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Type: Explained

These Newscards correspond to the explained section of various newspapers. They become immensely important for both prelims and mains and special attention needs to be paid to them

  • Limits to supply, rising demand: Behind Keralam’s electricity crisis

    Why in the News

    The Keralam State Electricity Board (KSEB) has instituted power cuts lasting between 30 minutes and an hour to manage peak hour demand, including cuts at night. Average daily demand in September 2026 reached about 5,000 MW against 3,794 MW in September 2025, and only 4,200 MW has been met. The shortfall arrives at the hour when the state’s largest renewable asset stops producing, because rooftop solar output ends at dusk and the state has no storage in service. The tension is that a state that leads the country in rooftop solar cannot use any of it against the demand peak that is actually breaking its system.

    How does a State draw power from the Central pool?

    1. What a Central Generating Station is: Central Generating Stations (CGS) are large power generating stations owned centrally rather than by a state utility.
    2. How allocation works: The Union Ministry of Power periodically allocates generation capacity to states from its pool of unallocated quota in those stations.
    3. Who has jurisdiction over electricity: Electricity is a subject on the Concurrent List of the Constitution, so both the Centre and the states have jurisdiction over it.

    How large is the shortfall?

    1. Demand has risen sharply in a year: Average daily demand in September 2026 was about 5,000 MW, against 3,794 MW in September 2025.
    2. Supply has not kept pace: The state has met only 4,200 MW, leaving a daily shortage.
    3. Own generation and the Central pool draw: Keralam produces only 1,650 MW and draws 1,500 MW from the Central pool.
    4. The structural position: The state generates only 25 per cent of its actual requirement from all sources including hydel, solar and wind, against 86 per cent for Andhra Pradesh and 50 per cent for Tamil Nadu.

    Why has hydropower been throttled?

    1. The monsoon failed: The southwest monsoon was weak through the June to September period, with Keralam recording a 26 per cent deficit in seasonal rainfall till 11 September.
    2. The El Nino effect: The El Nino effect, meaning the abnormal warming of surface waters in the equatorial Pacific Ocean that can suppress the Indian monsoon, has been witnessed this year.
    3. Reservoir water storage: Water storage across all KSEB reservoirs stood at only 63.75 per cent of the maximum storage level as of 10 September.
    4. The Board is rationing water, not power alone: KSEB has throttled down hydropower generation deliberately, holding storage against the withdrawal of the monsoon and higher temperatures in the weeks ahead.

    Why does rooftop solar not close the night gap?

    1. The state leads on rooftop capacity: Keralam’s solar production hit 2,508 MW by the end of May, with the vast majority of it rooftop panels.
    2. The scheme behind the build: Under PM Surya Ghar, Keralam has 2.96 lakh installations covering 3,03,531 households.
    3. The output arrives at the wrong hour: Solar power does not help meet the nighttime demand, because the state has no options to store it.
    4. The storage is contracted but not running: KSEB has lined up a slew of Battery Energy Storage Systems (BESS) that are yet to become operational.

    What is a Battery Energy Storage System?

    1. The battery and its grid electronics: A bank of rechargeable cells with power electronics attached to the grid. It charges when generation exceeds demand and discharges when demand exceeds generation, so energy produced in one hour is delivered in another.
    2. Time shifting of solar output: Solar output peaks near midday and ends at dusk, while the demand peak sits in the evening. A battery moves the midday surplus into the evening block, which is the only route by which a daytime resource serves a night peak.
    3. Ramping, not only energy: A battery responds within seconds, so it also covers the sunset ramp, the period when solar falls away faster than thermal or hydro plants can raise their output.
    4. The limits of stored duration: A battery holds a fixed quantity of energy and delivers it for a defined duration, commonly a few hours. It shifts a peak rather than adding generating capacity, and it supplies nothing that was not generated and stored first.

    Why is night demand rising?

    1. The consumer mix loads the evening: Domestic consumers make up 75 per cent of the state’s power connections, so demand rises at night rather than during working hours.
    2. Temperatures are abnormally high: The state disaster management authority has put Keralam on alert for an unusual rise in temperature, with a departure of up to 4 degrees Celsius from normal.
    3. Cooling load runs longer: Rising night temperatures are driving long duration air conditioner usage.
    4. Electric vehicle charging: KSEB has found that nighttime demand is also rising owing to the charging of electric vehicles.

    Challenges to Keralam’s power supply security

    1. Buying from the exchange fails when the scarcity is national: A deficit state can outbid others only when surplus exists somewhere, and this September the shortage is countrywide. Eg. India is witnessing an unusual surge in electricity demand this September, with peak power demand nearing the level recorded during peak summer, driven by a poor monsoon and low coal stock at power plants.
      The Fix: Contract firm capacity ahead of the season under medium term agreements, so the state is not bidding into a national spot market at the moment of scarcity.
    2. The coal fleet has no headroom to absorb the gap: Thermal plants are the swing capacity a deficit state usually leans on, and they are already running close to their limits. Eg. The plant load factor of most imported coal based plants is around 70 per cent or above, leaving no thermal plant that can be asked to raise generation.
      The Fix: Shift a defined share of the evening block onto demand response contracts with large consumers, so the peak is reduced rather than sourced.
    3. Nothing firm replaces solar at the evening ramp: The system loses its entire solar output within an hour of sunset, which is also the hour demand rises, and only fast ramping capacity can bridge that. Eg. Nationally, generation from gas based plants rose 80.3 per cent during 1 to 9 September over the same period last year, with the Centre relying on 4.5 to 5.5 GW of gas based capacity to meet the evening shortfall.
      The Fix: Bring the Board’s contracted battery systems into service against a dated commissioning schedule, since they are the only asset that can move midday solar into the evening block.
    4. Distributed solar weakens the utility that must still serve the peak: A rooftop consumer exports at midday and draws at night, so the utility recovers less revenue while carrying the same obligation to supply at the peak. Eg. Keralam’s rooftop capacity is concentrated in domestic connections, which are the same consumers driving the night peak.
      The Fix: Move rooftop settlement from net metering to net billing with a time of day price, so midday export and evening drawal are valued at what each is actually worth to the system.

    Conclusion

    The immediate crisis will ease when the monsoon withdrawal passes and temperatures fall, and the Board’s rationing is calibrated to hold storage until then. What will not change on its own is the structural position, because a state generating a quarter of its own requirement is buying the rest in a market that tightens in exactly the months it needs power most. The measurable marker is the commissioning of the contracted battery systems, since until they run, every additional megawatt of rooftop solar adds to the state’s daytime surplus and nothing to its evening deficit.

    Back2Basics: PM Surya Ghar Muft Bijli Yojana

    1. PM Surya Ghar: Muft Bijli Yojana: A central scheme under the Ministry of New and Renewable Energy to install rooftop solar systems on residential buildings.
    2. Coverage target: One crore households, with free electricity of up to 300 units a month for the households that install under it.
    3. Household financing route: Central financial assistance is credited directly to the beneficiary’s bank account, alongside access to collateral free low interest loans for the balance cost.
    4. Capacity building component: The scheme carries a capacity building component covering training in installation, operation, maintenance and repair of rooftop systems at the local level.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2025] Consider the following statements about ‘PM Surya Ghar Muft Bijli Yojana’: I. It targets installation of one crore solar rooftop panels in the residential sector. II. The Ministry of New and Renewable Energy aims to impart training on installation, operation, maintenance and repairs of solar rooftop systems at grassroot levels. III. It aims to create more than three lakhs skilled manpower through fresh skilling and up-skilling, under scheme component of capacity building. Which of the statements given above are correct? (a) I and II only (b) I and III only (c) II and III only (d) I, II and III ANSWER: (d)”

  • India’s BRICS balancing act

    Why in the News

    India is hosting the two day BRICS summit in New Delhi on 12 and 13 September 2026, and treats the grouping as a hedge against the Western economic order rather than a replacement for it. The United States and the European Union remain India’s largest export market and its largest source of investment. The same dependence has become a source of exposure. The United States imposed steep tariffs on India last year amid disagreements in trade deal negotiations, and India’s sovereign decision to purchase Russian oil during the Ukraine war turned it into a target. Tariffs are only the most visible instrument. Patent rules blocked a developing country waiver on vaccines at the height of the Covid-19 pandemic, a widening American sanctions regime has repeatedly halted an Indian port project in Iran, and European environment linked trade measures now act as a barrier to Indian exports. India therefore has to reduce reliance on an order it cannot yet do without.

    Why does India treat BRICS as a hedge and not a replacement?

    1. The bloc’s weight has grown: The BRICS share of global gross domestic product (GDP) grew from 17% to 35% between 1995 and 2024, surpassing the G7’s share.
    2. The West still supplies the markets and the capital: The United States and the European Union continue to be India’s largest export market and its largest source of investments.
    3. Western integration built the services sector: Integration with Western economies aided the growth of India’s service sector, which is where most of the new, well paid jobs have been created.
    4. What the hedge could deliver, and when: Expansion of south-south trade, the geographic concentration of critical minerals in the BRICS region and growth in alternative development finance such as the BRICS bank could support India’s growth. None of this is a counter-balance to the Western economic order today, and it could reduce India’s reliance a decade on.
    5. The stated rationale for the hedge: A former Reserve Bank of India (RBI) governor argues that India should treat the emerging international financial architecture around BRICS and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) as a “risk mitigant” and a rational response to an ever-expanding sanctions regime.

    What did the TRIPS waiver refusal reveal about patent control?

    1. What was asked for: In October 2020, at the height of the Covid-19 pandemic, India and South Africa sought a waiver of certain provisions of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement to help developing nations obtain vaccines and other life saving medicines.
    2. What TRIPS is: TRIPS is an international agreement administered by the World Trade Organisation (WTO) that sets minimum standards for protecting intellectual property (IP) in every member country.
    3. Who backed the request: India, South Africa and sixty other developing countries pressed for the waiver.
    4. What happened to it: The developed countries turned the request down.
    5. How the episode is read: A former trade negotiator holds that the failure exposed the danger in an existing patent regime which accords “primacy to patents over patients”.

    How large has the Western sanctions regime become?

    1. The total and the single largest source: A working paper titled ‘Asphyxiation by Sanctions: Harm, Fear and Smog’, written by a former Reserve Bank of India governor, counts 1,325 sanctions imposed globally since 1949, of which 486 were imposed by the United States.
    2. The programmes currently running: The United States currently administers over 30 sanctions programmes, making it responsible for three times as many sanctions as any other country or international body.
    3. When the expansion happened: United States led sanctions jumped in recent decades after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
    4. The second largest sanctioner: The European Union is the second largest sanctioner after the United States.
    5. Trade and financial sanctions grew most: The paper’s decade wise count records financial sanctions rising from 4 in the 1950s to 327 between 2010 and 2022, and trade sanctions from 21 to 209 across the same span.
    6. Travel, military and arms restrictions followed: Travel sanctions rose from 8 to 205 over the same period, military aid sanctions from 1 to 62, and arms sanctions from 7 to 67, so the spectrum has widened from trade measures to military ones.
    7. The reach now includes the messaging layer: Iran and Russia have been removed from the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT), the secure global messaging network financial institutions use to transmit payment instructions.
    8. The label the paper applies: The paper calls the United States the “hegemonic sanctioner”.

    What does Chabahar show about sanctions risk to an Indian project?

    1. When it started: India’s plan to develop Chabahar Port in Iran began in 2003.
    2. The first halt: United States sanctions targeting Iran imposed a “hard break” on progress.
    3. The window that opened: The project was revived between 2015 and 2017 after the United States eased sanctions.
    4. The window that closed again: India signed a ten year agreement with Iran to operate and develop the port in 2024, and shortly afterwards the United States again warned of sanctions.
    5. What the sequence shows: The project’s viability tracked United States policy toward a third country rather than the project’s own economics or India’s own decisions.

    Why do BRICS members reject the European Union’s environment linked trade measures?

    1. The measures at issue: The European Union has implemented a range of environment linked trade regimes which act as a barrier to India’s export growth.
    2. The bloc’s stated position: BRICS nations have “condemned and rejected” the European Union’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) and similar trade curbs, on the ground that they undermine their transition to a cleaner economy.
    3. The reading Indian trade experts give it: Indian trade experts hold that a trade and climate linkage through regulations such as CBAM is less about protecting the environment and more about promoting the interests of the developed world.
    4. The contrast with the tariff instrument: The United States has been explicit in using tariffs to cut imports from developing nations. The European measure arrives instead as an environmental regulation.

    Challenges to India’s BRICS hedge

    1. The grouping grants no market access: BRICS is not a free trade area and issues no tariff preference, so membership cannot substitute for the export markets the hedge is meant to make India less dependent on. Eg. India’s tariff reductions have come through bilateral agreements such as the one being concluded with the European Union, not through the bloc.
      The Fix: Negotiate a BRICS tariff preference on a narrow list of goods members already trade heavily in, so the grouping delivers a measurable trade gain rather than a declaration.
    2. Alternative development finance is too small to displace anything yet: The financing available through BRICS institutions is a fraction of what India raises from Western markets and from the older multilateral banks. Eg. India’s annual external commercial borrowing exceeds its entire cumulative borrowing from the BRICS bank.
      The Fix: Set a share target for BRICS sourced project finance inside the public capital expenditure plan, so the alternative is used rather than only cited.
    3. Mineral concentration is not the same as mineral access: The critical minerals sit inside the BRICS region and their processing capacity sits largely with one member, so geography does not convert into supply security for India. Eg. China accounts for the majority of global rare earth separation and processing capacity.
      The Fix: Tie offtake agreements with Brazil, South Africa and the Gulf members to refining capacity built in India, so the supply arrives in a processable form.
    4. A hedge invites the retaliation it is meant to insure against: Visible participation in the bloc has itself drawn tariff threats, so the insurance carries a premium paid in the very relationship being hedged. Eg. Tariff threats were directed at BRICS members over the grouping’s “un-American” policies.
      The Fix: Keep India’s BRICS agenda on development finance, payments efficiency and supply chains, and off currency displacement, so the hedge is defensible as economic policy rather than as alignment.

    Conclusion

    India’s position is not a choice between two economic orders. It is a dependence on one while building an option on the other. That option is not yet large enough to price, so every instrument the hedge rests on remains smaller than the exposure it is meant to offset. The cost of the hedge is already being paid in the relationship it insures against. What to watch is whether the Delhi declaration commits to anything carrying a number and a date, since a hedge that produces only text leaves the exposure where it was.

    Back2Basics: Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism

    1. What it is: CBAM is a European Union measure that charges an importer for the greenhouse gas emissions embedded in certain imported goods, set against the carbon price a European producer of the same good already pays.
    2. The goods it covers: It applies to cement, iron and steel, aluminium, fertilisers, electricity and hydrogen, the emission intensive sectors most exposed to import competition.
    3. How it is phased: A transitional phase requiring importers only to report embedded emissions ran from October 2023, and the definitive phase charging for those emissions began in 2026.
    4. India’s stated objection: India treats it as a unilateral trade barrier inconsistent with the principle of Common But Differentiated Responsibilities, since it charges a developing country producer at a developed country’s carbon price.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2019, GS2, 15 marks] “The long-sustained image of India as a leader of the oppressed and marginalised Nations has disappeared on account of its new found role in the emerging global order”. Elaborate.”

  • What the recent trajectory of India-China ties means for the summit

    Why in the News

    The Chinese President arrives in India for the BRICS leaders’ summit, his third visit since assuming the presidency and the first after a gap of seven years. The summit is the stated reason for the trip, and its bilateral weight comes from what the visit interrupts, the border standoff that began in eastern Ladakh in 2020 and marked the low point of the relationship, now in its seventh year. Years of diplomatic and military-level talks produced a disengagement of troops in 2024, and a sequence of normalisation steps has followed, from direct flights to eased visas. The structural disputes behind the standoff are untouched by those steps, and the trade deficit and market access questions sit exactly where they did. That fault line, alongside a turbulent global environment, will shape what the summit can agree.

    What is the record of India-China border standoffs?

    1. The two early conflicts: The 1962 war was followed by border clashes in Sikkim in 1967.
    2. The Ladakh standoffs of the last decade: Major standoffs occurred at Depsang in Ladakh in 2013 and at Chumar in Ladakh in 2014.
    3. Doklam: A standoff at Doklam followed in 2017, in a sector away from Ladakh.
    4. Eastern Ladakh since 2020: The standoff that began in eastern Ladakh in 2020 is still ongoing, with about 50,000 Indian troops deployed along the Line of Actual Control, meaning the undelineated line separating the two sides’ positions.
    5. The casualties of June 2020: The clashes of June 2020 killed 20 Indian defence personnel, including an officer of Colonel rank, and at least four Chinese defence personnel.

    What has changed since the 2024 disengagement?

    1. The talks produced a withdrawal: Years of diplomatic and military-level talks led to a disengagement of troops in 2024, and incremental steps have since been taken to stabilise the relationship.
    2. Connectivity restored: Direct flights between the two countries resumed and visa restrictions were eased.
    3. Pilgrimage resumed: The Kailash Mansarovar Yatra was restarted.
    4. Investment rules relaxed: Restrictions on Chinese investments in India were relaxed.
    5. The visit itself is the signal: Travel to India after a seven year gap is read as a positive signal, and only to a degree.

    What has not changed?

    1. The trade imbalance: A massive trade deficit remains the defining feature of the economic relationship.
    2. Market access runs one way: The lack of market access for Indian businesses in China is frequently flagged as an issue.
    3. Enforcement action continues: India is acting against Chinese firms for tax evasion.
    4. Trust is the deeper casualty: Strategic and political trust has been diminished by a border standoff now in its seventh year.
    5. The Pakistan factor deepened it: Collusion between China and Pakistan during Operation Sindoor further worsened the crisis of trust and credibility.

    How far have the founding economies diverged since BRIC was named?

    1. The origin of the label: Goldman Sachs analysts described India, China, Brazil and Russia as the world’s emerging economies in 2001, and BRIC was born as a grouping in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks.
    2. China: It has become the second-largest economy in the world after the United States.
    3. India: It has grown at a modest rate and been outpaced by Beijing.
    4. Russia and Brazil: Russia has faced challenges from wars of its own making, and Brazil has floundered amid frequent regime changes and scandals.
    5. South Africa: A later entrant to the grouping, it has not lived up to expectations.
    6. The 2009 turning point: The first BRICS leaders’ summit was held in the shadow of the global financial crisis, and China emerged from that crisis stronger than many Western nations.

    How does China’s assertiveness show up beyond the border?

    1. Military growth follows economic growth: China has grown militarily, with big-power ambitions to dethrone the United States.
    2. Where the posture is visible: Its increasingly aggressive and assertive stance shows in its neighbourhood, in its actions in the South China Sea, in the Indo-Pacific, and on the borders it shares with India.
    3. India absorbs a disproportionate share: India has faced the brunt of border standoffs frequently, and the belligerence of the Chinese state under the current President has been greater than at any time in the recent past.

    Is BRICS an anti-West grouping or a non-Western one?

    1. The two framings are not the same: China and Russia have attempted to frame BRICS as an “anti-West” grouping, and India sees it as a “non-Western” grouping.
    2. India’s position rules out the first: India has built robust ties with the United States over the last 25 years and is courting Europe, Australia, Canada and other Western nations, so it is decidedly not anti-West.
    3. The dependence is stated plainly: India needs the West for access to capital and technology, and as a destination for its people, more than China or Russia do.
    4. Beijing’s self-placement within the bloc: China has viewed itself as the “first among equals” in the grouping, and long supported enlarging it beyond the original five, which produced the 2023 expansion to the present strength of 11 members.
    5. Western action against members complicates the divide: US tariffs on Brazil and political disagreements with South Africa cut across the distinction the members are arguing over.

    What does the convergence against US tariffs actually buy?

    1. The shared exposure: The US President’s arbitrary tariff moves have cornered countries around the world, including China and India, and the two now find themselves on the same side in attempting to counter the effects.
    2. China’s own position has weakened: After years of high economic growth, China has revised its expectations for the near future.
    3. India’s use of the summit: India is hosting the summit partly to signal to the United States that it has other partners in fields ranging from technology to fuel security.
    4. What those partners supply: The United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia have been investing in the Indian economy, Russia has stepped in as an energy supplier amid the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, and Brazil is ready to partner on critical minerals.

    How has the West Asia war split the grouping?

    1. The sovereignty question it raises: The US war on Iran has raised questions about powerful nations violating the territorial integrity and sovereignty of others, and both China and Russia are guilty of the same in their own neighbourhoods.
    2. The economic cost is common: Energy prices and inflation have risen, and BRICS countries, as part of the Global South, are bearing the brunt.
    3. Members sit on opposite sides of the same war: Iran is attacking US military bases in West Asia, and the United Arab Emirates hosts several US military bases and personnel.
    4. Why this needs China: Moving those two members towards cooperation and presenting a more unified flank requires Chinese weight alongside India’s hosting role.
    5. The scale of attendance raises the stakes: Leaders of over 30 countries and groupings are attending, so a failure to reconcile positions is visible well beyond the membership.

    Challenges to stabilising India-China ties

    1. The trade deficit is structural, not tariff driven: India’s imports are concentrated in the intermediate and capital goods its own manufacturing runs on, so restricting imports raises domestic costs rather than closing the gap. Eg. Active pharmaceutical ingredients, the chemical inputs a finished medicine is made from, are sourced largely from China even as India exports the finished formulations.
      The Fix: Tie the production incentive schemes for bulk drugs and electronic components to measured reductions in import dependence, with the baseline published.
    2. Disengagement is not de-escalation: Withdrawal from friction points leaves the roads, airfields and habitat built up behind the line in place, so force can return faster than it left. Eg. Both sides have retained the forward infrastructure constructed after 2020.
      The Fix: Negotiate a verifiable de-induction of forces and a written restoration of patrolling norms, rather than treating troop separation as settlement.
    3. There is no agreed line to defend: The Line of Actual Control is not delineated on a map both sides accept, so the same patrol is routine to one side and an incursion to the other. Eg. Each side maintains its own claim line across the Depsang plains.
      The Fix: Task the Special Representatives mechanism with a sector-by-sector exchange of maps, beginning with the sectors where no standoff has occurred.
    4. A third country sets the floor under India’s threat assessment: The military supply and intelligence relationship between China and Pakistan means a bilateral understanding does not reduce the threat India plans against. Eg. Chinese-origin platforms form the bulk of Pakistan’s recent fighter and naval inductions.
      The Fix: Keep the normalisation track and the security track formally separate and say so publicly, so trade and travel measures are not treated as concessions on security.
    5. Economic opening is being restored without reciprocity: Relaxing investment rules restores Chinese capital’s access to India without restoring Indian firms’ access to the Chinese market. Eg. Press Note 3 of 2020 required government approval for investment from countries sharing a land border with India, and its relaxation is not matched by a Chinese commitment.
      The Fix: Make each relaxation sector specific and conditional on a named market access commitment of comparable value.

    Conclusion

    The visit restores high level contact without touching what caused its absence. India and China now share an exposure to US trade measures, and shared exposure produces a common grievance more readily than a common position, since each retains the option of settling separately with Washington. The unresolved tension is that India needs Chinese weight to hold the grouping together on trade and energy, and needs the grouping not to be read as anti-Western, which is the framing Beijing prefers. What to watch is whether the summit declaration carries a joint position on unilateral trade measures, and whether the normalisation sequence extends from travel and pilgrimage to market access, which is the test of whether anything structural has moved.

    Back2Basics: Operation Sindoor

    1. What it was: Indian military strikes in May 2025 on terrorist infrastructure located in Pakistan and in Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir.
    2. What prompted it: It followed the April 2025 attack on tourists at Pahalgam in Jammu and Kashmir.
    3. How it ended: Several days of exchanges across the border were followed by an understanding between the two militaries to stop military action.
    4. Why it appears in an India-China item: Chinese support to Pakistan during those exchanges is cited as having deepened India’s trust deficit with China, separately from the border dispute.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2017, GS2, 10 marks] ‘China is using its economic relations and positive trade surplus as tools to develop potential military power status in Asia’, In the light of this statement, discuss its impact on India as her neighbor.”

  • Bihar flooded despite rainfall deficit; Nepal isn’t the reason

    Why in the News

    Bihar has flooded in a season of deficit rainfall. The State received 601.1 mm of rain between 1 June and 8 September, 27% below normal, and the Disaster Management Department recorded 2,157 villages across 14 districts affected. The Water Resources Minister has said this year’s flood pattern differed from previous years, with the Ganga rising first rather than the rivers that enter Bihar from Nepal. Discharge at the Valmikinagar Barrage on the Gandak stayed below what officials had expected, and the flooding continued anyway. The explanation offered is a backwater effect, so the immediate cause sits downstream in the main river rather than upstream across the border.

    What is a backwater effect?

    1. How a tributary drains: A tributary can discharge into a main river only for as long as the water level in the main river stays below its own.
    2. What happens when the main stem rises: A high stage in the main river holds the tributary’s water back and spreads it across the tributary’s own floodplain, with no additional rain falling there.

    Why did Bihar flood on a rainfall deficit?

    1. The seasonal shortfall: Rainfall from 1 June to 8 September was 601.1 mm, 27% below normal, and the deficit stood at 30% as late as 1 September.
    2. The month ran the other way: Rainfall during September itself was 31% above normal, so the cumulative figure conceals the period when the flooding worsened.
    3. Localised extremes: Individual rain events delivered 214.92 mm in East Champaran and 154.55 mm in Sitamarhi.
    4. The recorded damage: By 9 September the Disaster Management Department reported 2,157 villages in 14 districts affected and about 40.51 lakh people hit.
    5. Seasonal totals are the wrong measure: A flood is produced by the intensity and timing of rain and by upstream discharge, not by the season’s aggregate.

    How was this year’s flood sequence different?

    1. The usual order: The Bagmati, Kamla, Kosi and Gandak, which enter Bihar from Nepal, normally rise first, and the Ganga follows.
    2. What happened instead: The Ganga became the first source of concern this year, which inverted the sequence the State’s flood response is built around.
    3. The catchment is not local: The Ganga’s catchment extends far beyond Bihar, so it carries water generated by rainfall upstream, including in Uttar Pradesh.
    4. The stated drivers: The Disaster Management Department’s Principal Secretary identified rainfall around the Allahabad and Varanasi region and the resulting downstream discharge as important factors, with discharge from neighbouring States a major factor for the other rivers too.

    Why did opening the Valmikinagar Barrage not settle the Gandak?

    1. The gates were opened early: When floods hit Nepal on 26 August, Bihar opened all 36 gates of the Valmikinagar Barrage on the Gandak, which was then below its normal levels.
    2. The peak came in under expectation: Discharge at the barrage reached 1,50,200 cusecs (cubic feet per second, the volume of water passing a point each second) and then declined, below what officials had expected.
    3. Flooding continued regardless: The Gandak and the Punpun could not drain once the Ganga had swelled, which is the backwater effect at work.
    4. A second local input: The Punpun was also carrying heavy rainfall from Jharkhand.
    5. A flood travels: A river flood is a moving event, so a peak recorded at one gauge is transferred downstream and the flooded area is far larger than the area that recorded the heaviest rain.

    What do Bihar’s embankments do, and what do they not do?

    1. The length built: The State has built more than 3,730 km of river embankments.
    2. What they have protected: These structures have historically shielded around 3,600 sq km of land during floods.
    3. The limit of the structure: Embankments do not remove the underlying vulnerability of one of India’s flattest and most sediment heavy alluvial landscapes.
    4. Sediment raises the bed: The Ganga, Gandak, Kosi and Bagmati carry enormous quantities of sediment, and accumulation within a channel lifts the riverbed relative to the land beside it. Silt is a permanent condition of Bihar’s rivers rather than an event.

    Why has the Farakka Barrage entered the flood argument?

    1. The State’s contention: State leaders hold that the Farakka Barrage has trapped large volumes of silt along the Ganga over the five decades since it was built.
    2. The claimed consequence: That accumulation has made the riverbed shallower, so even normal seasonal monsoon flows now spill over the banks and produce annual flooding across the plains.
    3. A treaty deadline gives it timing: The 1996 India Bangladesh Farakka Treaty expires in December 2026, and demands in Bihar are for a review of the pact.

    What in Bihar’s own geography keeps exposure high?

    1. The rivers move: The Ganga, Gandak and Kosi constantly reshape their channels, so the land at risk is not fixed from one year to the next.
    2. People live at the water’s edge: High population density means many communities are settled close to rivers, and a rise in level turns into an evacuation rather than an inconvenience.

    Challenges to Bihar’s flood management

    1. An embankment concentrates risk at its weakest point: A breach releases water at high velocity onto land that the structure had kept dry for decades, so the damage is deeper than an unprotected flood. Eg. The Kosi breach at Kusaha in 2008 shifted the river’s course and displaced over three million people in Bihar.
      The Fix: Hold a pre positioned stock of boulders and geobags at identified weak reaches before each monsoon rather than mobilising material after a breach.
    2. Land behind the line cannot drain itself: An area sealed off from the river also loses the outlet for its own rainfall, so ground protected from flooding turns permanently waterlogged. Eg. Large tracts in the Kosi and Bagmati belts of north Bihar have gone out of cultivation from persistent waterlogging.
      The Fix: Build and maintain sluices and drainage channels through the embankment line with a fixed operating protocol for the monsoon months.
    3. Flood moderation depends on storage that does not exist: Peak attenuation on the Kosi and the Gandak requires reservoirs upstream in Nepal that have never been constructed. Eg. A high dam at Barahkshetra on the Kosi has been under discussion since the 1950s without being built.
      The Fix: Separate real time data sharing and joint forecasting from the dam negotiation, so warning improves without waiting on construction.
    4. Warnings are issued off levels already recorded: Forecasts rest on gauge readings at the moment of the peak, which leaves little lead time on terrain where water spreads sideways for tens of kilometres. Eg. A level based warning gives downstream districts only hours once an upstream gauge has crossed its danger mark.
      The Fix: Build district level inundation forecasts from upstream rainfall and barrage release data rather than from gauge readings alone.

    Conclusion

    Bihar’s flood risk is no longer set mainly by how much rain falls inside the State. It is set by the level of the main river the State has to drain into, and by channels whose beds have risen relative to the land beside them. The unresolved tension is that the structures protecting settled land also hold in the sediment that raises those beds, so each decade of protection shortens the next decade’s margin. What to watch is whether flood planning shifts from adding embankment length to sediment management, drainage behind the line and forecasting built on upstream data.

    Back2Basics: Farakka Barrage

    1. What it is and where: A barrage on the Ganga in Murshidabad district of West Bengal, commissioned in 1975, a short distance upstream of the border with Bangladesh.
    2. Why it was built: It diverts a part of the Ganga’s flow into a feeder canal to the Bhagirathi and Hooghly, to flush silt and maintain navigability for the port of Kolkata.
    3. A barrage, not a dam: It regulates and diverts flow through gates rather than impounding a large storage reservoir behind it.
    4. The water sharing arrangement: An agreement between India and Bangladesh shares the dry season flow measured at the barrage in ten day cycles between 1 January and 31 May.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2024, GS3, 15 marks] What is disaster resilience? How is it determined? Describe various elements of a resilience framework. Also mention the global targets of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (2015-2030).”

  • The challenges for BRICS

    Why in the News

    India hosts the 18th BRICS Summit in New Delhi on 12 and 13 September, twenty years after the grouping was formalised in 2006. The grouping now accounts for a larger share of world output than the G7 and has grown from four members to eleven. Expansion has made agreement harder rather than easier. The foreign ministers’ meeting earlier in 2026 closed without a joint declaration after two members on opposite sides of an active conflict clashed. The economic project shows the same gap, with the idea of a single BRICS currency shelved in favour of settling bilateral trade in national currencies.

    How did BRICS grow from a four country dialogue into an eleven member bloc?

    1. Origin in a growth forecast: BRIC began in 2006 with Brazil, Russia, India and China, following a Goldman Sachs projection identifying these economies as future engines of global growth.
    2. From ministers to leaders: The format moved from a foreign ministers’ dialogue to a leaders’ forum, and the first summit was held at Yekaterinburg in Russia in 2009.
    3. First enlargement: South Africa joined in 2010, and the grouping took its present name.
    4. Second enlargement: Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the UAE were added in 2024, and Indonesia became the eleventh full member in January 2025.

    How does BRICS now compare with the G7 in economic weight?

    1. The position in 2000: The four original members together accounted for roughly 23% of global GDP on a purchasing power parity (PPP) basis, which compares economies using what a currency actually buys at home rather than at market exchange rates. The G7 held nearly 52%.
    2. The position in 2024: The eleven member grouping accounted for approximately 36.8% of global GDP (PPP), and the G7 share fell below 29%.
    3. Growth differential: BRICS economies are projected to grow by an average 3.8% in 2025 and 3.7% in 2026, more than three times the G7 average.
    4. Prosperity tells a different story: Per capita GDP averages around $53,000 in the G7 against roughly $8,200 in BRICS.
    5. What drives the aggregate: The bloc’s weight comes from population and resource scale rather than from individual prosperity.

    Why has the grouping’s original grievance survived twenty years?

    1. The founding complaint: Global institutions have not kept pace with the redistribution of economic and political power.
    2. What the first summit asked for: Reform of the international financial institutions and of the United Nations, greater energy security, and a more democratic multipolar world order.
    3. Still unmet: Those demands remain the grouping’s central agenda two decades later, which is why an economic forum has turned into a geopolitical one presenting itself as a voice of the Global South.

    What does BRICS do for India’s strategy of multi alignment?

    1. Membership without alliance: India participates simultaneously in BRICS, the G20, the Quad and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) without accepting alliance commitments.
    2. The purpose of that spread: Multi alignment rests on strategic autonomy and is about creating room for manoeuvre rather than choosing between competing power centres.
    3. The grouping is not anti Western by origin: BRICS emerged during an early phase of convergence between India and the United States on strategic questions.
    4. India’s institutional contribution: India proposed a development bank at the 2012 New Delhi summit, and that proposal became the New Development Bank (NDB).
    5. What the bank has done: By mid 2026 the NDB had approved approximately $44 billion across 141 projects.

    What divides the members over what BRICS is for?

    1. The Chinese and Russian reading: Both increasingly position the grouping as a counterweight to Western dominance and a platform to challenge United States led institutions and the dollar’s hegemony.
    2. Beijing’s stake in size: China drove the enlargement, treating a larger grouping as a vehicle to project leadership of the Global South.
    3. Moscow’s stake in survival: Excluded from the SWIFT messaging network that banks use to send cross border payment instructions, and facing sweeping sanctions, Russia treats BRICS as an economic lifeline.
    4. The Indian and Brazilian reading: Both view BRICS primarily as an economic and reform oriented grouping.
    5. Where the divergence became explicit: Russia demanded in 2023 that India pay for oil in yuan, and India refused, insisting on dollars or rupees only.

    Why has expansion made consensus harder to reach?

    1. The visible fault line: The BRICS Foreign Ministers’ meeting in New Delhi in May 2026 failed to agree on a joint declaration.
    2. What caused the breakdown: Two member states on opposite sides of an active conflict, Iran and the UAE, confronted each other directly.
    3. What the chair issued instead: India recorded a chair’s statement acknowledging “differing views among some members regarding the situation in West Asia”.
    4. The structural point: BRICS operates on consensus, and every added member adds another veto on any text touching a geopolitical crisis.

    What has replaced the idea of a single BRICS currency?

    1. The currency idea is shelved: The United States President has threatened 100% tariffs on BRICS nations if they created a new currency or backed another currency to replace the dollar, and a single BRICS currency has largely been dropped.
    2. Bilateral settlement instead: Members have moved to settling trade in national currencies, a decentralised route that needs no common institution. Russia and China now settle over 90% of their bilateral trade in ruble and yuan.
    3. The India cases: Roughly 90% of direct payments between Russia and India have moved to national currencies through Special Rupee Vostro Accounts, which are rupee accounts that a foreign bank holds with an Indian bank, authorised by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI). India has run a rupee and dirham settlement system with the UAE since July 2023 and a rupee and rupiah framework with Indonesia since July 2026.
    4. A payments layer, not a currency: BRICS Pay, to be unveiled at the 2026 summit, links national payment rails including Russia’s SPFS, China’s CIPS, India’s UPI and Brazil’s Pix, so members can settle trade without routing through dollar correspondent banks.
    5. India’s own preference: India pushes interoperable central bank digital currencies (CBDCs), meaning sovereign digital money that can move across systems, rather than a supranational currency.

    How far has the dollar’s position actually weakened?

    1. Reserve holdings barely moved: The dollar still accounted for 57.13% of global central bank reserves in the first quarter of 2026.
    2. No member is building an alternative reserve: No BRICS member is accumulating rupee, yuan or rand reserves at meaningful scale.
    3. The Western assessment: Western countries treat the grouping not as an immediate replacement for the existing international order, but as a platform capable of gradually reshaping the distribution of geopolitical power.

    Challenges to BRICS

    1. No permanent secretariat or charter: The grouping has no treaty, no standing staff and no institutional memory, so follow up on a summit commitment depends on whichever member holds the rotating chair. Eg. Implementation is tracked through each chair’s own sherpa arrangements rather than by a standing body.
      The Fix: Create a small permanent secretariat with a published implementation review against each summit declaration.
    2. Unsettled disputes between members cap cooperation: India and China remain in an unresolved boundary dispute, which limits how far either will accept the other’s leadership of the bloc. Eg. The Galwan Valley clash of 2020 froze wider cooperation between the two for years.
      The Fix: Ring fence bilateral disputes into a separate channel so bloc business is not suspended whenever a member pair falls out.
    3. The bank depends on the market it wants to bypass: The NDB raises much of its capital in dollar markets, so lending to a sanctioned member threatens its own credit standing and funding cost. Eg. The bank suspended new transactions in Russia in 2022 to protect its market access.
      The Fix: Expand local currency lending and local currency bond issuance so project finance does not rest on dollar funding.
    4. Enlargement without an entry standard: Membership now spans oil exporters, sanctioned economies and aid recipients with little shared trade interest, which weakens any common negotiating position. Eg. Argentina abandoned its accession after being invited to join in 2023.
      The Fix: Publish objective accession criteria covering intra bloc trade share and acceptance of the reform agenda before any further enlargement.

    Conclusion

    BRICS has accumulated weight faster than it has accumulated agreement. Its economic case is largely settled and its political case is not. The marker to watch at the New Delhi summit is whether the chair closes with a text every member has signed or with a statement of its own. A second marker is whether the payments platform moves from launch to measurable settlement volume, since that is where the grouping’s stated ambition meets the actual behaviour of its members.

    Back2Basics: New Development Bank

    1. Founding instrument: The bank was established by an agreement signed at the 2014 BRICS summit in Fortaleza, Brazil, and began operations in 2015.
    2. Headquarters: It is based in Shanghai, with its first regional office in Johannesburg.
    3. Voting design: The five founding members hold equal shareholding, unlike the weighted voting used in the Bretton Woods institutions.
    4. Membership beyond the founders: Bangladesh, the UAE, Egypt and Algeria have been admitted as members, so the bank’s membership is wider than the grouping itself.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026, GS2, 10 marks] “BRICS acts as a powerful counterweight in global governance, actively amplifying the voice and influence of the Global South.” Explain the role of BRICS in projecting itself as an alternative to other groupings.”

  • Manipur’s demand for a 1951 baseline for NRC: Why the date is contentious

    Why in the News

    The State’s Home Minister has told the Manipur Assembly that 1951 will be the base year for updating the National Register of Citizens (NRC) in the State, a register of residents against which claims to belonging are tested. The State cannot implement an NRC without the Centre’s approval, and officials are tracing the records of the register prepared in 1951. The choice of year is not an administrative detail. Manipur’s own permit system controlling entry from outside lapsed in 1950, which is why valley based organisations treat 1951 as the point from which outsiders must be identified. The Kuki Zo Council has challenged the reliability of that baseline, since the hill districts were barely enumerated in that year. A baseline that one set of claimants treats as the earliest honest record is the same baseline another treats as a record of its own absence.

    Why does 1951 have a claim as Manipur’s baseline?

    1. The permit system lapsed just before it: The erstwhile princely State ran a permit system regulating the entry of people from outside, and that system was abolished in 1950.
    2. 1951 produced both a count and a register: The first Census of independent India was conducted in 1951, and an NRC was prepared alongside it carrying names, parentage and residence.
    3. The earliest available demographic baseline: The Joint Committee on Inner Line Permit System (JCILPS), the umbrella body that led the agitation for an Inner Line Permit, argues that 1951 is the earliest point against which later migration and population change can be measured.
    4. The growth figure it relies on: The same body cites recorded decadal population growth rising from 12.80% in 1951 to 35.04% in 1961. A rise of that size does not by itself establish illegal immigration as its cause.

    What earlier settlements already named 1951?

    1. The 1980 understanding: The “Proceedings of Understanding” between the State government and student organisations named 1951 as the baseline.
    2. The 1994 agreement: A further agreement between the Lieutenant Governor and student organisations, concluded under President’s Rule in the State, carried the same year.
    3. The 2018 Bill: The Manipur People’s Protection Bill, 2018 named 1951 and classified as “non Manipuris” those who were not Meitei, not Meitei Pangal, not members of the Scheduled Tribes, and not resident in Manipur before 1951.
    4. Passed but never law: The Assembly passed that Bill unanimously and it did not become law.

    Why did Assam settle on a 1971 cut off instead?

    1. A longer agitation produced it: Assam had a far longer and more intense history of agitation over illegal immigration, culminating in the Assam Movement of 1979 to 1985.
    2. The Accord fixed a base date: Under the Assam Accord, 1 January 1966 was fixed as the base date. Those who entered before it were to be regularised.
    3. Two further brackets followed: Entrants between 1 January 1966 and 24 March 1971 were to be detected and registered under the law. Those entering on or after 25 March 1971 were to be detected and expelled.
    4. The date came from a settlement, not a survey: The 1971 date emerged from that specific political settlement, shaped by migration from East Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh.
    5. Manipur’s proponents distinguish their case: They argue their problem arises from the abolition of the permit system and later demographic change rather than from partition era migration.

    Why has the demand gained urgency now?

    1. It predates the current conflict: The demand existed before the ethnic violence that began in May 2023.
    2. A cross border influx added a security dimension: The movement of people from Myanmar after the 2021 military coup gave the demand a security framing it did not previously carry.
    3. Representation is the new stake: The 2027 Census and the prospect of delimitation have made the sequence of the two exercises politically significant.
    4. Valley organisations want the register first: Meitei and Naga organisations want the NRC completed before the Census, arguing that population figures should not influence future political representation until illegal immigration has been addressed.

    Why do the hill based organisations reject a 1951 baseline?

    1. The 1951 enumeration was incomplete in the hills: The Kuki Zo Council says most hill areas of Manipur had virtually no road connectivity in 1951, which made comprehensive population enumeration difficult.
    2. An incomplete record excludes rather than verifies: On that reading, a 1951 benchmark could exclude indigenous communities who were never fully counted in the first place.
    3. A community older than the boundary: Kuki, Zomi and Chin communities have historically lived on both sides of the India Myanmar border, so organisations representing them fear that a 75 year old baseline would fall hardest on them.

    Challenges to a 1951 baseline for the Manipur NRC

    1. The State has already reversed itself on the year: A shift in the proposed base year from 1971 to 1951 in 2018 triggered protests. Eg. In Jiribam, people from communities with longstanding links to neighbouring Assam feared exclusion, and the Bill was never brought into force.
      The Fix: Settle the base year through a published inquiry into record availability district by district before it is announced as policy.
    2. Its own operational choice was a different year: When the government had to operationalise the Inner Line Permit system, the Cabinet chose 1961 as the base year in 2022. Eg. The then Chief Minister said the choice followed consideration of the interests of the State’s 34 recognised tribes, and the 2024 recommendation of an NRC to the Centre also proposed 1961.
      The Fix: Align the NRC base year with the year already in force for the permit system, so one State does not operate two definitions of residence.
    3. Proof falls on those least able to furnish it: A baseline that old cannot distinguish a recent migrant from a long settled resident who simply cannot produce records. Eg. Assam’s own exercise left over 19 lakh applicants out of the final register published in 2019, largely on documentary grounds.
      The Fix: Accept a defined ladder of alternative proof, including school, land and ration records and village level certification, rather than a single documentary standard.
    4. The legal consequence of exclusion is undefined: The Centre would have to prescribe the evidentiary and appeals framework and clarify what exclusion means in law. Eg. Applicants excluded in Assam were left to Foreigners Tribunals, a forum whose orders have been criticised for inconsistent standards.
      The Fix: Publish the appeal forum, the time limit and the legal status of an excluded person before any enumeration begins.
    5. Displacement compounds verification: In a State where conflict has displaced thousands, documentary verification becomes harder still. Eg. Households moved into relief camps after the violence left property and identity records behind.
      The Fix: Treat a State certified displacement record as admissible proof of prior residence.

    Conclusion

    A base year is a political settlement presented as a date. Manipur’s valley and hill organisations both accept a register in principle and cannot agree on the year that defines belonging, because each candidate year redistributes the burden of proof. What to watch is the order of steps. If a base year is announced before the rules of evidence and appeal are written, the exercise will start producing exclusions before it has defined what exclusion means.

    Back2Basics: Inner Line Permit

    1. What it is: A travel document that an Indian citizen from another State must obtain to enter a protected State, valid for a limited period and purpose.
    2. Its legal source: It operates under the Bengal Eastern Frontier Regulation, 1873, which empowered the authorities to restrict entry into designated frontier areas.
    3. Where it applies: Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland and Mizoram have long required it, and Manipur was brought under the regime in 2019.
    4. What it does not decide: It regulates entry and stay by citizens of other States and does not by itself determine citizenship or residence for any other purpose.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2021] With reference to India, consider the following statements: 1.There is only one citizenship and one domicile. 2.A citizen by birth only can become the Head of State. 3.A foreigner, once granted citizenship, cannot be deprived of it under any circumstances. Which of the statements given above is/are correct? (a) 1 only (b) 2 only (c) 1 and 3 (d) 2 and 3 ANSWER: (a)”

  • Egg, chicken, milk prices: Why they remain high

    Why in the News

    Gross value added from India’s livestock sector was about 34% of that from crops in 2013-14, and the ratio touched 57% in 2023-24, the last year for which official data is available. The value of milk, eggs, meat and other animal products from Indian farms is steadily approaching that of foodgrains, oilseeds, sugarcane, cotton, vegetables, fruits and spices. That progress is being undermined by spiralling feed ingredient costs. The tension is that the same grain the animal economy runs on is also the feedstock the fuel blending programme is turning to, and the government cannot protect both at once.

    Components of livestock feed

    1. Energy comes from maize: Broiler chicken feed is 55-65% maize by weight, egg laying bird feed is 50-60% maize, and cattle feed 15-20%.
    2. Protein comes from oilseed cakes and meals: Broiler formulations carry 25-30% soyabean meal and layer feed 18-20%. Oilseed cakes and meals make up 40-50% by weight of compound cattle feed.
    3. The balance is micro ingredients: Animals also need minerals such as calcium and phosphorus, vitamins, dietary fibre, fat and synthetic amino acids such as methionine and lysine.

    How far have feed ingredient prices risen?

    1. Maize at Erode: The average price at the Alangeyam market in Tamil Nadu’s Erode district rose from Rs 2,537 per quintal in August 2025 to Rs 2,759 in August 2026, and stands at Rs 2,810 now.
    2. Soyabean meal at Indore: Prices of 50% protein soyabean meal on the National Commodity and Derivatives Exchange rose from Rs 38,186 per tonne in August 2025 to Rs 58,156 in August 2026. They have fallen to Rs 50,000 this month, against a September 2025 average of Rs 35,327.
    3. The peak and the switch: Soyabean meal has come off a peak of Rs 63,000 to Rs 64,000 per tonne, and maize began hardening just as it eased.
    4. The other protein meals: Groundnut and rapeseed oilcakes trade at Rs 38,000 and Rs 33,100 per tonne against September 2025 averages of Rs 24,188 and Rs 24,479, with cottonseed extraction at Rs 35,500 against Rs 30,500 and rice bran extraction at Rs 20,500 against Rs 13,669, on Solvent Extractors’ Association of India data.

    Why did egg prices climb this year?

    1. The current level: Egg prices in Delhi are at Rs 600 per 100 pieces on the indicative poultry farm-gate rates set by the National Egg Co-ordination Committee (NECC), and retail prices rule at Rs 7-9 per egg depending on whether the purchase is a 30 piece crate, a dozen or a smaller lot.
    2. The July spike: NECC suggested prices scaled Rs 725-730 per 100 eggs in July, and the month’s average of Rs 670.5 was 38.7% higher than a year earlier.
    3. Weather cut supply: The NECC’s stated explanation is that an extended summer and delayed monsoon rains linked to El Nino caused water shortages, heat stress and rising bird mortality, alongside a July spike in maize and soyabean meal prices.
    4. Demand is seasonal: Egg demand and prices generally rise after Diwali through winter and the spring season, and fall with rising temperature and humidity. The real dip runs through Shravan, Pitru Paksha, Navratri, Diwali and Chhath Puja, when many Hindu households avoid eggs.

    Why does feed cost decide the producer’s margin?

    1. Feed dominates the egg cost: Layer feed prices have climbed from Rs 24-26 to Rs 30-32 per kg over the last four months, and feed constitutes 65-70% of a farmer’s egg production cost.
    2. Broiler margins have narrowed: Broiler feed prices have surged from Rs 40 to Rs 46 per kg over the same four months, and total broiler production cost is now roughly Rs 110 per kg.
    3. The price has fallen back towards cost: Farmgate broiler prices crossed Rs 150 per kg of live weight across north India in late June and early July, and have settled at Rs 115-120 per kg after Shravan.
    4. The bird takes time to pay back: Farmers raise day old chicks of 35-45 gm to slaughter ready weight of 2-2.5 kg over 35-42 days. Layer hens begin laying at 18-20 weeks, continue until 70-72 weeks, and lay 250-300 eggs a year.

    Why is the supply outlook uneven between maize and soyabean?

    1. Soyabean looks comfortable: Farmers sowed almost the same area under soyabean this kharif season as last year, and the crop due for harvest in October and November is reported normal to good with no major insect pest or disease incidence.
    2. Imports have padded the stocks: Some large poultry companies with captive feed manufacturing facilities have contracted soyabean imports estimated at 0.9 million tonnes in 2025-26, improving carryover stocks for the new marketing year.
    3. Maize is the worry: Kharif maize acreage is down 4.1% on government data and the yield outlook is weak, on the assessment of CLFMA of India, the compound livestock feed manufacturers’ body. El Nino could also hurt the rabi maize crop.
    4. The output projection has turned: The US Department of Agriculture projects India’s maize production in 2026-27 at 50 million tonnes, a sharp decline from the record 55.1 million tonnes of 2025-26, which was itself a substantial jump over 43.4 million tonnes the year before.

    How does ethanol policy tighten the feed squeeze?

    1. Sugar feedstock is being closed off: With sugar prices rising, the Centre is expected to bar mills from using cane juice or B-heavy molasses, the intermediate molasses stream that still carries high sucrose, for manufacturing ethanol in the crushing year beginning October.
    2. The load shifts to grain: Grain based distilleries carry the blending programme when cane feedstock is restricted, and maize is the grain they draw on.
    3. Diversion itself may be reviewed: If maize prices keep rising into livestock feed costs and consumer prices for milk, eggs and meat, the diversion of the feed grain to ethanol production could itself come up for review.
    4. The blending target is the casualty: Meeting the existing 20% ethanol blending in petrol (E20) would become difficult in 2026-27.

    Challenges to India’s livestock feed supply

    1. Maize productivity is low: India’s average maize yield sits well below the world average, so additional demand has to be met by planting more area rather than by raising output per hectare. Eg. Single cross hybrid seed coverage remains limited across the rainfed kharif maize belts of Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh.
      The Fix: Drive seed replacement with single cross hybrids in the rainfed kharif districts and expand irrigated rabi maize, which yields far more per hectare.
    2. Protein meal supply carries no import ceiling: India does not permit routine imports of genetically modified soyabean meal, so domestic meal prices have no external cap when they run up. Eg. The Centre allowed a one time import of 1.2 million tonnes of de-oiled genetically modified soyameal in 2021 after poultry feed costs spiked.
      The Fix: Notify a standing tariff rate quota for de-oiled soyameal that opens automatically once domestic prices cross a declared trigger.
    3. Dairy runs on a fodder deficit: Cattle and buffalo rations depend on crop residue and grazing land that is shrinking, which pushes more of the ration onto purchased compound feed. Eg. Fodder crops occupy roughly 4% of India’s gross cropped area and that share has not expanded in decades.
      The Fix: Bring fodder crops into seed subsidy and assured procurement in the major milk shed districts, so a farmer growing fodder is not worse off than one growing grain.
    4. Poultry carries weather risk without cover: Commercial layer and broiler units sit outside the livestock insurance cover that large ruminants receive, so mortality in a heat wave is borne entirely by the farmer. Eg. The livestock insurance component of central animal husbandry schemes covers cattle, buffalo, sheep, goat and pig, and not commercial poultry.
      The Fix: Extend livestock insurance to commercial poultry units with a temperature triggered payout, so relief does not wait on a mortality survey.

    Conclusion

    Feed, not disease and not demand, is what now sets the price of an egg, a kilogram of chicken and a litre of milk. The animal economy has grown faster than the grain and oilmeal base that feeds it, so a single bad grain year passes straight through to the consumer. The decision point is the feedstock order for the coming crushing year, which settles how much grain the fuel programme takes before the feed industry gets to it. The marker to watch is whether the government caps grain diversion to protect feed supply, or holds the blending target and lets feed prices clear the market.

    Back2Basics

    1. What the NECC is: A body of poultry farmers formed in 1982 to co-ordinate egg marketing and stabilise prices for producers.
    2. What it does: It declares daily suggested farm-gate egg prices for each of its producing and consuming centres, which the trade uses as the reference rate.
    3. Its standing: The prices are indicative and carry no statutory force, and the body is a producers’ association rather than a regulator.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2015, GS3, 12.5 marks] Livestock rearing has a big potential for providing non-farm employment and income in rural areas. Discuss suggesting suitable measures to promote this sector in India.”

  • A possible G3 is casting a shadow over BRICS

    A possible G3 is casting a shadow over BRICS

    Why in the News

    BRICS leaders meet in Delhi this week to add further layers of cooperation, ranging from agriculture, health to digitalisation. The grouping’s two principal driving forces, Russia and China, are at the same time exploring separate and joint accommodations with the United States, whose domination of the world order BRICS exists to counter.

    What will the Delhi summit actually produce?

    1. More layers, slowly added: The summit will extend cooperation into agriculture, health and digitalisation.
    2. The declaration is not the draw: The last summit, at Rio de Janeiro, issued a declaration of 126 paragraphs without changing anything in the international system.
    3. The attraction is attendance: International interest is focused on the presence of the leaders of China, Russia and Iran.
    4. One bilateral carries the weight: The Chinese President is visiting India for the first time since 2019, and the two leaders are expected to stabilise the boundary situation and reset economic relations.

    Why has BRICS become less coherent?

    1. Expansion cut both ways: Enlargement added weight to the grouping and subtracted coherence from it.
    2. The Iran war split two members: The conflict opened a sharp divide between Tehran and Abu Dhabi, now fellow members of the grouping.
    3. Two incompatible asks: Iran wants BRICS to condemn American and Israeli military action. The United Arab Emirates, which suffered Iranian attacks and disruption to commerce through the Strait of Hormuz, stresses sovereignty, protection of civilian infrastructure and freedom of navigation.
    4. It has already cost an outcome: Those differences prevented the BRICS foreign ministers from issuing a consensual joint statement in Delhi in May.

    Why is a G3 conceivable now?

    1. A leader driven American approach: The US President has long held that good personal relations with the Russian and Chinese leaders could reduce global strategic tensions and produce major political and economic deals.
    2. Domestic and allied resistance: That instinct has repeatedly encountered resistance from the American foreign policy establishment, Congress and US allies.
    3. European and Asian fears differ: The Europeans worry that an accommodation with Moscow could be made at their expense. Asian allies fear that a bargain with Beijing could weaken American commitments to regional security.
    4. Nothing has been transformed yet: Neither relationship has been changed, and the preference for leader driven diplomacy keeps the possibility of movement open.
    5. The idea has been tested before: The possibility of such a meeting was explored last summer, during the 80th anniversary of the end of the Second World War.

    What does Russia bring to that table?

    1. The war has not been won: Four and a half years of fighting have produced no decisive victory, and the front remains costly and difficult to move.
    2. A channel has reopened: Shuttle diplomacy by American envoys between Moscow and Kyiv has reopened the diplomatic channel, without any sign that the fundamental differences between Russia and Ukraine are narrowing.
    3. Both sides hedge: Moscow and Kyiv are supporting the American peace initiative and preparing for escalation at the same time.
    4. European security could become a chip: Russian security questions could be treated by Washington as part of a larger bargain with Beijing.

    What does China bring?

    1. It negotiates from strength: China approaches Washington from a stronger position than Russia does.
    2. A sequenced diplomatic run: Its journey from the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit at Bishkek, through Cairo and Delhi, to the White House later this month presents China as the leader of the Global South and as a co-equal manager of the international order at the same time.
    3. What a second summit could yield: An extension of the trade truce, additional Chinese purchases from the United States and negotiations over technology restrictions are the available deliverables.
    4. The differences are structural: Washington accuses China of relying on subsidised exports and industrial overcapacity. Beijing uses rare earths, market access and its control of important supply chains as leverage.
    5. Taiwan is the standing ask: China will continue to press for a reduction in American support for Taiwan.

    Can anti-Western rhetoric and a seat at the American table hold together?

    1. Alignment and hedging run together: Russia and China are closer to each other than ever and share concerns about the United States. Both also seek a workable relationship with Washington.
    2. Both claim the high table: For all their anti-Western rhetoric, each claims a place at the high table with the United States.
    3. The claim has history: Russia was once part of the G8, the group of Western industrial states, and engaged directly with NATO. China now sees itself as America’s peer.
    4. What a trilateral would signify: Both lay claim to shaping the global order established after 1945, and a summit of the three leaders would mark the beginning of triangular global leadership as a successor to the Yalta System.
    5. It is not imminent: A global directorate of three is not close, and the idea remains an exploration rather than a plan.

    What are India’s three answers?

    1. Build national power first: The first answer is internal reform and accelerated economic development.
    2. Separate multipolarity from anti-American bloc politics: Russia and China use BRICS to expand their diplomatic options and to preserve the freedom to negotiate with Washington. India must approach the emerging order with the same realism.
    3. Widen the partnership base: India must intensify bilateral and minilateral cooperation with the Anglosphere, Brazil, Europe, Japan, Korea and other middle powers that have no enthusiasm for a G3 world.

    Challenges to BRICS

    1. Internal rivalry limits cohesion: Friction between the two largest Asian members prevents a common strategic position inside the grouping. Eg. The unsettled India-China boundary has kept the two from a shared security line inside the same forum.
    2. Consensus across incompatible political systems: The membership spans vibrant democracies and autocracies, which makes agreement on human rights or democratic norms unreachable in joint declarations. Eg. The entry of Iran and Ethiopia alongside Brazil and India widened that political range further.
    3. De-dollarisation is slower than the rhetoric: Local currency settlement has grown, and the US dollar still settles the overwhelming share of global trade. Eg. Rupee-rouble and rupee-dirham settlement covers only a fraction of India’s external trade.
    4. There is no permanent secretariat: The grouping has no charter and no standing institution, so continuity depends entirely on the annual chair. Eg. Each presidency resets the agenda, and commitments lapse when the chair changes.
    5. Intra-group trade stays low: Members continue to rely on G7 markets for high technology imports and services exports. Eg. Most members source advanced semiconductors and aerospace components from the United States, Europe and Japan.
    6. Expansion risks dilution: A larger BRICS+ risks becoming a discussion forum that produces no decisions. Eg. The Non-Aligned Movement grew past 120 members and lost the ability to reach operative positions.

    Way Forward

    1. Focus on areas of common interest: Confine joint positions to areas where members already agree, such as development finance and public health, rather than seeking a security consensus that does not exist.
    2. Adopt variable geometry: Move towards a variable geometry model in which subsets of members can sign issue specific instruments without binding the whole group.
    3. Strengthen payment infrastructure: Target payments infrastructure that lowers settlement cost and time, rather than focusing primarily on the displacement of the US dollar as a reserve currency.
    4. Create a permanent institutional mechanism: Establish a small standing secretariat with a limited mandate to track implementation of past declarations and maintain institutional continuity.
    5. Promote intra-BRICS supply chains: Direct the New Development Bank towards financing intra-group industrial supply chains, particularly in strategic sectors such as advanced technology and manufacturing.
    6. Formalise expansion criteria: Establish clear entry criteria for partner countries, ensuring that future expansion is based on economic complementarity rather than political alignment.

    Conclusion

    Multipolarity has always had two possible shapes: one distributes power across many capitals; the other concentrates it among a handful and calls the result a balance. BRICS rests on the first assumption; its two strongest members hedge towards the second. For India the operative question is not whether a three cornered directorate forms, which it may not, but whether Indian diplomacy is organised for a world in which its two largest partners in the grouping negotiate separately with Washington. That answer will show up in what India builds outside the room, not in what the room declares.

    About BRICS

    1. What it is: BRICS is an informal grouping of major emerging economies that coordinates political and economic positions outside Western led institutions, without a founding treaty.
    2. Membership: Its full members are Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, with Saudi Arabia participating without having formalised its status.
    3. Its weight: The grouping accounts for over 45 per cent of the world’s population, about 37 per cent of global output measured at purchasing power parity, which exceeds the G7’s share, and roughly 42 per cent of global oil production and exports.
    4. Its stated objectives: Reform of the United Nations Security Council, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank for more equitable representation, a multipolar order, and reduced reliance on the US dollar and on SWIFT, the messaging network banks use to instruct cross border payments.

    Key Facts about BRICS

    1. The acronym predates the grouping: ‘BRIC’ was coined in 2001 by a Goldman Sachs economist to identify high growth emerging economies.
    2. From officials to leaders: The first meeting of foreign ministers was held on the margins of the United Nations General Assembly in 2006. The first formal Leaders’ Summit was held at Yekaterinburg in Russia in 2009.
    3. How it grew: South Africa joined in 2011. Expansion was decided at the 2023 Johannesburg Summit, with Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates joining in 2024 and Indonesia in 2025.
    4. A partner tier: A ‘Partner Country’ category was introduced in 2024 to engage states such as Malaysia, Thailand and Nigeria without granting full membership.

    Initiatives under BRICS

    1. New Development Bank: Headquartered in Shanghai, it has approved over USD 35 billion in infrastructure lending.
    2. Contingent Reserve Arrangement: A USD 100 billion fund providing short term liquidity support to members.
    3. BRICS Pay: A cross border payment system in pilot stage, intended to work around SWIFT.
    4. BRICS Vaccine Research and Development Centre: Set up during the pandemic for technology transfer and vaccine equity.
    5. Remote Sensing Satellite Constellation: Six satellites contributed by member states, sharing data for disaster management.
    6. Partnership on New Industrial Revolution (PartNIR): Cooperation on artificial intelligence, digitalisation and green technology.
    7. BRICS Space Council: Established in 2025 to coordinate deep space exploration and lunar research.

    Back2Basics: The Yalta System

    • Why the term recurs: ‘Yalta System’ is used as shorthand for an international order settled among a small number of great powers rather than by the wider membership.f BRICS in projecting itself as an alternative to other groupings.”
    • Where the term comes from: The Yalta Conference of February 1945 brought together the leaders of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union to settle the shape of the post-war order.
    • What it settled: It fixed the occupation and reorganisation of Europe and confirmed agreement on creating the United Nations.
    • The concert it produced: It led to a Security Council with permanent seats and a veto for five powers, entrenching great power management of international peace.

    [2026, GS2, 10.0 marks] “BRICS acts as a powerful counterweight in global governance, actively amplifying the voice and influence of the Global South.” Explain the role of BRICS in projecting itself as an alternative to other groupings.

  • Why a flat map fails to accurately depict Earth

    Why a flat map fails to accurately depict Earth

    Why in the News

    • The UN General Assembly has adopted a resolution encouraging a shift from the Mercator projection towards the Equal Earth projection.
    • 164 countries, including India, supported the resolution.
    • The United States voted against, while six countries abstained.
    • The resolution is non-binding.
    • The debate centres on how world maps represent the relative size of different regions, particularly Africa.

    What is a Map Projection?

    • A map projection converts the three-dimensional Earth into a two-dimensional map.
    • Every projection involves some form of distortion.
    • Four major properties are: Area, Shape, Distance, Direction
    • Major types include:
      • Conformal: Preserves local angles and shapes.
      • Equal-area: Preserves relative areas.
      • Equidistant: Preserves selected distances.
      • Compromise: Balances different types of distortion.

    Mercator Projection

    • Developed by Gerardus Mercator in 1569.
    • Designed mainly for navigation.
    • Meridians and parallels are represented as straight lines.
    • A constant compass bearing can be represented as a straight line.
    • It is a conformal projection.

    Major Limitation

    • Areas become increasingly exaggerated towards the poles.
    • Greenland and Antarctica therefore appear much larger than their actual relative size.
    • This can visually distort perceptions of the geographical size of regions.

    Equal Earth Projection

    • Developed in 2018.
    • It is an equal-area projection.
    • Preserves the relative area of landmasses.
    • Particularly useful for:
      • Population distribution
      • Climate data
      • Land-use mapping
      • Resource distribution
    • It sacrifices some accuracy in shape and distance.

    Which Projection for Which Purpose?

    • Navigation → Mercator or other conformal projections.
    • Statistical/thematic maps → Equal-area projections such as Equal Earth.
    • General world maps → Robinson or Winkel Tripel.
    • Polar regions → Azimuthal projections.

    Challenges

    • UN resolutions are not legally binding.
    • Digital mapping systems continue to rely heavily on Mercator-derived projections.
    • Changing a projection does not eliminate distortion; it only changes which property is prioritised.
    • Therefore, maps should clearly mention the projection and its principal purpose.

    Way Forward

    • Use projection according to purpose, rather than adopting one universal map.
    • Provide equal-area options in government statistical and mapping platforms.
    • Clearly mention the projection used on published maps.
    • Improve geographical literacy by teaching the limitations of different projections.

    Prelims Pointers

    • Compromise projections → Balance multiple distortions.
    • Mercator → Conformal projection.
    • Mercator → Developed in 1569.
    • Mercator’s major use → Navigation.
    • Equal Earth → Equal-area projection.
    • Equal-area projection → Preserves relative areas.
    • Geostationary ≠ Geosynchronous is a separate orbital concept, not a map projection.
    • No flat map → Can simultaneously preserve area, shape, distance and direction perfectly.
  • For ISRO, expanding ecosystem is way forward

    For ISRO, expanding ecosystem is way forward

    Why in the News

    The chairman of the Indian National Space Promotion and Authorisation Centre (IN-SPACe), the nodal agency that promotes and guides private participation in space, has said that the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) would eventually not manufacture any launch vehicles, and that the work would be done by private companies. The remark widened a dispute that had begun when ISRO tightened its norms for resignation and voluntary retirement of senior scientific personnel. Employee associations wrote to the ISRO leadership asking whether the remark represented official policy. The ISRO chairman then stated categorically that there was no move to privatise the agency. The same statement welcomed an increasing role for private companies. The contest is between an agency being restructured towards exploration and science, and the commercial launch revenue it would give up to get there.

    What triggered the dispute inside ISRO?

    1. The starting point was a personnel rule: ISRO tightened its norms for resignation and voluntary retirement of senior scientific personnel, which is what opened the wider debate.
    2. The dispute then changed subject: It expanded into questions about the role of the private sector in space and about the future of the space agency itself.
    3. The staff sought a policy ruling: Employee associations asked the leadership whether a public remark by the head of the promotion agency represented official policy, which the ISRO chairman answered by ruling out privatisation.

    What model is the government moving towards?

    1. The reference model is NASA: ISRO is being prepared to focus primarily on big-ticket space projects, scientific missions and exploration missions, with routine launches passing to private industry.
    2. The agency is also the mentor: ISRO is being asked to handhold private industry and help it reach a level of maturity.
    3. Personnel already move that way: Most private space companies carry retired ISRO scientists as advisors or mentors.
    4. Infrastructure is already shared: ISRO offers its launch pads and related services to these companies.
    5. A launch vehicle has already left the agency: ISRO developed the Small Satellite Launch Vehicle (SSLV) over the years and has transferred the technology to Hindustan Aeronautics Limited, a public-sector undertaking.

    What does an expanded ecosystem deliver?

    1. Launch volume and revenue: A private space ecosystem can carry a large number of commercial launches and bring in much-needed revenue.
    2. People and jobs: It can develop a large talent pool and generate fresh employment opportunities.
    3. Diplomatic weight: Capabilities in space products and services are becoming a powerful diplomatic good.

    Where does the model cut against ISRO?

    1. Provider or beneficiary: The concern within sections of the ISRO staff is that the agency should not merely be a provider to the ecosystem but also a beneficiary of it.
    2. The revenue it steps away from: By moving out of commercial launches, ISRO forgoes an important source of income it currently earns.
    3. Budget dependence constrains ambition: Becoming entirely dependent on government budgets limits capability, since neither research and development nor ambitious exploration projects are cheap.
    4. Talent has a price: An agency doing frontier work has to attract and retain top-tier talent, which is also what the tightened exit norms were reaching for.

    Why is institutional independence part of the argument?

    1. Political attention has helped: Sustained interest at the highest political level in the space sector has brought ISRO steady government support for its plans and projects.
    2. The success has a stated cause: ISRO’s record is often attributed to its relative immunity from government interference.
    3. The staff concern is about that autonomy: The apprehension within the agency is that a restructuring driven from outside erodes the independence the agency has enjoyed so far, at the point when its missions become more ambitious.

    Challenges to India’s expanding space ecosystem

    1. Demand does not yet match the launch capacity being built: A commercial launch business depends on a payload pipeline that Indian startups do not control, and the global small satellite launch market is already crowded with subsidised incumbents. Eg. Skyroot Aerospace flew the Vikram-S suborbital demonstration in November 2022 and Agnikul Cosmos flew a single-stage vehicle with a 3D-printed engine in May 2024, and neither has since established a regular commercial orbital cadence.
      The Fix: Anchor private launch demand with a committed government payload order book, on the model of NASA’s block procurement of commercial launches.
    2. Deep-technology capital is scarce and short in tenure: Space hardware takes years to reach revenue, which sits badly with venture funds that need an exit inside a fund life. Eg. The Rs 1,000 crore venture capital fund for the space sector announced in 2024 is small against the capital a single launch vehicle programme absorbs.
      The Fix: Convert a share of that fund into milestone-linked, non-dilutive grants for qualification testing, which is the stage where hardware companies stall.
    3. The regulator promotes and authorises the same firms it helps: IN-SPACe both promotes private participation and authorises the activity, so the body encouraging an entrant also clears its safety and liability case. Eg. The Indian Space Policy, 2023 assigned both functions to the same agency.
      The Fix: Separate the authorisation function into a distinct decision-making arm with its own record of reasons, keeping promotion and clearance in different hands.
    4. Liability for damage rests with the government whoever launches: Under the Outer Space Treaty, 1967 and the Liability Convention, 1972, the launching State is internationally liable for damage caused by an object launched from its territory. Eg. A private Indian operator’s failure abroad becomes a claim against the Union of India, not against the company.
      The Fix: Enact a domestic space activities law fixing indemnity ceilings and compulsory third-party insurance for authorised private operators.

    Conclusion

    The two halves of the plan pull in opposite directions. An agency told to concentrate on science and exploration is also being told to release the commercial work that would part-fund it, which leaves the exploration mandate resting entirely on an annual budget line. The unresolved question is whether the government intends to replace the forgone earnings with an assured allocation, or whether the restructuring is a transfer of revenue without a transfer of cost. The marker over the next Budget cycle is the direction of the Department of Space’s allocation once commercial launch work has moved out, since a flat allocation would settle the question the agency’s staff are actually asking.

    Back2Basics: IN-SPACe

    1. What it is: The Indian National Space Promotion and Authorisation Centre is an autonomous body under the Department of Space, created in 2020 as the single-window agency for private participation in space activities.
    2. What it authorises: It grants authorisation to non-government entities for launches, satellite operations, ground stations and space-based services.
    3. What it enables: It permits private entities to use ISRO’s facilities and to obtain transfer of ISRO-developed technology.
    4. Where it sits in policy: The Indian Space Policy, 2023 assigns it the promotion and authorisation functions, keeps ISRO on research, development and exploration, and leaves NewSpace India Limited to commercialise ISRO’s technologies.

    [2026] Consider the following statements about involvement of private entities in India’s space programme:

    1. IN-SPACe is an autonomous agency formed to facilitate participation of private entities.

    2. Agnikul Cosmos launched the world’s first flight using 3D-printed rocket engine.

    3. Skyroot Aerospace has developed liquid fuel for GSLV.

    (a) 1 only

    (b) 2 and 3 only

    (c) 1 and 2 only

    (d) 1, 2 and 3