💥Join UPSC 2027,2028 Mentorship (August Batch) + XFactor Notes & Microthemes PDF
Talk to Mentor

Civilsdaily

Login

Type: Explained

These Newscards correspond to the explained section of various newspapers. They become immensely important for both prelims and mains and special attention needs to be paid to them

  • Tribunals Reforms Bill, 2026 creates National Tribunals Commission after a decade-long tussle with the Supreme Court

    Why in the News

    Parliament passed the Tribunals Reforms Bill, 2026, which creates a National Tribunals Commission, fixes member tenure at five years and repeals the Tribunals Reforms Act of August 2021. The measure ends a decade in which the Centre re-enacted provisions the Supreme Court had struck down, most recently in November 2025 when a Bench called the 2021 re-enactment an impermissible legislative override. It concedes the institution the Court had demanded while retaining the appointment, funding and rule making levers that produced the dispute.

    What is the National Tribunals Commission?

    1. An independent oversight body for tribunals: The National Tribunals Commission is created to sever the dependence of tribunals on their parent government ministries for administrative and financial needs.
    2. Composition: It will be headed by a former Supreme Court judge or a former Chief Justice of a High Court, with two judicial members and two technical members.
    3. Qualification for technical members: Technical members must have at least 25 years of experience in fields such as public administration, finance or law.
    4. Core functions: The Commission will conduct the selection process for vacancies, review the performance of tribunals and oversee inquiries into complaints against members.
    5. Data function: It will maintain a National Tribunals Data Grid.
    6. Executive appointment retained: The Centre appoints the chairperson and members, with the chairperson and judicial members appointed after consulting the Chief Justice of India.

    What is the National Tribunals Data Grid?

    1. A central case data repository: The National Tribunals Data Grid is the consolidated database of tribunal case and disposal data to be maintained by the Commission.
    2. Purpose: It supplies the performance data on which the Commission’s review of tribunal functioning will rest, mirroring the role the National Judicial Data Grid performs for courts.

    What is an impermissible legislative override?

    1. Re-enacting a struck down provision: A legislative override is impermissible when a legislature re-enacts the same provision a court has declared unconstitutional, without removing the defect the court identified.
    2. The settled distinction: A legislature may cure the basis of a judgment by changing the underlying law, but it cannot simply nullify the judgment by restoring the identical text.

    Why did the Centre and the Supreme Court end up in a decade long confrontation?

    1. Finance Act, 2017: The statute empowered the Centre to frame rules for tribunals, transferring service conditions and qualifications to executive rule making.
    2. Constitution Bench ruling, 2019: A Constitution Bench struck down those rules for undermining judicial independence.
    3. New rules and a judicial recommendation, 2020: The Centre notified fresh rules, and the Court recommended several modifications, including a five year tenure for members.
    4. Ordinance, April 2021: Instead of incorporating those suggestions, the Centre promulgated an Ordinance fixing tenure at four years, setting a minimum appointment age of 50, and requiring selection committees to recommend a panel of two names.
    5. Provisions struck down as arbitrary: The Court struck down those provisions.
    6. Tribunals Reforms Act, August 2021: Parliament then passed an Act re-enacting the exact provisions the Court had just declared unconstitutional.

    What did the Supreme Court hold in November 2025?

    1. Re-enactment condemned: A two judge Bench struck down provisions of the 2021 Act, calling the re-enactment an impermissible legislative override of earlier judgments.
    2. Criticism of persistent non compliance: The Court criticised the government for its persistent refusal to adhere to its pronouncements.
    3. Four year tenure held anti merit: The Court ruled that a short four year tenure is anti-merit and increases interference by the executive, jeopardising the independence of the judiciary.
    4. Panel of two names rejected: It held that the government could not demand a panel of two names, since this gave the executive undue discretion in appointments.
    5. Direction to create the Commission: It reiterated the need for a National Tribunals Commission and directed the Centre to establish one within four months.
    6. Transitional protection: It protected certain existing appointments and selections while the new framework was being put in place.

    What are the other major changes proposed?

    1. Repeal of the 2021 Act (change to an existing provision): The 2026 Bill repeals the Tribunals Reforms Act of August 2021 in its entirety.
    2. Tenure fixed at five years (change to an existing provision): Chairpersons and members will hold office for a term of five years, replacing the contested four year tenure.
    3. Age ceilings specified (change to an existing provision): The maximum age limit is set at 70 years for chairpersons and 67 years for members.
    4. Reappointment permitted (new provision): Chairpersons and members can be considered for reappointment.
    5. Search cum selection committee restructured (new provision): The committee for members will be headed by a judicial member of the Commission and will include a retired High Court judge, a government secretary, a technical member and experts.
    6. One name per vacancy (change to an existing provision): The committee will recommend one suitable candidate for each vacancy, with one additional name kept on a waiting list, replacing the panel of two.
    7. Appointment deadline imposed (new provision): The government must make the appointment within three months of receiving the recommendation.
    8. Stated legislative intent: The Statement of Objects and Reasons says the Bill is introduced in consonance with the directions of the Supreme Court, to improve efficiency and ensure independence, transparency and uniformity in the functioning of tribunals.

    Why does the Bill not fully sever executive control?

    1. Appointment power retained: The Centre appoints the chairperson and members of the Commission itself, so the body meant to insulate tribunals is constituted by the executive.
    2. Consultation is not concurrence: The chairperson and judicial members are appointed after consulting the Chief Justice of India, a formulation that does not bind the government to the advice.
    3. Secretariat under the Centre: The Centre appoints the Commission’s secretary, which places the administrative machinery of the oversight body within executive reach.
    4. Financial dependence continues: The Centre provides grants to the Commission, reproducing at one remove the funding dependence the Court objected to.
    5. Rule making powers preserved: The Centre retains rule making powers over several aspects of tribunal members’ qualifications and service conditions.
    6. Reappointment as a pressure point: Permitting reappointment gives the appointing authority a continuing hold over a serving member’s prospects.

    Challenges to the National Tribunals Commission

    1. Vacancies outlast reform statutes: Tribunal benches sit without presiding officers for long periods, e.g. the National Green Tribunal has functioned with single member or non functional zonal benches for extended stretches.
    2. Parent ministry conflict of interest persists in adjudication: A tribunal often decides cases against the very ministry that shapes its service rules, e.g. the Armed Forces Tribunal adjudicates disputes against the Ministry of Defence.
    3. Appeal architecture keeps burdening the Supreme Court: Several statutes provide a direct appeal from a tribunal to the Supreme Court, e.g. appeals from the Telecom Disputes Settlement and Appellate Tribunal go straight to the Supreme Court, bypassing the High Courts.
    4. Technical member dominance dilutes judicial character: Benches weighted toward administrative expertise weaken the adjudicatory function, e.g. the Court in the Madras Bar Association line of cases repeatedly objected to bench composition tilted against judicial members.
    5. Uneven infrastructure and geographic access: Litigants travel long distances because benches are concentrated in a few cities, e.g. the abolition of appellate bodies in the 2021 rationalisation pushed those appeals to High Courts already carrying large backlogs.
    6. Rationalisation without capacity transfer: Abolishing a tribunal shifts its docket to courts without a matching increase in judicial strength, e.g. the 2021 rationalisation abolished nine appellate tribunals including the Intellectual Property Appellate Board and moved their work to High Courts.
    7. Non compliance with judicial directions: The record of the last decade shows directions being met with re-enactment rather than implementation, e.g. the 2021 Act reproduced the very four year tenure the Court had struck down months earlier.

    Conclusion

    A decade of contest between the legislature and the Court has ended with the Centre conceding the institution, since the Bill creates the National Tribunals Commission the Court had demanded and restores the five year tenure the Court recommended in 2020. The concession stops short of independence, because the Centre still appoints the Commission’s chairperson, members and secretary, funds it through grants and retains rule making powers over qualifications and service conditions. The measure has reached the stage of passage by both Houses of Parliament as the Tribunals Reforms Bill, 2026, and awaits Presidential assent and notification before it can take effect. The next milestone named in the record is the constitution of the National Tribunals Commission, which the Supreme Court’s November 2025 judgment directed the Centre to complete within four months.

  • Census 2027 questionnaire notified with 40 questions and India’s first caste enumeration since Independence

    Why in the News

    The Registrar General and Census Commissioner of India notified a schedule of 40 questions for the population enumeration phase of Census 2027 on 14 August, and the schedule went live on 17 August in Ladakh and the snow bound areas of Jammu and Kashmir, Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh through a self enumeration portal. The design of a single field decides the value of the whole exercise, since Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe respondents select from a fixed drop down while every other respondent types a caste name into an open field, the same method that produced over 46 lakh caste names in the 2011 Socio-Economic and Caste Census.

    What is the population enumeration phase of Census 2027?

    1. The second of two phases: The Census runs in two stages, a houselisting and housing phase followed by the population enumeration phase that records individual level characteristics.
    2. Scope of the notified schedule: The Registrar General notified 40 questions to be asked during this phase, against 29 questions in the Census 2011 questionnaire.
    3. Thirteen new data fields: The schedule adds 13 new questions or data fields that were not part of the 2011 questionnaire.
    4. Self enumeration route: The schedule was made available through a self enumeration portal, allowing a household to fill its own record rather than wait for an enumerator.
    5. Fields marked mandatory: The data fields in the caste section are marked mandatory, with declining to declare recorded as an option rather than left blank.
    6. Wider than the gazette text: The schedule made available to respondents further expands the data fields notified in the Gazette of India.

    What was the Socio-Economic and Caste Census (SECC) of 2011?

    1. A separate survey, not the Census: The Socio-Economic and Caste Census (SECC) of 2011 was a household survey of deprivation indicators conducted alongside but separately from the decennial Census.
    2. The caste data outcome: Its open field method of recording caste returned over 46 lakh different caste names, and the government has maintained over the last decade that the data were unreliable because of errors in data collection.

    What is the National Population Register (NPR)?

    1. A register of usual residents: The National Population Register (NPR) is a register of persons usually resident in a locality, distinct from a citizens’ register.
    2. Status of the update: The NPR was initially proposed to be updated along with the first phase of the Census, and has been put on the back burner amid opposition over concerns that the data could be used to build a country wide National Register of Citizens (NRC).

    What are the new data fields added to the 2027 schedule?

    1. Parents’ religion, date and place of birth: Under the head Family Particulars, the schedule seeks the religion, date of birth and place of birth up to the village level of both the father and the mother.
    2. Birth outside India recorded: A separate option records the place of birth of the father and mother if either was born outside India.
    3. Religion categories fixed with an escape field: Six religious categories are listed, Hindu, Christian, Sikh, Buddhist, Muslim and Jain, with other religion recordable in a separate column.
    4. Identity document details: The schedule seeks Aadhaar, mobile, voter identity card and driving licence details.
    5. Place of COVID-19 vaccination: A question on the place of COVID-19 vaccination offers two options, within India or outside India.
    6. Overlap with the NPR rehearsal form: The additional questions on parents’ particulars, Aadhaar, mobile, voter identity card and driving licence mirror those asked in the 2019 rehearsal form for the National Population Register.

    How will caste be recorded, and why does the method matter?

    1. A drop down for SC and ST respondents: Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe respondents select their caste from a predetermined drop down menu, which fixes the universe of permissible answers.
    2. An open field for everyone else: Question 10(C) reads, if not SC or ST in this State or Union Territory, enter caste name, leaving the entry entirely to the respondent.
    3. Two additional recorded choices: Besides the caste field, the schedule carries Does not want to declare Caste and No Caste as recordable options.
    4. The first count since Independence: This is independent India’s first caste enumeration, since the last full caste count was conducted in 1931.
    5. Why the asymmetry matters: A closed list produces categories that can be aggregated and compared, while free text produces spelling variants, sub caste names, surnames and gotra entries that cannot.
    6. The objection raised: The principal Opposition party has questioned the open field methodology and alleged that the government has abandoned the caste census it announced on 30 April 2025.

    Why does the open field method invite the 2011 failure?

    1. The precedent is documented: The same open field method in the 2011 SECC returned over 46 lakh caste names for a country whose recognised caste categories number in the thousands.
    2. The government’s own verdict on that data: The administration has maintained consistently over the last decade that the SECC caste data were unreliable because of errors in data collection.
    3. Asymmetric quality by design: SC and ST returns will be clean because they are drawn from a list, while Other Backward Classes and general category returns will carry the full noise of free text.
    4. Post enumeration classification burden: Reconciling millions of free text strings into usable categories becomes a discretionary exercise conducted after the count, not during it.
    5. Policy consequence: The categories that most need reliable numbers for reservation and welfare targeting are precisely the ones the open field leaves unstructured.
    6. Trust consequence: Recording caste as mandatory while leaving its classification unstructured invites the charge that the exercise is being conducted without an intention to use the result.

    Challenges to Census 2027

    1. Migrant and homeless undercount: Circular migrants and street dwelling populations are systematically missed, e.g. the absence of updated migration data after 2011 left ration portability planning during the 2020 lockdown without a reliable base.
    2. Digital self enumeration excludes the least connected: A portal based first phase presumes smartphone access and digital literacy, e.g. only 57 percent of women in India have independent internet access against 72 percent of men.
    3. Enumerator capacity and training: The count relies on schoolteachers deputed for the task with short training, e.g. Booth Level Officers in the Telangana Special Intensive Revision of 2026 were found skipping door to door verification under workload pressure.
    4. Data privacy exposure: Collecting Aadhaar, mobile, voter identity and driving licence details in one record creates a linkable profile, e.g. the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 carries wide exemptions for State instrumentalities processing such data.
    5. Political contestation over the instrument: State level demands can stall the exercise itself, e.g. a 48 hour shutdown in Imphal in August 2026 demanded a National Register of Citizens before the Census in Manipur.
    6. Delimitation and reservation stakes raise the incentive to misreport: Census figures feed seat readjustment and reservation shares, e.g. Article 82 makes the census the basis for readjusting Lok Sabha seat allocation.
    7. Snow bound and conflict affected areas run on a different clock: A staggered reference date fragments comparability, e.g. Ladakh and the snow bound belts began enumeration in August 2026 while the rest of the country follows later.

    Conclusion

    The value of India’s first post Independence caste count now rests on a design choice rather than on the count itself, since a drop down for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and free text for everyone else guarantees two grades of data from a single schedule. The stage reached is definite, the 40 question schedule was notified by the Registrar General and Census Commissioner of India on 14 August 2026, and self enumeration went live on 17 August 2026 in Ladakh and the snow bound areas of Jammu and Kashmir, Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh, with the self enumeration window running to 31 August. The next milestone is the extension of population enumeration to the rest of the country, for which the source names no separate date. Unless the free text entries are reconciled against a recognised list, the exercise will reproduce the 46 lakh name problem the government itself called unreliable.

  • Parliament curbs States’ power to tax mineral rights through MMDR Amendment Bill, 2026

    Why in the News

    Parliament has passed the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Bill, 2026, which restricts the power of States to impose levies on mineral rights and mineral bearing lands. The change follows a Supreme Court ruling that had upheld exactly that State taxing power and permitted recovery of arrears going back to 1 April 2005. A legislative measure aimed at investor certainty now sits directly against a judicially affirmed source of State revenue.

    What is the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957?

    1. Governing statute: The Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 (MMDR Act) is the central law regulating the grant of mineral concessions and the development of mines in India. It is administered by the Ministry of Mines.
    2. Union declaration: Section 2 of the Act declares it expedient in the public interest that the Union take control of the regulation of mines and mineral development, which activates Parliament’s competence over the field.
    3. Concession regime: No person may undertake reconnaissance, prospecting or mining except under a licence or lease granted under the Act and the rules made under it.
    4. Auction based allocation: The 2015 amendment made auction the sole method for granting mineral concessions for major minerals, replacing discretionary allotment.
    5. Minor minerals carve out: Section 15 empowers State governments to frame rules for granting concessions in respect of minor minerals, while the power to notify a mineral as minor rests with the Central government.

    What is royalty in mining?

    1. Definition: Royalty is the payment a lessee makes to the State for the privilege of extracting and removing a mineral from the land, calculated per tonne or as a percentage of sale value.
    2. Statutory rates: Royalty rates for major minerals are fixed in the Second Schedule of the MMDR Act by the Central government, so a State cannot revise them on its own.

    What is a tax on mineral bearing land?

    1. Definition: A tax on mineral bearing land is a State levy imposed on the land itself, with the mineral yield of that land used as the measure of the tax.
    2. Distinct head: It is levied separately from royalty and from the auction premium a bidder pays to win a mine, and it is the head of levy the current amendment restricts.

    Current status of States’ power to tax mineral rights in India

    1. Judicially affirmed right: The Supreme Court upheld the right of States to impose taxes on mineral rights and mineral bearing lands, and separately permitted recovery of arrears going back to 1 April 2005.
    2. State levies already in force: Jharkhand imposed a mineral bearing land tax on iron ore at Rs 100 per tonne, subsequently hiked, and Tamil Nadu set a tax on limestone at Rs 160 per tonne.
    3. Scale of the levy structure: States impose 14 types of taxes, charges, fees and levies, including royalty and auction premium, and the rates of royalty and taxes vary across States.
    4. Statutory deductions already fixed centrally: Lessees additionally pay into the District Mineral Foundation (DMF) and the National Mineral Exploration Trust (NMET) at rates pegged to royalty, which the Centre sets.
    5. Position after the amendment: The new law restricts the State levies on mineral rights and mineral bearing lands, and a government fact sheet states that States will continue to receive the overwhelming share of mining revenue.

    Constitutional provisions related to the taxation of mineral rights

    1. Article 246 with the Seventh Schedule: Distributes legislative competence between Parliament and the State legislatures across the Union, State and Concurrent Lists.
    2. Entry 54, List I: Gives Parliament power over the regulation of mines and mineral development to the extent declared by law to be expedient in the public interest.
    3. Entry 23, List II: Gives States power over the regulation of mines and mineral development, expressly subject to Entry 54 of List I.
    4. Entry 50, List II: Gives States the power to levy taxes on mineral rights, expressly subject to any limitations imposed by Parliament by law relating to mineral development.
    5. Entry 49, List II: Gives States the power to levy taxes on lands and buildings, the head under which mineral bearing land taxes are framed.
    6. Article 265: Bars the levy or collection of any tax except by authority of law.

    Why has Parliament moved to restrict State levies?

    1. Certainty and predictability: The stated rationale is to provide greater certainty and predictability in the mining sector for project developers.
    2. Investment flows: A stable levy structure is intended to facilitate investment flows into a sector the Union treats as vital to growth.
    3. Cost pass through: Higher State levies feed into the price of minerals and therefore into infrastructure costs downstream.
    4. Price uniformity: The change is also read as a bid to bring some degree of uniformity in the prices of major minerals, since royalty and tax rates currently differ from State to State.
    5. Critical minerals push: The Union government has launched a critical mineral mission, and a more predictable framework is meant to support that programme.

    Why do States read the amendment as an erosion of fiscal federalism?

    1. Loss of an affirmed revenue head: States moved to raise revenue from mining only after the Supreme Court affirmed that they could, and the amendment removes that opening.
    2. Concentration of dependence: For mineral rich States such as Odisha, Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh, revenue from this channel accounts for a significant share of non tax revenue.
    3. Narrow revenue base: State governments already have limited avenues to raise resources on their own, so each restriction on a taxing head weighs heavily.
    4. Arrears at stake: The right to recover arrears from 1 April 2005 represented a large one time accrual that the restriction places in doubt.
    5. Centre State friction: The apprehension is expressed as a concern about State revenues in particular and fiscal federalism in general, which needs to be addressed rather than assumed away.

    What does the tax burden on Indian mining actually look like?

    1. Effective tax rate: The effective tax rate in India is higher than 50 percent of revenues, according to a report on States’ Best Practices in Mining by FIMI-EY.
    2. Comparative burden: The same report places the effective rate in other countries at 35 to 40 percent of revenues.
    3. Cumulative structure: The Indian figure is the result of stacking royalty, auction premium, statutory contributions and State levies, and not of any single rate.
    4. Rationalisation as the fix: Rationalisation of taxes and royalties is presented as the step that would facilitate greater investor interest in the sector.

    What do cross country comparisons show, and how far does the evidence go?

    1. Limits of the source evidence: The comparison offered is a single aggregate figure of 35 to 40 percent, with no individual country named, so it establishes a gap rather than a model to copy.
    2. Australia: Mineral royalties are a State subject, and Western Australia levies ad valorem royalties on iron ore without a federal ceiling on State rates.
    3. Chile: The mining royalty law of 2023 combines an ad valorem component with a margin linked component on large copper producers, and caps the combined burden on a firm.
    4. South Africa: The Mineral and Petroleum Resources Royalty Act, 2008 sets a formula based royalty that moves with the producer’s profitability and with whether the mineral is refined.
    5. Canada: Mining taxes are levied by provinces such as Ontario and Quebec on mine profits, layered above federal corporate income tax.

    Why does the amendment set investor certainty against a judicially affirmed State right?

    1. Reversal of an outcome, not of a principle: The Court affirmed the competence of States under the Constitution, and Parliament has used its own competence to restrict the exercise of that power.
    2. Two legitimate claims: A predictable national mining framework is a genuine requirement for large, long gestation projects. A stable taxing head is a genuine requirement for a State with few own revenue sources.
    3. Uniformity has a price: Uniform mineral prices across States are achieved by removing the very differentiation that reflected each State’s own fiscal need.
    4. Arrears create the sharpest edge: The recovery window from 1 April 2005 was the largest single revenue expectation created by the ruling, and it is the first casualty of the restriction.
    5. Assurance without a mechanism: The assurance that States will keep the overwhelming share of mining revenue rests on royalty and statutory contributions whose rates the Centre alone fixes.

    Major debates surrounding the taxation of mineral rights

    1. Is royalty a tax: A seven judge Bench in India Cement Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu (1989) held royalty to be a tax, and a nine judge Bench in Mineral Area Development Authority v. Steel Authority of India (2024) held by an 8 to 1 majority that royalty is a contractual consideration and not a tax, restoring the States’ Entry 50 power.
    2. Legislative override: The dispute is whether a statute that removes a taxing power after a ruling is a permissible change in the legal basis or an impermissible override of a binding judgment under Article 141.
    3. Retrospective recovery: Recovery of arrears from 1 April 2005 raises the question of whether long settled project economics can be reopened, against the States’ claim to revenue already lawfully due.
    4. Uniformity versus autonomy: National price uniformity for major minerals is set against the constitutional design that lets a State calibrate levies to its own resource endowment.
    5. Compensation gap: There is no settled empirical answer on what mineral rich States lose in absolute terms, since the 14 State levies are not reported on a common basis across States.

    Challenges to the mineral concession framework after the amendment

    1. Revenue substitution for mineral States: States losing a taxing head have no equivalent replacement within their own competence. e.g. Odisha, which draws a large part of its non tax revenue from mining, has no comparable own source levy to fall back on.
    2. Litigation risk: A statute narrowing a power the Court affirmed invites a fresh constitutional challenge, prolonging exactly the uncertainty the amendment targets. e.g. the India Cement to Mineral Area Development Authority sequence ran for 35 years before a settled answer emerged.
    3. Auction premium distortion: Aggressive premium bidding in auctions inflates costs regardless of tax rationalisation. e.g. several iron ore blocks in Odisha were won at premiums exceeding 100 percent of sale value, squeezing operating margins.
    4. Exploration deficit: Rationalising levies does not fix the shortage of drilled and proved resources that investors actually need. e.g. India has explored only a small fraction of its obvious geological potential area despite the National Mineral Exploration Trust being funded since 2015.
    5. Clearance and land bottlenecks: Forest, environment and land acquisition delays, not levy rates, hold up most mine starts. e.g. blocks in the Hasdeo Arand coalfield in Chhattisgarh have stalled for years over forest clearance and Gram Sabha consent.
    6. District Mineral Foundation utilisation: Funds meant for mining affected communities remain unspent or diverted, weakening the social licence for expansion. e.g. DMF collections have exceeded Rs 1 lakh crore cumulatively, with large unspent balances reported in mineral rich districts.
    7. Critical mineral import dependence: Domestic levy reform does not address dependence on imported processed minerals. e.g. India imports the bulk of its lithium and cobalt requirements for battery manufacturing.

    Conclusion

    Parliament has restricted the States’ power to tax mineral rights and mineral bearing lands, undoing in law the revenue consequence of a ruling that had affirmed that power and allowed arrears from 1 April 2005. Investor certainty has been purchased with the tax autonomy of the States that hold the minerals, and the assurance that States keep the overwhelming share of mining revenue rests on rates the Centre alone sets. The measure has been passed by both Houses of Parliament; the source states no further date or next step beyond that stage. Resolving the resulting Centre State friction, not the levy structure alone, is what will determine whether the new framework actually attracts investment.

    Foundational Context: Mining in India

    1. Scale of the sector: India produces 95 minerals, covering fuel, metallic, non metallic, atomic and minor minerals, and mining contributes roughly 2.5 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) including the associated quarrying activity.
    2. Global standing: India is among the world’s largest producers of coal, iron ore, bauxite, chromite and mica, and is the second largest coal producer globally.
    3. Ownership principle: Minerals vest in the State government where they occur, except in offshore areas and for atomic minerals, where they vest in the Union.
    4. Classification: Minerals are divided into major minerals and minor minerals, with minor minerals such as sand, ordinary clay and building stone regulated by State rules under Section 15 of the MMDR Act.
    5. Institutional set up: The Geological Survey of India (GSI) carries out regional exploration, the Indian Bureau of Mines (IBM) oversees conservation and scientific mining, and the Directorate General of Mines Safety (DGMS) regulates safety.

    Constitutional Framework Governing Mineral Taxation and Federal Finance

    1. Article 245: Sets the territorial extent of laws made by Parliament and by State legislatures.
    2. Article 246: Distributes legislative power across the three Lists of the Seventh Schedule.
    3. Entry 54, List I: Union control over the regulation of mines and mineral development to the extent declared by Parliament.
    4. Entry 23, List II: State power over regulation of mines and mineral development, subject to Entry 54 of List I.
    5. Entry 50, List II: State power to tax mineral rights, subject to limitations imposed by Parliament by a law relating to mineral development.
    6. Entry 49, List II: State power to tax lands and buildings.
    7. Article 141: Makes the law declared by the Supreme Court binding on all courts within India.
    8. Article 265: Bars levy or collection of any tax except by authority of law.
    9. Article 280: Provides for the Finance Commission, which recommends the sharing of Union taxes with the States.

    Laws and Rules Governing Mining in India

    1. Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957: The parent statute for mineral concessions and mineral development.
    2. Second Schedule: Fixes royalty rates for major minerals centrally.
    3. Section 15: Empowers States to make rules for minor mineral concessions.
    4. MMDR Amendment Act, 2015: Introduced auction as the sole route for granting major mineral concessions.
    5. Section 9B and Section 9C: Created the District Mineral Foundation for mining affected communities and the National Mineral Exploration Trust for exploration funding.
    6. MMDR Amendment Act, 2021: Removed the distinction between captive and merchant mines and eased the transfer of mineral concessions.
    7. MMDR Amendment Act, 2023: Created the exploration licence for deep seated minerals and empowered the Centre to exclusively auction 24 critical and strategic minerals.
    8. MMDR Amendment Act, 2025: Widened support for critical mineral recovery, including recovery from mine waste and tailings.
    9. Mines Act, 1952: Governs the health, safety and working conditions of persons employed in mines.
    10. Offshore Areas Mineral (Development and Regulation) Act, 2002: Regulates mineral development in India’s territorial waters and exclusive economic zone.
    11. Mineral Conservation and Development Rules, 2017: Prescribe scientific mining, conservation and mine closure obligations.
    12. Minerals (Evidence of Mineral Contents) Rules, 2015 and Mineral (Auction) Rules, 2015: Govern the exploration thresholds and the auction procedure for major minerals.

    Back2Basics: National Critical Mineral Mission

    1. What it is: A central mission to build self reliance across the critical mineral value chain, from exploration and mining to processing, recycling and recovery from waste.
    2. Approved: By the Union Cabinet in January 2025.
    3. Administering ministry: The Ministry of Mines.
    4. Duration: Covers the period from 2024-25 to 2030-31.
    5. Outlay: An outlay of about Rs 16,300 crore, with a further expected investment of about Rs 18,000 crore by public sector undertakings and other agencies.
    6. Exploration target: A large programme of exploration projects by the Geological Survey of India within India, along with exploration in offshore areas.
    7. Overseas component: Acquisition of critical mineral assets abroad by Indian public and private entities, supported by trade and diplomatic engagement.
    8. Circularity component: Promotion of recycling of end of life products and recovery of critical minerals from mine tailings and overburden.
    9. Stockpiling: Creation of a stockpile of critical minerals to insulate domestic industry from supply disruption.
    10. Regulatory support: Fast tracking of regulatory approvals for critical mineral projects, alongside the exclusive Central auction of the notified critical and strategic minerals.

    Government Initiatives

    1. National Critical Mineral Mission: Secures the critical mineral supply chain through domestic exploration, overseas asset acquisition, recycling and stockpiling under the Ministry of Mines.
    2. National Mineral Policy, 2019: Sets the policy framework for sustainable mining, exploration incentives and a transparent auction regime.
    3. Star Rating of Mines: A self assessment and verification system run by the Indian Bureau of Mines rating mines on scientific mining and sustainability parameters.
    4. Pradhan Mantri Khanij Kshetra Kalyan Yojana (PMKKKY): Implemented through District Mineral Foundations to fund drinking water, health, education and livelihood works in mining affected districts.
    5. National Geoscience Data Repository and the exploration licence regime: Open access geoscience data and a dedicated licence to draw private explorers into deep seated mineral search.

    Key Facts about Indian Mining

    1. Ministry: The Ministry of Mines administers the MMDR Act, other than for coal, lignite, petroleum, natural gas and atomic minerals.
    2. Critical minerals list: India notified a list of 30 critical minerals in 2023, of which 24 are auctioned exclusively by the Centre.
    3. District Mineral Foundation contribution: Lessees contribute 10 percent of royalty for concessions granted after 12 January 2015 and 30 percent for earlier concessions.
    4. National Mineral Exploration Trust contribution: Set at 2 percent of royalty paid by the lessee.
    5. Geological Survey of India: Established in 1851, headquartered at Kolkata, and the principal agency for regional mineral exploration.

    Challenges in the Mining Sector

    1. Long clearance timelines: A block cleared at auction still waits years for forest, environment and consent approvals. e.g. bauxite mining in the Niyamgiri hills of Odisha was halted after Gram Sabhas exercised their veto under forest rights law.
    2. Illegal mining: Unregulated extraction of minor minerals erodes State revenue and damages river systems. e.g. sand mining in the Yamuna and Sone river beds has repeatedly drawn National Green Tribunal intervention.
    3. Rehabilitation deficit: Displacement from large mines is inadequately compensated and land losers rarely regain livelihoods. e.g. displacement in the Talcher and Ib Valley coalfields of Odisha has produced long running resettlement disputes.
    4. Mine safety: Accidents in underground and rat hole operations continue despite the Mines Act framework. e.g. the Ksan mine flooding in Meghalaya in December 2018 trapped and killed rat hole miners in an illegal coal pit.
    5. Low value addition: India exports raw and semi processed ore and imports finished products. e.g. iron ore fines are exported while high grade steel inputs are imported back.
    6. Exploration underinvestment: Private participation in greenfield exploration remains thin despite the exploration licence. e.g. only a small share of India’s obvious geological potential area has been explored in detail.
    7. Import dependence in critical minerals: Processing capacity, not deposits alone, is the binding constraint. e.g. India relies on imports for nearly all its rare earth magnet requirements.

    Way Forward

    1. Institutionalise Centre State consultation on levies: Route mineral levy changes through a standing Centre State forum so that revenue impacts are quantified before a restriction is legislated.
    2. Publish a common levy dashboard: Report the 14 State levies on a uniform basis so that the effective tax rate claim of over 50 percent of revenues can be verified block by block.
    3. Compensate the transition: Provide a time bound, formula based transfer to mineral rich States for the revenue head withdrawn, on the model used for other tax transitions.
    4. Rationalise auction premium: Cap or stagger premium payments so that the auction price, rather than the tax rate, stops inflating the delivered cost of minerals.
    5. Front load exploration: Expand National Mineral Exploration Trust funded drilling and release geoscience data before auction so that bids reflect proved resources.
    6. Ring fence District Mineral Foundation spending: Enforce end use audit of DMF funds on drinking water, health and education in mining affected districts to rebuild the social licence for expansion.

    “[2025] Consider the following statements:
    Statement I: In India, State Governments have no power for making rules for grant of concessions in respect of extraction of minor minerals even though such minerals are located in their territories.
    Statement II: In India, the Central Government has the power to notify minor minerals under the relevant law.
    Which one of the following is correct in respect of the above statements?
    (a) Both Statement I and Statement II are correct and Statement II explains Statement I
    (b) Both Statement I and Statement II are correct but Statement II does not explain Statement I
    (c) Statement I is correct but Statement II is not correct
    (d) Statement I is not correct but Statement II is correct

  • Rotating detonation engines: the science and the promises

    Why in the News

    An India based defence startup announced that it had successfully demonstrated a rotating detonation engine (RDE) at a Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) facility in Hyderabad. The physics of the design has been understood since the 1960s, and the binding constraint has never been the theory but the materials, computing and diagnostics needed to hold a continuous supersonic detonation inside a compact chamber. Despite a global cluster of tests and funding rounds in 2026, no model is known to be ready for commercial or military use anywhere.

    What is a rotating detonation engine (RDE)?

    1. What it is: An engine design in which combustion happens as a continuous detonation travelling in a circle inside a ring shaped chamber, rather than as a flame front sweeping through a cylinder.
    2. Its promise: It uses fuel more efficiently than conventional rocket engines, so the same task needs correspondingly less fuel.
    3. Why the saving matters: Launching satellites and carrying explosives to distant targets are both expensive, and fuel saved can be passed to the payload, whether a satellite or a warhead.
    4. The efficiency figure: Going by physics alone, RDEs offer around 10 per cent to 25 per cent more thermodynamic efficiency than conventional combustors, with the exact value depending on real world conditions and engine design.
    5. What it produces: It can continuously generate thrust, or mechanical energy if coupled to a piston.
    6. Its current state: RDEs are confined to research and development, and there are no models known to be ready for commercial or military use.

    What is deflagration?

    1. What it is: Combustion in which a flame introduced into a fuel and air mixture travels through that mixture at less than the speed of sound.
    2. What it does thermodynamically: The combustion happens at constant pressure, because the mixture is free to expand as it heats up instead of being confined under pressure.

    What is detonation?

    1. What it is: Combustion in which the flame travels through the mixture at more than the speed of sound, imposing a shock wave on the mixture and heating it, which triggers rapid combustion behind the wave.
    2. What it does thermodynamically: The combustion happens at constant volume, because the shock wave compresses the unburned mixture immediately before combustion and the mixture has no time to expand.

    What is a pulsed detonation engine (PDE)?

    1. What it is: The simplest type of detonation engine, using a long tube as the combustion chamber so a detonation can pass through the whole mixture.
    2. Its cycle: The detonation races down the tube, compressing and burning the fuel and air mixture, and the hot high pressure products expand out of the open end at high speed. The tube is then purged before the next cycle begins.

    What is an annular combustor?

    1. What it is: A combustion chamber shaped as two concentric cylinders with a narrow ring shaped gap between them, the gap being called the annulus.
    2. Why the RDE uses it: The annulus gives the detonation wave a closed circular path to travel, which is what converts a one shot detonation into a continuous one.

    What is thermodynamic efficiency?

    1. What it measures: How much of a fuel’s chemical energy becomes useful work rather than being shed as waste heat.
    2. What a gain translates into: An RDE that improves thermodynamic efficiency by 20 per cent could theoretically require around 17 per cent less fuel for the same output, assuming other losses are unchanged.

    Why does detonation deliver more efficiency than deflagration?

    1. The regular engine case: A spark plug introduces a flame into the fuel and air mixture in the combustion chamber, and it travels through at subsonic speed.
    2. The expansion difference: In deflagration the mixture expands freely as it heats, so combustion proceeds at constant pressure.
    3. The compression difference: In detonation the shock wave compresses the unburned mixture just before it burns, so combustion proceeds at constant volume.
    4. The pressure outcome: A detonation engine therefore produces combustion products at a higher pressure.
    5. The energy conversion: More of the fuel’s chemical energy is converted into pressure rather than being shed as heat, and that is the entire basis of the fuel efficiency claim.
    6. The comparison held constant: The advantage holds for a detonation engine against a regular engine burning the same fuel.

    How does an RDE sustain a continuous detonation?

    1. The design choice: Instead of the detonation passing through a long tube once, it is made to flow in a circle.
    2. The chamber: The combustion chamber has an annular shape, and fuel and oxidiser are injected continuously into the ring shaped gap.
    3. The wave: One or more detonation waves race through the annulus while injection continues.
    4. The timing requirement: Fuel is injected into the annulus just ahead of the detonation wave, so the wave always meets fresh mixture.
    5. The exhaust: The wave consumes the fresh fuel and air mixture and expels the products through the nozzle along its axis.
    6. The rate: As long as fuel keeps arriving at the right time and in the right condition, the detonation can keep going even at thousands of times per second.
    7. The output: By Newton’s third law the momentum of the expelled gases produces an equal and opposite momentum on the engine, which is what generates thrust.

    Who is developing rotating detonation engines and with what funding?

    1. D-Propulse, India: The India based defence startup that recently announced a successful RDE demonstration at a DRDO facility in Hyderabad.
    2. NASA, United States: Ran a full scale RDE test in 2023 in which the engine fired for 251 seconds, a record at the time.
    3. GE Aerospace and Lockheed Martin: Demonstrated an RDE for hypersonic missiles in January, using air drawn from the atmosphere.
    4. SpaceWorks, United States: Reported hot fire tests of its RDE for rockets in February.
    5. Astrobotic, United States: Test fired its Chakram RDE continuously for 300 seconds.
    6. L3Harris, United States: Announced that it had tested two RDEs, in April and May respectively.
    7. Stellar Alpina, Switzerland: Completed a commercial RDE hot fire test and raised CHF 3.5 million.
    8. Juno Propulsion: Raised $1.4 million to develop an RDE for spacecraft thrusters.
    9. Venus Aerospace, United States: Raised $91 million in July to scale its tested RDE, then partnered with Lockheed Martin.
    10. What the roster shows: Activity is concentrated in the United States and in venture funded startups, and it spans rockets, hypersonic missiles and spacecraft thrusters rather than a single application.

    Why was a 1960s concept only testable now?

    1. The theory was settled early: Scientists worked out how an RDE could function by the 1960s, and building one was a different matter.
    2. Injection and pressure control: Sustaining a continuous detonation in a compact chamber requires engineers to precisely control fuel injection and internal pressure.
    3. Chamber geometry: The chamber needs a specific geometry for the engine to work as intended.
    4. Instability sensitivity: Unlike in regular engines, even small instabilities in the fuel and air mixture can destabilise an RDE.
    5. Temperature threshold: Engine materials must withstand more than 2,000 degrees Celsius.
    6. Pressure threshold: Materials must survive 10 to 100 atmospheres of pressure, and much higher in brief moments.
    7. Speed threshold: Detonation speeds exceed 1,500 m/s.
    8. Oscillation and loading: Pressures oscillate at several thousand cycles per second, and the structure sees potentially tens to hundreds of g depending on the design.
    9. What had to arrive first: Working RDEs required advances in high speed computing, diagnostics, fuel injection, materials and manufacturing.

    Why does the efficiency gain matter for launch and strike systems?

    1. Cost of access to space: Launching satellites on rockets is expensive, and fuel is a dominant share of the launch mass.
    2. Cost of long range strike: Carrying explosives to distant targets on missiles is equally expensive on the same fuel logic.
    3. The trade converted: Less fuel for the same task means more mass available for payload.
    4. Commercial consequence: Passing that saving to the satellite or warhead increases the profitability of the mission.
    5. Why launch benefits most: The gain is considered significant specifically for rocket launches, where the fuel to payload ratio is most punishing.
    6. The air breathing variant: For hypersonic missiles the engine draws oxidiser from the atmosphere, which removes the need to carry it.

    Why does a settled physics advantage still have no deployable engine?

    1. The stated status: RDEs remain confined to research and development, with no models known to be ready for commercial or military use.
    2. The evidence gap: Actual data from many tests by commercial entities are not available in the public domain.
    3. What the efficiency claim rests on: The 10 per cent to 25 per cent figure is derived from physics alone, not from fielded performance.
    4. The qualification the source itself attaches: The saving that can be passed to the payload holds at least on paper.
    5. Where the difficulty sits: The obstacle is not the thermodynamics but the survivability of materials and the controllability of the detonation.
    6. The demonstration versus product gap: A successful hot fire test proves the wave can be sustained, and it does not prove an engine can be throttled, restarted, integrated and qualified for flight.
    7. The funding signal: Capital is arriving before a product exists, which is a bet on the remaining engineering rather than a proof that it is solved.

    Challenges to rotating detonation engine development

    1. Material survivability under cyclic thermal load: Wall materials face more than 2,000 degrees Celsius and pressure oscillations of several thousand cycles per second, which drives fatigue cracking. e.g. regeneratively cooled chamber liners in conventional engines already fail at far lower thermal cycling rates.
    2. Detonation wave instability: Wave count, direction and mode can shift during a run, which changes thrust unpredictably. e.g. test campaigns commonly report transitions between single wave and multiple wave modes in the same firing.
    3. Injector design and mixing: Fuel and oxidiser must mix fully in the microseconds before the wave arrives, and incomplete mixing quenches the detonation. e.g. deflagration to detonation transition failures reported in early pulsed detonation engine work.
    4. Nozzle matching: The exhaust leaves the annulus with a rotating, unsteady pressure field that a conventional bell nozzle is not designed for. e.g. aerospike and plug nozzle concepts are being revisited specifically for detonation exhausts.
    5. Absence of validated test data: Commercial developers do not release performance data, so independent verification of efficiency claims is not possible. e.g. the hot fire results announced by several firms in 2026 carry no published specific impulse figures.
    6. Qualification and certification burden: Flight qualification requires demonstrated restart, throttling and life cycle margins that no RDE has yet shown. e.g. human rated engines must clear multiple full duration firings with margin, a standard the 251 second NASA record does not yet meet.
    7. Dual use export control: Detonation propulsion for hypersonic applications falls within missile technology control regimes, which restricts collaboration. e.g. Missile Technology Control Regime Category I restrictions on complete rocket systems and their major subsystems.
    8. Manufacturing tolerance: The annulus gap must be held to fine tolerance across a hot, deforming structure, which requires additive manufacturing at aerospace grade. e.g. additive manufactured combustion chambers have to be qualified for porosity and residual stress before flight use.
    9. Talent and facility scarcity: Very few facilities can instrument a detonation at these speeds and pressures. e.g. high speed schlieren and pressure diagnostics capable of resolving events at several thousand cycles per second exist in a handful of laboratories.

    Conclusion

    The rotating detonation engine’s advantage is a settled point of physics: replacing constant pressure deflagration with constant volume detonation converts more chemical energy into pressure instead of shedding it as heat, and that is worth roughly 10 per cent to 25 per cent in thermodynamic efficiency. What remains unsolved is entirely an engineering problem of materials, wave control and diagnostics, which is why a design understood in the 1960s still has no commercially or militarily ready model anywhere. The Hyderabad demonstration places India inside the small group attempting that engineering, and a demonstration is not yet a qualified engine.

    “[2026] Consider the following statements about involvement of private entities in India’s space programme:
    1. IN-SPACe is an autonomous agency formed to facilitate participation of private entities.
    2. Agnikul Cosmos launched the world’s first flight using 3D-printed rocket engine.
    3. Skyroot Aerospace has developed liquid fuel for GSLV.
    (a) 1 only
    (b) 2 and 3 only
    (c) 1 and 2 only
    (d) 1, 2 and 3

  • NASA’s Moon Base: What India will gain by joining

    Why in the News

    The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has invited the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) to join its Moon Base programme, a permanent crewed research station to be built on the Moon in stages. The invitation forces a choice between building an independent human spaceflight, space station and lunar landing capability at national cost, and acquiring the same capability faster inside a programme the United States leads. India signed the Artemis Accords in 2023 as the 27th nation, so the diplomatic ground for joining is already laid.

    What is the NASA Moon Base programme?

    1. What it is: A permanent research station on the lunar surface that astronauts and robots can inhabit for prolonged periods.
    2. What it is for: It is meant to facilitate research and to allow exploration and exploitation of lunar resources.
    3. How it is built: The base is assembled in stages over several years, requiring repeated crewed and robotic trips to the Moon.
    4. Its scale: In scale and ambition it compares only with the Apollo missions, and it could be the costliest scientific project ever undertaken.
    5. Its engineering claim: It will possibly be the most challenging engineering exercise ever attempted by humanity.
    6. Its delivery model: NASA will not execute it alone and is seeking partners in both the international community and private industry.

    What is the Bharat Antariksh Station?

    1. What it is: India’s planned indigenous space station, to be built and operated by ISRO as a crewed orbital facility.
    2. Why it is cited here: ISRO must hold the technology to build such infrastructure, and India is unlikely within about a decade to have a scientific ecosystem needing an entire station for its own use all year round.

    What is the lunar South Pole?

    1. What it is: The polar region of the Moon holding permanently shadowed craters where water ice is expected to survive.
    2. Why it is the target: Phase One of the Moon Base programme sends robotic missions specifically to the South Pole, because water ice can be converted into drinking water, breathable oxygen and rocket propellant.

    What are interoperable systems?

    1. What they are: Common standards and hardware interfaces that let equipment built by different countries connect and work together in space.
    2. What the Accords require: Signatories emphasise interoperability in fuel storage, landing structures, communications systems and power systems, which is a light obligation for ISRO because it is only beginning to develop these systems.

    What is deglobalisation?

    1. What it is: The retreat from shared international supply chains towards national self reliance in a strategic technology.
    2. Where it currently applies: Semiconductors, clean energy and artificial intelligence, where supply chains and resources are controlled by a small set of actors.

    What are the three phases of the Moon Base programme?

    1. Phase One, now to 2029: Focus on gaining reliable access to the lunar surface and building a deeper understanding of the environment.
    2. Phase One activity: Robotic missions will explore the lunar South Pole, demonstrate new technologies and gather the knowledge needed to guide future development.
    3. Phase Two, 2029 to 2032: NASA will begin deploying the first infrastructure needed to support long term operations on the Moon.
    4. Phase Two systems: Early power systems, cargo transportation, logistics and communications capabilities will expand the human footprint and enable increasingly complex missions.
    5. Phase Three, 2032 and beyond: NASA will begin assembling a permanent lunar outpost where astronauts can live and work for extended periods.
    6. Phase Three systems: Habitats, power systems, communications, transportation and other critical capabilities will support an enduring human presence.

    Why is NASA seeking partners instead of building the base alone?

    1. Budget compression: NASA’s budget has been cut significantly under the current US administration, so a solo build is not affordable.
    2. Shift of manufacturing: Most of NASA’s hardware production now happens in the private sector rather than in house.
    3. Two partner pools: It is seeking collaboration both from the international community and from private industry.
    4. A ready pool of states: The 70 countries that signed the Artemis Accords have already signalled a willingness to join such a collaboration.
    5. Cost of the mission profile: Repeated crewed and robotic trips to the Moon over several years put the cost beyond a single agency’s programme line.
    6. Precedent: The International Space Station established that a permanent crewed facility is built and run as shared infrastructure, not as one nation’s asset.

    Why can ISRO not sustain its lunar and station ambitions on its own?

    1. Three simultaneous programmes: ISRO is running an independent human spaceflight programme, a Moon landing programme and a full fledged space station programme in parallel.
    2. Capability against sustainability: Holding these capabilities is important, and running them sustainably on India’s own scientific and economic base is a separate question.
    3. The demand problem: India is unlikely, within about a decade, to have a scientific ecosystem hungry enough to occupy an entire space station all year round.
    4. The cost of lunar exploration: A separate full fledged lunar exploration programme carries costs that are prohibitive even for the world’s richest economy.
    5. Competing national goals: India is chasing multiple parallel goals on the path to prosperity, which limits how much can be allocated to space at the scale required.
    6. The shared infrastructure conclusion: The Bharat Antariksh Station will have to be shared infrastructure on the model of the International Space Station.

    What does ISRO gain by joining the Moon Base programme?

    1. Mission management experience: Participation gives ISRO experience in planning and executing complex missions of exactly the type it intends to run itself.
    2. Technology leapfrog: It allows ISRO to skip development stages rather than rebuild capability that already exists elsewhere.
    3. The obsolescence clock: Space exploration has reached a stage where a 10 year gap in technology development can leave a nation well behind.
    4. Avoiding duplication: There is no economic sense in reinventing capability that a partner already holds.
    5. Timeline compression: Cooperation with the United States lets ISRO fast track its own project timelines and reach the frontiers of technology development.
    6. Spin off benefits: The collaboration can generate spin off technologies with cascading dividends across sectors beyond space.
    7. No exclusivity cost: Signing the Accords or joining the Moon Base effort does not prevent India from continuing its long standing space cooperation with Russia.

    What do the positions of other space powers reveal about the Accords?

    1. Japan: A signatory and a major space faring nation, contributing habitation and pressurised rover work to the Artemis effort.
    2. South Korea: A signatory that has built an independent lunar capability, having placed the Danuri orbiter around the Moon in 2022.
    3. Israel: A signatory whose Beresheet lander attempt in 2019 made it one of the few states to have reached lunar orbit.
    4. European states: Several are signatories, and the European Space Agency separately supplies the service module for NASA’s Orion crew vehicle.
    5. Russia: Not a signatory, and it is attempting a comparable lunar effort through its own partnership.
    6. China: Not a signatory, and it is pursuing the same objective with Russia rather than through the Accords.
    7. What the split demonstrates: The absence of the two other major space powers is what gives the criticism of a US led camp its credibility.

    Are the Artemis Accords a US led bloc that bypasses multilateral arrangements?

    1. The formal position: The Accords are a set of principles and good practices that countries agree to follow in their space activities.
    2. The criticism: They are increasingly seen as a US led camp writing its own rules for space exploration and the use of extraterrestrial resources, subtly bypassing international multilateral arrangements.
    3. What lends the criticism weight: Russia and China, the two other major space powers, are outside the grouping.
    4. India’s historical reluctance: India has traditionally been extremely reluctant to join any such grouping, and it still joined as an early signatory, the 27th nation, in 2023.
    5. The counter argument, no exclusion: Space is not adversarial at present, and a US landing on the Moon does not give it control over the area or its resources.
    6. The counter argument, no scarcity: The Moon is large enough and its resources abundant enough to support the efforts of all parties in the foreseeable future.
    7. The counter argument, no supply chain lock: There is no domination of supply chains or control over resources in space, so the deglobalisation trend seen in semiconductors, clean energy and artificial intelligence does not transfer to this case.
    8. The residual risk: The real exposure is technological, not geopolitical, and it is the possibility of ISRO getting locked into the US technology ecosystem to the extent of overdependence.

    Challenges to India joining the Moon Base programme

    1. Technology ecosystem overdependence: Deep integration with one partner’s standards makes later substitution expensive. e.g. India’s dependence on Russian cryogenic engine technology in the 1990s stalled the GSLV programme for over a decade after the Missile Technology Control Regime pressure on the transfer.
    2. Programme discipline slipping: Collaboration can crowd out ISRO’s own milestones if targets are not separately protected. e.g. the Gaganyaan crewed flight has already moved from its original 2022 target to the later part of this decade.
    3. Export control friction: Dual use hardware transfers remain governed by US licensing that can be withheld. e.g. International Traffic in Arms Regulations clearances have historically delayed satellite component supplies to Indian entities.
    4. Budget asymmetry: India’s civil space spending is a small fraction of NASA’s, which limits its bargaining position on workshare. e.g. the Department of Space’s annual budget is of the order of Rs 13,000 crore against a NASA budget many times larger.
    5. Launch reliability: A partner role demands schedule certainty that India’s recent launch record does not yet demonstrate. e.g. three of the six ISRO missions in 2025 and 2026 failed to place satellites in the intended orbits.
    6. Balancing the Russia relationship: Deeper alignment with the Accords sits alongside a long standing space partnership that must be maintained separately. e.g. Russian support for the crew module and life support work under the Gaganyaan programme, including astronaut training at the Gagarin Cosmonaut Training Centre.
    7. Unsettled resource law: The Accords permit extraction and use of space resources, and that reading of the Outer Space Treaty is contested. e.g. the Moon Agreement of 1979 treats lunar resources as the common heritage of mankind and has been ratified by very few states.
    8. Volatile bilateral politics: The India United States relationship has been unstable in the last two years, which is a risk for a multi decade commitment. e.g. trade and tariff disputes running alongside this civil space engagement.

    Conclusion

    The Moon Base invitation converts an abstract question about strategic autonomy into a concrete question about economic sustainability. India can build the technology for a station and a lunar landing on its own, and it is unlikely to be able to run either sustainably at national scale, which is why joining offers a genuine leapfrog rather than a compromise. The condition that must hold is that ISRO protects its own targets and avoids locking itself into a single technology ecosystem while it collaborates.

    “[2025] Consider the following space missions:
    I. Axiom-4
    II. SpaDeX
    III. Gaganyaan
    How many of the space missions given above encourage and support microgravity research?
    (a) Only one
    (b) Only two
    (c) All the three
    (d) None

  • Losing forest for trees: India is counting trees when it should be restoring forests

    Why in the News

    A performance audit by the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) of the Green India Mission (GIM) has found that across a decade the Mission improved forest quality over only 0.11 million hectares against a target of 1.4 million hectares, and achieved barely 4 per cent of its forest cover expansion goal. The Mission was designed as ecological restoration, and it has been displaced in practice by a sapling planting drive whose success is measured in trees planted rather than in forest restored. The India State of Forest Report 2023 records a green cover gain of 1,445 sq km, of which only 156 sq km is true forest.

    What is the Green India Mission?

    1. What it is: A national mission of the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change aimed at protecting, restoring and enhancing India’s forest cover and at responding to climate change through adaptation and mitigation.
    2. Where it sits: It is one of the eight pillars of the National Action Plan on Climate Change, unveiled in 2008.
    3. Its climate function: It is the instrument through which India promised the Paris Agreement an additional carbon sink of 2.5 billion to 3 billion tonnes by 2030.
    4. Its animating idea: The objective is ecological, covering biodiversity, water, carbon sequestration and the revival of habitat, not the raising of tree numbers.
    5. Its twin physical targets: The Mission set out to increase forest and tree cover on one block of land and to improve the quality of existing forest cover on another.
    6. Its funding design: It was built to draw money and labour from other programmes rather than from its own budget line alone.

    What is the Compensatory Afforestation Fund Management and Planning Authority?

    1. What it is: The statutory authority, known as CAMPA, that manages funds collected from industry and other user agencies in return for the diversion of forest land to non forest use.
    2. What it funds: The money is channelled into afforestation, catchment treatment and habitat improvement, which is why the Green India Mission was designed to converge with it.

    What is tree cover outside recorded forests?

    1. What it is: Tree patches smaller than one hectare and trees standing outside the legally recorded forest area, counted separately from forest cover in the national forest assessment.
    2. Why the distinction matters: A plantation, an orchard or an avenue of trees adds to this category without adding to forest, so a rise in green cover can occur while forest itself stagnates.

    What is Ek Ped Maa Ke Naam?

    1. What it is: A tree plantation campaign launched in 2024, translated as A Tree in the Name of Mother, under which the government reports planting 140 crore saplings so far.
    2. Its effect on the Mission: For practical purposes it has replaced the Green India Mission as the visible face of India’s forest effort.

    What did the Comptroller and Auditor General audit find?

    1. Forest quality improvement: Against a target of improving forest quality over 1.4 million hectares, the Mission managed 0.11 million hectares, less than a tenth of the target.
    2. Forest cover expansion: On expanding forest cover the Mission achieved barely four per cent of its goal.
    3. Recorded shortfall on quality: The audit records a shortfall of about 91.87 per cent against the forest quality improvement target over ten years.
    4. Recorded shortfall on cover: The audit records a shortfall of about 97.57 per cent against the forest cover target over the same period.
    5. Coverage of the audit: The performance audit examined implementation across 16 States and Union Territories.
    6. Money actually received: Only about Rs 1,149.14 crore of budgetary support reached the Mission over the audited decade.
    7. Convergence not achieved: The Mission’s intended convergence with its partner schemes did not materialise.
    8. The overall verdict: A scheme conceived to heal India’s forests achieved almost nothing it set out to do across a decade.

    Why did the Mission’s convergence with other funding streams fail?

    1. The CAMPA channel: CAMPA holds money collected from industry for diverting forest land into afforestation, and that money did not flow into Mission activity as designed.
    2. The wage labour channel: The Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme, rebranded VB G RAM G, funds rural wage labour that can be used for plantation and land restoration works.
    3. What convergence was meant to do: The Mission’s own budget line was small by design, so its physical targets depended on borrowing funds and labour from these two much larger streams.
    4. What happened instead: The convergence never materialised, which left the Mission with a decadal target set for one scale of resources and an actual allocation of a different scale.
    5. The consequence for accountability: A mission that does not control its own money cannot be held to its own targets, and no single agency owns the shortfall.
    6. The displacement effect: With convergence absent, the plantation drive absorbed the political attention and the reporting space that restoration was meant to occupy.

    What does the India State of Forest Report 2023 show about the quality of the gain?

    1. The headline gain: The report records a gain of 1,445 sq km in green cover.
    2. The forest share of that gain: Only 156 sq km of that gain is true forest.
    3. The remainder: The other 1,289 sq km is tree cover outside recorded forests.
    4. Inside the recorded forests: Dense canopy within recorded forest area is thinning into scrub.
    5. What the two numbers together establish: India is planting more and foresting less, so an aggregate green cover figure conceals a decline in forest quality.
    6. Why this matters for the carbon pledge: A carbon sink commitment measured in billions of tonnes rests on dense forest, not on scattered tree cover that stores far less carbon per hectare.

    Why does the Aravalli Green Wall illustrate the limits of planting?

    1. The state of the range: The Aravallis are among the country’s most degraded ranges, with hillocks quarried away over decades.
    2. The invasion: Native growth has been overrun by the invasive vilayati kikar (Prosopis juliflora), which suppresses regeneration of native species.
    3. The proposed remedy: The range is now to be rescued by a Green Wall of fresh planting.
    4. What planting cannot do, first: Fresh saplings cannot undo the damage left by years of mining and the removal of the hill itself.
    5. What planting cannot do, second: Planting does not halt encroachment on the range, which is a land use and enforcement problem.
    6. What planting cannot do, third: An ecosystem that took millennia to assemble cannot be summoned back by a plantation drive.
    7. The governing distinction: Restoration rebuilds the ecological function of a landscape, and landscaping only adds vegetation to it.

    Where does counting trees diverge from restoring forests?

    1. Two different outputs: A sapling planted is a countable annual output. A restored forest is a slow change in canopy density, species composition and soil.
    2. Two different timelines: Planting reports results within a financial year, and restoration shows results across decades, which biases the system toward planting.
    3. Two different failure modes: Plantation failure shows up as sapling mortality that is rarely audited. Restoration failure shows up in the forest report, as it has in 2023.
    4. The metric drives the money: With 140 crore saplings as the reported achievement and 0.11 million hectares as the restored area, the reporting system rewards the activity that is easiest to count.
    5. Species and structure are lost in the count: A count of trees is indifferent to whether the trees are native, whether they form a canopy, and whether they support the species the forest once held.
    6. The ecological cost of the substitution: Biodiversity, groundwater recharge and habitat revival, the Mission’s stated objectives, do not follow automatically from a higher tree count.

    What can an audit of this kind not capture?

    1. The instrument is accountancy: The audit counts hectares and rupees, and it cannot count the worth of a living forest.
    2. Ecological value is not a line item: Pollination, water regulation, soil stabilisation and habitat quality have no entry in a financial performance table.
    3. Implementation reality: The assessment cannot always capture the practical difficulties of running a mission across State forest departments with varying capacity.
    4. Time lag in forest outcomes: Restoration works undertaken late in the audit period cannot show measurable results within it.
    5. Why the verdict still stands: Even on its own limited terms, an achievement of four per cent against a cover target and a tenth of a quality target is a failure of implementation, not a measurement artefact.
    6. What the audit does establish: The mission designed to restore India’s forests was allowed to wither while the state busied itself counting trees.

    Challenges to the Green India Mission

    1. Sapling survival is not tracked: Plantation drives report numbers planted and rarely report survival after three years. e.g. successive State plantation drives reporting crore scale planting with no published third year survival audit.
    2. Monoculture and exotic species: Plantations favour fast growing and commercially useful species over native mixed forest, which limits habitat value. e.g. eucalyptus and acacia blocks raised on degraded common land in Karnataka and Gujarat.
    3. Land availability for restoration: The Mission needs degraded forest land free of competing claims, and much of it carries grazing, cultivation and settlement use. e.g. contested village common land in the Aravalli belt of Haryana and Rajasthan.
    4. Forest rights not settled first: Restoration works on land where individual and community claims under forest rights law remain undecided create conflict with forest dwellers. e.g. pending community forest resource claims across central Indian districts.
    5. Invasive species suppress regeneration: Restoration on invaded land fails unless the invasive is removed first, which is costlier than planting. e.g. Prosopis juliflora in the Aravallis and Lantana camara across central Indian forests.
    6. Weak convergence architecture: The Mission depends on funds controlled by other schemes with their own targets and reporting cycles. e.g. CAMPA balances lying unspent with State authorities while Mission works waited for money.
    7. Staffing and capacity in forest departments: Frontline forest staff vacancies limit the supervision that assisted natural regeneration requires. e.g. large vacancy levels in forest guard and forester posts reported by several State forest departments.
    8. Diversion continues alongside restoration: Forest land continues to be diverted for infrastructure while restoration targets are missed, so the net position worsens. e.g. compensatory afforestation for the Ken Betwa link inside the Panna landscape.
    9. Green cover accounting conflates categories: Counting orchards, plantations and avenue trees within green cover masks the loss of dense natural forest. e.g. the 1,289 sq km of tree cover outside recorded forests in the 2023 assessment.

    Conclusion

    India has substituted a countable output, saplings planted, for the objective it actually set itself, which is restored forest, and the audit records the cost of that substitution across a decade. The Green India Mission failed not because restoration is unachievable but because it was starved of money, denied the convergence it was designed around, and displaced by a drive that reports faster numbers. Until forest quality, canopy density and sapling survival replace planting counts as the reported metric, the Paris carbon sink commitment will rest on an inflated green cover figure. The instrument exists and the finance does not follow it.

    Forest Cover and Restoration in India

    1. What forest cover means: All land more than one hectare in area with a tree canopy density of more than 10 per cent, irrespective of ownership or legal status.
    2. The assessment: The Forest Survey of India, Dehradun, publishes the India State of Forest Report every two years using satellite data and field inventory.
    3. The national scale: Total forest and tree cover is about 8,27,357 sq km, which is about 25.17 per cent of the geographical area, per the 2023 assessment.
    4. The split: Forest cover is about 7,15,343 sq km, or 21.76 per cent, and tree cover about 1,12,014 sq km, or 3.41 per cent.
    5. The policy target: The National Forest Policy, 1988 sets a goal of 33 per cent of the geographical area under forest and tree cover.
    6. The canopy classes: Forest cover is classed as very dense forest, moderately dense forest and open forest, by canopy density bands.
    7. The international commitment: India has committed to restoring 26 million hectares of degraded land by 2030, a pledge raised from an earlier 21 million hectare commitment under the Bonn Challenge.
    8. The climate commitment: India’s nationally determined contribution promises an additional carbon sink of 2.5 billion to 3 billion tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent through additional forest and tree cover by 2030.
    9. Why restoration differs from afforestation: Restoration rebuilds a degraded ecosystem’s native composition and function, and afforestation only establishes trees on land, often with a single species.

    Constitutional Framework Governing Forests and the Environment

    1. Article 48A: Directs the State to protect and improve the environment and to safeguard the forests and wildlife of the country.
    2. Article 51A(g): Places a fundamental duty on every citizen to protect and improve the natural environment including forests, lakes, rivers and wildlife.
    3. Article 21: Protects life and personal liberty, read by the courts to include the right to a clean and healthy environment.
    4. Seventh Schedule, Concurrent List Entry 17A: Places forests on the Concurrent List after the 42nd Constitutional Amendment, 1976.
    5. Seventh Schedule, Concurrent List Entry 17B: Places protection of wild animals and birds on the Concurrent List.
    6. Article 253: Empowers Parliament to legislate to implement international agreements, the basis for environmental laws giving effect to treaty commitments.
    7. Article 244 and the Fifth Schedule: Provide for administration of Scheduled Areas, which overlap substantially with India’s forest landscapes.
    8. Article 243ZD and Part IX: Place village level planning with Panchayats, the base for Gram Sabha consultation in forest areas.

    Laws and Rules Governing Forests and Compensatory Afforestation

    1. Indian Forest Act, 1927: Consolidates the law on forests, the transit of forest produce and the duty leviable on it, and provides for reserved, protected and village forests.
    2. Key feature: It creates the categories of legally recorded forest against which forest cover is measured.
    3. Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980: Requires prior approval of the Union government for the diversion of forest land to non forest use.
    4. 2023 amendment: Renamed the Act the Van (Sanrakshan Evam Samvardhan) Adhiniyam, 1980 and exempted specified categories of land and projects from prior approval.
    5. Compensatory Afforestation Fund Act, 2016: Establishes the National and State Compensatory Afforestation Funds and the authorities that manage them.
    6. Rules, 2018: Set out the procedure for utilisation of the accumulated fund for afforestation, catchment treatment and wildlife management.
    7. Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006: Recognises individual and community forest rights and requires Gram Sabha consent for diversion.
    8. Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972: Governs protected areas, and restricts activities inside national parks, sanctuaries, conservation reserves and tiger reserves.
    9. Environment (Protection) Act, 1986: The umbrella law under which environmental clearance, eco sensitive zone notifications and emission standards are issued.
    10. National Green Tribunal Act, 2010: Creates a specialised tribunal for environmental disputes, including challenges to forest diversion and afforestation failures.
    11. Biological Diversity Act, 2002: Provides for conservation of biological diversity and the constitution of biodiversity management committees at the local level.

    “[2016] Which of the following best describes/ describe the aim of ‘Green India Mission’ of the Government of India?
    1. Incorporating environmental benefits and costs into the Union and State Budgets thereby implementing the ‘green accounting’
    2. Launching the second green revolution to enhance agricultural output so as to ensure food security to one and all in the future
    3. Restoring and enhancing forest cover and responding to climate change by a combination of adaptation and mitigation measures
    Select the correct answer using the code given below.
    (a) 1 only
    (b) 2 and 3 only
    (c) 3 only
    (d) 1, 2 and 3

  • Why Adivasis are resisting the Ken-Betwa river-linking project

    Why in the News

    Construction on the Daudhan dam across the Ken river in Madhya Pradesh’s Bundelkhand region is advancing while 22 villages in Panna and Chhatarpur districts face displacement. The project is designed to move water to 13 water stressed districts, and the households paying for that transfer are largely Gond Adivasi families whose forest based livelihoods and absence of recorded land title place them outside the compensation package built for the transfer. A protest movement led by Adivasi women has been running since 2022 and drew national attention in April and July 2026.

    What is the Ken Betwa river linking project?

    1. What it does: It transfers water described as surplus from the Ken river to the Betwa river through a canal, for irrigation and drinking water in Bundelkhand.
    2. Approval: The Union Cabinet approved the interlink in 2021.
    3. The canal: A 231 km long canal carries the transferred water between the two rivers.
    4. The dam: The Daudhan dam, built across the Ken inside the Panna landscape, is the main structure of the project.
    5. The beneficiary area: Water stressed districts of Bundelkhand, a region spanning 13 districts across Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh.
    6. Its status in policy: It is the first link to be taken up for implementation under the national river interlinking programme.

    What is a patta?

    1. What it is: A document of recorded title or of a recognised right over land, issued by the revenue or forest administration.
    2. Why it decides everything here: Compensation for acquired land is paid per acre of titled land, so a family cultivating or using land without a patta has no claim to that component.

    What is the Forest Advisory Committee?

    1. What it is: The statutory committee under the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 that advises the Union government on proposals to divert forest land for non forest use.
    2. Its role here: Its 2017 record carries the detailed project report’s estimate of the tree felling the project requires.

    What is the Chita Aandolan?

    1. What it is: A symbolic pyre protest in which affected villagers lie on funeral pyres to signal that displacement amounts to the end of their life in the place.
    2. Who leads it: It has been led by Adivasi women of the affected villages and has run since 2022.

    What is minor forest produce?

    1. What it is: Non timber produce of plant origin gathered from forests, including mahua flowers, tendu leaves, fruits, resins and seeds.
    2. Why it is the livelihood question: Households in the affected villages meet their cash and food needs by collecting charwa, mahua, tendu leaves and guli golanda, none of which is valued in a land based compensation formula.

    What are the numbers behind the displacement?

    1. Villages submerged: 10 villages, including Daudhan, will be submerged by the reservoir.
    2. Villages displaced for compensatory forest: Because the project falls within the Panna Tiger Reserve, the people of another 12 villages will be displaced to offset the loss of forest area.
    3. Total affected: 22 villages across Panna and Chhatarpur districts in all.
    4. Population at the dam site: Around 700 people live in Daudhan village, next to which construction is under way.
    5. A village outside the submergence zone: Narauli, home to around 300 people and inhabited mostly by the Gond community, sits on a hill outside the submergence zone and faces the same loss of forest access.
    6. Cash compensation: Villagers who were 18 years or older in February 2024 are eligible for Rs 12.5 lakh each.
    7. Land compensation: Rs 5 lakh per acre of acquired land, payable only against titled land.
    8. Tree felling: A 2017 Forest Advisory Committee record carries the detailed project report estimate that 23 lakh trees will be felled. Some experts hold this to be an underestimate.
    9. Forest area submerged: The Daudhan dam submerges about 4,141 hectares of Panna Tiger Reserve land, within a wider rehabilitation process affecting about 1,913 families.

    How has the resistance developed?

    1. Start of the movement: The Chita Aandolan, or symbolic pyre protest, has been running since 2022.
    2. Preventive detention: The leader of the movement was placed under preventive detention in February 2026.
    3. Gathering at the magistrate’s office: About 200 villagers assembled at the sub divisional magistrate’s office demanding his immediate release.
    4. Police account of the escalation: The Superintendent of Police, Chhatarpur, stated that villagers later locked the office and threw stones at revenue officials and at a marriage procession, after which the police used minimum limited force.
    5. April protest: Affected Adivasi families staged a pyre protest in Chhatarpur on 10 April 2026, which brought the movement national attention.
    6. July protest: Villagers again lay on symbolic pyres and began a hunger strike at the Barnar river, with a protest on the banks on 18 July.
    7. Clearance of the site: After 15 days, the police cleared the protest site.
    8. Dialogue that did not occur: The movement’s leader stated that the administration had promised a dialogue with representatives of the Centre, and that no such conversation took place.

    Why was the project approved?

    1. The surplus framing: The Ken is treated as carrying water beyond its basin’s need, and the Betwa basin as deficient, which is the premise the transfer rests on.
    2. The regional case: Bundelkhand is among India’s driest and most impoverished regions and has a long record of drought and distress migration.
    3. The stated purpose: Irrigation and drinking water for the water stressed districts of the region.
    4. The two rivers: The Ken rises in the Vindhyan plateau, flows mainly through Madhya Pradesh and joins the Yamuna at Banda in Uttar Pradesh. The Betwa also rises in the Vindhyas, flows mainly through Uttar Pradesh and meets the Yamuna at Hamirpur.
    5. Why both matter locally: Both rivers run through the same region, so the transfer moves water within Bundelkhand rather than out of it.
    6. The contested premise: The surplus classification is an assessment of basin yield, and it is the step that decides how much displacement is treated as justified.

    Why does monetary compensation fail to reach the affected?

    1. The title requirement: Most Adivasi families in the affected villages do not hold patta land, so the per acre component does not apply to them.
    2. The cut off date: Eligibility for the cash component is fixed by age as on February 2024, which excludes those who reached adulthood after that date.
    3. Forest income is unvalued: Livelihoods built on mahua, charwa, tendu leaves and other forest produce are not converted into any head of compensation.
    4. Non submergence villages: Narauli is not in the submergence zone yet loses the forest that sustains it, a loss the acquisition framework does not recognise.
    5. Standing assets: Trees planted over a lifetime, including mango, ber, kaitha and teak, are counted as forest loss for the project and not as household assets.
    6. Process complaints: Houses in some villages were demolished without adequate notice or compensation, according to the movement’s leader.

    What is being lost beyond land and houses?

    1. Community: Households state that relocation breaks the kinship network in which they live, so the social relations of the village do not travel with the compensation.
    2. Language: Villagers raise the loss of their own dialect in a new settlement as a distinct concern.
    3. Sacred geography: Village deities and sites of worship are tied to the specific location and cannot be relocated with the households.
    4. Birthplace claim: Residents describe the land along the Ken as their janam bhoomi, or place of birth, and treat that as an independent ground of refusal.
    5. Forest as an economy: The forest edge supplies food, cash income and fuel, so its loss is an income shock and not only a cultural one.
    6. The collective demand: The stated position is a forest for their forest, land for their land, water for their water and a village for their village.

    Where does the water security case collide with the displacement cost?

    1. Two legitimate claims: Drinking water and irrigation for 13 water stressed districts is a genuine public purpose. So is the security of tenure of the households inside the submergence zone.
    2. Same region, different people: The transfer moves water within Bundelkhand, so the beneficiaries and the displaced belong to the same drought affected region.
    3. The forest multiplier: Because the reservoir sits inside a tiger reserve, forest loss must be offset, which displaces a second set of 12 villages that the dam itself would not have touched.
    4. Compensation without capacity: A cash package can settle a title based claim. It cannot replace a forest based livelihood or a functioning village.
    5. The dialogue gap: Even where the project moves ahead, an immediate and structured negotiation on resettlement and rehabilitation with an organised community is missing, as the organiser of the Narmada Bachao Andolan has recorded.
    6. Deferred rather than resolved: Building the dam settles the water question and shifts the livelihood question to a resettlement site that has not been defined.

    What has the administrative response been?

    1. Claim of redressal: The District Magistrate of Chhatarpur in April stated that most of the demands raised during the April protests had been addressed.
    2. Silence since: The current District Magistrate and the Chief Executive Officer of the Zila Panchayat did not respond to repeated requests for comment.
    3. Revenue department: An email to the Principal Secretary of the Madhya Pradesh Revenue Department, which oversees land acquisition, drew no reply.
    4. Policing of protest: Villagers who went to Chhatarpur and Bijawar to press their demands state that the police responded with lathis.
    5. Official account of force: The Superintendent of Police stated that minimum limited force was used after the office was locked and stones were thrown.
    6. Field level messaging: Households report being told by the village revenue official that their land is going to submerge and that no further claim arises.

    What are the villagers demanding?

    1. April demands, first: A joint survey of land and houses by the administration and the affected families.
    2. April demands, second: Rs 25 lakh in compensation per individual.
    3. April demands, third: Four times the value of the land in compensation.
    4. April demands, fourth: A deadline of April 2026 for settlement of these claims.
    5. July demands, first: Three acres of land granted jointly in the names of the male and the female head of each family.
    6. July demands, second: A village for the displaced village, so that the community is resettled together rather than scattered.
    7. July demands, third: The same April 2026 deadline carried forward.
    8. The organising principle: The shift from cash amounts in April to land and village in July reflects a demand for restitution in kind rather than a higher price.

    Challenges to the Ken Betwa river linking project

    1. Contested surplus assessment: The classification of a river as surplus rests on basin yield estimates that independent hydrologists dispute. e.g. objections filed before the Supreme Court’s Central Empowered Committee on the Ken’s assessed surplus.
    2. Loss inside a protected area: The reservoir submerges core tiger habitat, which no compensatory afforestation reproduces. e.g. about 4,141 hectares of Panna Tiger Reserve land under submergence.
    3. Cumulative pressure on the same landscape: Further projects are cleared in the same corridor while the dam is under construction. e.g. the 1,800 MW Panari pumped storage project cleared on about 411 hectares in the Panna Ranipur corridor in August 2026.
    4. Compensatory afforestation cannot replace old growth: Plantations take decades to deliver the produce and habitat value of a felled forest. e.g. an estimated 23 lakh trees to be felled under the detailed project report.
    5. Forest rights not settled before acquisition: Individual and community claims under forest rights law are often unsettled when land is taken. e.g. Gond families in the affected villages without patta land.
    6. Resettlement site quality: Displaced households are commonly resettled on land without water, forest access or common grazing. e.g. the long unresolved rehabilitation record of the Sardar Sarovar oustees.
    7. Cost and time escalation: Long gestation interlinking works overrun both budget and schedule, which pushes rehabilitation spending to the end. e.g. an approved cost of about Rs 44,605 crore in 2021 with an eight year completion schedule.
    8. Downstream and interstate obligations: Water sharing commitments between Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh determine actual delivery, not the design capacity. e.g. the interstate memorandum of agreement signed on 22 March 2021.

    Conclusion

    The Ken Betwa link moves water within Bundelkhand, and it moves the entire cost of that transfer onto Adivasi households whose form of landholding and forest based income the compensation framework does not recognise. The design question is not the amount of the package but its unit: the villages are asking for land, forest and a resettled village, and the State is offering a per head cash sum against titled acres most of them do not hold. Until forest rights are settled and a defined resettlement site is negotiated with the community as a unit, construction will continue to run ahead of rehabilitation.

    Interlinking of Rivers in India

    1. The idea: Transferring water from basins assessed as surplus to basins assessed as deficient, through a network of storage dams and link canals.
    2. The plan: The National Perspective Plan of 1980 of the Ministry of Irrigation set out the framework for such transfers.
    3. The agency: The National Water Development Agency, set up in 1982, prepares feasibility and detailed project reports for the links.
    4. The scale: The plan identifies 30 links, comprising 16 under the peninsular component and 14 under the Himalayan component.
    5. The judicial push: The Supreme Court in 2012 directed the Union government to implement the interlinking programme in a time bound manner and to constitute a special committee.
    6. The first link: The Ken Betwa link is the first project taken up for implementation under the plan, with a dedicated authority created for it in 2021.
    7. The claimed benefit: Drought proofing, flood moderation, additional irrigated area and hydropower, drawn from moving water between basins with different rainfall regimes.

    Constitutional Framework Governing Water, Land and Forest Rights

    1. Seventh Schedule, State List Entry 17: Places water supply, irrigation, canals, drainage, embankments and water storage with the States, subject to Entry 56.
    2. Seventh Schedule, Union List Entry 56: Allows Parliament to regulate and develop interstate rivers and river valleys in the public interest.
    3. Seventh Schedule, Concurrent List Entry 17A and 17B: Place forests, and the protection of wild animals and birds, on the Concurrent List after the 42nd Amendment.
    4. Article 262: Empowers Parliament to provide for adjudication of interstate river water disputes and to bar the jurisdiction of courts in them.
    5. Article 21: Protects life and personal liberty, read to include the right to livelihood and to a healthy environment.
    6. Article 48A and Article 51A(g): Direct the State to protect the environment and forests, and place a corresponding fundamental duty on every citizen.
    7. Article 244 and the Fifth Schedule: Provide for the administration of Scheduled Areas and the protection of tribal interests, including through the Tribes Advisory Council.
    8. Article 243ZD read with Part IX: Places village level planning with the Panchayats, which is the base for consultation requirements in Scheduled Areas.

    Laws and Rules Governing Displacement, Forests and River Projects

    1. Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013: Governs acquisition, compensation and the rehabilitation entitlements of affected families.
    2. Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980: Requires prior central approval for diversion of forest land to non forest use, with compensatory afforestation and net present value payments.
    3. Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006: Recognises individual and community rights over forest land and produce for forest dwelling communities.
    4. Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972: Governs protected areas, and provides for tiger reserves, critical tiger habitats and the National Tiger Conservation Authority.
    5. Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 and the Environment Impact Assessment Notification, 2006: Provide the environmental clearance process, including public hearing and appraisal for river valley projects.
    6. Panchayats (Extension to the Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996: Requires consultation with the Gram Sabha before land acquisition and resettlement in Scheduled Areas.
    7. Inter State River Water Disputes Act, 1956: Provides the tribunal mechanism for adjudicating disputes over interstate river waters.

    Back2Basics: Panna Tiger Reserve

    1. Designation: A tiger reserve, listed in the Places in News record as the protected area within which the Daudhan dam is being built.
    2. Location: Panna and Chhatarpur districts of Madhya Pradesh, on the Vindhyan range in the Bundelkhand region.
    3. Constitution: Panna National Park was notified in 1981 and the area was declared a tiger reserve in 1994 under Project Tiger.
    4. River: The Ken river flows through the reserve and supports its gorges, waterfalls and riverine habitat.
    5. International recognition: It was designated a biosphere reserve and was added to the UNESCO World Network of Biosphere Reserves in 2020.
    6. Conservation record: Tigers became locally extinct in the reserve by 2009, and a reintroduction programme rebuilt the population, treated as a landmark recovery.
    7. Vegetation: Tropical dry deciduous forest with teak and kardhai woodland, interspersed with grassland and plateau.
    8. Fauna: Tiger, leopard, sloth bear, chital, chinkara, sambar and nilgai on land, with gharial, mugger and the Indian vulture along the Ken.
    9. Landscape connectivity: It links to the Nauradehi Wildlife Sanctuary and the Satpura landscape, and the Panna Ranipur corridor extends toward Uttar Pradesh.

    Government Initiatives

    1. Ken Betwa Link Project Authority: The special purpose body created in 2021 to execute the link, with an interstate memorandum of agreement signed on 22 March 2021.
    2. National Perspective Plan and the National Water Development Agency: The 1980 plan and the 1982 agency that prepare and appraise interlinking proposals.
    3. Pradhan Mantri Krishi Sinchayee Yojana: Consolidates irrigation schemes to expand assured irrigation and improve water use efficiency at the farm level.
    4. Atal Bhujal Yojana: Supports community led groundwater management in water stressed blocks, including in Bundelkhand districts.
    5. Jal Jeevan Mission: Aims at functional household tap connections in rural areas, the drinking water objective the link project is meant to support.
    6. Project Tiger and the National Tiger Conservation Authority: Provide the statutory and funding framework for tiger reserves such as Panna, including village relocation packages.
    7. Compensatory Afforestation Fund Management and Planning Authority: Manages funds collected from forest diversion for compensatory afforestation and habitat improvement.

    Key Facts about the Ken Betwa Link Project

    1. Approval and cost: Approved by the Union Cabinet in December 2021 at a cost of about Rs 44,605 crore, with an eight year completion schedule.
    2. The agreement: A memorandum of agreement between the Union government, Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh was signed on 22 March 2021, observed as World Water Day.
    3. Annual irrigation: Designed to provide annual irrigation to about 10.62 lakh hectares across the two States.
    4. Drinking water: Designed to supply drinking water to about 62 lakh people.
    5. Power: Includes 103 MW of hydropower and 27 MW of solar capacity.
    6. The dam: The Daudhan dam is about 77 metres high and about 2,031 metres long, with a tunnel system feeding the link canal.
    7. The rivers: The Ken and the Betwa are both tributaries of the Yamuna, joining it at Banda and Hamirpur respectively in Uttar Pradesh.
    8. The region: Bundelkhand covers 13 districts across Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh and is among India’s driest and most impoverished regions.

    Challenges in River Interlinking

    1. Basin surplus is contested science: Surplus and deficit classifications rest on yield estimates that vary with the data series used. e.g. disputes over the assessed surplus of the Ken before appraisal bodies.
    2. Ecological alteration of river regimes: Reduced downstream flow changes sediment transport, fish migration and floodplain recharge. e.g. gharial habitat along the Ken downstream of the Daudhan site.
    3. Forest and protected area loss: Links routinely pass through forests and sanctuaries where diversion cannot be reversed. e.g. submergence of about 4,141 hectares inside the Panna Tiger Reserve.
    4. Displacement and rehabilitation deficits: Resettlement lags construction, so families lose land before they receive an alternative. e.g. the long running rehabilitation disputes of the Sardar Sarovar project on the Narmada.
    5. Interstate political friction: Donor States resist parting with water once a project is under way. e.g. the long deadlock over the Mahanadi and the Godavari Cauvery link proposals.
    6. Cost and time overruns: Multi decade civil works escalate in cost, which squeezes the rehabilitation component first. e.g. the 2021 approved cost of about Rs 44,605 crore for a single link.
    7. Climate uncertainty: Interlinking assumes stable rainfall distribution between basins, which a changing monsoon does not guarantee. e.g. simultaneous drought across both donor and recipient basins in a deficient monsoon year.
    8. Groundwater alternatives neglected: Large transfers draw attention and funds away from cheaper local recharge and watershed options. e.g. traditional Bundelkhand tanks and chandela ponds that remain unrestored.

    Way Forward

    1. Settle forest rights first: Complete recognition of individual and community forest rights under the 2006 Act before any acquisition notification is issued.
    2. Resettle the village as a unit: Provide a single relocation site with forest access, water and common land so that community structure survives the move, as the affected families have demanded.
    3. Compensate the livelihood, not only the acre: Value minor forest produce income and standing trees in the entitlement package for households without titled land.
    4. Institutionalise dialogue: Create a standing negotiation forum between the project authority, the district administration and elected village representatives, with recorded minutes.
    5. Independent hydrological review: Publish and peer review the basin yield assessment on which the surplus classification rests, before further links are appraised.
    6. Fund rehabilitation ahead of construction: Ring fence the rehabilitation and resettlement outlay and release it before submergence rather than after.
    7. Restore local water systems in parallel: Revive tanks, ponds and watershed structures across Bundelkhand so that drought relief does not rest on a single project.
    8. Compensatory afforestation in contiguous blocks: Locate the compensatory forest within the same landscape and monitor survival rates, rather than counting saplings planted.

    “[2017, GS3, 10 marks] Not many years ago, river linking was a concept but it is becoming reality in the country. Discuss the advantages of river linking and its possible impact on the environment.”

  • In J&K, a facade of normalcy cannot substitute for peace

    Why in the News

    An administrative order circulating in Anantnag directed government employees to take part in a Tiranga Rally, making attendance at a State sponsored event an official obligation. The order brings out the central tension in the governance of Jammu and Kashmir since August 2019, between an official account of restored normalcy and a security regime of raids, dismissals, detentions and attachments that continues without pause. Whether participation of this kind reflects public enthusiasm or administrative compulsion is the question the order leaves unanswered.

    What is Article 370 of the Constitution?

    1. What it provided: A temporary provision under Part XXI that limited Parliament’s legislative power over Jammu and Kashmir to defence, foreign affairs and communications, with other laws requiring the State government’s concurrence.
    2. The linked provision: Article 35A, added by a 1954 Presidential Order, allowed the State to define permanent residents and reserve rights in employment and property for them.
    3. What changed in 2019: Presidential Orders of August 2019 applied the whole Constitution to the State and rendered Article 370 inoperative, and Article 35A ceased to apply.
    4. The statutory change: The Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019 split the State into two Union Territories, Jammu and Kashmir with a legislature, and Ladakh without one.
    5. The judicial outcome: The Supreme Court upheld the 2019 measures in In re Article 370 of the Constitution (2023) and directed that statehood be restored and elections held.
    6. The contested question: The argument advanced in this piece treats the 2019 change as an abrogation imposed without consent, and reads subsequent governance as its continuation.

    Who is an overground worker?

    1. The term: A person alleged to provide logistical support to militants, such as shelter, transport, money or information, without taking part in armed action.
    2. Why the term matters: It is not defined in statute, so the label carries no fixed evidentiary threshold and can be applied to large numbers after a single incident.

    What is preventive detention?

    1. What it is: Detention ordered by the executive to prevent an anticipated act, without any charge, trial or conviction.
    2. Its basis: Article 22(3) to 22(7) carve preventive detention out of the ordinary protections against arrest, and permit detention up to three months before an Advisory Board must review it.

    What is the United Liberation Council?

    1. What it is: The name attached to a purported threat letter reported on 12 August, described by authorities and sections of the media as an affiliate of Lashkar e Taiba.
    2. What the letter did: It reportedly named several Kashmiri Pandit government employees and carried their telephone numbers.

    Why is the Tiranga Rally order treated as symptomatic rather than isolated?

    1. The object is not the issue: The objection is not to the national flag but to the coercive form of the instruction.
    2. Obligation replaces participation: When attendance at a government event becomes an administrative duty, the resulting turnout cannot be read as evidence of public sentiment.
    3. A pattern of governance: The order fits a style of administration that has defined the region since the Union government took direct control in August 2019.
    4. Display as policy output: A visible ceremony is treated as the deliverable, so the appearance of normalcy substitutes for the conditions that would produce it.
    5. Self defeating measurement: A government that compels attendance loses the only instrument that could have told it whether sentiment had actually changed.

    What measures define administration in the Valley since 2019?

    1. Raids and investigations: Searches and investigations by multiple central and State agencies have become a recurring feature of life in the Valley.
    2. Dismissals from service: Government employees have been dismissed over alleged links with militancy or with militant sympathisers, without the ordinary departmental process.
    3. Mass detention: Thousands have been detained after militant incidents, at times under broad allegations of being overground workers.
    4. Institutional closure: Educational and charitable institutions have faced closure or restriction over alleged links with banned organisations.
    5. Property attachment: Properties worth hundreds of crores of rupees have been attached under various laws.
    6. House demolition: Homes have been demolished where a member of the family stands accused of militancy.
    7. Post incident crackdowns: Thousands were reportedly detained after the killing of a police constable in south Kashmir, and the cycle of raids, detentions and suspicion followed the killing of migrant workers.

    What does the record on the Kashmiri Pandit community show?

    1. The threat letter: Reports on 12 August described a purported threat letter naming several Kashmiri Pandit government employees along with their telephone numbers.
    2. The attributed source: The letter was attributed to the United Liberation Council, described as an affiliate of Lashkar e Taiba.
    3. The casualty count: 25 members of the community have been targeted and killed since 2019.
    4. The named victims: They include Ajay Pandita Bharti, Rakesh Pandita, Makhan Lal Bindroo, Rahul Bhat, Rajni Bala, Puran Krishan Bhat and Sanjay Sharma.
    5. Why the memory matters: For a community displaced in the 1990s, each such threat revives the circumstances of that displacement rather than reading as an isolated crime.
    6. The return condition: Return has to rest on an environment in which the community feels safe, not on participation in official ceremonies designed to demonstrate that everything is normal.

    Why do the claim of normalcy and the continuing security regime contradict each other?

    1. The official account: The government tells the rest of India that Kashmir has entered a new era of peace and normalcy.
    2. The parallel reality: Extraordinary security measures, raids, detentions, dismissals and restrictions continue to shape the everyday lives of ordinary people.
    3. Both cannot be operative: A settled peace does not require a standing apparatus of preventive detention and property attachment to maintain it.
    4. The tourist test fails: Busy markets, full hotels and traffic on the roads are what a visitor sees in a few days. They measure commerce, not security of person.
    5. What each side gains: The government gains a demonstrable output in the display. The population gains nothing it can rely on when the display ends.
    6. The unresolved reminder: The threat letter of 12 August is the demonstration that the underlying problem has not closed, whatever the ceremonies record.

    How should normalcy actually be measured?

    1. Freedom to speak: Whether ordinary people feel secure enough to speak freely without anticipating consequences.
    2. Law as protection: Whether families believe the law will protect them rather than intimidate them.
    3. A visible future: Whether young people see a future for themselves in the region.
    4. Safe return: Whether communities that have suffered displacement and violence feel safe enough to return and rebuild their lives.

    What does the security regime do to a generation born after the conflict?

    1. Who they are: Those in their teens and twenties in Kashmir were born decades after the worst years of the conflict and bear no responsibility for the violence of the 1990s.
    2. What they observe: Many grow up watching fathers, brothers, relatives and neighbours being summoned, detained or questioned.
    3. Collective punishment: Large scale detentions and punitive measures after militant attacks deepen the perception that a whole community is being punished for the acts of individuals.
    4. The asymmetry they learn: One section of society is repeatedly assured that everything is normal while another is continually asked to prove that it is not a threat.
    5. The outcome: This produces bruised memory rather than reconciliation, and bruised memory does not disappear because officials are instructed to display flags.
    6. The time horizon: Brute force can silence a street for a period. It cannot silence a generation’s memory.

    What distinctions must the state draw?

    1. Militant and citizen: The State must distinguish between a militant and an ordinary citizen, which mass categorisation after an incident destroys.
    2. Accused and convicted: It must distinguish between an accused person and a convicted person, which dismissal, attachment and demolition before trial collapse.
    3. Family member and accused: It must distinguish between a family member and the person accused of committing a crime, which punitive action against a household erases.

    Challenges to restoring political normalcy in Jammu and Kashmir

    1. Punitive measures before adjudication: Attachment and demolition operate before a court has decided guilt, so the penalty precedes the finding. e.g. property attachments running to hundreds of crores of rupees under various laws since 2019.
    2. Undefined categories in enforcement: Terms such as overground worker carry no statutory definition, so detention scales with suspicion rather than evidence. e.g. thousands reportedly detained after the killing of a police constable in south Kashmir.
    3. Employment as a security instrument: Dismissal without departmental inquiry converts government service into a lever of security policy. e.g. dismissals of employees over alleged links with militancy since 2019.
    4. Targeted killings of minorities: The safety of returning and resident minority employees remains unsecured. e.g. 25 members of the Kashmiri Pandit community killed since 2019 and a threat letter naming employees on 12 August 2026.
    5. Statehood still pending: Restoration of full statehood remains incomplete, leaving an elected government without control over police and public order. e.g. the Supreme Court’s 2023 direction to restore statehood at the earliest.
    6. Space for civil society: Closure of educational and charitable institutions removes the mediating layer between the State and the population. e.g. restrictions on institutions over alleged links with banned organisations.
    7. Cross border sponsorship: Infiltration and external support keep the security justification alive irrespective of local political settlement. e.g. attacks on migrant workers in the Valley followed by area wide crackdowns.
    8. Economic dependence on tourism: A single security incident removes the region’s main visible income source. e.g. the collapse of bookings in the Valley after major attacks on visitors.

    Conclusion

    The administrative order in Anantnag is a small instrument, and its significance lies in what it substitutes for. Kashmir needs healing built on dignity, justice, security and dialogue, and healing cannot be produced by an order requiring attendance. A facade of normalcy may impress visitors, and it cannot substitute for real peace. The measure of whether the situation has changed is whether the State begins to distinguish the militant from the citizen and the accused from the convict, not whether the flag is displayed on schedule.

    Jammu and Kashmir after 2019

    1. Constitutional status: The former State was reorganised on 31 October 2019 into the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir, with a legislature, and the Union Territory of Ladakh, without one.
    2. Political timeline: Assembly elections were held in 2024, the first since 2014, restoring an elected government to the Union Territory.
    3. Statehood question: Full statehood has not been restored. Public order and police remain with the Union government under the Reorganisation Act.
    4. Security geography: The region has a Line of Control of about 740 km with Pakistan and a Line of Actual Control segment with China in Ladakh.
    5. Displacement history: Large scale displacement of the Kashmiri Pandit community occurred from 1990, and return and rehabilitation remains an unfinished policy objective.
    6. Economy: Horticulture, handicrafts and tourism dominate the economy, all of which are directly sensitive to security incidents.

    Constitutional Framework Governing Jammu and Kashmir and Security Measures

    1. Article 1: Declares India a Union of States and makes the territories in the First Schedule part of that Union.
    2. Article 3: Empowers Parliament to form new States and Union Territories and to alter boundaries, the provision used for the 2019 reorganisation.
    3. Article 370: The temporary provision governing the State’s relationship with the Union, rendered inoperative by the Presidential Orders of August 2019.
    4. Article 14: Requires equality before the law, which limits arbitrary classification of persons or communities in security administration.
    5. Article 19: Guarantees freedom of speech, assembly, association and movement, subject to reasonable restrictions on the specified grounds.
    6. Article 21: Protects life and personal liberty, and requires that any deprivation follow a procedure that is fair, just and reasonable.
    7. Article 22: Provides protections on arrest, and separately permits preventive detention with an Advisory Board review after three months.
    8. Article 239A read with the Reorganisation Act: Provides the framework for a legislature in a Union Territory, with police and public order reserved to the Union in the case of Jammu and Kashmir.
    9. Article 355: Places a duty on the Union to protect every State against external aggression and internal disturbance.

    Laws and Rules Governing Security Administration in Jammu and Kashmir

    1. Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019: Created the two Union Territories and set out the distribution of legislative and executive power between them and the Union.
    2. Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967: The principal anti terrorism statute, providing for banning organisations, designating individuals and attaching proceeds of terrorism.
    3. Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978: Permits preventive detention for up to two years on grounds of security of the State or maintenance of public order.
    4. Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Act, 1990: Confers search, arrest and use of force powers on the armed forces in areas declared disturbed, with prior sanction required for prosecution.
    5. National Investigation Agency Act, 2008: Establishes the central counter terrorism investigation agency and defines the scheduled offences it can take over.
    6. Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002: Provides for provisional attachment of property representing proceeds of crime, used in terror financing investigations.
    7. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023: Replaces the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and carries the powers to issue prohibitory orders and regulate assemblies.

    Back2Basics: In re Article 370 of the Constitution (2023)

    1. What it was: A Constitution Bench judgment of the Supreme Court on the validity of the Presidential Orders of August 2019 and the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019.
    2. Holding on sovereignty: The Court held that Jammu and Kashmir retained no element of internal sovereignty after its accession and the adoption of the Constitution.
    3. Holding on Article 370: Article 370 was held to be a temporary provision, and the President’s power to declare it inoperative was held to survive the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly of the State.
    4. Holding on Article 35A: The Court held that the removal of Article 35A did not violate the fundamental rights framework.
    5. Direction on statehood: The Court directed that the statehood of Jammu and Kashmir be restored at the earliest, while upholding the carving out of Ladakh.
    6. Direction on elections: The Election Commission was directed to hold Assembly elections by 30 September 2024.
    7. Additional direction: The Court recommended a truth and reconciliation commission to examine human rights violations in the region since the 1980s.

    Government Initiatives

    1. Prime Minister’s Development Package, 2015: An outlay of about Rs 80,068 crore covering road, power, health, tourism and rehabilitation projects in the region.
    2. Prime Minister’s Package for Kashmiri Migrants: Provides government jobs and transit accommodation to support the return of displaced Kashmiri Pandit families to the Valley.
    3. Udaan and Himayat: Skill development and placement schemes for youth of the region, run through the National Skill Development Corporation and the rural livelihoods mission.
    4. Prime Minister’s Special Scholarship Scheme: Funds higher education outside the region for students from Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh.
    5. Security Related Expenditure scheme: Reimburses the Union Territory for expenditure on security, relief and rehabilitation of surrendered militants and civilian victims.
    6. Operation Sadbhavana and the Civic Action Programme: Army and central armed police force programmes that fund schools, medical camps and community infrastructure in border and affected areas.
    7. New Central Sector Scheme for Industrial Development, 2021: An outlay of about Rs 28,400 crore of capital and interest incentives to attract manufacturing investment to the Union Territory.

    Key Facts about Jammu and Kashmir

    1. Reorganisation date: The two Union Territories came into existence on 31 October 2019, observed as National Unity Day.
    2. Representation: The Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir returns five members to the Lok Sabha and Ladakh returns one.
    3. Delimitation: The 2022 delimitation raised Assembly seats to 90, with 43 in the Jammu division and 47 in the Kashmir division, besides seats reserved for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes for the first time.
    4. Reservation extension: Central laws on reservation, including for Scheduled Tribes such as the Gujjar, Bakarwal, Gaddi and Sippi communities, now apply to the Union Territory.
    5. Boundaries: The region borders Pakistan along the Line of Control and China along the Line of Actual Control in Ladakh.
    6. Geography: The Pir Panjal range separates the Jammu division from the Kashmir Valley, and the Jhelum, Chenab and Indus are the principal rivers.
    7. Treaty link: The Indus Waters Treaty of 1960 governs the use of the western rivers that flow through the region, and India placed it in abeyance in 2025.

    Challenges in Internal Security Management

    1. Balancing force and consent: Security operations that succeed tactically can widen alienation and cost the political objective. e.g. area wide cordon and search operations following a single militant incident.
    2. Preventive detention without adjudication: Detention laws allow long custody without trial, which produces grievance even where the intelligence is sound. e.g. detention up to two years permitted under the Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978.
    3. Radicalisation through digital channels: Recruitment and propaganda have moved online, beyond the reach of physical area domination. e.g. encrypted messaging used for handler communication in recent militancy cases.
    4. Terror financing: Funding routes through hawala, cryptocurrency and front organisations are hard to interdict. e.g. investigations into non governmental organisations and trusts by central agencies since 2017.
    5. Rehabilitation of surrendered cadre: Without livelihood and social acceptance, surrendered militants relapse. e.g. surrender and rehabilitation policies across the Northeast and Left Wing Extremism affected districts.
    6. Centre and State coordination: Multiple agencies operating in the same theatre create gaps in intelligence handover. e.g. the multi agency centre framework created after the 2008 Mumbai attacks.
    7. Human rights accountability: Sanction requirements delay prosecution in cases of alleged excess, which erodes trust in the process. e.g. the prior sanction requirement for prosecuting armed forces personnel.
    8. Border management technology: Infiltration continues where terrain defeats physical fencing. e.g. tunnels detected along the international boundary in the Jammu sector.

    Way Forward

    1. Restore statehood on a stated timeline: Give the elected government responsibility for public order so accountability for security decisions is politically located.
    2. Individualise security action: Confine dismissal, attachment and demolition to persons against whom a case is established, with reasons recorded and an appeal available.
    3. Institutionalise dialogue: Create a standing channel with elected representatives, civil society and displaced communities rather than event driven engagement.
    4. Secure minority employees: Provide verified protection and posting choices to Kashmiri Pandit employees rather than requiring presence at ceremonial events.
    5. Time bound trials: Expand special court capacity so that persons in preventive detention are either charged and tried or released.
    6. Youth employment at scale: Convert skill schemes into placement linked outcomes so that the young have a visible economic route.
    7. Independent grievance mechanism: Set up an accessible body to examine complaints of excess, following the reconciliation mechanism the Supreme Court recommended in 2023.

    “[2023, GS3, 10 marks] Winning of ‘Hearts and Minds’ in terrorism-affected areas is an essential step in restoring the trust of the population. Discuss the measures adopted by the Government in this respect as part of the conflict resolution in Jammu and Kashmir.”

  • March to July, Govt sent one blocking order to social media firms every minute

    Why in the News

    Nearly 1.95 lakh state backed content blocking orders were sent to Instagram, Facebook and YouTube between March and July 2026, an average of one every 68 seconds, against a daily average of six in the preceding year. Most were routed through the Sahyog portal of the Ministry of Home Affairs and issued under Section 79(3)(b) of the Information Technology Act, 2000, the safe harbour condition, rather than the dedicated blocking power in Section 69A. The surge, combined with automated execution by the platform, converts a conditional legal duty into unconditional compliance.

    What is the Sahyog portal?

    1. What it is: A platform built by the Ministry of Home Affairs through which central and State agencies send content blocking notices to online intermediaries.
    2. Who uses it: Various central and State law enforcement and government agencies issue notices, and all three major social media companies have joined the portal.
    3. Legal hook: Notices are issued under Section 79(3)(b) of the Information Technology Act, 2000, the provision that conditions an intermediary’s legal immunity.
    4. What it replaced: It centralises what were previously scattered notices from individual police units and departments into a single automated channel.
    5. Scale of use: Between October 2024 and October 2025 the portal carried 2,312 blocking orders to 19 online platforms, a daily average of six.
    6. What one order covers: A single blocking order can cover hundreds of individual pieces of content or accounts, so the order count understates the volume removed.

    What is safe harbour under Section 79 of the Information Technology Act, 2000?

    1. The immunity: Section 79 protects an intermediary from liability for content that its users post, provided it does not initiate, select or modify that content.
    2. The condition: Section 79(3)(b) withdraws that immunity if the intermediary fails to remove unlawful material after receiving actual knowledge or a government notification.

    What is Section 69A of the Information Technology Act, 2000?

    1. The power: It allows the Union government to direct the blocking of public access to information in the interest of sovereignty, defence, security of the State, friendly relations, public order or the prevention of a cognisable offence.
    2. The safeguards: Blocking under it follows the Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking for Access of Information by Public) Rules, 2009, which require a committee review and reasons in writing.

    What is actual knowledge in intermediary liability?

    1. The test: Actual knowledge is the point at which an intermediary is informed of specific unlawful content and becomes obliged to act on it.
    2. Where it comes from: The Supreme Court in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015) read down Section 79(3)(b) so that actual knowledge means a court order or a government notification, not a private complaint.

    What is an Application Programming Interface?

    1. What it is: A defined interface that allows one software system to send instructions directly to another without a person operating either end.
    2. Its use here: Meta has integrated its interface with the Sahyog portal, so a flagged item uploaded to the portal is removed from its platforms automatically.

    What does the scale of the blocking orders show?

    1. Total volume: Nearly 1.95 lakh blocking orders in five months, about 1,275 a day, or one every 68 seconds.
    2. Instagram: Around 1,00,000 orders, just over half of the total, and the platform on which the student protests were most visible.
    3. Facebook: Around 80,000 orders.
    4. YouTube: Nearly 15,000 orders.
    5. Concentration: Meta owned platforms received roughly nine out of every ten orders issued to the three companies.
    6. The baseline: The comparable figure for October 2024 to October 2025 was 2,312 orders across 19 platforms, a daily average of six.
    7. Official record: The Ministry of Home Affairs annual report for 2024 and 2025 recorded a little over 1.11 lakh pieces of suspicious online content blocked until March 2025 under Section 79(3)(b).
    8. Comparative removals: Meta reported removing over 23 million pieces of content in Indonesia between July and December 2025 against about 41,000 in India, which had already doubled from 28,000 in the first half of that year.
    9. User base: India has over 600 million social media users, with an estimated 10 million to 100 million posts a day.

    What changed in February 2026?

    1. The amendment: The Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology notified amendments to the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021.
    2. The new deadline: Content must now be removed within two to three hours, against the earlier window of 24 to 36 hours.
    3. Added conditions: The amended rule requires that an order come from an officer of a prescribed rank and state its reasons.
    4. The compliance effect: A window of two to three hours makes case by case human review commercially impossible at Indian volumes.
    5. The platform response: Meta integrated its interface with the Sahyog portal so removal happens machine to machine, without separate human review.
    6. What was removed: Automation eliminates the room for the company to review or contest a directive before complying with it.

    Why does the shift from Section 69A to Section 79(3)(b) matter?

    1. Different purpose: Section 69A is a dedicated blocking power. Section 79(3)(b) is a condition attached to an immunity, not a power to censor.
    2. Different safeguards: Section 69A orders pass through a review committee under the 2009 Rules and carry recorded reasons. Section 79(3)(b) notices carry no equivalent statutory committee.
    3. Different issuing authority: Section 69A is exercised by the Union government. Section 79(3)(b) notices come from a wide range of central and State agencies through the portal.
    4. Different subject matter: Section 69A is largely confined to national security and public order. The portal route is used for a far wider category of content.
    5. The legal consequence: The intermediary that refuses a Section 79(3)(b) notice does not face a penalty. It loses immunity for all user content, which is a far larger risk.
    6. What that produces: The threat of losing safe harbour makes refusal irrational, so the conditional structure operates as a command.

    What content was targeted?

    1. The protest period: The five month window covered the student protests against examination paper leaks at Jantar Mantar in Delhi, which began in early June and were called off on 25 July after the resignation of the Union Education Minister.
    2. Official acknowledgement: A senior government official stated that a considerable share of the orders were issued as the protests gathered momentum, particularly on Instagram.
    3. Protest content: Users reported the removal of posts supporting the student protests.
    4. Policy criticism: Posts criticising the government’s ethanol fuel blending policy were among those blocked.
    5. Electoral content: Content relating to the West Bengal Assembly elections was also removed.
    6. Synthetic media: Deepfakes formed a further category among the removals.
    7. Political speech: The national convenor of a national political party stated that some of his Instagram posts were blocked in India.

    Where does automated compliance turn against the legal design?

    1. The doctrinal problem: Actual knowledge requires that someone at the company know of the content and assess the order. An interface that executes takedowns automatically has no knowledge at all.
    2. No verification of authority: Nobody at the company checks whether the order comes from an officer of the prescribed rank or states the reasons the amended rule requires.
    3. Conditional becomes unconditional: Machine to machine execution converts a conditional legal duty into unconditional compliance, which is the substance of the objection raised by the Internet Freedom Foundation.
    4. The state interest on the other side: Coordinated disinformation, deepfakes and incitement travel faster than any human review cycle, which is the case for a short deadline.
    5. The unequal risk: The cost of over removal falls on the user, who has no notice and no appeal. The cost of under removal falls on the company as loss of immunity for all content.
    6. Notice denied: Meta informs users which State authority sent a request in most markets, but not in India, citing legal obligations and regulatory considerations.
    7. No proportionality check: One order can cover hundreds of accounts, so a single instruction can remove speech at a scale no court has examined.

    Challenges to the content blocking regime

    1. Absence of a review committee: Orders under Section 79(3)(b) carry none of the committee scrutiny that Section 69A orders pass through. e.g. the 2009 Blocking Rules committee has no counterpart for portal notices.
    2. Secrecy of orders: Blocking directions are treated as confidential, so neither the user nor the public sees the reasoning. e.g. Rule 16 of the 2009 Blocking Rules requires confidentiality of complaints and actions taken.
    3. No pre decisional hearing for the user: The person whose speech is removed is not heard before removal and often not informed after it. e.g. account holders learning of removal only from the platform’s generic notification.
    4. Chilling effect on lawful speech: Platforms over comply to protect immunity, which removes lawful criticism along with unlawful content. e.g. removal of posts criticising the ethanol blending policy during the same five month window.
    5. Federal multiplication of issuers: A wide set of central and State agencies can issue notices, so there is no single accountable authority. e.g. the portal carried orders to 19 platforms from multiple agencies in the previous year.
    6. Litigation uncertainty: Platforms that challenge the portal route face the loss of immunity while the case runs. e.g. X Corporation’s challenge to the Sahyog portal before the Karnataka High Court, dismissed in 2025.
    7. Encryption and traceability conflict: The traceability requirement in the 2021 Rules cannot be met without weakening end to end encryption. e.g. the pending challenge by WhatsApp to Rule 4(2) of the 2021 Rules.
    8. Capacity asymmetry: Smaller Indian intermediaries cannot build automated compliance systems and face the same deadlines. e.g. the two to three hour removal window applies to every significant social media intermediary.

    Conclusion

    The volume of blocking orders has risen from six a day to about 1,275 a day, and the legal route has moved from a dedicated blocking power with statutory safeguards to a safe harbour condition that carries none. Automation completes the shift, because a system that removes content without any person reading the order cannot satisfy the actual knowledge standard the Supreme Court built the provision around. The amended rules are in force and the orders continue. The unresolved question is whether Section 79(3)(b) can lawfully function as a general censorship channel when the Constitution requires every restriction on speech to be traced to a specific ground and a recorded reason.

    “[2024, GS3, 15 marks] Social media and encrypting messaging services pose a serious security challenge. What measures have been adopted at various levels to address the security implications of social media? Also suggest any other remedies to address the problem.”

  • 60 days on, a disturbing US-Iran stalemate

    Why in the News

    The 60 day window for the United States and Iran to agree a long term peace framework expired on 17 August 2026 with no agreement. Both sides had already shut that window through late June and July while trading strikes, and the Strait of Hormuz remains blockaded by Iran and counterblockaded by the United States. A deadlock that neither side can end now holds global oil and gas movement hostage.

    What is the US Iran Memorandum of Understanding of 17 June?

    1. What it was: An interim understanding signed on 17 June 2026 that declared the immediate and permanent termination of military operations on all fronts.
    2. The clock: It set a 60 day timeframe, extendable by mutual consent, within which a broader agreement was to be reached.
    3. What the broader deal covered: Limits on Iran’s nuclear programme on one side and the lifting of United States sanctions on the other.
    4. The disputed clause: Point 5 was read by Tehran as giving it the right to manage the Strait of Hormuz, which it shares with Oman. Washington rejected that reading.
    5. How it collapsed: Hostilities resumed once Iran began firing on vessels it said were using an unapproved route through the waterway.
    6. Status on expiry: No long term framework exists. The interim text is the only agreed document and it is no longer being observed.

    What is the Strait of Hormuz?

    1. Location: A narrow sea passage connecting the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea, bordered by Iran to the north and Oman and the United Arab Emirates to the south.
    2. Why it matters: About a fifth of global oil and liquefied natural gas moved through it before the war, with no overland route able to absorb that volume.

    What is a naval blockade?

    1. Definition: A blockade is the use of warships to stop shipping from entering or leaving a coast or a waterway.
    2. The two sided version here: Iran has closed the strait to traffic it has not approved. The United States has answered with a counterblockade of Iranian ports that it says it can sustain indefinitely by rotating ships.

    What is the Bab el Mandeb Strait?

    1. Location: The passage between Yemen and Djibouti that links the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden, and so links Suez traffic to the Indian Ocean.
    2. Current state: The Yemen based Houthi group enforces a partial blockade there, which puts a second chokepoint on the same route at risk.

    What are strategic petroleum reserves?

    1. Definition: Underground crude oil stocks held by the State to cover consumption when imports are cut off by war, sanctions or a supply shock.
    2. How they work: The reserve is filled when prices are low and released into refineries when supply stops, so the shock reaches the economy slowly rather than at once.

    Why did the 60 day framework fail to hold?

    1. Interpretation, not intent: The understanding began to unravel largely over disagreement on how its own terms should be read, not over a refusal to talk.
    2. The strait stayed shut: The framework never reopened the Strait of Hormuz, which Iran has effectively blockaded since the Israel and United States attack of 28 February 2026.
    3. The war widened instead: The 60 day period saw the Houthis and Saudi Arabia begin attacking each other, extending the conflict to a second waterway.
    4. Escalation on the ground: Iranian drones struck the office of the Kurdistan Regional Government’s prime minister in northern Iraq on 17 August.
    5. Policy shift in Tehran: A senior Iranian official stated that Iran has moved from a defensive to a fully offensive posture and would strike to break the American naval blockade if diplomacy failed.
    6. Parallel track: Iran and Oman have separately negotiated the coordinates of a jointly managed route through the strait, and progress there has been slow.

    Which figures define the scale of the disruption?

    1. Transit collapse: Traffic through the strait fell to two vessels in a day against more than 130 daily before the conflict.
    2. Share of world energy: About one fifth of global oil and liquefied natural gas flowed through the strait before the war.
    3. Timeline: The war was launched on 28 February 2026. The Memorandum of Understanding was signed on 17 June and its window closed on 17 August.
    4. Second chokepoint: Seven missiles were fired at the Bab el Mandeb Strait and the Mokha coastline in a single day, alongside Houthi claims of striking a Saudi landing ship and four patrol boats.
    5. Spillover count: The Kurdistan region of Iraq has been targeted more than 1,000 times by Iran and pro Iran armed groups since the war began.
    6. Environmental cost: A 160 km oil slick from a bulk carrier struck by a projectile spread off Qeshm island and threatened the Hara mangrove forests, a UNESCO biosphere reserve.
    7. India’s gas shift: Indian liquefied natural gas imports rose 15.4 percent to 7.08 million tonnes over May to July as Qatari supply collapsed.

    Why are both sides doubling down on economic warfare?

    1. Lesson learned in Washington: Bombing alone has not dislodged the government in Tehran, and the United States is running low on munitions.
    2. Lesson learned in Tehran: The United States has come to stay in the region, and ballistic missiles fired at American bases or at Israel will not change that.
    3. American instruments: Washington has rescinded sanction waivers on Iranian oil in the international market and threatens to hold its naval blockade of Iranian ports indefinitely.
    4. Iranian instrument: Tehran’s single point of leverage is the strait itself, which it can keep closed at low cost to its own military.
    5. Iran’s political bet: Tehran calculates that it can squeeze the American administration until the midterm elections and treats the stalemate as the new balance of power.
    6. The American constraint: With a midterm election approaching, the United States President must show that the pressure campaign is producing results without trapping the country in another foreign war.

    What do the positions of other States in the conflict demonstrate?

    1. Oman: It shares the strait with Iran and is negotiating a jointly managed route with Tehran, which makes a small mediating State the only working channel. The United States President has threatened to bomb Oman if it gets in the way of a deal.
    2. Gulf States and the Malacca model: Oman, backed by Gulf States, offered Iran a scheme of voluntary transit fees for using the strait, modelled on the arrangement used in the Strait of Malacca.
    3. Israel: It launched the war jointly with the United States on 28 February, which is why the closure of the strait is treated in Tehran as a response to an attack rather than an independent act.
    4. Saudi Arabia: It is now in direct exchange of fire with the Houthis, which shows how a bilateral war spreads to a second chokepoint through proxies.
    5. Yemen and the Houthis: A non State armed group enforces a partial blockade of the Bab el Mandeb using ballistic missiles and drones against naval and commercial shipping.
    6. Iraq and the Kurdistan region: Iranian drones and pro Iran armed groups have struck the autonomous region’s leadership more than 1,000 times, showing that the conflict travels through weak neighbouring States.
    7. Qatar: Its liquefied natural gas exports must cross the strait, which is why the shutdown forced buyers such as India to switch to United States, Nigerian, Omani and Angolan cargoes.

    Where does the stalemate turn against both sides?

    1. Each side believes time favours it: Tehran is waiting out the American electoral calendar. Washington is waiting for economic pain to force a concession.
    2. Neither can convert leverage: Neither party has gained decisive leverage to force a settlement, and neither can end the conflict on its own terms.
    3. Rhetoric against interest: The American position swings between threatening to bomb a mediating State and insisting that a negotiated settlement is possible.
    4. Cost falls on third parties: The deadlock means the rest of the world remains hostage to a conflict that neither side is capable of ending.
    5. Stalemate as an outcome: The likeliest result is not victory for either side but the deadlock itself becoming the new normal.
    6. Diplomacy is not a hedge: For States dependent on the strait, waiting for a settlement is a bet on two governments that have both chosen to wait.

    What does the stalemate demand of India?

    1. Managed so far: India has absorbed the consequences of the closure to date without a visible supply failure.
    2. Three interests exposed: A persisting stalemate puts India’s economic, energy and strategic interests at risk together, not one at a time.
    3. Diplomacy alone is insufficient: Negotiating access with either party does not remove the underlying dependence on a single waterway.
    4. Cut import dependence: India must reduce its overwhelming dependence on imported oil rather than manage each disruption as it arrives.
    5. Build larger reserves: Strategic petroleum reserve capacity has to be expanded well beyond present levels. Oil and Natural Gas Corporation is to reserve half of its 1.75 million tonne Mangaluru facility for strategic storage.
    6. Diversify and substitute: Gas sourcing has already shifted to the United States, Nigeria, Oman and Angola, and investment in alternative energy is the only durable substitute.

    Challenges to India’s energy security in a Hormuz disruption

    1. Single route concentration: A large share of Indian crude and gas passes one 21 nautical mile wide passage with no overland alternative. e.g. Qatari liquefied natural gas supply to India collapsed once the strait shut.
    2. Reserve cover is thin: Indian strategic reserves cover only a few days of national consumption against the 90 day standard used by International Energy Agency members. e.g. phase one caverns at Visakhapatnam, Mangaluru and Padur hold 5.33 million tonnes in total.
    3. Freight and insurance shock: War risk premiums and rerouting raise the landed cost of every cargo even when volumes are secured. e.g. Red Sea diversions around the Cape of Good Hope from 2024 added roughly two weeks to voyages from Europe.
    4. Currency and fiscal transmission: An oil price spike widens the current account deficit and pushes up subsidy and inflation pressure together. e.g. every $10 rise in the crude price is estimated to add close to 0.4 percent of gross domestic product to India’s import bill.
    5. Refinery configuration: Indian refineries are tuned to specific crude grades, so substitution is not simply a question of finding any seller. e.g. sour heavy Gulf grades cannot be replaced one for one by lighter Nigerian or United States crude.
    6. Diaspora and remittance exposure: About nine million Indians work in the Gulf, and a wider war puts both their safety and their transfers at risk. e.g. evacuation operations of the scale of Operation Ajay in 2023.
    7. Shipping and seafarer risk: Indian crews form a large share of global merchant manning and are directly exposed to attacks on commercial vessels. e.g. the drone strike on a merchant vessel in the Arabian Sea in December 2023.

    Conclusion

    The lapse of the 60 day window confirms that the closure of the Strait of Hormuz is no longer a temporary interruption but the working balance of power between two governments that both expect the other to break first. For India the practical consequence is that the exposure is structural and cannot be negotiated away one shipment at a time. Reduced dependence on imported crude, a materially larger strategic reserve and a faster shift to alternative energy are the only responses that survive whichever way the deadlock ends.

    About Global Maritime Chokepoints

    1. Definition: A chokepoint is a narrow shipping channel through which a large share of world trade must pass, so a closure at that point reroutes or halts global flows.
    2. Strait of Hormuz: The single largest oil chokepoint, carrying roughly 20 million barrels a day of petroleum liquids before the war, about a fifth of world consumption.
    3. Strait of Malacca: The busiest passage between the Indian and Pacific Oceans, carrying most of the crude bound for China, Japan and South Korea.
    4. Bab el Mandeb: The Red Sea entrance that connects Suez traffic to the Indian Ocean, about 18 nautical miles wide at its narrowest.
    5. Suez Canal and Panama Canal: Artificial chokepoints whose closure adds thousands of nautical miles to a voyage. e.g. the Ever Given grounding blocked Suez for six days in March 2021.
    6. Turkish Straits and Danish Straits: The Bosphorus and Dardanelles carry Black Sea grain and Russian crude. The Danish Straits carry Baltic exports.
    7. India’s position: India lies alongside the Indian Ocean sea lanes that connect Hormuz and Malacca, which makes it both exposed to and capable of policing these routes.

    Treaty Framework Governing Passage Through International Straits

    1. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982: The framework treaty governing maritime zones, navigation rights and the settlement of maritime disputes.
    2. Article 3: Allows a coastal State a territorial sea of up to 12 nautical miles, which is why the Strait of Hormuz falls within Iranian and Omani waters.
    3. Article 37: Applies the transit passage regime to straits used for international navigation between one part of the high seas and another.
    4. Article 38: Guarantees all ships and aircraft the right of transit passage, which cannot be suspended by the bordering States.
    5. Article 44: Bars States bordering a strait from hampering or suspending transit passage and requires them to publicise navigational hazards.
    6. Article 88 and Article 301: Reserve the high seas for peaceful purposes and bar the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity of any State.
    7. Iran’s position: Iran signed but has not ratified the Convention, and argues that the transit passage regime does not bind a non party.

    Laws and Rules Governing India’s Oil and Gas Security

    1. Petroleum Act, 1934: Regulates the import, transport, storage, production and refining of petroleum and petroleum products.
    2. Oilfields (Regulation and Development) Act, 1948: Governs the grant of exploration and production rights over petroleum and natural gas.
    3. Territorial Waters, Continental Shelf, Exclusive Economic Zone and Other Maritime Zones Act, 1976: Defines India’s maritime zones and the rights India exercises in each of them.
    4. Merchant Shipping Act, 1958: Governs registration, safety and manning of Indian flag vessels and the protection of Indian seafarers.
    5. Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory Board Act, 2006: Creates the downstream regulator for refining, transport, distribution and marketing, other than production.
    6. Essential Commodities Act, 1955: Allows the Union government to control the production, supply and distribution of petroleum products in a scarcity.
    7. Energy Conservation Act, 2001: Provides the legal base for efficiency standards and, after the 2022 amendment, for a domestic carbon credit trading scheme.

    Back2Basics: Strait of Hormuz

    1. Designation: A maritime chokepoint, tracked in the Places in News list as a strategic waterway rather than a protected area.
    2. Location: Between Iran on the north and Oman’s Musandam peninsula and the United Arab Emirates on the south.
    3. Connects: The Persian Gulf on one side to the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea on the other.
    4. Dimensions: About 21 nautical miles wide at its narrowest, with inbound and outbound shipping lanes of about two miles each separated by a buffer.
    5. Littoral States: Iran, Oman and the United Arab Emirates. Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait and Iraq have no route to the open ocean except through it.
    6. Islands: Qeshm, Hormuz, Larak, and the disputed Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs, held by Iran and claimed by the United Arab Emirates.
    7. Ecology: The Hara mangrove forests off Qeshm island, dominated by grey mangrove, form a UNESCO biosphere reserve.

    Government Initiatives

    1. Indian Strategic Petroleum Reserves Limited: Builds and operates India’s underground crude caverns. Phase one covers Visakhapatnam, Mangaluru and Padur with a combined 5.33 million tonnes.
    2. Strategic reserve phase two: Approved caverns at Chandikhol in Odisha and a second Padur facility, adding about 6.5 million tonnes of capacity.
    3. Hydrocarbon Exploration and Licensing Policy and Open Acreage Licensing Policy: Replace production sharing with a revenue sharing model and let bidders select blocks on their own initiative to raise domestic output.
    4. National Green Hydrogen Mission: Approved in 2023 to build five million tonnes of annual green hydrogen capacity by 2030 and cut fossil fuel imports.
    5. Ethanol Blended Petrol Programme: Substitutes imported crude with domestic ethanol. The 20 percent blending target was advanced to 2025 and met.
    6. PM Surya Ghar Muft Bijli Yojana: Supports rooftop solar in one crore households, shifting household demand away from fossil generation.
    7. Overseas equity oil: ONGC Videsh Limited holds producing assets abroad so that a share of India’s crude comes from equity rather than the spot market.

    Key Facts about India’s Oil and Gas Dependence

    1. Import dependence: India imports over 85 percent of the crude oil it consumes and about half of its natural gas.
    2. Consumption rank: India is the third largest consumer of crude oil in the world after the United States and China.
    3. Refining capacity: India is the fourth largest refiner globally, with Jamnagar in Gujarat the largest single refining complex in the world.
    4. Main suppliers: Russia, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and the United States are the largest sources of Indian crude imports.
    5. Gas sources: Qatar has been India’s largest supplier of liquefied natural gas, delivered under long term contracts through Hormuz.
    6. Reserve benchmark: International Energy Agency members hold 90 days of net import cover. India’s strategic reserves cover only a small fraction of that.
    7. Institutional link: India became an Association country of the International Energy Agency in 2017 and has sought full membership.

    Challenges in India’s Energy Security

    1. Import concentration by geography: A single region supplies a majority of Indian crude, so one regional conflict moves the whole import basket. e.g. West Asian suppliers accounted for the bulk of Indian crude before Russian barrels rose after 2022.
    2. Payment and sanctions exposure: Secondary sanctions can strand a supply relationship that is otherwise commercially sound. e.g. Indian refiners halted Iranian crude purchases in 2019 after the United States ended sanction waivers.
    3. Domestic production decline: Output from ageing fields keeps falling even as demand rises, widening the import gap. e.g. Mumbai High output has fallen steadily from its peak levels.
    4. Storage and pipeline gaps: Gas cannot reach demand centres without a completed grid, so imported cargoes are stranded at terminals. e.g. sections of the Urja Ganga pipeline in eastern India took over a decade to commission.
    5. Critical mineral dependence in the transition: A shift to electric mobility replaces oil dependence with lithium, cobalt and rare earth dependence. e.g. India imports nearly all of its lithium and cobalt requirement.
    6. Grid readiness for renewables: Variable solar and wind output needs storage and balancing capacity that does not yet exist at scale. e.g. curtailment of renewable generation in high output states during low demand hours.
    7. Price pass through politics: Retail fuel prices are politically managed, so a crude spike lands on oil marketing company balance sheets rather than consumers. e.g. under recoveries absorbed by public sector oil marketing companies during 2021 and 2022.

    Way Forward

    1. Expand strategic storage: Complete the phase two caverns and move Indian cover toward the 90 day benchmark used by International Energy Agency members.
    2. Commercialise reserve operation: Allow foreign and private participation in cavern filling so storage is built and rotated without full budgetary funding.
    3. Diversify supply geography: Hold standing contracts across West Asia, West Africa, the Americas and Russia so no single waterway carries a majority of volumes.
    4. Accelerate substitution: Scale ethanol blending, compressed biogas, green hydrogen and electric mobility so demand growth is not met by imported crude.
    5. Secure the sea lanes: Sustain Indian naval deployments for merchant escort in the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea, and expand maritime domain awareness sharing.
    6. Build the gas grid: Complete the national gas grid and city gas networks so imported and domestic gas reaches demand centres.
    7. Deepen mineral supply chains: Secure lithium, cobalt and rare earth supply through overseas assets and domestic processing so the energy transition does not create a fresh chokepoint.

    “[2026] Ships from which of the following countries have to cross the Strait of Hormuz to reach out to the Indian Ocean?
    1. Bahrain
    2. Syria
    3. Qatar
    4. Egypt
    (a) 1 and 2
    (b) 1 and 3
    (c) 2 and 3
    (d) 3 and 4