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  • Centre-state compromise on mines, minerals is in tatters

    Centre-state compromise on mines, minerals is in tatters

    Why in the News

    An opinion piece argues that the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Act, 2026 (MMDR Amendment Act) has centralised mineral taxation authority at the expense of States. This disturbs a long standing settlement, dating to the original Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957, under which States collected royalty on minerals within their territory without a corresponding compensation mechanism now built in. The piece contends this follows a pattern already seen in the Goods and Services Tax (GST) Council, where States have progressively lost autonomous taxation power to a Union-dominated body. The tension is between the Union’s claim that uniform mineral taxation supports national resource planning, and States’ claim that this erodes a revenue base the Seventh Schedule recognises as theirs.

    What changed under the amendment?

    1. Centralised rate-setting power: The amendment shifts the power to determine certain mineral levies and cesses from State legislatures to the Union government, narrowing what States can independently tax.
    2. Erosion of a settled compromise: Mineral royalty had functioned as a relatively stable, State-collected revenue source since the 1957 Act. The amendment disturbs that settlement without a corresponding compensation mechanism.

    Why is this compared to the GST Council experience?

    1. Repeated pattern of centralisation: The piece argues that the GST Council, though structured as a joint Centre-State body, has in practice let Union preferences dominate rate decisions, and that the same dynamic is now repeating in mineral taxation.
    2. States left to negotiate after the fact: Under both regimes, States raise objections after a rate or rule is set centrally, rather than co-designing the rule up front.

    Current Status of Fiscal Federalism in India

    1. The Union controls the most buoyant tax sources, income tax, corporate tax and the dominant share of the GST base, while States carry larger expenditure responsibilities in health, education and welfare, producing a standing vertical fiscal imbalance.
    2. Devolution to States is currently governed by the 16th Finance Commission’s award, which fixed the States’ share of the divisible pool at 41 percent.
    3. Mineral royalty and cesses have historically sat with States as an independent, non-shared revenue source, which is the specific arrangement this amendment narrows.

    Constitutional Provisions Related to Fiscal Federalism

    1. Article 246 and the Seventh Schedule: Distribute taxation and legislative subjects between the Union, State and Concurrent Lists, and mineral development is a subject that straddles Union and State competence under Entry 54 of the Union List and Entry 23 of the State List.
    2. Article 280: Establishes the Finance Commission to recommend the distribution of net tax proceeds between the Union and the States.
    3. Article 246A and Article 279A: Together create the GST regime and the GST Council as the joint body that recommends GST rates and administration.
    4. Article 293: Governs the Union’s control over State borrowing where a State remains indebted to the Union.

    Major debates surrounding Fiscal Federalism

    1. Divisible pool erosion through cesses and surcharges: Revenue the Union raises as a cess or surcharge does not enter the divisible pool the Finance Commission distributes, so a nominal 41 percent devolution understates the Union’s discretionary control over shared revenue.
    2. State taxation autonomy under GST: States gave up the power to independently tax goods and services on joining GST, leaving royalty and mineral levies among the few remaining independent State taxation instruments, which is precisely what this amendment now narrows.
    3. Weak third-tier finances: Local bodies devolved under the 73rd and 74th Amendments remain financially dependent on State and Union transfers, compounding the same imbalance one tier further down.

    Challenges in Fiscal Federalism

    1. No binding consultation requirement before a rate change: Neither the GST Council’s structure nor the MMDR Act requires the Union to secure State consent before altering a shared levy, only consultation. Eg. The GST Council’s voting structure gives the Union a one-third weightage sufficient to block any change it opposes. Fix. Amend Article 279A to require a demonstrated State revenue-neutral transition before a Council decision that narrows State taxation power takes effect.
    2. No compensation mechanism for a narrowed State tax base: Unlike the GST transition, which carried a five-year compensation guarantee for States, the MMDR Amendment Act, 2026 carries no equivalent revenue protection for States losing mineral levy autonomy. Eg. The GST Compensation Cess mechanism lapsed in 2022, and States have separately argued its withdrawal alone widened the same imbalance this amendment now adds to. Fix. Extend a time-bound compensation formula, indexed to each State’s historical mineral revenue, for a fixed transition period.

    Government Initiatives for Fiscal Federalism

    1. Finance Commission: A constitutional body appointed every five years to recommend Union-State and inter-State devolution of tax proceeds and grants-in-aid.
    2. GST Council: The joint Union-State body under Article 279A that recommends GST rates, exemptions and administrative rules.
    3. District Mineral Foundation: A statutory trust under the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 that channels a share of mineral royalty into welfare of mining-affected areas, funded from the same royalty base this dispute concerns.

    Back2Basics: Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957

    1. The Act is the principal central law governing mineral concessions and mineral development in India, most recently amended in 2026.
    2. It empowers the Union to prescribe rates of royalty and dead rent on minerals, which States then collect.
    3. A 2015 amendment introduced auction as the mandatory mode of allocating mineral concessions, replacing the earlier discretionary allotment system.

    Conclusion

    The mineral taxation dispute is presented as further evidence that fiscal federalism in India increasingly follows a pattern of after-the-fact State objection to Union-set rules, rather than genuine ex ante bargaining. What remains unresolved is whether States will pursue a legal challenge or extract a compensation formula through political negotiation.

    “[2025, GS2, 15 marks] Examine the evolving pattern of Centre-State financial relations in the context of planned development in India. How far have the recent reforms impacted the fiscal federalism in India?”

  • India, China to advance boundary talks for ‘early harvest’, set up new LAC meeting points, hotlines

    India, China to advance boundary talks for ‘early harvest’, set up new LAC meeting points, hotlines

    Why in the News

    India and China have agreed to advance work on delimiting the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and to create new mechanisms for managing the border. The two sides reached this outcome at the conclusion of the 25th round of Special Representative (SR) talks, the designated channel between India’s National Security Adviser and China’s Foreign Minister for discussing a political framework for a boundary settlement. The talks follow the restoration of high level border diplomacy after the 2020 Galwan standoff, which had frozen the SR mechanism for several years. Eight outcome points have been agreed, including new military hotlines and meeting points, an expert mechanism on trans-border rivers, and a push toward “early harvest” delimitation in less disputed sectors, even as neither government has published a public roadmap for how full delimitation will proceed.

    What did the two sides actually agree to?

    1. New military hotlines and meeting points: The two sides will add direct communication lines and physical meeting points along the LAC to reduce the risk of miscalculation during patrols. Eg. Existing hotlines were credited with de-escalating stand-offs after 2020, and the new points extend coverage to previously uncovered stretches.
    2. Boundary delimitation working groups: Both sides will set up dedicated groups to work toward an “early harvest” agreement on sectors where the alignment is least contested, rather than attempting a single comprehensive settlement.
    3. Trans-border river mechanism: A joint expert mechanism will meet to share hydrological data on rivers that cross the border. This addresses a long standing Indian concern about upstream Chinese dam activity.

    Why does the lack of a public roadmap matter?

    1. Transparency gap: Neither government has released the substance of what an “early harvest” delimitation would cover or which sectors are prioritised. Parliament and citizens have no way to assess the trade-offs being discussed.
    2. Precedent for slippage: Past India-China dialogue mechanisms, including the Special Representative talks themselves, have lapsed for years after an initial burst of activity. An outcome document alone does not guarantee follow-through.

    Conclusion

    The 25th round of Special Representative talks has produced the most concrete institutional steps on the India-China boundary since the Galwan standoff, but a working roadmap for actual delimitation remains undisclosed. The next milestone is the first meeting of the delimitation working groups and whether the trans-border river mechanism produces a data-sharing protocol.

    Back2Basics: Line of Actual Control (LAC)

    1. The LAC is the de facto boundary separating Indian and Chinese controlled territory, distinct from an internationally recognised border.
    2. It is not a single demarcated line. Both sides hold differing perceptions of its alignment in several sectors, including eastern Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh.
    3. The Special Representatives mechanism, established in 2003, is the designated channel for discussing a political framework for a boundary settlement.

    “[2026] The Chancellor of Germany visited India in January 2026. Which of the following is/are NOT correct in terms of outcomes?
    1. MoU between All India Institute of Ayurveda and University of Hamburg
    2. MoU on Youth Hockey Development between Hockey India and German Hockey Federation
    3. Establishment of a bilateral dialogue mechanism on the Indo-Pacific
    4. Opening of an Honorary Consul of Germany in Lucknow
    (a) 2 and 3 (b) 1 and 4 (c) 3 and 4 (d) 1 only

  • UN panel flags ‘human rights violations’ in India, urges Delhi to suspend, review NRC

    UN panel flags ‘human rights violations’ in India, urges Delhi to suspend, review NRC

    Why in the News

    The UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) has released concluding observations, following its eleventh periodic review of India on August 11-12, criticising the implementation of the National Register of Citizens (NRC) in Assam and calling for its suspension. This is a One development, one row item; The Hindu and The Indian Express both carried the Committee’s findings, and this entry is filed from the Indian Express account, which reports the call to suspend the NRC and the Committee’s specific concern about the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) process, in more detail.

    What did the Committee find, and what did it call on India to do?

    1. The Committee criticised the NRC’s implementation in Assam: It found that the process subjected Bengali-speaking Muslims to what it described as “systematic and structural racial discrimination,” and called for the NRC to be suspended and India’s legislative framework around it to be reviewed.
    2. The Special Intensive Revision process was separately flagged: The Committee raised concern that Bengali-speaking Muslim voters were reportedly disproportionately affected by the Election Commission’s SIR process in West Bengal and Assam.
    3. The Committee’s concern extends to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, and Rohingya refugees: It said it was “gravely concerned” about reports of large-scale violations by law enforcement officials against ethnic and ethno-religious groups, including Scheduled Tribes, Scheduled Castes (particularly Dalits), and non-citizens, and cited allegations of racially motivated violence, excessive use of force, extrajudicial killings, arbitrary detention, torture and sexual violence.
    4. It called for accountability, not merely acknowledgement: The Committee asked India to conduct prompt, thorough and impartial investigations into these allegations and ensure accountability for those responsible, and to urgently address hate speech and hate crimes against Rohingya, Bengali-speaking Muslims, migrants and asylum-seekers.
    5. India’s response came through its review delegation: India sent the Solicitor-General as head of delegation for the underlying periodic review held on August 11-12, ahead of these concluding observations.

    Conclusion

    CERD’s concluding observations place NRC suspension, a review of the associated legislative framework, and law enforcement accountability toward Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Rohingya refugees on record as a formal treaty-body finding against India, made under the same UN human rights review process, rather than as commentary on a single incident, with India’s substantive reply yet to be reported.

    Back2Basics

    1. UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD): The treaty body of independent experts that monitors States parties’ implementation of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), which India ratified in 1968, through periodic reviews and concluding observations.
    2. National Register of Citizens (NRC), Assam: A register, first prepared in 1951 and updated under Supreme Court supervision, intended to identify genuine Indian citizens in Assam by excluding illegal migrants, particularly in the context of the Assam Accord (1985).
  • Fair pricing could help sustain UPI network

    Fair pricing could help sustain UPI network

    Why in the News

    The op-ed, by a NITI Aayog consultant, argues that the zero-Merchant Discount Rate (MDR) regime underpinning Unified Payments Interface (UPI)‘s free-to-use model is financially unsustainable, and proposes a differentiated pricing structure as the Department of Financial Services examines whether to restore MDR for high-threshold transactions or merchants. The piece is pegged to a Parliamentary Standing Committee on Finance report tabled this month, which cited an industry estimate of about Rs 20,700 crore in annual UPI operating costs against a Rs 2,000 crore government allocation under the zero-MDR regime.

    What is the fiscal problem with UPI’s current pricing model, and what does the op-ed propose?

    1. The cost-subsidy gap is large and quantified: The Parliamentary Standing Committee on Finance’s report cited industry estimates of roughly Rs 20,700 crore in annual UPI operating costs, against a government allocation of only Rs 2,000 crore under the zero-MDR regime, with banks and payment companies absorbing the balance.
    2. Two restructuring options are formally under examination: The Department of Financial Services is examining restoring MDR for certain high-threshold transactions or merchants, and separately, phasing out government support through a tiered incentive structure.
    3. The op-ed’s proposed principle is differentiated, not uniform, pricing: It argues for keeping UPI free for consumers and small merchants while allowing a capped MDR for larger commercial users and higher-value transactions, on the basis that a uniform rate would be negligible for a large retailer but consequential for a street vendor.
    4. The author’s own research links merchant ecosystem formalisation to UPI adoption: Citing research with Sharon Buteau, the op-ed states that more formalised merchant ecosystems are associated with higher UPI use, and that MDR design should be calibrated to where acceptance networks are still developing rather than applied uniformly.
    5. Aggregated payment data is proposed as a second, non-MDR revenue and policy tool: The op-ed cites PhonePe’s PulsePro and a recent MoU with the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MeitY) to integrate UPI transaction metrics into PM GatiShakti for infrastructure and economic planning, arguing that privacy-safe aggregated payment signals have public value independent of any pricing decision.

    Conclusion

    The op-ed’s position is that UPI’s zero-MDR model has reached a fiscal limit documented by Parliament’s own Standing Committee, and that a threshold-based, differentiated MDR, protecting small merchants and consumers while pricing larger commercial transactions, is a more sustainable path than either continuing an unfunded subsidy or imposing a uniform fee that would slow onboarding in less-formalised markets.

    Back2Basics

    1. Merchant Discount Rate (MDR): The fee a merchant pays to their bank or payment service provider for accepting digital payments, historically waived to zero on UPI and RuPay debit card transactions in India since January 2020 to encourage adoption.
    2. Unified Payments Interface (UPI): A real-time payment system developed by the National Payments Corporation of India (NPCI) that enables instant interbank transactions through a single mobile application.

    “[2023, GS3, 10 marks] What is the status of digitalization in the Indian economy? Examine the problems faced in this regard and suggest improvements.”

  • Simpler mining tax model can mean more revenue for states

    Simpler mining tax model can mean more revenue for states

    Why in the News

    The chairperson of the Economic Advisory Council to the Prime Minister, argues that the recently passed Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Act, 2026 replaces a fragmented mineral taxation system, up to 14 different taxes, charges, fees and levies across States, with a simpler, uniform and predictable framework, extending the certainty-over-discretion principle already applied to mineral block allocation in 2015 to mineral taxation itself.

    What does the amended Act change, and what does it retain?

    1. It targets fiscal fragmentation across States: The amendment addresses a landscape where mineral producers face up to 14 types of taxes, charges, fees and levies that differ by State, and aims to keep India’s mineral market integrated rather than fractured along State fiscal lines.
    2. The revenue-sharing formula with States is retained, not altered: Since the e-auction regime began in 2015, States have received more than Rs 7 lakh crore, about 90% of total revenue from the coal and non-coal sectors combined, through royalty, auction premium, District Mineral Foundation (DMF) contributions and GST; the amendment continues this formula, with 90 paise of every rupee earned from mineral production retained by the State.
    3. The reform is framed as continuing a 12-year trajectory: The op-ed traces the shift from a pre-2014 system of discretionary block allotment, marked by delay and opacity, to transparent competitive e-auctions, arguing that the new tax simplification extends the same certainty principle to fiscal treatment of mining.

    Conclusion

    The op-ed’s position is that a simpler, uniform mineral tax framework under the amended MMDR Act protects mineral-rich States’ own revenue pool while removing the fiscal fragmentation that has made India’s mineral market uncompetitive against import sources, an argument resting on the Act’s own revenue-sharing data rather than a general case for lower taxation.

    Back2Basics

    1. Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957: The principal central legislation governing regulation of mines and mineral development in India, under which State governments grant mineral concessions but the Centre sets the overarching regulatory and taxation framework.
    2. District Mineral Foundation (DMF): A non-profit trust set up in mining-affected districts under the Act to work for the interest and benefit of persons and areas affected by mining-related operations, funded through a share of royalty payments.

    “[2025, GS2, 15 marks] Examine the evolving pattern of Centre-State financial relations in the context of planned development in India. How far have the recent reforms impacted the fiscal federalism in India?”

  • Karnataka’s draft SIR rolls reveal alarming levels of deletion

    Karnataka’s draft SIR rolls reveal alarming levels of deletion

    Why in the News

    The draft electoral rolls released after the enumeration phase of the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) show Karnataka’s rolls shrinking by 19.5%, a deletion of 1.08 crore names, the second-highest deletion rate among major States after Telangana. Constituency-level analysis shows the deletions concentrated overwhelmingly in Bengaluru’s urban core, and the Election Commission’s continuing refusal to release the electors-to-population ratio, combined with Karnataka’s own opaque disclosure practices, has deepened concerns about whether the exercise can be independently verified.

    What do the numbers show about how the deletions are distributed?

    1. Five constituencies lost more than half their electors: Bommanahalli (54.8%), Dasarahalli (52.1%), B.T.M. Layout (51.6%), Vijayanagar (51.1%), and C.V. Raman Nagar (51.1%) each saw over 50% of their rolls deleted, the first time any major State has recorded constituencies crossing that threshold during SIR enumeration, and all five sit in the core Bengaluru area.
    2. The deletions are heavily concentrated in a small number of seats: Half of the 1.08 crore deletions came from just 36 of Karnataka’s 224 Assembly Constituencies, of which 28 were in the core Bengaluru area.
    3. A structural gap against the eligible population persists: Karnataka’s draft SIR roll is at least 67 lakh short of the population eligible to vote as estimated by the Union government’s Technical Group on Population Projections, the largest shortfall among the major States compared in the underlying data.
    4. The “Shifted” category is unusually high even in rural constituencies: Unlike the urban-concentration pattern seen in other States, Karnataka recorded a high share of deletions marked “Shifted” even in predominantly rural constituencies.

    Why is the process itself under scrutiny, independent of the deletion numbers?

    1. The Election Commission has not released the electors-to-population ratio for any State during this SIR round: This ratio, mandatory during every roll revision, is the standard check on under- or over-enrolment, and its absence is attributed by the Commission to the lack of Census data.
    2. Karnataka’s disclosure practice is the weakest among major States: Unlike other States that host a searchable deletion list, Karnataka’s Chief Electoral Officer has hosted the deleted-voters list only as booth-wise documents on scattered Google Drive links, in English only, without old booth numbers, making verification difficult for affected voters.
    3. Gender-disaggregated data on deletions is missing: Karnataka has not released gender-wise deletion data, unlike other States, and the Chief Electoral Officer’s office has stated it does not hold this data.

    Conclusion

    The scale and concentration of Karnataka’s SIR deletions, combined with the Election Commission’s continuing non-disclosure of the electors-to-population ratio and Karnataka’s own weak search and disclosure infrastructure, leave roughly 44 lakh voters in the draft rolls facing discrepancy notices with no independently verifiable baseline against which the exercise’s accuracy can be tested.

    Back2Basics

    1. Special Intensive Revision (SIR): An intensive, house-to-house revision of electoral rolls carried out under the Representation of the People Act, 1950, distinct from the routine annual summary revision, undertaken to re-verify enrolment through fresh enumeration.
    2. Electors-to-Population (EP) ratio: The proportion of the population eligible to vote (18 years and above) that is actually enrolled on the electoral rolls; a low EP ratio indicates under-enrolment and a high one can indicate over-enrolment or padding.
  • Rajnath approves transfer of missile technology to domestic defence industry

    Rajnath approves transfer of missile technology to domestic defence industry

    Why in the News

    Defence Minister Rajnath Singh has approved the transfer of technology (ToT) for all conventional missile systems developed by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) to the Indian defence industry, opening the way for domestic private production of these systems for the first time. Until now, production had rested with Defence PSU Bharat Dynamics Limited, DRDO’s own in-house facilities, and the India-Russia joint venture that builds the BrahMos cruise missile. This is a One development, one row item; both The Hindu and The Indian Express carried the decision, and this entry is filed from the Indian Express account, which names the specific missile systems and the strategic systems excluded from transfer.

    What does the transfer of technology actually change?

    1. A closed production model opens to private industry: Production of DRDO-developed conventional missile systems was previously confined to a defence PSU and DRDO’s own facilities; the ToT decision allows private companies, MSMEs, and other technology partners to manufacture these systems, subject to qualifications, certifications, and regulatory requirements.
    2. An initial set of named systems anchors the rollout: Officials cited the beyond-visual-range air-to-air missile ASTRA, the anti-radiation missile RUDRAM, the short-range air defence system VSHORADS, the anti-tank guided missile NAG, and the Naval Anti-Ship Missile (NASM) as the systems the initiative could begin with, though the stated goal is to extend private production to all conventional missile systems.
    3. Strategic systems are explicitly carved out: The Agni series and the K-series missiles will not be part of this technology transfer, since they are classified as strategic missiles rather than conventional ones.
    4. The stated objective is industrial-scale transition: The Ministry of Defence framed the decision as enabling the transition of missile projects from the development stage to industrial-scale production, reducing import dependence and increasing indigenous value addition.

    Conclusion

    The decision restructures who is permitted to manufacture India’s conventional missile systems, shifting DRDO’s role from developer-cum-producer to developer-cum-technology-provider, and is intended to widen the industrial base, including private firms and MSMEs, that can supply the country’s expanding conventional missile requirements.

  • Minister seeks fundamental shift in fight against drought

    Minister seeks fundamental shift in fight against drought

    Why in the News

    The Union Environment Minister has called for a fundamental shift in the global approach to droughts, from reactive relief to proactive, technology-enabled resilience. He made the appeal at the Ministerial Dialogue on Accelerating Drought Resilience during the 17th Conference of Parties (COP17) of the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD), held in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia.

    What did the Minister’s statement propose?

    1. Drought is reframed as a development challenge: The Minister said drought is no longer an occasional event but a defining development challenge, citing its compounding disruptions to global water security, agricultural food systems, biodiversity, and economic stability.
    2. India’s own model was presented as a template: He highlighted India’s coordinated, multi-institutional approach integrating early warning, mitigation, relief and community resilience, where rainfall monitoring and satellite-based drought assessments trigger preparedness at the inter-ministerial and State levels.
    3. Land restoration was linked directly to water security: He called for restoring the forest before restoring the flow, underscoring India’s focus on catchment and riverscape forestry to reduce erosion, improve water retention, and recharge groundwater.
    4. The Minister called for a shift from relief to prediction: He advocated integrating predictive technologies, localised early-warning monitoring, and proactive land management policies, so vulnerable communities can anticipate and absorb environmental shocks rather than depending primarily on post-disaster relief.

    Back2Basics

    1. United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD): Adopted in 1994 following the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, it is one of the three Rio Conventions, alongside the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD).
    2. It is the sole legally binding international agreement linking environment and development to sustainable land management. COP17, held in Mongolia under the theme “Restoring Land. Restoring Hope,” is its 17th Conference of Parties.

    Conclusion

    The Minister’s intervention at COP17 sets out India’s preparedness-first model as its negotiating position within the UNCCD process, positioning predictive, land-restoration-based resilience as the alternative to a relief-centred global response to drought.

    “[2014, GS3, 12 marks] Drought has been recognised as a disaster in view of its party expense, temporal duration, slow onset and lasting effect on various vulnerable sections. With a focus on the September 2010 guidelines from the National disaster management authority, discuss the mechanism for preparedness to deal with the El Nino and La Nina fallouts in India.”

  • ‘Killer robots’ are closer than ever, warn UN, ICRC

    ‘Killer robots’ are closer than ever, warn UN, ICRC

    Why in the News

    The United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) have jointly warned that the world is dangerously close to the autonomous targeting of humans by machines, renewing an urgent appeal for international regulation of lethal autonomous weapon systems. The statement renews a 2023 call by the UN Secretary General and the ICRC president for specific bans and restrictions on the technology by this year.

    Note: Lethal autonomous weapon systems are weapon systems that select targets and apply force without human intervention.

    What is the concern, and how has it changed since 2023?

    1. The warning has hardened, not softened: The two bodies stated their fundamental concerns remain unchanged from 2023 but that the underlying risks have intensified since then.
    2. The alarm includes the technology’s own developers: The statement highlights that scientists and engineers involved in developing these weapon systems have themselves raised concerns about the direction the technology is taking.
    3. No confirmed use yet, but the trajectory is the concern: Experts state there has been no confirmed use of fully autonomous weapons to directly target humans so far, and the warning is precautionary rather than a report of an actual deployment.

    International Regulation

    1. United Nations: The UN has repeatedly called for international rules governing autonomous weapons.
    2. Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW): Discussions on LAWS have taken place under the CCW framework.
    3. UN Secretary General and ICRC: Both have advocated prohibiting weapons that operate without meaningful human control and imposing strict restrictions on other autonomous weapons.
    4. International Humanitarian Law (IHL): Existing principles such as distinction, proportionality and precaution remain central to assessing autonomous weapons.

    India’s Position

    1. India has participated in international discussions on Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems under the CCW.
    2. India has generally emphasised the importance of human control, international law and responsible development of emerging military technologies.
    3. For India, the issue is particularly relevant as AI, drones, robotics and autonomous systems become increasingly important in modern warfare.

    “[2025, GS2, 15 marks] “The reform process in the United Nations remains unresolved, because of the delicate imbalance of East and West and entanglement of the USA vs. Russo-Chinese alliance.” Examine and critically evaluate the East-West policy confrontations in this regard.”

    [2025] Consider the following statements regarding Al Action Summit held in Grand Palais, Paris in February 2025:
    I. Co-chaired with India, the event builds on the advances made at the Bletchley Park Summit held in 2023 and the Seoul Summit held in 2024.
    II. Along with other countries, US and UK also signed the declaration on inclusive and sustainable AI.
    Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

    [A] I only

    [B] II only

    [C] Both I and II

    [D] Neither I nor II

  • Our Central Asia strategy needs less romance, more realism

    Our Central Asia strategy needs less romance, more realism

    Why in the News

    Prime Minister Modi visits Uzbekistan and the SCO summit in Kyrgyzstan this week, entering a Central Asia that bears little resemblance to the region he toured in 2015. Central Asia has gained independent geopolitical agency and diversified its great-power relationships, exposing the gap between India’s ambition for strategic reconnection and its actual capacity for access and investment.

    How has Central Asia’s regional coherence altered its position between competing powers?

    • Central Asian Five consolidation: Since 2018 the five states have met regularly at summit level and signed a friendship treaty, moving toward organisational substance as a Central Asian community.
    • C-6 expansion: The Central Asian Five invited Azerbaijan to form the C-6, linking the region more closely to the Caucasus and Türkiye.
    • Fergana Valley settlement: Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan settled long-running border disputes in the Fergana Valley, removing a structural source of intra-regional friction.
    • Intra-regional trade growth: Rising intra-regional trade has reinforced political cooperation, converting Central Asia into a region in its own right rather than the sum of five post-Soviet republics.

    What do recent institutional realignments show about Central Asia’s shift toward the Greater Middle East and the West?

    • Kazakhstan–Abraham Accords: Kazakhstan announced accession to the Abraham Accords at the Washington summit with the US in November 2025.
    • Board of Peace charter: Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan signed the charter of Trump’s Board of Peace at Davos in January 2026.
    • Organisation of Turkic States: Türkiye converted the OTS from a cultural forum into an instrument for political, economic and defence cooperation across Central Asia.
    • US bureau reorganisation: Washington restructured the State Department in 2006 to group Central Asia with Afghanistan and the Subcontinent, an earlier connectivity bet that Afghan instability defeated.

    What geographic constraints continue to block India’s direct access to Central Asia?

    • Land route blockage: Pakistan blocks India’s overland route, and Afghan instability rules out an alternate land corridor.
    • Chabahar disruption: The Iran–US conflict has complicated Chabahar and the International North-South Transport Corridor, leaving India’s one built connectivity node idle.
    • Emerging unaddressed issues: Central Asian states have moved toward pragmatic engagement with the Taliban, but new problems like Amu Darya water-sharing are arising in areas where India has no established role.

    Why can India not replicate other external powers’ approaches in Central Asia?

    • Diplomatic precondition unmet: Delhi has not resolved whether to extend diplomatic flexibility toward Pakistan, Türkiye and Azerbaijan, flexibility that would expand its room for manoeuvre.
    • Capability gap: India cannot match China’s infrastructure spending, Russia’s geographic advantages, Europe’s financial resources, or Türkiye’s Caspian access.
    • Multi-vector environment: Central Asian states engage all major powers and commit exclusively to none, closing off the option of an exclusive partnership regardless of capability.

    Conclusion

    India’s Central Asia policy should replace romantic historical framing with a realistic assessment of its access constraints and capabilities, and build engagement incrementally from that assessment rather than from renewed aspiration.

    Back2Basics

    1. Central Asian Republics (CARs): The five states that emerged from the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, sharing historic trade and cultural links with India through the Silk Route.

    “[2024, GS2, 10 marks] Critically analyse India’s evolving diplomatic, economic and strategic relations with the Central Asian Republics (CARs) highlighting their increasing significance in regional and global geopolitics.”