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Civilsdaily

Type: Explained

These Newscards correspond to the explained section of various newspapers. They become immensely important for both prelims and mains and special attention needs to be paid to them

  • Fading alphabet to fresh paint: Dogri scripts a comeback on Jammu signboards

    Why in the News

    New public signboards in Jammu carry area names in Namey Dogra Akhar, the script of the Dogri language, alongside the usual Devanagari for Hindi and Roman for English. Dogri has long been written in Devanagari, with its own script falling into disuse. Civic authorities are putting the boards up at prominent locations and institutions as an attempt to revive that script. Dogri itself carries the full set of formal protections available to an Indian language, at the Union level and in the Union Territory. The tension is that the decision that secured the language, adopting Devanagari to popularise its literature, is the same decision that displaced its script.

    What is Namey Dogra Akhar?

    1. A modified Takri: Namey Dogra Akhar is a modified version of Takri, the original script in which Dogri was written. The name translates as new Dogri script.
    2. It was created to solve a transcription problem: Takri had no vowel signs, so official orders and documents could not be reliably transcribed in it.
    3. The vowels were borrowed from Devanagari: Writers were directed to take vowel signs from Devanagari, which produced the new script. It then entered administrative work alongside Persian, which was already in use.

    Where does Dogri stand as a language?

    1. Family and group: Dogri is an Indo-Aryan language, part of the Indo-European family that also includes Hindi, Bengali and Punjabi. It belongs to the Western Pahari group, a cluster of related languages found mainly in the western Himalayas.
    2. Speakers and spread: It was the primary language of nearly 2.6 million people at the 2011 Census. It is spoken mainly by the Dogras of Jammu and Kashmir’s Jammu division, with smaller groups in Punjab, Himachal Pradesh and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.
    3. Formal recognition: Dogri was recognised as one of the 22 scheduled languages under the Eighth Schedule in 2003. It was declared one of the official languages of the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir in 2020.

    How did the script lose its place in administration?

    1. The first Dogra ruler left it undeveloped: Maharaja Gulab Singh, the first Dogra ruler of Jammu and Kashmir, directed his energies at expanding the empire up to Tibet. He found little time to promote or develop Takri.
    2. His successor built the new script into government: Maharaja Ranbir Singh, who ascended the throne in 1856, was a scholar of Sanskrit and Persian and a reformer who had the civil and criminal laws compiled into the Ranbir Penal Code. The modified script emerged in administrative work during his rule.
    3. Urdu replaced Persian and squeezed the script out: Maharaja Pratap Singh, who succeeded in 1885, replaced Persian with Urdu as the official language to simplify administrative work, since Urdu was already widely used among the local population.
    4. Local use outlasted official use: The Dogri script continued to be used by many local people for several years after it lost its administrative standing.
    5. Three script demands were balanced against each other: Maharaja Hari Singh, who became ruler in 1926, faced British pressure for English in official work and a demand for Hindi in the Dogra heartland. He promoted Devanagari and Roman alongside the Perso-Arabic script used for Urdu.

    Why did reviving the language not revive the script?

    1. A literary body switched scripts to widen readership: The Dogri Sanstha, a literary organisation, adopted the Devanagari script in 1944 to popularise Dogri literature.
    2. The switch bought recognition at the script’s expense: It helped Dogri gain Sahitya Akademi recognition in 1969. It also contributed to the eventual decline of Namey Dogra Akhar.
    3. Academic institutionalisation ran entirely in Devanagari: The University of Jammu set up a Dogri Research Cell in 1971, later upgraded into a full department. The language became a formal subject in affiliated degree colleges in 1987, taught in Devanagari.
    4. The agitations were about the language, not the script: A Dogri Action Committee led by a Dogri poet held demonstrations in 1990 to get the language introduced in schools. An umbrella group, the Dogri Sangharsh Morcha, launched an agitation two years later for inclusion among the scheduled languages, and Dogri entered primary schooling as a third language in 2002.

    What is the current revival attempt?

    1. It began outside government: Civil society members started displaying boards written in Namey Dogra Akhar at religious places and cremation grounds a few years ago. A former principal of the Government Medical College, Jammu led that effort.
    2. It then moved to the municipal body: The same effort approached the Jammu Municipal Corporation to install public signboards, which is how the boards reached prominent locations and institutions.
    3. Teaching is the announced next step: Classes in the Dogri script are to be started, on the stated position that a language cannot survive without its own script.

    Challenges to reviving the Dogri script

    1. Signage does not by itself create readers: A script on a board stays decorative until a population can decode it, and Dogri continues to be taught in Devanagari. Eg. Manipur returned Meitei Mayek to everyday use only after making the script compulsory in schools from 2006.
      The Fix: Introduce the script as a taught component of the existing Dogri syllabus in schools and colleges rather than as an optional cultural add on.
    2. Digital support is thin: A script without fonts, keyboard layouts and rendering support cannot be used in the places where writing now happens. Eg. The Dogra script received its own Unicode block in 2018, and usable fonts and input methods remain scarce.
      The Fix: Commission open licensed fonts and an input method, and require them in Union Territory government publishing so the script has a working digital base.
    3. The written corpus is not accessible: Older material in Takri and its modified successor survives largely in temple and private collections rather than in catalogued, digitised archives. Eg. The National Mission for Manuscripts, set up in 2003, catalogues such holdings, and regional collections in scripts with few readers move slowest through it.
      The Fix: Fund a script specific digitisation and transliteration project, so learners have material to read once they can read it.
    4. Official status has not required the script: Recognition for the language and official language status in the Union Territory brought protection to Dogri without obliging anything to be written in its own script. Eg. Government business in the Union Territory runs in Devanagari, Roman and Perso-Arabic.
      The Fix: Mandate the script on official signage, letterheads and certificates, so demand for literacy follows an actual use.

    Conclusion

    The boards make the script visible before they make it legible, and that gap is where comparable revivals have stalled. Recognition for Dogri arrived through a script that was not its own, which is why formal status has never carried the script along with the language. The marker to watch is whether the promised classes and a place in the school syllabus follow the signboards, since a script survives by being written rather than by being displayed.

    Back2Basics: Eighth Schedule of the Constitution

    1. What it lists: The Eighth Schedule names the languages the Union is obliged to develop and enrich. It currently carries 22 languages, against 14 at the Constitution’s commencement.
    2. Where it is used in the Constitution: Article 344(1) provides for an Official Language Commission whose members are drawn from these languages. Article 351 directs the Union to draw on them in developing Hindi.
    3. How a language is added: Inclusion requires a constitutional amendment. Dogri, Bodo, Maithili and Santhali were the most recent additions, made by the 92nd Constitutional Amendment Act.

    [2018, GS1, 10 marks] Safeguarding the Indian art heritage is the need of the moment. Discuss.

  • Antibiotic-resistant infections: Risks, costs

    Why in the News

    Infections caused by antibiotic resistant bacteria are more likely to kill hospitalised patients in India and cost more to treat than infections caused by drug susceptible strains. A surveillance study by the Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR) records higher mortality, longer hospital stays and higher antibiotic costs where the bacteria resist carbapenems, the broad spectrum antibiotics doctors hold in reserve for serious infections. The study links laboratory resistance results to what then happened to the patient, which Indian resistance surveillance had not previously done at this scale. Most of the severe infections it recorded began inside the hospital rather than in the community. The tension it sets up is between the search for the next antibiotic and the routine work of preventing infection in the first place.

    What is antimicrobial resistance?

    1. Bacteria survive the drugs meant to kill them: Resistant bacteria continue to grow and reproduce in the presence of antibiotics designed to stop them. Treatment narrows to whatever the organism still responds to.
    2. Resistance spreads sideways, not only down generations: Resistant bacteria pass resistance genes to their offspring. They also transfer those genes to unrelated bacteria through the exchange of DNA.
    3. Carbapenem resistance closes the reserve line: Carbapenems are held back for serious infections where other antibiotics have already failed. Resistance to them leaves few effective options behind.

    What did the ICMR surveillance study cover?

    1. Scale and period: The ICMR antimicrobial resistance (AMR) surveillance network studied 159,336 hospitalised patients across 20 tertiary care hospitals between April 2022 and April 2025.
    2. Two of the four bacteria tracked: Escherichia coli causes urinary tract infections. Klebsiella pneumoniae triggers both urinary and lung infections.
    3. The other two: Acinetobacter baumannii causes ventilator associated pneumonia, bloodstream infections, wound and surgical site infections, urinary tract infections and sometimes meningitis. Pseudomonas aeruginosa causes bloodstream, eye and ear infections.
    4. Resistance was the majority finding: Almost 61.1 percent of the patients studied carried infections resistant to carbapenem antibiotics.

    How much does carbapenem resistance raise the risk of death?

    1. Escherichia coli: 24.4 percent of patients with carbapenem resistant infections died, against 17.3 percent of those with susceptible infections. That is a 41 percent higher relative risk of death.
    2. Klebsiella pneumoniae: Mortality was 31.2 percent in the resistant group against 23.5 percent in the susceptible group, a 33 percent higher relative risk.
    3. Acinetobacter baumannii: Mortality was 37.9 percent against 32.8 percent, a 16 percent higher relative risk.
    4. Pseudomonas aeruginosa: Mortality was 28.9 percent against 20.2 percent, a 43 percent higher relative risk.
    5. Bloodstream infections carry the heaviest toll: Among patients with carbapenem resistant bloodstream infections, mortality ran from 39.3 percent for E. coli to 50.8 percent for A. baumannii. It was 44.8 percent for K. pneumoniae and 46.4 percent for P. aeruginosa.

    What does resistance add to the cost of treatment?

    1. Escherichia coli: Antibiotic cost averaged about Rs 39,846 per patient for resistant infections against Rs 20,034 for susceptible ones.
    2. Klebsiella pneumoniae: The corresponding figures were about Rs 55,688 and Rs 47,918.
    3. Acinetobacter baumannii: Treatment cost about Rs 62,150 for resistant infections against Rs 41,372 for susceptible ones.
    4. Pseudomonas aeruginosa: Treatment cost about Rs 66,599 for resistant infections against Rs 48,392 for susceptible ones.
    5. The costing is deliberately conservative: Only antibiotics priced under the Jan Aushadhi scheme were counted. Intensive care, bed and room charges, diagnostic investigations, procedures, supportive care and consultation were all left out, so the real burden on patients and the health system is larger.

    Why does the study point to infection control rather than antibiotic overuse?

    1. The severe infections began in the hospital: More than 85 percent of bloodstream infections across the four bacteria were classified as healthcare associated.
    2. The named failure points are procedural: Healthcare associated transmission, invasive devices, recent surgery and gaps in infection prevention and timely diagnosis are what the study identifies. Reducing the problem to antibiotic overuse alone misplaces it.
    3. Antibiotics cannot substitute for prevention: The measures named are hand hygiene, device associated infection prevention, appropriate insertion and early removal of invasive devices, environmental cleaning, surgical infection prevention and surveillance of healthcare associated infections. Prevention stops the reserve antibiotics from being needed at all.
    4. Diagnostics decide whether prescribing is targeted: Timely diagnostics let a doctor identify the resistant organism and select a narrow, appropriate antibiotic. Without them, broad spectrum drugs are used by default.
    5. Surveillance has to reach the patient, not stop at the isolate: Integrated surveillance connecting laboratory results with mortality and treatment outcomes is what produced these findings. Prescribing data alone would not have shown them.

    What the study could not establish

    1. A tertiary hospital population is not a national average: These hospitals manage referred and often critically ill patients, so the level of resistance found there cannot be read as the level in the country.
    2. Key clinical variables were absent: The data carried no patient level information on how sick each patient was, how quickly appropriate treatment began, the source of the infection or the specific resistance mechanism involved.
    3. The findings describe practice, not drug superiority: The results reflect real world treatment patterns in India. They do not prove that one drug is universally better than another.

    Challenges to containing antimicrobial resistance in India

    1. Antibiotics move without a prescription: Schedule H1 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945 requires a prescription and a separate sales register for named antibiotics, and compliance at the retail counter is weak. Eg. The Red Line campaign marks such medicines with a red stripe on the pack precisely because the schedule alone was not restricting sales.
      The Fix: Link Schedule H1 sales to an electronic prescription record, so the register is generated by the transaction instead of written up after it.
    2. Non human antibiotic use applies constant selection pressure: Antibiotics used for growth promotion and disease prevention in poultry and aquaculture select for resistant bacteria outside any clinical setting. Eg. India banned colistin, a last resort human antibiotic, in food producing animals in 2019 after its use in poultry farming was documented.
      The Fix: Replace single drug bans with a positive list of permitted veterinary antibiotics, enforced through residue testing at the point of procurement.
    3. Manufacturing effluent breeds resistance in the environment: Antibiotic residues discharged from pharmaceutical plants expose environmental bacteria to sub lethal drug concentrations, which is the condition in which resistance develops. Eg. Water bodies receiving effluent from the pharmaceutical cluster at Patancheru near Hyderabad have recorded high antibiotic concentrations.
      The Fix: Notify enforceable antibiotic residue limits for pharmaceutical effluent and make compliance a condition of the plant’s consent to operate.
    4. Infection prevention has no staffing floor: Most Indian hospitals run no dedicated infection control team to conduct hand hygiene and device audits, so prevention has no one accountable for it. Eg. National Accreditation Board for Hospitals and Healthcare Providers (NABH) accreditation requires an infection control programme, and it covers a small share of India’s hospitals.
      The Fix: Make a minimum infection prevention and control staffing norm a condition of hospital empanelment under Ayushman Bharat Pradhan Mantri Jan Arogya Yojana.
    5. Diagnostic delay forces empirical prescribing: Culture and sensitivity testing capacity sits mainly in large hospitals, and results take days, so smaller facilities start broad spectrum therapy blind. Eg. Rapid molecular testing is routine for drug resistant tuberculosis under the National Tuberculosis Elimination Programme, with no equivalent programme for bacterial bloodstream infections.
      The Fix: Fund rapid molecular resistance testing at district hospital level and tie its use to the hospital’s antibiotic prescribing audit.

    Conclusion

    India’s resistance response has been organised around what is prescribed, because prescribing is what the system can already count. This study relocates the problem to where the infection is acquired, which is a different task with a different owner inside the hospital. The unresolved part is that prevention carries no staffing norm, no dedicated budget line and no measurable output of its own, while prescribing has a surveillance network behind it. The marker to watch is whether prevention starts being counted the way prescribing already is.

    Back2Basics: Jan Aushadhi scheme

    1. What it is: The Pradhan Mantri Bhartiya Janaushadhi Pariyojana supplies quality generic medicines at prices well below their branded equivalents.
    2. Who runs it: It is implemented by the Department of Pharmaceuticals under the Ministry of Chemicals and Fertilizers, through the Pharmaceuticals and Medical Devices Bureau of India.
    3. How it reaches patients: Medicines are sold through dedicated Janaushadhi Kendras rather than through ordinary retail pharmacies.

    [2019] Which of the following are the reasons for the occurrence of multi-drug resistance in microbial pathogens in India?

    1. Genetic predisposition of some people

    2. Taking incorrect doses of antibiotics to cure diseases

    3. Using antibiotics in livestock farming

    4. Multiple chronic diseases in some people

    Select the correct answer using the code given below.

    (a) 1 and 2

    (b) 2 and 3 only

    (c) 1, 3 and 4

    (d) 2, 3 and 4

  • Ground control

    Why in the News

    Nine employee associations of the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) have written to the chairman seeking clarity on staff strength, recruitment and the outsourcing of core functions. The letter was sent on the day the agency recorded its largest success of the year, the launch of its first geosynchronous imaging satellite, EOS-05, on the Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV). The grievance follows from the Indian Space Policy of April 2023, which signalled that ISRO would eventually stop building commercial satellites and launch vehicles and would concentrate on exploratory missions. ISRO has stated that it will not be privatised or reduced, and the Indian National Space Promotion and Authorisation Centre (IN-SPACe), the body set up to enable private participation, has stated that the agency will not be diminished and that only industry’s role must grow. Neither institution has addressed the concern the letter actually raises, which is the loss of jobs. The underlying question is whether the sector’s direction still matches its founding principle, that space technology is an instrument of social development rather than a contest for prestige.

    What does the Indian Space Policy, 2023 set out?

    1. A division of roles: The policy separates the space sector into ISRO, IN-SPACe and NewSpace India Limited, and assigns each a distinct function instead of leaving all of them with ISRO.
    2. ISRO’s redefined remit: ISRO is to move out of routine operational and commercial production of satellites and launch vehicles, and towards research and development in advanced technologies and exploratory missions.
    3. IN-SPACe as the single window: IN-SPACe authorises and supervises the space activities of private entities, so a company deals with one authorising body rather than with the operator of the launch infrastructure.
    4. NewSpace India Limited as the commercial arm: The public sector company under the Department of Space is responsible for commercialising space technologies and platforms developed with public money.

    What are the employee associations asking for?

    1. Staff strength and recruitment: The associations want stated numbers on sanctioned strength and future recruitment, since a shrinking mandate implies a shrinking establishment.
    2. Outsourcing of core functions: The letter distinguishes contracting out manufacturing from contracting out functions the agency treats as core, and seeks clarity on where that line now falls.
    3. The institutional replies avoid the question: Both the agency and the authorisation body have answered on the agency’s continued existence, which was not what was asked.
    4. The timing is the point: The grievance surfaced on a day of technical success, which indicates that the concern is about the institution’s trajectory and not about its capability.

    Which vision of the space programme is the sector following?

    1. The founding principle: The programme was built on a refusal to be drawn into space races and on the use of space technology as a tool for social development, meaning communication, weather and resource mapping for domestic needs.
    2. The competing image: The alternative is space as an emblem of national power, membership of a small club of space faring countries, and a proliferation of startups as evidence of arrival.
    3. The 2035 test the sector is being set: If the sector is to be a source of export earnings and a nucleus of value added services that absorbs skilled labour and creates jobs, hard choices taken now may be justified.
    4. Where the line falls: Joining a bandwagon driven by billionaire ambition and notions of conquest is a different objective from either, and the case for restructuring collapses if that is what it delivers.

    What does the comparison with NASA show?

    1. The budget gap: The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) operates on $24.4 billion against the Department of Space’s Rs 13,705 crore, roughly 16 times larger.
    2. NASA also contracted: NASA’s budget fell from 0.7% of American gross domestic product in 1966 to 0.1% now, so its own shift to contracting out followed a sustained loss of fiscal share.
    3. Its establishment shrank with it: NASA’s civil service headcount fell from about 36,000 at the peak of the Apollo programme to about 14,000 today, which is the trajectory ISRO’s employees are reading against.
    4. The unaddressed comparator: China’s space programme has not been seriously reckoned with in India’s planning, and it is the one operating at a scale and cadence that directly bears on India’s position.

    Is the new private base the same as the old one?

    1. ISRO never made everything itself: Unlike NASA in its early years, which designed and made every component, ISRO has always had a manufacturing relationship with private industry, including Walchandnagar Industries and Larsen and Toubro.
    2. The entrants are of a different type: The current activity is not established companies building on decades of manufacturing experience but new entrants funded by foreign capital that may not stay.
    3. The business model has shifted: Most new entrants are interested in satellite data as a service rather than in building hardware, which is a different industrial base from the one that supplied the agency.
    4. The transferable capability is therefore narrower: A vendor base built on data services cannot absorb the manufacturing functions ISRO is being asked to shed.

    Challenges to ISRO’s restructuring

    1. In house capability is easy to lose and slow to rebuild: Skills that live in the hands of a small number of engineers disappear once the work is contracted out and the staff are not replaced. Eg. Cryogenic engine development took India close to two decades to master after external supply was cut off.
      The Fix: Ring fence a defined set of critical technologies as retained in house capability, with recruitment sanctioned against them irrespective of outsourcing elsewhere.
    2. The private demand base is thin: A domestic space economy built on data services has few anchor customers other than government departments, so private capacity depends on public orders it is meant to replace. Eg. Earth observation demand in India is dominated by central and State government users.
      The Fix: Commit an anchor procurement volume for satellite data and launch services over a fixed multi year period, so private capacity is built against contracted demand.
    3. Foreign capital in the entrant base is mobile: Startups funded by capital that can exit quickly cannot be relied on to hold strategic capability through a downturn. Eg. Global space venture funding has moved sharply between years, tightening after periods of expansion.
      The Fix: Condition the transfer of any strategic technology on domestic ownership thresholds and on a minimum period of operation in India.
    4. Transferring a launch vehicle is harder than transferring a design: Handing production of a vehicle to industry moves drawings but not the accumulated process knowledge that makes a launch repeatable. Eg. The Small Satellite Launch Vehicle technology transfer to industry involved an extended period of hand holding rather than a clean handover.
      The Fix: Structure every technology transfer with a defined number of jointly executed missions before the agency withdraws.
    5. The regulatory body is also the promoter: IN-SPACe both promotes private participation and authorises it, so the function that grants approvals is the function measured on how many approvals it grants. Eg. Authorisation and promotion sit within one body rather than in separate agencies.
      The Fix: Separate the authorisation function into a statutory regulator with its own appointment process, leaving promotion with the existing body.

    Conclusion

    The agency’s technical record is not what is in question, and a successful launch is precisely why the staffing letter is difficult to dismiss. What is unresolved is that two institutions have given assurances about the agency’s survival while declining to state what happens to the people inside it, and an assurance that avoids the question asked is not an answer. The concrete thing to watch is whether the Department of Space publishes a transparent policy stating sanctioned staff strength, the recruitment pipeline and the specific functions that will remain in house.

    Back2Basics: Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle

    1. What it is: A three stage Indian launch vehicle designed mainly to place communication and other heavier satellites into geosynchronous transfer orbit.
    2. Its stages: It uses a solid first stage with liquid strap on boosters, a liquid second stage, and an indigenous cryogenic upper stage.
    3. Why the cryogenic stage matters: Cryogenic propulsion burns liquid hydrogen with liquid oxygen at very low temperatures, giving the high efficiency needed for the final push to a high orbit, and India developed it after external supply was withheld.
    4. Its record: The vehicle has a higher failure rate than India’s Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle, which is why each successful GSLV flight is treated as a significant outcome.

    [2026] Consider the following statements about involvement of private entities in India’s space programme:

    1. IN-SPACe is an autonomous agency formed to facilitate participation of private entities.

    2. Agnikul Cosmos launched the world’s first flight using 3D-printed rocket engine.

    3. Skyroot Aerospace has developed liquid fuel for GSLV.

    (a) 1 only

    (b) 2 and 3 only

    (c) 1 and 2 only

    (d) 1, 2 and 3

  • Lucknow air cleanest, Indore’s second best among cities with million-plus people

    Why in the News

    Lucknow has been ranked first among million plus population cities in Swachh Vayu Sarvekshan 2026, the annual air quality ranking run under the National Clean Air Programme (NCAP). Indore was placed second and Jabalpur third in the same category of 47 cities. The rankings were declared in Delhi and the awards were distributed by the chairperson of the National Green Tribunal (NGT). Municipal wards that improved their air quality were honoured for the first time this year. The tension sits in the scoring itself: improvement in particulate matter (PM) 10 concentrations carries a weight of only 2.5%, so a city can top the ranking while its air remains above the national standard.

    What is Swachh Vayu Sarvekshan?

    1. What it ranks: It is an annual assessment of cities under the National Clean Air Programme, scoring the actions a municipal body has taken to improve air quality rather than the air quality it has achieved.
    2. How cities are grouped: Cities and towns are placed in three population based categories, those with a million plus population, those between 3 lakh and 10 lakh, and those below 3 lakh, so a small town is not ranked against a metropolis.
    3. What is scored: The parameters cover waste management, road dust control, dust from construction and demolition waste, reduction in vehicular pollution and reduction in industrial pollution. Reduction in PM 10 concentrations carries a weight of 2.5%.
    4. What the winners receive: The top three in each category receive cash prizes and mementos, ranging from Rs 1.50 crore for the first place in the million plus category down to Rs 12.5 lakh for the third place in the smallest category.

    Which cities topped the ranking, and which trailed it?

    1. Million plus population category: Lucknow first with Rs 1.50 crore, Indore second with Rs 1 crore, and Jabalpur third with Rs 50 lakh.
    2. Cities of 3 lakh to 10 lakh: Rourkela first with Rs 75 lakh, Firozabad and Guntur sharing second place with Rs 50 lakh, and Amravati third with Rs 25 lakh.
    3. Cities below 3 lakh: Kalinga Nagar first with Rs 37.5 lakh, Angul second with Rs 25 lakh, and Talcher third with Rs 12.5 lakh.
    4. The bottom of the largest category: Chennai, Jamshedpur, Kota, Kolkata and Madurai were placed in the bottom five of the 47 million plus cities.
    5. The two largest cities: Delhi ranked 30th and Mumbai 37th in the same category.

    What did the top ranked cities actually do?

    1. Lucknow’s interventions: The city deployed electric vehicles in its waste collection fleet, used mechanised sweepers to manage road dust, and cleared legacy waste dumps.
    2. Jabalpur’s interventions: The city ran a waste to energy plant, achieved full collection of waste with scientific disposal, mechanised street sweeping and promoted electric vehicles.
    3. The common thread is municipal solid waste and dust: Both winning profiles are built on services a municipal body directly controls, and neither turns on industrial or vehicular emission sources.
    4. Indore’s standing: Indore, ranked India’s cleanest city for seven years until 2025, converted that solid waste management capacity into second place on air quality.

    Challenges to the Swachh Vayu Sarvekshan ranking

    1. Effort is scored, outcomes are not: With actual PM 10 reduction weighted at 2.5%, the survey ranks the interventions a city reports rather than the air its residents breathe. Eg. Lucknow topped the category while its annual PM 10 concentration stood at 137 micrograms per cubic metre against the national standard of 60.
      The Fix: Raise the weight on measured concentration decline and make the award conditional on continuous ambient monitoring data rather than on activity reports.
    2. The measured pollutant is the coarser one: The survey and the programme centre on PM 10, while PM 2.5 is the fraction that penetrates deep into the lungs and drives the health burden. Eg. Road dust suppression lowers PM 10 sharply without touching combustion sources that generate PM 2.5.
      The Fix: Score PM 2.5 concentration decline as a separate parameter with its own weight, so combustion sources cannot be scored around.
    3. A city boundary is not an airshed: Pollution crosses municipal limits, so a city’s ranking reflects sources it does not control alongside those it does. Eg. Delhi’s winter concentrations rise with stubble burning in neighbouring States and with emissions from thermal plants outside the city.
      The Fix: Move the assessment unit to the airshed, ranking a cluster of local bodies jointly and funding them against a common source apportionment study.
    4. Self reported action invites inflation: Cities score themselves on activities such as sweeping frequency and dust suppression that no independent agency verifies. Eg. Mechanised sweeper deployment is recorded as procurement rather than as operating hours on the road.
      The Fix: Require third party verification of a random sample of claimed interventions before the cash award is released.
    5. Baselines flatter the already polluted: A city that started from a very high concentration records a large percentage decline while remaining far above the standard. Eg. Lucknow’s PM 10 fell 45.2% from 250 micrograms per cubic metre in 2017-18, and is still more than twice the standard.
      The Fix: Score cities against the absolute standard as well as against their own baseline, so meeting the norm rather than improving on a bad start is what wins.

    Conclusion

    A ranking that scores what a municipal body did, and barely scores what happened to the air, will reward administrative activity long before it rewards clean air. The gap is visible in this year’s own result, where the winning city remains far outside the national standard. What to watch is whether the weight given to measured concentration is raised in the next survey, and whether the ward level awards introduced this year are backed by ward level monitoring data.

    Back2Basics: National Clean Air Programme

    1. What it is: A national framework launched in January 2019 by the Union Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change to cut particulate pollution in cities that fail the national ambient air quality standards.
    2. Which cities it covers: It covers non attainment cities, meaning cities that did not meet the standards over a five year period, along with million plus cities, taking in 131 urban areas.
    3. The target: The original goal of a 20% to 30% reduction in particulate concentrations by 2024 against a 2017 baseline was revised to a 40% reduction by 2025-26.
    4. How it is funded: Million plus cities receive air quality grants routed through the Fifteenth Finance Commission, while the remaining cities are funded through the programme’s own allocation.

    “[2022, GS3, 10 marks] Discuss in detail the photochemical smog emphasizing its formation, effects and mitigation. Explain the 1999 Gothenburg Protocol.”

  • India’s carbon credit scheme receives U.K. official recognition

    Why in the News

    The United Kingdom has recognised India’s Carbon Credit Trading Scheme (CCTS) as a qualifying overseas carbon pricing scheme for the purpose of carbon price relief. The recognition was conveyed by His Majesty’s Treasury to the Bureau of Energy Efficiency (BEE) under the Ministry of Power. The scheme has been placed on the United Kingdom’s published indicative list of overseas carbon pricing schemes assessed as meeting the qualifying criteria under the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (Calculation of CBAM Rate and Determination of Carbon Price Relief) Regulations 2026. A carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) charges an imported good the gap between the carbon price paid where it was made and the price the importing country’s own producers pay. The recognition therefore lets a carbon price already paid in India be set off, lowering the effective CBAM liability on Indian goods. The relief is calculated on the price a tonne of carbon actually fetches in India, so a domestic market still in its early compliance cycles decides how much of the British levy an exporter escapes.

    What is the Carbon Credit Trading Scheme?

    1. Statutory basis: The scheme rests on the Energy Conservation Act, 2001, as amended by the Energy Conservation (Amendment) Act, 2022. It is administered by the Bureau of Energy Efficiency under the Ministry of Power.
    2. Compliance mechanism: Obligated entities in notified industrial sectors receive greenhouse gas emission intensity targets, stated as emissions per unit of output. An entity that beats its target earns carbon credit certificates, and one that misses it must buy them.
    3. Offset mechanism: An entity outside the compliance list can register an emission reduction project voluntarily. It earns certificates once the reduction is verified.
    4. Trading venue: Certificates are traded on the power exchanges. That trade is what produces a domestic price for a tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent.

    How does the recognition change the cost of exporting to the United Kingdom?

    1. Carbon price relief: The British levy is charged on the embedded emissions of an imported good at a British carbon rate. A carbon price already paid in the country of production is deducted from that rate where the paying scheme qualifies.
    2. The indicative list is the administrative gate: Placement on the list is what makes the deduction available to goods produced under the scheme. The list is indicative, so it fixes eligibility rather than the final rate an exporter pays.
    3. Exposed sectors: The United Kingdom’s mechanism applies from 1 January 2027 to imports of aluminium, cement, fertiliser, hydrogen, iron and steel. Indian steel and aluminium shipments are the largest exposures within that set.
    4. The obligation on the exporter survives: Recognition attaches to the scheme, not to any single firm. Each consignment must still be accompanied by emissions data for the goods concerned.

    Challenges to the Carbon Credit Trading Scheme

    1. A weak price yields a weak set off: The deduction is worth only what a carbon credit certificate sells for in India, so a low clearing price transfers most of the levy to the British exchequer anyway. Eg. Energy saving certificates under the Perform, Achieve and Trade scheme, the country’s earlier market based instrument, cleared at prices too low to change investment behaviour.
      The Fix: Set a floor price for compliance certificates, so the market cannot clear below the level at which abatement becomes worth financing.
    2. Target setting is based on intensity, not absolute emissions: An obligated entity meets its target by cutting emissions per tonne of output while expanding total output, so national emissions can rise inside a compliant market. Eg. Cement plants raise clinker substitution to cut intensity while adding fresh capacity.
      The Fix: Convert the compliance mechanism to a declining absolute cap once the first two cycles have established a reliable emissions baseline.
    3. Narrow coverage of the emitting base: The compliance mechanism reaches only large notified industrial sectors, leaving out transport, buildings and the bulk of smaller industrial units. Eg. Foundries and re-rolling mills in industrial clusters sit outside the obligated list despite being coal fired.
      The Fix: Extend the offset mechanism with sector specific methodologies for small units, so a cluster level project can be registered rather than a single plant.
    4. Measurement and verification capacity is thin: Credits are only as sound as the emissions data behind them, and accredited carbon verifiers in India are few relative to the number of obligated entities. Eg. Voluntary carbon markets globally have been discredited by projects whose claimed reductions could not be reproduced on audit.
      The Fix: Accredit and licence verification agencies ahead of the compliance deadline, with random re-audit of a fixed share of issued certificates.
    5. Overlap with earlier instruments confuses the signal: Renewable energy certificates and energy saving certificates already price parts of the same abatement, so a firm can face several partially overlapping obligations. Eg. A cement plant may hold energy saving certificates for efficiency gains that also lower its greenhouse gas emission intensity.
      The Fix: Publish a single conversion and transition schedule that folds legacy certificates into the carbon credit market on a stated date.

    Conclusion

    Recognition removes a trade barrier only to the extent that the domestic carbon market becomes real. The set off is a pass through of a price India charges itself, so the instrument that protects exporters is the same one that has to discipline them. What to watch is the clearing price at the first compliance cycle auctions and whether the European Union grants an equivalent recognition, since the European market absorbs a far larger share of Indian steel and aluminium than the British one.

    Back2Basics: Bureau of Energy Efficiency

    1. Statutory body: The Bureau was set up in 2002 under the Energy Conservation Act, 2001, and functions under the Ministry of Power.
    2. Mandate: It is charged with reducing the energy intensity of the Indian economy, meaning energy consumed per unit of gross domestic product.
    3. Standards and labelling: It runs the star rating programme for appliances and the Energy Conservation Building Code for commercial buildings.
    4. Market instruments: It designed and administers the Perform, Achieve and Trade scheme and now the carbon credit market, making it the nodal agency for India’s carbon pricing architecture.

    “[2023] Consider the following statements :

    Statement-I: Carbon markets are likely to be one of the most widespread tools in the fight against climate change.

    Statement-II : Carbon markets transfer resources from the private sector to the State.

    Which one of the following is correct in respect of the above statements?

    (a) Both Statement-I and Statement-II are correct and Statement-II is the correct explanation for Statement-I

    (b) Both Statement-I and Statement-II are correct and Statement-II is not the correct explanation for Statement-I

    (c) Statement-I is correct but Statement-II is incorrect

    (d) Statement-I is incorrect but Statement-II is correct

  • ISRO’s role is by no means diminishing: space officials

    ISRO’s role is by no means diminishing: space officials

    Why in the News

    Nine Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) employee associations have written a joint letter dated 4 September seeking written clarification on whether the government intends to transfer the agency’s launch vehicle and satellite manufacturing to private firms.

    What did the employee associations actually ask?

    1. Whether the position is an approved decision: They asked whether the stated future of ISRO not manufacturing launch vehicles represents an approved Space Commission decision.
    2. What happens to the workforce: They asked what would happen to sanctioned strength and recruitment over the next five to 10 years.
    3. Whether they will be consulted: They asked whether the associations would be consulted before irreversible decisions are taken.
    4. Where the letter went: It was addressed to the Secretary, Department of Space and Chairman, ISRO, and copied to the Confederation of Central Government Employees and Workers.

    What is the official position on ISRO’s role?

    1. The role is stated as undiminished: IN-SPACe’s chairman said the direction is not a smaller ISRO but a larger Indian space ecosystem, with ISRO pushing the technological frontier.
    2. Privatisation is denied outright: ISRO’s clarification stated that the agency will neither be privatised nor have its importance reduced.
    3. Transfer is distinguished from withdrawal: Handing over a mature technology does not amount to leaving that domain, on the agency’s stated reasoning.
    4. Ownership stays public: Critical national space infrastructure will remain owned by the government.

    How is the division of labour defined?

    1. The 2020 reforms set the structure: The reforms were aimed at expanding the overall ecosystem, with IN-SPACe authorising non-government participation and NewSpace India Limited (NSIL) commercialising mature capabilities.
    2. Industry takes the mature end: Industry is to increasingly manufacture and scale launch vehicles and satellites whose technology is settled.
    3. The agency keeps the unsettled end: ISRO is to concentrate on advanced research and development, scientific and strategic missions, and infrastructure too complex for private developers.
    4. The policy instrument: The arrangement is described as an ISRO-led national space ecosystem, institutionalised through the Indian Space Policy 2023.

    What does the reform record show so far?

    1. Firm formation: India now has over 450 space start-ups, against a handful in 2020.
    2. The revenue target: The space economy is roughly $8.4 billion and the stated aim is to grow it to $44 billion by 2033.
    3. The retained programmes: The Bharatiya Antariksh Station by 2035 and an Indian crewed lunar mission by 2040 are named as the missions ISRO itself will build toward.

    Why could employees only raise this as associations?

    1. They are outside the industry definition: Department of Space employees are exempted from the statutory definition of industry.
    2. They cannot unionise: That exemption means they cannot form trade unions to bargain on employment terms.
    3. The available channel is narrower: They organise instead as service associations recognised under the Central Civil Services (Recognition of Service Associations) Rules, 1993, which permits representation rather than negotiation.

    Challenges to an ISRO-led national space ecosystem

    1. Government remains the anchor customer: Private launch and satellite demand is thin, so firms depend on public orders for volume. Eg. NewSpace India Limited awarded the Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle industrial production contract for five vehicles to a Hindustan Aeronautics Limited and Larsen and Toubro consortium in 2022.
      The Fix: Publish a multi-year public launch and satellite procurement calendar, so firms can size capacity against committed demand rather than announcements.
    2. Technology transfer terms decide whether industry can compete: A transferred design without production know-how and test infrastructure leaves the recipient dependent on the agency. Eg. ISRO transferred the Small Satellite Launch Vehicle technology to Hindustan Aeronautics Limited in 2025.
      The Fix: Attach test facility access and a defined hand-holding period to every transfer agreement, with milestones the recipient must independently clear.
    3. Long-gestation capital is scarce: Launch and propulsion ventures need patient capital across development cycles that outlast most venture fund horizons. Eg. The Union Budget for 2024-25 announced a Rs 1,000 crore venture capital fund for the space sector for this reason.
      The Fix: Route that fund through milestone-linked tranches tied to qualification tests, rather than as equity at a single valuation point.
    4. Foreign investment rules still differ by segment: Investment caps vary across launch vehicles, satellites and components, which complicates raising capital for an integrated firm. Eg. The 2024 foreign direct investment revision set different automatic-route thresholds for satellite manufacturing, launch vehicles and component supply.
      The Fix: Publish a single classification note stating which activity falls in which segment, so a firm knows its cap before it raises capital.

    Conclusion

    Both sides agree that industry should build what is settled and the agency should build what is not. The disagreement is over where that boundary currently sits and who has the authority to move it. The workforce question the associations raised is the one neither reply engaged with. Until the Department of Space states its recruitment intent in numbers, the assurance rests on stated direction rather than on anything an employee can verify.

    Back2Basics

    1. NewSpace India Limited: The commercial arm of the Department of Space, incorporated in March 2019 as a central public sector enterprise.
    2. Predecessor: It took over the commercial role earlier held by Antrix Corporation, which now handles a narrower marketing mandate.
    3. Business model: It operates on a demand-driven model, owning and operating satellites and launches for identified customers rather than only marketing surplus capacity.
    4. Headquarters: It is based in Bengaluru and reports to the Department of Space.

    [2026] Consider the following statements about involvement of private entities in India’s space programme:

    1. IN-SPACe is an autonomous agency formed to facilitate participation of private entities.

    2. Agnikul Cosmos launched the world’s first flight using 3D-printed rocket engine.

    3. Skyroot Aerospace has developed liquid fuel for GSLV.

    (a) 1 only (b) 2 and 3 only (c) 1 and 2 only (d) 1, 2 and 3

  • No provision in Forest Rights Act to obtain gram sabha consent for projects: Ministry

    No provision in Forest Rights Act to obtain gram sabha consent for projects: Ministry

    Why in the News

    The Union Ministry of Tribal Affairs has told the Union Ministry of Power that the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006 carries no provision for obtaining gram sabha consent for Stage-II forest clearance. It added that such matters do not fall within its purview.

    How does gram sabha consent for forest clearance actually work?

    1. The requirement sits in the diversion rules, not in the Act: The Forest Rights Act, 2006 carries no language on gram sabha consent for diverting forest land to non-forest purposes. The Union government’s rules under the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 require that all processes under the Forest Rights Act be completed before a diversion certificate is issued.
    2. Step one, identify and recognise: The guidelines require potential claimants under the Forest Rights Act to be identified, and their rights to be recognised where they apply.
    3. Step two, vest the rights: Recognised rights are then vested in the holders before the diversion proposal can move.
    4. Step three, obtain the no-objection certificate: The concerned gram sabhas then issue a no-objection certificate on the proposal to divert that forest land for the stated purpose. This certificate is what is commonly called gram sabha consent for forest clearance.

    What is the Ministry of Tribal Affairs’ stated position?

    1. The communication is dated and specific: The Ministry stated on 31 August that there is no provision for obtaining gram sabha consent for Stage-II forest clearance in the Forest Rights Act, 2006 or the rules made under it.
    2. It disclaims jurisdiction: It concluded that such matters therefore do not fall under its purview.
    3. The Act says otherwise on responsibility: The Forest Rights Act explicitly names the Ministry of Tribal Affairs as the nodal ministry responsible for the law’s implementation.
    4. The disclaimer has a record behind it: The Ministry has previously claimed no role in the Nicobar mega-infrastructure project and in Forest Rights Act implementation cases in Madhya Pradesh, Karnataka and other States, arguing that the Act assigns implementation to State and Union Territory governments.

    Why is that position contested?

    1. The requirement is not free-standing: The no-objection certificate is demanded because the diversion rules make completion of the Forest Rights Act processes a precondition. A ministry that owns the Act’s implementation cannot disown the precondition built on it.
    2. No alternative authority exists: The position leaves no ministry able to settle a disputed consent, which is the objection recorded by a Supreme Court advocate who formerly advised the Ministry of Tribal Affairs under both governments.
    3. The timing sharpens the gap: The disclaimer was issued while a parliamentary committee proposal to lower the consent standard is live and awaiting inter-ministerial examination.

    What did the parliamentary committee propose, and why?

    1. The report is dated: The Parliamentary Standing Committee on Public Undertakings reported on NHPC Limited on 3 August, and the Power Ministry’s deliberations with the Tribal Affairs Ministry followed from it.
    2. The delay figure: Based on discussions with NHPC officials, the committee recorded an average forest clearance time of 106 months for under-construction projects.
    3. The bottleneck it identified: It found the requirement that all concerned gram sabhas consent to be the single most critical bottleneck.
    4. The stalled project named: The Teesta-IV hydroelectric project is indefinitely stalled because consent from a small minority of gram panchayats remains pending.
    5. The proposed dilution: The committee endorsed NHPC’s recommendation for a qualified super-majority, meaning consent from 70 to 75 per cent of affected gram sabhas, for large hydropower projects of national importance. It asked the Power Ministry to examine the feasibility of that proposal with the Ministry of Tribal Affairs.

    Challenges to gram sabha consent under the Forest Rights Act

    1. Consent can be recorded without a real assembly: Resolutions are produced without quorum or without convening the habitation actually affected. Eg. Villagers of Hariharpur, Salhi and Fatehpur alleged forged gram sabha consent for the Parsa coal block in the Hasdeo Aranya forests of Chhattisgarh.
      The Fix: Require a video record and a habitation-wise attendance roll for every consent resolution, uploaded before the diversion certificate is issued.
    2. Rights recognition lags, so the assembly may hold no title: Community forest resource rights remain unrecognised across most eligible villages, which weakens the standing of the body being asked to consent. Eg. Recognition of community forest resource rights has advanced in Maharashtra and Odisha and stalled across most other States.
      The Fix: Complete community forest resource recognition across the affected district before a diversion proposal is admitted for consideration.
    3. The rules have already moved consent later in the sequence: Consent now arrives after a project has an in-principle approval, which reduces it to a formality. Eg. The Van (Sanrakshan Evam Samvardhan) Rules, 2022 removed the gram sabha consent step from the stage preceding in-principle approval.
      The Fix: Restore the consent step ahead of in-principle approval, so no project is sanctioned before the affected assembly has been heard.
    4. Compliance is certified by the authority pushing the project: The State administration both promotes the project and certifies that the statutory process was followed. Eg. The environment ministry accepts the State’s compliance certificate at the final clearance stage without independent verification.
      The Fix: Route the compliance certificate through the State tribal welfare department, accompanied by a published list of recognised claimants.

    Conclusion

    Two positions now stand directly against each other. The statute names one ministry as responsible for its implementation, and that ministry says the consent question is not its business. Nothing in the system supplies an alternative authority to settle a contested consent, so a disputed resolution has no forum. That gap matters most now, because a proposal to lower the consent standard is live and no ministry has claimed the authority to rule on it.

    [2021] At the national level, which ministry is the nodal agency to ensure effective implementation of the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006?

    (a) Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change

    (b) Ministry of Panchayati Raj

    (c) Ministry of Rural Development

    (d) Ministry of Tribal Affairs”

  • ‘Working together, combining resources, talent, scale, we think India and Canada can be world beaters’

    ‘Working together, combining resources, talent, scale, we think India and Canada can be world beaters’

    Why in the News

    Canada’s High Commissioner to India has set out the instruments now in place to rebuild the bilateral relationship, and has stated confidence that the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) will be concluded by the end of the year.

    How has the relationship been rebuilt since the 2023 rupture?

    1. Leader-level contact restored: The two Prime Ministers have met four times over the past year. New envoys were announced in June last year after the reset was agreed.
    2. Security channels reopened: Security officials on both sides are now in regular contact over practical cooperation. The stated purpose is that neither side is surprised by the other’s statements or actions.
    3. A terrorist entity listing: Canada has listed the Bishnoi gang as a terrorist entity and launched a financial crimes commission. The stated trigger is extortion pressure on the Indian community in Canada from such gangs.
    4. The separatism question remains open: Canada’s position is that political expression is protected in a democracy, so it will not restrict views it disagrees with. Its intelligence agency’s report tabled before Parliament refers to Khalistan actors and to the Air India bombing.

    What does Canada offer India on energy and critical minerals?

    1. Scale in hydrocarbons: Canada ranks fourth in oil reserves and production, fifth in natural gas production, fifth in liquefied petroleum gas production and sixth in nuclear power.
    2. Export capacity is being built out: By 2030 Canada expects to export 50 million tonnes of natural gas through its West Coast ports, with a 400 per cent increase in liquefied petroleum gas export capacity. A newly announced pipeline will allow the export of two million barrels of oil, against a production of five to six million barrels a day.
    3. India’s import volume matches that scale: India imports crude oil at roughly the level Canada produces each day. Canada has never sold India oil, gas or liquefied petroleum gas.
    4. Minerals are in the ground, not in production: Canada holds rare earths, lithium and graphite, and 20 per cent of the world’s tungsten reserves. It has no active tungsten mine, and opening one takes three to five years.

    How central is nuclear cooperation to the relationship?

    1. A concluded contract: A uranium sale worth $2.3 billion for India’s reactors was concluded during the Canadian Prime Minister’s visit.
    2. The installed base is Canadian in origin: Eighteen of India’s 24 existing reactors are based on CANDU technology.
    3. Canada’s new policy is export-facing: A newly announced nuclear policy looks to build up to 10 more reactors in Canada, and is focused on working with other countries on building their nuclear capacity.
    4. Small modular reactors are the proposed next step: Powering the full electrification of India’s railway system has been floated as an application for small modular reactors.

    What does the trade track now involve?

    1. A dated target: The CEPA is targeted for conclusion by the end of the year, with both Prime Ministers having repeatedly committed to it.
    2. The record it is measured against: The previous attempt at a bilateral trade agreement ran 12 years without getting far. Canada concluded a comparable agreement with the United Arab Emirates in 47 days.
    3. A trade volume commitment: The two Prime Ministers committed to double bilateral trade by 2030. Current trade is described as nowhere near where it should be.
    4. A business delegation follows: A large Canadian trade delegation is due in India in October.

    What is the defence and maritime component?

    1. A partnership already announced: A maritime security partnership was announced in March, covering defence material cooperation. The joint statement provides for a defence dialogue between the two governments.
    2. An information-sharing framework is being negotiated: A joint security of information agreement is under work, to give companies on both sides a framework for handling sensitive information.
    3. The procurement number is large: About $180 billion of Canada’s $500 billion defence outlay to 2035 is procurement, with the remainder on dual-use infrastructure.
    4. Canada’s constraint is scale, not technology: A population of 42 million cannot absorb the cost of defence products alone, and Canada has agreed with European partners to develop 12 submarines. Its stated specialisations include optics, driven by rising access to the Arctic.

    What is the state of the student and visa channel?

    1. The numbers are substantial: There are 400,000 Indian students in Canada, alongside a diaspora of almost two million people.
    2. Caps were a housing response: Study permit caps were imposed because intake outran available housing. Some colleges were found to be delivering no real education.
    3. Reputation is the cost being carried: The tightening left a perception in India that Canada had closed itself to students. The visa system is under review to correct processing.

    Why is Canada turning to India now?

    1. Trade talks with the United States have collapsed: Canada walked away from the negotiation over demands it judged to lie beyond normal trade talks, including impositions on its cultural sovereignty. Tariffs are being imposed dollar for dollar in response.
    2. Diversification is stated as the primary plan: Canada describes building its own economy and external partnerships as plan A rather than a fallback. Investment is being directed into domestic resources and capacity.
    3. China remains the larger relationship: Canada’s economic relationship with China is bigger than the one with India and has been put back on an even keel. It is described as different in quality and character from the Indian relationship.

    Challenges to the India-Canada reset

    1. The criminal case is still live: A finding in the Canadian courts on the 2023 killing can reopen the political dispute the reset was built to contain. Eg. The allegation in October 2023 produced tit-for-tat expulsions and the withdrawal of most Canadian diplomats from India.
      The Fix: Keep the security dialogue and the economic track under separate institutional mandates, so a judicial outcome suspends neither.
    2. Distance works against Canadian energy: Freight cost and voyage time from the Pacific coast disadvantage Canadian cargoes against short-haul Gulf suppliers. Eg. Iraq, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates supply the bulk of India’s crude on far shorter sea routes.
      The Fix: Anchor Canadian supply in long-term contracts and upstream equity rather than spot cargoes, so volume rather than delivered price carries the relationship.
    3. Nuclear liability law blocks reactor sales: Foreign vendors have resisted India’s supplier recourse provision, which is why cooperation has stayed at the fuel supply stage. Eg. Section 17(b) of the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act, 2010 has held up foreign reactor contracts for over a decade.
      The Fix: Settle supplier recourse terms in a bilateral protocol before any reactor negotiation opens.
    4. Critical mineral reserves are not supply: Reserves without processing capacity cannot displace the existing source of refined material. Eg. China refines the majority of the world’s rare earths and graphite.
      The Fix: Co-invest in Canadian separation and refining plants under a shared offtake agreement, rather than contracting for unmined ore.

    Conclusion

    The relationship is being rebuilt instrument by instrument rather than by settling what broke it. That design holds only as long as both governments treat the court’s eventual finding as a legal outcome and not a diplomatic one. Everything else listed so far is either a contract or an announcement. The trade agreement is the first thing the two governments have set themselves to close, and whether they close it is the marker to watch.

    Back2Basics

    1. CANDU reactor: Short for CANada Deuterium Uranium, a pressurised heavy water reactor design developed in Canada.
    2. Fuel and moderator: It runs on natural uranium and uses heavy water as both moderator and coolant, so it needs no uranium enrichment.
    3. On-power refuelling: Fuel bundles are replaced while the reactor is running, which raises availability and removes the need for shutdown refuelling.
    4. The Indian link: India’s pressurised heavy water reactor programme began with Rajasthan Atomic Power Station Unit 1, built with Canadian collaboration and commissioned in 1973.

    [2019, GS2, 15 marks] “What introduces friction into the ties between India and the United States is that Washington is still unable to find for India a position in its global strategy, which would satisfy India’s National self-esteem and ambitions” Explain with suitable examples.

  • As yoga and Ayurveda become part of India’s global health diplomacy

    As yoga and Ayurveda become part of India’s global health diplomacy

    Why in the News

    India’s recent trade agreements now carry written commitments on traditional medicine. The India-Oman Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA), operationalised in June 2026, carries what the government describes as its first comprehensive commitment on traditional medicine across all modes of supply. The India-New Zealand Free Trade Agreement (FTA) adds a dedicated health and traditional medicine annex. Together these agreements move Ayurveda, Yoga and Naturopathy, Unani, Siddha, Sowa-Rigpa and Homoeopathy (AYUSH) from a cultural export to a formalised health services opportunity. Practitioners of these systems now have a treaty basis for licensing, standards and mobility abroad. The contest is over what that basis is worth, since formal recognition converts into market access only where evidence, regulation and practitioner quality satisfy the host regulator.

    What have India’s recent trade agreements committed on traditional medicine?

    1. The Oman agreement sets the benchmark: The India-Oman CEPA carries the government’s first comprehensive commitment on traditional medicine covering all modes of supply. It came into operation in June 2026.
    2. The New Zealand agreement creates a mobility route: The India-New Zealand FTA carries a dedicated health and traditional medicine annex covering AYUSH practices. It provides a structured mobility pathway with a dedicated visa quota for AYUSH practitioners.
    3. The European Union agreement goes furthest on qualifications: The India-European Union FTA, signed in January 2026, allows AYUSH practitioners to use their Indian qualifications in member countries that have no regulatory framework of their own. It also provides for AYUSH wellness centres and clinics.
    4. The common obligations are regulatory, not promotional: All three agreements carry measures to ease licensing, develop standards and facilitate the movement of AYUSH practitioners and instructors. The New Zealand agreement additionally institutionalises cooperation on education, training, standards development and wellness services.

    What carries the strategy outside the trade agreements?

    1. A dedicated visa category: The AYUSH visa was introduced in 2023 for foreign nationals travelling to India for treatment under these systems. Between January 2023 and December 2025, 3,375 people travelled on AYUSH or e-AYUSH visas and another 579 on attendant visas.
    2. The earlier reported count: The Ministry of AYUSH had previously reported 1,646 AYUSH visas issued to nationals of 75 countries between January 2024 and February 2025.
    3. An education channel: Under the AYUSH Fellowship Scheme, 260 students from 32 countries were studying these systems in Indian institutions. Education operates as a channel of influence alongside treatment.
    4. Overseas programming: The Ministry’s international cooperation programmes fund training, seminars, conferences and knowledge exchange. These include yoga instruction and education delivered overseas.

    Why can the return on these commitments not be measured?

    1. The growth figure is not an AYUSH figure: Foreign medical arrivals in India rose from 1.83 lakh in 2020 to 6.44 lakh in 2024. That count covers medical travel of every kind and not AYUSH patients specifically.
    2. No country-wise ranking is published: The government does not publish a current consolidated country-wise ranking of AYUSH patients. The named markets are Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, the United Arab Emirates, the United States, Germany, Russia, Malaysia, Mauritius and Saudi Arabia.
    3. The market share is unknown: The absence of consolidated data makes it impossible to assess what share of India’s medical value travel market AYUSH actually holds. A negotiator therefore cannot state the value of the access being sought.
    4. The expert objection is about inputs, not demand: Credible standards, an evidence base, regulation, practitioner quality and patient safety are named as the preconditions for these systems to establish themselves in regulated healthcare markets.

    Challenges to AYUSH market access abroad

    1. Host country law decides the right to practise: Destination markets license practitioners under their own medical statutes, so an Indian qualification carries no automatic right to treat patients. Eg. Ayurveda is recognised in law as a practising profession in only a small set of jurisdictions, Hungary and Switzerland among them.
      The Fix: Negotiate mutual recognition annexes that name the qualifying degree and the permitted scope of practice, rather than a general commitment to cooperate on standards.
    2. A thin clinical evidence base: Regulators in evidence-driven markets ask for trial data that most classical formulations do not carry. Eg. The World Health Organization opened its Global Centre for Traditional Medicine at Jamnagar in 2022 to build exactly this evidence and data base.
      The Fix: Fund registered controlled trials on a shortlist of high-volume formulations and publish the protocols, so a foreign regulator can audit the method.
    3. Product safety findings block entry: Heavy metal content in some traditional preparations has drawn regulatory action in importing countries. Eg. The United States Food and Drug Administration has issued import alerts against Ayurvedic products over lead and mercury contamination.
      The Fix: Make batch-level heavy metal testing and certification mandatory before export, with the results carried on the product label.
    4. Domestic advertising undercuts the regulatory case: Cure claims made without trial evidence at home weaken the argument for recognition abroad. Eg. The Supreme Court held Patanjali Ayurved in contempt in 2024 over advertisements claiming cures for named diseases.
      The Fix: Enforce the Drugs and Magic Remedies (Objectionable Advertisements) Act, 1954 against AYUSH advertising and publish the penalty orders.

    Conclusion

    The commitments are in force and the harder work now sits inside India. What a foreign regulator will ask for is what a practitioner has been trained to and what a preparation contains, and neither is currently documented to an auditable standard. India also cannot count its own AYUSH patients separately from medical travellers, so it has no way to report what any of these annexes has delivered. The first practitioner registered abroad on an Indian qualification, and the first published count of AYUSH-specific arrivals, are the two markers that will show whether this is trade access or an announcement.

    Back2Basics

    1. Ministry of AYUSH: Formed in November 2014 by upgrading the Department of AYUSH, which itself succeeded the Department of Indian Systems of Medicine and Homoeopathy set up in 1995.
    2. Mandate: It administers education, research, drug standardisation and practice regulation for the six recognised systems.
    3. Education regulators: The National Commission for Indian System of Medicine and the National Commission for Homoeopathy, both created by 2020 statutes, regulate education and registration in place of the earlier central councils.
    4. Drug regulation: AYUSH medicines are regulated under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 and the rules made under it.

    [2026] The Chancellor of Germany visited India in January 2026. Which of the following is/are NOT correct in terms of outcomes?

    1. MoU between All India Institute of Ayurveda and University of Hamburg

    2. MoU on Youth Hockey Development between Hockey India and German Hockey Federation

    3. Establishment of a bilateral dialogue mechanism on the Indo-Pacific

    4. Opening of an Honorary Consul of Germany in Lucknow

    (a) 2 and 3 (b) 1 and 4 (c) 3 and 4 (d) 1 only

  • India, China hold military talks in Arunachal

    India, China hold military talks in Arunachal

    Why in the News

    The Indian and Chinese Armies have held their first Corps Commander-level meeting in the Eastern Sector, at the Vacha-Damai Border Personnel Meeting Point in Arunachal Pradesh.

    What is a Border Personnel Meeting Point?

    1. A designated meeting place on the Line of Actual Control: Border Personnel Meeting Points are fixed locations along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) where troops and local commanders of the two armies meet face to face on agreed dates.
    2. The lowest rung of the border management architecture: They handle local incidents, transgressions and ceremonial exchanges, sitting below the diplomatic and Special Representatives channels that handle the boundary question itself.
    3. Five existed before this round: Chushul and Daulat Beg Oldi in Ladakh, Nathu La in Sikkim, and Bum La and Kibithu in Arunachal Pradesh.

    What is new about this meeting?

    1. The first at this level in the Eastern Sector: Corps Commander-level meetings between the two armies have largely been held at the Chushul-Moldo Border Meeting Point in eastern Ladakh, particularly after the Galwan Valley clashes.
    2. A mechanism built for one sector applied to another: Until now the Corps Commander-level channel had primarily been used to address military issues and tensions along the western sector in Ladakh.
    3. The delegation was joint rather than purely Army: The Commander of 3 Corps led a 12-member delegation that included an Inspector-General of the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP), the force that mans the border posts along the LAC.
    4. The formation that owns the ground led it: 3 Corps, headquartered at Rangapahar in Nagaland, is responsible for operational areas along the LAC in Arunachal Pradesh, alongside the Tezpur-based 4 Corps.

    What friction prompted the meeting?

    1. Reported activity in a specific pocket: Chinese activity and alleged incursions have continued in the Taksing area of Upper Subansiri district despite two high-level engagements since July.
    2. Conflicting claims and a build-up along the line: The meeting takes place against conflicting territorial claims and a military build-up along the LAC, which is the standing condition the local mechanism exists to manage.
    3. Operational readiness reviewed at the same time: The Army Chief recently visited the headquarters of 3 Corps, where formation commanders briefed him on operational readiness and on measures being taken to strengthen combat capabilities.

    How has the border dialogue architecture been built up this year?

    1. The diplomatic tier met first: The two countries held the 36th meeting of the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India-China Border Affairs on 6 August.
    2. The political tier followed three weeks later: The 25th round of talks between the Special Representatives on the Boundary Question was held in Beijing on 26 August. India was represented by the National Security Adviser, and the Chinese delegation was led by the Director of the Office of the Central Commission for Foreign Affairs.
    3. Two new meeting points and new hotlines were agreed: The eight-point outcome document provided for two additional Border Personnel Meeting Points and new hotlines to strengthen communication and confidence-building along the frontier.
    4. The new points cover the sectors that lacked them: One of the newly proposed points will be in the Eastern Sector under the operational responsibility of 3 Corps, and the other in the Central Sector. Joshimath is not among the newly identified points.

    Challenges to the border personnel meeting mechanism

    1. Local commanders have no agreed line to refer to: The LAC has never been jointly delineated on maps, so a meeting on a transgression begins with each side asserting a different alignment. Eg. The two countries exchanged maps of the middle sector around 2001 and the process stalled before the western and eastern sectors were taken up.
      The Fix: Resume the map exchange sector by sector, beginning with the pockets where transgressions recur, so a local meeting has a common reference document.
    2. Infrastructure asymmetry sets the terms of any local talk: China’s road, rail and airfield network across the plateau allows a faster build-up than Indian logistics in the eastern frontier permit. Eg. The Lhasa-Nyingchi railway, opened in 2021, runs close to the eastern frontier.
      The Fix: Complete the Arunachal Frontier Highway and the all-weather tunnel network on the Indian side, so force posture does not depend on seasonal road access.
    3. Facts on the ground change between meetings: Dual-use border villages and permanent construction alter the position a subsequent meeting is negotiating over. Eg. China has built clusters of border villages opposite the Arunachal Pradesh frontier.
      The Fix: Accelerate delivery under the Vibrant Villages Programme, so the Indian side of the frontier retains a resident population that anchors the claim.
    4. The mechanism has no calendar of its own: Meetings convene when one side requests them, so the channel is least available during the periods of tension it exists for. Eg. The extension to the Eastern Sector required a decision at the Special Representatives level rather than a local one.
      The Fix: Fix a mandatory minimum frequency for meetings at each point and a defined response window for a request raised outside it.

    Conclusion

    The dialogue architecture along the frontier has moved from a single-sector crisis channel to one that covers the eastern and central stretches as well. Whether that widening amounts to more than an additional venue depends on whether the two newly agreed meeting points and hotlines become operational, and how quickly a reported transgression is taken up through them. The immediate milestone is the BRICS Summit that India hosts in New Delhi from 11 to 13 September, which the Chinese President is expected to attend.

    Back2Basics

    1. Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India-China Border Affairs: A diplomatic-level institutional channel established in 2012 to manage peace and tranquility along the border between the two countries.
    2. Composition: It is led by joint-secretary-level officials of India’s Ministry of External Affairs and China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with representatives of the defence establishments of both sides.
    3. Mandate: It coordinates on incidents along the LAC and prepares the ground for talks at the Special Representatives level, and it holds no authority to settle the boundary itself.

    [2024, GS3, 15 marks] India has a long and troubled border with China and Pakistan fraught with contentious issues. Examine the conflicting issues and security challenges along the border. Also give out the development being undertaken in these areas under the Border Area Development Programme (BADP) and Border Infrastructure and Management (BIM) Scheme.”