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Type: Explained

These Newscards correspond to the explained section of various newspapers. They become immensely important for both prelims and mains and special attention needs to be paid to them

  • Chinese overcapacity is a problem for the world

    Chinese overcapacity is a problem for the world

    Why in the News

    Chinese manufacturing overcapacity is being framed as a global structural challenge rather than a bilateral trade irritant. China is the world’s largest trade surplus economy, with a surplus valued at $1.2 trillion, and accounts for roughly 30 per cent of global manufacturing output. Cheap Chinese supply lowers input and consumer prices everywhere it lands. The same supply also removes the space in which importing economies would build their own manufacturing capability. What is contested is whether import dependence on the world’s most competitive producer thwarts capability building and upgradation in manufacturing value chains.

    What is Chinese overcapacity?

    1. Capacity built beyond profitable demand: Chinese industry carries production capacity well past what commercial returns justify, sustained by state support rather than by market profitability.
    2. The subsidy and credit mechanism: State backed industrial subsidies and a state directed financial system supplying cheap credit allow firms to expand without being concerned about profits and returns against their international competitors.
    3. How it shows up in prices: Firms operating on razor thin or negative margins run zero sum price wars at home and abroad to expand market share, producing a self defeating race to the bottom.

    How did China build an “absolute advantage” in manufacturing?

    1. The advantage is not price alone: China’s success reflects scale, supplier networks, infrastructure, technological capabilities and state supported industrial ecosystems, not only low cost production.
    2. Breadth of the product range: The same base manufactures textiles, machinery, electronics, solar photovoltaic (solar PV) modules, batteries and electric vehicles (EVs) at competitive prices.

    What does China’s low cost supply give the rest of the world?

    1. Gains accrue to rich and poor economies alike: China’s rise has produced significant economic gains for both developed and developing countries.
    2. Cheaper inputs, not only cheaper consumption: Low cost Chinese goods reduce the prices of consumer goods, machinery, clean technology products and intermediate inputs.
    3. A development effect: Those cheaper inputs support industrial transformation and infrastructure development in developing economies.

    Why does the same cheap supply weaken manufacturing in developing countries?

    1. Asymmetric competitive pressure: Producers in developing countries face difficulty competing with Chinese producers, creating what is termed a “late industrialisation dilemma”.
    2. Upstream capability erodes: The pressure gradually weakens both the incentives and the capabilities to foster domestic upstream industries.
    3. The question is dependence, not efficiency: The issue is not whether Chinese imports are efficient and competitive, but whether import dependence blocks capability building and upgradation in manufacturing value chains.

    How is China’s dominance reshaping global value chains?

    1. Control of critical nodes: In the EV sector China controls 65 per cent of lithium refining, 70 per cent of cobalt refining and over 80 per cent of battery manufacturing.
    2. A position across multiple stages: China occupies a dominant and critical position across multiple stages of manufacturing value chain networks, which is transforming the geography of those networks.
    3. The paradox of dominance: The most competitive supplier in the system is also the source of strategic vulnerability for every country that relies excessively on a single supplier.

    What does Chinese overcapacity mean for India’s self reliance?

    1. Import concentration: China accounts for roughly 17 per cent of India’s imports, with dependence concentrated in solar PV modules, telecom components, electronics and active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs).
    2. The MSME layer takes the hit: Chinese imports have affected micro, small and medium enterprise (MSME) led domestic manufacturing, undermining India’s manufacturing imperatives.
    3. A component bottleneck: India’s electronics industry faces a shortage of printed circuit boards because of geopolitical headwinds and supply chain impediments, which affects downstream manufacturing.
    4. The pincer dilemma: Chinese export curbs could restrict India’s access to key inputs such as solar wafers, cells and batteries. India’s Production Linked Incentive (PLI) scheme for solar and EVs is at the same time challenged at the World Trade Organization (WTO) for violating local content rules.

    Challenges to rebalancing Chinese overcapacity

    1. No effective multilateral discipline on industrial subsidies: Trade rules reach export and local content subsidies, and reach unreported state support and cheap state bank credit only weakly. Eg. China’s subsidy notifications to the WTO have been repeatedly counter notified as incomplete by the United States, the European Union and Japan.
      The Fix: Negotiate a subsidy transparency code with automatic counter notification, so unreported support carries a rebuttable presumption of injury.
    2. Rebalancing depends on Chinese household demand, which stays weak: Household consumption remains under 40 per cent of Chinese output, so domestic absorption cannot take the place of exports. Eg. The property sector downturn after 2021 cut household wealth and pushed precautionary saving higher.
      The Fix: Tie any coordinated adjustment to verifiable social security and household income targets rather than to currency movement alone.
    3. Tariffs shift trade rather than retire capacity: Duties raise the price of arriving goods and leave the surplus plants that produced them in operation. Eg. Duties on Chinese solar cells were followed by assembly routed through Southeast Asia, later covered by circumvention findings.
      The Fix: Pair every trade remedy with rules of origin and value addition thresholds, so relief is not defeated by transshipment.
    4. Alternative suppliers do not exist at the required scale: Refining and processing capacity outside China takes years to build even where the ore is available. Eg. Indonesia’s nickel processing expansion was itself built largely with Chinese capital and technology.
      The Fix: Fund refining and processing capacity through pooled offtake guarantees among importing countries rather than through single country subsidies.
    5. No forum acts on the surplus itself: Existing instruments discipline individual programmes and individual shipments, not aggregate industrial capacity. Eg. WTO subsidy disputes are brought against named schemes one at a time.
      The Fix: Open a global dialogue on gradually rebalancing the Chinese economy in partnership with the United States and other major economies, on the pattern of the 1985 Plaza Accord.

    Conclusion

    The argument over Chinese overcapacity is not an argument about efficiency. Cheap supply and domestic capability building pull against each other, and no importing economy has yet found a way to hold both. The unresolved question is whether a surplus economy will accept an adjustment that no external rule obliges it to accept.

    What is Global Trade Governance?

    1. About: Global trade governance is the body of rules framing trade between nations, administered mainly through the World Trade Organization, founded in 1995 as successor to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
    2. Membership: The WTO has 166 members covering over 98 per cent of world trade.
    3. Rationale: The system exists to make market access predictable and to lower barriers. Average industrial tariffs fell from around 40 per cent in 1947 to about 4 per cent today.
    4. Core principles: Most Favoured Nation treatment requires favourable terms offered to one member to extend to all, and National Treatment bars discrimination against imported goods once they enter a market.

    Laws and Rules Governing Global Trade Governance

    1. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, 1995: Classifies subsidies and permits an affected member to impose countervailing duties where a subsidised import causes injury.
    2. Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures, 1995: Prohibits investment conditions that discriminate against imports, including local content requirements.
    3. Customs Tariff Act, 1975: Sections 9 and 9A give India its statutory power to levy countervailing and anti dumping duties.
    4. Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992: Provides the legal basis for India’s import and export policy and for the Director General of Foreign Trade.

    Challenges in Global Trade Governance

    1. The dispute settlement tier is paralysed: Appeals cannot be heard, so a losing member can appeal into a void and avoid compliance. Eg. The Appellate Body has been non functional since December 2019 after appointments were blocked.
      The Fix: Restore an automatic and binding two tier dispute settlement system with appointments delinked from any single member’s consent.
    2. Unilateral measures bypass the rulebook: Members increasingly act outside the agreed remedy process, which removes the predictability the system was built to supply. Eg. Sweeping reciprocal tariffs imposed in 2025 were applied without recourse to WTO procedures.
      The Fix: Strengthen the organisation’s standing to act against politically motivated tariff action rather than leaving each dispute to bilateral settlement.
    3. The negotiating function has stalled: Multilateral talks have produced little since 2008, so the rulebook does not cover the trade that has grown since. Eg. The 2026 ministerial conference closed without an overall declaration and the electronic commerce duty moratorium lapsed.
      The Fix: Modernise the rules to cover electronic commerce, digital trade and cross border data flows, and consider majority voting for defined categories of agreement.

    Back2Basics: Plaza Accord

    1. What it was: An agreement reached in 1985 among the United States, Japan, West Germany, France and the United Kingdom to act jointly on exchange rates.
    2. What it did: The five agreed to intervene in currency markets to depreciate the US dollar against the Japanese yen and the Deutsche Mark.
    3. Why it is cited: It remains the standard example of major economies coordinating to correct a large trade imbalance rather than each acting through tariffs.

    “[2025, GS3, 10 marks] What are the challenges before the Indian economy when the world is moving away from free trade and multilateralism to protectionism and bilateralism? How can these challenges be met?”

  • Why risk-monitoring in the Himalayas is like looking for ‘needles in haystacks’

    Why risk-monitoring in the Himalayas is like looking for ‘needles in haystacks’

    Why in the News

    A Senior Fellow of the Energy, Water and Sustainability Program at the Stimson Center, a US based non-profit think tank, has set out the sequence of the recent Nepal flood and the lessons it holds for hazard monitoring across the Himalayas.

    What triggered the Nepal flood, and why is the trigger still uncertain?

    1. A glacial detachment carrying bedrock: The present consensus is that the initial trigger was a glacial detachment that included bedrock on the northern slopes of Langtang Lirung, a 7,000-plus-metre peak in the Langtang range.
    2. The triggering process is not understood: The failure could be related to climate-related risks or to gradual shifts at the site itself.
    3. A slow creep, then a tipping point: Preliminary analysis indicates minor movement of the glacial mass in the weeks or months before the event, followed by a tipping point.

    How did a single glacial failure cascade more than 100 kilometres downstream?

    1. The descent: The failed mass swept down a gully toward the Lhende River, which reaches the Chinese border. The source area was around 5,200 metres, so the flow descended a couple of thousand metres.
    2. A temporary natural dam: The flow deposited a mixture of ice, rock and sediment that blocked the river.
    3. Three contested water sources: Debate continues on how much water came from the glacier itself, from melting of entrained ice, and from water that accumulated behind the landslide dam.
    4. Nine minutes to the border: The dam failed and sent a major pulse of water downstream, which reached the China border in roughly nine minutes. Footage from the Gyirong border facility shows a massive dark wave carrying a large volume of material, not just water.
    5. Back into Nepal within seconds: The border facility sat at a confluence with the Gyirong River tributary, and within seconds of hitting it the flow was already moving back into Nepal. There was no realistic opportunity to warn communities downstream, and many of those who could have generated an alert were themselves swept away.
    6. Dams, hydropower and villages: The flow destroyed dams and hydropower projects downstream, recruited additional sediment, and swept through villages along the river corridor.
    7. Beyond every mapped floodplain: The event continued into Nuwakot district and affected larger market towns in the floodplain, in areas well beyond the 100-year or 500-year floodplain (the extent a flood of that average recurrence interval is expected to reach). This was a thousand-year-plus flood event.
    8. Registered at the India-Nepal border: Significant impacts extended more than 100 kilometres downstream, and the flood pulse also registered at the India-Nepal border.

    Why are cascading hazard chains the larger Himalayan problem?

    1. A pattern across three countries: The same chain has appeared in Chamoli, in Sikkim with the South Lhonak GLOF (glacial lake outburst flood), and in Nepal with the Melamchi disaster.
    2. Climate risk as an amplifier: Climate risks are interacting with and amplifying other disaster risks, and these events are becoming more frequent and more intense.

    Why does hazard monitoring keep missing the sites that fail?

    1. Known high-risk sites exist, and this was not one: Several places around Nepal have been identified as high-risk areas for glacial detachment and surges, and glaciers immediately on the other side of Langtang Lirung are high-priority research sites. This particular location had no red flags.
    2. Hindsight still needs a target: Analysts are examining whether changes could have been detected in the days before the event, but that would still require knowing where to look.
    3. No signal to separate from noise: Monitoring every glacier and every mountainside that could collapse is not feasible without some signal that narrows the search.
    4. Satellites answer only the question they were pointed at: Remote sensing and satellite-based analysis are important, but different satellite tools answer different questions, and each needs a target. Engaging local communities is how the target is found.
    5. Almost every event came from an unknown place: Of over a dozen extreme events in the Himalayas over 10 years, almost all came from unknown places, the South Lhonak GLOF being the one known risk.
    6. No borrowed training data: Patterns are beginning to emerge, but no training dataset from the Alps or Norway can simply be transferred to the Himalayas, which have their own context and significant data scarcity and data sparsity.

    What monitoring triangle does the interview propose for India, Nepal and the Himalayas?

    1. Mapping is the baseline: The mapping exercise undertaken by India’s Home Ministry and space agencies to monitor glacial lakes and hazards is an absolute necessity. Nepal does not have the same level of resources. Some mapping has been done there, and it is not as comprehensive.
    2. Maps enable zoning; monitoring is the key: Once maps exist, hazard zoning and modelling can begin, but detection depends on continuous monitoring.
    3. Corner one, remote sensing: Remote sensing and satellite imagery form one part of the triangle.
    4. Corner two, fixed station networks: Hydromet (hydrological and meteorological) and seismic stations form the second.
    5. Corner three, localised monitoring through local government: Local governments, disaster managers and Community Disaster Management Committees can collect local data, report landslides and monitor impacts after storms.
    6. Localised monitoring through people immersed in the terrain: Yak herders and fishermen notice changes in rivers, glaciers and glacial lakes. Oral histories with elders reveal smaller avalanches, glacial-lake floods and other events that science has not recorded, helping identify potential hotspots.
    7. The combination is the detector: Combining the station network, remote sensing and localised monitoring gives a better chance of detecting changes and distinguishing the signal from the noise that tells you where to look.

    Challenges to Himalayan hazard monitoring

    1. Hydropower sited in hazard corridors without upstream sensing: Projects sit in narrow gorges below unstable ice and rock with no instrument between the source and the intake. Eg. The February 2021 Chamoli rock and ice avalanche from Ronti peak destroyed the Rishiganga and Tapovan-Vishnugad projects with no upstream warning.
      The Fix: Make a hazard chain assessment and ridge line sensors with satellite telemetry a condition of clearance for every Himalayan hydropower project.
    2. Instruments die with the event they are meant to detect: A sensor placed at the lake or in the channel is destroyed by the first surge and reports nothing. Eg. Monitoring equipment installed at South Lhonak lake in September 2023 was washed away in the October 2023 outburst that also breached the Teesta III dam at Chungthang.
      The Fix: Place redundant stations on high ground and at staggered distances downstream so at least one survives to trigger sirens.
    3. Cross-border flows carry no shared alert: The upstream country holds the first minutes of warning and no protocol obliges it to pass them on. Eg. India’s hydrological data sharing arrangement with China on the Brahmaputra lapsed in 2023.
      The Fix: Adopt a Hindu Kush Himalaya alert protocol through the International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD) that pushes automatic upstream alerts to downstream disaster authorities within minutes.
    4. Warnings that never reach the last mile: A satellite detection is useless to a village asleep in a gorge with no siren and no signal. Eg. The Sikkim outburst struck after 10 pm on 3 October 2023 and reached the Teesta valley settlements in the dark.
      The Fix: Pair the National Disaster Management Authority’s Common Alerting Protocol based cell broadcast with battery-backed community sirens in every mapped downstream settlement.

    Conclusion

    India has the baseline map; Nepal has part of one. Neither has the monitoring triangle that turns a map into a warning. The unresolved gap is that detection still depends on knowing where to look, and the herders, fishermen and village committees who hold that knowledge are not yet wired into any station network. The test of the next monsoon is whether a single high mountain site with no red flag gets watched because a community reported it first.

    Back2Basics

    1. What it is: A sudden release of water from a lake formed by melting glaciers, held back by a natural dam of loose moraine debris or ice rather than bedrock.
    2. How it starts: An avalanche, rockfall or ice calving into the lake sends a displacement wave over the dam, or seepage erodes the moraine from within until it collapses.
    3. Why it is deadlier than a rain flood: The surge carries rock and sediment, arrives with minutes of warning, and can breach infrastructure far below the lake.
    4. India’s framework: The National Disaster Management Authority issued dedicated guidelines on GLOF and Landslide Lake Outburst Flood management in 2020.

    [2021, GS1, 15 marks] How does the melting of the Arctic ice and glaciers of the Antarctic differently affect the weather patterns and human activities on the Earth? Explain. (250 words)

  • Solution for stubble burning lies close to the farm

    Solution for stubble burning lies close to the farm

    Why in the News


    Punjab’s paddy harvesting season is approaching, reviving Delhi’s air-pollution concerns. The focus is shifting from banning stubble burning to creating profitable markets for parali and increasing farmers’ income.

    What is biochar?

    1. Definition: Biochar is a carbon-rich material produced by heating biomass under limited oxygen, so the carbon is retained as char rather than burnt away.
    2. Feedstock: It can be made from crop residues such as paddy, maize, cotton and mustard stalks.
    3. Yield: Roughly 100 kg of dry parali yields around 30 kg of char.
    4. Use in soil: Applied to soil, it improves water retention and nutrient-use efficiency and locks carbon away for a century.

    Why do farmers still burn after years of measures?

    1. Unchanged economics: Residue is bulky, the window before wheat sowing is narrow, and almost every alternative to burning carries a cost.
    2. Burning is quick and cheap: Alternatives involve cost, labour and uncertainty, so burning remains the rational choice at the field.
    3. Limits of enforcement and subsidy: Enforcement and machinery subsidies help, and behaviour changes only when the residue itself becomes valuable.

    What has changed in the economics of parali?

    1. From a cost to a price: Farmers in several locations were paying to have straw removed. Today in parts of Punjab the same straw fetches around Rs 1.5 to 2 per kg.
    2. Who is buying: Demand from power plants, compressed biogas (CBG) units and pellet manufacturers is slowly creating a market for what was treated as waste.
    3. The new question: If parali now has value, the issue is where that value should be created and how much can remain with the farmer.

    Why is biochar different from burning straw for energy?

    1. Carbon fate: Burning biomass as fuel recovers energy and returns much of its carbon to the atmosphere. Biochar applied to soil retains a significant share of the carbon and serves an agronomic purpose.
    2. Punjab’s need: The rice-wheat system is under stress from declining soil quality, intensive fertiliser use and groundwater depletion, and residue generated by the same system could improve its soils.

    Where is the value created, and who captures it?

    1. The processing location problem: Parali has to be collected, baled, stored and transported within the narrow window before wheat sowing. Long-distance transport of a bulky, relatively low-value material quickly eats into its economics.
    2. Farmer as raw material supplier: The farmer supplies the raw material, and most value addition happens after the biomass leaves the village.
    3. The biochar irony: A farmer supplies the straw, sees it processed elsewhere and later buys back a product made from biomass originating on farms like his.
    4. The chakki precedent: Wheat does not travel 100 km merely because flour requires machinery. The village chakki places processing close to where the commodity is produced and consumed.

    How would a village-scale biochar system work?

    1. Build-operate-transfer: A technology provider installs and operates the unit, trains local operators and ensures quality and emission standards. Over time the asset and the capability transfer to a farmer producer organisation (FPO), a self-help group (SHG) or a cooperative.
    2. Government’s role: The government provides standards, training, concessional finance and initial support rather than running thousands of units, and panchayats help with land and coordination.
    3. Farmer’s routine: Farmers bring straw to a nearby processing point much as they bring wheat to a flour mill. Some biochar returns to their fields and the rest is sold where markets exist.
    4. What changes: Raw straw travels less, value addition happens closer to the farmer, and villages are not left with subsidised machinery nobody knows how to operate.

    Challenges to village-scale biochar processing

    1. Emissions from small kilns: A poorly run pyrolysis unit releases methane, carbon monoxide and particulate matter, and so replaces one smoke source with another. Eg. The Kon-Tiki flame curtain kiln, the low-cost design most village pilots use, has no flue gas treatment.
      The Fix: Notify emission standards for small pyrolysis units under the Central Pollution Control Board and make the build-operate-transfer operator liable for them until handover.
    2. Carbon credit verification: Biochar earns carbon removal credits only where permanence is measured, and a village unit cannot measure it alone. Eg. The Puro.earth biochar methodology requires a hydrogen to organic carbon ratio below 0.7 as the test of permanence.
      The Fix: Aggregate village units under an FPO level registry with laboratory testing so that credits are pooled and sold at scale.
    3. Paddy straw is a poor feedstock on its own: Paddy straw carries a high silica content, so its char is ash heavy and lower in fixed carbon than wood char. Eg. Rice straw ash is largely silica, and the char inherits it.
      The Fix: Blend paddy straw with maize, cotton and mustard stalks across seasons so that a unit runs year round on a better mix.
    4. Competition from existing straw buyers: A village unit competes for the same straw as large plants that already pay for it. Eg. The Verbio compressed biogas plant at Lehragaga in Sangrur, Punjab, consumes about one lakh tonnes of paddy straw a year.
      The Fix: Site biochar units in blocks beyond the collection radius of existing CBG and pellet plants, using the State’s straw balance map.
    5. Window mismatch: Straw arrives in three weeks and a unit needs feedstock for months. Eg. Punjab’s paddy harvest runs through late October and wheat sowing closes by mid-November.
      The Fix: Subsidise baling and covered storage at the processing point under the crop residue scheme so that processing continues after the window closes.

    Conclusion

    The policy question on parali has moved from stopping a practice to locating a market, and the location decides who captures the value. Village-scale processing answers that question only if quality, emissions and offtake are secured before the technology provider exits. The next window is the October to November harvest. Whether any State pairs its residue management subsidies with village-level processing points is the thing to watch.

    Stubble Burning in India

    1. What it is: Stubble burning is the practice of setting fire to the straw residue left in fields after harvest, especially paddy, to clear the land quickly for the next sowing.
    2. Where and when: It is concentrated in Punjab, Haryana, Uttar Pradesh and the National Capital Region during the post-monsoon October to November window.
    3. Why it happens: The narrow gap between paddy harvest and wheat sowing pushes farmers toward the cheapest and fastest clearing method.
    4. Scale: Punjab alone generates about 20 million tonnes of paddy straw a year.

    Challenges in Stubble Burning

    1. Episodic air pollution: Burning sharply aggravates the Air Quality Index across the Indo-Gangetic Plain within days. Eg. In December 2025 Delhi’s AQI crossed 500 and over 150 flights were delayed.
      The Fix: Front-load machine deployment in the fortnight before harvest with block-level fire targets monitored by satellite.
    2. Soil degradation: Burning destroys beneficial soil microbes, nitrogen and organic carbon. Eg. Each tonne of burnt paddy straw loses about 5.5 kg of nitrogen, 2.3 kg of phosphorus and 25 kg of potassium.
      The Fix: Pay a per-acre incentive for in-situ incorporation with Happy Seeder or Super Seeder, verified by satellite.
    3. Meteorological trap: Winter temperature inversions and calm winds prevent dispersal and compound the damage. Eg. Delhi invoked Stage IV of the Graded Response Action Plan in November 2024 when the AQI crossed 450.
      The Fix: Time enforcement and straw collection to the weeks before inversions set in rather than to the pollution peak.
    4. Paddy-centric cropping in a water-stressed region: Free farm power and assured procurement lock Punjab into paddy. Eg. About three fourths of Punjab’s groundwater assessment units are over-exploited as per the Central Ground Water Board.
      The Fix: Offer a per-hectare diversification incentive for maize and pulses with assured procurement so that the residue problem shrinks at source.
    5. Penalty without a price: Enforcement fines farmers who have no cheaper alternative. Eg. Environmental compensation for burning was doubled in November 2024 to Rs 5,000 for under two acres, Rs 10,000 for two to five acres and Rs 30,000 above five acres.
      The Fix: Pair the penalty with a guaranteed straw purchase price at the block level so that not burning is the cheaper option.

    “[2025, GS3, 10 marks] What is Carbon Capture, Utilization and Storage (CCUS)? What is the potential role of CCUS in tackling climate change?”

  • All animals need equal consideration

    All animals need equal consideration

    Why in the News

    A division Bench of the Supreme Court has ordered the Keralam government to take custody of Raman, Keralam’s tallest elephant, in Jayakrishna Menon vs. Krishnankutty & Ors. The Bench observed that the court cannot remain a mute spectator in matters concerning animals and that their wellbeing is of “paramount importance”. It held that it would fail in its duty towards “voiceless animals” if it ignored the elephant’s continued use for temple activities after its own prohibition. The order stands in contrast with Re: City Hounded by Strays, Kids Pay Price (2026). There a three judge Bench adopted a much narrower interpretation of the law. That reading led to the removal of large numbers of dogs from public institutions. The divergence raises the question whether Indian animal law grades animals by their value to humans rather than by their capacity to suffer.

    What is equal consideration?

    1. The principle: Framed by moral philosopher Peter Singer, equal consideration holds that the basic principle of equality does not require equal or identical treatment; it requires that the interests of each being be weighed equally.
    2. Who qualifies: Every being that has interests, some subjective awareness, or the capacity to feel pleasure or pain.
    3. Different treatment can follow: Equal consideration for different beings can lead to different treatment and different rights, because their needs differ.

    What questions does the differential treatment of two animals raise?

    1. The court’s own premise: The elephant order implicitly acknowledges an animal’s propensity to suffer and the need to ensure its wellbeing.
    2. One elephant against lakhs of dogs: Why one elephant’s wellbeing is of paramount importance and the welfare of lakhs of street dogs is disregarded.
    3. One institution, two approaches: How the same institution adopts two contrasting, if not contradictory, approaches to issues involving similar moral considerations.
    4. Whether courts should decide at all: Whether the judiciary is the best positioned institution to decide cases that seal the fate of animals, for better or for worse.

    Do the differences between the two animals justify different consideration?

    1. The elephant’s legal standing: The Indian elephant is a charismatic animal, listed as Endangered on the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) Red List, and explicitly protected under the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972.
    2. The street dog’s legal standing: The street dog is legally perceived as a problem that needs to be tackled.
    3. Different relationships with humans: One is expected to live in the wild away from human habitation. The other shares public spaces, requiring humans to learn to coexist in shared spaces.
    4. The test: Whether these differences are significant enough to attract completely different moral and legal considerations.
    5. What is actually missing: In the two judgments the absence of equal consideration itself drives the differential treatment. Equal consideration would require an assessment of the needs of each animal and then the determination of a course of action.

    Why does the remedy lie with Parliament rather than the courts?

    1. Anthropocentric bias in both statutes: The Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 for elephants and the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960 for street dogs evaluate the worth of animals by their value to humans. That valuation determines the nature and level of protection each animal receives.
    2. A gap in legislative guidance: Two cases involving different animals produced contrasting approaches from the same court. That exposes the absence of a legislative standard for animal well-being across legal categories.
    3. The Swiss model, cited in passing: The Swiss Constitution ensures the well-being of animals and also protects animal dignity, granting animals an inherent worth.
    4. Parliament’s responsibility: Parliament should extend protection to every being worthy of moral consideration, through a legislative foundation that provides moral consideration to all animals and pathways for ethical coexistence.

    Challenges to an equal consideration standard in Indian animal law

    1. Fragmented statutes: The same act of harm is governed by different laws depending on the animal’s legal category, so no single test of suffering applies. Eg. Street dogs fall under the Animal Birth Control Rules, 2023 made under the cruelty law, and elephants fall under Schedule I of the wildlife law.
      The Fix: Enact a single animal welfare code with a sentience-based standard that applies across categories, with the wildlife schedules layered on top for conservation purposes.
    2. Nominal penalties: Section 11 of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960 punishes a first cruelty offence with a fine of Rs 10 to Rs 50, unchanged since enactment. Eg. The draft Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (Amendment) Bill, 2022 proposed fines up to Rs 75,000 and imprisonment for gruesome cruelty and has not been introduced in Parliament.
      The Fix: Introduce the amendment Bill with graded penalties and a statutory definition of sentience.
    3. Unsettled legal status of animals: High Courts and the Supreme Court have taken different positions on whether animals are legal persons, so lower courts have no stable rule. Eg. The Uttarakhand High Court in Narayan Dutt Bhatt v. Union of India (2018) and the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Karnail Singh v. State of Haryana (2019) declared animals legal persons, a status no Supreme Court ruling has endorsed.
      The Fix: Settle the legal status of animals in statute rather than leaving it to divergent judicial declarations.
    4. No enforcement arm: The Animal Welfare Board of India is advisory, and district level societies exist on paper. Eg. The Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (Establishment and Regulation of Societies for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals) Rules, 2001 require a society in every district, and many districts have none.
      The Fix: Fund district societies from State budgets with mandated veterinary and inspector staffing and a reporting line to the State Animal Welfare Board.

    Conclusion

    The two rulings leave a tension unresolved. Indian animal law protects by category, endangered species on one side and nuisance animals on the other, and the capacity to suffer sits on neither side of that line. A court can decide the case before it; it cannot write a standard that applies to every animal. The thing to watch is whether Parliament takes up the pending amendment to the cruelty law and whether it writes sentience, rather than human utility, into the test.

    Animal Welfare Law in India

    1. What it covers: Statutory protection of animals from cruelty and of wild species from harm, spread across a cruelty statute, a wildlife statute and subordinate rules for specific uses such as transport, slaughter, performance and experiments.
    2. Two regimes: The cruelty law applies to any animal, domestic, captive or stray. The wildlife law protects species by schedule, and the Wild Life (Protection) Amendment Act, 2022 reduced the schedules from six to four.
    3. Institutions: The Animal Welfare Board of India (statutory since 1962), the Committee for Control and Supervision of Experiments on Animals for laboratory use, and the National Board for Wildlife for protected species.
    4. Scale: India holds about 60 percent of the world’s Asian elephants, with 29,964 counted in the 2017 synchronised census, and the 20th Livestock Census (2019) counted 1.53 crore stray dogs.

    Challenges in Animal Welfare

    1. Rabies from an unmanaged stray population: Sterilisation and vaccination have not reached the coverage that stops transmission. Eg. India accounts for about 36 percent of global rabies deaths as per the World Health Organization.
      The Fix: Fund local bodies to reach 70 percent vaccination coverage of the dog population in each ward, since transmission breaks at that threshold.
    2. Captive elephants at festivals: Parading in heat, crowds and noise causes injury and deaths of animals and people. Eg. The Kerala High Court’s 2024 guidelines on distance and rest norms for parading elephants were contested before the Supreme Court by festival organisers.
      The Fix: Enforce microchip registration and the 2024 transfer rules so that every captive elephant has a traceable owner accountable for its welfare.
    3. Culture against welfare: Traditional events with animals are permitted by State amendments to the cruelty law. Eg. A five judge Bench in Animal Welfare Board of India v. Union of India (2023) upheld Tamil Nadu’s Jallikattu amendment.
      The Fix: Codify measurable welfare conditions for each permitted event under the Performing Animals rules, with veterinary supervision as a licence condition.
    4. Regulation of livestock trade: Welfare rules for animal markets have collapsed under political contest. Eg. The Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (Regulation of Livestock Markets) Rules, 2017 were stayed by the Supreme Court and withdrawn in 2018.
      The Fix: Re-notify market rules confined to welfare conditions such as water, shade and transport limits, without conditions on the purpose of sale.

    “[2022] Which one of the following has been constituted under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 ?

    (a) Central Water Commission

    (b) Central Ground Water Board

    (c) Central Ground Water Authority

    (d) National Water Development Agency

  • At SCO, Modi seeks dismantling of terror infra as Pak’s Shehbaz listens

    At SCO, Modi seeks dismantling of terror infra as Pak’s Shehbaz listens

    Why in the News

    The Prime Minister told the leaders of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) (the ten member Eurasian security grouping that includes India, Pakistan, China, Russia and Iran) that the crisis in West Asia demonstrates that a conflict in one region does not remain confined there. He said it impacts global energy security, maritime trade and supply chains, and that the Global South bears the brunt of the consequences.

    Why did India put the West Asia war at the centre of its SCO message?

    1. Security has widened: In an interconnected world the scope of security has expanded significantly, so a regional war becomes an energy, shipping and supply chain problem for every member.
    2. The meeting with Iran: Iran’s President was among the leaders at the summit. The Prime Minister met him on Monday, their first meeting since the start of the war.

    What did India demand on terrorism, and what gives the demand its weight?

    1. Beyond action and reaction: With Pakistan’s Prime Minister listening, the Prime Minister said terrorism remains a grave challenge for all of humanity and that the fight cannot be limited to a mere “action-reaction” mindset.
    2. Dismantle the whole ecosystem: He called for dismantling the entire ecosystem of terror financing, recruitment, radicalisation and safe havens, and for members to speak in one voice that there is no room for double standards.
    3. Terrorism as state policy: Countries that use terrorism as an instrument of state policy and shelter terrorists must be sent a strong message that terrorism cannot be a strategic asset for anyone.
    4. The Operation Sindoor antecedent: In May 2025, days after the Pahalgam terror attack, India launched Operation Sindoor, striking terror targets in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and Pakistan. Four days of hostilities followed and ended with Pakistan seeking a ceasefire.
    5. The Tianjin precedent: At the SCO summit in Tianjin on August 31 and September 1 last year, the Prime Minister called the Pahalgam attack the “most heinous face of terrorism” and an open challenge to every nation, and said double standards on terrorism are unacceptable.

    What are the three pillars India set out for the SCO’s next 25 years?

    1. The framework: India’s vision for the SCO rests on three pillars, S for Security, C for Connectivity and O for Opportunity. Over 25 years the grouping built a tradition of dialogue across Eurasia, and the goal for the next 25 is to translate that cooperation into tangible results.
    2. Security: This pillar is the terrorism agenda set out above, carried as a demand on the grouping rather than as a bilateral grievance.
    3. Connectivity: Its scope must expand beyond roads, railways and air corridors to simplifying customs procedures, promoting digital documentation and enhancing the efficiency of logistics networks.
    4. Opportunity: The benefits of cooperation must directly reach people, with people-to-people ties at the heart of the next 25 years. The yardstick of success is new opportunities for youth, new markets for entrepreneurs, farmers benefiting from technology and improvement in citizens’ lives.
    5. Shared geography: As the world navigates uncertainty and instability, the task is to transform shared geography into shared opportunities.

    Why is connectivity the pillar that divides the members?

    1. Sovereignty as the condition: India supports all initiatives that connect markets, facilitate trade and open growth avenues, on the condition that respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations is paramount, which it described as the core spirit of the SCO Charter.
    2. The Iran route: India wants to access Central Asia through Iran, since Pakistan has denied India overland transit to the region.
    3. The corridor objection: The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor is an irritant for India because it runs through territory India claims and so violates its territorial integrity and sovereignty.

    What follows the summit?

    1. The Delhi BRICS summit: The Chinese President and the Russian President attended, and the Prime Minister met them informally during the leaders’ group photograph. Both are expected at the BRICS summit in New Delhi on September 12 and 13.
    2. A Pakistan-hosted summit: Pakistan hosts the next SCO summit in 2027, and India’s participation will be watched closely by members of the grouping.

    Conclusion

    India has made no double standards on terrorism the price of its engagement with the SCO. The grouping’s next chair is the country that demand is aimed at. Two dates now test the position: the BRICS summit in New Delhi on September 12 and 13, where the same Chinese and Russian leaders reconvene, and the next SCO summit under the Pakistani chair, where India must decide whether and at what level to attend.

    [2026] Which of the following countries are members of the European Union?

    1. Belarus

    2. Poland

    3. Germany

    4. Switzerland

    (a) 1, 2 and 4 (b) 1 and 4 only (c) 2 and 3 (d) 2 and 4 only

  • Take Bishkek to BRICS

    Take Bishkek to BRICS

    Why in the News

    The Bishkek SCO summit offered India a preview of the challenges awaiting BRICS: balancing strategic autonomy, geopolitical rivalry, institutional cooperation and an increasingly diverse, difficult-to-align membership.

    Why is Central Asia’s diversification an opening for India?

    1. A region loosening one dependence: Central Asia was shaped by its Soviet past and still maintains economic links with Russia, but its five countries no longer treat Moscow as their sole partner.
    2. China, Iran and the Gulf as alternatives: The region now looks to China for trade, investment and infrastructure, and to Iran and the Gulf for access to the south. The ongoing conflict complicates the southern route.
    3. Shared security concerns: The region’s growing strategic importance and shared concerns, including terrorism, are what led India and all Central Asian states except Turkmenistan to establish strategic partnerships, which gives India standing before the summit began.

    How can India build connectivity without a land route?

    1. Geography blocks the direct routes: There is no overland access through Pakistan, and Afghanistan’s airspace remains beset by security risks. The absence of direct land access has constrained trade and wider economic and cultural engagement.
    2. Connectivity as strategic geography: Connectivity goes beyond roads and railways. It shapes the economic and strategic geography of Eurasia, so India must expand engagement in ways that overcome the limits geography imposes.
    3. Start with what does not travel by road: The starting point is products and services that do not depend on roads, namely services, digital systems and technological investments.

    Why is the SCO a weak platform for India’s terrorism agenda?

    1. What India asked for: The Prime Minister called on the international community to collectively dismantle the ecosystem of terror, including its financing and recruitment networks.
    2. The will has weakened: International political will against terrorism has weakened over the past year, and the forum reflects that shift.
    3. Pakistan’s recovered standing: Over the past year Pakistan has largely overcome its diplomatic isolation, and it is set to assume the SCO’s rotational chairmanship.
    4. A forum that could not agree on words: In June last year the SCO defence ministers could not agree on the references to terrorism in their joint statement.
    5. China’s financial weight: China possesses greater financial resources than any other member and is heavily investing in Central Asian infrastructure under the Belt and Road Initiative, which sets the forum’s centre of gravity.

    Why should bilateral ties be the objective inside a multilateral forum?

    1. Weight on individual partnerships: Given the forum’s limits, Delhi should place greater weight on its individual partnerships with member states.
    2. The Uzbekistan uranium agreement: The agreement with Uzbekistan on the long-term supply of uranium is a step in that direction.
    3. Multi-vector actors want options: Central Asian countries are emerging as multi-vector actors. They seek multiple options to improve market access rather than choosing between competing powers, and India should become one of those options.
    4. The forum as a venue: A multilateral forum like the SCO is best used to advance bilateral relationships, and that is the strategy to carry forward to BRICS as India prepares to host its 18th summit.

    Conclusion

    The SCO no longer delivers on India’s terrorism agenda, and geography limits what it can deliver on connectivity. What remains useful is the room the summit gives India to sign with individual member states. The test of that approach is whether the BRICS summit in New Delhi produces bilateral agreements of the Uzbekistan uranium kind rather than only a joint declaration.

    Back2Basics: Shanghai Cooperation Organisation

    1. Origin: Founded in 2001 in Shanghai, growing out of the Shanghai Five grouping of 1996 that settled border issues between China, Russia and three Central Asian states.
    2. Membership: Ten members, China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, India, Pakistan, Iran and Belarus. India and Pakistan joined in 2017, Iran in 2023 and Belarus in 2024.
    3. Structure: The Secretariat is in Beijing and the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure is in Tashkent. The chairmanship rotates annually among members, and the chair hosts the next summit.

    “[2026, GS2, 10 marks] “IPMDA (Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness) bridges the gap between India’s SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) vision and the Quad’s collective Indo-Pacific strategy.” Make a critical assessment of the statement focusing on IPMDA.”

  • Red label for salt, sugar and fat is a good start

    Red label for salt, sugar and fat is a good start

    Why in the News

    The Food Safety and Standards Authority of India (FSSAI) has proposed front-of-pack warnings (mandatory cautions printed on the front face of a packet, not in the nutrition table on the back) in the form of red hexagonal labels on packaged food high in sugar, refined carbohydrates, salt and unhealthy fats.

    Can a warning label change what people actually eat?

    1. The case for scepticism: Eating behaviour is complex and shaped by gender, economic wherewithal, awareness and faith-based restrictions, so a label competes with several stronger determinants of choice.
    2. The evidence from Chile: Chile recorded a 24 per cent drop in sugary drink consumption after it introduced black octagonal warning labels on packages in 2016, which shows that a clear front-of-pack warning can shift consumption.
    3. Why the earlier star design failed: An earlier FSSAI proposal for a health star rating was criticised because stars are perceived as positive. Warning labels bearing stars have been associated with increased consumption of unhealthy foods, so clarity and legibility decide whether a label warns or advertises.

    Why can a label be only one part of the response?

    1. A double burden: The obesity epidemic exists alongside malnutrition, so a policy that only discourages excess consumption addresses one half of India’s nutrition problem.
    2. The broader public-health response: The label must sit inside three further measures, raising nutritional awareness, stronger regulation of junk food, and nudges towards healthier lifestyles.
    3. What a label can honestly claim: A red label on a packet will not by itself make people eat better. Its value lies in making it easier to tell healthy choices from harmful ones at the point of purchase.

    Challenges to the front-of-pack warning label proposal

    1. No notification or timeline yet: The proposal has not been notified and the implementation timeline is still awaited, so the regulator’s intent has no legal force. Eg. FSSAI’s 2022 draft for an Indian Nutrition Rating star label was never operationalised and has now been replaced by this proposal.
      The Fix: Notify the regulation with dated phases so manufacturers and consumers have a fixed compliance calendar.
    2. A threshold that misses single-nutrient products: The first of two intended phases applies the label only where a product is high in two or more unhealthy ingredients, which leaves out products high in just one. Eg. A sweetened biscuit that is high in sugar but within limits for salt and fat would carry no warning in phase one.
      The Fix: Trigger the label on any single nutrient of concern crossing its limit, as Chile’s per-nutrient octagons do.
    3. A font too small to warn: The proposed font size may be too small to be effective, so the label could exist on paper without being seen on the shelf. Eg. Chile fixes a minimum size for each octagon relative to the pack face so it cannot be shrunk into the design.
      The Fix: Prescribe a minimum label area as a share of the front panel rather than a point size alone.

    Conclusion

    A warning label sorts products, it does not by itself change appetite. The Chilean result shows the sort is worth doing when the mark is unambiguous. What decides the outcome now is the notification: the date it is issued, whether phase one keeps the two-ingredient threshold, and whether the font is large enough to be read. Those three details are what to watch when FSSAI publishes the final regulation.

    Back2Basics: Food Safety and Standards Authority of India

    1. Statutory basis: FSSAI is a statutory body established under the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006, which consolidated earlier food laws into a single regulator.
    2. Ministry and location: It functions under the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare and is headquartered in New Delhi.
    3. Mandate: It lays down science-based standards for food articles and regulates their manufacture, storage, distribution, sale and import, including labelling and display rules.

    [2024, GS2, 15 marks] In a crucial domain like the public healthcare system, the Indian State should play a vital role to contain the adverse impact of marketisation of the system. Suggest some measures through which the State can enhance the reach of public healthcare at the grassroots level.”

  • Over 7,200 CBI cases under Prevention of Corruption Act pending trial, says CVC report

    Over 7,200 CBI cases under Prevention of Corruption Act pending trial, says CVC report

    Why in the News

    The Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) has reported in its annual report that over 7,200 cases investigated by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 were awaiting completion of trial at the end of 2025.

    Where does the anti-corruption pipeline stall?

    1. Trials run past two decades: More than 400 of the 7,229 pending Prevention of Corruption Act trials have been open for over 20 years.
    2. Appeals add a second backlog: 14,083 appeals, revisions and writ petitions under the Act were pending in the High Courts and the Supreme Court.
    3. Over a third of those are more than a decade old: 3,161 were 10 to 15 years old, 1,347 were 15 to 20 years old and 739 were over 20 years old.
    4. The wider trial load is larger still: Counting cases outside the Act, 11,510 CBI court cases were pending trial at the end of the year.

    What do the investigation and conviction figures show?

    1. Convictions improved: The conviction rate in CBI cases was 71.71 percent in 2025 against 69.14 percent in 2024.
    2. Investigation pendency is small by comparison: 755 corruption related cases were pending investigation, made up of 679 regular cases, 63 preliminary enquiries and 13 Lokpal references (cases the Lokpal has referred to the CBI for investigation).
    3. A year is the usual limit, and 274 cases crossed it: Of the 679 regular cases, 274 had been pending for over one year.
    4. The intake in 2025: The CBI registered 797 regular cases, 177 preliminary enquiries and recorded 31 Lokpal references during the year.

    What capacity does the vigilance system have?

    1. One in seven CBI posts is vacant: Against a sanctioned strength of 7,300, 1,088 posts were vacant, with the largest gap of 672 in the executive ranks.
    2. Departmental inquiries under the Commission: For officers under CVC jurisdiction, 1,460 departmental inquiries were in process during 2025 and 731 were completed.
    3. Inquiries outside its purview: For employees outside its jurisdiction, 9,883 inquiries were in process and 5,561 were completed.
    4. Complaint disposal kept pace: The Commission received 34,153 complaints in 2025 in addition to 1,260 carried forward from 2024, and disposed of 35,193.

    Challenges to prosecuting corruption under the Prevention of Corruption Act

    1. Sanction is a gate the executive controls: Section 19 requires the government’s sanction before a court can take cognisance against a public servant, and Section 17A, added by the Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act, 2018, requires prior approval even to begin an inquiry into a decision taken in official capacity. Eg. In Vineet Narain v Union of India (1997) the Supreme Court fixed a three month limit for sanction decisions, and the 2018 amendment wrote that limit, extendable by one month, into Section 19 itself.
      The Fix: Treat sanction as deemed granted when the statutory period lapses without a decision.
    2. Special courts are too few for the load: Section 3 of the Act requires trials before special judges, and the same judges carry other criminal work, so a corruption trial waits behind the general docket. Eg. In Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay v Union of India the Supreme Court in 2021 recorded 4,984 pending criminal cases against legislators and directed special courts to prioritise them.
      The Fix: Designate exclusive special judges for Prevention of Corruption Act trials in every district with a CBI court, with a monthly disposal target monitored by the High Court.
    3. State consent limits where the CBI can act: Under Section 6 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 the CBI needs a State’s consent to investigate within it, and a growing list of States has withdrawn general consent so every case needs a fresh order. Eg. West Bengal withdrew general consent in November 2018, and in 2024 the Supreme Court allowed the State’s suit against the Union over CBI investigations to proceed to trial.
      The Fix: Enact a standalone CBI statute defining its jurisdiction, as the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Personnel, Public Grievances, Law and Justice recommended in 2023.
    4. Deputation, not a cadre, staffs the agency: The CBI fills most executive posts by deputation from State police and central forces, so vacancies persist when States decline to release officers. Eg. In May 2013, during the coal block allocation hearing, the Supreme Court described the CBI as a “caged parrot” after the agency’s status report had been shared with the Law Minister.
      The Fix: Expand direct recruitment at the sub inspector and deputy superintendent levels and offer fixed tenure with cadre security to reduce reliance on deputation.

    Conclusion

    The Commission’s numbers show the agency’s work improving at the stages it controls and stalling at the stages it does not. The pendency now sits with the courts and the sanctioning authorities rather than with the investigators. The marker to watch is whether the next annual report shows the oldest trials closing rather than the backlog growing.

    Back2Basics: Central Vigilance Commission (CVC)

    1. Origin: Set up in 1964 on the recommendation of the Santhanam Committee on Prevention of Corruption, and made a statutory body by the Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003.
    2. Composition: A Central Vigilance Commissioner and up to two Vigilance Commissioners, appointed by the President on the recommendation of a committee of the Prime Minister, the Union Home Minister and the Leader of the Opposition in the Lok Sabha.
    3. Powers over the CBI: It exercises superintendence over the CBI’s investigations of offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act by virtue of Section 4 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946, and reviews the progress of those investigations.
    4. Reporting: It submits an annual report to the President, and the report is laid before both Houses of Parliament.

    [2026, GS2, 15 marks] “Transparency and accountability in governance are not about controlling corruption but about creating the trust of stakeholders in the policy process by following the Rule of Law and Participatory Governance.” Comment.”

  • SC seeks Centre’s response on use of ‘totalisers’ in EVM vote counting

    SC seeks Centre’s response on use of ‘totalisers’ in EVM vote counting

    Why in the News

    The Supreme Court has sought the Centre’s response on the use of “totalisers”, machines that consolidate and count votes from multiple electronic voting machine (EVM) control units at once without revealing booth-wise voting trends, as a “fall-back option”. The order came on a petition arguing that totalisers would protect voters’ privacy by concealing booth-wise voting patterns and shield them from reprisals. The Election Commission (EC) had warned the Court against the move, saying that introducing a new and unregulated mechanism at a time when the integrity of EVMs is itself under frequent public questioning could give rise to fresh allegations and controversy. The tension is between the voter’s privacy at the booth level and the booth-wise, machine-wise trail that the EC calls the backbone of a self-verifying count.

    What is a totaliser?

    1. What it does: A totaliser consolidates and counts votes from multiple EVM control units simultaneously, so the result is declared for the group rather than for each booth.
    2. How it connects: It links a cluster of 14 control units, from 14 polling stations, via a cable.
    3. What it outputs: It provides a consolidated result for each candidate across that group of EVMs, with no booth-wise breakdown.

    Why does the petitioner want totalisers?

    1. Privacy of the individual voter: Booth-wise results reveal how a locality voted, and the petitioner argued that totalisers would safeguard the privacy of individual voters.
    2. Protection from reprisals: Political parties victimise voters at the local level after identifying voting patterns in particular polling booths, and concealing the pattern removes the target.
    3. A fall-back, not a replacement: The Court framed the question to the Centre as one of a “fall-back option”, not a wholesale change in counting.

    On what legal and political grounds does the Election Commission object?

    1. The climate is wrong: The EC told the Court that the functioning and integrity of EVMs are still a subject of frequent public questioning, and that a new and as yet unregulated mechanism would further complicate public confidence in an already sensitive area.
    2. There is no law for it: Neither the Representation of the People Act, 1951 nor the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961 nor any allied enactment contains a provision recognising, regulating or governing the use of a totaliser in counting.
    3. Amendments would be needed: Substantive amendments and a revision of the statutory procedure governing the counting of votes would have to be made to include totalisers.
    4. Parties have said no: Three of six national parties and 18 of 29 State parties opposed the idea, and only the Law Commission of India, in its 255th report, suggested their selective use.

    Why does the Election Commission say totalisers would reduce transparency?

    1. Counting is witnessed booth by booth: Polling and counting are conducted in the presence of candidates and their agents.
    2. Form 17C is the reconciliation tool: Candidates and agents use Form 17C to match the vote count at the end of polling and again after counting at every polling station, and those comparisons are used in adjudications before election tribunals and courts.
    3. The trail is the backbone: The one-to-one, booth-wise and EVM-wise correspondence under Form 17C is what the EC calls the backbone of the self-verifying and transparent character of counting, and that transparency gives credence to the outcome.
    4. Parties use the pattern legitimately: Knowledge of booth-level voting lets parties improve outreach in booths where they underperformed and make corrective organisational decisions.
    5. Aggregation hides faults: Totalisers would mask technical malfunction and human error in individual EVMs, since clubbed machines stand concealed within the aggregate figure and cannot be identified or independently verified by any party.
    6. The main worry: The EC’s chief concern is that totalisers would become fodder for further misapprehension about EVMs.

    Challenges to introducing totalisers

    1. Machine-level verification would lose its anchor: The Court-ordered paper trail check works per machine, and an aggregated result has no machine to check against. Eg. Association for Democratic Reforms v. Election Commission of India (2024) required Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT) slips to be counted for five randomly selected EVMs per Assembly segment.
      The Fix: Keep the machine-wise VVPAT count and Form 17C reconciliation internal to the counting hall, and publish only the aggregated result.
    2. Small clusters still reveal patterns: In sparsely populated segments a cluster of 14 booths can map onto one or two villages, so aggregation does not conceal the locality’s vote. Eg. Hill and tribal constituencies routinely have polling stations serving a few hundred electors each.
      The Fix: Set the cluster size by elector count rather than by a fixed number of machines.
    3. The EC’s own position has moved: The Commission proposed totalisers to the Law Ministry in 2008 and the Law Commission endorsed selective use in 2015, so its present opposition invites the charge of inconsistency. Eg. The 255th report on electoral reforms cited the EC’s proposal when recommending the change.
      The Fix: Publish a reasoned position paper setting out what changed between the 2008 proposal and the present affidavit.

    Conclusion

    The Court has kept the question open and asked the Centre rather than deciding it. The next step is the Centre’s reply, and the source gives no date for it. The marker to watch is whether the Centre is willing to amend the election rules, since without that amendment the EC’s legal objection stands whatever the Court thinks of the privacy claim.

    Back2Basics: Form 17C

    1. What it is: The “Account of Votes Recorded” prepared by the presiding officer of each polling station under the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961.
    2. Part I: Records the identification numbers of the EVMs used, the total electors, the votes recorded in the machine and the number of tendered votes, and a copy goes to each polling agent at the close of poll.
    3. Part II: Records the result of counting for that machine, filled in at the counting centre and signed by the counting supervisor and candidates’ agents.
    4. Why it matters: It is the only document that lets a candidate compare votes polled at a booth with votes counted from that booth.

    [2026, GS2, 10 marks] Is the right to vote a fundamental right? Discuss the position of the Election Commission of India while undertaking the revision of electoral rolls. Can it also examine the question of citizenship of voters?”

  • Distinguished jurist: The unused route to appoint an SC judge

    Why in the News

    A sitting Supreme Court judge has called the “distinguished jurist” route to the Supreme Court under Article 124(3) an “unused mandate” of the Constitution that “needs our serious attention”. The provision has existed since the Constitution came into force, and in more than seven decades no one has been appointed under it. The judge argued that a jurist on the Bench would “diversify the Bench” and would not be “constricted by narrow technicalities”, leaving the Court better placed on public law questions. The tension is that the text permits the appointment while the process, a collegium of judges recommending candidates and Bar rules that keep academics out of practice, has never produced one.

    What is the distinguished jurist route under Article 124(3)?

    1. Three routes to the Court: Article 124(3) allows the appointment of a citizen of India who has served as a High Court judge for five years, practised as an advocate for ten years, or “is, in the opinion of the President, a distinguished jurist”.
    2. Two routes have staffed it: Most judges have been elevated from the High Courts, and a smaller number of lawyers have been appointed directly from the Bar.
    3. The third has never been used: No distinguished jurist has been appointed to the Supreme Court since 1950.

    Where did the clause come from?

    1. A Constituent Assembly amendment: H.V. Kamath moved the clause on 24 May 1949, arguing that the pool of candidates should not be “necessarily confined to Judges or Advocates”.
    2. The case he made: India needed a way to bring in men or women “possessed of outstanding legal and juristic learning” even if they had never practised law, and judges of the International Court of Justice at The Hague are chosen on similar terms.
    3. Ambedkar’s only reservation: B.R. Ambedkar did not object to the idea, wondered whether “eminent” would fit better than “distinguished”, and left the wording to the Drafting Committee, after which the amendment went through.
    4. The High Court parallel was repealed: The Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976, enacted during the Emergency, added a distinguished jurist route for High Court judges under Article 217, and the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978 removed it.

    What would a jurist on the Bench change?

    1. Diversity of the Bench: The judge’s argument is that a jurist brings a background the Court’s present composition, drawn from High Courts and the Bar, does not.
    2. Public law capacity: A jurist would not remain constricted by narrow technicalities and would be in a stronger position to deal with public law issues.
    3. Academia’s influence on judging: The participation of legal academia and scholars would have a defining impact on the judicial functioning of the Supreme Court.

    Why has the route never been used?

    1. Two explanations from the judge: First, the central government and later the collegium took the view that Indian academia lacks the depth for elevation to the Supreme Court; second, neither the central government nor the collegium has seriously explored the provision.
    2. Who counts as a jurist: The term is generally understood to cover anyone engaged in serious work in the practice, teaching or research of law, including those without courtroom experience.
    3. The Bar rules shut the practice door: Bar Council rules generally prevent full-time law teachers from practising law, so an academic cannot accumulate the ten years at the Bar that the second route needs.
    4. The collegium is the gate: Appointments are initiated through the collegium (the Chief Justice of India and the senior-most judges who recommend names), so a jurist must first be recommended by the Supreme Court collegium before the appointment reaches the government.
    5. The one near miss: Upendra Baxi recalled in 2015 being addressed as “Judge Baxi” by a professor whom Justice P.N. Bhagwati had told that Baxi would be made a judge within months, an appointment that never materialised.
    6. Baxi’s verdict: “The Presidents of India have been looking with a telescope and have not found any jurist worth appointing”, which led him to call the route “a dead issue”.
    7. The Bar route still works: The most recent appointment from the Bar was Justice V. Mohana, recommended by the collegium in May 2026 and sworn in the following month.

    Challenges to using the distinguished jurist route

    1. The collegium evaluates what it knows: A body of judges assesses candidates on judgments written and cases argued, which an academic does not have. Eg. The Memorandum of Procedure for Supreme Court appointments sets out consultation for High Court judges and advocates and carries no chapter on jurists.
      The Fix: Add published criteria for the jurist route to the Memorandum of Procedure, covering scholarship, public law expertise and professional standing.
    2. The President’s “opinion” has no test: The clause leaves the standard undefined, so any appointment invites challenge as arbitrary. Eg. Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India (2015) struck down the National Judicial Appointments Commission, leaving no body outside the judiciary to frame such a test.
      The Fix: Let the collegium adopt and publish a reasoned selection note for any jurist it recommends, as it now does for some elevations.
    3. Tenure would be short: A scholar considered at the age judges are elevated would retire at 65 within a few years, which limits the institutional gain. Eg. Justice Indu Malhotra, appointed from the Bar in 2018, served three years.
      The Fix: Consider jurists in their early fifties, matching the age at which High Court judges are elevated.
    4. The depth objection is asserted, not tested: The claim that Indian academia lacks depth has never been tested against a shortlist, and other supreme courts have seated academics without judicial or Bar seniority. Eg. The United States Supreme Court seated Felix Frankfurter from Harvard Law School in 1939 and Elena Kagan, who had never been a judge, in 2010.
      The Fix: Have the collegium consider a named shortlist of jurists at least once, so the objection rests on an assessment rather than an assumption.

    Conclusion

    The route is alive in the text and dead in practice, and the reason is procedural rather than constitutional. The status is a public call from within the Court, with no proposal from the collegium or the government to act on it. The marker to watch is whether the collegium or the Memorandum of Procedure names any criterion for the route, since without one the clause stays a dead letter.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2024, GS2, 15 marks] Explain the reasons for the growth of public interest litigation in India. As a result of it, has the Indian Supreme Court emerged as the world’s most powerful judiciary?”