureaucratic rigidity and institutional pride have caused India to reject key collaborative opportunities for engine co-development. Eg: A proposed joint project with Safran (France) for developing an engine for AMCA and Tejas MkII was reportedly declined by DRDO.

What caused the HF-24 Marut’s underperformance?

• Underpowered Engine: The Marut was equipped with British Bristol Siddeley Orpheus 703 turbojets, which lacked the thrust needed for supersonic performance. Eg: Designer Kurt Tank had envisioned a more powerful engine, but it never materialised, severely restricting the aircraft’s speed and payload capabilities.

• Failure to Acquire Suitable Alternatives: Despite multiple attempts, India could not procure or co-develop a more suitable engine to enhance the Marut’s performance. Eg: Efforts to source a better engine from Egypt and Germany failed, leaving the Marut stuck with the underpowered Orpheus units.

• Operational Limitations in Combat: The aircraft performed well in ground-attack roles, such as in the 1971 war, but its overall combat effectivenesswas limited by its propulsion shortfall. Eg: Indian Air Force veterans cited that the engine limitation was the Marut’s Achilles’ heel, preventing it from evolving into a full-spectrum fighter.

How does engine import dependency impact India’s defence?

• Delays in Defence Production and Induction: Dependency on foreign engines leads to project delays when there are supply chain issues or export restrictions. Eg: Delivery of 99 General Electric F404 engines for the LCA Mk1A was delayed by 13 months, pushing back aircraft induction timelines.

• Limited Operational and Strategic Autonomy: India becomes vulnerable to geopolitical pressures and foreign policy decisions of engine-supplying nations. Eg: U.S. reluctance to share core technologies like single-crystal turbine blades restricts India’s ability to upgrade or export its fighter aircraft.

• Constraints on Defence Exports: Exporting platforms equipped with foreign engines requires third-party approvals, limiting India’s potential in global defence markets. Eg: India’s ability to export Tejas is restricted by U.S. controls on the GE F404 engine, limiting defence diplomacy options.

What must India do to achieve propulsion self-reliance? (Way forward)

• Establish Strategic Global Partnerships for Technology Transfer: India must engage in joint ventures with trusted international engine manufacturers to acquire critical technologies like single-crystal turbine blades and thermal barrier coatings. Eg: The proposed GE-HAL deal to manufacture the F414 engines in India should ensure full transfer of know-how to avoid long-term dependency.
• Develop an Integrated Indigenous R&D Ecosystem: India needs to create a cohesive framework connecting DRDO, GTRE, academia, and private industry to focus on advanced propulsion R&D with long-term investment. Eg: Encouraging private sector participation in defence through the Innovations for Defence Excellence (iDEX)platform can accelerate jet engine innovation.

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